FAULTLINES

The K.P.S. Gill Journal of Conflict & Resolution

Volume 25
 FAULTLINES
The K.P.S. Gill Journal of Conflict & Resolution
Volume 25

edited by
AJAI SAHNI

Kautilya Books
&
The Institute For Conflict Management
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The Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi
October 2019

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Faultlines: the k.p.s. gill journal of conflict & resolution
Edited by Ajai Sahni
 FAULTLINES - THE SERIES

FAULTLINES focuses on various sources and aspects

of existing and emerging conflict in the Indian subcontinent.
Terrorism and low-intensity wars, communal, caste and other
sectarian strife, political violence, organised crime, policing, the
criminal justice system and human rights constitute the central
focus of the Journal.
FAULTLINES is published each quarter by the INSTITUTE
FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT.
PUBLISHER & EDITOR
Dr. Ajai Sahni
ASSISTANT EDITOR
Dr. Sanchita Bhattacharya

EDITORIAL CONSULTANTS
Prof. George Jacob
Vijendra Singh Jafa
Chandan Mitra

The views expressed in FAULTLINES are those of

the authors, and not necessarily of the INSTITUTE FOR
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT. FAULTLINES seeks to provide
a forum for the widest possible spectrum of research and opinion
on South Asian conflicts.
 Contents

Foreword i
1. Buddha Goes to War 1
─ Ramananda Sengupta
2. Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview 31
─ Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul
3. Pakistan: Democratic Forces and the Deep State 89
─ Musa Khan Jalalzai
4. Is India ready to deal with Hybrid War? 111
─ Prakash Panneerselvam
5. Pakistan: The Role of Madrasas in Women’s
Empowerment 137
─ Kristie J. Krause
 Foreword

In every age, we have been reminded of the inherent and

extreme contradictions of war. The stresses of armed conflict
appear to bring out the best and the worst in mankind, at once
provoking unimaginable barbarities as well as a creative genius
that has spurred human knowledge, science and technology into the
realms of greatness; destroying the very foundations of morality
and social order, even as they inspire fundamental transformations
in values and establish new worlds of hope; stirring in the human
mind unequalled rapacity and inconceivable self-sacrifice, moral
collapse and spiritual exaltation.
And when war coalesces with religion – as it invariably
does throughout history – such contradictions are infinitely
compounded. All the great Faiths emphasise restraint, abnegation
and an inflexible morality above all concerns of profit, victory
and even survival. Yet all institutionalized Faiths have allied
themselves to stark power and pelf, and some of the greatest
atrocities of history – wars of aggression, rapine, genocide, slavery,
some of the vilest and most oppressive forms of discrimination
and oppression – each has been, at some time, validated by high
religious authority. A vast chasm has been created by ambition
and avarice, between the principles and the practice of religion.
The Gospel of Jesus Christ, for instance, the very foundation
of Christianity, preaches a radical pacifism. In the Sermon on
the Mount, Christ declares, “Do not resist the one who is evil.
But if anyone slaps you on the right cheek, turn to him the other
also.” And yet, it is in the name of Christ that the crusades were

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Ajai Sahni

launched and sustained over nearly four centuries. And where

Christ declared, “Let him who is without sin cast the first stone”,
the Catholic church inflicted the torments of the great Inquisition.
The Hindus speak of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, ‘the world is
one family’, but constructed the gross inequities of a vicious caste
system.
Islam, the Faithful remind us repeatedly, is a religion of peace.
And yet, today, violence and discord afflict almost every Muslim
majority state, and strife flows from these to impact much of the
world.
How could Buddhism be an exception? Despite occasionally
startling examples of commitment to the core tenet of Ahimsa or
non-violence against all living beings – perhaps embodied in the
life of the present (14th) Dalai Lama, Lhamo Thondup – Buddhist
communities and states have not been averse to war and violence.
And what brings violence to an end? India’s Northeast
has been a locus of chronic ethnic violence virtually since the
moment of the birth of the nation. A proliferation of insurgencies
have since afflicted much of the region but appear, now, to have
substantially burnt themselves out. While kinetic measures have
been integral to the state’s counter-insurgency responses in the
Northeast, a wide variety of non-kinetic strategies have also been
deployed. Prominent among these have been a diverse range of
peace initiatives, some of which have successfully ended specific
insurgencies, others that have limited or ended certain patterns of
violent action, and still others that have produced enduring, albeit
uncertain and fragile cessations of hostilities, and a restoration of
democratic processes and governance.
Separately, the state and its agencies may itself be the source
and cause of insurgent and terrorist violence, even as the shadowy
core of its power centre – the deep state – actively undermines and
‘manages’ democratic processes. This has certainly been the case
in Pakistan, where the military-madrasa-mullah nexus has come
to dominate the national imagination and democratic processes,

ii
 Foreword

though election after election has demonstrated the absence of

democratic support to this corrosive power cabal. Pakistan’s
history is a cautionary tale for others in the region and across the
world on how identity politics and militarism are an incendiary
mix, and not a force that can help cement nationhood.
But identity politics and a new legitimation of authoritarian
and communal politics is now a growing reality in India, and will
provide fertile ground for hostile states to exploit in new patterns
of disruption. The wars of the future are ‘hybrid’, exploiting a
range of instrumentalities well below the threshold of open war, to
inflict harm on the target state. India is already victim to corrosive
proxy wars and patterns of long-term subversion, and the scope
for injury is vastly augmented by the revolutionary technological
transformations of the past years, by globalization and the
integration of the communications and information technology
spectrum, and a progressive erosion of the distinctions between
the military and non-military spheres. All measures suggest that
India’s leaderships are yet to imagine the sheer magnitude of this
challenge, and a policy response remains well beyond the reach
or aspirations of the powers that be.
The madrasa has long been a favourite whipping boy in
the discourse on radicalization, extremism and terrorism, on the
one hand, while conservative Muslims insist that the institution
provides much-needed educational and welfare services,
particularly in societies where state systems fail to fulfil basic
obligations. Such a failure is acute with regard to the female
population in Pakistan, where state and public institutions have
systematically reinforced the disempowerment of women, and
where female education receives particularly low priority within
and dismal wider educational scenario. Empirical assessments
of the role and efficacy of madrasas are rare, and an evaluation
of the efficacy (or otherwise) of madrasas in promoting female
empowerment in Pakistan is of particular significance.

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Ajai Sahni

This volume explores these diverse themes in a continuing

effort to bring into critical focus elements of the complex dynamic
that produces, sustains, confronts and, on occasion, neutralizes
divergent patterns of conflict.

Ajai Sahni
October 28, 2019

iv
 Buddha Goes to War

Ramananda Sengupta∗

One of the fundamental tenets of Buddhism is ahimsa,

or non-violence. Yet the history of Buddhism is replete with
violence, committed not just by followers defending their
country or faith, but also for personal and political gains. While
many Tibetan Buddhists violently (and in vain) opposed the
Chinese after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) “liberated”
their country in 1950, Chinese and Japanese Buddhists have
often supported and justified extreme acts of violence down
the ages, including during World War II. And recently, there’s
been a rising spate of violence by Buddhists, including monks
in Myanmar, Thailand and Sri Lanka, who believe that their
religion is under threat. So what explains this massive gap
between perception and reality?
The Buddha was a wealthy Indian prince named Siddhartha
Gautama who lived around the 6th century BC. But struck by
the fact that life appeared to be an endless cycle of sorrow,
suffering and death, he became an ascetic in search of the
meaning of existence. After years of wandering around in
search of an answer, he achieved Nirvana (enlightenment)

* The author is a Foreign and Strategic Affairs analyst.

Ramananda Sengupta

after meditating for 49 days under a Bodhi tree, and became

the Buddha, or the enlightened or awakened one.
His teachings soon spread across India into China and Asia
and eventually around the world. Today there are an estimated
380 million practitioners of his faith, which essentially preaches
deep contemplation and compassion for all living things.
But the faith mutated along the way, and today the three
main denominations of Buddhism are Theravada, Mahayana,
and Vajrayana, each with several sub-sects. The Tibetan
sect falls undaer Vajrayana, while the numerous Mahayana
sects include Zen, Pure Land, Nicheran, Sokka Gokai, and
the Falun Gong, which rattled the Communist regime in
China. Theravada, practiced in South and Southeast Asia in
countries like Sri Lanka, Burma and Thailand, lays stress
on the monastic aspect of the religion, although monks have
joined political dispensations in places like Myanmar and Sri
Lanka. Mahayana, which means ‘large vehicle’, is practiced
in North, East and Southeast Asia in countries like China,
Korea, Vietnam and Japan, and stresses on Bodhicitta or the
awakened heart.
The Vajrayana or diamond (indestructible) vehicle comes
from the syncretism between Buddhism and the Hindu Tantric
Yoga, and it has many complicated practices and systems of
Bodhisattvas, Buddhas and Deities. Tibet, Nepal and Japan are
some countries where Vajrayana is practiced.
The faith also morphed “to include a pantheon of deities
in addition to Gautama Buddha. Those include numerous
bodhisattvas, the term for sage-like individuals who work
for the enlightenment of all sentient beings. In Theravada
Buddhism, practiced mainly in Southeast Asia, Gautama
Buddha is only the most recent of 28 Buddhas described in

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 Buddha Goes to War

holy texts. And then there are avatars, humans believed to be

incarnations of deities.”1
While some Buddhist texts do sanction taking human
lives in exceptional cases to protect the sangha or defend
the innocent, most (but not all) Theravada and Mahayana
Buddhists today reject even these justifications.2

“If You Meet the Buddha on the Road, Kill Him”

That was the intriguing title of a book by American
psychotherapist and author Sheldon Kopp, first printed in
1972.3 Subtitled “the pilgrimage of psychotherapy patients,”
the book comprises a number of short stories which dwell on
the ‘pilgrimage’ aspect of psychotherapy, and expounds on
Kopp’s belief that it’s the journey of life that matters, not the
destination. But apart from obliquely hinting that one needed to
believe in oneself and not blindly follow a Buddha, or anyone
else who claimed to have all the answers, the book doesn’t
quite explain why the Buddha, a symbol of non-violence, or
ahimsa, needs to be killed.
Kopp’s title may have been startling, but it was not original.
He was echoing Línjì Yìxuán, a Buddhist monk who founded
the Linji school of Zen Buddhism in late 9th century China.
According to Linji, “Followers of the Way [of Zen], if you want
to get the kind of understanding that accords with the Dharma,
never be misled by others. Whether you’re facing inward or
facing outward, whatever you meet up with, just kill it! If you

1 Dave Roos, “That Fat, Jolly Fella Isn’t Buddha”, August 24, 2018, https://
people.howstuffworks.com/that-fat-jolly-fella-isnt-buddha.htm.
2 Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, “Buddhism on Peace
and Violence”, https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/buddhism-on-
peace-and-violence.
3 Sheldon Kopp, If You Meet the Buddha on the Road, Kill Him!, Bantam
Books, New York, 1972.

3
Ramananda Sengupta

meet a buddha, kill the buddha. If you meet a patriarch, kill the
patriarch. If you meet an arhat, (someone who has, or is about
to achieve Enlightenment,) kill the arhat. If you meet your
parents, kill your parents. If you meet your kinfolk, kill your
kinfolk. Then for the first time you will gain emancipation,
will not be entangled with things, will pass freely anywhere
you wish to go...”4
Of course, Linji was not literally promoting mass murder,
parricide or the killing of whoever one came across in their
lives, but stressing, perhaps a bit dramatically, that true
salvation lay in understanding that anything, even the Buddha,
was an attachment that one needed to get rid of in order to
achieve true salvation.
However, the words “kill” and “Buddha” in the same
sentence are difficult to reconcile for most people for whom
Buddhism tops the list of all the ‘peaceful’, ‘non-violent’
religions in the world.
“The impression of Buddhist pacifism is so strong that it
has suggested to historians that it was a significant factor in
the downfall of Buddhism in India,”5 argues Stephen Jenkins,
Professor of Religion at Humboldt State University, whose
research is focused on Buddhist ethics, “Buddhist kings would
seem to be implicated in a hopeless moral conflict. No Kṛṣṇa
seems to rescue the Buddhist Arjuna from the disempowering
moral conflict that arises between a warrior’s duty and the
values of ahiṃsā (nonviolence).”6

4 Burton Watson, (trans.), The Zen Teachings of Master Lin-Chi: A

Translation of the Lin-chi lu, New York, Columbia University Press, 1999.
5 Stephen Jenkins, “Making Merit through Warfare and Torture According
to the Ārya-Bodhisattva-gocara-upāyaviṣaya-vikurvaṇa-nirdeśa Sūtra”,
2009,https://www.thezensite.com/ZenEssays/CriticalZen/Making_Merit_
Through_Warfare_and_Torture.pdf.
6 Ibid.

4
 Buddha Goes to War

Perhaps nothing embodies this non-violent image more

than the forever smiling Lhamo Thondup, or Tenzin Gyatso,
better known as the 14th Dalai Lama, the spiritual head of the
Tibetan Buddhists.
This is the same Dalai Lama who blessed Indian Army
Colonel Sonam Wangchuk a day before he led his unit of
Ladakh Scouts to take on Pakistani intruders in Kargil in late
May 1999. Three days later, battling extreme weather and
geographical conditions, Wangchuk’s 40-man unit attacked
and killed or evicted some 135 Pakistani soldiers who had
occupied Chorbat La, a strategic pass 5,141m (16,866 ft) high
in the Himalayas.
Colonel Wangchuk was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra,
India’s second highest military decoration, for his bravery.
Recalling that the meeting with the Dalai Lama before the mission
was mooted by a senior JCO, Wanchuk recalled in an interview
that his faith helped him tremendously: “We were given prasad
and sacred threads by him (the Dalai Lama). When you are alone
on the battle front far from loved ones it is only divine presence
that encourages you to go ahead and do your best.”7
So here we have a Buddhist warrior who has no trouble
reconciling his faith with his job, or as he describes it, his duty,
despite it entailing violence and killing. He’s not the only one.

The Secret War in Shangri La, or the Shadow Circus

In 1998, the BBC released a documentary titled The
Shadow Circus: The CIA in Tibet,8 which shattered the popular

7 “Kargil: How Sonam Wangchuk and 40 men defeated 135 Pakistani

troops”, Rediff, July 26, 2019, https://www.rediff.com/news/special/kargi
l-how-sonam-wangchuk-defeated-135-pakistanis/20190726.htm.
8 Tensing Sonam, “The Shadow Circus: The CIA in Tibet”, June 30, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R_5LOPYzddY.

5
Ramananda Sengupta

impression that the non-violent Tibetans allowed the People’s

Liberation Army to stroll into Lhasa in 1951 after half-hearted,
token resistance.
Produced by Tenzing Sonam, (whose father Lhamo Tsering
was a resistance leader) and his wife Ritu Sarin, the film uses
rare footage to vividly recount how a few thousand Tibetans
took on the mighty PLA for almost two decades. Outgunned
and outnumbered, they fought a violent and bloody guerrilla
battle on the roof of the world. And their unlikely, and in the
end, unreliable ally for much of the time was the American
Central Intelligence Agency.
The 50-minute documentary cites retired CIA veterans and
surviving Tibetan fighters to shed light on how Washington
funded and trained the resistance until it suddenly decided that
wooing Communist China made better sense.
According to intelligence documents declassified by
the US State Department in August 1998, the CIA budgeted
almost USD1.7 million a year through most of the 1960s
for the Tibetan resistance. Code named ST Circus, the top-
secret operation included covert training at a site in the
remote Colorado mountains (where Tenzing’s father went for
training) and later in Mustang, Nepal. It also involved supplies
for reconnaissance teams in Tibet and an annual subsidy of
USD180,000 for the Dalai Lama, who fled Tibet after an
unsuccessful uprising and took refuge in India in 1959. And
the ‘Tibetan cause’ was promoted through “Tibet Houses” set
up in New York and Geneva.9
According to one memo among the declassified US
documents, “The purpose of the program… is to keep

9 Jim Mann, “CIA Gave Aid to Tibetan Exiles in ‘60s, Files Show”, Los
Angeles Times, September 15, 1998, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-
xpm-1998-sep-15-mn-22993-story.html.

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 Buddha Goes to War

the political concept of an autonomous Tibet alive within

Tibet and among foreign nations, principally India, and to
build a capability for resistance against possible political
developments inside Communist China,”10 then under the iron
rule of Chairman Mao Zedong.
Warren W. Smith Jr., a research historian at Radio Free
Asia and author of several books on China’s control policies
in Tibet, asserts that Indian intelligence officials also set up a
secret Tibetan unit within the Indian Army, though declassified
US documents indicate that Tibetan leaders occasionally
complained to Washington about India’s half-hearted support.11
In Shadow Circus, Acho, an operative who was part of the
CIA sponsored outfit conducting raids into Tibet from Mustang,
vividly recounts one of the more “successful” raids, where 40
Tibetan horsemen ambushed a Chinese military convoy on the
Xinjiang-Lhasa highway in 1961:12 “The driver was shot in the
eye, his brains splattered behind him and the truck came to
a stop. The engine was still running. Then all of us fired at
it. There was one woman, a very high-ranking officer, with a
blue sack full of documents.”13 These documents later proved
to be treasure trove for US intelligence operatives desperate for
information on Mao’s China. But the graphic rendering of the
violence speaks for itself.
In his 1990 autobiography Freedom in Exile, the Dalai
Lama admits that two of his four elder brothers (Thubten J.
Norbu, who passed away in the US in September 2008, and
Gyalo Thondup, 91, who runs an ancient noodle making

10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Patrick French, “A Secret War in Shangri-La”, The Daily Telegraph,
November 14, 1998, https://info-buddhism.com/CIA_in_Tibet-A_Secret_
War_in_Shangri-La.html.
13 Ibid.

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Ramananda Sengupta

factory in the Indian hill town of Kalimpong), made contact

with the CIA during a trip to India in 1956.14
According to the Dalai Lama, the CIA’s decision to help
was “not because they cared about Tibetan independence, but
as part of their worldwide efforts to destabilize all Communist
governments... Naturally, my brothers judged it wise to keep
this information from me. They knew what my reaction would
have been.”15
China, however, insists that the Dalai Lama knew of the
operations right from the start, and accuses him of being a
“splittist” agent of foreign forces seeking to violently separate
Tibet from China.
Lamenting the CIA decision to train and equip Tibetan
guerrillas who conducted raids into Tibet from Mustang, the
Dalai Lama argues that this “only resulted in more suffering
for the people of Tibet. Worse, these activities gave the
Chinese government the opportunity to blame the efforts of
those seeking to regain Tibetan independence on the activities
of foreign powers – whereas, of course, it was an entirely
Tibetan initiative.”16
Notice, however, that he does not say that those seeking to
regain Tibetan independence should do so without violence.
Richard Nixon, who was elected President of the United
States in November 1968, decided to open up to China. But one of
Beijing’s pre-conditions for any formal talks was that all help to
Tibetans had to stop. In 1971, a year before Nixon and Chairman

14 Dalai Lama, Freedom in Exile, Harper Collins Publishing, San Francisco,

1991.
15 Jim Mann, “CIA Gave Aid to Tibetan Exiles in 60s, Files Show”, Los
Angeles Times, September 15, 1998, http://latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-
1998-sep-15-mh-22993-story.html.
16 Ibid.

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 Buddha Goes to War

Mao Zedong held their historic meeting in Beijing, the CIA

abruptly wound up its Tibetan operations. And in 1974, Nepal
bowed to Chinese pressure and sent its army to close the camps
in Mustang. When the Dalai Lama heard that the few remaining
rebels there were refusing to surrender, he sent a taped message
urging them to do so. Unable to handle the conflict between the
instructions of their spiritual head and the need to defend their
faith, many of the US trained rebels jumped into a raging river
and drowned. One senior officer slit his throat after handing
over his weapons, while another was ambushed and shot by the
Nepalese army. Tenzing argues, “These were men who had been
fighting the Chinese since the mid-Fifties, people who had grown
up with guns and knives, being asked to surrender their weapons
… It was the end of everything for them.”17
The two instances mentioned above – Colonel Wangchuk
and the Tibetan resistance – show that when it comes to
defending their nation, Buddhists have no qualms about
resorting to violence or going to war. The same logic applies
when it comes to defending their faith.
The cover of Buddhist Warfare18, a series of essays edited
by Michael K. Jerryson and Mark Juergensmeyer, has a
disquieting photograph of a youngster in maroon Buddhist robes
and shaved head standing on the bank of the mighty Irrawady –
brandishing a revolver. The essays not only document violence
down the ages by Buddhists of all hues – and there are many
– but also expose the deep symbiotic relationship between the
Buddhist clergy and several states which co-opt religion to
justify violence for political ends. This link between Buddhism
and aggressive political and military action are clearly visible

17 Patrick French, op. cit.

18 Michael K. Jerryson and Mark Juergensmeyer (eds.), Buddhist Warfare,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010.

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Ramananda Sengupta

in the large number of people who died in the wars between

Burma and Thailand, and in Cambodia.
And then of course there is the extreme brutality of
Japanese soldiers during their conquest of China, particularly
in Nanking in December 1937:
The Japanese invaders took full control of the city on
December 13. In seven short weeks, they engaged in
“an orgy of cruelty seldom if ever matched in world
history.” They brutally murdered, raped, and tortured as
many as 350,000 Chinese civilians. In this bloodbath,
more people died than at Hiroshima and Nagasaki
combined. For months, the city was filled with piles of
rotting corpses. Nearly 80,000 women were raped and
mutilated, many gang-raped. Soldiers disembowelled
women. Fathers were forced to rape their daughters,
sons their mothers. All manner of inhuman torture was
practiced without remorse. Children and the elderly
were not spared. Thousands of young men were
beheaded, burned alive, or used for bayonet practice.19
In his introduction to Buddhist Warfare, Jerryson says that
while “The motivations for this volume are many, but chief
among them is the goal of disrupting the social imaginary
that holds Buddhist traditions to be exclusively pacifistic and
exotic.”20 He then goes on to note:
The Indian Kālacakratantra describes an eschatological
war in which the army of the bodhisattva king of
Shambhala conquers and annihilates Muslim forces
and re-establishes Buddhism.21
19 Josh Baran, “Sword of Compassion?”, Tricycle, 1998, https://tricycle.org/
magazine/sword-compassion/.
20 Michael K. Jerryson and Mark Juergensmeyer, op. cit, p.3.
21 Schmithausen,Lambert, “Aspects of the Buddhist Attitude towards War,”
in E.M. Houben and K.R. Van Kooij (eds.), Violence Denied: Violence,

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 Buddha Goes to War

And in Japan, Zen became a mechanism of the state and

a motive to fight – to convert the heathens. Japanese
Buddhist military objectives in the early 1900s were to
kill unbelievers and to convert their state to Buddhism.
In accordance with Mahāyāna principles, people who
were not enlightened would be reborn; therefore, there
was no true destruction of life. Once the state became
Buddhist, unbelievers would be reborn in a Buddhist
country. Brian Victoria writes that, in this context
of Buddhist war, murder becomes a form of upāya
(skillful means), since sentient beings are ultimately
saved. When Buddhist states have attempted to
preserve Buddhist principles and values, popular
forms of Buddhist nationalism and fundamentalism
have been simultaneously elicited.22
In his subsequent essay, Jerryson brings out the link
between violence and the role of monks as a political symbol in
Buddhist countries, and suggests that attacks – real or perceived
– on monks could be one of sparks, triggering violent acts of
Buddhist retaliation.
Any “view of an authentic early Buddhism” that rejected
violence “flies in the face of reality” since “Buddhism has
always been closely associated with rulers” and was “an
instrument of power,” asserts Bernard Faure, Kao Professor of
Japanese Religion at Columbia University, in another essay.23
The role of Chinese Buddhists who enthusiastically
endorsed and supported the Korean War effort to ingratiate

Non-Violence and the Rationalization of Violence in South Asian Cultural

History, Brill, Leiden, 1999, p. 58.
22 Michael K. Jerryson and Mark Juergensmeyer, op. cit. p. 9.
23 Faure, Bernard, “Concluding Remarks: Afterthoughts”, in Michael K.
Jerryson and Mark Juergensmeyer (eds.), Buddhist Warfare, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 216-217.

11
Ramananda Sengupta

themselves with the Communist state is brought out by Xue

Yu, author of Buddhism, War and Nationalism. In this case,
“patriotism served almost as a new religion.”24
Among the other essayists in Buddhist Warfare, Brian
Daizen (Andre) Victoria, professor of Japanese studies at
Antioch University and the director of the Antioch Education
Abroad Buddhist Studies in Japan, is the only one who asserts
that the “soldier-Zen” in Imperial Japan “so grievously violated
Buddhism’s fundamental tenets that the school was no longer
an authentic expression of the Buddhadharma”.25 According
to him , the clear alignment of Buddhists with state interests
was so clearly evident in Imperial Japan, and proved that the
“sangha has become corrupt and degenerate,” adopting a
“slavish subservience” and “becoming the de facto pimp and
prostitute of the state.”26
In his 1999 dissertation, Zen and Japanese Militarism:
A Critical Inquiry into the Roots of “Imperial Way-Zen,
Victoria dwells on “the way in which institutional Buddhism
became ever more tightly interwoven with, and supportive
of, the government’s ongoing expansionist policies on the
Asian continent, especially in Korea and northern China,”
and “the increasing role played by leaders of both the Rinzai
and Soto Zen sects within institutional Buddhism in justifying
the identification of Buddhist doctrine and practice with a
martial spirit and warfare.”27 Further, “What becomes clear is
24 Xue Yu, Buddhism, War, and Nationalism: Chinese Monks in the Struggle
Against Japanese Aggression 1931-1945, Routledge, New York, 2005, p.
151.
25 Victoria, Brian Andre, “A Buddhological Critique of ‘Soldier Zen’ in
Wartime Japan”, in Michael K. Jerryson and Mark Juergensmeyer (eds.),
Buddhist Warfare, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 106.
26 Ibid, p. 128.
27 Brian Andre Victoria, “Zen And Japanese Militarism: A Critical Inquiry
Into The Roots Of “Imperial Way-Zen”, Temple University Graduate

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 Buddha Goes to War

the manner in which these ostensibly religious efforts were in

reality merely one aspect of the Japanese government’s attempt
to win the allegiance and acquiescence to its rule of its colonial
subjects...”28
The irony of images of Avalokiteshvara, the Buddhist
embodiment of compassion, adorning Japanese Kamikaze
aircraft during World War II, or the Pure Land Buddhist
monks arguing that the war was necessary to preserve ‘true’
Buddhism, is hard to miss.
More than 4,000 kilometres southeast of Japan lies
Myanmar, a predominantly Buddhist nation in the news today
for its brutal suppression of Rohingya Muslims. Earlier known
as Burma, Myanmar is the northernmost country of Southeast
Asia. Flanked by China in the north, Laos and Thailand in
the east and southeast, Bangladesh and India in the west and
northwest and the Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal to the
south and southwest, it is the 26th most populous country in
the world, and the 40th largest country by area, with a 2019
estimated population of 54.34 million.
Almost 90 per cent of this population practices Theravada
Buddhism, which adheres closely to the oldest Buddhists texts
and stresses on a rigorous observance of the monastic code.
Christians comprise 6.2 per cent of the population, Muslims
4.3 per cent, Animists 0.8 per cent and Hindus 0.5 per cent.
The Muslims are primarily concentrated in the Rahkine state
on the Bay of Bengal, with the port city of Sittwe as its capital.
Buddhism has been the state religion of Burma beginning
with the Kingdom of Bagan in the 11th century, and the Faith
has been used to consolidate the national identity since then.

Board, December 1, 1995, pp. 13-14, https://terebess.hu/zen/mesterek/

Victoria-Zen-Militarism.pdf.
28 Ibid.

13
Ramananda Sengupta

Subsequently, most Burmese kings and rulers supported the

Buddhist Sangha – or the monastic order – which in turn gave
the ruling dispensation some legitimacy. While encouraging
nationalism, the Sangha, which had immense moral authority,
also ensured that the country was run according to ‘Buddhist’
principles.
In the mid-16th century, King Bayinnaung waged relentless
wars to acquire huge chunks of territory, and probably under
pressure from the Sangha, imposed restrictions on Muslims.
When he died in 1581, his kingdom included large chunks of
Laos and Thailand, then known as Siam. Things started falling
apart soon after his death, and the kingdom started eroding
politically and physically.
Muslim sailors and traders from the Arab world as well
as from neighbouring India started settling in Rakhine (then
known as Arakan) around the 9th century. But many local
Buddhists felt threatened by the newcomers and their alien
culture, and there were several clashes between the two. In
1785, Burmese Buddhists from the south attacked and annexed
Arakan, killing most Muslim Rohingya men and driving the
others into neighbouring Bengal, then under British rule.
After the first Anglo Burmese War (1824-1826), the
British seized Arakan and encouraged Muslim farmers from
Bengal, including Rohingyas, to settle there, again fuelling
local resentment.
After two more wars, in 1853 and in 1886, the British
captured Burma and started bringing in more Hindus and
Muslims from India to fill government jobs. The Buddhist
monks – who thus lost their exalted position in the state as well
as a large chunk of their revenue – were at the forefront of the
protests against colonial rule as well as the influx of Indians,
and many took part in violent protests in 1930 and 1938.

14
 Buddha Goes to War

The riots in 1938 had another trigger, “A book published

by an Indian Muslim author, reprinted with an attachment
containing ‘highly disparaging references to Buddhism’.”29
It is unclear whether religious or political provocateurs
added this attachment, but it further inflamed communal and
religious tensions. Demonstrators including monks demanded
that the author be punished; if not, they threatened to treat
Muslims as “enemy number one” and take action to “bring
about the extermination of Muslims and the extinction of their
religion and language.”30 At this stage, “Some monasteries
became armed sanctuaries and storage space for loot, contrary
to monastic rules. More than 4,000 people were arrested,
including monks accused of violence, arson and murder.”31 A
colonial British inquiry into the 1938 riots noted, “One of the
major sources of anxiety in the minds of a great number of
Burmese was the question of the marriage of their womenfolk
with foreigners in general and with Indians in particular.”32
Further, Randy Rosenthal, an editor and writing instructor
at Harvard University who specialises in Buddhist studies and
literature, asserts,
An important contributing factor to the current crisis
in Rakhine occurred during WWII. Under Japanese
occupation, Buddhists in Rakhine (then called
Arakan) were recruited to fight as proxies for the
Japanese… Local Muslims, in contrast, were armed

29 “Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar”, ICG Report No. 290/Asia,

September 5, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myan
mar/290-buddhism-and-state-power-myanmar.
30 Ibid.
31 Mikael Gravers, “Anti-Muslim Buddhist Nationalism in Burma and Sri
Lanka”, Contemporary Buddhism, Volume 16, Number 1, 2015, pp. 1-27.
32 Burma Riot Inquiry Committee, Interim Report, Rangoon, Superintendent,
Government Printing and Stationery, Burma, 1939.

15
Ramananda Sengupta

and mobilized by the British as independent militias

who performed guerrilla-attacks on Japanese forces.
This meant that Buddhists and Muslims were fighting
against each other, which resulted in the groups
becoming geographically separated and “ghettoized,”
with Muslims fleeing north to avoid the anti-Muslim
violence of the Japanese offensives, and Buddhists
fleeing south to avoid the anti-Buddhist violence of
the guerrilla counter-offensives. After the war, waves
of government violence against Rohingya occurred
in 1954, 1962 (during the military takeover), 1977-
78 (when the military forced the Rohingya to carry
Foreign Registration Cards, and over 200,000 were
driven into Bangladesh), 1992, 2001 (in response to the
Taliban’s destruction of Buddhist statues in Bamiyan),
and 2003.33
The fact that the Rohingya Muslims lobbied for a separate
Rakhine state towards the end of World War II, as well as after
the British left in 1948, did not help matters. Describing them
as ‘stateless Bangladeshis’, all the subsequent dispensations
have refused to recognise them as Burmese citizens.
The military, which ruled Myanmar in some form or the
other from 1962 to 2011, constantly fuelled the notion of the
country and its religion being in danger from “outsiders.”34

33 Randy Rosenthal, “What’s the connection between Buddhism and ethnic

cleansing in Myanmar?”, November 13, 2018, https://www.lionsroar.com/
what-does-buddhism-have-to-do-with-the-ethnic-cleansing-in-myanmar/.
34 Interestingly, one of the finest accounts of the Muslims in Myanmar was
written by Moshe Yegar, an Israeli diplomat who served in Rangoon in the
early 1960s. His MA thesis, titled “The Muslims of Burma: A Study of
Minority Group,” published in 1972 is probably one of the best works on
the subject.

16
 Buddha Goes to War

The transition to democracy in 2011 didn’t change much.

Today, while Myanmar has no official religion, powerful
elements in the new government support blatantly anti-Muslim
Buddhist outfits with immense grass-roots support, such as the
969 movement and the Amyo Barthar Thathanar (Organisation
to Protect Race and Religion), better known by the Burmese
acronym Ma Ba Tha.
Popular and powerful monks like Ashin Wirathu, the
spiritual leader of the 969 movement and head of the Ma
Ba Tha, and his followers feed and promote the narrative
that Muslims (or Chittagong Bengalis) from Bangladesh had
sneaked in not just to dilute and erode the local Buddhist culture
and population, but are part of a crusade to turn Myanmar into
a Muslim nation. Describing mosques as enemy bases, these
two outfits have publicly urged Buddhists to boycott Muslim
shops and shun interfaith marriages.
“Some Buddhist leaders have justified violence against non-
Buddhists,” an article in the South China Morning Post notes,
Sitagu Sayadaw is one of the most respected religious
leaders in Myanmar, known for his teachings and for
his philanthropic work. In a recent sermon, he clearly
intended to suggest that the killing of those who are
not Buddhist is justified on the grounds that those
who do not follow Buddhist precepts and do not take
refuge in the Buddha, his teachings and the monastic
community, are less than human. Violence is justified
if those persecuted are not Buddhists.35

35 Paul Fuller, “Blood sutra: whatever happened to Buddhism, religion of

peace and compassion?”, This Week in Asia, June 23, 2018, https://www.s
cmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/2152083/blood-sutra-whatever-
happened-buddhism-religion-peace-and.

