Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 40, No.

4, 2008
doi: 10.1111/j.1469-5812.2007.00361.x

Spinoza as Educator: From

Educational
EPAT
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0013-1857
Original
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2007 Aloni
Blackwell
Oxford,
Nimrod
Spinoza Philosophy
Articles
UK
as Philosophy
Publishing
Educator ofLtd
Education
and Theory
Society of Australasia

eudaimonistic ethics to an empowering

and liberating pedagogy
N A
Philosophy of Education Department, Kibbutzim College of Education, Israel

Abstract
Although Spinoza’s formative influence on the cultural ideals of the West is widely
recognized, especially with reference to liberal democracy, secular humanism, and
naturalistic ethics, little has been written about the educational implications of his
philosophy. This article explores the pedagogical tenets that are implicit in Spinoza’s
writings. I argue (1) that Spinoza’s ethics is eudaimonistic, aiming at self-affirmation,
full humanity and wellbeing; (2) that the flourishing of individuals depends on their personal
resources, namely, their conatus, power, vitality or capacity to act from their own inner
natures; and (3) that the combination of the Spinozian conceptions of humanism, liberal
democracy, eudaimonistic ethics, and the enlightened and sovereign individual constitute
together the grounds for a comprehensive empowering and liberating pedagogy.

Keywords: Spinoza, empowering education, liberating education, humanistic

education, eudaimonistic ethics

By conventional disciplinary standards, Spinoza is rightfully not considered an

educator: he was not a teacher by profession, as a philosopher he never wrote a
treatise on education, and one can hardly find references to his writings in aca-
demic courses on the history and philosophy of education. Nevertheless, by ‘softer’
standards or a looser usage of language, Spinoza is often regarded as one of the
greatest educators of mankind. Very much like Moses and Buddha, Confucius and
Lao Tzu, Jesus and Muhammad, Plato and Aristotle, Rousseau and Marx,
Nietzsche and Freud, Darwin and Einstein, he belongs to a small and exclusive
group of prophets, philosophers and scientists that have created and shaped the
major cultural categories by means of which people perceive reality and give mean-
ing and value to their experiences.1
Spinoza’s reluctance—conscious or unconscious—to deal with educational topics
in his writings is perplexing. Because it has been customary in the history of
philosophy for discussions of educational matters to develop from and follow dis-
cussions of metaphysical, epistemological and ethical issues, it strikes us as quite
odd that Spinoza’s ethical discourse does not extend its focus to matters of educational

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Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and
350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
532 Nimrod Aloni

philosophy and educational psychology. As William Frankena (1971) and Steven

Nadler (2006) point out, as a philosophical system-builder Spinoza reaches his
discussion on ethical issues only after laying the required metaphysical, epistemo-
logical, and psychological foundations. Very much like Plato and Aristotle before
him and Rousseau and Kant who followed him, his ethical discussion ‘takes on
almost every major area in philosophy: metaphysics, theory of knowledge, philos-
ophy of mind, philosophical psychology, moral philosophy, political philosophy,
and the philosophy of religion’ (Nadler, 2006, p. ix). Put more concretely, since
‘Spinoza’s ultimate goal is an explanation of human happiness in a deterministic
universe, he needs first of all to investigate what exactly a human being is and how
it fits into the metaphysical scheme of things’ (ibid., p. 122). His reasons for
stopping short of addressing educational matters—grounded in his personal ten-
dencies or in his deterministic metaphysics (in the light of which pedagogy might
be considered useless and in vain)—we will probably never know. We can, however,
explore educational elements, insights and implications that are inherent in Spinoza’s
philosophy and are ‘waiting’ to be disclosed—and to this we shall turn now.
Regarding Spinoza as a key figure in the formative education of the West usually
involves reference to his pioneering advocacy of liberal democracy, atheistic
humanism, and eudaimonistic ethics. A discussion of his influence on the first
aspect—that of modern liberal democratic life—can be found for example in Feuer’s
Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism. Spinoza, it is argued there, ‘was the first political
philosopher of modern times to avow himself a democrat ... [considering democracy]
the best way to assure the liberties of man’ (Feuer, 1987, p. 102). We can also look
at much more recent discussions of these issues in Rebecca Goldstein’s Betraying
Spinoza: The renegade Jew who gave us modernity (2006) as well as in her ‘Reason-
able Doubt’ (2006): an article in the New York Times on the relevance of Spinoza’s
political theory to the West’s struggling with religious fundamentalism and quest
for multicultural tolerance and pluralism.2 With respect to the second aspect—of
atheistic worldview—it is probably best to look at Yovel’s Spinoza And Other Heretics
(1988) where Spinoza is presented as the first truly secular and free spirited phi-
losopher as well as exerting major intellectual and moral influence on Kant, Heine,
Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. A less scholarly yet more important source on
these matters—one that brings stronger evidence for Spinoza’s influence on the
formation of atheist humanism—is found in the various manifestos of the American
Humanists Association, which center on Spinoza’s main tenets of rationalism, nat-
uralism, liberty, atheism, solidarity, and quest for this-worldly personal fulfillment
and happiness.3
It is however on neither liberal democracy nor atheistic humanism that I would
like to focus in this article. I have in mind the third of the three aspects, Spinoza’s
eudaimonistic ethics,4 that can serve us best as a starting point for exploring educa-
tional insights in his philosophy, in general, and erecting a ‘Spinoza-based’ liberat-
ing and empowering pedagogy, in particular.5 The special appeal of eudaimonistic
ethics to people and its direct relevance to educational theory and practice lie in
its naturalist and commonsensical attitude. As explored and elaborated by various
philosophers such as Arendt, MacIntyre, Norton, and Nussbaum, it is the kind of

