Indo-US Diplomatic Interactions Under

The National Democratic Alliance Government

1998-2004

Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University for award of the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

LAJPAT RAI
Under the Supervision of
Dr. Manish Dabhade

Diplomacy and Disarmament Division

Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament
School of International Studies
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
New Delhi – 110067
 CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1
Introduction 2-32

CHAPTER 2
Historical Overview of the Indo-US Relations 33-76

CHAPTER 3
Nuclear Diplomacy: Security Compulsions 77-114

CHAPTER 4
Strategic Diplomacy: India and US on Terrorism 115- 171

CHAPTER 5
Conclusion 172-180

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 CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This research has been carried out for the objective of reviewing as well as analyzing
Indo-American relations during the period from 1998 till 2004 when National
Democratic Alliance (NDA) enjoyed political power in India. Indo-US foreign
relations underwent some dramatic, drastic, and favourable changes during this
period. In this study efforts have been made to examine these dramatic changes in the
mutual relations concerning India as well as the USA chronology of the changes in
these relations has been made for monitoring the path of the ruptures in friendly
relations and in the restoration of those ruptures.

The purpose of this research is to study the diplomatic approach of America after the
1998 nuclear tests conducted by India. The scope will be limited to the study of
India’s diplomacy vis-à-vis USA under the National Democratic Alliance
governments, 1998-2004. The NDA, a coalition under the leadership of the BJP, came
to power in 1998 general election but was forced to face another election when one of
its constituent allies (AIADMK) walked out of the coalition. The NDA won the 1999
elections with more seats and ruled the country till the next election in 2004 and
became the first non Congress government to complete a full five-year term. The
NDA, while trying to maintain an image of a strong posture (1998 nuclear tests,
Operation Parakram) continually sought to bring USA to the negotiating table through
summit diplomacy. This study will also examine whether Indian diplomacy was able
to measure up to the required standards in convincing the US about Pakistan’s direct
and insidious role in promoting terrorism in India. Apart from the aforesaid two
matters, one more matter of this study relates to the fact if Pakistan responded in some
positive way towards India in the wake of active and continuous co-operation
involving the US and India for defeating the specter and dread of terrorism.

Research Questions:

1. How have been the Indo-US relations during the NDA government (1998-
2004)?

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2. What has been the course of nuclear diplomacy after the Pokhran tests of
1998?

3. How has the issue of terrorism been dealt in the strategic diplomatic dialogues
between India and US?

4. Have strategic relations between the India and US during the NDA
government (1998-2004) comprised the principle of strategic autonomy?

5. How has the Indo –US relationship been affected by their relationship with
countries like China and Pakistan?

The US, a phenomenal superpower even during the period of the 1940s, did not pay
much attention to India when it became independent in 1947. The diplomatic ties
between the two nations were very formal. Trade was limited and defense cooperation
too was very limited. India was busy in recovering from the colonial hangover. It did
not want to be aligned with any group of nations. Later on Indian cooperation with
Russia increased.

But, the elevation of President Clinton changed this scenario considerably. Even
though his previous Administration had started recognizing the role of India owing to
the emergence of India as a regional power, but President Clinton took more serious
note of India’s presence in Asia. Prior to 1998, the American diplomacy paid very
limited attention towards dealing with this region and with India in particular. The
US was averse to India owing to Indian pacts with Russia. After President Carter visit
to India in 1978, the next Presidential visit by President Clinton was the fourth one till
1990s (Pant 2011: 38).

The formation of the NDA government in India under the headship of Atal
Behari Vajpayee took place in 1998. This government gave a new direction to the
bilateral relations between India and the USA. The US Ambassador to the UN, Bill
Richardson, visited India in April, 1998. It was a follow up of the US President’s
dialogue with the Indian Prime Minister. Atal Bihari Vajpayee was the Prime Minister
of India belonged to a very prominent political party called BJP (Bhartiya Janta
Party.) The team sent by the US Administration included an expert on the BJP which
was then the ruling party in India. His name was Walter Anderson. These member of

3
the team thought that the B JP-ed government would go ahead with India’s nuclear
programme.

This trip by Richardson was a kind of reconnaissance trip by the US This team came
to India on April 14, 1998 for discussing matters related to some improvement in
mutual ties. They were aware about the illustrious record of Vajpayee in foreign
relations. Vajpayee was earlier the Foreign Minister of India way back in 1977 and
was very well conversant with the matters related to foreign policy of India. He
assured the Anderson team that India had no plans to make sweeping or drastic
changes in the policy of India as far as war the matter of nuclear weapons was
concerned. Vajpyaee’s deputy, to wit the Indian Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh, met
this US team and met this team in the US Embassy in Delhi and he assured them of
India cooperation in all the matters discussed with Prime Minister Vajpayee. Matters
started looking up about improving ties. (Riedel 2018: 118)

INDIAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSION & THE US STANCE

However, something unexpected put a temporary hiatus in the bilateral relations. This
thing was India’s nuclear explosion in 1998. The nuclear-weapon blasts on May 11,
1998 came less than a month after the Anderson visit. India tested three nuclear tests
on that day. On May 13, India tested two more such tests. The US Administration was
caught unaware. The CIA could not gauge and monitor the Indian moves. It seemed
that almost all these activities were carried out at night time. The US felt let down by
India (Riedel 2018: 121).