17
Ramananda Sengupta

The current Rohingya crisis was sparked by the gang

rape and murder of a young Rakhine woman in May 2012 by
three Muslims, which spiralled into massive clashes between
Muslims and Buddhists, often abetted by local security forces,
which used reports that the Muslims were jihadis planning
terrorist strikes in the country as an excuse. The anti-Muslim
violence spread beyond the Rakhine state and Rohingya to
Meiktila in central Myanmar, where a mosque was burnt down
and over a 100 killed.
Ashin Wirathu, a seemingly unassuming monk of the
Masoeyein Monastery, who was featured on the cover of
Time magazine as “the Face of Buddhist Terror” in July 2013,
insists that his movement is a peaceful one. But in his talks,
he often stresses that Buddhism, which once extended all the
way from Afghanistan in the West to Japan in the East, faces
an existential threat from a rising Islam. He cites the razing of
the Buddhist library in Nalanda/Bihar at the end of the 12th
century, the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddha by the Taliban
in Afghanistan in 2001, and points out that Indonesia, once a
Hindu and Buddhist nation, has since ‘fallen’ to Islam, while
the Philippines is grappling with violent jihadists. Myanmar,
he asserts, is next. “I am only warning people about Muslims.
Consider it like if you had a dog that would bark at strangers
coming to your house – it is to warn you. I am like that dog.
I bark,”36 he asserts. What his followers do after he barks, he
says, is not his problem.
This key fault-line between Buddhism and Islam is also
visible in Thailand, and further west in the tiny island of Sri

36 Marella Oppenheim, “Ashin Wirathu – ‘It only takes one terrorist’: the
Buddhist monk who reviles Myanmar’s Muslims”, The Guardian, May
12,2017, https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2017/may/12
/only-takes-one-terrorist-buddhist-monk-reviles-myanmar-muslims-
rohingya-refugees-ashin-wirathu.

18
 Buddha Goes to War

Lanka, both countries where militant Buddhist outfits have

forged linkages with the Ma Ba Tha and 969 movement of
Myanmar. The growing Islamophobia worldwide after the 9/11
attacks and the rise of Muslim terror outfits like the Islamic
State (formerly Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham, ISIS; also,
Daesh) wanting to turn the world into an Islamic caliphate,
have further fuelled the ranks of Buddhists believing that they
face a major threat. Social media is vigorously used to promote
and build on these fears.

Soldiers in Saffron
In January 2019, General Apirat Kongsompong, the
Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army, announced
that he planned to have some of his soldiers ordained into the
monkhood and assigned to posts in temples.37
This unusual announcement came days after a group of
armed men stormed Wat Rattananuparb, a Buddhist temple
in Sungai Padi District of the southernmost Thai province
of Narathiwat, killing the abbot and three other monks, on
January 18, 2019. While no one claimed responsibility, Muslim
separatists increasingly active in the region were suspected to
be behind the incident.
Narathiwat is one of Thailand’s three southernmost
provinces (the others being Yala and Pattani) which have
Muslim majorities in the Buddhist-dominated country. The
three provinces and a small part of neighbouring Songkhla
were part of a Malay sultanate annexed by Thailand in 1909,
and tensions have simmered ever since. On the same day
that the Narathiwat temple was stormed, a roadside bombing

37 Narong Nuansakul, “Army plans to have soldiers ordained, posted to

temples in troubled South: Army chief”, The Nation Thailand, January 22,
2019, https://www.nationthailand.com/breakingnews/30362720.

19
Ramananda Sengupta

wounded five soldiers and a shootout between paramilitary

rangers and Muslim rebels left one of the gunmen dead. Days
earlier, a local Imam was shot dead, while four civil defense
volunteers were killed in a drive-by shooting on January 10, in
the neighbouring Pattani province.38
The violence in the south has been described as one of the
deadliest low-intensity conflicts on the planet, with more than
7,000 people killed and over 11,000 injured since 2004.
According to the Thai Foreign Ministry, there are
approximately 7.5 million Thai Muslims in the Kingdom or
about 12 per cent of the total 62.5 million Thai population,
While the majority of them are Sunnis, there are a few Shias
and followers of Wahhabi sects too.
The social characteristics of the area are those of
Malay Muslims, who form the majority of the people
in the society and live in harmony with ethnic Thai
and Chinese minorities. At present, there are about
1.4 million Thai Muslims in the three provinces,
which accounts for 18 per cent of the Thai Muslim
population…39
The ministry however insists that the problems in the
three southern provinces are in general similar to those
existing in other remote provinces of other regions in
Thailand. They include poverty, underdevelopment,
unemployment, low education, as well as discrimination

38 “Thailand: Suspected Muslim rebels storm temple, kill monks”, Taiwan

News, January 19, 2019, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/
3621056.
39 “Muslims in Thailand”, Royal Thai Embassy, Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, 2017, http://www.thaiembassy.org/riyadh/en/organize/29025-Mus
lim-in-Thailand.html.

20
 Buddha Goes to War

from corrupt and misbehaving officers. However, due

to the specific social and cultural conditions of the
South, these problems have been used as a pretext
for creating divisions and attempting to separate the
three southern provinces from the rest of Thailand by
claiming the history of semi-autonomous Pattani over
100 years ago.40
The stark differences in culture, language and customs in
the southern provinces have often led to friction, even though
the government insists that these are more due to economic
and cultural reasons rather than religious. It argues that though
several separatist movements have tried to exploit these ethnic,
religious and linguistic faultlines, they have been unsuccessful
because their violent activities have undermined public safety
and security.41
In late October 2015, Apichart Punnajanto, the monk
who headed Bangkok’s Wat Benchamabophit Dusitwanaram,
popularly known as the Marble Temple, urged his followers on
Facebook to burn one mosque to the ground for every Buddhist
monk killed in the Deep South.
Though the offensive post was quickly pulled down by the
government, Phra (a prefix loosely translated as ‘Venerable’)
Apichart Punnajanto, then 30, remained unrepentant. The
death of a single monk should be considered a religious attack,
he said in interview to Newsweek. “I was stressed before,
when monks got killed and injured,” he added. “Now it’s past
that point—no stress, just revenge. This is why I said those
things about burning the mosques: because I want revenge.”
Punnajanto’s idol, according to the Newsweek report, “is

40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.

21
Ramananda Sengupta

Myanmar’s firebrand monk U Wirathu, whose anti-Muslim

rhetoric helped stoke deadly riots in 2012 and 2013.”42
Punnajanto declares, “What I want to do is to make
Buddhists who are still sleeping and think things are beautiful,
I want to make them aware of what’s going on. Muslims aren’t
trying to invade just the three [southern] provinces; they are
trying to occupy the whole country.”43
Bangkok-based security analyst at IHS-Jane’s, Anthony
Davis, observes, “There is a growing strain of anti-Muslim
sentiment within the Buddhist sangha [monastic community]
in Thailand…This thing isn’t some nasty little insect hidden
away under a rock, it’s becoming mainstream.”44
Several rounds of talks between the government and the
rebels, including the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) have
failed a Patani separatist movement in northern Malaysia and
Southern Thailand, and the violence continues.
An AFP report on July 25, 2019, a day after Muslims rebels
armed with grenades attacked a military outpost in Pattani
and killed four soldiers before escaping with several machine
guns, noted, “Insurgents operating in small, secretive village-
level cells carry out near-daily bomb attacks and shootings in
Thailand’s south – including the murder of Buddhist civilians
and Muslims perceived to be collaborating with the state.”45

42 Abby Seiff and Rin Jirenuwat, “A Thai Monk Is Using Social Media to
Preach Violence Against Muslims”, Newsweek, April 4, 2016, https://
www.newsweek.com/2016/04/15/thailand-monk-apichart-social-media-
muslim-violence-443698.html.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 “4 killed as Thai rebels hit military base”, The Straits Times, July 25,
2019, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/4-killed-as-thai-rebels-hit
-military-base.

22
 Buddha Goes to War

Trouble in Paradise: Sri Lanka’s other war

The resignation of all nine Muslim Parliamentarians and
two provincial governors in Sri Lanka after the coordinated
bombings of Churches and hotels on Easter Sunday (April 21,
2019), exposed the deepening fault lines between the majority
Sinhala Buddhists and the small Muslim community in Sri
Lanka. Over 250 people were killed and hundreds injured in
the attacks, claimed by Daesh (Islamic State).
The resignations came after Athuraliye Rathana, a powerful
hardline Buddhist monk, lawmaker and adviser to President
Maithripala Sirisena, went on a hunger strike demanding the
removal of the two governors and a minister he accused of
having links with the suicide bombers. The other eight Muslim
ministers resigned in solidarity.
The links between the Buddhist clergy and politicians in
Sri Lanka is overt, with many monks not just supporting, but
joining nationalist political parties.
In March 2018, communal riots broke out in the eastern
town of Ampara and subsequently spread to nearby Kandy.
This followed a video purportedly showing a Muslim
restaurant owner from the town admitting that the food he
served Sinhalese was mixed with “sterilisation pills,” which
went viral on social media,46 and the death of a Sinhalese truck
driver who was assaulted by four Muslim men.47

46 Janet Guyon, “In Sri Lanka, Facebook is like the ministry of truth”, Quartz.
com. April 22, 2018 https://qz.com/1259010/how-facebook-rumors-led-
to-real-life-violence-in-sri-lanka/.
47 “Sri Lanka declares state of emergency after Buddhist-Muslim clash”,
Reuters, March 6, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-
clashes/sri-lanka-declares-state-of-emergency-after-buddhist-muslim-
clash-idUSKCN1GI0WG.

23
Ramananda Sengupta

Angry Sinhalese mobs attacked Muslim establishments

and mosques, and the latter responded in kind. At least two
people were killed and scores hurt, and government declared
an emergency to stem further violence.48 There were disturbing
reports however that the local administration and the police
had overtly sided with the Sinhalese.49
Therevada Buddhists, who comprise almost 75 per men cent
of the population, monopolise the country and treated minorities
(Hindus 12.6 per cent, Muslims 9.7 per cent and Christians
7.6 per cent) condescendingly even during the British Colonial
rule. After independence in 1948, the government’s attempts to
impose Buddhism by incorporating it into the constitution and
enforcing the use of Sinhala as the official language angered
the minorities, and sparked a violent movement for a separate
homeland for Tamils, who live principally in the north and east
of the island. The ensuing civil war, which began in the early
1980s, saw the Sinhalese, including monks, using Buddhist
religious texts to justify attacks on Tamils. Just like India’s
predominantly Buddhist Ladakh Scouts, the mostly Buddhist
Sri Lankan Army found solace – and perhaps justification for
their violence – in their religion. The war finally ended in 2009,
after a massive military offensive and the killing of Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) chief Velupillai Prabhakaran.
But, as the recent accusations which led to the resignation
of all Muslim ministers clearly show, the Buddhist hardliners
were quick to shift their target.

48 “Sri Lanka violence: Nationwide state of emergency lifted”, BBC, March

18, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43446239.
49 Tom Allard and Shihar Aneez, “Police, politicians accused of joining Sri
Lanka’s anti-Muslim riots”, Reuters, March 25, 2018, https://www.reute
rs.com/article/us-sri-lanka-clashes-insight/police-politicians-accused-of-jo
ining-sri-lankas-anti-muslim-riots-idUSKBN1H102Q.

24
 Buddha Goes to War

Apart from the hardline Jathika Hela Urumaya founded by

Athuraliye Rathana, the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS, also known
as Buddhist Power Force) is another outfit which has been
in the forefront of the anti-Muslim violence in Sri Lanka. In
2013, the outfit, said to have links with the Ma Ba Tha and 969
movement of Myanmar, ran a virulent campaign demanding
the boycott of stores selling halal-certified meat, alleging
that Muslims were illegally slaughtering young calves. It
also claimed that the All Ceylon Jamiyyathul Ulama, which
certifies halal products, was plotting to bring about Sharia law
in Sri Lanka.
Other Sri Lankan Buddhist nationalist organisations such
as the Sinhala Ravaya (The Roar of the Sinhalese and the
Ravana Balaya (Ravana’s Force), have also got a shot in the
arm with the Easter Sunday massacre, and the now familiar
narrative about the “Muslim problem” has grown stronger.

The Gods of War

No paper on Buddhist violence would be complete without
referring to the self-immolation by hundreds of Tibetan monks
and nuns in Tibet and China, and some in India and Nepal.50
While insisting that he does not encourage such violence
against the self, the Dalai Lama has praised the courage of
these protesters. After initially blaming the “cultural genocide”
unleashed by the Chinese for these acts, he later said he wanted
to remain neutral on the issue.
In Vietnam, Mahayana Buddhist monk Thích Quảng Đức
burned himself to death at a busy Saigon road intersection
on June 11, 1963, to protest against persecution by the South
Vietnamese regime. He was followed by five other monks.

50 “Self-Immolation Fact Sheet”, International Campaign for Tibet, https://

savetibet.org/tibetan-self-immolations/.

25
Ramananda Sengupta

Today, the communist regime in Vietnam allows Buddhists to

practice but watches them warily to ensure that radicals from
neighbouring nations do not vitiate the atmosphere.
Even though none of the main religions of the world
promote violence at a philosophical level, Faith has often been
used to justify war and violence down the ages.
A ‘War Audit’ commissioned for the BBC programme
What the World Thinks of God noted, in 2004,
All advocate peace as the norm and see genuine
spirituality as involving a disavowal of violence. It is
mainly when organised religious institutions become
involved with state institutions or when a political
opposition is trying to take power that people begin
advocating religious justifications for war.51
A section of the War Audit, devoted to the situation in
the first years of the 21st century, “looks at the most recent
examples of serious religion related violence: inter-communal
violence in Gujarat in India and Al Qaida’s war on the USA and
its allies,” and examines “the three different fundamentalisms
on show in these cases: Hindu, Muslim and Christian.”52
A subsequent section,
…asks whether it is possible to identify a list of states
that are most likely to go to war by invoking the name
of God. It notes the difference in the disposition to war
in the name of God between these states and secular
or atheistic states, such as China. A genuinely secular
(atheistic) state may be less inclined to go to war than a
state in which religion is very prominent, as long as the
51 Greg Austin, et. al. “God And War: An Audit & An Exploration”, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/world/04/war_audit_pdf/pdf/war_audit.
pdf.
52 Ibid.

26
 Buddha Goes to War

secular state is one which is not pursuing a millenarian

or totalitarian ideology (such as Communism or
Nazism) and as long as the state is one in which
pluralism and tolerance of diversity are the norm.53
Buddhism, is referred to only in a footnote in the War
Audit, but it is an interesting one:
Buddhism does not support war or any type of violence;
none of the Buddhist scriptures advocate the use of
violence as a means to resolve conflict or as a way of
life. One of Buddha’s sermons powerfully illustrates
Buddhism’s commitment to non-violence: ‘Even
if thieves carve you limb from limb with a double-
handed saw, if you make your mind hostile you are not
following my teaching.’ ‘Hatred is never appeased by
hatred in this world; it is appeased by love.’54
Non-violence, it adds, is at the heart of Buddhism. Indeed,
the first of five precepts of Buddhism states: ‘I shall undertake
to observe the precept to abstain from harming living beings’.55
Neuroscientist, philosopher, and author Sam Harris
has no such illusions. In “Killing the Buddha”56 he argues
that Buddhism’s philosophy, insight and practices would
benefit more people if they were not presented as a religion.
The Chinese Buddhist monk Línjì Yìxuán’s exhortation to
“Kill the Buddha” should be taken seriously, he says. “...as
students of the Buddha, we should dispense with Buddhism.”57

53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Sam Harris, “Killing the Buddha”, Shambhala Sun, March 19, 2006,
https://samharris.org/killing-the-buddha/.
57 Ibid.

27
Ramananda Sengupta

Buddhism is not spared in his long listing of recent religious

violence, although he cites only the instance of Sri Lanka.
Incompatible religious doctrines have balkanized
our world into separate moral communities, and
these divisions have become a continuous source of
bloodshed. Indeed, religion is as much a living spring
of violence today as it has been at any time in the past…
The recent conflicts in Palestine (Jews vs. Muslims),
the Balkans (Orthodox Serbians vs. Catholic Croatians;
Orthodox Serbians vs. Bosnian and Albanian Muslims),
Northern Ireland (Protestants vs. Catholics), Kashmir
(Muslims vs. Hindus), Sudan (Muslims vs. Christians
and animists), Nigeria (Muslims vs. Christians),
Sri Lanka (Sinhalese Buddhists vs. Tamil Hindus),
Indonesia (Muslims vs. Timorese Christians), Iran
and Iraq (Shiite vs. Sunni Muslims), and the Caucasus
(Orthodox Russians vs. Chechen Muslims; Muslim
Azerbaijanis vs. Catholic and Orthodox Armenians)
are merely a few cases in point. These are places where
religion has been the explicit cause of literally millions
of deaths in recent decades.”58
In his underground bestseller titled Skinny Legs and All,
author Tom Robbins has another take on religion.
Religion is nothing but institutionalised mysticism.
The catch is, mysticism does not lend itself to
institutionalisation. The moment we attempt to organise
mysticism, we destroy its essence. Religion, then, is
mysticism in which the mystical has been killed. Or,
at least diminished... not only is religion divisive and
oppressive, it is also a denial of all that is divine in
people; it is a suffocation of the soul… religion is a
58 Ibid.

28
 Buddha Goes to War

paramount contributor to human misery. It is not

merely the opium of the masses, it is the cyanide.59
On a lighter note, perhaps it is time to clear another
misconception. Almost everyone is familiar with the Laughing
Buddha, whose large belly and sack are believed to represent
abundance and good luck. Listed among the seven Japanese
Gods of luck and good fortune, his figurines adorn mantelpieces
and cash registers around the world.
In reality, the image has nothing to do with the original
Buddha, but is one of his many avatars, reportedly a 10th-
century Chinese monk named Budai, a gregarious, pot-bellied
monk who wandered from village to village carrying a large
sack over his shoulder. (Budai means “cloth sack” in Chinese.)
He was beloved by children and the poor, to whom he would
give rice and sweets from his sack. On his deathbed, Budai
penned a poem in which he revealed himself as the avatar
of Maitreya, a deity also known as the “Future Buddha.”
Crucially, perhaps, the world should pay more attention to his
catch-phrase: “Let Go”.60
Semantics aside, religion is a peculiarly human trait.
And most humans, particularly when they feel threatened
individually or collectively, or when they believe it would
either bring or deprive them of wealth or power, are prone to
violence. Buddhists, like the followers of any other religion,
are humans first.

59 Tom Robbins, Skinny Legs and All, Bantam Books, New York, 1990.
60 Dave Roos, op. cit.

29
 Peace Process in India’s
Northeast: An Overview

Giriraj Bhattacharjee∗ and M.A. Athul∗ ∗

India’s North East Region (NER) has faced a multitude

of separatist and secessionist insurgencies since Independence.
These insurgent groups, although up in arms against the state,
did not have unified or common demands. While some were
secessionist in nature [such as the Naga National Council
(NNC) and United National Liberation Front (ULFA)], others
such as Bodos, Kukis and Dimasas, demanded a separate state
or autonomous District Councils within the Union of India.
Throughout the course of conflict, neither the state nor the
insurgents have been able to prevail upon each other, thereby
sparking a long, attritional pattern of violence. Throughout the
seven decades of insurgency in the region, neither Government
forces nor major insurgent groups have been able to militarily
prevail upon each other, although the Army and other
Government Forces now have a permanent presence in the
region. The presence of the Indian Army has been consolidated

* Giriraj Bhattacharjee is a researcher at the Institute for Conflict

Management.
** Athul M.A. is a researcher at the Institute for Conflict Management.
Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

in the region with two corps formations, 3rd and 4th, based in
Rangapathar (Dimapur) and Tezpur (Assam).1
Both parties have realised that they would eventually
have to come to the negotiating table and conclude a mutually
acceptable end state agreement.
However, the pattern of attrition seeps into the negotiation
process as well, resulting in a long drawn out process. This
also reflects the Government’s approach (irrespective of
political dispensations over time), which is primarily aligned
to a conflict management mode, rather than a resolution mode
that could terminate the conflict.
A primary example for such long drawn out peace process
is seen in the case of Nagaland, where initial informal meetings
between Government of India (GoI) and National Socialist
Council of Nagaland-Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM) resulted in the
signing of a ceasefire agreement in 1997, over two decades
ago. Although, more than 80 rounds of peace talks have also
taken place, a conclusive peace treaty is still elusive. The
ceasefire agreement was signed by the IK Gujral Government,
but neither the then Government nor later dispensations have
been able to reach a conclusive peace agreement.
Armed movements in the region commenced in 1956,
with the NNC led by Angami Phizo raising the banner of
rebellion. NNC was initially formed as a political platform in
1946, its predecessor being the Naga Club. The organisation
initially demanded autonomy within erstwhile Assam, which
previously consisted of present-day Nagaland, Meghalaya

1 M.S.Prabhakara, “Going round the mulberry bush”, The Hindu, March 20,
2010, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/Going-round-the-mulberry-
bush/article16583727.ece.

32
 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

and Mizoram. However internal rifts within NNC later led to

secessionist demands. NNC’s armed violence continued till the
signing of the Shillong Accord in November 1975.2 However,
a faction of NNC refused to comply with the agreement and
went on to form the National Socialist Council of Nagaland
(NSCN) in 1980. The torchbearers of this group were Isak
Swu, Thuingaleng Muivah and SS Khaplang. The NNC was
quickly side-lined and NSCN became the main force in the
region. In 1988, the NSCN split along tribal lineages into the
NSCN-IM and NSCN-Khaplang (NSCN-K). In 2011, the
NSCN-K split further into NSCN-KK (currently identified as
NSCN-Kitovi-Neopao); and again in 2015, the new faction,
NSCN-Reformation (NSCN-R) emerging.
In 1997, the government of India signed a ceasefire
agreement with NSCN-IM, which had established itself as the
most powerful of all insurgent groups in Nagaland. After more
than 80 rounds of talks thereafter, a Framework Agreement
was signed in 2015. On December 13, 2016, six Naga National
Political Groups issued a joint statement saying that they had
on their “own volition,” agreed to come together in the interest
of the Naga people as a whole and formed an interim ‘Working
Group’, which would negotiate with the government for a

2 The Accord, thus states: “The representatives of the underground

organisations conveyed their decision, of their own volition, to accept,
without condition, the Constitution of India. It was agreed that the arms,
now underground, would be brought out and deposited at appointed places.
Details for giving effect of this agreement will be worked out between them
and representatives of the Government, the security forces, and members
of the Liaison Committee. It was agreed that the representatives of the
underground organisations should have reasonable time to formulate other
issues for discussion for final settlement.”, SATP, “Nagaland Accord-The
Shillong Agreement of November 11,1975”, https://satp.org/document/
paper-acts-and-oridinances/nagaland-accord-the-shillong-agreement-of-
november-111975.

33
Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

comprehensive peace accord acceptable to all the concerned

parties and varied interests.
In the case of Mizoram, the two-decade long Mizo
insurgency (1966-86), which ended with the Mizo Accord,
is the only instance of an unambiguous resolution of conflict
in north east India via a political peace process. The neglect
towards the Mizo suffering during the 1959 famine was the
cause of the two-decade long insurgency.3 A Mizo Cultural
Society formed in 1955 was rechristened the Mizo National
Famine Front (MNFF) on account of the famine. By 1961 the
MNFF renamed itself as the Mizo National Front (MNF).4
Armed violence raged for two decades, commencing 1966, till
the signing of the Mizo Accord in June 1986. Following the
Accord, the state of Mizoram was created in February 1987
and MNF chief Laldenga became the first Chief Minister. Two
important steps which probably ensured a rich peace dividend
over the past three decades were the surrender of weapons
by the MNF militants and a large rehabilitation plan which
ensured that the surrendered militants were economically
rehabilitated. Among the 614 surrendered rebels, 350 were
given employment with the Government; 45 provided taxi
permits; 15 allotted shops: and the rest were given government
contracts.5 Under a unique surrender package, each of them

3 Mizoram Backgrounder, SATP, https://satp.org/backgrounder/india-insurg

encynortheast-mizoram.
4 “What is the Mizo National Front?”, Indian Express, December 11,
2018, https://indianexpress.com/article/what-is/mizo-national-front-mnf-
mizoram-results-5488114/.
5 Ramesh Menon, “Former Mizo insurgents gradually settle down to civilian
life”, India Today July 15, 1988, https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/
special-report/story/19880715-former-mizo-insurgents-gradually-settle-
down-to-civilian-life-797452-1988-07-15.

34
 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

was given INR 2,000 for their immediate needs. This was
followed by another grant of INR 20,000 for buying household
goods. Each was also given half a bigha of land (about 7,500
sq. ft.) to construct a house for which a grant of INR 40,000
was to be given. Except for the housing grant, other grants
have been disbursed.6
In Manipur, the first insurgent group to be formed was
in the Imphal Valley, the United National Liberation Front
(UNLF), in 1964. Later, in the 1970s and 80s, groups like
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), People’s Revolutionary
Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), and Kangleipak Communist
Party (KCP) emerged and engaged in urban guerrilla activities.
The initial issues that fuelled the insurgency were related to
a sense of pride and distinct identity of the State, culturally
associated with the long reigns of the Meitei kings. Other issues
like the States’ merger, and the status of the meitelon language
and identity, added to popular dissatisfaction and conflict.7
Secessionist movements based on separate ethnic
‘nationality’ were raging in the hills of the state, where Naga
militant formations like NNC and NSCN-K were active.
Moreover, the Mizo militant group -MNF was active in Mizo-
Kuki dominant areas. The 1990s saw the insurgency worsen,
with Naga-Kuki clashes following militant activities by Kuki
armed groups in Moreh and neighbouring areas along the
Indo-Myanmar border, where a lucrative border trade was
concentrated.

6 Ibid.
7 “Manipur Backgrounder”, http://satp.org/backgrounder/india-insurgencyn
ortheast-manipur.

35
Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

The ceasefire agreements with the two powerful Naga

groups – NSCN-IM (signed in 1997) and NSCN-K (signed
in 2001) – brought relative peace in neighbouring Nagaland,
and an extension of the agreement to the Naga inhabited areas
in Manipur was subsequently proposed by the then Indian
Government. However, there was a severe backlash in the
Imphal valley, with apprehensions that such an extension
would give credence to Naga claims on Manipuri lands, and
undermine Manipur’s territorial integrity.
Most of the valley-based Manipuri groups refused to
negotiate with the State and Union Governments. In 2004,
UNLF, responding to peace overturns from the governor, laid
down four pre conditions to initiate peace talks.8
In 2009-10, the ‘chairman’ of UNLF, R.K. Meghen alias
Sanayaima was handed over to India by the Bangladeshi
authorities.9 But, even after his arrest and 10 years
of subsequent imprisonment, the group has not climbed down
from its position. However, some Imphal Valley based militant
groups – KCP-Lallumba, United Revolutionary Front (URF),
KCP-Lamphel, United People’s Party of Kangleipak (UPPK)
and two factions of KYKL-MDF – have signed Memorandums
of Understanding (MoU)s with the Government of India and
Government of Manipur.10

8 Bibhu Prasad Routray“Talks with the UNLF: A Non-starter”, IPCS, http://

www.ipcs.org/focusthemsel.php?articleNo=1659.
9 “UNLF Chairman Meghen arrested”, Epao, October 13, 2010, http://e-pao.
net/GP.asp?src=15.141010.oct10.
10 “Peace Treaty with Insurgents in Manipur”, Ministry of Home Affairs,
Unstarred question no 2550, Lok Sabha, Government of India, May 10,
2016,https://mha.gov.in/MHA1/Par2017/pdfs/par2016-pdfs/ls-100516/
2550E.pdf.

36
 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

Kuki militant formations started negotiations with the

Indian Army in 2005. On August 22, 2008, a tripartite
agreement was signed between the militant conglomerate and
the Union and State Government. At present 25 militant groups,
under two conglomerates-the Kuki National Organization
(KNO) and the United People’s Front (UPF), have agreed to
suspend operations but any peace process has to accommodate
the diversity of the State’s ethnic groups, the sentiments of
Valley residents, Manipur’s territorial integrity as well as the
demands for integration of Naga and Kuki areas under one
administrative arrangement. While the Meitei of Imphal Valley
defend the territorial integrity of the State, the hill residents,
mainly Nagas, demand the integration of all the Naga areas
straddling Manipur and Nagaland. The Kuki’s want their areas
under one administrative arrangement within Manipur.
As with Manipur, there are multiple conflicts in Assam.
These conflicts are based on issues of Assamese cultural
identity, land alienation of tribal communities, the ‘foreigners’
issue, autonomy of the hill districts and inter- tribal clashes for
gaining control over land and resources. Civil society groups
represented by the All Assam Students Union (AASU) and tribal
interest by the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU), launched
massive social movements, including the Assam movement
of 1976-1985 and the Bodoland Statehood movement in the
late 1980s. Non-acceptance or non-satisfactory outcomes of
the movements or peace agreements with Government led
to sections within the youth or hardliners picking up the gun
to resolve their issues.11 Though the government signed two

11 Barun Das Gupta, “Bodoland Territorial Council to come into being

tomorrow”, The Hindu, December 6, 2003, https://www.thehindu.com/200
3/12/06/stories/2003120604521200.htm.

37
Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

MoU’s with civil society organisations, AASU in 198512 and

ABSU in 199313 in Assam, violence continued even after these
accords. Many smaller groups have sprung up who proclaim
themselves protectors of the communities that they claim to
represent. Some of these are clearly driven by lucrative extortion
opportunities. Three MoU’s were signed with Bodo, Karbi and
Dimasa militants in 2003, 2011 and 2012, respectively. The
Government is now negotiating with 13 insurgent groups with
diverse demands and interests.
There are similarities in the causes of insurgent movements
in Assam and Tripura. Both are linked to the massive migration
to these States after the partition of the Indian subcontinent.
The initial spurt of insurgency in Tripura erupted in the form
of Seng Krak (Clenched fist) after the Princely States merged
with the Indian Union and subsequent plans to settle non-tribal
refugees from East Pakistan in tribal reserve forest areas. The
situation in East Pakistan which resulted in the influx of millions
of refugees in the early 1970s reignited the insurgency in the
State. The fear of the ‘indigenous’ tribal population becoming
a minority in its own land moved the tribals to take up arms
against the state. The Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) was
formed on November 10, 1978, with plans to conduct insurgent
activities in collaboration with the MNF of Mizoram.14
Violence unleashed by the militants against non-tribal
populations and government installations led to a crackdown
by Security Forces. The subsequent peace process led to a MoU
with TNV in 1988, but, as in the case of Nagaland and Assam,

12 “Assam Accord”, Government of India, https://assamaccord.assam.gov.in/

portlets/the-assam-accord.
13 “Bodo Accord”, State Government of Assam, 1993, https://peaceaccords.
nd.edu/sites/default/files/accords/Bodo_Accord_-_1993.pdf.
14 Tripura Backgrounder, SATP, https://satp.org/backgrounder/india-insurge
ncynortheast-tripura.

38
 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

a section of dissatisfied militants relaunched violent militancy

in the form of the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)
and All Tripura Tribal Force. While NLFT underwent several
subsequent splits, the All Tripura Tribal Force was rechristened
the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), and orchestrated an
upsurge in violence. In 1993, Dasrath Deb became the first
tribal Chief Minister (CM) of the State. After assuming power,
he successfully negotiated with the ATTF and signed an MoS
which led to the surrender of more than 1,600 cadres in March
1994 under an amnesty scheme offered by the State Government.
But a group of ATTF cadres refused to surrender and kept the
outfit alive. The NLFT and ATTF were subsequently banned
under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
The police led model of counter insurgency subsequently
wiped out insurgency in the State. An MoU with the Nayanbashi
Jamatia faction of NLFT was signed in 2004. L.H. Darlong,
Tripura’s Principal Secretary of Tribal Welfare noted, in 2018,
There was a peace talk with the insurgent outfit
NLFT (NLFT-BM) three years back. Few insurgents
surrendered after the peace talks. But there was no
response from them after that. No one is aware of any
peace talk which is in progress with NLFT now.
The insurgency in the State of Meghalaya started in 1992
with the formation of Hynniewtrep Achik Liberation Council
(HALC). The State however was more of a victim of a spill-
over effect of the insurgency from neighbouring Assam.
A split in HALC resulted in the formation of Hynniewtrep
National Liberation Council (HNLC) in 1993.15 In 1995, the
15 Rining Lyngdoh, “HNLC stresses political solution - Outfit urges Meghalaya
govt to end differences through dialogue”, The Telegraph January 7, 2015
https://www.telegraphindia.com/states/north-east/hnlc-stresses-political-
solution-outfit-urges-meghalaya-govt-to-end-differences-through-dial
ogue/cid/1626913.

39
Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

Figure 1: Northeast Peace Talks

Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) was formed and it
continued to be operational until it signed a tripartite ceasefire
agreement with the state and central governments in 2004.
But there was a factional split soon after, although it was
formally revealed in 2012. The newly formed group was
identified as Breakaway faction of ANVC (ANVC-B). In
2013, the ANVC-B signed a tripartite draft agreement with
the state and central governments, and in September 2014,
a Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) was reached between
the concerned parties. The MoS provided immunity to the
cadres who were charged with criminal cases of assorted hues.
According to MoS, “Criminal cases registered against members
of the ANVC for non-heinous crime shall be withdrawn by

40
 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

the state government”.16 It also states that the cases registered

against ANVC members for “heinous crimes shall be reviewed
case by case according to the existing policy on the subject,
and, wherever feasible, steps for withdrawal of such cases will
be initiated by the state government”.17 In the same year, an
agreement was signed with ANVC and ANVC-B under which
748 militants surrendered their weapons at Dakopgre in Tura
in West Garo Hills District in December 2014.18

Components for a sustainable peace agreement

A peace agreement can be defined as a formal commitment
between two hostile parties to end a war.19 A peace peace
accord can range from a cease fire agreement to a framework
for social and political changes. Accords which go beyond
ceasefires and terms of reference for further talks are likely to
include provisions related to independence/autonomy/power
sharing, human rights and fair distribution of resource and
employment.20 A peace process can also be defined as a process
when people with inimical interests or ideas attempt to align or
converge their interests which are acceptable, attainable and
practical to all stakeholders. The most important consensus

16 “Chairmen of the two outfits surrender arms”, The Times of India,

December 16, 2014, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/guwahati/
ANVC-breakaway-faction-disbanded/articleshow/45526617.cms.
17 “Meghalaya Time Line”, SATP, https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/
india/states/meghalaya/timeline/2014.htm.
18 Ibid.
19 “Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace : A tool kit for advocacy and
action”, International Alert, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.
un.org/files/ToolkitWomenandConflictPreventionandResolution_
InternationalAlert2004.pdf.
20 Swarna Rajagopalan, “Peace process in Northeast India: Journey over
milestones”, East-West Centre, 2008, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/
system/tdf/private/ps046.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=32284.