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ethical theory that begins with the simplest existential questions and most basic
human concerns: How can I best live my life? How should I actualize myself—
properly and efficiently—in order to live well, flourish, and be happy? How would
my humanity achieve its best, so that my life would demonstrate both high quality
and great success or blessedness?
In advancing, in the midst of the 17th century, a naturalistic, egoistic and enlight-
ened ethical theory of self-actualization and self-affirmation, Spinoza ‘left to the
world a consciously new ethics ... a new morality’ (Frankena, 1971, p. 85); a
rationalist and perfectionist ethics of virtue that seeks personal well being, without
reference to traditional terms such as holiness, ‘ought’, duty and sin; an ethics ‘that
represents a return to the ethics of the Greeks’ (ibid., p. 86). It is clear, on this
account, why the Jews in his Amsterdam community, at first, and the political and
religious leaders of the general public, later, have considered Spinoza’s ethical
doctrine a danger and threat that should be fought and eliminated. It is likewise
clear that his refreshing ethical theory, very much like Galileo’s scientific outlook,
would have a great appeal to educated and critical minds and become an important
foundation of the whole modern ethos. In the words of Yosef Ben-Shlomo, what
Spinoza offered to modern humanity is a philosophy of life that ‘is relevant to all
humans, deals with the most concrete aspects of life, and sets a way for a mean-
ingful life and for overcoming our basic and common existential fears ... From this
perspective, it seems that Spinoza’s teachings offer the most serious alternative to
the historical religions’ (Ben-Shlomo, 1983, Preface).
Before we look more closely at Spinoza’s eudaimonistic theory and how a liberat-
ing and empowering pedagogy can develop out of it, let us examine a few educative
elements in Spinoza’s writings, elements that can explain, at least to some extent,
the direct appeal and attraction so many people around the world felt in encoun-
tering his writings. I am referring here to the fact that Spinoza has been chosen by
thousands of people around the globe to be their most meaningful personal edu-
cator; not in the ordinary sense of an educator that is appointed by a school
principal to teach a group of students, but in the deeper and more meaningful
Nietzschian sense, as a personal example of wisdom and virtue that an individual
chooses for himself or herself as a resource for his or her life-project and personal
edification.6
The secret of Spinoza’s Pedagogical Eros—that which makes him for many a
‘companion for life’, a source of vitality and inspiration, and a philosophical guide
who challenges towards a fuller and more fulfilling life—unfolds itself when looked
into with the diagnostic eyes of another philosopher-educator—Martin Buber.
According to Buber, in ‘The Education of Character’ (1971), three traits charac-
terize great educators. First of all, true educators inspire in students a feeling of
personal trust; more specifically, a feeling that the educator is wholeheartedly there
for them, and that the chief motive of the educator is to care for the wellbeing,
self-realization, and growth of his students—as ends for themselves rather than as
means for the accomplishment of religious, ideological or economical goals. Secondly,
they instill in their students a sense of idealism; namely, that there exists in human
life truth, goodness, beauty, integrity, justice, perfection, style, friendship and other