All these clandestine and unexpected activities evoked critical US reprisal. One act of
this reprisal was that the Congress wanted that President Bill Clinton must invoke the
Glenn Amendment of the Arms Control Act which could impose extensive economic
and military sanctions on India. The US applied Glenn Amendments on India after
these nuclear-weapon tests by India. The Indian Prime Minister wrote a letter to the
US President. This letter meant for President Bill Clinton was published in New York
Times, Prime Minister of India Atal Behari Vajpayee, explained the rationale for the
underground nuclear tests. He wrote, “We have an overt nuclear state on our border, a
state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations
with that country have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust

4
persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem. To add to the distrust that
country has materially helped another neighbour of ours to become a covert nuclear
state” (Ibid.)

Even then, President Clinton was furious at these surreptitious nuclear weapon tests
by India. He felt that his hand were tied. He had to impose sanctions as per the US
laws and his Administration would have to vote against India in such global forums as
the US Treasury and the World Bank. President Clinton wanted that India should sign
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT.). These tests by India made his situation
very awkward about CTBT also. He imposed some very tough sanctions against
India (Ibid.).

As far as India was concerned, it cited the nuclear threat imposed by China and China
had become nuclear in 1964 after the invasion of India in 1962. China created one
more serious problem for India in 1987 and both sides had to deploy about 60,000
troops each on the Indo-China border. It was stated by India that in spite of the best
Indian efforts, the stand-off and threat from China was alarming. Even then the
Security Council of the UN passed Resolution No.1172 on June 08, 1998 and this
resolution condemned the Indian nuclear tests. This resolution demanded a ban on all
future tests ((Ibid.))

However, there was an anti-climax in the form of defiance to this resolution of the
aforesaid UN resolution about complete ban on nuclear tests. India defied the ban
imposed by this resolution, and the US efforts to curb the nuclear arms race did not
succeed. The government of India refused to implement these recommendations of the
UN. With regard to signing of the CTBT also, India imposed some conditions about
complete annihilation weapons throughout the world and about complete and global
ban on the nuclear-weapon tests. Those conditions were not at all acceptable to other
nations. Hence, India remained bound to carry on nuclear-weapon research for the
safety of it from two very hostile neighbouring countries (Ibid.: 122).

On the other side, there was one more threat of nuclear weapons. It was from Pakistan
this time. The government of Pakistan was keen on retaliating against the Indian
nuclear tests. A US team visited Pakistan for dissuading the government of Pakistan.
The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, and his team discussed this matter.

5
But, it seemed that Pakistan was determined to carry out nuclear tests on account of
the tests carried out by India and on account of the mounting public pressure. Pakistan
conducted its nuclear tests on May 28 and 30 in 1998. Pakistan tried to justify this act
by saying that India and Israel already had nuclear weapons(Ibid.).

These tests by Indian and Pakistan brought in a new era of Indo-US relations that
brought about many far reaching changes from1998 to 2004. These changes in Indo-
US relations under President Clinton and later on under President George W. Bush
proved a very significant precursor to the Indo-US relations later on also including the
signing of the US – India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation
Enhancement Act (Ibid. :122).

NUCLEAR DIALOGUE DURING THE CLINTON AMMINISTRARTION:

President Clinton remained the President of the US from 1991 to 2001. This
Administration undertook sustained dialogue with the government of India after the
nuclear tests conducted by India in 1998. As per Talbott, the then Deputy Secretary of
State the US Administration was already in negotiation with the government of India
for improving mutual relations as the US had recognized India as an emerging
powerful international entity. With this being the view of the US, the Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright duly visited India in1997 for further negotiation, and
President Clinton was scheduled to visit India in 1998. However, his visit to India was
deferred owing to a series of nuclear tests conducted by India.

After the Indian nuclear tests, Pakistan also conducted nuclear tests in 1998 itself. The
Clinton Administration imposed military and economic sanctions on both the
countries. International economic aid to India was reduced to $3 billion from the
earlier amount of $4 billion. It was annual reduction falling to $1 billion in 1998. The
US stopped many military programmes including the sale of arms, military exercise
that were held jointly by the US and India prior to the imposition of these sanction.
The US also placed 200 Indian nuclear and defence establishments on its Entity List
(imposition of dealing without a specific licence), and restriction of the transfer of
high-technology items. Many of these sanctions were in additions to the sanctions
imposed after 1974 nuclear test conducted by India.

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Later on, meetings were held between the Indian Foreign Minister and the US Deputy
Secretary of State. Agreement was entered into for lifting some sanctions in lieu of
Indian compliance of some conditions laid down by the US Administration’s
benchmark for meeting demands made by India.

By the time the Clinton Administration ended, a number of economic, but not military
sanctions, had been lifted. Consequently, India complied with two more US
benchmarks of stricter control of exports and moratorium on nuclear tests (nuclear test
restraints). However, India did not agree to comply with other benchmarks. In return
of the acts done by the Clinton Administration, India strengthened its exports control
(Benchmark no.1), and India with regard to the benchmark 3, India announced
moratorium on further nuclear tests. India agreed to sign Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT) if other countries too did the same. However, CTBT got stalled.
India also did not accept conditions stipulated in benchmarks no. 4 and 5.

It is noteworthy that sanctions imposed in the areas of 2 to 6 of Barriers/Sanctions

imposed by the US in II (A) were not lifted by the US but, India wanted waiver of
these sanctions more for economic and energy reasons. Hence, during the period of
1999 – 2000, Indian even thought of separating its civil and military programmes.
These steps resulted in settlement of these in Joint Statement of July 2005.

However, Clinton Administration was not inclined to waive sanctions. On these

restrictions, Strobe Talbott stated that “unless and until they (Pakistan and India)
disavow nuclear weapons and accept safeguards on all their nuclear activities they
will continue to forfeit the full recognition and benefits (that is, the lifting of thepost-
1974 technology control regimes) that accrue to members in good standing of the
NPT.” (Talbott, 1998). In this manner, most of the sanctions and the technology
control regime against India remained intact till the end of the regime of this President
even though he paid a State visit to India in 2000. Thus, these restrictions and
sanctions remained in operation, and they continued to be an irritant in India – US
relations even when President Clinton relinquished his post of the President of the
United States.