41
Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

among stake holders should be to put an end to violence and

resolve the issues at hand in a non-violent manner.
In India’s internal security landscape, accords are defined
as constructs that the rivalling parties have made for themselves
and once they have entered into, they seem not only to exist
independently of whatever the signatories think about them,
but shape and mould their thoughts and practices, laying down
modalities on the basis of which their affairs are supposed to
be conducted in the future.21
Some of the essential features required for lasting peace
settlements resulting in overall removal of violence and feeling
of alienation are:

Democratic and consensual process

The dialogue process should not be ‘dictated’ by one party
alone. A consensus has to be built with in the negotiating parties
as well as between both sides on the modalities of the negotiation
process. Moreover, a mutually acceptable frame work and end
state has to be concisely formed between and amongst the
parties. For example, the Ao Senden (apex body of Ao Nagas)
in its meeting on July 27, 2007 at Camp Hebron, in Dimapur
(Nagaland) assumed responsibility for the problems afflicting
the tribe while offering concrete solutions after consultations
with all the different village representatives to the Hoho.
On the same day, the views of all the Hohos like Ao,
Angami, Tangkhul, Jeme, Konyak, Sema, and the NSCN-
IM, were listened to by around 5000 participants from all the
Naga-inhabited areas of the Northeast. By the end of the day, a
common consensus was reached for an indefinite extension of
ceasefire between the NSCN-IM and the Union Government;
transparency in the functioning of the NSCN- IM; support for
21 Ibid.

42
 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

the peace negotiations between the Union Government and the

NSCN-IM; more representations from the Nagas in the formal
peace talks; infrastructure development; and improvement in
the security situation in conflict prone areas were reached.22

Trust and Transparency

In the initial phase of a negotiation or peace process, it is
essential that the trust deficit between both parties, who until
recently has been actively involved in violence against each
other, is effectively addressed. Specifically, in the northeast
region, since the conflicts have been long drawn and protracted
in nature, the trust deficit is a reality amongst the societal actors
such as Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), Government
representatives and insurgents. Building up trust and bringing a
transparent process is essential as it would help in neutralising
any other organisation or agency which could revamp the
apprehensions of any hostile party and spoil the process.
Moreover, a transparent view of the complex issue at hand
and that all the negotiators have a common understanding
of the conflict is essential for any efficient peace process or
negotiation.

Inclusivity
Peace process negotiation is inherently influenced by
inclusivity. All the stake holders should be brought to the
negotiating table, and the dialogue should also take into
account the grievances, hopes and aspirations of all the stake
holders. All the parties should be ready to set aside pre-

22 Namrata Goswami, “Peace Negotiations and Dialogue in the Northeast:

The Naga Case”, Restorative Justice in India: Traditional Practice
and Contemporary Applications, July 2017, http://www.spinger.com/
cda/content/document/cda_downloaddocument/9783319476582-c2.
pdf?SGWID=0-0-45-1610645-p180318683.

43
Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

conceived notions and judgmental mindsets and hear out each

other’s points of view. If the peace process does not have
maximum number of people on board, a sustainable peace will
be difficult to attain. A process of addressing the grievances
and apprehensions of all stake holders should be identified and
enacted upon to remove any residual grievances.
Both the negotiating parties have to have a clear and
common end state in mind, which has to be acceptable for all
parties involved and not leave any party aggrieved or feeling
left out. If not, the aggrieved party might revert back to
violence, thus, decreasing the peace dividend and prolonging
the conflict. If the violence sustains, a future peace agreement
may have to be penned with the violent party, which in
turn may result in bitterness within the society resulting in
fratricidal violence and targeted killings. A primary example
for this is the Shillong Agreement of 1975. Although the NNC
officially signed the cease fire agreement, Angami Phizo was
either not consulted or by passed in the peace process.23 The
faction of NNC led by Isak Swu, Thuingaleng Muivah and SS
Khaplang formed the NSCN, which then continued the violent
movement resulting in the ultimate failure of the accord.

Identity and Context

The major insurgencies in northeast India have been ethnic
or identity based. The perceived lack of commonness between
sections of society is a root cause of the feeling of ‘otherness’,
resulting in violent movement. The initial aim of the dialogue
process thus should be to address this “us and them”
perception. Since parties involved in the negotiations would
23 Kaka D Iralu, “Some corrections regarding the 1964 ceasefire and Shillong
Accord”, Morung Express, September 6, 2018, http://morungexpress.
com/some-corrections-regarding-the-1964-ceasefire-and-shillong-accord-
of-1975/.

44
 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

be from varied ethnic or religious or regional backgrounds, the

dialogue process should be insistent on accommodating the
identity of everyone. The aim being to stress on commonalities
rather than differences, and the shared worldviews and ideas
between both parties. 24 The fear of loss of identity should be
sympathetically addressed and steps initiated to retain and
ensure the uniqueness of the ethnic groups.
Additionally, tribal rivalries or distinctions has also fanned
ethnic militant actors in the region. Actions taken to diffuse or
help over-ride these cultural or ethnic faultlines, particularly in
the grass root level would go a long way to ensure a sustained
peace initiative.
At the same time, the negotiators from the Government
should be knowledgeable about the origins and context of
the conflicts. Cultural familiarity and local knowledge are
pertinent for the negotiating party to ensure that the process
would move on unhindered and that no misunderstandings or
animosities develop.
These components are likely to have a cascading effect on
the peace process- if a democratic process is under taken it
would automatically help in earning the trust of the opposing
side, thereby helping the process to become transparent. This in
turn evolves into a procedure with the support of more people
thereby making it inclusive.

MIZO ACCORD: THE SUCCESS STORY

Circumstances leading to the Accord
The Mizo insurgency initiated in 1966 with ‘Operation
Jericho’25 by MNF later evolved into a guerrilla war of attrition.
24 Ibid.
25 David Buhril, “50 years ago today, Indira Gandhi got the Indian Air Force
to bomb its own people”, The Scroll, March 5, 2016, https://scroll.in/

45
Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

The MNF had bases primarily in Chittagong Hill Tracts

(CHT) in the then East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh),
where they ‘head quartered’ a parallel Government in Dhaka.26
They also received funding from the Pakistan’s Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) and between 1972-75 the MNF had a base
in Islamabad.27 China also supported the Mizo insurgents.
According to Zoramthanga, the current Chief Minister of
Mizoram and ex- MNF insurgent, MNF insurgents had gone
to China and “met Premier Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Lin Biao
and Chiang Ching” along with other Chinese leaders and they
were given help by the Chinese in the form of arms.28
However, the 1971 war and the creation of Bangladesh
induced the Mizo rebels to shift their bases and headquarters
from Bangladesh and they concentrated their bases in the Arakan
region in Myanmar, where they were hosted by the Burma
Communist Party (BCP), a Myanmar Insurgent Group backed
by Beijing. As a result of this loss of their Bangladesh base,
356 MNF cadres led by MNF ‘vice president’ Lalnunmawia
and MNF ‘defence minister’ R. Zamawia, surrendered to
Indian SF’s on December 25, 1971.
Unlike East Pakistan authorities, the Myanmar
Government was not sympathetic to the Mizo cause. In 1968

article/804555/50-years-ago-today-indira-gandhi-got-the-indian-air-force-
to-bomb-its-own-people.
26 Shantanu Nandan Sharma, “Zoramthanga: From being an insurgent to
becoming Mizoram CM”, Economic Times, December 16, 2018, https://
economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/elections/assembly-elections/
mizoram-assembly-elections/zoramthanga-from-being-an-insurgent-to-
becoming-mizoram-cm/articleshow/67109534.cms?from=mdr.
27 Ibid.
28 “China and Pak Supported Mizo Insurgency, Says Former Chief Minister in
Autobiography”, The wire December 10, 2018, https://thewire.in/security/
china-and-pak-supported-mizo-insurgency-says-former-chief-minister-in-
autobiography.

46
 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

MNF, which had declared the Chin Hills (in Myanmar) as part
of ‘greater Mizoram’, conducted attacks in which they lost 55
cadres.29 This did not go down well with Myanmar authorities.
Moreover, hostility between MNF and the Myanmar forces,
MNF could not contact Beijing for further support.
The creation of Bangladesh and the subsequent loss of bases
and mass surrender resulted in a decrease in the tempo of violence,
and indirectly, although not immediately, led to the Peace Accord
of 1986. An immediate result of the decrease in tempo of violence
was the creation of the Union Territory of Mizoram (which was
earlier a part of Assam as Lushai Hill District).
After 1971, although the MNF top leadership including
Laldenga and his family with his aides, namely Zoramthanga,
the ‘secretary’, ‘captain’ Tawnluaia and ‘captain’ Lalsangliana
found their way to Karachi and were given shelter, they found
it difficult to contact or communicate with their headquarters
in Arakan.30 However, after the creation of Bangladesh,
Pakistan found little use for Mizo rebels.
Significantly, MNF also could not find any political
support or sympathy from any other country for their cause.
According to MNF ‘vice president’ Tlangchhuaka, “political
aid to champion our cause was quite difficult to obtain and no
one was ready to offer us.” As a result, the top leadership of
MNF, including Sainghaka and Lalnunmawia, were convinced
of a need for a peaceful solution.31
MNF leader Laldenga himself seems to have been aware
of the lack of political support. He had once stated that “Our
party’s demand was self-determination for the Mizos, which

29 Chawngsailova, Mizo National Front and its role in Mizoram Politics,

North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong, 1997, p.115.
30 Ibid, p. 114.
31 Ibid, p. 178.

47
Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

does not necessarily mean secession from Indian Union, When

I look twenty years ahead, I cannot see any international
opinion in favour of us.”32
As early as 1973, while based in Pakistan, MNF leader
Zoramthanga contacted Indian intelligence agencies,
conveying his interest to engage in talks. Later he flew to
Geneva from Pakistan to meet Indian intelligence officials,
where he conveyed his willingness to return to India for peace
talks.33 In a letter to Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of
India, he stated that:
Since 1973 my officials have been meeting your
representatives… As I had mentioned, I have no doubt
in my mind that the solution of Mizoram Political
system will have to be achieved within the constitution
of India.34
Later, in November 1975, as per his request, India arranged
for MNF’s top leadership, including ‘vice president’, ‘army
chief’ and ‘party president’, to join Laldenga in Cologne
in Germany. Despite, differences arising between him and
Tlangchhuaka the ‘vice president’ and Biakchhunga the
‘army chief’35, the talks did not break down and on February
18, 1976, MNF leaders and Indian officials issued a signed
press statement in which MNF leaders ‘acknowledged that
Mizoram was an integral part of India’ and conveyed to the
Indian government their decision to accept the settlement of
the problem in Mizoram within the Constitution of India.36

32 Ibid, p. 198.
33 Ibid, p. 181.
34 Jagadish Kumar Patnaik, Mizoram: Dimensions and Perspectives: Society,
Economy and Polity, Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi, 2008, pp.
32-37.
35 Ibid.
36 Chawngsailova, 1997, op. cit., p.166.

48
 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

Later a MNF convention was organized in Calcutta

(West Bengal) on March 1976 wherein Zoramthanga was
‘elected’ as ‘general secretary’. This gave the mandate for the
MNF delegation to negotiate the peace settlement with the
government. The convention helped turn a new page in the
Mizo conflict, as it collectively decided to negotiate within
the frame work of the Constitution of India.37 The convention
also decided to convert MNF into a political entity in India.
And in the effort to bring peace, it decided to halt all violence,
collect and surrender weapons and gather all insurgent MNF
personnel in camps within a month. The government, on its
part, decided to suspend all operations against MNF cadres
with the exception of those attempting to cross the International
Boundary.38
On July 1, a formal peace agreement was finally signed
by the Indian government and the MNF, Under the July
agreement, as it became known, the agreement MNF accepted
that Mizoram was part of India and agreed to forgo violence.39
But this agreement hit a roadblock following doubts
regarding surrender of arms and opposition from MNF leaders
based in Arakan, and government forces resumed the anti-
insurgent operations. Some steps taken by the new Indian
Government which came to power in 1977 also alienated the
Mizo rebels, and the talks started to break down. In June 1977
Laldenga was asked to leave the country. However, he persisted
in the resumption of the talks and pursued the dialogue with
the then Home Minister Charan Singh. Nevertheless, the talks
soon derailed as Laldenga refused to give up the demand of
forming an interim Government under him and his colleagues.40
37 Ibid, p. 186.
38 Jagadish Kumar Patnaik, 2008, op. cit., pp. 32-37.
39 Chawngsailova, 1997, op. cit., p. 187.
40 Jagadish Kumar Patnaik, 2008, op. cit., p. 32-37.

49
Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

Cracks started to appear amongst the MNF leadership as

well. In Laldenga’s absence three ‘presidents’ were elected
by MNF based in Arakan. However, Laldenga was able to
overcome the threat to his position and an MNF Assembly was
convened in 1979 and Laldenga was elected as the ‘president’,
while Zoramthanga was elected the ‘vice president’ and
Tawnluia the ‘army chief’. Additionally, those who opposed
Laldenga’s leadership were dismissed from MNF.41 But the
talks were dead.

THE ACCORD OF 1986

The next attempt at political settlement was made after
Indira Gandhi came back to power.42 Laldenga met the Prime
Minister on April 4, 1980 and both sides agreed to a ceasefire
and the talks resumed on April 13, 1980. Subsequently a cease
fire was ordered by MNF on June 16, 1980. However, the peace
process was terminated again in 1982, after incumbent Chief
Minister (CM) T. Sailo refused to step down from power to
accommodate Laldenga as the CM.43 The ceasefire agreement
also broke down, and insurgent actions and Counter Insurgency
operations started again. After the breakdown, an organization
formed by nine church denominations in Mizoram, the Mizoram
Church Leaders Committee (MCLC) started talking with both
the MNF and the government in an attempt to rekindle the peace
process. In April 1984, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited
Mizoram, where representatives from the MCLC met her and
submitted a memorandum asserting that the MNF was ready
to come to negotiating table. This restarted the stalled peace
process and on September 6, 1984, Laldenga declared that he

41 Ibid.
42 L. Memo Singh, “The Mizo Accord”, Imphal Free Press, June 25, 2014,
https://www.ifp.co.in/page/items/21852/the-mizo-accord.
43 Chawngsailova, 1997, op. cit., p. 150.

50
 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

was ready to order an immediate ceasefire agreement to create

a conducive environment for settlement. He arrived in Delhi on
October 29, 1984. However, Indira Gandhi was assassinated on
October 31, 1984, the day on which he was slated to meet her.
This again pushed back the signing of the peace agreement.
The negotiations picked up later when Laldenga met Rajiv
Gandhi on February 15, 1985 and the government entrusted
Home Secretary S. Pradhan with the negotiations. Earlier,
these were spearheaded by G. Parthasarathy. In an attempt to
pressurise the government and MNF to accelerate the peace
process, students of Mizo Zirlai Pawl (MZP) started a state-wide
agitation in Mizoram on March 12, 1986. The Mizo students
organised a relay fast and a general shutdown throughout the
state on June 3 and June 27.44 On June 15 Laldenga returned to
Delhi for peace talks while a political mechanism was devised
for the then Mizoram CM Lalthanwala to resign to make way
for the MNF supremo. According to the deal, on a date agreed
between Laldenga and the Indian Government, Lalthanhawla
would resign and Laldenga would be elected as the leader
of the Government and be sworn in as Chief Minister. The
‘Memorandum of Settlement’ was signed on June 30, 1986.
Thus, the Mizo insurgency which raged for two decades
from 1966-86 was brought to a peaceful conclusion. According
to the signed accord,
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution,
no act of Parliament in respect of
(a) Religion or Social practices of the Mizos,
(b) Mizo customary Law or procedure,
(c) Administration of Civil and Criminal Justice involving
decisions according to Mizo customary Law,

44 Ibid, p. 212

51
Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

(d) Ownership and transfer of land, shall apply to the

State of Mizoram unless the Legislative Assembly of
Mizoram by a resolution so decides.45
MNF agreed to a time bound process of surrendering its
weapons and ammunition and return to civil life for its cadres.
MNF also stated that they would not extend any support to
TNV, PLA, or any such groups by way of training. supply of
arms, or in any other matter. Reciprocating this, the government
pledged robust steps for rehabilitation of MNF cadres as well
as compensation programs for the families of those killed in
the violence. Other provisions included provision of statehood
to Mizoram (which was then a Union Territory). Additionally,
the Mizos were reassured that their customary traditions and
religious practices would be respected.

SOME OTHER SIGNIFICANT PROVISIONS OF THE

ACCORD
• Inner line Regulation, as now in force in Mizoram,
will not be amended or repealed without consulting the
State Government.
• The rights and privileges of the minorities in Mizoram
as envisaged in the constitution shall continue to be
preserved and protected and their social and economic
advancement shall be ensured.
• State will be at liberty to adopt any one or more
languages to be used for all or any of the official
purposes of the State.
• State would have its own University and High Court.46

45 “Mizoram Accord 1986”, SATP, https://satp.org/document/paper-acts-and-

oridinances/mizoram-accord-1986.
46 Ibid.

52
 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

Today the Mizo Accord is considered to be the most

successful instance of conflict resolution in northeast India.
After the signing of the accord, instances of insurgency related
violence have been negligible with only about 49 fatalities
being recorded between 1992-2019 (till June 3, 2019).

Figure 2: Comparative data between Mizoram and other

insurgency affected states in North-east

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO SUCCESS OF

ACCORD
Some of the factors which have to the successful negotiation
of peace accord and factors which constituted to the sustenance
of the peace are:
Time bound process and a Flexible Political end state-
Unlike the ongoing Naga peace process, the Mizo peace
process was shorter. After the collapse of July agreement of
1976, the next round of peace talks was initiated in 1980 when
Indira Gandhi came to power. Although she was assassinated
in 1984, it did not spell an end to the talks. Her successor was
also committed to the peace process.

53
Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

Both the government and the Mizo rebel leadership

displayed astute flexibility during the peace negotiations.
Although the MNF started as a secessionist movement, they
later displayed political flexibility by giving up the demand for
an independent ‘greater Mizoram’, one of the pre- conditions
set by the government for talks. A negotiation can only be
successful if both parties can empathize and accommodate
each other, and both parties in this case were ready to do so. On
the government’s part, it was ready to make political changes
in the state Government and allow MNF’s Laldenga to become
the CM of the state.
Absence of factionalism and internal consultations- MNF
continued to be homogenous entity throughout the span of
armed insurgency. Hence the peace process was much less
complicated as the GoI had only one insurgent group to deal
with. Moreover, Laldenga continued to be the undisputed
leader of the group. Although there were some moves against
Laldenga, he was able to resolve the internal differences and
consolidate his influence in the group, so that he could take a
decision on behalf of the group which was acceptable to the rank
and file. Moreover, Laldenga also consulted his organization
members at every step of the process. Intra- MNF discussions
were almost an integral part of the Mizo peace process.
Although these internal consultations may have resulted in
delays and back-tracking, this process did ensure that there
was no internal dissatisfaction within the MNF leadership.
And when the accord was signed all internal grievances were
heard and addressed, resulting in a consensual decision within
MNF to sign the peace accord.
Unity, Political transition and Stake-holdership- The
Mizo movement was built on an inclusive ethnic identity
comprising diverse Mizo sub groups. A probable reason for

54
 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

the MNF not fracturing into factions may also have been the
inclusive regional nature of the organisation, unlike that of the
Naga’s, Bodo’s or ULFA. The MNF was thus able to align
itself with all sections of the Mizo community and mobilize
them throughout the insurgent movement, as well as the
peace process.47 Moreover, this inclusiveness also enabled the
civilians to exert pressure on the actors involved in negotiation
to bring the peace process into a conclusive end at the earliest.
After the signing of the accord in 1986, MNF rapidly
evolved into a political party and integrated into the mainstream
politics. The successful transition from an insurgent group
fighting the authorities into that of a full-scale political party
which was part of a system which MNF was up in arms against
showed the political sense and organisational flexibility of
the MNF. With transition into a political party which came to
power in the state, the rebels became a direct stakeholder in
ensuring that the accord would not break down and that there
was no renewed violence in the state. This stakeholder ship
cascaded to strengthen MNF’s commitment to the accord.

47 Sushil Sharma, “Lessons from Mizoram Insurgency and Peace Accord

1986”, June 2016, https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/lessons-
from-mizoram-insurgency-and-peace-accord-1986.pdf.

55
Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

Figure 3: Mizoram Conflict Chronology

THE NAGA ACCORDS

The oldest and most formidable insurgency in the region
is that of the Nagas. There were several peace initiatives taken
by the government and civil society to resolve the conflict.
Starting from the pre-independence Akbar Hydari Agreement

56
 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

of 1947 to the latest Framework Agreement of August 2015,

there have been four key peace initiatives so far.

THE NAGA-AKBAR HYDARI ACCORD 1947

The then Governor of Assam, Sir Akbar Hydari, visited
Kohima, from June 27 to 29, 1947, and held long discussions
with leaders of the NNC and various tribal groups. The result
was the Nine-Point Understanding between the Governor and
the NNC, giving broad concessions to NNC in the domain
of Judicial, Executive, Agriculture, Education and Forest
Departments, as well as Legislative, Land and Taxation issues.

Two salient points with regard to the understanding

Boundaries – That present administrative divisions should
be modified so as (1) to bring back into the Naga Hills District
all the forests transferred to the Sibsagar and Nowgong
Districts in the past; and (2) to bring all Nagas under one
unified administrative unit as far as possible. All the areas so
included would be within the scope of the proposed agreement.
No areas would be transferred out of the Naga Hills without
the consent of the Naga Council.48
Period of Agreement – The Governor of Assam as the Agent
of the Government of the Indian Union will have a special
responsibility for a period of 10 years to ensure the observance
of the agreement. At the end of this period the Naga Council
would be asked whether they require the above agreement to
be extended for a further period or a new agreement regarding
the future of Naga people was to be arrived at.49

48 “The Naga-Akbar Hydari Accord, 1947”, SATP, 1947, https://www.

satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/nagaland/documents/papers/
nagaland_9point.htm.
49 Ibid.

57
Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

Thus, the essential feature of the nine-point agreement

was providing integration of Naga areas, protection from
outsiders, special powers in the sphere of judiciary, economy
and decentralization of administration to the NNC, and a
provision (clause 9) of review after 10 years. The agreement
was signed between Governor Hydari and representatives of
different tribes. Next year, on December 28, 1948, Governor
Hydari passed away, undermining the implementation of the
agreement.50
Moreover, a faction led by Apatani Zapu Phizo denounced
the agreement and conducted a controversial ‘referendum’.
This faction claimed that in the plebiscite, 99 per cent of Nagas
had preferred separation from India. Subsequently, an armed
faction of NNC emerged, undertaking violent attacks against
Government forces. Naga Hills (then under undivided Assam)
was declared a disturbed area by the government of India and
the Army was called in.
Meanwhile, civil society and tribal groups continued their
efforts to bring about an acceptable solution and bridge the
divide. A resolution was adopted in Naga People’s convention
held in August 1957 for a unified Naga Hills- Tuensang area
within the Indian Union.51 On December 20, 1957, Naga Hills-
Tuensang Area (NHTA) was created as Autonomous District.

Sixteen point and formation of Nagaland

The NHTA arrangement did not arouse much enthusiasm.
As a result, three years later, another accord was signed in
1960 between the Naga People’s Convention (NPC) and

50 A Lanunungsang Ao, From Phizo to Muivah, Mittal Publications, New

Delhi, 2002, p. 9.
51 B.G. Varghese, India’s Northeast Resurgent, Konark Publishers, New
Delhi, 1996, p. 89.

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 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

the Government.52 The 16-point agreement was preceded

by demands placed by the delegates of the NPC/ Congress
(described as moderates) before the then Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru on July 26, 1960. Subsequently, agreement
was reached during the meeting between the Indian Foreign
Secretary Subimal Dutta and NPC delegation on July 27-28,
1960.
In the mid- and late- 1960s, violence by NNC continued
intermittently along with the counter-insurgency drive by the
SFs. Parliament passed the 13th Amendment to the Constitution
in 1962 and formed the state of Nagaland on December 1, 1963.
The NPC and peace mission held talks with Naga underground
group. During the same period, tribal differences led to conflict
within the Naga underground and much blood was shed.
Critics argue that division and mistrust within the Naga
society started with NPC signing the 16-point agreement.
The NPC was not a party to the ‘Naga conflict’ and hence the
agreement failed to pacify the rebels.
Meanwhile, separately, there were eight rounds of talks
from 1964 to 1968 with NNC, resulting in a Cease Fire
Agreement, which was signed on September 6, 1964.53
However, negotiations broke down by 1968, as a combined
result of three factors. The primary reason was continued
insurgent violence despite the ongoing negotiations. Second, a
political vacuum created on the government side with the quick
demises of successive heads of state, Jawaharlal Nehru (1964)
and his successor Lal Bahadur Shastri (1966). And third, the

52 Bhowmick, Subir, “The Accord that never was: Shillong Accord 1975” in
Samir Das ed., Peace Process and Peace Accords, Sage Publication, New
Delhi, 2005, p. 210.
53 Nishit Dholabhai, “Naga groups charge Delhi with apathy”, The Telegraph,
September 6, 2003, https://www.telegraphindia.com/states/north-east/nag
a-groups-charge-delhi-with-apathy/cid/802215.

59
Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

overtures made by the NNC towards China also resulted in the

breakdown of talks.
The ceasefire which was applicable in Manipur’s Mao,
Tamenglong and Ukhrul Sub Divisions (Naga dominated
areas in Manipur) was called off on September 1,1972, after
the then Chief Minister (CM) of Nagaland Hokishe Sema was
ambushed by NNC militants.
A split within NNC also occurred during the talks, with
the formation of the Revolutionary Government of Nagaland
(RGN) under the leadership of Scato Swu, the ‘president’ of
FGN.

SHILLONG ACCORD 1975

The 1971 liberation of Bangladesh had destroyed the
militant sanctuaries in East Pakistan. Therefore, a large
group of militants had surrendered after the war and were
rehabilitated. Talks were restarted with the Naga underground
groups resulting in the 1975 Shillong Accord.
The agreement was signed between Nagaland Governor
L.P. Singh, representing Government of India and I. Temjenba,
S. Dahru, Z. Ramyo, M. Assa and Kevi Yalley, representing the
underground organisations, on November 1975. In the Shillong
Accord, members of the Naga underground unconditionally
accepted the Constitution of India and also agreed to deposit
arms. However, the accord was signed by ‘underground’
leaders in their personal capacity and not as leaders of an
organisation.
Importantly, Phizo, the NNC leader did not sign the accord,
and another influential hardline group led by Thuingaleng
Muivah and Isak Swu also saw the accord as a ‘surrender’.
Violence resumed in the late 1970s. The rebels were now
stationed in Burma and operated along the Indo- Myanmar

60
 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

border, and were clearly not interested in talks.54 In 1980,

NSCN was formed by the trio of Isak Chisi Swu, Thuingaleng
Muivah and S.S. Khaplang

INCREMENTAL PROGRESS
Peace talks between the NSCN-IM and the Government
of India started in the early 1990s with Prime Minister P.V.
Narasimha Rao initiating the process. The next Prime Minister
H.D. Deve Gowda cemented the initiative when he met Swu and
Muivah in Zurich in Switzerland on February 3, 1997, resulting
in a Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) five months later. Atal Bihari
Vajpayee took the process to the next level, meeting Swu and
Muivah.55 As a result, on July 1997, a CFA was reached and
became operational from August 1, 1997. This led to Designated
Camps in Nagaland and “Camps Taken Note Of” in Manipur,
i.e., Oklong, Bunning and Chandel Camps,56 for the Naga
underground cadres. In 1998, an informal CFA was agreed
upon with NSCN-K, which was later formalised in 2001. A
Ceasefire Monitoring Board (CFMB) was formed, comprising
representatives of the Central and State governments along
with militants, to oversee the implementation of ground rules.57

54 Iboyaima Laithangbam, “Naga rebels show no inclination to accept

Shillong Accord of 1975 in letter and spirit”, India Today, May 15, 1979,
https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/indiascope/story/19790515-naga-
rebels-show-no-inclination-to-accept-shillong-accord-of-1975-in-letter-
and-spirit-822037-2014-02-28.
55 Avirook Sen,” Bloody insurgency in Nagaland may finally become a
thing of the past”, India Today, June 14, 1999, https://www.indiatoday.
in/magazine/states/story/19990614-bloody-insurgency-in-nagaland-may-
finally-become-a-thing-of-the-past-781101-1999-06-14.
56 Sushil Kumar Sharma, “The Naga Peace Accord: Manipur Connections”,
IDSA, December 18, 2015, https://idsa.in/policybrief/the-naga-peace-
accord-manipur-connections_sksharma_181215.
57 “Centre, NSCN-K declare ceasefire” The Hindu, April 28,2001, https://
www.thehindu.com/thehindu/2001/04/29/stories/01290005.htm.

61
Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

On 14 June 2001, during the annual review meeting

between the government interlocutor and NSCN-IM, the
ceasefire was extended “without territorial limits”.58 The
decision led to massive protests in the neighbouring State of
Manipur, where the Valley residents (mostly Meitei) felt that
such a move could eventually lead to a division of the State.
The Union Government was forced to withdraw the decision
on June 24, 2001, to pacify Manipuri sentiments.
The ban59 on the NSCN-IM was lifted in 2002. This in
turn facilitated easier movement of the Swu-Muivah duo for
peace talks.

MAJOR MILESTONES
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s 2003 Nagaland
visit and statement: Nagas (especially militant groups engaged
in negotiation) consider the speech in Kohima by the Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee during his visit to the State as
a landmark. Vajpayee recognised the ‘unique Naga history’,
which formed the basis of the ongoing negotiaions, observing:
“As far as the Central Government is concerned, let there be
no doubt in anyone’s minds that we are as keen as you are
to achieve permanent peace with honour and dignity for the
people of Nagaland. We fully respect your unique identity. It
will be protected. We are proud of your culture. It too will be
protected.” 60

58 Sudeep Chakravarti, “Naga ceasefire: ‘it’s a headache’”, Livemint, June 19,

2015, https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/13Vhw0hB197Mjxf3Rpak4J/N
aga-ceasefire-its-a-headache.html.
59 “Ban on Naga outfit lifted”, The Hindu, November 27, 2002, https://www.
thehindu.com/2002/11/27/stories/2002112706740100.htm.
60 Prasanta Mazumdar, “Nagas who fondly remember Vajpayee, mourn
his demise”, New Indian Express, http://www.newindianexpress.com/
nation/2018/aug/17/nagas-who-fondly-remember-vajpayee-mourn-his-
demise-1859073.html.

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 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

Indefinite extension of NSCN-IM Ceasefire Agreement:

From 1997-2007 the cease fire agreement was renewed
annually. However, in 2008, both parties agreed to an indefinite
CFA extension. The indefinite CFA has continued to be
effective till date. The significance of indefinite ceasefire with
NSCN-IM can be understood when compared with Suspension
of Operations agreement signed with another northeast based
militant group. In case of other militant groups, the SoO is
periodically (ranging between six months to a year) renewed.
For instance, the SoO with NSCN – Neokpao-Kitovi (NSCN-
NK) and NSCN-R was extended for a period of one year (with
effect from 28th April, 2018-till 27th April, 2019).
‘Covenant of Reconciliation’: There has been a cyclical
pattern of violent upsurge during the CFA period mostly in
the Naga inhabited areas of the Northeast region. This was
mostly attributed to the rising factionalism. Naga Factionalism
(internecine violence between different Naga factions) was at
its peak in the years 2008, 2007 and 2006 with 119 killings
(79 incidents), 90 killings (62 incidents), and 74 killings (60
incidents), respectively.61 There was a sharp drop in such
killings in 2009 and 2010, mostly due to the ‘Covenant of
Reconciliation’ (CoR) signed by the top leaders of NSCN-K,
NSCN-IM and the Federal Government of Nagaland/ (FGN/
NNC) on June 13, 2009. This followed a Naga Reconciliation
meet in Chiang Mai in Thailand from June 1 to June 8, 2009.
Signing of Framework Agreement in 2015: On August
3, 2015, GoI and NSCN-IM signed a Framework Agreement
essentially for resolution of the protracted Naga issue. The
agreement was described as creating a preamble for a final
resolution.
61 Veronica Khangchian, “Naga Factionalism Escalates”, SAIR, Volume
10.41,https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/sair10/10_41.
htm#assessment2.

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Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

Formation of Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs) and

widening of peace talks: NNPG was formed by NSCN- NK,
NSCN-Reformation (NSCN-R) and four factions of NNC –
Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN), NNC- Parent Body,
Non-Accord faction of NNC/National People’s Government
of Nagaland (NPGN/NNC-NA), and Government Democratic
Republic of Nagaland /NNC-NA (GDRN) on December 14,
2016.62 The GoI interlocutor R.N. Ravi was also engaged with
these groups to make the process more inclusive. NSCN-IM had
expressed some reservations to GoI on NNPG’s involvement.
The issue was sorted out after the Government assured NSCN-
IM that the talks with NNPGs was informal in nature.63
Stakeholder consultations during talks and after signing
of Framework Agreement: Before signing the Framework
Agreement, Naga Hoho, Naga Students’ Federation (NSF), Naga
Mothers’ Association (NMA) and Naga legislators from Manipur
and Nagaland were taken into confidence.64 An office was set up
at Vigyan Bhavan in New Delhi where Naga militant leaders,
civil society members and student groups could walk in to meet
the government interlocutor R.N. Ravi with prior intimation.
Supra State Model Breakthrough and protest from
neighbouring states: In 2011 media reported65 that
62 Giriraj Bhattacharjee, “Nagaland: Widening Accord”, SAIR, Volume 16.20,
https://www.satp.org/south-asia-intelligence-review-Volume-16-No-
20#assessment2.
63 Giriraj Bhattacharjee, “Nagaland: Unresolved Reconciliation”, SAIR, Volume
17.38, https://www.satp.org/south-asia-intelligence-review-Volum e-17-No-38.
64 Kaushik Deka, “Hope floats for peace in Nagaland after the government’s
personal touch to back-channel talks clinches a peace treaty with
the NSCN(IM)”, India Today, November 30, 1999, https://www.
indiatoday.in/magazine/nation/story/20150817-hand-held-to-a-historic-
accord-820229-1999-11-30.
65 Namrata Goswami, “A non-territorial resolution to the Naga ethnic
conflict”, IDSA, November 15, 2011, https://idsa.in/idsacomments/
AnonterritorialresolutiontotheNagaethnicconflict_ngoswami_151111.