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valuable qualities that are worth pursuing and can make human reality so much
more meaningful and fulfilling. Finally, the influence of great educators is espe-
cially effective when the educator has no special intention to educate; it takes place
by means of an existential dialogue in which educators affect the whole being of
their students with their full presence as excellent human beings.
With regard to the first pedagogical trait, one cannot be mistaken about
Spinoza’s true caring for his student-readers. Whether one looks in the opening
chapter of the Improvement of the Understanding (2000), where he invites us with
great passion and intimacy to join him in the quest for edification and happiness,
or in the later formulation in the Ethics, where he states that ‘the good which every
man who follows after virtue desires for himself, he will also desire for other men’
(1974, IV, Prop. 37)—it is clear that his concern with us, his audience, arises from
a humanist interest in enhancing the humanity of every individual and in establish-
ing a society based on the principles of reason, liberty and justice. Very much like
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra,7 Spinoza doesn’t wish to shape our character and form our
worldview for the purpose of advancing some religious or ideological goal. Spinoza’s
pedagogical drive, like Zarathustra’s, originates from an overflowing spiritual
existence and a strong urge to actualize the vitality, wisdom and beauty which
exists in most people only as a potential. As we shall see later, again like Nietzsche’s
Zarathustra, Spinoza has no interest in herd-like and passive believers; he seeks
sovereign individuals who can join him in the pursuit of a higher art of living.8
Regarding the second trait, there is wide agreement in philosophic scholarship
that Spinoza has conducted the most complete and courageous attempt to form a
philosophy of life that is edifying and enlightening in itself and could serve as a
rationalist alternative to the mystical teachings of traditional religions. Very much
like Ecclesiastes, Buddha, Socrates, and Aristotle before him, and quite similarly
to Nietzsche and Camus after him, Spinoza repeatedly challenges his audience with
the most fundamental questions of human existence: the meaning and end of life,
the origin of human vitality, the essence of human dignity, and the road to the
ultimate good and supreme happiness. Spinoza presents sensual pleasures, social
status, and material wealth as possible keys for the good life and personal fulfill-
ment, yet he negates them—in line with the arguments of Aristotle in the
Nicomachean Ethics—on the theoretical basis that they fail to actualize the distin-
guishing and higher qualities of humans as well as on the empirical ground that
they fail to secure long term and stable happiness. The desirable alternative—in
line with the philosophy of Aristotle and contrary to Nietzsche’s—is to aspire for a
life of intellectual inquiry and the pursuit of truth—a life that he characterizes as
guided by ‘the intellectual love of God’. The end product that Spinoza envisaged
is very moving in its optimism: individuals that enjoy good health, tranquility and
happiness, and a society that is blessed with a rational social contract that secures
freedom, fairness, and peace.9
Coming to the third trait of true educators, we will deal with the special educa-
tive influence that arises out of existential encounters with the personality of the
educator in his totality. In Spinoza’s case, we should naturally limit ourselves to
encounters via his writings and biographies. One major characteristic that readers

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encounter in Spinoza’s Ethics is the complete coherence or full correspondence in

the relation of content and style. As is the case in the writings of Plato where the
form of dialogue furthers the ideal of Philosophical Dialectics, or in the works of
Nietzsche where the aphoristic style establishes the epistemological doctrine of
Perspectivism, Spinoza’s manifold styles of writing and modes of approaching his
readers manifest his central doctrine of holistic humanism. At times, he speaks to
us as a meticulous logician and ‘hard headed philosopher’ whose sole concern is with
adequate and precise definitions, axioms, propositions and proofs. At other times,
he approaches us directly and intimately, in the first person singular, elaborating
and explaining issues in the ‘notes’ and ‘corollaries’, loosening up to the extent of
addressing us passionately, and in a simple language, as if trying to persuade the
readers to join him in a an idealistic yet practical struggle for human betterment.
Spinoza is present to us not only as a multifaceted person who is engaged with
the most fundamental philosophical and existential issues, but also as a man of
personal integrity and intellectual honesty. In his philosophical arguments, as much
as in his existential choices, there is hardly any room for compromises, pragmatic
lies, or comforting prejudices. Philosophy, in Spinoza’s case, is always rigorous and
challenging; if reason finds no evidence for the existence of a personal God, than
we should rid ourselves from this mystical belief and substitute it with a rational
picture of reality. If religious leaders abuse their power to stupefy and manipulate
the masses, their authority and influence in our public life must be limited. If it is
as rational to care for the edification of others as it is for your own,10 then that care
should apply to all humans and not only to those belonging to one’s community
or religion. And if it is the case that acquiring understanding rather than social
status is of the greatest importance, then it suits Spinoza to philosophize humbly
at his home rather than to get a professorship at a prestigious university.11
In all the above examples, Spinoza is present to us as a sensible, temperate,
sensitive, conscientious person with a radical commitment to truth and integrity.
‘I judge a philosopher’, wrote Nietzsche, ‘by whether he is able to serve as an
example’ (1965, p. 18). In this test very few have passed with the success and
dignity of Spinoza. To use Nietzsche’s terminology, in his life and philosophy,
Spinoza exemplifies the sovereignty and power of higher human beings: adding
value and meaning to the world by virtue of exercising his personal resources, not
for dominating others or achieving social status, but for personal edification via
self-overcoming and self-perfection.12
Let us turn now from the pedagogical Eros that is embedded in his writings to
the pedagogical themes that can be derived from his philosophy. As I noted in the
opening paragraph, unlike other eudaimonistic theorists, such as Aristotle and
Seneca before him and Maslow after him, Spinoza’s eudaimonistic theory has hardly
been considered to have pedagogical implications. In order to do justice to
Spinoza’s philosophy—to disclose and elaborate its pedagogical significance—let us
begin by stating that common to all eudaimonistic theories is the premise that the
gradual development and actualization of the potentialities that lie in everyone’s
inner nature would lead to higher states of personal and social existence. It further
implies: firstly, that the development and actualization of our inner nature is guided