THE TALBOT MISSION:

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The resolution passed by the U.N. numbered 1172 about the stoppage of further
nuclear tests by India did not succeed in its goal. Even then, the US Administration
did not stop making efforts for improving ties with India and to some extent with
Pakistan. The focus of the American Administration shifted to South Asia. President
Clinton realized the enormity of the importance of a huge and developing nation like
India (Ibid.: 123).

His campaign was led by Strobe Talbot, who as the Deputy Secretary of State and was
a capable and trusted aid of President Clinton. He very ably briefed the Secretary of
State, Madeleine Albright about these developments. Strobe met Jaswant Singh, the
Indian Foreign Minister, at ten locations in as many as seven countries. He wrote in
his narrative that his negotiations with India were most intense and meaningful so far
in the history of Indo-US relations (Ibid.: 124).

Strobe Talbot wanted that India should follow the guidelines earmarked in the
Resolution No.1172. India assured him of the some of the adherences on that
including the control over the export or smuggling of the nuclear technology. The US
vehemently advocated that India should sign CTBT. This signing by India would
become an admission of error by India and stop India from conducting further nuclear
tests. That was not admissible to India as the countries persuading India had
themselves conducted nuclear tests in hundreds; the US 1,054 tests, Russia 715
nuclear tests, and France, 210 nuclear tests. China, India’s hostile neighbour, too had
carried out nuclear weapons tests so many times (Ibid.).

Hence, the Indian side told the US side that it was finding ways of the signing of the
CTBT, but US knew that India was neither denying nor accepting the terms laid by
CTBT. The US also understood the compulsions of India owing to hostility displayed
by China from time to time and the presence of more hostile Pakistan just on the
border of India (Ibid.)

ABRUPT CHANGE IN INDIA’S INTERPRETATION OF TERRORIST

THREATS TO INDIA

In the year 1999, the Kargil War took place between India and Pakistan. In this war,
the US played a positive role in averting a major war. The US duly reprimanded
Pakistan, and it was successful in dissuading Pakistan from carrying of the war

8
further. In this farsighted and prompt stance of the US, an impetus to India’s relations
with the US came into being. Genuine and direct conferences between two sides led
by the then Foreign Minister of India late Jaswant Singh and former US Deputy
Secretary of State Strobe Talbot put the bilateral relations on a fast track (Ibid.: 125).

This steady and visible progress in the so far static, acrid, and unfavourable relations
was appropriately reflected in a brochure published by the American Embassy in
India. The wording of this letter explained much by means of the undercurrents of this
letter. The wording was a follows: “after almost half a century of talking at each
other, India and the US grew accustomed to talking to each other” (Ibid.). Talbott also
stated that the two countries were becoming better at each disagreeing without being
disagreeable. It was the longest spell of high-level of dialogue that the two countries
had engaged in their history.

This new phase of good relations initiated by the Clinton Administration underwent
some significant and favourable changes in the favour of India all of a sudden owing
to some devastating increase in terror-related acts globally. The US now fully realized
that terrorism was a global threat very dangerous and fatal. It happened when “al
Qaeda” came into existence. The term “al Qaeda” is an Arabic word and it means “the
base” (Ibid.: 126) It is a very lethal terrorist outfit.

In August, 1998, the terrorists of al Qaeda simultaneously exploded bombs in

Tanzania and Kenya. These deadly bomb explosions killed 212 in Tanzania and 11 in
Kenya. Many thousand innocent and defenceless people were injured; some of them
very seriously. The majority of the dead were African citizens. Apart from these
victims, 12 American citizens died in these bomb blasts. Just overnight, al Qaeda
became the most dreaded and marked terrorist organization in the world for the
government of the United States. One startling aspect was that some links connected
to these deadly and dastardly attacks found the involvement of some people in
Pakistan (Ibid.).

Founded by one of the wealthiest scions of the Saudi families named Bin Laden, Al
Qaeda, became the first global terrorist organization of the world. It was based in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. And, its first big and very lethal assault was in the
American offices in Africa. Bin Laden was earlier was a recruiter for mercenaries for
war against Russians in Afghanistan starting from the early 1980s. He was a known

9
accomplice of ISI, the Pakistani Secret Military Agency. He helped in establishing
such terrorist organization as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba with the help of the most dreaded
unit of the Pakistani army, to wit the ISI (Ibid.: 127).

The ISI was preoccupied in repulsing Soviet Union’s advances in Afghanistan. It was
getting aid and money from the US. Hence, it did not disturb or curb the growing
activities of al Qaeda. It did not dismantle the Mujahedeen camps established by al
Qaeda in Pakistan. However, owing to his defeat in a military campaign in 1989, Bin
Laden, fled from Afghanistan and went to his native land Saudi Arabia. This defeat in
that military campaign in 1989 was in Afghanistan. However, he returned to
Afghanistan from his self-imposed exile in1996. The ISI introduced Bin Laden to the
Taliban who were already working in collusion with the ISI. The Taliban duly
provided a safe haven to Bin Laden and his outfit, al Qaeda. By the year 1998, al
Qaeda was a State within the State of Afghanistan under the patronage and support
of Taliban (
Ibid.)