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 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

the negotiations between the government and the NSCN-IM

faction was in its final stages. The final settlement envisaged a
“special federal relationship” between India and Nagaland and
the creation of a “supra-State body” for the Nagas of Manipur,
Assam and Arunachal Pradesh to “preserve, protect and
promote their cultural, social and customary practices”. But
the Assam and Manipur State leadership were not enthusiastic
about the “supra-State body” and the agreement was never
signed.66

HURDLES
NSCN-K Ceasefire agreement with Myanmar (2012) and
2015 unilateral abrogation of ceasefire with India: In 2011,
late Khole Konyak and N. Kitovi Zhimomi parted way with
Khaplang and formed NSCN-KK (now known as NSCN- NK).
The 2011 split weakened the NSCN-K. Sensing that it was
being left out of the peace talks, the outfit began clamouring that
Naga nationalism was being stifled by the Indian government
with its peace talks with NSCN-IM. In 2012, the NSCN-K
signed a ceasefire agreement with Myanmar, allowing it greater
freedom of movement within that country.67 On March 27,
2015, NSCN-K unilaterally exited the ceasefire, declaring that
“any ‘meaningful peace and political interaction’ between the
two entities (NSCN-K and the Indian government) should be
premised on the concept that Naga’s were sovereign people.”
In 2017, S.S Khaplang passed away, and in 2018 the outfit was
again divided with Myanmarese national Yung Aung assuming
responsibilities and expelling the Indian leader Khango Konyak.
The Khango Konyak led group joined the talks in 2019.

66 “Assam Objects to Naga Supra State Body”, The Shillong Times, November
19, 2011.
67 Wasbir Hussain, “Naga Peace Process: Gone Off Track” , IPCS, May 7,
2015, http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=4869.

65
Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

The issues of integration, separate flags and Constitution

remains the most contentious: According to a report submitted to
the Rajya Sabha,68 NSCN-IM still insists on integration of Naga
inhabited areas, though it had given up its demand of sovereignty.
According to 2017 NSCN-IM headquarters press release:69
The issue of integration of all Naga territories is
an integral part of the ongoing Indo-Naga political
dialogue. Naga territories, which have been kept apart
arbitrarily and indiscriminately by the British on the first
place and then further divided between Burma (now
Myanmar) and India under the leadership of then Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru without the knowledge
and consent of the Naga people, is unacceptable. Just
as there cannot be a kingdom without territory, the
Indo-Naga political talks, sans integration of all the
contiguous Naga areas, will be a futile exercise”.
Most recently, NSCN-IM ‘general secretary’, Thuingaleng
Muivah, in an interview to Northeast Live on February 16, 2019,
declared, “there will be one Nagalim, only one government our
flag and our constitution must be there. This is the stand we
have given…”
On March 1, 2019, the present interlocutor to Naga Talks,
R.N. Ravi has conceded that symbolic issues such as Naga
constitution and flag remain issues that need to be resolved. 70

68 Security Situation in the North Eastern States of India, presented to

Parliament (Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha), July,19, 2018, http://164.100.47.5/
committee_web/ReportFile/15/101/213_2018_7_17.pdf.
69 Sumir Karmakar, “Cloud over Naga Peace talks”, The Telegraph, July 2,
2018, https://www.telegraphindia.com/states/north-east/cloud-over-naga-
peace-talks/cid/1453578?ref=search-page.
70 “Delay for solution not with GoI: Ravi”, Nagaland Post, March 1, 2019,
http://www.nagalandpost.com/delay-for-solution-not-with-goi-ravi/1
91335.html.

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 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

Figure 4: Nagaland Conflict Chronology

67
Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

ACCORDS IN ASSAM
Multiple insurgent groups from the state with varied aims
are negotiating with the Indian Government. The Government
is also engaged with militant formations representing different
regions and ethnicities in the state within the framework
of peace talks. In light of these complexities, the various
diverging issues and initiatives taken by Government with
respect to Bodo, major and minor Hill tribe groups, Adivasi
and Assamese outfits are discussed below.

BLT ACCORD
The agitations for a separate State for plain tribals later
translated into a quest for a Bodo State in the mid-1980s. The
‘cultural hegemony’ of Assamese speaking people in the State
further alienated the Bodos (the largest plain tribal group). A
Separate Statehood movement led by the All Bodo Student’s
Union (ABSU), with the war cry of dividing Assam 50:50,
aroused the emotions of the youth. Armed militant groups also
became part of this fight for a separate homeland. The oldest
such groups, Bodo Security Force (BdSF), under the leadership
of Ranjan Daimary, was formed on October 3, 1986, to fight
for a ‘sovereign state’ of Bodoland. On November 25, 1994,
the BdSF rechristened itself the National Democratic Front of
Bodoland (NDFB). Another militant group, Bodo Liberation
Tigers (BLT), with an aim to carve out a separate ‘Bodo State
within India’, came into prominence in the mid-1990s.
Meanwhile, the Bodo Autonomous Council (BAC) was
formed in 1996, after an agreement was signed between ABSU
and the State Government. The principal issue that remained
unresolved even after the signing of this accord was the number
of villages to be included within the BAC.

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 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

But BAC failed to resolve the Bodo question. As a result,

the Government engaged in a three-year long dialogue with
BLT, one of the most violent Bodo militant groups operating
in the region. In 2003, an MoS was signed between BLT and
the Union and State Governments, leading to the formation
of the autonomous Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) in
Assam under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution.
After signing the accord, BLT chief, Hagrama Mohilary had
said, “If the BTC accord signed yesterday is executed in letter
and spirit, the Bodos will not have to go for another accord in
future to assert their rights and development. BTC is capable
of fulfilling the hopes and aspirations of the Bodos.”71
However, the powerful militant group NDFB was not a part
of the process and opposed the formation of BTC,72 believing it
would undermine its demand for a ‘sovereign Bodoland’.
In 2010, the Bodoland People’s Front (BPF) (a political
party formed after the dissolution of BLT) went back to its
stance demanding a separate Bodo State. A resolution was
passed declaring, inter alia,
…it is unanimously felt by all the people of Bodoland
that the contentious issues... can be resolved only
by creation of a separate Bodoland State. Therefore,
the resolution has been moved, as decided by the
Executive Council of BTC on January 20 last, ‘for
bringing permanent peace and all-round development
to the Bodoland area’.73

71 Bibhu Prasad Routray, “Bodo Settlement: Accord for Discord?”, SAIR,

Volume 1.31, http://old.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/1_31.htm.
72 G. Vinayak, “ULFA opposes autonomous council for Bodos”, Rediff,
August 2, 2012, https://www.rediff.com/news/2002/aug/02assam.htm.
73 “BTC House passes resolution for Bodoland State”, The Assam Tribune,
February 17, 2010, http://www.assamtribune.com/scripts/mdetails.asp?id=
feb1810/at08.

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Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

MoS WITH KARBI ANGLONG DISTRICT BASED

UPDS
The genesis and continuity of the insurgency in Karbi
Anglong and Dima Hasao (erstwhile N. C. Hills) in Assam
were mainly due to prolonged neglect of the region by the
central and State Governments, the strategic location of these
underdeveloped regions, and ethnicity. In the late 1980s, a
movement was launched for an Autonomous State comprising
undivided Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills (now
Dima Hasao) under Article 244A of the Indian Constitution.
The movement could not attain its stated objective and the
principal group behind it, the Autonomous State Demand
Committee (ASDC) is now almost non- existent. In the early
1990s, Dimasa and Karbi militant groups made an appearance
with help from Naga separatists who were active in these
Districts, using it to escape counter insurgency operations
in the neighbouring States of Nagaland and Manipur, and
also for extortion activities. After the Government launched
counter insurgency operations in these Districts to contain
militant activities, an SoO was signed with Dima Halam
Daogah (DHD) and the Karbi militant group, United People’s
Democratic Solidarity (UPDS). As seen in the case of several
other militant formations, these groups splintered, and factions
were increasingly involved in ethnic violence and fratricidal
killings. However, at present all the armed groups except Karbi
Longri North Cachar Hills Liberation front (KLNLF) have
been disbanded.
The Karbi militant group UPDS was formed in March
1999 with the merger of two outfits in Assam’s Karbi Anglong
District, the Karbi National Volunteers (KNV) and Karbi
People’s Front (KPF). In 2002, UPDS agreed to a ceasefire

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 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

agreement with the Government.74 After nearly a decade of

the signing of SoO, UPDS signed a tripartite MoS with the
Central and State Governments on September 25, 2011. The
Anti-Talks faction of UPDS, rechristened Karbi Longri N.C.
Hills Liberation Front (KLNLF) continued its violent activities
till its surrender in 2010. After KLNLF’s surrender, another
faction, Karbi People’s Liberation Tigers (KPLT) emerged
to continue violent activities. Counter insurgency operations
have weakened KPLT and the group is now largely defunct.
The MoS75 signed with UPDS promised to convert the
autonomous council to a territorial council, increase the seats
under the council, and raise financial support and special
packages amongst other provisions.

MoS WITH DHD

In N.C. Hills, Bharat Langthasa launched a militant group
named Dimasa National Security Force (DNSF) in the early
1990s to fight for the cause of Dimasa tribals. Four years later,
its ‘chairman’ Bharat Langthasa, along with a large number of
cadres, surrendered to the government on November 17, 1994.
Soon afterwards, Jewel Garlosa alias Mihir Barman floated the
Dima Halam Daogah (DHD) in 1995, with the stated goal of
forming a separate Dimasa State named Dimaraji. The outfit,
was involved in various acts of violence in the District and
neighbouring regions, until a ceasefire agreement was signed
between the DHD leadership and the Government of India on
January 1, 2003, in order to peacefully resolve the conflict.
An year later, however, Jewel Garlosa broke away to form the

74 “UPDS agrees to ceasefire in Assam”, The Hindu, May 24, 2002, https://
www.thehindu.com/thehindu/2002/05/24/stories/2002052404811100.htm.
75 “Historic Agreement Signed between Centre, Assam Govt. and UPDS”,
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, November 25, 2011,
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=77623.

71
Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

Jewel faction of DHD (DHD-J) also known as Black Widow

(BW). The ‘commander-in-chief’ Pranab Nunisa and ‘vice-
president’ Dilip Nunisa took charge of what was left of DHD
after the split, and called it DHD-N. On September 23, 2004,
the undivided DHD team met the then Union Home Minister
Shivraj Patil and submitted a memorandum demanding a
separate homeland for the Dimasa tribals. After the split
DHD-J engaged in large-scale violence throughout N.C. Hills
and neighbouring districts. On March 8, 2008, Jewel Garlosa
was arrested in Bangalore.
The following year, two batches of Black Widow militants
surrendered along with their weapons. On October 8, 2012, the
Central and the State Governments signed a MoS with both
factions of the DHD – the DHD-N and the DHD-J. The MoS
principally provides for enhanced autonomy for the North
Cachar Hills Autonomous Council (NCHAC) and a special
package for socio-economic and educational development of
the area. A special economic package of INR 2 billion (INR
400 million per annum), over and above the Plan allocation,
for the subsequent five years was to be provided to the
DHATC, to undertake special projects. The appointment of an
interlocutor hastened talks with UPDS and DHD.76 The arrest77
of top DHD-J leaders Jewel Garlosa and Niranjan Hojai also
forced the belligerent group to surrender its arms and agree for
peaceful resolution.
Nevertheless, the two DHD factions were the greatest
violators of the SoO agreement. 462 cadres were arrested and

76 “Historic Agreement Signed between Centre, Assam Govt. and UPDS”,

Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, November 25, 2011,http://
pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=77623.
77 “DHD(J) C-in-C Niranjan Hojai held in Nepal”, The Assam Tribune, July
4, 2010, http://www.assamtribune.com/scripts/detailsnew.asp?id=jul0410/
at06.

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 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

82 weapons recovered during the SoO period.78 Cadres of these

militant groups or their splinters have also been suspected to
be involved in major ethnic clashes (during 2001-2009)-such
as Hmar-Dimasa, Karbi-Kuki Karbi-Dimasa and Zemi Naga-
Dimasa in these Hill Districts.
Apart from above mentioned MoSs which have been
finalised, talks are currently ongoing with several other militant
groups based in the State.

ONGOING TALKS WITH ULFA

Large scale violent activities were launched by the United
Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) from the late 1980s. The
Government response was precipitated by the abduction
and killing of Soviet coal engineer Sergei Gretchenko from
Margherita in 1991.
The counter insurgency Operations codenamed Bajrang
and subsequently Rhino were launched to contain rising
violence. Following the crackdown and reprisals by ULFA, a
ceasefire was announced in 1991. In 1992, ULFA had given
a written proposal for peace talks, with almost the entire
leadership onboard, with the exception of Paresh Baruah. The
process did not make any headway as the ULFA leadership
backtracked and slipped out of the country.79 Even as the talks

78 “Militant outfits in peace process flouting ceasefire ground”, The Times

of India, February 11, 2012, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/
guwahati/Militant-outfits-in-peace-process-flouting-ceasefire-ground-
rules/articleshow/11853105.cms.
79 Sushil Kumar Sharma, “Future Prospects of Peace Talk with United
Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) Genesis, Issues and Recommendations”,
VIF, Occasional Papers, July 2016, https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/
files/future-prospects-of-peace-talk-with-united-liberation-front-of-assam-
genesis-issues-and-recommendations_0.pdf.

73
Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

failed, a large number of ULFA cadres, led by the head of its

‘publicity wing’ Sunil Nath, surrendered to the Government.80
Another set of surrenders took place after the Bhutan
operations. In 2003, the Royal Bhutan Army launched
Operation All Clear to flush out Indian militant groups, mainly
ULFA, Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) and NDFB,
operating from its territory. More than 30 rebel camps were
reportedly destroyed, and a large number of rebels were either
arrested or killed. All those arrested were subsequently handed
over to India. Thereafter, several hundred rebels, mostly
belonging to ULFA and NDFB, surrendered before the Indian
Government.
In 2005, ULFA constituted an 11-member People’s
Consultative Group to prepare the ground for formal peace
talks with the Government. Unfortunately, it pulled out of the
peace process in September 2006, following serious differences
with the Government, particularly over its insistence that the
‘sovereignty of Assam’ be accepted as a pre-condition for
talks.
It took two years of sustained efforts by the State
Government to bring ULFA onboard for a peace process. On
June 24, 2008, ‘Alpha’ and ‘Charlie’ Companies of ULFA’s
28th Battalion declared a ‘unilateral ceasefire’ with the
Government.81
Meanwhile, improved security cooperation between
Bangladesh and India led to the handing over of top ULFA

80 Samudra Gupta Kashyap, “Between ULFA and peace”, Indian Express,

February 20, 2011, http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/between-ulfa-
and-peace/752251/0.
81 “Ulfa crack units declare ceasefire”, The Telegraph, June 25, 2008,
https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/ulfa-crack-units-declare-ceasefire/
cid/571328.

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 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

leaders, including Arabinda Rajkhowa, Raju Baruah, Chitraban

Hazarika, Sashadhar Choudhury, to India by the Bangladeshi
authorities between November and December 2009.82 Except
for Paresh Baruah and Anup Chetia, all the other leaders now
came on board for peace talks.
After agreeing to unconditionally participate in talks with
the Central Government in February 2011, the Pro-Talks
Faction of ULFA (ULFA-PTF) signed a tripartite agreement
for Suspension of Operations (SoO) with the Centre and
State Governments in September of that year. Paresh Baruah
announced the formation of ULFA-Independent to chart a
separate path. In 2015, ‘general secretary’ of undivided ULFA
Anup Chetia had been handed over to Indian authorities
by Bangladesh.83 In 2011, retired Intelligence Bureau (IB)
Director, P. C. Haldar was appointed as the interlocutor for
the group, and continued till 2016. Latest reports indicate that
an accord with the group is almost ready, as the Government
is ready to consider the major demands that were forwarded to
it by the outfit

TALKS WITH NDFB FACTIONS

In October 2004, following sustained counter Insurgency
operations, NDFB declared a unilateral ceasefire. This was
followed by a formal signing of SoO in 2005. Over the course
of the next decade, there were multiple splits within NDFB, for

82 Wasbir Hussain, “Crippling the ULFA”, SAIR, Volume 8.19,https://

www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/sair8/8_19.htm#assessment1;
“Bangladesh hands over Ulfa chairman Rajkhowa to India”, The
Times of India, December 4, 2009, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.
com/india/Bangladesh-hands-over-Ulfa-chairman-Rajkhowa-to-India/
articleshow/5298994.cms.
83 “Anup Chetia handed over to India by Bangladesh”, Deccan Herald,
November 11, 2015, https://www.deccanherald.com/content/511250/anup-
chetia-handed-over-india.html.

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Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

a variety of reasons, ranging from the crackdowns in Bhutan

and Bangladesh, intensive counter insurgency operations, and
the 2008 multiple bombings in Assam.
Currently, peace talks are progressing with two factions
of NDFB – NDFB Pro-Talks Faction (NDFB-PTF) and
NDFB- Ranjan Daimary (NDFB-R). Another faction led by
I.K. Songbijit broke away from the Ranjan Daimary group
forming NDFB-IKS and continued to engage in violence.
The NDFB factions engaged in peace talks with GoI have
also been involved in continuing illegal activities: 46 NDFB-
PTF militants were arrested between 2005 and 2012 for
illegal activities and 36 weapons were recovered from these
militants.84 No further updates with regards to SoO violations
are available.
Separately, in 2008, 2012 and 2014 there was large-scale
violence against Muslims in BTC areas by NDFB militants.85
After a massacre of the Adivasi community in 2014, NDFB-
IKS (now known as the Saoraigwra faction) has been put
under sustained pressure by SFs and its activities have become
minimal.

TALKS WITH ADIVASI GROUPS

Five Adivasi militant groups, All Adivasi National
liberation Army (AANLA), Birsa Commando Force (BCF),
Adivasi Cobra Military of Assam (ACMA), Santhal Tiger Force
(STF) & Adivasi People’s Army (APA), surrendered their

84 “Militant outfits in peace process flouting ceasefire ground”, The Times

of India, February 11, 2012,https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/
guwahati/Militant-outfits-in-peace-process-flouting-ceasefire-ground-
rules/articleshow/11853105.cms.
85 Veronica Khangchian, “Recurring Bloodbath” SAIR, Volume 12.44, https://
www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/sair12/12_44.htm.

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 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

arms86 and began to negotiate with the State about the issues
faced by their community. The major demand is granting them
land rights and Scheduled Tribe status. These groups allege
that Government did not initiate talks; and have warned that
they will start an agitation for separate state if these demands
are not met by 2019.87

TALKS WITH MINOR HILL BASED KUKI AND

HMAR MILITANT GROUPS
Various Kuki and Hmar militant groups, including the
United Kukigam Defence Army (UKDA), Kuki Revolutionary
Army (KRA), and Kuki Liberation Army (KLA) are also active
in the twin hill Districts – Dima Hasao and Karbi Anglong.
These groups purport to protect the interest of the minor tribes
from their dominant counterparts (Dimasa and Karbi). Since
2012, these groups have entered into peace talks with the State
Government.88 There has been little significant development in
the talks with these groups.
Although the peace talks with militant groups have
culminated in the signing of three MoSs, some of the issues
that ignited the militant movements in Assam persist. As seen
in the case of Mizoram, the top Bodo and Dimasa militants of
Assam who have come over ground have found political
rehabilitation with top positions in Autonomous Council

86 Giriraj Bhattacharjee, “Farewell to Arms” , SAIR Volume 10.30, https://

www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/sair10/10_30.htm#assessment2.
87 “Grant ST status or movement for separate Adivasi state will start”, The
Sentinel, April 12, 2018, https://www.sentinelassam.com/news/grant-st-
status-or-movement-for-separate-adivasi-state-will-start/.
88 Giriraj Bhattacharjee, “Farewell to Arms” , SAIR, Volume 10.30, https://
www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/sair10/10_30.htm#assessment2.

77
Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

bodies.89 Former top ULFA militant Naba Kumar Sarania had

won 2014 Parliamentary election from Kokrajhar Constituency
of Assam as an Independent candidate.90The concessions
agreed upon with these militant groups increase the insecurity
for other communities residing in the same region. The
election of Sarania from Kokrajhar Constituency is largely
due to consolidation of the support of non-Bodo people for his
candidature.
No doubt, the level of violence in the State of Assam
had come down dramatically in recent years, due to multiple
reasons that include peace talks with the violent groups,
counter insurgency operations and cooperation from
neighbouring countries. But the key to achieving lasting peace
in case of Assam does not lie in a single accord. There is a
need to understand and address the multiple ethnic faultlines
arising not only from the historical past (foreigners’ issues,
land alienation) but also from recent developments such as
creation of BAC and subsequently BTC, renaming N.C. Hills,
ambiguous clause 691 of Assam Accord. Solutions that are not
community specific could be the way ahead.

89 Samsul Alam, “Debolal new chief of NC Hills council”, The Telegraph,

June 12, 2016, https://www.telegraphindia.com/states/north-east/debolal-
new-chief-of-nc-hills-council/cid/1413152.
90 Samudra Gupta Kashyap, “From ULFA to LS, first non-Bodo MP from
Kokrajhar”, Indian Express, May 20, 2014, https://indianexpress.com/
article/india/politics/from-ulfa-to-ls-first-non-bodo-mp-from-kokrajhar/.
91 Clause 6 reads: “Constitutional, legislative and administrative safeguards,
as may be appropriate, shall be provided to protect, preserve and promote
the cultural, social. Linguistic identity and heritage of the Assamese people.

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 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

Figure 5: Assam Conflict Chronology

INTEGRAL FACTORS FOR A SUCCESSFUL PEACE

PROCESS
The insurgencies in the Northeast have recorded
tremendous declines, with overall fatalities falling to 74
in 2018, the lowest since 1992. The reasons for the decline

79
Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

range from divisions within the ranks of militant groups,

loss of Bhutan and Bangladesh as militant sanctuaries, and
progressive negotiations between the Government and many
of the active extremist formations in the region. The most
important development being the engagement with NSCN-IM
and the Framework Agreement signed in 2015.
If the 1950’s saw the initial sparks of the Naga rebellion,
the 1960’s experienced the emergence of Manipuri and
Tripura insurgent outfits; the 1970’s saw the advent of
Assamese the separatist movement; the 1980’s witnessed
the state of Meghalaya registering the initial sparks of armed
violence, even as the Kuki insurgency emerged in Manipur.
The 1990’s saw the Bodo insurgency taking root in Assam.
In short from the 1950’s through to the 1990’s, the region
has seen the spawning of one major insurgency after another.
However, there has been no major spread of insurgency into
new ethnic groups or significant spread of armed movements
into new geographical areas since 2000. Counterintuitively,
the saturation of militancy eventually led to the current
stabilisation of the security environment in the region.
The Security Forces and Government Administration have
been able to gradually contain the violence throughout the
North East. Between 1992-2002, the cumulative insurgency
related fatalities, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal
(SATP) were 13,121. However, the figure decreased to 7,253
between 2003-2012 and to 1,361 between 2013-19 (until June
3, 2019).92 In pure numerical terms the current fatality rate is
1/10 to that incurred between 1992-2002 (Figure 6).

92 “Fatalities in terrorist violence in India’s Northeast 1992-2019”, SATP,

https://satp.org/datasheets/archives/india.

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 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

Figure 6: Decadal decline in fatalities in North-East Region

With the violence declining in the Northeast, the current
environment is ideal for bringing to a close the multitude of
insurgencies which have plagued the region. The average
civilian in Northeast has been exhausted by continuing
insurgency and resulting criminality, including parallel taxation
and abduction for ransom. The idea of secession has run its
course, and there is no substantial demand of ‘Independence’.
A crucial reason for the demise of secessionist militancy
has been the increasing move by residents of the Northeast
out of the region,93 to metros and other parts of India resulting
in the significant erosion of ‘otherness’, which was prevalent
earlier. This migration and consequent engagement is only
likely to grow further in the coming years.

93 “50 lakh people may migrate from North-East in 5 years”, Hindu

Businessline , December 26, 2011, https://www.thehindubusinessline.
com/economy/50-lakh-people-may-migrate-from-north-east-in-5-years/
article23069875.ece.

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Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

Support from the neighbourhood: The cooperation

of neighbouring countries has played a significant role in
bringing the groups to the negotiating table and the resultant
decline in insurgency. Since 2003, the India government has
been able to convince the sovereign Governments of Bhutan,
Bangladesh and Myanmar to dismantle the camps and bases
of Indian Insurgent Groups (IIGs) based in their respective
territories. The dismantling of major bases in the Sagaing
region in Myanmar; CHT, Moulvibazar and Sherpur Districts
in Bangladesh; and Samdrup-Jongkhar and Samtse Districts in
Bhutan, took place over an extended period of time. The actions
of these countries have been a major factor in the decrease of
violence in India’s Northeast. New Delhi has been able to bring
the neighbourhood to act in an effective manner. However,
since nothing is permanent in the world of international
relations, there can be no certainty about the future direction of
relations with neighbours and the sustainability of the current
environment, which has weakened militant structures.
The government must take advantage of the flat-lining
of insurgencies in the Northeast to address residual irritants,
because the factors that have contributed to the current calm
may not last forever.
Time bound Peace Process and Forming a consensus: The
Government machinery must change its conflict management
mode to a conflict resolution mode, and ensure that peace
processes are executed in a time bound manner. If the peace
process drags on for an extended period, the uncertainty of
the end agreement persists. This entices militant groups to
increase their cadre strength and arsenal. For instance, a senior
official in 2017 noted that, “In 2015, when NSCN-IM signed
an agreement, it had 2,000 cadres in its fold, after that they

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 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

recruited 5,000 more. The current strength is 5,000 as 2,000

deserted the ranks…”94
Moreover, chances of extraneous events derailing peace
processes also increase if the process drags on. For example,
on January 12, 2019, ULFA-PTF had threatened to pull out of
the eight-year-old peace talks if the Citizenship Amendment
Bill (CAB) was passed to become a law. There is widespread
resentment among the people of Assam against the Bill. In
such a situation, ULFA leader Mrinal Hazarika argues, it will
be difficult to continue with the peace talks if the Centre moves
ahead with the passage of the bill.95
Regrettably, one of the common features of most Indian
peace accords has been the absence of all the top tier insurgent
leadership unitedly joining the negotiation process. While
some supported talks, others opposed it. As a consensual
decision was often absent, armed violence continues and
insurgent groups get factionalized, further complicating the
conflict scenario. On November 11, 1975, Government of India
signed an agreement with a section of NNC and Naga Federal
Government (NFG). However, the NNC did not prepare the
grounds for signing of the accord, and important functionaries
such as Thuingaleng Muivah, who was the ‘general secretary’
of NNC and Isak Swu ‘vice president’ of NNC were staying in
China when the accord was signed.96 After the Shillong Accord,

94 Vijaita Singh, “NSCN-IM settles for ‘shared sovereignty’”, The Hindu,

May 18, 2017,https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/nscn-
im-settles-for-shared-sovereignty/article18493154.ece.
95 “ULFA Says They Will Pull Out of Peace Talks if Citizenship Bill Passed”,
Northeast Today, January 13, 2019, https://www.northeasttoday.in/ulfa-
says-they-will-pull-out-of-peace-talks-if-citizenship-bill-passed/.
96 Samudra Gupta Kashyap, “What Isak Chisi Swu’s death means: ‘I’ of
NSCN who trekked to meet Chou; man who saw past, future”, Indian
Express, June 29, 2016, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/naga-
rebel-leader-isak-chishi-swu-dead-nscn-2882241/.

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Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

the NNC was completely side-lined and NSCN became the

primary insurgent group of the Naga cause.
Similarly, in Assam, in case of ULFA, there were differences
within the top leadership which led to the splintering of ULFA.
The ‘commander in chief’ Paresh Baruah opposed the decision
taken by the ‘general council’ to engage in unconditional peace
talks. This resulted in a formal split in August 2012. Paresh
Baruah expelled Arabinda Rajkhowa, the ‘president’ of ULFA
and replaced him with Abhijit Asom. The Arabinda Rajkhowa
faction is currently called the ULFA-PTF and has entered into
peace talks with the government. However, the Paresh Baruah
led ULFA-Independent, continues to engage in violence.
The lack of common consensus and resultant factionalism
has been followed by narrower, non-inclusive and self-
centered demands for peace talks by insurgent leaderships who
were interested in forwarding the interests of their respective
tribal or ethnic lineage. These demands, which were viewed
as antithetical to the interests of other ethnic or tribal groups,
resulted in factional violence and the mushrooming of minor
insurgent groups as well.
This process can be seen in Nagaland, where the undivided
NSCN fractured along tribal lines in 1988. A rumour had
circulated that Swu and Muivah had ‘sold out’ and planned
to oust Khaplang, seize arms from the Konyak cadres and
surrender in India. In order to resolve the issue, a ‘national
assembly’ session was called. However, while the meeting
was going on, cadres loyal to Khaplang and the Myanmar
Army attacked cadres loyal to Isak and Muivah, killing at least
140 Isak-Muivah loyalists, who belonged to the Tangkhul
tribe. This resulted in a vertical split into the Khaplang (Hemi

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 Peace Process in India’s Northeast: An Overview

and Konyak) and Muivah-Swu (Tangkhul- Sema) factions.97

Meanwhile, Angami and Chakesang tribes remained loyal to
NNC. Further complicating the inter-tribal rivalry, in 2011
cadres belonging to the Zeliangrong98 tribal grouping of both
NSCN-IM and NSCN-K formed the Zeliangrong United Front
(ZUF) with the proclaimed objective of protecting the interests
of the Zeliangrong tribes.99
Rehabilitation of Militants: A robust system to help
rehabilitate the militants and integrate them back into society
is essential. Without proper rehabilitation, members may form
their own group or form gangs of petty criminals. In one such
recent incident, five surrendered NLFT militants were arrested
for robbing a petrol pump at Maharani in the Gomati District
in Tripura.100 An effective rehabilitation plan is essential
for the insurgent violence to end, and prevent its transformation
into a law and order problem. In Mizoram an effective
rehabilitation policy was also rolled out to lessen the chance
of formation of any splinter groups. The issue of the surrender
of 750 Mizo insurgents was resolved by the formation of two
camps in the Indo-Bangladesh border, at Parva (Lawngtlai
District) and Marpara (Mamit District). After surrendering
their arms and ammunition in the camps, the rebels went to the
rehabilitation centre at Luangmual on the outskirts of Aizawl.101
97 Sashinungla, “Nagaland: Insurgency and Factional Intransigence”,
Faultlines, Volume 16, January 2005, https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/
publication/faultlines/volume16/Article4.htm.
98 Zeliangrong tribe is composed of ‘Zemas’,’ Liangmeis’ and ‘Rongmeis’.
99 Veronica Khangchian, “The Nagas: Troubling Fission”, SAIR , November
21, 2011, https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/sair10/10_20.htm
#assessment2.
100 “Five surrendered NLFT cadres arrested on robbery charge”, UNI, February
28, 2019, http://www.uniindia.com/five-surrendered-nlft-cadres-arrested-
on-robbery-charge/east/news/1514306.html.
101 Sushant Singh, “In fact: Happy Birthday peace: The Mizo Accord turns
30”, Indian Express, June 30, 2016, https://indianexpress.com/article/

85
Giriraj Bhattacharjee and M.A. Athul

Over 100 surrendered militants were absorbed into the

India Reserve Battalion (IRBN), about 70 in the Mizoram
Armed Police and about another 100 in the State Government.102
The importance of rehabilitation was further stressed by a
Parliamentary Panel on Home Affairs. The panel prepared a
generous rehabilitation and settlement scheme for militants of
NSCN-IM, which signed a Frame Work Agreement with the
government in 2015. The panel report stated:
The committee, keeping in view the historical dynamics
of insurgency, wishes to remind the Government that
the most important aspect of any agreement with
insurgents is the adequate rehabilitation and settlement
program for the cadres of the insurgent outfits. NSCN-
IM, being the largest group in the entire region, would
have thousands of cadres who must be adequately
settled to make the agreement successful and to prevent
the emergence of any splinter groups.103
Although 39 armed groups have signed SoOs with the
Government, for varied periods of time, the resultant peace
process has been cumbersome and time consuming and no final
agreement has been signed to cement an enduring settlement
so far.

explained/mizo-accord-congres-mizoram-insurgents-mizo-accord-
anniversary-2884305/.
102 “Pragmatic 25 years ago: The Mizo Accord, June 2011”, Takshashila,
https://takshashila.org.in/pragmatic-25-years-ago-the-mizoram-accord/.
103 Vijaita Singh, “Push for generous rehab scheme for Naga cadres”, The
Hindu, February 9, 2019, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/push-
for-generous-rehab-scheme-for-naga-cadres/article26226076.ece.

86
 SOUTH ASIA TERRORISM PORTAL
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for the counter-terrorism effort. SATP is the largest and most
comprehensive Portal of its kind, and already contains over
85,000 pages of information.
Unique features include assessments and background
reviews of all major internal conflicts in the South Asian
region, an extensive coverage of major terrorist outfits through
individual profile pages, and timelines for each conflict.
TERRORISM UPDATE, a news briefs page, is updated on a daily
basis. Researched articles published in FAULTLINES: THE
K.P.S. GILL JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & RESOLUTION
and the South Asia Intelligence Review are available for free
download. The database, information, research material and
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SATP is a project executed under the aegis of the Institute
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Visit us at: www.satp.org

 Pakistan
Democratic Forces and the Deep
State

Musa Khan Jalalzai∗

Pakistan is wobbling on the brink. The scimitar of

jihadist ideology of the country’s miltablishment (military
establishment) is trying its level best to destabilise the
neighbouring countries of India and Afghanistan. The Army
and intelligence agencies lack a clear and long-term national
security approach. The country’s domestic policy is in dire
straits. Every month, the Corps Commanders’ Conference
ends with castigation and slander.1 The spectrum of rogue and
radicalised elements range from military officers to employees
of the Strategic Planning Division and officers of the nuclear
force. The patience of Baloch and Pashtun leaders to tolerate
the search and stop policy of armed forces and the abduction
of their children, women and tribal elders by intelligence
agencies on a regular basis, has now dematerialised. The
populace of these areas is also suffering from starvation and
various diseases.2
* The author is a Foreign and Strategic Affairs analyst.
1 “Pakistan army brass meets amid political turmoil”, September 1, 2014,
https://www.rediff.com/news/report/pakistan-army-brass-meets-amid-
political-turmoil/20140901.htm
2 Musa Khan Jalalzai, Pakistan: Living with a Nuclear Monkey, Vij Books,
Delhi, 2018, pp. 1, 2 and 3.
Musa Khan Jalalzai

Broken-down ethnically, the garrison state is now tottering

under the heavy burden of debt and poverty.3 Prime Minister
Imran Khan with his porringer in hand has been cruising
across Asia, beseeching financial help to pay for the interest
on debts since 2018. The whole financial system of the country
is out of element to overcome this crisis.4 The Prime Minister
supplicated the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a
bailout package to treat the wounds of his teetering-tottering
state. By the end of June 2018, Pakistan had a current account
deficit of USD 18 billion, nearly a 45 per cent increase from an
account deficit of USD 12.4 billion in 2017.5
At the same time, Balochistan, Sindh, and Waziristan in
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), are in turmoil. The Islamic State
(IS/Daesh), Taliban and Jihadists have returned to the region
and continue to target civilians and military installations. The
nexus of Mullah and miltablishment is making the situation
even worse. The deep state6 is expanding its sphere of influence
to all state institutions to gradually undermine democracy, and
enrich its private criminal enterprise.7
3 Ibid.
4 Daniel F. Runde and Richard Olson, “An Economic Crisis in Pakistan
again: What is different this Time?”, Centre for Strategic and International
Studies, October 31, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/economic-crisis-
pakistan-again-whats-different-time.
5 Ibid.
6 As stated by Michael Crowley in “The Deep State is Real”, Politico
Magazine, September/October, 2017, “Political scientists and foreign policy
experts have used the term deep state for years to describe individuals and
institutions who exercise power independent of—and sometimes over—
civilian political leaders. They applied it mainly to developing countries
like Algeria, Pakistan, Egypt and Turkey, where generals and spies called
the real shots in nominally democratic societies and replaced elected
leaders when they saw fit. (Turkey and Egypt have recently moved to more
overt security-state dictatorships, in which the deep state is the only state)”.
7 Musa Khan Jalalzai, 2018, op. cit., p. 5.