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by a telos or vocation that is immanent in the nature of every human qua human;
and secondly, that the perfection achieved in this developmental process is both
subjective and objective, i.e. good human life that is manifested in wellbeing and
personal happiness as well in excellence in the humanly distinctive realms of intel-
lectual, moral, and civic life. In Spinoza’s theory, just like in other eudaimonistic
theories, ‘in so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good’
(Book IV, Prop. 31). In other words, as it is reason that Spinoza identifies as man’s
essential nature, all things that invigorate our power of rational inquiry and are
conductive to understanding are good and useful for us—enhancing our reality as
well as our perfection and happiness.13
There is, however, a unique characteristic in Spinoza’s philosophy that stands as
an obstacle—some would argue insurmountable—to any meaningful discussion of
utilizing his ethical, let alone pedagogical, views. I am referring here to his world-
picture: his metaphysical determinism, according to which everything in reality—
Nature or God—is determined by a system of eternal causality; hence any discus-
sion of free will, eudaimonistic ethics, or pedagogical initiative may seem meaning-
less and in vain.14 According to Spinoza’s world-picture, ‘in the mind there is no
absolute or free will, but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause,
which has also been determined by another cause ... and so on to infinity’ (Book
II, Prop. 48). In light of this—with many Spinoza scholars—we are bound to raise
the question whether it is meaningful and altogether possible to engage in ethical
and pedagogical discourse that aims at the initiation of people into higher modes
of thought and activity. In other words, what kind of educational initiatives could
make sense in a reality that is deterministic and with teachers and students who
are incapable of autonomous deliberations and freedom of choice? Does the best
that we can hope for consist in engaging our students with philosophical activities,
thereby affecting them indirectly and hoping that these activities somehow become
causes of edification for our students?
While not pretending to solve this problem, I will only posit here the dominant
view among Spinoza’s scholars—upon which I shall rely in developing my argument—
that even within the framework of his metaphysical determinism, there is still room
for achieving some measure of freedom and personal autonomy. The argument goes
as follows:

(a) Existence, according to Spinoza (long before Nietzsche and Foucault) is a perpet-
ual struggle for self-preservation and self-affirmation (Nadler, 2006, p. 221), each
person endeavoring to remain in his own being and act in accordance with his true
and essential nature. ‘The universe’, in other words, ‘contains a large number of
things or modes which effect each other, each thing tries to preserve its being, but
what it actually does is not the outcome of this endeavor alone—rather, it is the
outcome of the interaction between its endeavor or power and the endeavors or
powers of the things which affect it’ (Parkinson, 1971, p. 11).
(b) The conatus of every individual—the endeavor to achieve enough vitality or power
for generating activity from one’s inner nature rather than to be forced from exter-
nal sources—is necessarily in conflict with such endeavors of other individuals; the

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results of which are various degrees of freedom and autonomy—the extent to

which an individual is active (relying on the recourses of his inner being) rather
than passive (affected and determined by external forces).
(c) The distinctive human way—by virtue of human nature—to preserve their being
and increase their power and liberty in relation to other things consists in reaching
higher levels of thought and knowledge and therefore conducting rational life that
is generated and governed by reason (Hampshire, 1971). In other words, to be
powerful is ‘to be the adequate cause of one’s own being’ (Nadler, 2006, p. 230),
and the road to a higher life of wellbeing and autonomy consists of the individual’s
‘drawing on its own cognitive resources’ (ibid., p. 193) and ‘increasing the number
of true and adequate ideas’ (ibid., p. 161).

If we combine this portrayal or characterization of Spinoza’s philosophy with the