NEW CHAPTER IN INDO-US MILITARY COOPERATION

The Indian officials lead by its able Foreign Minister who visited the US immediately
after the 1998 attack on the US embassies in Africa. Jaswant Singh, the Indian
Foreign Minister, reminded the US officials of the Indian forewarning that the war
happening in Afghanistan was creating “Frankenstein monster.” This monster was
composed of Afghan Pashtun Islamists, Muslim extremists from around the globe,
and the ISI. The US listened to the Indian point of view very intently and carefully.
The US tried to persuade Afghanistan for handing over Bin Laden to Saudi Arabia
and for banning al Qaeda, but the Taliban refused point blank. The US bombed an al
Qaeda training camp by means of a cruise missile attack on August 21, 1998. This
attack missed Bin Laden very narrowly, but some ISI officers were killed in this
attack (Ibid.:126).

Now, the US understood the deceptive role of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and it started
pressuring Pakistan to act. A resolution no. 1214 was passed on Dec., 1998, for
arresting Bin Laden and for banning al Qaeda. The US started realizing that
restrictions and sanctions imposed on account of the India nuclear-weapon tests
needed some relaxation. And this process of loosening sanction became steadily. The

10
military as well as economic sanctions started getting relaxed one by one. A new era
of diplomatic relations that took a good turn in 1998 became more active and
favourable for both, the US and India. President Clinton made some recommendation
for lifting some sanctions against India. These sanctions were connected with military
and civil matters. Defence and Civil restrictions imposed by the USA were eased by
the US Congress and by President Clinton himself (Ibid.)

Then, began the era of Bush Administration from 2001 onwards when President Bush
assumed the highest office of the US government in the year 2001. India supported
the US Administration when it announced the deployment Ballistic Missile Defence
(BMD) in 2004. India also supported the US when it proposed considerable reduction
in nuclear weapon stockpile and in missile defence in the world. India laid emphasis
on the fact that there was need for moving away from the concept of Mutual Assured
Destruction concept (MAD) and follows a cooperative and defensive transition that is
highlighted by further cuts in nuclear forces.

Indo-US Defence Policy Group (DPG) was formed as the highest policy-making body
for giving shape to bilateral cooperation between India and the US India took part in
Missile Defence Conference in Dallas, US It was held in 2002. The meetings between
the Indo-US DPGs were carried on even after the change of the government in India.
The new government followed the guidelines of the previous government in this
matter. A request, which was made in 2002 about the clearance of a classified
technical presentation of the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) – 2 Anti-ballistic
System to India, was granted by the Bush Administration later on. It was on one
condition that India would not indulge in sharing of this technology with any other
country. PAC is a long-range, all-weather, and all-altitudes air-defence system for
facing tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircrafts. The range of it is 70
kilometres and it can climb to an altitude of 24 kilometres. India duly welcomed this
favourable step by the US as P C – 2 is a precursor to PAC – 3 missile. PAC – 3 is the
latest upgraded system of anti-missile projects.

The tilt in favour of India manifested when Bill Clinton visited India in 2000.
The visit was the first by a United States’ since Jimmy Carter’s visit to India in 1978.
History took its full circle when Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, while speaking
to the Asia Society in New York during his visit to the USA in 2003, described the

11
USA as a ‘natural ally of India’, an adage which was accorded to erstwhile USSR
during the hallowed time of the Non-alignment Movement. A milestone in the
bilateral relations was the announcement of the ‘Next Steps in Strategic Partnership’
in January 2004. The high point of relationship between the two countries was Indo-
US Nuclear Deal announced by President George Bush later on (Pant 2011: 50).

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION OUTREACH TO INDIA

During the period of the Bush Administration, Condoleezza Rice, his advisor in
foreign affairs, played a key role in promoting foreign relations between India and the
US. Her article in “Foreign Affair” was written in 2000. She said that her avowed
belief was that the US Administration should pay more close attention towards India
as far as foreign relations were concerned. This proximity with India was needed
more because of the matter of balancing regional balance in Asia. She took the US
Congress in the loop of her dealings with India. She stated that proximity with India
was fruitful and viable because of India’s democratic values, political stability, and
transparency. She described India as a “Thriving Democratic India” (Ibid. :64
)

THE FIRST TERM OF PRESIDENT BUSH:

This Administration was quick to note the emerging significance of India as a rising
power in Asia as was mentioned by President Bush in his speech just after a few days
of his assuming Presidency of the United States of America. He called for closer ties
with India as it was the emerging force of the Asian region. Hence, in 2002 and
onwards, the US and Indian military exercises began and India even started buying
small quantities of US arms. Even then, differences between the two nations remained
on account technology denial regime of the US despite the fact that the Indian
officials had told the US that lifting of technical denial clause was the litmus test for
improving Indo-US relations. They duly informed the US by saying,” We have been
saying very candidly that a trinity of issues – high technology commerce, civilian
nuclear energy cooperation, and collaborations in space – can take the Indo-US
relationship to a qualitatively new level of partnership” (Mistry 2012)
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Bush Administration intended to remove these constraints one by one. First of all, it
removed some post-1998 sanctions by joint military exercise and sale of military
equipment. After it, Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) was formalized. But
there were obstructions within the US government’s high ranking officers for
removing these sanctions. Some officers supported the lifting of them it, some
preferred the lifting of the sanctions one by one, and some wanted to retain these
sanctions.

However, all these sanctions were eventually lifted on September 22,2001. It was
done so because sanctions against Pakistan too were lifted because the US was in dire
need of Pakistani assistance for military campaign against Afghanistan. In this
manner, many sanctions dealing with economic , military, and technology were
almost completely lifted by the US Administration by late 2001. But, other sanctions
remained. In due process, technology cooperation between the two nations became
more intense. In October 2001, the US Ambassador in New Delhi advised his
government to remove obstacles in civilian nuclear, civilian space, and high
technology areas. The US rejected the civilian nuclear cooperation suggestion , but
accepted civilian space and high-technology theme in Vision Statement of
November2001 signed between the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and President
Bush.