90
 Democratic Forces and the Deep State

The nexus of jihadists, wealthy individuals and serving

and retired bureaucrats, as well as opportunistic politicians,
has lent its support to the invisible forces of disorder so that the
deep state is able to preserve and continue a lucrative business
enterprise.8
Pakistani intelligence agencies are undergoing a deep
crisis of confidence, professional credibility and national
security management. A contest of strength between the
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Intelligence Bureau
(IB), and a misplaced sense of patriotism9; poor, politicised
and sectarian organisational management; and an inefficient
approach to national security, threaten the territorial integrity
of this staggering state.10 The uninterrupted militarisation of
the public mind and thought, and the enfeebled operational
mechanism of civilian intelligence in the country has resulted
in a popular mindset where every movement, action and way
of thinking of Pakistan’s political leadership as well as the
common people have become militarised, and accordingly
seeks a military solution for every major or minor issue.11
Expanding the spectrum of their illegal business of
torture and forced-disappearance to cover major foreign and
domestic policy areas, the agencies have assumed a more

8 Imad Zafar, “The corrosive influence of Pakistan’s ‘deep state’”, Asia

Times, March 28, 2018, https://www.asiatimes.com/2018/03/opinion/red-
line-needs-redefined-power-corridors/.
9 Hassan Abbas, “Reform of Pakistan’s Intelligence Services”, Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs, March 15, 2008, https://www.
belfercenter.org/publication/reform-pakistans-intelligence-services.
10 Musa Khan Jalalzia, “Pakistan: Reorganization of Intelligence
infrastructure”, Daily Times, March 24, 2014, https://dailytimes.com.
pk/105378/pakistan-reorganisation-of-intelligence-infrastructure/.
11 Musa Khan Jalalzai, “Pakistan: fixing the intelligence machine”, Daily
Times, April 14, 2014, https://dailytimes.com.pk/105114/pakistan-fixing-
the-intelligence-machine/.

91
Musa Khan Jalalzai

controversial position than ever before. Normally, the prime

task of intelligence agencies is to lead policy makers in the
right direction, based on detailed and reality-based intelligence,
but the case in Pakistan is different.12 The agencies mislead
the political leadership and policy makers, driving them into
the wrong direction, and making alliances with radicalised
elements in support of the miltablishment’s business of forced
disappearances and torture.13 In all previous democratic
governments of the country, even ministers of Cabinet rank
never dared to question the secret agencies about their illegal
prisons, and kidnapping for ransom.14
Nevertheless, civilian and military intelligence agencies in
Pakistan face numerous challenges, including widespread lack
of civilian support, faith in themselves, sectarian and political
affiliations, as well as the war in Waziristan and Balochistan,
where the circle of intelligence information collection has
contracted drastically.15

How The Intelligence Agencies Morphed

Over the last two decades, the role and scale of Pakistan’s
intelligence agencies has grown over and above their prescribed
functions, to the degree that their operations, often undercover
and at odds even with each other, have earned them the repute
of being a “State within a State”.16 In most parts of the country,
intelligence information collection faces numerous difficulties
since the Taliban and other militant groups control important

12 Hassan Abbas, op. cit.

13 Musa Khan Jalalzia, “Pakistan: Reorganization of Intelligence
infrastructure”, op. cit.
14 Musa Khan Jalalzai, 2018, op. cit., pp. 172-173.
15 Ibid, p. 161.
16 Abbas Nasir, “Pakistan’s Intelligence Agencies: The Inside Story”, Herald,
September 14, 2017, https://herald.dawn.com/news/1153827.

92
 Democratic Forces and the Deep State

strategic locations. Having faced serious difficulties in dealing

with insurgent forces in Balochistan and Waziristan, the
agencies started translating their anger into the killing and
kidnapping of innocent civilians with impunity.
The real journey of the ISI and IB began in the 1980s,
when they tightened their belts to challenge the Soviet KGB
(Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti) and other European
intelligence networks in Afghanistan.17 They learned intelligence
operations in war zones, and tried to professionalise their rank
and file. However, General Zia-ul-Haq’s sectarian policies
destroyed their hopes. The intelligence infrastructure, instead,
became deeply radicalised, ethnicised and sectarianised, and its
members started physically participating in the Afghan jihad.
During Zia’s military regime, the process of radicalization took
root in military barracks and in the intelligence infrastructure.
A major change occurred when Zia instructed military and
intelligence units to take combatant mullahs with them to the
frontline. Soldiers and officers were also required to attend
Tablighi Jamaat classes. The purpose was to indoctrinate
young officers.18 All military, civilian and policing agencies
participated regularly in Tablighi congregations to ‘purify’
their soul for the Afghan and Kashmir jihad.
As the Afghan War came to an end and the jihadists
returned to Pakistan, a new wave of terrorism and radicalisation
challenged the authority of the state. The ISI never sought
to restrain their violent actions against civilian and military
installations in Afghanistan. Even within Pakistan, the ISI’s
intransigence, remorselessness and refusal to cooperate with
civilian intelligence agencies on national security issues,

17 Musa Khan Jalalzai, 2018, op. cit. p. 162.

18 Musa Khan Jalalzia, “Pakistan: Reorganization of Intelligence
infrastructure”, op. cit.

93
Musa Khan Jalalzai

often prompted internal tugs-of-war. The ISI never extended

a hand of cooperation to civilian intelligence agencies, or even
considered IB as an older civilian brother, over the past four
decades. The unending resultant tussle forced former Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif to restructure the IB and make it more
effective to counter ISI’s influence in political institutions. The
Prime Minister allocated huge funds to the IB to recruit and
employ more agents to meet the country’s internal and external
challenges.19 The greatest challenge Nawaz Sharif faced was
on the national security front. The miltablishment was not
happy with his national security approach.20
The Intelligence Bureau is the country’s main civilian
intelligence agency, and functions under the direct control
of the Prime Minister, tackling terrorism, insurgency and
extremism. The way military intelligence has operated
over the past decades is not a traditional or cultural pattern.
Instead of tackling national security challenges, the ISI,
along with Military Intelligence (MI) and other units, have
mostly concentrated on countering democratic forces within
the country.21 When the intelligence war among military and
civilian agencies intensified, the blame-game became the
main focus of literary debates in newspapers and electronic
media, and the theme adopted was that these jihadists were
making things worse. Democratic forces stood behind civilian
intelligence agencies, while pro-establishment agencies
supported the ISI and its undemocratic business.
A secret war goes on between the ISI, IB and MI. It is
known that the officials from the military’s ISI agency had

19 Musa Khan Jalalzia, The Prospect of Nuclear Jihad in Pakistan, Algora

Publishing, New York, 2015, p.184.
20 Musa Khan Jalalzai, “Pakistan: Reorganization of Intelligence
infrastructure”, op. cit.
21 Musa Khan Jalalzai, 2018, op. cit. p. 174.

94
 Democratic Forces and the Deep State

their phone calls eavesdropped at the height of civil-military

tension in 2014, following an attempt on the life of the Geo TV
anchor Hamid Mir, who said he suspected ISI involvement.
The rivalry between the IB and ISI boiled over in June 2017
when a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) probing alleged money-
laundering by the Sharif family made a written complaint to
the Supreme Court that the IB was wiretapping JIT members,
including ISI and military intelligence personnel. The JIT
further reported that the IB was hampering its inquiries, adding
that military-led intelligence agencies were not on “good
terms” with the IB. It said that IB had collected intelligence
on members of the JIT from the National Database and
Registration Authority (NADRA) and presented it to Nawaz
Sharif for use against them.22 In the present situation, it is not
clear what roles are being allocated to the three major agencies.
The crucial question that still needs to be addressed is whether
these agencies function under the watchful eyes of an elected
government, or are they still so sturdy that they are themselves
instrumental in installing or toppling such governments.23

A Question Of Credibility
All civilian and military agencies have a specific mindset.
Their sectarian affiliation and dearth of electronically trained
manpower, lack of professional surveillance approach, and the
absence of a proper intelligence sharing culture raised serious
questions about their credibility, and seed a weak national
security approach.24 These and other things also caused the
failure of the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA)

22 F. M. Shakil, “The growing ‘tug of war’ between Pakistan’s Spy Agencies”,

Asia Times, October 4, 2017, http://www.atimes.com/article/growing-tug-
war-pakistans-spy-agencies/.
23 Abbas Nasir, “Pakistan’s Intelligence Agencies: The Inside Story”, op. cit.
24 Hassan Abbas, op. cit.

95
Musa Khan Jalalzai

to effectively counter the exponential growth of radicalisation

and extremism within Pakistan.25
Military and civilian intelligence agencies did not cooperate
with NACTA in its war against radicalised forces. As a matter
of fact, NACTA established a Joint Intelligence Directorate
(JID) with officers from ISI, MI, IB, and Law Enforcement
Agencies (LEAs). The JID’s goal was to manage and pool
effective intelligence works undertaken by both civilian and
military intelligence agencies of the country, and to increase
intelligence sharing with Police Departments, Provincial
and Federal LEAs.26 The JID was to help the democratic
government in dealing with extremism and Talibanisation
in four provinces, but the government didn’t pay long-term
attention, nor did it receive sufficient financial support. The
military establishment, moreover, failed to help train its
operational managers.
Under the NACTA Act, the agency was entrusted to the
Board of Governors (BOG). The Prime Minister was the
Chairman, and its members included defense, finance, foreign
and law ministers, members of the Senate and National
Assembly, Chief Ministers of the four provinces, the Prime
Minister of Kashmir, the Interior Secretary, Director General of
Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), all chiefs of intelligence
agencies, and chiefs of Police department from all provinces.
On September 25, 2018, Prime Minister Imran Khan chaired
the first meeting of the BOG. Expressing dissatisfaction over
the NACTA’s performance, he ordered the establishment of
a special committee to oversee its performance and make it
competent.
25 Musa Khan Jalalzai, 2018, op. cit. pp. 165-167.
26 “Joint Intelligence Directorate”, National Counter Terrorism Authority
NACTA Pakistan, Government of Pakistan, https://nacta.gov.pk/joint-
intelligence-directorate-jid/.

96
 Democratic Forces and the Deep State

In 2017, the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif tried to

take control of foreign and internal policy of the country,
but was disqualified from his post by the Supreme Court. He
sought to lead Pakistan’s India and Afghan policy in the right
direction; but was intercepted, humiliated, and his movements
were salami-sliced.27 When former President Asif Ali Zardari
tried to bring the ISI under democratic control, he faced the
same fate. He was pushed around and his crippled and tortured
body would be shifted to hospital in an army ambulance. The
continuous militarisation and Talibanisation of society, and
instability led to the catastrophe of disintegration and failure
of the state, which was further inflamed by the US war on
terrorism, and involvement of NATO forces in Afghanistan.28
Pakistan’s weak and unprofessional diplomatic approach
towards Afghanistan prompted a deep crisis, including the
closure of trade routes and a diplomatic impasse.29
One can easily focus on the Army’s political and
bureaucratic role in state institutions. According to the
Constitution of Pakistan, every democratic government is
answerable to the people of Pakistan. But in reality, they are
actually answerable to the Army headquarters in Rawalpindi.
Every single Prime Minister in Pakistan can only do his or her
job smoothly if they completely surrender defense, interior,
strategic decisions and foreign policy to the Army. It means the
rules for civilian governments are pre-decided and they have
been told to go by the book and not cross the red-lines defined
by the defense establishment. This makes it a “State within a
State” that, instead of ruling the country from the front, prefers

27 Musa Khan, The Afghan Intel Crisis: Satellite State- War of Interests and
the Blame Game, Algora Publishing, New York, 2017, p.133.
28 Musa Khan Jalalzai, 2018, op. cit., p. 133.
29 Ibid.

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Musa Khan Jalalzai

that the politicians and civilian governments implement its

decision and exercise power.30
To punish Afghanistan’s National Army, Pakistan’s
intelligence agencies provided sophisticated weapons to the
Taliban and other extremist organisations to make the war in
Afghanistan disastrous and unfavorable to Kabul since 2001.
Pakistan’s military establishment continues to train, arm, and
transport terrorist groups inside Afghanistan to target civilian
and military installations, and make the lives of civilians,
including women and children, hell. The ISI has often been
accused by the Afghan Army and Government of playing a role
in major terrorist attacks. Pakistan has long been a vigorously
troublesome state for Afghanistan, struggling to limit India’s
political influence there, and working to organise radical
elements to create a war-like situation in Kashmir as well.31

The Cost Of War

The war in Afghanistan has brought instability, hate,
disparity and destruction due to regional rivalries. Peace is a
distant dream in Afghanistan. Robert Kaplan warned that if
the Taliban control Afghanistan again, radicalisation will get
strong and Pakistan’s sphere of influence will expand from
India’s border all the way to Central Asia. An Afghanistan
that falls to the Taliban sway threatens to create a succession
of radicalised Islamic societies from the Indo-Pak border to
Central Asia. This would be, in effect, a greater Pakistan,

30 Imad Zafar, “Dawn Leaks: A Tweet that Underscored the State within
State”, The Nation, May 1, 2017, https://nation.com.pk/01-May-2017/
dawn-leaks-a-tweet-that-underscored-the-state-within-a-state.
31 “Why Pakistan supports terrorists Groups”, Vanda Felbab-Brown,
Brookings, January 5, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2018/01/05/why-pakistan-supports-terrorist-groups-and-why-the-
us-finds-it-so-hard-to-induce-change/.

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 Democratic Forces and the Deep State

giving Pakistan’s ISI the capability to create a clandestine

empire composed of the likes of the Haqqani Network and the
Lashkar-e-Taiba.32
Moreover, Afghans understand that the Pakistan Army
pursued its own agenda in Afghanistan by providing funds
and sanctuaries to Taliban on Pakistani soil. Its support to
the Haqqani Network, and the IS/Daesh has prolonged the
catastrophic Afghan war. These and other concerns have
created great diplomatic and foreign policy challenges for
Islamabad. Today, the country’s leadership feels isolated, and
no one is willing to dance to its beat. These and other afflictions
and suffering have forced the civilian leadership to attempt
to reconceptualise foreign policy. On February 28, 2018,
Dawn reported the country’s National Security Committee
(NSC) decision to recalibrate foreign policy to make it more
effective and regionally focused.33 Pakistan’s nuclear black
marketing across the globe also caused much embarrassment.34
The Army is behind the disruptive sectarian forces within the
country, and provides clandestine support to sectarian religious
groups in Pakistan as an instrument to undermine democratic
governments.
Over the past three decades, Pakistan’s military
establishment has stoutly denied supporting violent religious
groups regardless of whether a group’s targets lay across
national borders or, instead, its aim was to attain specific
political objectives within Pakistan. But today the military’s

32 Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tell Us

About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate, Random House
International, New York, 2012.
33 “National Security Committee agrees to recalibrate foreign policy, initiate
economic partnerships”, February 28, 2019, Dawn, https://www.dawn.
com/news/1392089.
34 Musa Khan Jalalzai, 2018, op. cit., p. 4.

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Musa Khan Jalalzai

attitude is more ambivalent. Both serving and retired senior

Army officers are now openly expressing support for some
groups. These include the religious parties opposed to the
Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N), notably Hafiz
Saeed’s Milli Muslim League (MML) and Khadim Hussain
Rizvi’s Tehreek Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah (TLYRA). Religious
groups have already made their debut on the national scene and
experienced initial successes in the NA-120 by-elections.35 In
a video that went viral, the serving Director General of the
Pakistan Rangers, Punjab, Major-General Azhar Naveed Hayat
Khan, can be seen handing out coupons of Rs1,000 to TLYRA
demonstrators while assuring them support, stating, “kya hum
bhi aap kay saath nahin hain?” (Are we not with you?).
On December 25, 2017, former Afghan Minister of Interior,
Wais Ahmad Barmak warned that Daesh in Afghanistan receive
support from Pakistan and that a majority of the fighters belong
to Afridi and Orakzai tribes based in Pakistan.36
Pakistan’s miltablishment and its secret agencies have
been using jihadists in Afghanistan to achieve their strategic
goal. Pakistan backed Taliban are fighting to control natural
resources and sites in different provinces of Afghanistan.
It was reported in May 2019 that illegal mining of gold and
other precious minerals has dramatically increased in Taliban-
controlled regions close to the border with Pakistan. One of
the tribal leaders of Helmand Province, Najibullah Baloch who
was the former District Governor of Khanishin, disclosed that,
once excavated, the raw materials are smuggled into Pakistan,

35 Kunwar Khuldune Shahid, “A Win for All: Pakistan’s NA-120 By-

Election”, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/a-win-for-all-
pakistans-na-120-by-election/.
36 Pervez Hoodbhoy, “Mainstreaming Jihad: Why Now?”, Dawn, December
16, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1376805.

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 Democratic Forces and the Deep State

where they are processed.37 The Pakistan Army has already

constructed a road from Chitral to the Badakhshan Province
of Afghanistan to allow easy access to natural resources’
extraction sites.
Furthermore, the military-madrasa-mullah nexus has
deliberately manipulated and encouraged jihadism by
favouring a tactical deployment of jihadi groups in Kashmir
and Afghanistan to expand Pakistan’s regional influence. The
internal conditions within Pakistan have also deteriorated over
the past decades because of the focus on building up militancy
and grooming Islamist extremist groups as weapons, in
Rawalpindi’s eternal and obsessive struggle against India. The
military-militant cabal is the core problem of Pakistan today.
The Abbottabad raid and the Mehran Naval Base attack were
strong enough pointers in this direction. These two incidents
were symptomatic of a larger malaise that has been eroding the
army’s professionalism for quite some time.38
Pakistan’s support to the Taliban is due to two reasons:
to establish its political and military influence in Afghanistan,
and push India back to the borderlines of South Asia. Pakistan
believes that India supports militants in Balochistan, and its
‘Good Taliban’ are those who fight against Afghanistan and
India, while it’s ‘Bad Taliban’ are those who fight against its
own Army. On November 27, 2013, the then Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif appointed General Raheel Sharif as Chief of
the Pakistan Army, but Sharif later resisted his government’s

37 Mohammad Ilyas Dayee and Abubakar Siddique, “Taliban Ramp Up Mining

In Southern Afghan Region”, Gandhara, May 20, 2019, https://gandhara.
rferl.org/a/taliban-ramp-up-mining-in-southern-afghan-region/29952965.
html.
38 Jan Muhammad Achakzai, “Pakistan to become Singapore or Syria-the
Choice is Starker”, Global Village Space, December 25, 2018, https://
qoshe.com/yazar/jan-achakzai/2506681.

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Musa Khan Jalalzai

pressure to introduce security and intelligence sector reforms.39

This change of face ensured that any action against the Taliban
would be ineffective, even as General Sharif’s mission of
killing Pashtuns in Waziristan failed to eradicate domestic
militancy.
Moreover, a large number of General Sharif’s Army officers
and soldiers refused to fight against the civilian population.
The Army Chief declined to negotiate with tribal leaders, and
refused to respect Parliament and democratic norms. Instead,
he designed the policy of shoot to kill in Waziristan, causing
death of large numbers of innocents, including women and
children, with impunity, and the kidnapping of tribal elders.40
The Army has failed to develop a true ethnic representation
process or to motivate Baloch and Sindhis to join the ranks of
the armed forces. However, a great deal of experience in the
killing of innocent civilians has been amassed. In Balochistan,
thousands of Baloch men and women disappeared in so-called
military operations over the last 15 years, while the tortured
and mutilated bodies of thousands of missing persons turn up
on roadsides.
The ‘integration of terror’ into the military concept of
war and strategy and the involvement of civilians in a total
religious war naturally led to the idea of non-state players
who could be acting in connection with the military as part
of their pre-operational preparation, including striking ‘terror
in the heart of the enemy’. The launching of various civilian
militant groups during Zia-ul-Haq’s time can be traced to the
evolution of this military doctrine. Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
39 Jon Boone, “Pakistan ‘Unprepared’ for refugees fleeing operation against
Taliban”, The Guardian, June 26, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/jun/26/pakistan-displaced-military-operation-taliban-north-
waziristan-humanitarian-assistance.
40 Musa Khan Jalalzai, 2017, op. cit.

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 Democratic Forces and the Deep State

(SSP) and its militant wing the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) were

floated to quell Shia and Christian opposition to pro-Sunni
Islamisation measures and the promulgation of the Blasphemy
Law, respectively.

War In The Afghan Backyard

The miltablishment and the ISI view the Afghan Taliban as
the ‘Good Taliban’, and support the latter’s fight in Afghanistan
as a welcome development. Regarding the issue of Good and
Bad Taliban, the Pakistan Army views all such Afghan groups,
including the Quetta Shura located in Quetta, Balochistan,
and the Haqqani Network, located in Waziristan, as ‘strategic
assets’. The Afghan Taliban is supported by the ISI to maintain
influence over Afghanistan, particularly in a scenario after
the American drawdown of Forces from the area, as many
in Pakistan’s military establishment continue to think of the
Afghan landmass as Pakistan’s backyard and an area which
will offer them ‘strategic depth’ in the event of hostilities with
India. Pakistan has also encouraged and promoted terrorist
organisations such as the LeT, JeM, and HuM which it views as
strategic assets to be used against India. These terrorist groups
have been waging a proxy war against India over the past three
decades in Kashmir at very little cost to Pakistan – a policy of
bleeding India with a thousand cuts, but keeping the conflict
below perceived levels of India’s threshold of response.41
General Raheel ordered armed forces into Waziristan to
suppress domestic terrorism by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP), and shifted Afghan Taliban commanders to safe
houses elsewhere. The challenge to Pakistan’s sovereignty in
Swat and Buner was addressed with brute force only after the

41 Dhruv C. Katoch, “Pakistan’s Armed Forces: Impact on the Stability of the

State”, Journal of Defence Studies, Volume 5, Number 4, 2011, p. 72.

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Musa Khan Jalalzai

Taliban were ensconced in newer safe havens. The insurgency

in South Waziristan was tackled on a war footing after years
of procrastination, but the writ of TTP still runs in Waziristan.
The issue of ethnic representation within the armed forces
has also raised serious concerns. Some experts argue that
Pakistan’s army is not a national army and view it as the club
of Punjabi generals.42
Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives include ‘liberating’
Kashmir and engaging the Indian Army in a long and an
unending war, and terrorist proxies such as LeT have been
created and are supported to this end. However, the formation
of LeT also has an Afghan angle. LeT was established in the
Kunar Province of Afghanistan as the military wing of the
Pakistan-based Islamist fundamentalist movement Markaz al-
Dawa wal Irshad. The LeT maintained several charities such as
Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation; Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq; Jamaat
al-Dawa; Jamaat-i-Dawat; Jamaat Daawa, Paasban-e-Ahle-
Hadis, and Milli Muslim League.
The international community first began taking notice
of LeT after its coordinated attacks in Mumbai, India, in
November 2008. However, the group was established far back
in 1987, at a time when Pakistan was involved in the anti-Soviet
campaign in Afghanistan. Over time, the group developed
deep and enduring linkages with other Pakistani state proxies
operating in Afghanistan, including the Taliban and al Qaeda.
LeT had access to a steady supply of volunteers, funding, and –
most important of all – sustained state support. Long bolstered
by Pakistan’s ISI Directorate, this Wahhabi group promoted
the vision of a universal Islamic Caliphate through Tabligh

42 Musa Khan Jalalzai, 2015, op. cit., p. 111.

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 Democratic Forces and the Deep State

(preaching) and Jihad (armed struggle).43 Once the Taliban had

established its dominance in Afghanistan, LeT was redirected
to wage jihad in Indian Kashmir. LeT follows Salafi version
of Islam. This extremist organisation receives military training
from the Pakistan Army.
Terrorist organisations including al Qaeda, LeT, Taliban,
a range of Arab extremists and Takfiri jihadists in Pakistan
and Afghanistan pose a threat to regional and world security.
They train suicide bombers across Asia and the Middle East.
Religious and political vendettas are settled by using suicide
bombers against rival groups or families in Pakistan. A
generation of fear is controlled by extremist elements and non-
state actors in Waziristan, Kabul and Quetta.
Terrorists are trained by Pakistan to further its foreign
policy agendas in India and Afghanistan. But some of these
groups, or factions within them, have turned their weapons on
the Pakistan armed forces. The controversial but faith-based
connection between the Pakistan Army and the militants has
weakened as a result of the kill and dump policy of the rogue
army in the Waziristan region of erstwhile FATA.

The Danger Within

Despite the Pakistani state’s denial, there have been clear
pointers to the existence of sympathisers and collaborators of
Islamist radical organisations within all three-armed forces
of Pakistan. Every major attack on a military installation in
the country bears clear marks of collusion by elements from
within. Many Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and army personnel,
including six officers, were convicted for attempts on the life
of General Pervez Musharraf in December 2003, when he
was the country’s President. On August 20, 2005, an Army

43 Ibid.

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Musa Khan Jalalzai

soldier, Abdul Islam Siddiqui, was hanged after an in-camera

Court Martial, for triggering an explosion to target Musharraf
in Rawalpindi. On another occasion, an anti-aircraft gun was
discovered on the flight path of General Musharraf’s plane,
when he was taking off from Rawalpindi Air base on a pitch-
dark night. In 2010, two former Army officers and two serving
officers, including a colonel, were convicted by court martial
for planning an attack on the Shamsi airbase, which is used by
the Americans to fly their drones. Two serving Army officers
have also been court martialled for links with Hizb-ut-Tahrir.44
Terrorists have also attacked Pakistan’s nuclear
installations. In 2007, two air force facilities in Sargodha,
housing deliverable nuclear weapons were attacked. On 21
August, 2008, terrorists attacked the Ordnance Factories
in Wah in Punjab Province, Pakistan’s principal nuclear
weapons’ assembly unit. In July 2009, a suicide bomber
struck a bus that may have been carrying A.Q. Khan Research
Laboratory scientists, injuring 30 people. Further, two attacks
by Baloch militants on suspected Atomic Energy Commission
facilities in Dera Ghazi Khan have also drawn international
attention to the security of the country’s nuclear installations.
In June 2014, two suicide bombers killed high ranking military
officers linked to Pakistan’s nuclear programme in Fateh Jang.
Moreover, on October 10, 2009, nine terrorists, dressed in
army uniforms, attacked the Army’s General Headquarters
(GHQ) at Rawalpindi, which also houses the Army Strategic
Forces Command, the nerve centre of the country’s nuclear
weapons command and control.

44 Alok Bansal, “radicalisation of Pakistani Armed Forces”, CLAWS, June 28,

2011, https://www.claws.in/624/radicalisation-of-pakistani-armed-forces-
alok-bansal.htm.

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 Democratic Forces and the Deep State

Pakistan has all the signs and symptoms of an ailing state

that may not be able to sustain itself at the current rate of
deterioration. People, an important constituent of the elements
that defines a State, are fast losing faith in their institutions.
Democratically elected governments have been accused of
shameless inability and inefficiency in handling the tottering
state, particularly over the past four decades. Pakistan is,
moreover, at war with itself. This partial civil war has been
caused by the misadventures of many state agencies, as well
as of many internal and external forces. All these forces are
working on divergent agendas, with little care about the future
of the Pakistani people and the implications of these deadly
agendas for South Asia and the rest of the world.
Among internal forces, religious parties endorse and
encourage extremism, jihad, and intolerance, and relentlessly
prepare Muslim youth for Ghalba-e-Islam (the global
dominance of Islam). This task is being executed in an estimated
2.1 million religious seminaries spread all over Pakistan.45
Originally the religious parties were providing jihad training to
youth in collaboration with those who were providing training
to the Mujahideen in the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan,
campaigns that subsequently expanded to include Indian
Kashmir. All this was being done with funding and weaponry
from CIA, through the ISI. The Mujahideen, created by the CIA
and ISI, are now fighting against Americans in Afghanistan,
against India in Kashmir, and against the Pakistan army in
Swat, Waziristan and other tribal areas of Pakistan.46
The poverty-stricken and economically failing Pakistani
state has become a headache for its neighbours. Pakistan needs

45 Yunis Khushi, “Pakistan’s Internal and External Enemies”, Annals of Social

Sciences & Management studies, Volume 1, Issue 4, 2018, p. 1.
46 Ibid.

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Musa Khan Jalalzai

to specify its direction of either joining the path of Singapore

and Malaysia, or joining the club of failed states. The country
is now facing unprecedented challenges. Economically
crumbling, with a dysfunctional political system, corrupt
political elite, unemployed youth, extremism – both religious
and now ethnic – and the only Muslim country to have nukes...
the list of problems feeding a rising chaos goes on.
Pakistan lacks a coherent, long-term view on issues, and
this is reflected in its poor diplomatic efforts. Governments
come and go, but the challenges confronting the nation persist,
indeed, escalate, demanding periodic re-assessment based on
emerging situations. The war in neighbouring Afghanistan is
weakening Pakistan as a modern state. The longer the war in
Afghanistan continues the more it will complicate the situation
in Pakistan.47
The most disturbing aspect of all is the lack of capacity
of the current system to cope with these challenges. Even
worse is the agony of realising that the contemporary system
is beyond repair. It is so rotten that any fix will take decades.
The country is already on the edge, and one may not need to
wait for decades to experience a gloomy future. The choice for
Pakistan is clear: does it want to be a progressive country, or
fall into the debris of violence and destruction, like Syria, Iraq,
and Libya.48

47 Yasmin Aftab Ali, “Isa failing state?”, Pakistan Today, February 13, 2018,
https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/02/13/is-pakistan-a-failing-state/.
48 Jan Muhammad Achakzai, 2018, op. cit.

108
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 Is India ready to deal with
Hybrid War?

Prakash Panneerselvam∗

The beginning of the 21st century has seen a crucial

paradigm shift in the nature of conflict. Sub-conventional
patterns, including intra-state conflict and international
terrorism have replaced traditional inter-state armed conflict
as the primary security challenge of nation states.
While inter-state conflicts have declined in recent times,
there has been a remarkable rise in intra-state and other sub-
conventional conflicts, which include sabotage, subversive
confrontation and armed violence.1 Cyber space adds yet
another dimension to both conventional and sub-conventional
wars.
This has led to the emergence of the concept of hybrid
warfare, a phrase coined by former US Army Chief George
W. Casey, who said future wars would entail “prevailing in
protracted counterinsurgency campaigns; engage to help other
nations build capacity and assure friends and allies; support

* Assistant Professor, National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS),

Bengaluru.
1 Antony, A.K. “Keynote Address”, in Changing Nature of Conflict: Trends
and Responses, Knowledge World, New Delhi, 2009, p. 9.
Prakash Panneerselvam

civil authorities at home and abroad; [and] deter and defeat

hybrid threats and hostile state actors.”2 Hybrid warfare
involves threats to a nation’s political, military, economic,
social, informational and infrastructural vulnerabilities. It
usually involves non-state actors indulging in subversive roles
supported by states in order to give the latter some plausible
deniability. Hybrid warfare exploits the ambiguity of the
fog of war to remain below obvious detection and response
thresholds.3
The politico-economic fallout of such a war includes
demographic and social tensions, leading to serious internal
security and governance issues. With cities emerging as the
nerve-centres of economic growth, it is crucial to enhance
security of major Indian metropolis. In recent times, armed
conflicts are increasingly taking place in urban spaces. The
nation’s armed forces, principally oriented to counter external
threats in open spaces, are ill-trained and equipped to fight in
crowded urban areas with large civilian populations. But this
is likely to change given the rising threat of hybrid conflict,
which includes threats ranging from new forms of terrorism
like ‘lone wolf’ attacks to cyber-terrorism and the use of armed
force in urban settings is likely to increase. Security experts
conceptualise anything disturbing urban settings violently as
the ‘new terrorism’.
According to National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, although terrorist attacks
took place in 100 countries in 2017, there was significant
geographical concentration geographically. 59 per cent of all

2 Timothy McCulloh and Richard Johnson, Hybrid Warfare, Joint Special

Operations University, Tampa, 2013, p.4.
3 Patrick J. Cullen and Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud, MCDC Countering
Hybrid Warfare Project: Understanding Hybrid Warfare, 2017, p. 4.

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 Is India ready to deal with Hybrid War?

attacks took place in five countries (Afghanistan, India, Iraq,

Pakistan, and the Philippines), and 70 per cent of all deaths due
to terrorist attacks took place in five countries (Afghanistan,
Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, and Syria).4
Recent terrorist strikes targeting major cities across the
world have added to the nightmares of policy makers, many
already grappling with increasing violence in urban areas,
including violent mobs rampaging through city streets, arson,
assaults and assassinations, bombs and barricades, gang wars,
killings and kidnappings.5
Since it appears quite inevitable that the armed forces will
be increasingly called upon to operate amidst areas with large
civilian populations, the forces should understand the urban
environment not merely against the backdrop of conflict, “but
as a dynamic relationship with the force operating within it
– local population, soldiers, guerrilla fighters, journalists,
photographers and humanitarian agents.”6 Their overwhelming
objective will be to disarm the potential threat without harming
civilians or suffering unacceptable losses due to this restriction.
Both civilian and soldier’s lives are equally compromised by the
emerging threats around the cities and town in coming decades.
This essay offers a three-pronged approach to understand the
new threat and suggest ways to minimise civilian casualties
during such hybrid conflicts in urban areas.