characteristics canvassed earlier of eudaimonistic ethics, it seems that a framework
for discussing a liberating and empowering pedagogy has been established. As put
by Gilles Deleuze, ‘man is not born free, but becomes free or frees himself—
becoming a free or strong man’ (Deleuze, 1988, p. 70). And this freedom, as we
have seen earlier, does not amount to the ordinary sense of freedom of will or
choice, but rather to man’s ‘coming into possession of his power of acting, that is,
when his conatus is determined by adequate ideas from which active affects follow,
affects that are explained by his own essence’ (ibid., pp. 70–71). Another way of
putting it, this time in normative terms, is that in his philosophy of power and
freedom, Spinoza is challenging us with the ethical and pedagogical ideal of the
sovereign individual: persons who are active creators and shapers of their life’s
content and condition rather than passive products of their circumstances; men and
women who utilize their rational, critical and autonomous thinking to establish
themselves as authorities and rule for their deliberation and conduct.
With respect to the developmental process required for the accomplishment of
personal sovereignty, it is explicated in the eudaimonistic framework that ‘as each
thing possesses more of perfection, so it is more active and less passive’ (Spinoza,
1974, Book V, Prop. 40). Personal sovereignty, in other words, is a function of
maturation and development. As the individual’s concrete mode of existence is
determined by the balance of power between the inner factors of physical and
spiritual vitality and the external factors of the natural and social circumstances,
then we may say that in the framework of Spinoza’s philosophy sovereigns will
become those who have developed the cognitive powers of rationality and critical
reason—they will be better immunized against dogmas, prejudices, superstitions,
superficial conventions, demagogy, and other social mechanisms by which persons
are manipulated and enslaved.
Like other advocates of perfectionist ethics and pedagogy—such as Plato, Aris-
totle, Seneca, and Montaigne, before him, and Nietzsche and Ortega who followed
him—Spinoza is in an important sense a cultural elitist. After all, whether we are
using Plato’s metaphor of the cave or employing the modern talk of ‘the initiation
of the young into worthwhile and higher modes of thought and action,’ the point
is that we hold the educators as individuals who achieved higher or more cultivated

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modes of living and whose calling is to liberate others, of a cruder or baser nature,
from the fetters of ignorance, passions, conformity and superstition.15 It is clear for
Spinoza, as he states in the last sentence of the Ethics that ‘all things excellent are
as difficult as they are rare’ (Book V, Prop. 42). Put differently, by the very nature
of excellence or virtue, it would be unrealistic to expect many ‘persons who per-
fected their intellect and live according to the dictates of reason ... [as well as
managing to lead] a life of moderation’ (Nadler, 2006, p. 231). The implication of
this in the educational arena, is that despite our effort to cultivate as many sover-
eign individuals as possible, only a few will manage to overcome the ‘masses
mentality’ and achieve an enlightened and sovereign mode of human existence.
This position on the part of Spinoza situates him between two distinguished
elitist thinkers of the late 19th century. On the one hand, Spinoza posits a democratic
and egalitarian kind of elitism, such as the one endorsed by Matthew Arnold:
firstly, that the key to human betterment and cultural development lies in the
cultivation of the quest for perfection as well as the engagement with the best that
has been thought, done and created in the various spheres of human culture;
secondly, that a sound and responsible educational policy should consist in good
liberal education for all.16 This view seems to be congruous with Spinoza’s stance
on these matters: ‘The highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all
and therefore all can equally rejoice therein’ (1974, Book IV, Prop. 36). In other
words, ‘men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason, are most useful to their
fellow men; therefore, we shall in obedience to reason necessarily endeavor to bring
about that men should live in obedience to reason’ (ibid., Prop. 37, Proof 1).
On the other hand, Spinoza recognizes—very much in line with the radical
elitism of Nietzsche—that only very few would be able to achieve the kind of
spiritual vitality that is required for establishing themselves as sovereign individu-
als—enlightened, autonomous, and authentic. As diagnosed in Nietzsche’s philos-
ophy of power and later in the philosophies of Ortega and Sartre, the great majority
of people are bound—because of weakness of their conatus (in Spinoza’s term) or
out of existential laziness and ‘bad faith’ (in the terms of Nietzsche, Ortega and
Sartre)—to adopt the comfortable and less demanding life of intellectual inertia
and social conformity.17
Being a child of the 17th century, Spinoza could never entertain the thought that
in his philosophizing he was ‘doing’ radical education and critical pedagogy. How-
ever, his harsh criticism in his Theological-Political Treatise of the stupefaction and
enslavement of the public by religious leaders could mark him as a predecessor of
20th century radical educationists and critical pedagogues. Spinoza accuses religious
leaders of conducting emotional manipulations on the people. They utilize the
natural fears and anxieties that are common to all humans in order to inculcate
superstitious beliefs about the will of God and the reality of Afterlife, and, thereby,
bring people under religious authority and enslave them for the promotion of their
leaders’ interests. By fostering in them the dispositions of docility, submissiveness,
and conformity—which Nietzsche later termed ‘slave morality’—they manage,
Spinoza argues, to ‘degrade man from rational being to beast, which completely
stifles the power of judgment between true and false’; or even worse, ‘men who