Secondly, the sale of high-technology military equipment started from the US after
the Munich Security Conference of 2001, and this sale went ahead by means of
Firefinder radars to India. This sale was the first sale of major military equipment to
India in many years.

In the third place, technology, which was the main part of meeting between India’s
National Security Advisor and his US counterpart, was discussed for several times
from 2001to 2003, Mishra urged Rice and Hadley to ease restrictions on high
technology transfers to India, recognizing that this could eventually facilitate civilian
nuclear cooperatio The Rice–Mishra dialogue led to the creation of a High
Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG). In Novermber,2002, officials from both
sides signed the Vision Statement.

The main features of the HTCG were stated in a document called Rice-Mishra paper
in December, 2002. The US agreed to limited civilian nuclear trade with India subject

13
to strong Indian control on exports of nuclear material. In this manner, HTCG brought
down barriers for exports to India. US dual-use technology exports rose from $ 30
million in 2002 to above $90 million in 2004. Even then, civil nuclear trade
restrictions remained in place. The restrictions did not go much beyond the
restrictions about economic, military, technology, and dual-use technology transfer.
All other restrictions remained as they were in the past.

The Indian Natation Security Advisor informed the National Security Advisor and
then Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, and President Bush that dialogue should
flow from top to bottom. This was stated because many bureaucratic impediments
arose from middle level officers. As per the Indian National Security Advisor, India
would put all nuclear projects of foreign collaboration under safeguards. He also
stated that India would restrict strategic nuclear programmers to the minimum level
required for our national security. Late on, in the year 2003, India asked President
Bush to adjust the US dual-use licensing policies for expediting additional technology
cooperation. India suggested advancement in civil nuclear, civilian space, and high-
technology cooperation. The United States added one more of the matters in them,
and it was missile defence. All these four topics became a part of what was later
called the NSSP initiative (Ibid.).

THE NSSP INITIATIVE:

The Bush Administration was well aware of the limitations imposed by NSSP in the
year 2003. However, this Administration interpreted the implications of this project,
and it thought of a “glide path” with regard to civilian nuclear and space cooperation
with India. A delegation from the US came to India in September 2003 for this
purpose. A delegation from India visited the US in the month of December during the
same year for more talks in this matter. In the month of January in 2004, both the
sides formatted the above mentioned “glide path”. The agenda of it and the
implementation of the agenda and the progress of the agenda are worth studying and
analgising step by step (Mistry 2012).

With regard to the agenda, it can be stated that the official from India and the US
concentrated on (i) high-technology, (ii) civilian space, and (iii) civilian-nuclear
issues. This concentration was on account of the fact that these three subjects mattered
so much for India. Both sides were committed to these subjects of civilian nuclear

14
cooperation between the US and India in spite of fact that there existed many
hindrances and barriers in the US legislative system and in the restrictions contained
in NSG restrictions.

With regard to the matter of implementation of the agenda, the NSSP stipulated that
there should be reciprocal steps in four phases (a preliminary phase and three
additional phases) over a period of five years. The first phase of the compliance of the
prerequisite of NSSP was completed by both the sides in September 2004 after the
initiation of the completion process in January 2004. The second and the third phase
got complied with very quickly, much quickly than the expected time, and by the
early 2005, New Delhi demanded moving beyond the NSSP and implementing
complete nuclear cooperation (Ibid.).

With regard to the concrete or actual progress of the agenda, the first phase, which got
completed in September 2004 as stated in the above paragraph, India complied with
the non-proliferation benchmark 1 (stronger exports control). India signed one end-
use verification agreement with the US As per this Agreement, India accepted the
presence in India of one US Export Control Attache at the American Embassy in New
Delhi. In lieu of this step by India, the US modified its licencing policy with regard to
2 B (Civilian Space Cooperation) and 3 A (nuclear cooperation on balance-of-plant
items.) The US removed from its “entity list” the Indian Space Research
Organization (ISRO) headquarters. Secondly, the government of the United States of
America made easy the way of licensing requirement for exporting low-level dual-use
articles to ISRO subordinates, i.e. the subsidiaries of ISRO. Still, the US
Administration did not relax the conditions connected with space rocket technology.

The US Administration denied India this facility because it could be used in

manufacturing and maintaining missiles. In the third place, the US gave approval for
transfer of articles designated for balance-of-plant portion of safeguarded Indian
nuclear facilities. This facility falling within the ambit of 3 A (Nuclear cooperation
on balance-of-plant items) were capable of allowing cooperation in the areas of 3 B
(safety technology) and 3 C (International research) during the NSSP’s second phase.

In the second phase of NSSP, India increased export control legislation and
enforcement; specially. It was connected specially with intangible technology
transfer, brokering, transit, re-export, and catch-all controls. India also agreed to

15
Missile Technology Control Regime (MRCR) and the NSG. In return of these
compliances, the US agreed to remove licencing stipulation for transferring dual-use
technology for protecting facilities in India and exploring joint Indo-US satellite
ventures. It was also envisaged that in the third phase, and it was expected that a
Space Launch Agreement would be signed with India that was similar to agreement
with Russia and Ukraine.

However, the provisions contained in 3 D (steam-cycle technology) were not touched.

In addition to 3D, areas falling in (4) nuclear fuel for Tarapur reactors, (5) nuclear
fuel for some other reactors in India, and (6) nuclear reactor imports remained outside
the domain of the US win-set. It means these sanctions too were not lifted.

