THE CLASSICAL REVIEW 91

words 'ut dicebat ipse' (de r.p. 2.2) are surely an indication that Cato's reported
views on the growth of Rome's 'constitution' did not stand in the Origines.
P. 289: I cannot see that agr. 14.3 indicates that it would be possible to
obtain a lower price than that recommended by Cato.
I hope I do not appear too critical. Astin's reading is vast and there is no
better picture to be had of the complex personality of Cato and the complex
problems associated with him. As I have indicated, though, the problems are
too complex to be treated by one scholar, or within the confines of one book.
University of Manchester JOHN BRISCOE

HANNIBAL'S WAR
J.F. LAZENBY: Hannibal's War. A Military History of the Second
Punic War. Pp. xiv + 340; 9 plates; 21 maps and plans. Warminster:
Aris & Phillips, 1978. £8-75.
Military history is not in fashion, for understandable reasons. There is first
the natural—if exaggerated—defensiveness of ancient historians in face of the
charge that they are constantly working over familiar ground with traditional
methods. More respectably, they are properly anxious to explore new
questions and new lines of approach, including many stimulated by
developments in other and often younger areas of learning. But a greater
emphasis upon other aspects of history—especially those with a substantial
social or economic content—may all too easily slide into an unwise neglect
of more traditional military and political history. It is something of a shock
to discover that, despite the notable contributions of H.H. Scullard, Lazenby's
book is the first for nearly a century to offer in English a full-scale,
comprehensive study of the Second Punic War from a military point of
view. Yet if we do not have a thorough grasp of the fundamentals of so
momentous an episode, if through neglect of re-examination and of research
we fail to advance our understanding of it, we are scarcely likely to arrive at
a sound understanding of those other matters which currently occupy our
interest, not only in respect of the war years but in respect of the decades
which preceded and followed it.
There ought therefore to be a general welcome for Lazenby's book, the
more so since it is sound, sensible, and for the most part very readable. It
offers an unashamedly military account, with just enough political history to
illuminate but not to distract from the main substance. The problems of
presenting the complicated episodes of a war fought in widely separated areas,
often simultaneously, are resolved effectively and economically in eight well-
judged chapters, which are supplemented by useful appendixes, a chronological
outline, some brief but helpful notes to the text, and no less than twenty-one
maps and plans (with another map in the end-papers). The printing of some of
the maps—as also of nine plates—perhaps leaves a little to be desired from the
aesthetic point of view, though this is possibly a carping criticism in these days
of high prices. From the practical point of view, however, they are admirably
clear and helpful.
Inevitably there are some points which may not command general

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 92 THE CLASSICAL REVIEW
agreement—for example, some of the comments on p. 25 which seem to lean
towards seeing Hannibal's attack on Saguntum as a deliberate move to initiate
a war of revenge; and in some parts of chapters IV and VI the plodding
succession of military events defeats Lazenby's otherwise generally successful
efforts to impart liveliness to his presentation and maintain a sense of the
broader picture. A more substantial point is Lazenby's decision to include in
the body of his text not only the principal references to ancient authors but
almost all his discussions of controversial matters, including controversies
about the basic facts. The consequence is that on a number of occasions the
reader is for several pages distracted from the main thread of events and their
interpretation by substantial and semi-technical discussions of details which in
the opinion of the reviewer would have been more appropriately handled in
notes or appendixes. Also, in the central section of the final chapter, entitled
'The Aftermath', Lazenby appears to the reviewer to allow himself to wander
too far and too loosely over the subsequent history of Rome, even though in
the process he applies many a useful corrective to the tendency in Toynbee's
Hannibal's Legacy to trace back too much to the Second Punic War in an unduly
tight consequential relationship.
These however are differences of judgement which do not detract from the
solid merits of this book. It offers a narrative, but informs that narrative
sensibly and lucidly. It combines grasp of the detail with shrewd comment
upon the broad strategic issues. The first part of the final chapter is a well-
balanced examination of those strategic issues and of the factors underlying
Rome's victory; and the final part, assessing the qualities of the great generals
of the war, argues powerfully that the conventional tendency to equate the
merits of Hannibal and Scipio does less than justice to the altogether
exceptional achievements of Hannibal. Lazenby does not delude himself
that it is possible to produce a revolutionary new interpretation of Hannibal's
war, but he has undoubtedly succeeded in his declared objective of producing
a sound narrative which is based firmly on the sources, and which takes
account of much research which is virtually inaccessible to the ordinary
student and the general reader.

Queen's University, Belfast ALAN E. ASTIN

CAESAR'S POLITICAL SUPPORT 49-44 B.C.

HINNERK BRUHNS: Caesar und die romische Oberschicht in den
Jahren 49-44 v. Chr. (Hypomnemata, 53). Pp. 200. Gottingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprccht, 1978. Paper.
In an important and detailed monograph Dr. Bruhns has attempted to
analyse the political support which Caesar enjoyed between 49 and 44 B.C.
In Roman Revolution Sir Ronald Syme argued that there was a continuing
strain of opposition to the Establishment which Caesar was able to exploit.
Heterogeneous in character this opposition comprised supporters of Marius
(and their descendants) who had lost out in the Civil Wars and equites
scattered throughout Italy and the provinces, as well as a small, but very
influential, group of eminent aristocrats. After Pharsalia Caesar replenished

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