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 Spinoza as Educator 539

despise reason, who reject and turn away from understanding as naturally corrupt,
these, of all people, are thought to possess light from on High’ (1951, Preface).
Moreover, the great majority of people are driven by their false consciousness to
‘fight as bravely for slavery as for safety, and count it not shame but highest honor
to risk their blood and their lives for the vainglory of a tyrant’ (ibid.). Reading
these words in the Preface to his Theological-Political Treatise, one cannot avoid
thinking about the similarities in content of passion found in radical and influential
texts of the 1960’s such as Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man and Postman and
Weingartner’s Teaching as a Subversive Activity.
In Spinoza’s view, in order for people to achieve freedom from the degrading rule
of ignorance and prejudice, the state should provide two life-affirming or growth-
promoting conditions: the first, a cultural and political climate of pluralism and
tolerance in which ‘everyone should be free to choose for himself the foundations
of his creed’ (ibid.); the second, that the practice of education would focus on
developing the cognitive capacities of the people—from the first level of confused
ideas and shallow understanding, to the second level of scientific thinking and
adequate ideas, and finally to the third level of intuitive understanding that is based
on holistic and integrative knowledge.18 We may phrase it in the language of
Spinoza, that the combination of political freedom and cognitive excellence would
allow and enable the young to reach greater power of conatus—having better immu-
nization against the influence of external forces and manipulation. We may likewise
put it in the more colloquial language of Postman and Weingartner (1969): they
equip students with better crap detecting kits.
Another pedagogical aspect that Spinoza introduced prior to modern educational
theorists is his holistic humanism. Very much in line with the romantic and holistic
naturalism of Rousseau and the pedagogical progressivism of Neill, Dewey, Russell,
and Rogers, Spinoza insists on attributing importance not only to the cognitive but
also to the emotional and bodily dimensions. ‘Whatsoever increases or diminishes,
helps or hinders the power of activity in our body’, he writes, ‘helps or hinders the
power of thought in our mind’ (1974, Book III, Prop. 11). The classical principle
of ‘a healthy soul in a healthy body’ is reformulated in Spinoza’s theory into the
doctrine that mind and the body are just two different manifestations or attributes
of one unity or being—whatever happens in the physiological order of the body has
its parallel in the mental order of the life of the mind. We should further attribute
importance to the role of the senses and emotions as crucial elements in our self-
perception and emotional intelligence, without which a satisfying and successful life
is not possible. The sensual and emotional experience of bodily and mental well-
being, Spinoza contends, is nothing but the joy of accomplishing more happiness
and blessedness in our life. It is worth noting here that this view of Spinoza, of the
importance of cultivating joy and personal happiness, runs contrary to some ortho-
doxies of the historical religions of the West, which traditionally associate joy and
gaiety with dangerous permissiveness and moral degeneration.
Contrary to the traditional ethics of humility and submissiveness and very much
in line with the life-affirming and vitality-seeking ideals of Nietzsche, Russell, and
Neill, Spinoza advocates passionate self-affirmation and self-edification.19 There is

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nothing that irritates the spirit of such humanists more than the sacrifice of per-
sonal happiness and vitality on the altar of God or the State; it is joy and vitality
that a humanist educator wishes for his students—’to free oneself, flourishing,
expanding outward into the world’ (Goldstein, 2006, p. 179). Moreover, we can
easily imagine Spinoza’s passionate and restless spirit speaking from the throat of
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra: ‘Remain faithful to the earth, and do not believe those who
speak to you of otherworldly hopes! Poison-mixers are they, whether they know it
or not. Despisers of life are they, decaying and poisoned themselves of whom the
earth is weary; so let them go’ (1968, ‘Zarathustra’s Prologue’); ‘Lead back to the
earth the virtue that flew away, as I do—back to the body, back to life, that it may
give the earth a meaning, a human meaning’ (ibid., ‘On the Gift-Giving Virtue’).
The last pedagogical component that will be addressed here belongs to the moral
discourse concerning good versus bad and good versus evil. It is here that Spinoza
posits a straight foreword atheistic view, according to which ‘Good and Bad, they
indicate no positive quality in things regarded in themselves, but they are merely
modes of thinking, or notions which we form from the comparison of things one
with another’ in proportion to their agreement or disagreement with the models of
perfection that we have set for ourselves (1974, Book IV, Preface). ‘By good’ he
adds, ‘I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to us; by evil I mean that
which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in the attainment of any good’
(ibid., Definitions 1 and 2); and one and the same thing can be good for one, bad
for another, and completely irrelevant to a third. In light of such contentions,
unless Spinoza was a rationalist and naturalist, we could have mistaken his position
as moral relativism, subjectivism or even nihilism—the truth is quite the opposite.
In the context of his commitment to rationalism, naturalism and philosophy of
immanence, Spinoza’s views on morality, in general, and on the nature of good and
bad, in particular, seem to be congruent with the school of thought that is cur-
rently called pragmatic humanism.20 This philosophical position—of which John
Dewey was one of the founders and which was later advocated by different thinkers
such as Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, and Martha Nussbaum—seeks to inte-
grate a cosmopolitan humanistic morality with a commitment to a liberal and
multicultural democracy. In other words, the simple fact that all humans share a
common human nature as well as an ‘earthly habitat’ creates the possibility for an
objective and universal discourse concerning the factors that promote and inhibit
human flourishing. In this universal or global discourse, which comprises numer-
ous and different methodologies, the treasures of moral and pedagogical knowledge
acquired by humanity should enjoy—very much like medicine, psychology and
ecology—the status of objective validity. We know, for example, that there is room
in human culture for a great variety of foods as well as of methods for constructing
houses—yet there exists a universal method for measuring the nutritious value of
foods as well as a universal method for measuring the strength and firmness of
houses. Likewise, as in the cases of foods and houses, we are well aware that
societies around the globe can develop different cultural contents—yet the universal
values of human life, dignity, freedom, equality and rationality must be dominant
in the life of every society for its citizens to flourish and achieve wellbeing. We have