Thus, it can be concluded that the sanctions imposed by the US after nuclear tests by
India were very severe. Many of them were lifted as the Indian side could convince
the US about the dire need of nuclear assets for India’s safety. Apart from it, Pakistan
help in war with Afghanistan facilitated the lifting of some sanctions against India.
Above all, the Bush Administration started realizing the influence of India in this
region and it was convinced that the influence of India was for the progress of India
and the region (Mistry 2003.

It is interesting to observe the scanty attention devoted to India in the annual reports
of the Secretary of Defense from 1998 to 2002.

“The region cannot be stable until there is a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace
between Arabs and Israelis and a peaceful resolution to India-Pakistan disputes.
(Secretary of Defense, Annual report, 1998, p.12)”

“Stability in South Asia depends on improved relations between India and Pakistan,
and a commitment from both countries to support international efforts to control
proliferation of ballistic missiles and NBC technologies and expertise” (Secretary of
Defense, Annual report, 1999, p.12).

“Stability in South Asia depends on improved relations between India and Pakistan,
and a commitment from both countries to exercise restraint in their nuclear, missile,
and chemical and biological weapons policies and practices” ( Secretary of Defense,,
Annual report, 2000, p.12)

16
“The Navy continues to plan and execute its fleet battle experiments. FBE-India will
be conducted in multiple locations throughout the southwestern United States in the
Spring of 2001 and will focus on forced entry and access for
expeditionary/contingency operations” (Secretary of Defense, Annual report,2001, p.
181)

“the Air Force supported numerous humanitarian relief operations throughout the
world including earthquake relief to India, firefighting air operations in Idaho and
California, and the delivery of over two million daily rations to Afghanistan”
Secretary of Defense, (Annual report,2002, p.141)

Interesting there was no mention of India in the annual reports of 2003 and 2004 of
the Secretary of Defense of USA.

The Review of Literature

Both the US and India made earnest and steady efforts for cooperation during 1998 to
2004 in the era of the end of cold war and the brutal and dastardly attack of 9/11.
Many writers and scholars have outlined these relations, some successfully and some
not so successfully, and they have examined the impact of these two relations on the
affairs of many other countries world apart from the effect of these initiatives on both
the nations. The narratives of few of the noteworthy authors and thinkers have been
stated in this study.

Bill Clinton in his book “My Life” (2004) has pointed out that during the Cold War
period, maladroit diplomacy had kept India and the United States apart for too long.
During the Cold War, strains with China drove India nearer towards Soviet Union,
apart from it Cold War drove the United States nearer to India’s next door nation, to
wit Pakistan. As Clinton stated in his book that along the finishing of cold war, there
was chances about improvement in Indo-US relations. He wrote: “With the end of
cold war, I thought I had an opportunity, as well as an obligation, to improve US-
India relations” (Clinton 2004). This book is a testimony of the positive impact of his
actions on America and the world. It also gives details how he survived his criticism
from those people who belonged to “the Far Right.” During the second half of the
month of May, the US struggle about debarring nuclear tests were stunned after

17
India carried underground nuclear tests numbering five. After about fifteen days,
Pakistan answered this act of India by conducting six nuclear tests. India asserted that
those nuclear arms were required for creating a deterrent for China; Pakistan asserted
that the government there was replying against India. The public estimation in the
two countries vehemently upheld this ownership of nuclear arms, even though this
created an unsafe plan. Regarding one matter it can be said that our domestic
security individuals were sure. That matter was that dissimilar from the United States
as well as the Soviets relations during the Cold War era, India as well as Pakistan
knew almost nothing regarding each other’s nuclear competences as well as
strategies about using the nuclear arms. Subsequent to the Indian nuclear tests the
US President wrote, “I insisted with the prime minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, for
not going Indian way , but the Pakistani Prime Minister couldn’t repel so much
political stress from his countrymen. I felt immensely anxious regarding India’s
verdict , not just for the reason that I reflected it as very hazardous, but more because
this verdict had disturbed and proved regressive about my strategy about cultivating
better Indo-US associations . Also, the Indian action made it more difficult for me to
get a ratification from the Senate about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. On
eighteenth, I visited India for a seven-day trip , and during that time, I visited
Pakistan as well as Bangladesh. I was visiting India for laying the foundation of
that which I expected would be an optimistic long-term association. So much time
had been wasted after the end of the Cold War. During the time of the Cold War,
India sided with Soviet Union mainly as some counterbalance against China.
Bangladesh was the poorest nation in the region of South Asia, even then it is big
nation with some pioneering commercial packages and an approachable assertiveness
on the way to the US Different from Pakistan as well as India, Bangladesh happened
to be one non-nuclear country. In addition to all this, it had already ratified “the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” which was more than could be said for the United
States. My halt within Pakistan was considerably contentious owing to the fresh army
coup in Pakistan, but I resolved that I must visit that nation owing to a number of
causes, namely to inspire for a prompt return to a civilian set-up and for some
decreasing of strains about Kashmir; to persuade General Musharraf against
executing Nawaz Sharif , deposed prime minister of Pakistan. The Prime Minister
was on trial about the safety of his life; and to persuade Musharraf for assistance to
us about bin Laden as well as al Qaeda. During the fourth day of that visit, I got an
18
opportunity for addressing the Parliament of India. The building of the Parliament is
a colossal circular building wherein many hundred members of parliament sit closely
bunched at row after row of slender tables. I narrated my respect abut India’s
democracy, multiplicity, and imposing developments in constructing an up-to-date
economy. I forthrightly deliberated about our dissimilarities regarding nuclear
matters, and tried to persuade them about coming to an amicable resolution with
regard to Kashmir problem. Fairly to my astonishment, I received an outstanding
reception. The members of Parliament much-admired my speech by striking the table.
It showed that the Indian people were as eager as I was about our long distancing to
end. I left the shores of India with a positive feeling that our two nations had started
a compacted and friendly association.”