4 “National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to

Terrorism: Annex of Statistical Information”, Department of Homeland
Security Science and Technology, University of Maryland, Baltimore,
2017, https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2017/.
5 Anthony Richards, “Conceptualizing Terrorism”, Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, Volume 37, Issue 3, 2014.
6 Eyal Weizman, Lethal Theory, May 9, 2006, roundtable.kein.org/files/
roundtable/Weizman_lethal%20theory.pdf.

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Prakash Panneerselvam

Further, as Dexter Filkins notes, “Apart from the increased

effectiveness and lethality of non-state actors within hybrid
war, the symbiotic relationship between sponsor and client is
another variable that differentiates hybrid war from traditional
forms of conflict.”7 The Syrian Civil War and spread of Islamic
State (IS)/Daesh presented examples of the complex strategic
challenge to the world posed by modern hybrid warfare.
Hybrid war that simultaneously combines conventional,
irregular, and terrorist components is a complex challenge
which can only be tackled by an adaptable and versatile
military. As aptly stated by Carl von Clausewitz, “Every age
has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own
peculiar preconceptions.”8 The United States has increasingly
focused on a counterinsurgency doctrine in the wake of its
wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.

Hybrid Warfare in Urban Environments

Hybrid warfare in the urban-environment is seeing a
revised form of combat techniques integrated into battle tactics
to attack a strong enemy. Urban Warfare is generally defined
as “Combat conducted in urban areas such as towns and
cities.” But different nations define it differently. According to
US Army’s “An Infantryman’s Guide to Combat in Built-Up
Area” Military Operation in Urban Terrain (MOUT) is defined
as:
“all military actions that are planned and conducted
on terrain where man-made construction affects the
tactical options available to the commander. These
7 Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” New Yorker, September 23,
2013, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-shadow-com
mander.
8 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by Michael Howard and Peter
Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976.

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 Is India ready to deal with Hybrid War?

operations are conducted to defeat an enemy that may

be mixed in with civilians. Therefore, the rules of
engagement (ROE) and use of combat power are more
restrictive than in other conditions of combat.”9
The Indian Army, part of many urban operations ranging
from low-intensity conflict to counter-insurgency and
guerrilla warfare, doesn’t have a formal doctrine per se for
Urban Operations. However, Professor C. Christine Fair of
Georgetown University provides evidence to show that that
India is adopting the US doctrine of MOUT to address this
gap.10 Even though India is yet to develop a formal doctrine,
it has acquired and developed competency equivalent to the
MOUT doctrine. In formulating such a doctrine, the historical
context and relevance plays a crucial role in developing and
preparing soldiers for future urban-warfare.
According to available literature, the concept of Urban-
Warfare started to evolve in the minds of military planners since
the Second World War. The Battle of Stalingrad is a viable
example to start with, in which the powerful German army
was outlasted by the Soviet defenders. The Commander of the
Soviet Army, Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov, played a crucial role
in that battle. Realising the German Army’s inefficiency in
Urban-Warfare, Chuikov developed an important tactic called
“hugging the enemy”, by which he directed the Soviet Army to
manoeuvre closely with German forces to avoid their superior
artillery and airpower. He also employed effective psychological
tactics, using snipers to terrorise German soldiers. The lack
of popular support and underestimating resistance in the city
prolonged the confrontation, and the German army lost the
9 Department of Army, FM 90-10-1. “An Infantryman’s Guide to Combat in
Built-up Areas,1993, Washington D.C.
10 C. Christine Fair, “Military Operation in Urban Areas: The Indian
Experience”, Indian Review, Volume 2, Number 1, 2003.

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Prakash Panneerselvam

Battle of Stalingrad because it employed conventional military

tactics and underestimated the effectiveness of guerrilla tactics
in an urban-environment. This was a major triumph for allied
forces in the Battle of Stalingrad, and subsequently, the Battle
for Berlin. From then on, military history has been dominated
by urban military tactics.
The Cold War environment again overturned the argument
of conventional military superiority, deterring adversaries
from direct attacks. Instead, war broke out in an asymmetric
manner and was often fought in the vicinity of urban spaces.
The Korean War (1950-1953), Vietnam War (1995-1975),
Lebanon (1982 and 2006), military operation in Beirut (1982-
1984) and the operations in Kosovo, Iraq, Syria, Philippines
and Afghanistan are all principally sub-conventional warfare
against the enemy, with a substantial proportion of operations
concentrated in the urban terrain. In all these major conflicts,
the US was greatly involved in fighting against adversaries in
far-away cities. The US strategic community believes that this
trend is likely to continue in future and that the military must
be ready to conduct such operations.11
Military planner and theorists have pointed out that “the
beginning of the 21st century was marked by proliferation of
hybrid wars between flexible and sophisticated adversaries
engaged in asymmetric conflicts, using various forms of
warfare according to the purpose and time chosen.”12 This
new kind of war has not only questioned the traditional and
conventional military thinking but, also generated lots of

11 Daryl G. Press, “Urban Warfare: Options, Problems and the Future”, MIT
Centre for International Studies, Massachusetts, 2009, https://www.files.
ethz.ch/isn/92711/Urban_Warfare.pdf..
12 Russell W. Glenn, “Urban Warfare: Options, Problems and Future”, MIT
Centre for International Studies, Massachusetts, 2009, https://www.files.
ethz.ch/isn/92711/Urban_Warfare.pdf.

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 Is India ready to deal with Hybrid War?

debate in the strategic community over the definition of the

“hybrid war” and also demands new appropriate measures to
adapt to the new reality imposed by it.13
In the case of India, border disputes with its neighbours
have dominated strategic affairs and policy thinking for the
past 70 years. However, India also has reasonable experience
in Urban-Combat. The insurgencies in Punjab and Kashmir,
the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) mission to Sri Lanka
(1987-1990) and various counter-insurgency operations have
enhanced Indian military might to face emerging challenges.
Due to political sensitivities, the role of the Indian military is
limited, and Indian Paramilitary Forces under the Ministry of
Home Affairs take control of disturbed areas. But apart from
the Indian Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine, there is no
official literature available in the public domain to understand
the Indian armed forces’ policy towards sub-conventional and
urban-warfare.
Meanwhile, belligerent elements are increasingly and
effectively exploiting the hybrid war paradigm in different
shapes and forms. The rising number of terrorists, insurgents
and guerrilla forces targeting India and its cities over the
past 70 years poses a clear and present danger. The Britain
Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC)
Countering Hybrid Warfare project has five major reasons for
the rise of hybrid warfare.14
First, hybrid warfare uses a wider set of military, political,
economic, civilian and informational instruments which are
usually overlooked in traditional threat assessments.
13 Ibid.
14 Patrick J. Cullen and Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud, “MCDC Countering
Hybrid Warfare Project: Understanding Hybrid Warfare”, 2017, https://
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/647776/dar_mcdc_hybrid_warfare.pdf.

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Prakash Panneerselvam

Second, it targets vulnerabilities across societies in ways

that we do not usually think about.
Third, it synchronises attacks in novel ways. For example,
by only looking at the different instruments of power an
adversary possesses, one cannot necessarily predict how and
to what degree they might be synchronised to create certain
effects. Thus, the functional capabilities of a hybrid warfare
adversary, although important, will not necessarily provide the
right information to understand the problem.
Fourth, hybrid warfare intentionally exploits ambiguity,
creativity, and our understanding of war to make attacks less
‘visible’. This is due to the fact that they can be tailored to stay
below certain detection and response thresholds, including
international legal thresholds, thus hampering the decision-
making process and making it harder to react to such attacks.
Fifth, a hybrid warfare campaign may not be discovered
until it is already well underway, with damaging effects having
already begun manifesting themselves and degrading a target’s
capability to defend itself.15 The September 11 attack on the
US, followed by Indian Parliament attack on December 13,
2001, the July 7, 2005, London subway bombing, the infamous
2008 attack on Mumbai and the series of ‘Lone Wolf’ attacks in
Europe in the last few years targeting civilians clearly signify
the change in tactics and urban settings emerging as a choice
of target. In future, non-state actors such as Al Qaeda and the
Islamic State/Daesh may seek urban spaces a viable option to
launch attacks, particularly to seek media attention.
With the improvement in technology and terrorist
organisations simultaneously enabling small groups to inflict
harm on much larger populations, “the weapon of terrorism

15 Ibid.

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 Is India ready to deal with Hybrid War?

thus severely limited the safe harbour advantage enjoyed by

the cities, in time of traditional warfare.”16 Therefore, from
prolonged war to limited war and to the war on terror, cities
are likely to be the new theatres of such conflicts.

Hybrid Target
In the new age of warfare, non-state actors are active in
targeting cities and urban spaces to wage global campaigns.
Urban spaces provide ample opportunity for terrorists and
non-state actors to sneak in and inflict a brutal attack to
terrorize large populations through “shock and awe” tactics.
American terrorism expert Brian Michael Jenkins thus makes
the following points: One, terrorism has become bloodier;
two, terrorists have developed new financial resources so that
they are less dependent on state sponsors; three, they have
evolved new models of organisation and can now wage global
campaigns; four, terrorists have effectively exploited new
communications technologies; and five, some terrorists have
moved beyond tactics to strategy, although none of them have
achieved their stated long-term goals so far.17
Violence is matter of perception and measurable
phenomena. Certain categories of violence associated with
political action, such as protests, strikes, demonstrations, tax
revolts and civil disobedience movements are not classified
as terrorist acts. Earlier, insurgents and guerrilla forces using
similar terrorist tactics were exempted from the definition

16 Edard L. Glaeser and Jesse M. Shapiro, “Cities and Warfare: The Impact
of Terrorism on Urban Form”, Working Paper Number 8696, National
Bureau of Economic Research, http://post.economics.harvard.edu/
hier/2001papers/2001list.html.
17 Brain Michael Jenkins, “The New Age of Terrorism”, RAND Corporation,
Santa Monica, 2006, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
reprints/2006/RAND_RP1215.pdf.

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of terrorism. However, Alex P. Schimd of the International

Centre for Counter-Terrorism, observed,
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated
violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine
individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic,
criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to
assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the
main targets. The immediate human victims of violence
are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity)
or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from
a target population, and serve as message generators.
Threat- and violence-based communication processes
between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims,
and main targets are used to manipulate the main
target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a
target of demands, or a target of attention, depending
on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is
primarily sought.18
Schmid goes on to note that terrorism is the “peacetime
equivalent of war crime.”19 This leaves no room for ambiguity
in defining the terrorist act and clearly differentiates the
relationship between terrorism and other violent acts in the
society.
Warfare has witnessed a constant change down the
ages. Today, terrorist motivation relies on collateral damage
and massive destruction. B.S Raghavan explains it in terms
of “inhuman hatred, all-consuming ill-will and ranging

18 United Nations, “Definitions of Terrorism”, 2006, http://web.archive.org/

web/20070527145632/http:/www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.
html.
19 Ibid.

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 Is India ready to deal with Hybrid War?

fanaticism”.20 The series of attack on cities worldwide makes

it clear that non-state actors, insurgents and guerrilla forces are
an emerging threat to urban areas.

Urban Settings
Global urbanisation is a crucial environmental factor
gaining prominence in urban warfare. Generally, an urban area
is characterised based on the density of human population. In
1800, less than 3 per cent of world population lived in urban
areas. In the 21st century the figure has risen to approximately
47 per cent, says the UN. By 2025 the world population living
in urban areas is likely to grow significantly.21 Particularly,
urbanisation in India is ratcheting up very fast. In 1991, only
26 per cent of India’s population lived in urban areas. But
projections conclude that, by 2025, 40 per cent of India’s
population will be living in cities and two-third of the total
population growth between 2000 to 2025 would be in urban
areas.22 Mumbai, with 29,650 people per square kilometre, will
be the second most populous city in the world by 2020, with
over 25 million inhabitants. The future urban area is thus going
to be increasingly congested, complex and confusing. At the
same time, these cities emerge as centres of politics, finance,
industry, transportation, communication and cultural activity.
In the globalised world the city acts as a hub for business
and international politics. Rapid urbanisation provides ample

20 B.S. Raghavan, “Fight the war on New Terrorism to the finish”, Rediff,
May 14, 2008, https://www.rediff.com/news/2008/may/14guest1.htm,
and Robert F. Hahn II and Bonnie Jezior, “Urban Warfare and the Urban
Warfighter of 2025”, Parameters, Summer, 1999, https://smallwarsjournal.
com/documents/urban2025.pdf.
21 Demographia World Urban Areas & Population Projections”, 2010, http://
www.demographia.com/db-worldua.pdf.
22 P.N. Mari Bhat, Indian Demographic Scenario 2025, Institute of Economic
Growth, Delhi, 2001.

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opportunity for business and trade to flourish, and transforms

cities into economical nerve centres of a nation. Elena
Irwin, Faculty Director at Ohio State Sustainability Institute,
emphasises that “economic growth and urbanisation are
inextricably linked.”23 Many rural areas have transformed into
urban centres because of massive inflow of capital and Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI). Therefore, most nations have their
economic strongholds in cities.
The integrity of the nation is also based on its urban spaces
due to their heterogeneity. Multi-cultural, multi-lingual and
multi-religious societies are unique, but at times such diversity
also creates a tension in urban society. German sociologist
George Simmel asserts that urban living has a profound social
and psychological effect. According to him, urban dwellers
avoid emotional involvement and interactions tend to be
economic, rather than social.24 The urban environment leads to
a self-centred lifestyle and curtails socialising in larger ways.
But though urban life is self-centred, many sociologists believe
that distinctions and differences in class, caste and race still
persist in the urban conglomerations.
On a tactical level, high rise building, broad roads and lanes
jostle for space with slums, narrow streets and congested lanes.
Such irregularities are integral to urban areas, particularly in
Third World countries, where urban spaces are not planned and
governed properly. Therefore, they appear highly unorganised.
On several occasions, when lives are in danger, street vendors,
occupied pavements, traffic and haphazard and illegal parking
have created major hurdles for emergency teams trying to
reach crisis areas.
23 E. Irwin, “Market forces and urban expansion”, 2014, https://wenku.baidu.
com/view/e300a1494b35eefdc9d33338.html.
24 Margaret L. Andersen and Howard F. Taylor, Sociology: Understanding a
Diverse Society,Wadsworth Publishing, Belmont CA, 2007.

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 Is India ready to deal with Hybrid War?

Other major imperatives of emerging urban societies are

knowledge and value based. The instant flow of information
through modern telecommunications and social and mainstream
media, allow inhabitants to communicate constantly in real
time across vast distances, giving them a greater and immediate
sense of awareness. Moreover, the mainstream media’s stress
on immediate dissemination of news has often led to media
crews reaching emergency spots before other first responders
or law enforcement agencies. In future, the flow of information
and media are increasingly going to determine the credibility
of the government’s response to a crisis. There are also distinct
possibilities that terrorist organizations, non-state actors and
insurgents will exploit both modern communication tools and
the media to achieve their political and ideological objectives.
Strategically, cities play a critical role in the emerging
security environment and offer a viable opportunity for non-
state actors, guerrillas, militants and terrorist to wage war
against nations. For maximum impact, large gatherings,
economic centres, diversity in society, as well as high profile
monuments (symbols of nations), are often the targets of non-
state actors. If non-state actors manage to execute an attack
in a highly urbanised space, they will inevitably succeed in
promoting their objectives. Given this scenario, the armed
forces’ response to such threats has to be swift and target
oriented, while ensuring that no civilians are caught in the
cross-fire.
With this in mind, it is worth reflecting on Russia’s Chief
of General Staff General Valery Gerasimov and his so-called
“Gerasimov Doctrine,” which highlights the increasing
importance of non-military means to achieve political and
strategic goals, and the ramifications of these means. According
to Gerasimov, the lessons of the Arab Spring are that if the

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‘rules of war’ have changed, their consequences have not – the

results of the ‘coloured revolutions’ are that a “thriving state
can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into
an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign
intervention and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian
catastrophe and civil war.” 25 In terms of the scale of casualties
and destruction these new-type of conflicts are equivalent to
the consequences of any real war. The Russian Armed forces
therefore need to have a clear understanding of the forms and
methods of the use and application of force. This corresponds
to the statements by other senior Russian officials about how
hybrid-type conflicts can evolve and merge—and draw states
into interstate wars that then undermine them. Russian Armed
forces need to be able to fight that “fierce armed conflict” and
also shut out potential “foreign intervention.”26

Humanitarian Issues
Accomplishing military objectives inside populated
areas is difficult. Besides, the rules of conduct devised by
the International Humanitarian Law (IHL), largely limit state
armed forces in their pursuit of targets in urban areas. IHL
particularly focuses on the legality of the conduct of parties
to hostility that has reached the level of armed conflict (jus in
bello).

25 Robert Coalson “Top Russian General Lays Bare Putin's Plan for
Ukraine”, HuffPost, November 2, 2014, https://www.huffpost.com/
entry/valery-gerasimov-putin-ukraine_b_5748480?guccounter=1&gu
ce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_
sig=AQAAAD_CHGntH8EEUa20Bi84wTIHVK27TFsTikxYZjgqUH0
5nerwL42KEiUkky9rF0_tG1tbx8DPzf7k6_d6YK6wLY6MYdMKc4m4pa
WAuvYWTDt1uW8AOhvvVkr2Vr_ lEkLDizJq5GAxSfmEqGeQPYybxc
DnF0LcQgKcCPpxWaKbG9CS
26 Andrew Monaghan, “The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare”, Parameters,
Volume 45, Number 4, Winter 2015-16.

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 Is India ready to deal with Hybrid War?

In an asymmetric conflict the weaker side can integrate or

conceal itself within civilian populations to avoid detection. If
the military target27 is within a civilian population, the objective
tends to be immune from a wide range of attacks, per se. 28 At
the same time, it is understood that a non-state actor benefits
from the presence of civilian populations and uses it as a shield
or cover in military operation, which is in total violation of
international law.29 Article 57, Additional Protocol I, offers
the following guidelines about the proportion of force to be
used and precautions that armed force should take into account
before attack30:
• Do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to
be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and
are not subject to special protection, but are military
objectives;
• Take all feasible precautions in the choice of means
and methods of attack in order to avoid, or minimise,
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and
damage to civilian objects; and
• Refrain from deciding to launch any attack on a target
which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
27 Under Article 52, military objectives are limited to “those objects which
by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution
to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite
military advantage”.
28 Article 51, Geneva Convention.
29 Michael John-Hopkins, “Regulating the conduct of urban warfare: lessons
from contemporary asymmetric armed conflicts”, International Review of
the Red Cross, Volume 92, Number 878, 2010.
30 Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, “Proportionality in the Conduct of Hostilities
The Incidental Harm Side of the Assessment”, Chatham House The Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 2018, https://www.chathamhouse.org/
sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-12-10-proportionality-
conduct-hostilities-incidental-harm-gillard-final.pdf.

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Prakash Panneerselvam

civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian

objects or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.
• Apart from these, Additional Protocol Articles 12, 15,
53, 54, 55 and 56 impose liability on armed forces and
restrain them from targeting civilian populations.
The IHL also imposes a specific obligation on the armed
forces to protect civilians and property in case of war, and the
military commander is made responsible for the operation
and is obliged to follow the key specific rules laid down by
the IHL. Increasingly, non-government organisations, human
rights watch groups and international law agencies have the
authority to scrutinise the legality of military responses.
In India, the government has arranged a specific mechanism
to look into the violation of rules and norms of armed forces
engaged in counter-insurgency and anti-terrorist activity. In
principle, the Indian Constitution guarantees fundamental
rights to citizens, and the National Human Rights Commission
(NHRC) is authorised to look into any violation of such rights.
Nevertheless, the issue related to urban-combat is yet to be
seriously analysed by the civil and/or legal administration.
Civil society, human rights activist groups and media seek
strong responses from the government to restrain the use of
armed forces in urban areas. Indian authorities would need to
closely study emerging trends in urban warfare if they are to
craft appropriate responses.

India and Urban Combat Experience

India’s security perception over the past 70 years has been
dominated by conventional military thinking. At the same time,
India faces a unique internal security problem, partially aided

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 Is India ready to deal with Hybrid War?

by external actors such as Pakistan’s ISI and China. Rapidly

developing India faces crucial 21st century security challenges
from all quarters.
A report submitted to the Planning Commission under the
heading “India Vision 2020” pointed out some key security
issue for future India. There is no direct reference to urban
environments, but it points out the key ‘Factors Influencing
the Security Environment in 2020’31:
• The twin revolution of rising expectations and
information and communication will continue.
• The fundamental ideological conflict between India
and Pakistan is unlikely to be resolved without a major
socio-political change in Pakistan.
• Territorial disputes with neighbours that have defied
resolution for 50 years may not lend themselves to an
early solution.
• Religious extremism and radical politics will continue
to have an adverse impact on core values.
• Rising dependence on energy imports will make us
increasingly vulnerable, economically, as well as
diplomatically.
• Public opinion, both domestic and international, and
the media will become increasingly important forces
in international affair.
• The international order is likely to evolve into a
polycentric configuration, with its centre of gravity
shifting increasingly to Asia, which will include seven
out of the ten largest economies and six out of the eight
nuclear weapon states.
31 S.P. Gupta, “India Vision 2020”, Planning Commission of India, 2002,
http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/pl_vsn2020.pdf.

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Prakash Panneerselvam

• The increasing economic and military strength of

China may pose a serious challenge to India’s security
unless adequate measures are taken.
In the emerging security environment, the Indian armed
forces will be increasingly responsible for countering internal
security issues. Article 355 enjoins the Union to protect the
States against “internal disturbance” and “armed rebellion”. It
is from this Article that the central and state governments draw
their authority to call upon the armed forces to provide aid to
civil authority.
The Indian Army formed a specialised force called “Para
Commandos” to deal with special operations. Starting from
the 1971 India-Pakistan War, the Para Commandos have
participated in many operations in India and abroad: Operation
Blue Star (1984), the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka
(1987), Operation Cactus in the Maldives (1988), the Kargil
War (1999) and Operation Khukri in Sierra Leone (2000) are
notable among these.
Other specialised units formed for counter-terrorism and
urban-warfare operations include the Ghatak Unit (Indian
Army), Indian Navy’s Marine Commando (MARCOS) and
Garuda Commando (Indian Air Force). Paramilitary special
forces such as the National Security Guard (NSG), Special
Protection Group (SPG), Special Frontier Group (SFG),
Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (COBRA) and the
newly formed Force One elite commando force of the Mumbai
Police are trained to respond to any urban terrorist attack within
15 minutes.32

32 Imran Gowhar, “City to get its own commando force”, Mid Day, October
29, 2010, Mid Day: http://www.mid-day.com/news/2010/oct/291010-
similarly-commando-force-terror-training.htm.

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 Is India ready to deal with Hybrid War?

To facilitate the armed forces to carry out such operations,

they are provided legal cover under the constitutional and legal
statutes such as33:
• Constitution of India, Articles 352 and 355.
• Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 127 to 131.
• Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 and 1990.
• Regulation for the Army, 1987 Edition, Paragraphs
301 to 307.
This legal cover imposes great responsibilities on the armed
forces during such operations. However, civil right activists
and human right groups have lodged a series of complaints
against armed forces engaged in counter-insurgency and anti-
terrorist operations. The best example to quote is Operation
Blue Star, where the Army’s assault on the Golden Temple
complex, the holiest Sikh shrine, resulted in a series of human
rights’ violations. Many top government officials, including
K.P.S Gill, who served twice as Director General of Police
(DGP) Punjab, criticised the pattern of the use of military
force in operation Blue Star, resulting in enormous human
loss and material damage.34 This operation subsequently led
to the assassination of the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
and the subsequent anti-Sikh riots across the country. This case
demonstrates the necessity of extreme caution while employing
military force in the urban context. Even paramilitary forces
employed in urban-centric warfare should be trained in all
aspects of such operations, particularly including human rights
issues and a high degree of political consciousness, apart from
normal combat training.

33 Rahul K Bhonsle, “Human Rights in Counter-terrorism Strategy”, CLAWS

Journal, Winter, 2007.
34 Anikendra Nath Sen, “Inside K.P.S. Gill”, Outlook, September 1, 1997,
http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?204124.

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Prakash Panneerselvam

Preparing Soldiers for the Hybrid Warfare

Environment
Soldiers are essentially trained to kill or disable enemy
forces during combat operations. But in urban warfare, they
must temper that training to ensure the safety of civilians and
also prevent unacceptable losses while doing so. To help them
in this, smart robots, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and
precision munitions offer a wide range of option for policy
makers as well as tactical planners. At the same time, non-
state actors are also learning from past experience, presenting
a more complex security challenge for the armed forces. The
hybrid aspect of urban areas thus becomes a “centre of gravity”
for non-state actors to wage a covert or direct assault on civilian
populations to perpetuate their political or ideological struggle.
The responsibility of the soldier in this unique environment
is thus enormous. The problem of identifying “foe or
friend” remains the centrepiece of argument for civilian and
combatant casualties. When differentiating enemy from friend
is achievable, civilians and non-combatants will become less
vulnerable during urban-conflict. Operational preparedness
and a policy level approach for the armed forces, which
might possibly reduce civilian, combatant and non-combatant
causalities in urban-environments, is consequently necessary.

Training Requirements
The military is principally trained for conventional warfare.
Fighting in built-up areas requires special battle techniques and
tactics, as well as conditioning to overcome urban combat stress.
Past performance guarantees nothing for future operations, and
therefore, training sequences need to be revised constantly to
match evolving situations. Soldiers must be prepared to absorb
and understand complex situations before taking decisions in

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 Is India ready to deal with Hybrid War?

dynamic built-up areas, rather than waiting for orders from

higher authorities. Bottoms-up learning needs to be inculcated
into the training methodology, and this should also fulfil the
soldier’s career aspirations. This, in turn, encourages the urban
war-fighter to assume responsibility and adopt correct attitudes
while fighting an enemy in built-up areas.

Reduce Quantum of Force

Armed forces operating inside built-up areas must use
appropriate force to eliminate potential threats. Exercising
massive fire-power against a weaker adversary results in
excessive and avoidable collateral damage. Further, falling
debris can provide fortifications for the enemy to mount
attacks against the armed forces. In close quarter combat, the
debris and destruction caused by shelling can jeopardise troop
movements and make them vulnerable to enemy fire. Massive
use of force in urban areas can result in destruction of lives and
property. The use of air power, in particular, must be optimised,
overwhelmingly for gathering intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance, and transportation of personnel and material.
Countries such as the US, Israel and Sri Lanka have effectively
used air assets in operations against insurgents, which resulted
in many civilian deaths. Moreover, the frequent use of the
Predator UAVs to track and attack Taliban near the Af-Pak
border resulted in numerous civilian casualties, and also
strained the US-Pakistan relationship.
Indian counter-insurgency and anti-terrorist operations
principally take place internally. The inappropriate use of force
not only kills fellow citizens, but also turns the public will
against the government. Proportionate force is, consequently,
necessary to tackle the menace. New weapon systems, with
greater precision and lower levels of lethality, designed for

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urban environments, need to be explored and deployed.

Traditional tactics such as rolling in tanks, artillery, and
conventional infantry in cities must be strictly prohibited and
special command and control systems developed to monitor
and direct soldiers in urban warfare to minimise the actual use
of force in urban combat.

Doctrine Driven Technology

Rapidly evolving technology and sophisticated gadgets
play a vital role in reducing civilian and combatant casualties
in urban area. Basically, superior technology gives the armed
forces an edge while dealing with enemy forces. In hybrid
warfare, strategic thinkers believe technology has to be
modified according to need of an operator (soldier). Advances
in limited effect ammunition can help planners and operators
reduce collateral damage by inflicting a carefully measured
quantum of destruction.
Non-lethal technology will also be helpful for the armed
forces engaging in urban-combat other than war. For instance,
in peacekeeping operations or a humanitarian situation, non-
lethal weapons can help the armed force perform their duty
without inflicting major casualties. However, operators should
not over-use such weapons. Moreover, any indiscriminate or
excessive use can also prove counter-productive. For example,
the overuse of “pellet guns” in Kashmir has led to a huge
uproar and public anger against the armed forces in the Valley.

Stress in Hybrid-Combat
Combat in open space gives much room for soldiers to
engage a target. But operations in built-up areas with complex
building structures restrict a soldier’s view, creating tension
and panic. Stress is compounded by the pressure to engage

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targets while minimising civilian casualties. This stress creates

negative reaction and can result in misconduct. In long-drawn
deployments, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders (PTSD) and
Combat Stress Disorder (CSD) undermine a soldier’s combat
effectiveness. Soldiers deployed in extreme condition are prone
to CSD. For instance, as many as 891 suicide cases have been
reported by the Indian defence forces between 2011 and 2018.35
In many cases, stress has led the killing of fellow officers or
soldiers, as well as civilians in combat areas.
Stress disorders can be partially addressed by tough and
realistic training, making soldiers understand the operational
environment and keeping them informed about enemy tactics
and movements. A habit of following Rules of Engagement
(ROE) and the army’s moral code must also be inculcated.
Scientific debriefing after operations help soldiers understand
the environment and keep them healthy.

Real Time Situational Awareness

Real Time Situational Awareness (RTSA) is going to
be important component for future soldiers. The flow of
intelligence has to be channelised properly to reach every
operator in the battle field and alert them about the situation
around them in real time. Enclosed urban spaces limit a
soldier’s ability to look beyond a certain range; so intelligence
gathered through various other sources invariably helps them
engage the correct target.
RTSA, human intelligence and intelligence through other
(technological) means can be major sources to help distinguish
“foe from the friend” in the urban battlefield. It also helps the

35 “Between 2011 and 2018, Almost 900 Armed Forces Personnel Died by
Suicide”, The Wire, February 19, 2019, https://thewire.in/security/india-
armed-personnel-suicides.

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Prakash Panneerselvam

soldier in a vulnerable or disadvantaged position in a built-up

area find the right direction for pursuit or engagement.

Perception Management
The military or any other armed force in today’s context has
to be prepared to face public scrutiny. Perception management
thus becomes an imperative to protect the image of armed
forces in battle and gain or retain public support. Social media
platforms like Facebook, WhatsApp, YouTube, Instagram and
others play an important role in the modern world. Terrorists
around the globe have been using these platforms to recruit
members for their organisations, collect donations and spread
fake news to create panic in the society. The Islamic State/
Daesh is the best example, as it effectively used social media
to spread their ideology around the globe. They have also used
these media tools to recruit members for their organisation in
Syria and Iraq to fight against government forces. The armed
forces, consequently, have a huge additional responsibility to
use social media to counter these narratives.
Soldiers are the centrepiece of any armed force. Fighting
in built-up areas is a relatively new discourse in the Indian
armed forces. Since India is surrounded by unstable and
hostile countries, the armed forces have to prepare for every
eventuality. Other than war, the army’s preparation for Stability
and Support Operation (SASO) is necessitated by India’s
power projection in Asia. The increase in population and the
growing pace of India’s economy will open new urban centres
across the nation. Since urban areas are the country’s nerve
centres, the government will need to respond accordingly, to
set up specialised security arrangements across all cities to deal
with all possible threats spawned by hybrid warfare.

134
 FORM IV
(See Rule 8)
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Whether citizen of India? Yes, Indian
Address: 309, Hari Sadan
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New Delhi – 110 002
4. Publisher’s Name: Ajai Sahni
Whether citizen of India: Yes, Indian
Address: IIIrd Floor, Apsara Arcade,
B-1/8, Pusa Road,
New Delhi – 110 005
5. Editor’s Name: Ajai Sahni
Whether citizen of India? Yes, Indian
Address: IIIrd Floor, Apsara Arcade,
B-1/8, Pusa Road,
New Delhi – 110 005
6. Names and addresses of individuals who Ajai Sahni
own the newspaper and partners or IIIrd Floor, Apsara Arcade,
shareholders holding more than one per B-1/8, Pusa Road,
cent of total capital. New Delhi – 110 005
I, Ajai Sahni, hereby declare that the particulars given above are true to the
best of my knowledge and belief.
October 28, 2019 (Sd) Ajai Sahni
Signature of Publisher
 Pakistan
The Role of Madrasas in
Women’s Empowerment
A Study of the Khanewal and Vehari Districts of
Punjab

Kristie J. Krause∗

Oppression is a phenomenon experienced by many women

in Pakistan. Powerlessness is an expected result, and is a
situation where women have little control over aspects of their
lives. The foundation for women’s oppression in Pakistan rests
in the political, social, cultural, and patriarchal structure of
society, where men control women’s opportunities, including
the right to education.1 In such backdrop, a reasonable way
to reduce oppression is by promoting knowledge in higher
education among the female population of the country.
In developing countries like Pakistan, women’s
empowerment is of great importance, as almost 30 per cent of

* Dr. Kristie J. Krause works with Census Bureau of US Government.

The paper is based on the field work of her doctoral research submitted
to the Chicago School of Professional Psychology. She did an extensive
field study in the districts of Khanewal and Vehari of Punjab Province of
Pakistan.
1 A. Naz and H. U. R. Chaudhry, “Developing gender equality; an analytical
study of sociopolitical and economic constraints in women’s empowerment
in Pakhtun society of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province Pakistan”, Indian
Journal of Health and Wellbeing, Volume 2, Number 1, 2011, pp. 259-266.
Kristie J. Krause

women are considered both economically and socially poor.2

A high level of female education is of utmost importance,
because it provides a rock-solid base to heighten gender
equality.3
As of 1974, there were 121 madrasas in the Punjab
province of Pakistan. By 2016, this number had increased
to approximately 13,782.4 The mushrooming of madrasas
in Punjab has long been a key recruiting ground for militant
groups. Punjab is Pakistan’s second largest and most densely
populated province, with a population exceeding 82 million,
comprising 56 per cent of the country’s total population.5 Most
of Pakistan’s military support also comes from this province.
It can be said that, if Pakistan were to collapse due to Islamist
extremism, then it is in Punjab where this would occur, as it is
a fertile ground for various extremist religious activities, and a
rich recruitment area for madrasa students.6

2 H. Rehman, et. al., “Role of microfinance institutions in women

empowerment: A case study of Akhuwat, Pakistan” South Asian Studies,
Volume 30, Number 1, 2015, p. 107.
3 M. Meraj and M.B. Sadaqat, “Gender equality and socio-economic
development through women’s empowerment in Pakistan”, Ritsumeikan
Journal of Asia Pacific Studies, Volume 34, Number 16, 2016, pp. 125-140.
4 S. Khan, “Women’s empowerment through poverty alleviation: A socio-
cultural and politico-economic assessment of conditions in Pakistan”,
European Virtual Conference on Management Sciences and Economics,
Volume 1, Number 1, pp. 25–52.
M. Ramzan, “Sectarian landscape, madrasas and militancy in Punjab”.
Journal of Political Studies, Volume 22, Number 2, 2015, pp. 421-436.
5 F. Anjum, et. al., “Health issues and wellbeing: Working children in carpet
industry in Punjab Pakistan”, Professional Medical Journal, Colume 22,
Number 5, 2015, pp. 640-647.
6 C.H. Hansi, “Fault lines in Pakistan and implications for India”, 2017,
http://www.claws.in/images/publication_pdf/1090930096_MP66Hansi.
pdf.

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 Pakistan: Role of Madrasas in Women’s Empowerment

Over a period of time, Islamist radicalisation has made

serious inroads in the province. The wave of terrorism in Punjab
gained momentum and hit Pakistan itself when military forces
captured Islamabad’s Red Mosque in 2007. This incident
represented the first clear case of Ulama and students (both
male and female) within a Pakistani madrasa taking up arms
in opposition to the state, and gravitating towards militancy.7
After 9/11, the then Pakistani President Musharraf decided
to ally with the U.S. in the ‘War on Terror’. The President
declared that any madrasa that taught extremism or was found
to be involved in destructive or militant activities would be
shut down. Musharraf’s government began demolishing
militant madrasas as a part of its pledge to the U.S. and to its
War on Terror. In January of 2007, the government informed
the Red Mosque administration that its main madrasas would
be shut down.
This incident instigated retaliation from the young students
of the Red Mosque, who for months had campaigned to
Talibanise Pakistan, wanting to turn it into a state that enforced
the strictest version of Islam as the Law of the land. In July
2007, the government deployed military troops in response
to the Red Mosque’s violent campaign to impose Sharia law.
Young students, including female, were pouring into the
madrasa to ‘martyr’ themselves. During the eight-day siege,
over 150 students, militants, and soldiers were killed. A female
madrasa student from the Red Mosque described the incident
as an apocalypse, because many women were martyred in the
hail of bullets from all sides.8

7 Masooda Bano, The Rational Believer: Choices and Decisions in the

Madrasas of Pakistan, Cornell University Press, New York, 2012.
8 H. Trivedi and M. A. Naqvi, “Among the believers”, Munjusha Films,
2015,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lNut1K34aFg&list=PLV4HS70
bPiZ3JgHzv bZ5PS37zsghBzTDG.

139
Kristie J. Krause

Pakistan’s madrasa education system is currently changing.

This change is necessary to prevent madrasas from getting
trapped in a cycle of violence because of the ideological divide
in society that leads to conflict over those who support Sharia
law and those who do not. In 2006, Musharraf implemented a
five-year plan to reform madrasas. By 2008, over 12,000 out
of the estimated 13,000 madrasas in Punjab had registered
with the government to receive funding. However, updated
information demonstrated that madrasas in Pakistan had
opposed all of the government’s efforts at reform.9
Between 2007 and 2014, there were 3,700 terrorist attacks,
1,200 schools destroyed, and over 50,000 people died.10 Militant
groups were out for revenge to support the cause of the Red
Mosque and attack military and civilian targets. For example,
the Peshawar school attack in December 16, 2014, caused
global public outcry. In response, the Pakistani Army launched
a major offensive into the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan- TTP’s
stronghold, flattening villages and confiscating weapons. Over
one million people were internally displaced within Pakistan
as a result of these operations.11
The international community views madrasas as having
less to do with education and more to do with a security threat
to the modern world.12 The Afghanistan Ministry of Defense
(MoD) reported that the jihadis who are at war with the
Afghan Defense Forces include many students from madrasas

9 J. Park and S. Niyozov, “Madrasa education in South Asia and Southeast

Asia: Current issues and debates”, Asia Pacific Journal of Education,
Volume 28, Number 4, 2008, pp.323-351.
10 H. Trivedi and M.A. Naqvi, 2015, op. cit.
11 Ibid.
12 T. M. Butt, “Social and political role of madrassa: Perspectives of religious
leaders in Pakistan”, A Research Journal of South Asian Studies, Volume
2, Number 27, 2012, pp. 387-407.

140
 Pakistan: Role of Madrasas in Women’s Empowerment

in Pakistan. The MoD emphasises, further, that many of these

madrasas educate and equip students so that they are prepared
to fight the Afghan government forces.13
In the United States, madrasas are viewed as a global
security threat, which prompted Washington to provide
Pakistan over USD 225 million in aid in support of their
reform efforts.14 Pakistan was thought to be one of the
most strategically important countries for the United States,
evidenced by the investment of more than USD 30 billion over
a period of 60 years15, to help reform the country and produce a
more stable and democratic nation, more capable of countering
terrorism.16
The improvements surrounding reformed madrasas for
women are on the rise in Pakistan.17 This change is needed for
females, who constitute 48 per cent of the country’s population,
but have fewer education and empowerment opportunities
when compared to their male counterparts.18 Madrasas face a
myriad of challenges in preparing females for life in a rapidly
13 A.W. Arian, “Pakistani madrasas foster terrorists to wage war against
Afghans: MoD”, Therearenosunglasses, June 28, 2016, https://
therearenosunglasses.wordpress.com/2016/06/28/afghan-mod-charges-
pakistanimadrasas-foster-the-terrorists-who-wage-war-against-
afghanistan/.
14 Masooda Bano, op. cit.
15 Daniel F. Runde, “An Economic Crisis in Pakistan Again: What’s Different
This Time?”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 31,
2018,https://www.csis.org/analysis/economic-crisis-pakistan-again-whats-
different-time.
16 H. Mirahmadi, et. al., “Empowering Pakistan’s civil society to counter
violent extremism”, Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice,
Volume 8, Number 1, 2016, pp. 188-214.
17 M. Farooq, “Disciplining the feminism: Girls’ madrasa education in
Pakistan”, The Historian, Volume 3, Number 2, 2013, pp. 1-25.
18 A. Anantharam, “Engendering the nation: Women, Islam, and poetry in
Pakistan”, Journal of International Women’s Studies, Volume 11, Number
1, 2013, pp. 208-224.

141
Kristie J. Krause

changing Pakistani society with the emergence of modernity

and globalisation.19 One of the key components of reformed
madrasas for females is to equip students with economically
marketable skills and allow them to seek gainful employment
upon graduation.20 In acknowledgement of increasing rivalry
with public schools, a large number of madrasas have proven
quite eager to change in response to local educational demands.

Obstacles for Women’s Empowerment in Pakistan

In spite of increased international efforts, the situation
with regard to women’s empowerment in Pakistan has not
significantly improved.21 Some of the barriers concerning
women’s empowerment in Pakistan are violence, male
dominance, discrimination, subordination, and inequality of
rights.22 Violence in the form of sexual abuse, domestic abuse,
acid burning, and honour killings are some of the central
elements that shape women’s disempowerment in Pakistan.23
According to the report of HRCP (2015), between 2008 and

19 J. Park and S. Niyozov, 2008, op. cit.

20 K. Borchgrevink, “Transnational links of Afghan madrasas: Implications
for the reform of religious education”, Prospects, Volume 43, Number 1,
2013, pp. 69-84.
21 A. A. Ali, and M. J. Akhtar, “Empowerment and political mobilization
of women in Pakistan: A descriptive discourse of perspectives” Pakistan
Journal of Social Sciences, Volume 32, Number 1, 2012, pp. 221-228.
22 A. Mohyuddin and M. Ambreen, “Economic empowerment of women
in the rural areas of Balochistan”, Pakistan Journal of Women’s Studies,
Volume 19, Number 2, 2012, pp. 239-256.
23 D. Bhawani et. al., “Gender equality and women empowerment in Pakistan
(36th STP)”, Civil Services Academy, Lahore Pakistan Administrative
Campus, 2013, http://www.academia.edu/7287527/Gender_Equality_and_
Women_Empowerment_in_Pakistan.
N. Kabeer, “Women, wages and intra-household power relations in urban
Bangladesh”, Development and Change, Volume 28, Number 2, 1997, pp.
261-302.
A. Mohyuddin and M. Ambreen, op. cit.

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 Pakistan: Role of Madrasas in Women’s Empowerment

2015, there were more than 3,000 women victims of honour

killing in Pakistan. In 2015, there were 55 acid attacks against
women in the country.24 Other main hurdles for women’s
empowerment in Pakistan include oppressive patriarchal
structures, rigid socio-cultural customs and traditions, poverty,
strict interpretations of Islam, and discriminatory laws.25
Oppressive patriarchal structures- Pakistani society
exhibits a patriarchal mindset, with the dominance of
men over women in all matters of family life.26 The word
patriarchy means the rule of the father and originally was
used to describe a particular type of male-dominated family.
The characteristics of Pakistan’s patriarchal society consist of
extremely restrictive codes of behaviour for women, such as the
practice of rigid gender segregation and a dominant ideology
linking family honour to female virtue. As a result, men are
responsible for safeguarding family honour through complex
social arrangements that ensure the protection, restriction,
and dependence of women.27 These patriarchal attitudes
towards women in Pakistan are deep-rooted and support the
discriminatory practices against them.28
Gender discriminatory laws and gender biases- A number
of progressive laws supporting women’s empowerment
were passed between 2010 and 2012. These laws include the
National Commission on Status of Women Act, the Domestic

24 A. Hadi, “Patriarchy and gender-based violence in Pakistan”, European

Journal of Social Sciences Education and Research, Volume 10, Number
2, 2017, pp. 297-304.
25 S. Z. Awan, “Role of civil society in empowering Pakistani women”, South
Asian Studies, Volume 27, Number 2, 2012, pp. 439-458.
26 Ibid.
27 R. Frederick-Littrell and A. Bertsch, “Traditional and contemporary status
of women in the patriarchal belt. Equality, Diversity and Inclusion”, An
International Journal, Volume 32, Number 3, 2013, pp. 310-324.
28 S. Z. Awan, 2012, op. cit.

143
Kristie J. Krause

Violence Bill, and the Protection against Harassment of

Women at the Workplace.29 At the official level, several laws
have been adopted in Pakistan to safeguard women (i.e., The
Women in Distress and Detention Fund (Amendment) Act,
2011; Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection), Act
2012; and the National Commission on the Status of Women
Act, 2012). However, in spite of these safeguards, cultural
patterns in Pakistan do not let women enjoy their legal and
religious rights protected by the law and provided by Islam.30
The gender discrimination involves income disparity and
social status where men benefit from wages, social position,
practices, and laws.31
Women in Pakistan also face discrimination in family law,
property law, and in the judicial system.32 Women are still not
safeguarded under constitutional provisions. It seems that once
the origin or basis of a law or a rule is claimed to be Islamic,
the Pakistani Government and political leaders dare not repeal
them.33 The political costs of defying the divine word of God
are too high, and, usually, the Government simply does not
act, or acts inconsistently.34 Today, Islamic socio-religious
29 N.S. Murshid and F.M. Critelli, “Empowerment and intimate partner
violence in Pakistan: results from a nationally representative survey”,
Journal of Interpersonal Violence, Volume 2, Number 1, 2017, pp. 1-22.
30 Sanchita Bhattacharya, “Status of women in Pakistan”, Journal of the
Research Society of Pakistan, Volume 51, Number 1, 2014, pp. 179-211.
31 F.Y. Bukhari and M. Ramzan, “Gender discrimination: A myth or truth
women status in Pakistan”, Journal of Business and Management, Volume
8, Number 2, 2013, pp. 88-97.
32 D.Y. Coleman, Pakistan: 2015 country review, 2015, http://www.
countrywatch.com.
33 G.C. Chua, et.al., “Honour killing as engendered violence against women
in Amit Majmudar’s partitions”, 3L: Language, Linguistics, Literature,
Volume 22, Number 1, 2016, pp. 221-233.
34 R. Imran, “Legal injustices: The zina hudood ordinance of Pakistan and
its implication for women”, Journal of International Women’s Studies,
Volume 7, Number 2, 2013, pp. 78-100.

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 Pakistan: Role of Madrasas in Women’s Empowerment

laws exist through Hudood laws, promulgated in 1979 and

enforced in 1980. They are a collection of five criminal laws,
collectively known as the Hudood Ordinances.
The Ordinance criminalises Zina, which is defined as extra-
marital sex, including adultery and fornication. Additionally,
the Qanoon-e-Shahadat (Law of Evidence) states that the
testimony of a female is considered half that of a man’s in a
Pakistani court of law. Thus, three out of four Pakistani women
in prison under its Hudood laws are rape victims because they
are required to produce four male witnesses to prove their
allegation, which is nearly impossible. As a result, many
Pakistani women who report their rape to the police end up
being charged with adultery on their part, and the Sharia courts
in Pakistan punish them with long term imprisonment and, in
some extreme cases, even the death sentence.35
Significantly, Muhktar Mai, a survivor of a gang rape
in 2002, was able to get one man out of the group of six of
the more powerful Pakistani men who raped her convicted.
However, she and her family continue to live with permanent
death threats. In the past, the male dominated Pakistani society
justified honour killings through the notion that females must
refrain from sexuality to maintain the honour of the family.36 In
times of communal strife, this leads to women being viewed by
their male family members as threats against the honour of their
respective religions and communities. Only recently has the
Parliament in Pakistan taken a positive step to protect women
against honour killings. On October 6, 2016, an Anti-honour
Killing Bill, setting the minimum punishment for an offender

35 P. Chesler, “Punished for being raped and for accusing rapists: Women’s
burden under sharia”, October 28, 2014, Breitbart, http://www.breitbart.
com/nationalsecurity/2014/10/28/punished-for-being-raped-the-burden-
of-women-under-sharia/.
36 G.C. Chua, et.al., 2016, op. cit.

145
Kristie J. Krause

to be 25 years in prison, was passed.37 However, the law on

honour killings, like a range of other laws, remains on paper,
and society continues to be indifferent to the plight of women.
According to a July, 2019 report, in the province of Punjab,
over the preceding one year, 234 cases of honour killing were
reported, of which six were withdrawn. As many as 400 of 439
suspects involved in the remaining 228 cases were arrested,
but only 2 per cent of the accused were convicted. A Police
source said that the main reason for this abysmally low rate of
conviction is that the aggrieved party tends to reconcile with
the suspects and the matter never ends up in court.38 Seeking
justice in such cases is a long-drawn process and women are at
a great social and institutional disadvantage. In many cases the
community and tribal elders arbitrate for ‘restoring the honour’
of the victim’s family by convincing the parties to reach a
compromise and getting the killer pardoned by victim’s family.
Pakistani women continue to face widespread discrimination
in other aspects of their lives including the home, employment
sector, and community.39 Even after women get married, they
are not given freedom to work or make decisions.40 There
is also strong social pressure for women to stay at home
while enjoying fewer benefits relating to nutrition, health,
and education, when compared to their male counterparts.
Improvements in women’s empowerment in Pakistan cannot

37 H. Fatima, et. al., “Pakistan steps up to remove “honour” from honour

killing”, The Lancet Global Health, Volume 5, Number 2, 2017.
38 “2% of honour killing suspects convicted”, July 5, 2019, https://www.
pakistangendernews.org/2-of-honour-killing-suspects-convicted/
39 M. Sohail, “Women empowerment and economic development-An
exploratory study in Pakistan”, Journal of Business Studies Quarterly,
Volume 5, Number 4, 2014, 1-24.
40 M. Qureshi, “The gender differences in school enrolment and returns to
education in Pakistan”, The Pakistan Development Review, Volume 51,
Number 3, 2012, 219-256.

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 Pakistan: Role of Madrasas in Women’s Empowerment

occur until there is good governance with accountability and

the rule of law.41
Poverty- Given the burden of poverty on women in
Pakistan, the significance of empowering them cannot be
overstated. Poverty, together with established norms of gender
inequality, contributes to multiple complications for them.
Combating poverty remains the top priority in almost all the
national plans of the Pakistani government. Pakistan is facing
the formidable challenge of poverty-reduction because of its
status as the sixth most populous nation in the world. Since
independence, Pakistan’s population increased almost five
times from 34 million in 1951 to 173.5 in 2010 and 207.8
million by 201742 By 2050, Pakistan is expected to be the
4th most populous country in the world with more than 348
million people.43
In Pakistan, 60.3 per cent of the total population lives on
less than two dollars a day, with the rural areas having more
severe and absolute poverty compared to the urban areas of
the country.44 Empirical evidence has found that one way
to reduce poverty in Pakistan is the education of the female
head of the household.45 Mass education is the only way to
eradicate poverty and act on the findings on women’s status

41 Ahmar, Moonis, “The State of Social Development in Pakistan” in Habib

Tiliouine and Richard J. Estes eds. The State of Social Progress of Islamic
Societies, Springer International Publishing, Gewerbestrasse, 2016.
42 Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, “Population Census”, http://www.pbs.gov.
pk/content/population-census.
43 I. A. Shakil et.al., “Population-poverty connection in Pakistan: Is it really
a problem?”, Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan, Volume 51,
Number 1, 2014, pp. 1-27.
44 Ibid.
45 G. M. Arif and S. Farooq, “Rural poverty dynamics in Pakistan: Evidence
from three waves of the panel survey”, Pakistan Development Review,
Volume 53, Number 2, 2014, pp. 1-32.

147
Kristie J. Krause

in the developing country of Pakistan.46 Women’s education

in Pakistan remains grossly underinvested by families because
of the direct and indirect cost of sending girls to school and
because of safety concerns in secular schools. Consequently,
many families are more willing to send their daughters to
madrasas because they are thought to be safer.47 Families
are also swayed by religious and community leaders who
encourage them to send their daughters to madrasas, so that
these leaders can enhance their own economic security.48
Strict religious interpretation of Islam- The mis-
interpretation of Islam is one of the reasons why women’s
empowerment is so difficult to achieve in Pakistan.49 Religious
doctrines impact directly on Muslim women’s empowerment.50
Religious beliefs such as the pardah system exclude Pakistani
women from the public sphere and confine them to a domestic
sphere for a significant portion of their life.51
Other research has found that Islamic leaders may
promote or hinder South Asian Muslim women in pursuing

46 F.Y. Bukhari and M. Ramzan, 2013, op. cit.

47 M. Qureshi, 2012, op. cit.
48 M.A. Ali et. al., “War against terrorism and its impact on academic
performance in district swat Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pakistan”,
Journal of Management Info, Volume 9, Number 1, 2016, pp. 12-20.
A. Keddie, “Framing discourses of possibility and constraints in the
empowerment of Muslim girls: Issues of religion, race, ethnicity and culture”,
Race Ethnicity and Education, Volume 14, Number 2, 2010, pp. 175-19.
49 F.Y. Bukhari and M. Ramzan, 2013, op. cit.
50 R. Imran, “Deconstructing Islamization in Pakistan: Sabiha Sumar
wages feminist cinematic jihad through a documentary lens”, Journal of
International Women’s Studies, Volume 9, Number 3, 2008, pp. 117-142.
51 S.A. Begum and M. N. Beena, “Empowerment of Muslim women in
Islam”, Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Volume 19, Number 10,
2014, pp. 27-29.
A. Mohyuddin and M. Ambreen, 2012, op. cit.

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 Pakistan: Role of Madrasas in Women’s Empowerment

opportunities, such as educational attainment.52 For example,

Islamic leaders who promote women’s rights could help
women fulfill their academic aspirations and improve their
impoverished conditions. Conversely, Islamic leaders can also
create a lot of hurdles for women by extracting references from
Islamic texts or traditions that are unsupportive of women’s
empowerment.

Education and Empowerment

Pakistan is the sixth most populous country in the world
with a total population of 207.8 million. Pakistan’s rapidly
growing population adds to the many challenges faced by the
nation’s education system. The educational system is complex
and inadequate, and, as such, has not met basic learning needs.
With respect to education and women’s empowerment, it can
very well be said that, higher education not only empowers
women, but also helps them to enlarge their world views,
choices, and growth of knowledge within the basic structures
of families in a traditional society. Educated women are more
likely to view the world through a different lens, which may
lead them to improve their social conditions. For example,
education helps women shape their views on issues like
violence against them and makes them more likely to demand
their basic human rights in existing patriarchal countries.53
Similarly, educated women are more likely to raise educated
girls with greater awareness of their personal rights, and

52 P. Bagguley and V. Hussain, “Negotiating mobility: South Asian women

and higher education” Sociology, Volume 50, Number 1, 2014, pp. 43-59.
53 S.R. Schuler, et. al., “Women’s empowerment as a protective factor against
intimate partner violence in Bangladesh: A qualitative exploration of the
process and limitations of its influence”, Violence Against Women, Volume
23, Number 9, 2017, pp. 1100-1121.

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Kristie J. Krause

elevated confidence and freedom to make decisions that affect

their lives.54
The biggest obstacle to educational reform is the absence
of a blueprint such as that used across the globe.55 This study
attempted to investigate reformed madrasas in Pakistan as a
way to expand universal knowledge of educational reform.
Reform efforts differ depending on the context, and researchers
need to investigate ways they can create a “theory of change”
that can be applied more widely.56

Key Elements of Reformed Madrasas

State cooperation and support- A Madaris Reform Project
(MRP) was launched in 2002 in Pakistan to strengthen lines of
communication between madrasas and the government. The
MRP planned to fund the salaries of teachers to be appointed
to teach non-religious subjects. A salary of Rs. 4000 per month
(equivalent to USD 38.16) would be given to teachers for
teaching formal subjects at the secondary level and Rs. 10,000
per month (equivalent to USD 90.46) at the intermediate level.57

54 “Global Education Monitoring Report, Accountability in education:

Meeting our Commitments”, UNESCO, August, 2017, http://unesdoc.
unesco.org/images/0025/002593/259338e.pdf.
55 M. Afzal, “Education and attitudes in Pakistan (Special Report)”, United
States Institution of Peace, 2015, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/
SR367- Education-and-Attitudes-in-Pakistan.pdf.
C. Strickland, “Conducting focus groups cross- culturally: Experiences
with pacific northwest Indian people”, Public Health Nursing, Volume 16,
Number 3, 1999, pp. 190-197.
56 D.G. White and J.A. Levin, “Navigating the turbulent waters of school
reform guided by complexity theory”, Complicity: An International
Journal of Complexity and Education, Volume 13, Number 1, 2016, pp.
43-80.
57 Sanchita Bhattacharya, “Madrasa policy in Pakistan: Strategies from
within”, International Journal of South Asian Studies, Volume 2, Number
2, 2009, pp. 177-194.

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 Pakistan: Role of Madrasas in Women’s Empowerment

There have been other attempts by the Government of Pakistan

to reform madrasas58:
• In 2000-2003, the Musharraf Government introduced
the Education Sector Reform Action Plan and focused
on the inclusion of modern subjects in madrasas and
registering every madrasa.
• In 2001, the government created a Pakistan Madrasa
Education Board (PMEB) to establish a network
of “model madrasas” and encourage madrasas to
provide both religious and secular education. They
also established public-private partnerships (PPPs) in
attempts to gain support for their educational reform
process.
• In 2002, the government initiated, the Deeni Madaris
Ordinance (Voluntary Registration and Regulation) and
promised funding to madrasas that formally registered
with the government.
• In 2005, the Pakistani state ordered madrasas to expel
all foreign students.
• In 2009, the government tried to establish a Madrassa
Regulatory Authority under the Interior Ministry to
control madrasas, but this was rejected by the Ittehad-
e-Tanzeem-ul-Madaris Pakistan (ITMP), an umbrella
organisation of madrasa oversight boards.

58 Masooda Bano, “Public private partnerships (PPPs) as ‘anchor’ of

educational reforms: Lessons from Pakistan”, UNESCO, 2008, http://itacec.
org/document/sindh_public_private_partnership/learning_resources/
Bano%2 0.%202008%20World%20bank.pdf.
Sanchita Bhattacharya, “Madrasa education in Pakistan: In the context
of government policy”, Global Education Magazine, Number 9, 2014,
http://www.globaleducationmagazine.com/madrasa-education-pakistan-
contextgovernment-policy/.

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Kristie J. Krause

• In October 2010, the government succeeded in making

an agreement with ITMP for the introduction of modern
subjects in some courses in madrasas.
It is difficult to assess the positive impact, if any, of these
reforms, because most of the initiatives called for voluntary
submission to regulations, leaving many madrasas uninvolved.59
At present, it remains unclear how many madrasas receive
government-supported funds in Pakistan.60
Train program for teachers- The government of Pakistan
has a long history of advocating the importance of quality
teachers in education to raise the status of the country. At
the first educational conference held in Karachi in 1947,
Muhammad Ali Jinnah stated, “We should redouble our efforts
to make teacher education rich. This will strengthen the system
of education and in this way, we can raise the status and honour
of Pakistan in the community of Nations.”61
Teachers in madrasas play a crucial role in the learning
process for female students and must receive current training
to meet the modern demands of Pakistani society.62 Teachers in
madrasas need to be encouraged to participate in the numerous
free teacher training workshops organised by the government

59 Sanchita Bhattacharya, 2009, op. cit.

60 Masooda Bano, “Beyond politics: The reality of a Deobandi madrasa in
Pakistan”, Journal of Islamic Studies, Volume 8, Number 1, 2007a, 43-68.
M. A. Raheem, “A comparative study of the attitudes of students attending
urdu medium, english medium and seminary schools in Pakistan”,
Doctoral dissertation, University of Glasgow, 2015, http://theses.gla.
ac.uk/6425/1/2013RaheemPhD.pdf.pdf.
61 W. Khan, “Quality of teacher education in Pakistan”, Dialogue, Volume 10,
Number 2, 2015, pp. 212-219.
62 S.F. Kazmi and T. Pervez, “Socio economic and cultural perspectives of
terrorism in Pakistan and the madrassa (mosque) students”, International
Journal of Academic Research, Volume 3, Number 2, 2011, pp. 2-32.

152
 Pakistan: Role of Madrasas in Women’s Empowerment

and non-government sectors.63 Further, reformed madrasas

require qualified teachers exposed to the various teaching
methodologies that enhance the learning process of Islamic
religious education.64
Reformed madrasas in Pakistan are beginning to reflect
modern teaching methods in their studies.65 Some Pakistani
madrasa teachers embrace modern teaching styles such as
using leading or thought-provoking questions and encouraging
students to ask questions about what they’re seeking to
understand.66 On the contrary, some madrasa teachers are less
likely to embrace modernisation, and show less support for
equal rights for women as compared to secular teachers.67
Curriculum- To stay abreast of secular universities and
to equip future students with the changing conditions of the
world, madrasas need to expand their curriculum.68 The
concept of curriculum reform for madrasas has been part of
Pakistani society since the early 1980s with a plan to modernise
their education system. This curriculum reform consisted of
introducing secular subjects such as English, science, and

63 S.W.A. Kauser and A.W. Sial, “The impact of systematic structure of

madrassahs on student’s outcomes in Pakistan: Do they need structural
reforms?”, Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies, Volume 14,
Number 41, 2015, pp. 127-147.
64 A. Fauzi, “The management of teachers’ empowerment of state madrasah
Aliyah in Banten province”, Higher Education Studies, Volume 6, Number
2, 2016, pp. 32-54.
65 N. Rustham and Arifin Mamat, “Teaching methodologies in a weekend
madrasah: A study at Jamiyah education centre, Singapore”, International
Journal of Arts and Commerce, Volume 1, Number 2, 2012, pp. 48-167.
66 J. Park and S. Niyozov, 2008, op. cit.
67 D.J. Roof, “Problems of common interest: The shaping of education in
Pakistan, 1970- 2014”, Pakistan Journal of Commerce & Social Sciences,
Volume 9, Number 1, 2015, pp. 35-51.
68 S.W.A. Kauser and A.W. Sial, 2015, op. cit.

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Kristie J. Krause

mathematics, alongside religion-related subjects.69 In 2007,

the government began to focus on reforming the Deobandi
curriculum, the largest madrasa education board for women.70
This change represented nearly three-quarters of the madrasas
and 90 per cent of all the female students.71 The Dars-e-Nizami
is the curriculum of the Deobandi madrasas, and it centres on
creating more docile, subservient, and domesticated women,
with a focus on the specific manners required to conform to
their image of the ideal Muslim woman.72
Infrastructure and information technologies- Reforms
are also expanding infrastructure and information and
communications technologies (ICTs) into the domain of
madrasas in Pakistan. The infrastructure of madrasas in
Pakistan can be situated on a continuum from the most
traditional one-room schoolhouse to elaborate modern
campuses.73 Some recently established private madrasas
offer modern infrastructure, with well-endowed libraries, and
science and computer laboratories.74 Libraries have been shown
to be useful in female education because they provide relevant
knowledge and skills through ICTs. Advanced technologies

69 “Major evaluation of Pakistani madrasa reform project completed”, Salam

Institute for Peace and Justice, Issue 4, 2009, http://www.salaminstitute.
org/Winter_Newsletter0109.pdf.
70 T. Bradley and R. Saigol, “Religious values and beliefs and education for
women in Pakistan”, Development in Practice, Volume 22, Number 5/6,
2012, pp. 675-688.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
S.M.A. Zaidi, S.M.A., “Madrassa education in Pakistan: Controversies,
challenges and Prospects”, Centre for Strategic and International Analysis,
SISA Report number 3, 2013, http://strategiskanalyse.no/publikasjoner%20
2013/2013-03-04__SISA3_Madrassa_Education_-_Syed_Manzar_
Abbas_Zaidi.pdf.
73 J. Park and S. Niyozov, 2008, op. cit.
74 S.W.A. Kauser and A.W. Sial, 2015, op. cit.

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 Pakistan: Role of Madrasas in Women’s Empowerment

inspire confidence and self-reliance, and also equip women

with abilities to address current problems of the modern world.75
Extra-curricular activities- Some female madrasas are
providing extracurricular training to their students in order to
encourage proper Islamic etiquette and manners.76 One type of
extra-curricular activity observed in female madrasas was the
salat workshop. Salat is the ritual prayer, one of the five pillars
of Islam.77 It includes different body postures and recitation of
different meaningful Ayat (verses) during each posture.78
Activities that have successfully been introduced in the
reformed madrasas across Pakistan79, however, include strong
writing and language programs to help prepare students for
entering the real world of publication. Some reformed madrasas
have introduced the arts into their curriculum. The students of
Jamia Ashraf-ul Madaris, Karachi, receive martial arts training
from a national champion. Further, conversation sessions or
presentations are also common extracurricular activities in
some madrasas. The Jamia Salfia Madrasa in Islamabad has
a seminar week at the end of the first term of the year, and

75 R. Zakar et. al., “Harnessing information technology to improve women’s

health information: Evidence from Pakistan”, BMC Women’s Health,
Volume 14, Number 1, 2014, p. 105.
76 M. Begum and H. Kabir, “Reflections on the deobandi reformist agenda in
a female Quomi madrasah in Bangladesh”, South Asia: Journal of South
Asian Studies, Volume 35, Number 2, 2012, pp. 353-380.
77 “Masjid”, Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World, 2015, p. 145, http://
www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-
andmaps/Masjid.
78 H. Doufesh, et. al., “Effects of Muslims praying (salat) on EEG gamma
activity”, Complementary Therapies in Clinical Practice, Volume 8,
Number 24, 2016, pp. 6-10.
79 Rahman, K., “Madrassas in Pakistan: Role and emerging trends”, in A
Pandya, et. al. eds., Islam and politics: Renewal and resistance in the
Muslim world. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2009.

155
Kristie J. Krause

has included topics such as “Torch Bearer of Humanitarian

Services or Centres of Terrorism”.80

Madrasa Education for Women in Pakistan

Higher education in Pakistan is ranked among the lowest in
the world and is accessed by just 6 per cent of the population.81
The country uses just over 2 per cent of its Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) on higher education, despite a commitment
to spend 4 per cent by 2018.82 Higher education for women
in Pakistan can be obtained in four ways: through the secular
university systems, madrasas, private universities, or colleges.
This study examined female madrasas because they are so
important to Pakistani women and are scarcely researched in
the literature.
Multilayered reasons exist why this type of education is
considered important in Pakistan. Many Pakistanis argue
that madrasas are the most important educational institution
in society because their core religious curriculum focuses
on the teaching of Hadith (source of Prophet Muhammad’s
sayings).83 One of Prophet Muhammad’s sayings is that a child
who memorises the Quran completely goes to heaven and

80 Ibid.
81 S. Malik and K. Courtney, “Higher education and women’s empowerment
in Pakistan”, Gender and Education, Volume 23, Number 1, 2011, pp. 29-
45.
A. Raza, “World university rankings: Only 7 Pakistani institutions among
top 980 universities”, Dawn, September 23, 2016, https://www.dawn.com/
news/1285647/world-university-rankings-only-7-pakistaniinstitutions-
among-top-980-universities.
82 Ibid.
83 T. M. Butt, 2012, op. cit.
A. Naz, “Attitude of female teachers towards religious minorities: A
case study of KPK female madrassas”, Sustainable Development Policy
Institute, Working Paper Number 123, 2011, http://www.eldis.org/go/
display&type=Document&id=69871.

156
 Pakistan: Role of Madrasas in Women’s Empowerment

takes along ten relatives. However, Hadith is just one aspect

of madrasa syllabus which includes other facets: Quranic
education, jurisprudence, Prophet Muhammad’s actions,
biography of the Prophet, philosophy and Sharia (Islamic
law).84
The national emphasis on female madrasas today is due to
the Ulama who believed that women in their households needed
education. From the 1990s onward, it became a customary
practice for male madrasas to open a separate traditional female
madrasa, which has allowed for the continued growth and
development of women.85 Traditional female madrasas have
a significant role in the prospects of women’s education and
empowerment in Pakistan.86 Before their emergence, women
from religiously conservative families had few educational
options.87 Female madrasas allow unique opportunities for
such women to gain access to the outside world. However,
women are still very much excluded in the social hierarchy
of Pakistan, and the pardah system (segregation of women) is
very much prevalent inside most madrasas. A former female
madrasa student belonging to the Red mosque madrasa
network in Pakistan noted that the laws of Islam restricted
females from stepping outside the walls of the madrasa.88
The access to education for women living in rural areas
is even more limited. Many female madrasas provide room
and boarding subsidies, thereby increasing the opportunity for

84 H. Trivedi and M. A. Naqvi, 2015, op. cit.

85 Masooda Bano, The Rational Believer: Choices and Decisions in the
Madrasas of Pakistan, Cornell University Press, New York, 2012.
86 M. Aslam and G. Kingdon, “Can education be a path to gender equality
in the labor market? An update on Pakistan”, Comparative Education,
Volume 48, Number 2, 2012, pp. 211-229.
87 Masooda Bano, 2012, op. cit.
88 H. Trivedi and M. A. Naqvi, 2015, op. cit.