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 Spinoza as Educator 541

relatively solid knowledge—to use Spinoza’s terminology and to draw on the UN’s
Human Development Index—that these values are instrumental in bringing us
closer to accomplishing the ideal of human flourishing that is immanent in our nature.
Spinoza does not limit himself to providing a definition of the ‘good’ and a
methodology for its identification, but also discloses for his readers a list of desir-
able positions, dispositions, sensitivities, and behaviors that are to be cultivated in
our self-edification and in the education of others. In the realm of social morality,
Spinoza stresses the importance of ‘love thy neighbor as thou love thyself ’. In his
words: ‘the good which every man who follows after virtue desires for himself, he
will also desire for other men’ (1974, Book IV, Prop. 37). The logic and justification
of this virtue is not grounded in a theological and deontological altruistic imperative,
but in enlightened egoism—that ‘a person is most useful to other people when he
is rationally pursuing his own self-interest’ (Nadler, 2006, p. 242). Spinoza is of
the opinion that, contrary to the belief that underlies the predominant egotistical
and competitive morality, the conditions for the flourishing of any individual only
improve with the improvement of the well being and personal fulfillment of his fellow
citizens. On the interpersonal level, this understanding is translated into a caring
concern that every member of society should enjoy the rights and opportunities for
a dignified life. On the communal level, this understanding should be manifested
in a social contract that is based on the virtues of human solidarity and social
responsibility. In the words of Spinoza: ‘men who are governed by reason—that is,
who seek what is useful to them in accordance with reason—desire for themselves
nothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind, and consequently,
are just, faithful, and honorable in their conduct’ (1974, Book IV, Prop. 18).21

Notes
1. This point is manifested best in Heine’s famous contention that ‘all our modern
philosophers, though often perhaps unconsciously, see through the glasses which Baruch
Spinoza ground’ (Heine, 1964, 9, p. 84). Other good references on this point are the
entry on Spinoza, written by MacIntyre, in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy; Yovel, Spinoza
and other Heretics; and the most recent book of Goldstein, Betraying Spinoza: The
renegade Jew who gave us modernity.
2. This point is also stressed in Brinker (2004), where he states that: ‘Spinoza’s political
philosophy is usually recognized as the first classical model of enlightened liberal
thought, recommending a complete separation of state and church’ (p. 167).
3. See for example in the ‘Statement of Purpose’ of Free Inquiry, the journal of the ‘Council
for Secular Humanism’ in the US, as well as in Paul Kurtz’s books (1982, 1988, 1994).
4. On the nature and characteristics of eudaimonistic ethical theories see: Hanna Arendt,
The Human Condition, Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory; David
Norton, Personal Destinies: A Philosophy of Ethical Individualism; and Martha Nussbaum,
The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy.
5. ‘Of Human Freedom’ (book V), as a development from and overcoming of ‘Human
Bondage’ (book IV), is the culmination of Spinoza’s Ethics. As put by Feuer in his
Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism, ‘The free man is the central conception of Spinoza’s
ethics’ (p. 199). The same idea is conveyed by Yosef Ben-Shlomo, who states that ‘the
liberation of man is the ultimate end of Spinoza’s philosophy,’ in Lectures on the
Philosophy of Spinoza, p. 50.