“At the end of the UN conferences, the OPEC declared about some increase in the
production of oil from 800,000 barrels a day, and Prime Minister Vajpayee of India
visited Washington for a state visit, and on September 19, the Senate followed the
House in endorsing the bill conceding regular trade associations with China, hence
clearing the way for its entry into the WTO. I was sure that in time this would
demonstrate itself as one of the most significant foreign policy expansions of eight
years of mine. During my meeting with the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Vajpayee, I
articulated my indignation and profound regret that some terrorists had used my visit
to India as a justification to kill. I enjoyed good rapport with Mr. Vajpayee and
expected that he would get chance to reengage with Pakistan prior to the time he left
his office. We disagreed about the matter of test ban treaty. However, I was duly
aware of it, because Strobe Talbott was in touch with the Indian Foreign Minister,
Mr. Jaswant Singh, as well as a few other Indian leaders for many months about
nonproliferation issues. Nevertheless, Mr. Vajpayee did not agree with me about
pledging to miss the future tests, and we approved about a set of optimistic
ideologies which would oversee our two-sided association, which were not so
friendly for such a long time.”

Strobe Talbott wrote one book titled “Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and
The Bomb” (2004) He gives a very fascinating and meaningful account of the
progress and vitality of the Indo-US dealing after the Indian nuclear blast . This blast
created a breach in the matters of foreign relations and commerce between two
greatest democracies of the world with a combined population of more than 1.25

19
billion people. “Strobe Talbott met Mr. Jaswant Singh, the Indian foreign Minister ,
for fourteen times. He was instrumental in resolving many matters from behind the
scene and restoring confidence amidst America and India. In this book, he has
mentioned a few dimension of the course of progress in the foreign relations of the
two nations. The Pokhran test was viewed by India as an exercise of its sovereign
rights and an act of military necessity, whereas the United States saw it as an
irresponsible and hazardous provocation. The main American concern was that other
countries with the potential and desire to obtain nuclear weapons would see India as
an enticing precedent. Jaswant requested me to reconsider what I had said from an
Indian perspective: India remained isolated, as it had been for "the fifty wasted years."
It had long been subjected to a double standard, denied the right to defend itself
against its foes, in terms of U.S.-Indian relations, from "its rightful acceptance" as a
normal, mature power. The most prominent of these was China, which was described
as "the principal variable in the calculus" of Indian foreign and defence strategy.

The United States bore its own share of responsibility for India's decision to conduct
the Pokhran II test, "complicating as it may be." India might have been able to live
with nuclear weapons as a "option" and not felt the need to proceed with "overt
weaponization" had it not been for the NPT's indefinite extension and Washington's
obvious intention to universalize the CTBT. The NPT, in particular, made a mockery
of India's long-held ambition of universal disarmament by legitimising nuclear
weapons. What gave the US the authority to argue that India's determination to
protect its own security, especially against nuclear countries like China, was
illegitimate? As it turned out, Pakistan was the most time-consuming and contentious
issue between us. When that topic came up, which was only when I brought it up,
Jaswant would either sigh or shake his head wearily, as if I had diverted us into
territory that was neither pleasant nor germane--nor, for that matter, suitable for
lengthy discussion between representatives of two "major powers," a category that, in
his opinion, did not include Pakistan. In India's eyes, Pakistan was not just a sibling,
but a twin-"we are born of the same womb," stated Jaswant. However, Pakistan has

20
always had a response and has always been wrong. He didn't take seriously--or at
least didn't want me to think he did--the possibility of nuclear war between India and
Pakistan, a relatively small, incurably unstable, and incorrigibly difficult country that
aspired to and deserved parity with India. China, not Pakistan, was a force and a threat
worthy of India's strategic concern.I pointed out that the United States has been going
towards the kind of delink age he desired in recent years. Since the conclusion of the
Cold War, Americans have been considering India as a major regional power with the
potential to become a global force as well. It was India's nuclear test, coupled with the
completely inevitable outcome of Pakistan's, that refocused everyone on the extent to
which the fortunes of the two countries were, like it or not, intertwined. As a result,
outsiders did not insert the hyphen between India and Pakistan. Rather, it was placed
there by the two countries themselves. It represented the way they pursued their
almost infinite hostility. They were, I observed, like a couple of boxers, either flinging
punches in battle or snarling at each other in a clinch while nominally at peace.

Jaswant Singh in his book “Defending India”, (1999) has highlighted two crucial
aspects of India’s tactical philosophy – warfare is not any concern of the military
alone and the strategic decision –making is the task performed by a small political
military class of leaders for whom a philosophy of planned thoughtfulness is an
essential attribute regardless of the form of governance. One of the determinants of a
true strategic partnership is India’s support and cooperation with the US for fighting
global terrorism. It includes dealing with various hidden terror outfits, Iraq situation,
the issue of clandestine nuclear proliferation especially among the ‘rouge states’.
India ought to work in unison with the US for resolving these menacing and serious
matters of terrorism. It is true that these issues of counterterrorism should not prove
insurmountable, but they should not infringe into India’s genuine interests of security
and commerce. The Indian military doctrine is based on the Defense Strategy of
Government of India. It is dependent on government’s long and useful experience of
many years. The doctrine aims at fighting conventional war with or without involving
weapons of mass destruction (W.M.D.), sub conventional war, and non-combat war.
The most likely is full scale war or limited scale war of which the later (limited scale
war) is more likely. As compared to the Army of Army, the Army of India does not

21
have that much war-fighting experience. However, the Indian Army possesses good
operational knowledge of types of terrains, dealing in diverse environments and in
peacekeeping in different parts of war.