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Kristie J. Krause

rural women to obtain an education.89 Past research indicates

that parents in conservative rural areas were more willing to
send their daughters to madrasas as against secular schools.90
Some Pakistani parents tend to view secular universities
as problematic and are more comfortable in sending their
daughters to madrasas as a way to safeguard their family
honour and traditional roles.91 Female madrasas appear to be
on the rise because of a growing interest in the influence that
they have on women’s education in Muslim countries such as
Pakistan.92
Five recognised Islamic schools of thought are represented
under the Wafaq (the umbrella organisation of madrasas). In
Pakistan, the majority of madrasas are registered under the
Wafaq and include the following: Wafaq al-Madaris al-Arabia
(Deobandi); Tanzim al-Madaris al-Arabiya (Barelvi); Wafaq
al-Madaris al-Shia (Shia); Wafaq al-Madaris Al-Salafiya (Ahl-
i-Hadith); and the Rabita al-Madaris (Jamaat-i-Islami).93 A
review from the madrasa registration data showed that, on
average, around 25 per cent of the madrasa student population
in each Wafaq is female.94 Deobandi, Jamaat-i-Islami, Ahl-i-
Hadith, and Barelvi Wafaq belong to Sunni Muslims, and the
Shia Wafaq belongs to Shia Muslims.

89 M.J. Bhatti, “Questioning empowerment: Pakistani women, higher

education and marriage”, Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Institute
of International and Comparative Education, Normal University, 2013,
Retrieved from http://www.savap.org./journals/ARInt./.
90 Masooda Bano, “From mardas to low-cost private schools: Developing
new education partnerships”, 2013, http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/
files/Skoll_Centre/Docs/essay-masooda.pdf.
91 M. J. Bhatti, 2013, op. cit.
92 M. Sohail, 2014, op. cit.
93 Sanchita Bhattacharya, 2009, op. cit.
94 Masooda Bano, 2012, op. cit.

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 Pakistan: Role of Madrasas in Women’s Empowerment

Past research on religious views toward women’s education

found differences among the Sunni and Shia Islamic sects.
For example, Islamic perspectives on women’s education
derived from interviews of female madrasa students studying
at the postgraduate level found that Shia women demonstrated
more liberal views about co-education at the university level,
compared to the Sunni women. The previously mentioned study
dealt with both the Shia and Sunni sects of Islam. The current
study is based on interviews of students attending female-only
madrasas studying at the bachelor’s level or master’s level of
religious education.95
A hierarchy exists within the madrasa schooling system,
which is marked by five levels of education. Each level has
a clearly spelled out curriculum. Level one is the ibtida’iya
and consists of primary school. Level two is the khasa and
represents the senior secondary level. Level three is the aliya
and is equivalent to a bachelor’s degree. Level four is the
alimiya and amounts to a master’s degree. Level five is the
elite madrasa, which offers takhassus (specialisation) and is
equivalent to a doctoral degree.

Purpose of the Study

First, the present study explores the role of reformed
madrasas (high vs. low) on women’s empowerment in Pakistan.
The term reformed madrasa was created by the researcher in
this study to describe key aspects of this type of education.
Highly reformed madrasas represent schools that have six or
more of the following components: infrastructure (e.g., good
classrooms, libraries, electricity, gas, and telephone facilities),
extracurricular activities for students, job options (e.g.,
religious scholar), use of modern subjects/textbooks in their

95 T. Bradley and R. Saigol, 2012, op.cit.

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Kristie J. Krause

syllabus, funds from the government, state supported teachers,

and training programs for teachers. The low reformed madrasas
represent schools with five or fewer components. Second, this
study examined the effect of educational attainment equivalent
to bachelor’s degree (aliya) and master’s degree (alimiya)
on women’s empowerment. Third, the study investigated the
role of schools of thought in women’s empowerment. Fourth,
the study captured women’s empowerment experiences
within the cultural context of a Muslim community. Finally,
the study strived to assist policy development within the
education division to provide more opportunities for women’s
empowerment in Pakistan.

Population and Sample

Data was collected from madrasas (N=5) located in
the Punjab province of Pakistan. Three of these were of the
Jamaat-i-Islami, Ahl-i-Hadith, and Deobandi schools of
thought in Vehari District located in Vehari city. Data was
also collected from two madrasas of the Ahl-i-Hadith and
Barelvi schools of thought, located in Jahanian city, Khanewal
District. The participants in this study were from the Sunni sect
of Islam and belonged to one of the four schools of thought:
Deobandi, Barelvi, Jamaat-i-Islami, or the Ahl-i-Hadith. This
study used a convenience sampling frame to select female
students from madrasas located in the Punjab province of
Pakistan. The province had a respectable availability of female
madrasas from many schools of thought.96 The researcher used
convenience sampling because the contacts in the Pakistani
community had connections just in the Khanewal or Vehari
districts, and hence were only able to provide access to these

96 S. J. Jejeebhoy and Z. A. Sathar, “Women’s autonomy in India and Pakistan:

The influence of religion and province”, Population and Development
Review, Volume 27, Number 4, 2001, pp. 687-712.

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 Pakistan: Role of Madrasas in Women’s Empowerment

madrasas. Consequently, the sample used in this study did

not represent comparable madrasas from all four schools of
thought. A priori power analysis determined the sample size
needed to reject the null hypotheses (N=132).
This study’s inclusion criteria removed the influence of
specific confounding variables. The inclusion criteria consisted
of attributes that are essential for the sample selection to
participate in the study. First, they must attend madrasas in
urban areas of Punjab. Second, their institution must be a
member of one of the five schools of thought. Third, they must
study at the bachelor’s or master’s level of education. Fourth,
they must be 18-25 years of age. Fifth, they must be competent
in the Urdu language (written and oral). Finally, they must give
their consent to participate in the research.
Exclusion criteria identified responses by the sample
that required their removal from taking part in the research.
The exclusion criteria for non-participation consisted of the
following elements: students failed to give consent, studied
at a madrasa outside the Punjab province, attended secular
universities, studied at the doctoral level, were not members of
one of the identified schools of thoughts, were outside the age
range (18-25), or were not competent in the Urdu language.
These exclusion criteria ensured that all participants used in
the data collection met the same standards.97

Findings of the Study

As part of this research, interviews and data collection
strategies took place at five madrasas in Punjab. Two adjoining
districts of Khanewal and Vehari located in the southern part
of the province were used as the main research sites because

97 J.W. Creswell, Qualitative inquiry & research design: Choosing among

five approaches, Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publication, Los Angeles, 2013.

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Kristie J. Krause

they were known to have madrasas of all schools of thought.

Representation of different educational levels was addressed
by considering only madrasas that had levels three and four,
equivalent to either bachelor’s or master’s level education.
A Concurrent Transformative Mixed Methods Approach98
was used to increase the validity of this study while
minimising its limitations. By taking into account both the
quantitative and qualitative data, this researcher promoted a
deeper understanding of women’s empowerment. To increase
awareness of the cultural context, the researcher conducted
pre-observations in the physical setting of a madrasa before
engaging in the research.
This study also controlled for measurement bias by pilot
testing the questionnaire with a small group (n=2) similar to
the sample used in the study. Pretesting of the instruments
verified the format, language, sequence and comprehensibility
of the questions to ensure that they were culturally appropriate.
The researcher also considered cultural norms when selecting
data collectors such as gender matching of research assistants
to participants. Lastly, the study allowed enough time for
planning, capacity building, and training of research staff.

98 The study used concurrent transformative mixed method design to

accomplish its research goals. For instance, the strong emphasis on
policy development for improving women’s education made this design
an appropriate choice Thus, the transformative framework was a good fit
for this research because it dealt with marginalised populations (women
in Pakistan) and addressed specific issues of oppression and power
in the Muslim community. The concurrent design provides an overall
understanding of the research problem. It consisted of the researcher
collecting and analysing both strands of data (qualitative and quantitative)
during the same phase of the research process. Empirical researchers
recommend using a transformative lens in mixed methods when
researching underrepresented women throughout the world impacted by
power imbalances and marginalisation.

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 Pakistan: Role of Madrasas in Women’s Empowerment

The study used self-administered questionnaires (N=132)

and in-depth interviews (n=10) with Pakistani women (age-
group of 18–25 years) in Punjab, to determine how the schools
of thought, reform of educational opportunities, and higher
education in particular, affected women’s empowerment.
Community collaboration and networking allowed access
to five madrasas where participants attended school. The
findings indicated variations among the schools of thought
(e.g., size of a madrasa, number of students, and availability
of resources), which may influence women’s education and
outlook. Second, it was found that teacher training programs
are an important component of reformed madrasas. Third, this
study found that higher education was not the only factor in
women’s empowerment. Additional data demonstrated that
participants did not tolerate violence against women (92.5
per cent), were politically active (72.7 per cent), favoured
delayed marriage (65.3 per cent), gained freedom to travel
(93.52 per cent), performed work for some type of payment
(64.7 per cent), and felt a sense of increased respectability (90
per cent). Further, the data revealed that madrasas supported
students with increased knowledge of women’s rights, upward
mobility, career pathways, and social supports, which are all
factors in women’s empowerment.
There are no more than 150 female madrasa students
studying at the highest level. For the purpose of this study,
only the bachelor’s and master’s education levels have
been considered because, by virtue of their seeking higher
education, students are likely to have a clear idea of women’s
empowerment.99

99 Masooda Bano, 2012, op.cit.

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Kristie J. Krause

Globally, women now exceed men in obtaining higher

education.100 Even in lesser developed countries in Southern
Asia, the proportion of female participation in higher education
is on the rise.101 In Pakistan’s case, as we all know, Malala
Yousafzai has become a global icon representing the struggle
to increase access to education, especially for Muslim girls
in Pakistan.102 As a young girl, Malala Yousafzai defied the
Taliban in the Northwestern region of Pakistan and demanded
that girls be allowed to receive education. In 2012, a Taliban
member attempted to assassinate her on the bus home from
school by shooting her in the head. She survived the attack on
her life and went on to become the youngest winner of the Nobel
Peace Prize in 2014. Malala is a champion for advancing the
education of women in Pakistan, although she and her family
have had to leave Pakistan in order to pursue her education and
ensure her family’s safety.
Although the government of Pakistan recognises education
as a fundamental right for all its citizens and is committed to
providing education to both men and women, availability of
higher education in Pakistan is ranked among the lowest in
the world. Specifically, 6 per cent of the population earns a
higher education degree.103 According to Annual Publication
of Pakistan Education Statistics, 2016-2017, 0.956 million
students were enrolled in colleges, and 1.463 million were

100 S. Marginson, “The worldwide trend to high participation higher education:

Dynamics of social stratification in inclusive systems”, Higher Education,
Volume 5, Number 2, 2016, pp. 1-22.
101 M.A.R. Dias, “Higher education: Vision and action for the coming century”,
Prospects, Volume 107, Number 4, 2017, pp. 367-375.
102 Khurshid, Ayesha, “Globalized local and localized global in a women’s
education project in Pakistan”, in M. F. Astiz and M. Akiba eds., The
Global and the Local, Sense Publishers, 2016, pp. 99-113.
103 S. Malik and K. Courtney, 2011, op. cit.
A. Raza, 2016, op. cit.

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 Pakistan: Role of Madrasas in Women’s Empowerment

in university.104 Further, the participation rate for women in

school in Pakistan is generally low because specific cultural
and traditional values limit educational and empowerment
opportunities for girls and women.105
It is useful to examine women’s empowerment and the role
of: (a) education; (b) freedom and autonomy; (c) community and
social support; and (d) individual characteristics in supporting
or challenging women’s education, as demonstrated by the
quantitative and the qualitative results of the present study.
Women’s empowerment focuses on issues such as
disparities in politics, wealth, and education.106 Research
has shown that education is the most important pathway for
women’s empowerment because it increases: knowledge,
bargaining power, nutrition, use of health services, employment
opportunities, and other benefits.107 However, empowerment
among Pakistani women remains low because they must
overcome many political, cultural, and patriarchal hurdles to
acquire education.
The Role of Education- Five schools of thought influence
madrasa education in Pakistan. These schools of thought define
the operation of a madrasa by establishing the curriculum,
developing standards, conducting examinations, and issuing

104 Pakistan Education Statistics 2016-2017, Government of Pakistan, http://

library.aepam.edu.pk/Books/Pakistan%20Education%20Statistics%20
2016-17.pdf.
105 M. Rani, “Women physicists in Pakistan and my story of hard-earned
success”, Canadian Journal of Physics, Volume 95, Number 7, 2017, 1-3.
106 K. Kantachote, et. al., “Indicators of women’s empowerment in developing
nations”, Workshop in International Public Affairs, 2013, https://pdfs.
semanticscholar.org/ae82/42a19cdc6ded7bfad7082146b557adaf42f8.pdf.
107 D.Y. Coleman, 2015, op. cit.

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Kristie J. Krause

certificates at various levels.108 The Dars-e-Nizami is the

standard curriculum of all schools of thought. The primary
objective of the curriculum is to teach core subjects on Islam
so that students can learn to become religious scholars.109
Schools of Thought- Ethnographic research conducted
by Masooda Bano in 2012 in 110 madrasas in Pakistan
demonstrated the different schools of thought and their
influence on madrasa education. Bano’s ethnographic research
approach used four distinct methods.110
• in-depth interviews with relevant stakeholders
• group discussion
• field observations
• and self-administered surveys
The present study found that many Pakistanis, especially
in the most populated province of Punjab, belonged to the
Barelvi school of thought, which placed heavy emphasis on
visiting shrines and venerating Sufi saints. It was also noted
that the Punjab province had approximately 3,579 Barelvi
madrasas, compared to only 150 Jamaat-i-Islami madrasas.
The study found differences in the number of students studying
at the four madrasas.111 The size of a madrasa and educational
standing can have a strong bearing on women’s education
and overall outlook. For example, one of the Ahl-i-Hadith
schools of thought visited was the smallest, both in size and
108 H. Bhutto and I. Narongraksakhet, “A Critical analysis of sanaviyah amah
curriculum of madrasah in Pakistan”, The Scholar: Islamic Academic
Research Journal, Volume 3, Number 1, 2017, pp. 1-19.
109 S. U. Shah, et. al., “Need base education and madrassa system: A
comprehensive analysis of mainstream schools of thought in Pakistan”,
Merit Research Journal of Education and Review, Volume 2, Number 2,
2014, pp. 19-27.
110 Masooda Bano, 2012, op. cit.
111 Ibid.

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 Pakistan: Role of Madrasas in Women’s Empowerment

in the number of students (n=5). Additionally, this was the

only madrasa that did not have desks or writing implements
for the students. The other madrasas had the researcher sit on
a mat on the floor, while the students sit on a mat in front of a
desk before them, while conducting the interviews. Although
the Ahl-i-Hadith madrasa lacked basic resources for their
students, they were the only school to permit the researcher to
view the Salat-al-Maghrib (prayer), which occurred just after
sunset in a separate room.
The Deobandi school was the largest madrasa both in
size and in the number of students. The researcher was also
able to get a private tour from the head female teacher at this
madrasa. This also included the teacher taking the researcher
inside her home, which was located on the school campus.
Additionally, the head teacher mentioned that her husband
was the head teacher of the boy’s madrasa located next to the
female madrasa, with a separate entrance. The teacher further
explained that obtaining a job in a female madrasa was easier
for women who had a husband working at the adjoining male
madrasa.
This study also found variations among the four schools
of thought and the teacher training programs offered at
the madrasas. This study reflected a trend of increasing
empowerment for students whose teachers enjoyed increased
education at their madrasas. The students’ level of empowerment
in this study seemed to vary, but since the schools of thought
were not comparable in terms of size and educational standing,
more specific conclusions could not be drawn.
Training of Teachers- Teachers are perhaps the most
critical component of any system of education, and how well
they teach depends on many factors. The availability of teacher
training programs would be one factor. Rigorous research on

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Kristie J. Krause

teacher training programs demonstrates that they can change

the way teachers teach and, therefore, how much students
learn.112
A mixed-methods study found that teachers who received
training from literacy coaches helped fourth- and fifth-grade
students to achieve considerably higher quality discussions
than those of classes, whose teachers were not in the program.113
Similarly, an experimental study of middle school teachers
(N=2), who completed a training program on critical thinking,
found that students in their classes achieved higher learning
outcomes than students in classes taught by teachers who
did not receive the training.114 Moreover, a case study of
teachers (N=7) found that teachers who received training that
involved reflecting with peers on videos of their own teaching
enabled them to fix problematic practices in their classrooms.115
Finally, a study conducted in 2017, on undergraduate teachers
(N=31) at a medical university in Nepal on the effects of
teacher training programs, found that 90.3 per cent of teachers
who participated in training programs comprised of group
exercises, interactive teaching sessions, daily evaluations, and
presentations, enhanced their quality of teaching.116

112 C. Sleeter, “Toward teacher education research that informs policy”,

Educational Researcher, Volume 43, Number 3, 2014, pp. 146-153.
113 L. C. Matsumura, et. al., “The effect of content-focused coaching on the
quality of classroom text discussions. Journal of Teacher Education,
Volume 63, Number 3, 2012, pp. 214–228.
114 Y.T.C. Yang, “Cultivating critical thinkers: Exploring transfer of learning
from preservice teacher training to classroom practice”, Teaching and
Teacher Education, Volume 28, Number 12, 2012, pp. 1116–1130.
115 T.R. Tripp and P.J. Rich, “The influence of video analysis on the process of
teacher change”, Teaching and Teacher Education, Volume 28, 2012, pp.
728–739.
116 N. Baral, et. al., “Effect of teachers training workshop outcomes on real
classroom situations of undergraduate medical students”, Kathmandu
University Medical Journal, Volume 13, Number 2, 2017, pp. 162-166.

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 Pakistan: Role of Madrasas in Women’s Empowerment

Thus, research has shown a clear relationship between

teaching quality and learning outcomes for students.117 This
pattern persists even for developing countries. An article that
examined education plans across many developing countries
(N=40) found that every country had teacher training programs
that enhanced teaching quality and learning outcome for
students.118 In contrast, teacher training programs for madrasas
are lacking in Pakistan, because the government does not
provide the financial aid needed to cover teacher training costs.119
The quantitative results from the present study demonstrate
this, because most of the madrasas did not receive government
funds (78.8 per cent). Consequently, difficulty in financing at
various levels in different madrasas teacher training programs,
which were meant to enhance the professional skills of teachers,
were reflected in student performance.
Women’s Rights- A recognised indicator of women’s
empowerment is education. Many women in Pakistan are
denied their basic right to an education. Worldwide, a number
of reasons prevent women from accessing their right to an
education. One of the key issues is the culture of patriarchy and
the Violence against Women (VAW) that occur in South Asian
countries. Pakistan is a patriarchal society where men often use
violence as a tactic to exert power and control over women. The
shooting of Malala Yousafzai in 2012 is an example of how the
culture of patriarchy and VAW is used in Pakistan to exert
control over women’s rights to access education. Similarly,
117 “Teaching and learning: Achieving quality for all (Education for All
Global Monitoring Report)”, UNESCO, 2014, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0022/002256/225654e.pdf.
118 F. Hunt, “Review of national education policies: Teacher quality and
learning outcomes”, Prospects, Volume 45, Number 3, 2015, pp. 379-390.
119 S. Shaukat and A.W. Pell, “Seeking a change strategy for Pakistan’s
madrassahs”, Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences, Volume 36, Number 2,
2016, pp. 857-868.

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Kristie J. Krause

in April 2015, human rights activist Sabeen Mehmood was

shot and killed and thus effectively silenced for her stance
on rights in the Balochistan province.120 In Pakistan, all the
major institutions and services, such as education, healthcare,
and employment, are controlled by men. As a result of this
male dominance, women continue to face obstacles in securing
access to education. Even if women can access, the educational
content reinforces gender stereotypes and a curriculum of
hidden discrimination is perpetrated.
Previous studies have demonstrated that patriarchal
societies are more likely to accept VAW.121 For example,
Madhani and colleagues in 2017, conducted a community-
based observational study of Pakistani women (N=1,325)
on various types of violence. They found that approximately
half of the women (47 per cent) considered physical abuse to
be violence. Only a few of the women (8 per cent) believed
verbal abuse to be violence, and an even smaller percentage of
women (0.4 per cent) regarded sexual abuse to be violence.122
Another type of violence that some women endure in Pakistan

120 Lois Parshley, “The life and death of Sabeen Mahmud”, The New Yorker,
2015, http://southasia.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/shared/Viewpoint/
Articles/Sabeen_Mahmud.pdf.
121 T. S. Ali, et. al., “Violence permeating daily life: A qualitative study
investigating perspectives on violence among women in Karachi, Pakistan”,
International Journal of Women’s Health, Volume 4, 2012, pp. 577-585.
R. Zakar, et. al., “Primary health care physicians’ response to the victims
of spousal violence against women in Pakistan”, Health Care for Women
International, Volume 32, Number 9, 2011, pp. 811-832.
Women, U.N., Global guidance on addressing school-related gender-
based violence, 2016, UNESCO Publishing.
R. Zakar, 2013, op. cit.
122 F.I. Madhani, et. al., “Women’s perceptions and experiences of domestic
violence: An observational study from Hyderabad, Pakistan”, Journal of
Interpersonal Violence, Volume 32, Number 1, 2017, pp. 76-100.

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is intimate partner violence (IPV). For example, a quantitative

study revealed that two-thirds of women from Karachi, Pakistan
believed that IPV was justified if a wife did not follow her
husband’s orders.123
Based on the participants’ responses concerning the
empowerment scale, the questionnaire in the present study
demonstrated that 92.5 per cent of the students did not justify
a husband beating his wife. It appears that the participants in
this study were socialized in ways to avoid different types
of VAW. Studies have shown that educated women were
less likely to condone violence against them. Two studies
in Bangladesh found that women’s education was the main
reason for decreasing approval of IPV as well as other forms
of violence in the country.124 In the present study and in some
past research, education has been shown to have a significant
role in decreasing VAW. VAW could be more effectively
addressed by increasing access to higher education for women
in South Asian countries.
Political Rights- Violence against women in politics has
not improved in Pakistan. Over the past decade, there has
been a high prevalence of crimes against Pakistani women
in politics. For example, the former Prime Minister, Benazir
Bhutto, and the Punjab Minister of social welfare, Zille Huma
Usman, were both assassinated in public in 2007. A study
that examined the impact of crime victimisation on political
participation across five continents found that individuals
who are recently victimised become more politically active

123 P. A. Ali, et. al., “Intimate partner violence in Pakistan: A systematic

review”, Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, Volume 16, Number 3, 2014, pp. 299-
315.
124 S.R. Schuler, 2017, op. cit.

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Kristie J. Krause

than non-victims.125 The quantitative data of the study showed

that 96 out of the 132 students voted in elections. Therefore,
it is likely that the recent high-profile cases of crimes against
Pakistani women in politics motivated the students in this
study to become politically active.
In contrast, in other parts of Pakistan, women are still largely
excluded from politics.126 The constitution of Pakistan ensures
political participation for women. However, traditional values
and patriarchy often lead to practices that conflict with what
the policies expound. For example, a study that investigated
women’s empowerment in India found that patriarchal
attitudes regarding the rights of women were the vital factors
that hindered women’s political empowerment across South
Asia.127 Political parties in Pakistan also play an important role
in women’s empowerment. An article entitled, “All parties
need to work together for women’s empowerment,” by Bilawal
Bhutto noted that Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) played an
important role in empowering women. PPP introduced pro-
women legislation, strengthened initiatives such as the Benazir
Income Support Program (BISP), and working alongside
NGOs that support women.128
Additionally, interviews were conducted in 2015, of 14
women belonging to the Jamaat-i-Islami, a prominent Islamist
political party which is committed to increasing educational
and political opportunities for women while demanding
125 R. Bateson, “Crime victimization and political participation”, American
Political Science Review, Volume 106, Number 3, 2012, pp. 570–587.
126 M. Meraj and M.B. Sadaqat, 2016, op. cit.
127 S. Narayan, “A socio-cultural obstruction to women empowerment in
Indian society, IJAR, Volume 3, Number 2, 2017, 179-182.
128 “All parties need to work together for women’s empowerment:
Bilawal”, Pakistan Today, January 8, 2018, https://www.pakistantoday.
com.pk/2018/01/08/all-parties-need-to-work-together-for-women-
empowerment-bilawal/.

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 Pakistan: Role of Madrasas in Women’s Empowerment

segregated workplaces. As one respondent put it, “we have

no problems with modernity, such as education, driving,
employment, etc., but we have to ensure that it fits into our
own ideology”.129 The Jamaat-i-Islami also has a separate
women’s wing that encourages the state to improve the status
of women in Pakistani society by enhancing men’s ability to
provide political, social, and economic support to women of
all classes.
Status of Women- The status of women in Pakistan is
usually attributed to the ascribed gender roles that reinforce
women’s inferior status in society. However, the status of
Pakistani women differs significantly across classes, provinces,
and the rural/urban divide. For example, Punjabi women are
socially, economically, and politically better off compared to
women in the other provinces, where they are marginalised and
irrelevant to the functioning of mainstream society.130 Further,
a rural Pakistani woman suffers more gender inequalities
compared to urban women because of different socioeconomic
development and tribal and feudal customs.131 For example,
watta satta (exchange marriage) is a tribal custom in which
brides are traded between two clans, particularly in rural areas
in Pakistan.132 In 2012, in Swat, a family married off their six-
year old daughter into a rival family to settle a dispute between
them. This incident represents an extreme case of tribal
custom prevailing in Pakistan, but many others also exist. It
was recommended that one way to reduce tribal customs and
129 S. Saeed, “Jamaat-e-Islami women in Pakistan: Vanguard of a new
modernity?”, Contemporary Sociology, Volume 44, Number 6, 2015, pp.
815-816.
130 C.H. Hans, 2017, op. cit.
131 M. Meraj and M.B. Sadaqat, 2016, op. cit.
132 R.N. Bhutta, et. al., “Dynamics of watta satta marriages in rural areas of
southern Punjab Pakistan”, Open Journal of Social Sciences, Volume 3,
Number 12, 2015, 166-178.

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Kristie J. Krause

their adverse effects on women’s status is the promotion of

education.133
This study found that education played a role in promoting
women’s status in society. The women in this study reported
that education provided them with feelings of respectability
both in their families and in their peer group. Ninety per cent of
participants in the study felt their education produced respect.
Data from the nationally representative Pakistan Demographic
and Health Survey (2012-2013) demonstrated that Pakistani
men respected educated women because these women could
contribute financially to the family and be more self-sufficient.134
Many women in Pakistan are not able to earn an income
because of social restrictions that inhibit their participation
in the workforce. For example, pardah is a social practice of
female isolation that prevents women’s movement in Muslim
communities. A qualitative study investigating the socio-
cultural factors affecting gender equality in the workplace
among Pakistani women (N=30) revealed that the pardah
system played a role in female labour force participation
(FLFP). This occurred because it excluded them from the
public sphere.135
Freedom and Autonomy-Education is one of the most
important determinants of women’s autonomy.136 Much of the
qualitative research that focuses on women’s autonomy comes

133 Ibid.
134 M. Meraj and M.B. Sadaqat, 2016, op. cit.
135 F. Ali and J. Syed, “From rhetoric to reality: A multilevel analysis of
gender equality in Pakistani organizations”, Gender, Work & Organization,
Volume 24, Number 5, 2017, pp. 472–486.
136 G. Samari and A.R. Pebley, “Individual and Household Determinants of
Women’s Autonomy: Recent Evidence from Egypt”, Working Paper,
California Center for Population Research, University of California, 2015,
http://papers.ccpr.ucla.edu/index.php/pwp/article/download/686/73.

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from South Asia.137 The link between education and autonomy

can be explained in a number of ways, one of which is that
women with less autonomy may be prevented from continuing
to receive higher education.138 Research has shown that highly
educated women were more autonomous because they were
more likely to be employed and, as a result, have direct access
to a source of income.139 Similarly, it was reported that women
with less autonomy were more likely to have no education,
were more likely to be unemployed, followers of Islam, and
come from male-headed households.140
Another important aspect of autonomy is freedom of
movement. Pakistani society puts limits on women’s freedom
to move around in public. A study that examined Pakistani
women’s ability to travel while infected with HIV (N=21) found
that some of the barriers which prevented movement outside
the home were the system of pardah, and the husband’s lack of
support to take them to places in the community.141 Further, it is
considered “shameful” in many parts of the country if women’s

137 G. J. Carlson, et. al., “Associations between women’s autonomy and child
nutritional status: A review of the literature”, Maternal & Child Nutrition,
Volume 11, Number 4, 2015, pp. 452-482.
138 G. Samari and A.R. Pebley, 2015, op. cit.
139 P. England, “Women’s employment, education, and the gender gap in 17
countries. Monthly Labor Review, Volume 3, Number 12, 2012, pp. 166-
178.
N. Steiber et. al., “Contextualizing the education effect on women’s
employment: A cross- national comparative analysis”, Journal of Marriage
and Family, Volume 78, Number 1, 2016, pp. 246-261.
G. Samari and A.R. Pebley, 2015, op. cit.
140 P. Chakraborty and A. K. Anderson, “Maternal autonomy and low birth
weight in India”, Journal of Women’s Health, Volume 20, Number 9, 2011,
1373-1382.
141 A. Saeed and S. Farooq, “I can’t go out: Mobility obstacles to women’s
access to HIV treatment in KPK, Pakistan”, Journal of the Association of
Nurses in AIDS Care, Volume 28, Number 4, 2017, pp. 561-574.

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ability to move around is not restricted.142 This occurs less in

cities such as Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore. The quantitative
data from the study revealed that 93.52 per cent of the madrasa
students could travel to places in the community, especially for
school or other purposes, but they first needed permission from
the male head of the family (73.54 per cent). This result agrees
with additional literature that revealed that Muslim men put
limits on the women’s freedom to travel in order to preserve
their patriarchal power in society.143
In Muslim countries, women’s freedom of movement and
ability to travel is limited because they are barred from driving
motor vehicles. It was illegal for women in Saudi Arabia to
operate motor vehicles until September of 2017.144 No legal
restriction exists in Pakistan, but women are socially restricted
from driving motorcycles, which is the preferred mode of
transportation, because most middle-lower class families cannot
afford a car.145 There are also socially sanctioned rules that
define how Pakistani women and girls must sit on a motorbike
to avoid violation of female modesty. Social rules include not
being able to drive a motorcycle or hold the handlebars with
both hands, and sitting behind a male driver with both legs on
the same side of the seat. These social sanctions on women’s
ability to drive a motorcycle or ride as men do dramatically

142 Z. Mumtaz and S. Salway, “Understanding gendered influences on women’s

reproductive health in Pakistan: Moving beyond the autonomy paradigm”,
Social Science & Medicine, Volume 68, Number 7, 2009, pp. 1349-1356.
143 P. Hoodbhoy, “Women on motorbikes-what’s the problem?”, The Express
Tribune, February 22, 2013, https://tribune.com.pk/story/511107/women-
on-motorbikeswhats-the-problem/.
144 Martin Chulov, “Saudi Arabia to allow women to obtain driving licences”,
The Guardian, September 26, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2017/sep/26/saudi-arabias-king-issues-order-allowing-women-to-
drive.
145 P. Hoodbhoy, 2013, op. cit.

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limits their mobility as well as their choices in life (education,

jobs, etc.). In these ways, the patriarchy and culture of Pakistan
shape women’s behaviours.
Social and Community Support- Educational settings can
provide women with access to social supports. The qualitative
results of this study demonstrated that the madrasas were social
spaces where women had:
• the ability to build relationships with other women,
reducing their isolation
• a place to develop their critical mind and discuss ideas
with others
• an independent sense of worth in contradistinction to
their traditional second-class citizenship
• aspirations for a better future – seeing themselves as
contributing members of society
• a network through which they could question their
socially assigned gender roles-as more than just wives
and mothers
Moreover, the support found in the madrasas can also lead
to women criticising and discussing the social restrictions that
hinder women’s empowerment in Pakistan. Empowerment
research shows that social support can play an important role
in women’s empowerment.146 Empowering education provides
pro-social values and allows students to develop friendships,
networks, feelings of social connectedness, respect for human
rights, collaborative skills, negotiating skills, leadership skills,

146 A. Cornwall, “Women’s empowerment: What works?”, Journal of

International Development, Volume 28, Number 3, 2016, pp. 342-359.

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Kristie J. Krause

and knowledge of social systems and local and global issues.147

A community-based observational study among women (N=
1,325) in Pakistan highlighted that women tended to speak to
their friends about stressful experiences (e.g., violence against
them).148 Many women in Pakistan lack the ability to socialise
with other women because they are confined to their homes.
This lack of social support may explain why many Pakistani
women do not have anyone to confide in, which could affect
their ability to cope with issues that impact their lives.
The qualitative data in the present study, however,
shows that 80 per cent of the women interviewed utilised
their madrasa as a social space to seek guidance from their
friends while in school. For example, one of the interviewees
stated that she and the other women in the madrasa utilised
each other as support mechanisms. Accordingly, the social
supports found in madrasas could be used to build the power
of collectivisation to change women’s lives at the individual,
family, and community levels.

Locus of Empowerment
This mixed methods study explored female madrasas and
the role of the different schools of thought, higher education,
and educational reform, in women’s empowerment in Pakistan.
The study demonstrated that the female madrasas provide
students with knowledge of women’s rights, political views,
upward mobility, career pathways, social/community supports,
and freedom/autonomy. In these ways, female madrasas,
specifically at higher levels, are valuable institutions because

147 E.M. Graham and C. Lloyd, “Empowering adolescent girls in developing

countries: The potential role of education”, Policy Futures in Education,
Volume 14, Number 5, 2016, 556–577.
148 F.I. Madhani, 2017, op. cit.

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they provide some empowerment opportunities to Muslim

women that otherwise would not exist.
Creating opportunities for higher education and ensuring
gender-equitable access to women could empower future
generations. Pakistan is one of the worst performing countries in
the world in terms of gender inequality. Therefore, knowledge
about gender equity, women’s rights, family violence, and
positive coping strategies should be incorporated in madrasas
for both women and men. Madrasas can play an important
role in educating masses about women’s rights. Encouraging
religious leaders to play a positive role in preaching Islamic
values and women’s rights that strongly condemn Violence
against Women, to madrasa students could be an effective
instrument to bring about behaviour change in the country.
These finding and recommendations, targeted at the policy
level, can enable the Higher Education Commission (HEC)
of Pakistan to address cultural, religious, and social values in
their educational institutions. Efforts are currently underway
in many madrasas in South Asia to integrate education reform.
Policy changes targeting reformed madrasas should include
mental health and community supports for Pakistani women.
Teachers’ training would have a large social return in the
development of the country. In order to enhance and encourage
a better and more powerful future for Muslim women,
collaborative efforts among various systems of education are
required at the local, community, and international level. As
an international approach, women’s empowerment should
be investigated by scholars and organisations with the goal
of expanding women’s equity in education, health, and well-
being.

179