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542 Nimrod Aloni

6. A conception that Nietzsche introduced in Schopenhauer as Educator and later developed

in Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
7. Nietzsche admired Spinoza, felt strong kinship with him, and even though he objected
to his rationalism he considered him one of his philosophical ancestors. On similarities
between their philosophies, especially between Spinoza’s ‘conatus’ and Nietzsche’s ‘will
to power’, see Yovel, Spinoza and other Heretics as well as Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza:
Practical philosophy. On Nietzsche, in general, and on Zarathustra, in particular, as
educators, see: Nimrod Aloni, Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche’s healing and edifying philosophy;
Jacob Golomb, ‘Nietzsche’s Early Educational Thought’; Haim Gordon, ‘Nietzsche’s
Zarathustra as Educator’; Eliyau Rosenow, ‘Nietzsche’s Educational Dynamite’ and his
‘Nietzsche’s Concept of Education’.
8. On these elements see Feuer, in Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism, that ‘to found a sect
was far from Spinoza’s intention; there was no longing in him for dociles, no craving for
the reassurance of admirers’ (p. 257).
9. True, complete and lasting happiness is what Spinoza declares to be seeking in the
opening section of On The Improvement Of The Understanding, and it is in Book V of his
Ethics that he portrays how the highest form of knowledge can provide personal well
being and blessedness as well as social solidarity and cooperation.
10. Even though the acts of caring are motivated, according to Spinoza, mainly by cognitive
considerations, the nature and implications of caring are not substantially different from
the affective or feminine notion of caring advanced by Nel Noddings in Caring: A
feminine approach to ethics and moral education; that is, concern for and promotion of the
well being and self-actualization of others.
11. Spinoza cherished most his intellectual independence and looked for no social status or
a leading role in academia, hence he declined the opportunity offered to him to serve
as a professor of philosophy at the prestigious university of Heidelberg. On Spinoza’s
personal integrity and intellectual honesty see for example: Joseph Ratner, The Philosophy
of Spinoza; Irmiyahu Yovel, Spinoza and other Heretics; and in Rebecca Goldstein: Betraying
Spinoza: The renegade Jew who gave us modernity.
12. In her recent Betraying Spinoza, Rebecca Goldstein, like most other commentators on
Spinoza, stresses the point that in his private life—unlike many other great philosophers—
‘he was a lovable man’ (p. 47), and she quotes from Russell’s famous History of Western
Philosophy that ‘Spinoza is the noblest and most lovable of the great philosophers’.
13. De Dijn (2004) explains that we should consider Spinoza’s ethical theory in the broadest
sense as ‘the pursuit of real well-being, real happiness’ (p. 37), and that ‘Spinoza’s
ethics, properly speaking, turns out to be more related to the issues of self-loss and self-
realization—issues intrinsically linked to the search for a meaningful life’ (p. 39).
14. Yakira (2004) phrases this problem as follows: ‘How is it possible, we are endlessly
asked, to reconcile human freedom with causal determinism and logical necessitarianism,
both of which are doctrines that Spinoza adopts’ (p. 70).
15. On some characteristics of the liberating or emancipatory approach in education see
Soltis & Fenstermacher, Approaches to Teaching. See also on the nature of traditional and
neo-humanist liberal education: Charles Bailey, Beyond the Present and the Particular: A
theory of liberal education; Robert Hutchings, Great Books: The foundation of a liberal
education; and T. S. Eliot, ‘What a is Classic?’.
16. See Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy. On his views and their relevance to education
see Nimrod Aloni, Enhancing Humanity, pp. 31–32.
17. On Spinoza’s elitist views on the problems of ‘common people’, ‘the multitude’ or ‘the
masses,’ see chapter 5 of Yovel, Spinoza and other Heretics, as well as in Frankena,
‘Spinoza’s New Morality’. Nietzsche stresses this point in almost all his books, referring
to the phenomena of ‘Slave Morality,’ and of the ‘Herd Animal’; Ortega in his book on
The Revolt of the Masses, referred to the ‘mass man’; and Sartre addressed the man of
the masses especially in Anti-Semite and Jew.

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 Spinoza as Educator 543

18. In his Ethics, Spinoza’s theory of knowledge consists of three stages—sensual, rational-
scientific, and intuitive-holistic. In his On the Improvement of the Understanding, he refers
to four stages, in which the first two—randomly gathered information and the sensual—
were later combined into the first stage presented in the Ethics. Yovel and Segal (2004)
address this issue already in the Preface to their collection, speaking of freedom as the
climatic stage that is achieved by ‘a mature ratio’.
19. On Spinoza’s philosophy of ‘courage and self-affirmation’ see Paul Tillich, The Courage
to Be, especially in ch. 1. Examples of the life-affirming approach and the importance
of self-assertion in modern educational thought occur in: Nietzsche, ‘Thus Spoke
Zarathustra’; A. S. Neill, Summerhill; Bertrand Russell, Education and the Good life.
20. A term coined by Richard Bernstein, in Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, and later
defended in his The New Constellation: The ethical-political horizons of modernity/
postmodernity.
21. On this point it is worth quoting Steven Nadler from his Spinoza’s Ethics: ‘It is life
guided by reason and based in knowledge where an individual does only what is truly
useful not to himself, but also aids others in their own pursuit of perfection ... a moral
philosophy that is virtue oriented. What matters most is not the actions that one
performs or even the intentions that one has, but above all the kind of person one is
and the character one possesses (p. 225).

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Journal compilation © 2007 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia