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GHP Management Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, No. 24-435 (U.S. June 30, 2025) (Thomas J., Dissenting From Denial of Cert.)

The Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari in the case of GHP Management Corporation v. City of Los Angeles, where landlords challenged an eviction moratorium enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic. Justice Thomas, dissenting, argued that the moratorium may constitute a physical taking under the Takings Clause, highlighting a split among circuits regarding this issue. He emphasized the need for the Court to clarify its precedents to resolve the confusion surrounding landlords' rights to evict tenants for nonpayment of rent.

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GHP Management Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, No. 24-435 (U.S. June 30, 2025) (Thomas J., Dissenting From Denial of Cert.)

The Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari in the case of GHP Management Corporation v. City of Los Angeles, where landlords challenged an eviction moratorium enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic. Justice Thomas, dissenting, argued that the moratorium may constitute a physical taking under the Takings Clause, highlighting a split among circuits regarding this issue. He emphasized the need for the Court to clarify its precedents to resolve the confusion surrounding landlords' rights to evict tenants for nonpayment of rent.

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Cite as: 606 U. S.

____ (2025) 1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


GHP MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, ET AL. v. CITY
OF LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 24–435. Decided June 30, 2025

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.


JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari.
During the COVID–19 pandemic, the City of Los Angeles
enacted an eviction moratorium that “ ‘effectively pre-
clude[d] residential evictions.’ ” 2022 WL 17069822, *1 (CD
Cal., Nov. 17, 2022). Among other restrictions, this policy
barred landlords from evicting tenants “due to COVID-
related nonpayment of rent.” Ibid. Petitioners—13 owners
of Los Angeles apartment buildings and their shared man-
agement company—sued the city, arguing that the morato-
rium effected a per se physical taking, in violation of the
Takings Clause’s prohibition on takings of “private prop-
erty . . . for public use, without just compensation.” U. S.
Const., Amdt. 5. I would grant review of the question
whether a policy barring landlords from evicting tenants for
the nonpayment of rent effects a physical taking under the
Takings Clause.
This question is the subject of an acknowledged Circuit
split. The Eighth and Federal Circuits have held that a bar
on evictions for the nonpayment of rent qualifies as a phys-
ical taking, while the Ninth Circuit has held that it does
not. Compare Darby Development Co. v. United States, 112
F. 4th 1017, 1034–1035 (CA Fed. 2024), and Heights Apart-
ments, LLC v. Walz, 30 F. 4th 720, 733 (CA8 2022), with
2024 WL 2795190, *1 (CA9, May 31, 2024). In issuing the
decision below, the Ninth Circuit expressly acknowledged
2 GHP MANAGEMENT CORP. v. LOS ANGELES

THOMAS, J., dissenting

this split. See ibid., n. 2.


This Circuit split stems from confusion about how to rec-
oncile two of our precedents. The Ninth Circuit treated as
controlling this Court’s decision in Yee v. Escondido, 503
U. S. 519 (1992), which held that a statute did not effect a
physical taking when it allowed mobile home owners to
evict tenants only after an onerous delay. Id., at 527–528.
The Yee Court explained that “[t]he government effects a
physical taking only where it requires the landowner to sub-
mit to the physical occupation of his land,” whereas the
landlord petitioners in Yee had voluntarily contracted with
their tenants and were accordingly subject to laws “regu-
lat[ing their] use of their land by regulating the relationship
between landlord and tenant.” Ibid. Thus, in the Ninth
Circuit’s view, the Los Angeles eviction moratorium did not
“effect a taking” because petitioners had already “opened
their property to occupation by tenants.” 2024 WL
2795190, *1.
By contrast, the Eighth and Federal Circuits looked to
our more recent decision in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid,
594 U. S. 139 (2021). There, we held that a law requiring
agricultural employers to allow labor organizers onto their
property constituted a physical taking because it “appropri-
ate[d] for the enjoyment of third parties the owners’ right
to exclude.” Id., at 149. And, the Eighth and Federal Cir-
cuits reasoned, if “forcing property owners to occasionally
let union organizers on their property infringes their right
to exclude,” it follows that “forcing them to house non-rent-
paying tenants (by removing their ability to evict)” does too.
Darby, 112 F. 4th, at 1035; accord, Heights Apartments, 30
F. 4th, at 733.
Because “[w]e created this confusion,” we have an obliga-
tion to fix it. Gee v. Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc.,
586 U. S. 1057, 1059 (2018) (THOMAS, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). That obligation is particularly strong
here, as there is good reason to think that the Ninth Circuit
Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 3

THOMAS, J., dissenting

erred. Under the logic of Cedar Point, and our Takings


Clause doctrine more generally, an eviction moratorium
would plainly seem to interfere with a landlord’s right to
exclude. See Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of
Health and Human Servs., 594 U. S. 758, 765 (2021) (per
curiam) (“[P]reventing [landlords] from evicting tenants
who breach their leases intrudes on one of the most funda-
mental elements of property ownership—the right to ex-
clude”). Nor does Yee dictate otherwise: Although the stat-
ute there constrained landlords’ right to evict, it was not
“an outright prohibition on evictions for nonpayment of
rent.” Darby, 112 F. 4th, at 1035; see 503 U. S., at 527–528.
Finally, this issue is important and recurring. Given the
sheer number of landlords and tenants, any eviction-
moratorium statute stands to affect countless parties. And,
the end of the COVID–19 pandemic has not diminished the
importance of this issue. Municipalities continue to enact
eviction moratoria in the wake of other emergencies. See,
e.g., San Diego Cty., Cal., Ordinance No. 10936, §2 (N. S.)
(2025) (codified at San Diego Cty., Cal., Code of Regulatory
Ordinances tit. 3, div. 1, ch. 5, §31.503); Statement of
Proceedings for the Public Hearing Meeting of the Board
of Supervisors of the Cty. of Los Angeles 7–8 (Feb.
25, 2025), https://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/sop/
1178834_022525.pdf. Even if it were otherwise, we would
do well to clarify our case law now, rather than in the heat
of the next national emergency.
* * *
This case meets all of our usual criteria for granting cer-
tiorari, and it does not contain any impediments that would
hamper our review. The Court nevertheless denies certio-
rari, leaving in place confusion on a significant issue, and
leaving petitioners without a chance to obtain the relief to
which they are likely entitled. I respectfully dissent.

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