Jaswant Singh in his book, “A Call to Honor”,(2006) has argued that the nuclear tests
of 1998 were not only a necessity but they need to be understood as a continuation of
India’s overseas policy since independence. The basic tenet of India’s foreign policy
in terms of nuclear domain is that the security of India rests in either total global
disarmament or in the exercise of the code of alike and genuine security for every
nations in the world. The first mission of managing the international fallout after
Pokhran had to be with the United States. It was the preeminent global voice, the
United States was the premier power, the 'hyperpower' in Hubert Vedrines' words,
though this phrase frequently irritated the State Department. Furthermore, the United
States was plainly at the vanguard of this entire 'disapproval campaign against India,'
and others would simply not change their views unless it did. But it wasn't 'approval
of the exams' that I was looking for; in fact, the mere concept seemed unjustified and
patronising to me. What I was looking for was an intellectual understanding, an
acceptance of India's reasoning behind Pokhran II; there was no agreement, no quid
pro quo, none was sought, none was offered. What I sought, and what I frequently
discussed with my distinguished interlocutor, Strobe Talbott - then deputy secretary of
state, a man of outstanding intellectual ability, transparent integrity, and blessed with
an incredible ability to see the other person's point of view - was a 'harmonisation of
positions between the United States and India, as they evolved through a
harmonisation of respective views'. To 'harmonise' the proclaimed stances of these
two great countries was obviously a task of enormous difficulty, especially given how
varied their positions were. It wasn't as if India was attempting to persuade the US to
change its attitude. That clearly could not be the case, and for India to forsake or
retreat from its declared stances was also out of the question. Despite this, if
'harmonisation' was still something I strived towards, it could only be through some
mutual acceptance, an accommodation of some aspects of the other's stance. This
entailed shifting from a position of rigid immovability to bending (as in advanced
equitation), but only in regions where there was no compelling national interest. In
my opinion, there was another, unspoken component. Without a doubt, the ultimate
national security factor that would give India muscle was its economy. India's

22
economic development could not advance if relations with the US remained
confrontational; we needed to cooperate, to work together. That, in my opinion, was
and still is a national security priority for India. That is why the first requirement was
to connect with the US. But first, a practical problem had to be overcome. Was the US
even interested in engaging with India? I left for the United States, with no illusions
about the enormity of the difficulties that lay ahead. Or, for that matter, what lay
behind at home - opinionated views, prejudice, sheer hostility and a propensity to
remain imprisoned in the past, as against shedding the irrelevancies of inherited
thought and adopting pragmatic realism as would enable us to meet today's
challenges. That was my task: 'to meld together contrasting opinions into a single,
generally accepted viewpoint,' to paraphrase Kissinger's felicitous phrase. These
additional domestic loads of India, and the United States too, often hindered efforts.
That would perhaps not be so if the two countries were not committed democracies,
both with a demanding citizenry, an active and questioning opposition, an overactive
and irreverent press, and that vast, uncharted and mercurial ocean called 'public
opinion' It is perilous to conduct foreign policy in the full glare of public scrutiny but
this so often is unavoidable. Yet, for delivering results, for getting things done in the
subtle realm of international affairs, constant public scrutiny - accompanied almost
always by ceaselessly critical comment - is not the most suitable accompaniment. I
was, of course, fully aware of all this, but not of the many pitfalls that lay ahead. I
found, and painfully. that the road ahead had many potholes, that the questioning
would go to the extent of doubting my very bona fides, of searching constantly for my
'true' motives This made my task so much more trying. The very first assumption
made was that, as the Indian interlocutor, I was somehow out to sell the country, that I
was 'abandoning national interests', or, still more colourfully, that 'I was a CIA agent
or was fast on the way to becoming one!" At first I found such insinuations deeply
wounding and sought to rebut each and every one. Then their sheer excesses
converted them into absurd irrelevancies, finally into comments worthy only of
ridicule, amusement perhaps, occasionally, no more. Yet, all this is very much a
reality, being experienced still. It will continue to exist for so long as the entrapment
of the past remains. Why does this tendency manifest itself in the case of United
States alone, not so much say even in the case of the United Kingdom or France or
Germany? Whereas Russia continues to be held high in public esteem despite it
having been transformed almost beyond recognition Ap partial explanation lies in the
23
evolution of India-United States relations since, 1947, briefly explained earlier. Yet, if
any harmonisation of positions was to be achieved, then certainly the very first need
was to free ourselves of this overhang of the past. And these overhangs existed in
America too, ancient cobwebs in the corridors of decision-making systems

Jaswant Singh in that book, “India at Risk: Misconceptions and Misadventures of

Security Policy (2013)”, states that the tests of nuclear weapons of India carried out
on 11 May 1998 and nuclear tests of Pakistan on 28th and 30 May 1998 became
significant occurrences that changed the strategic environment within the region and
the world. He credits the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee for taking that
valiant step, who also emphasized on Indian nuclear policy of ‘no-first use’,
commitment for global disarmament.

“Conflict and Peacemaking in South Asia edited by P. Sahadevan (2001)” contains

the measured views of many eminent writers about the US foreign policy dealing with
South Asian States. It studies their competing interests, their strategic preponderance,
security, territory, and water resources. The book further highlights that the principal
contenders and competitors of this volatile region are India, Pakistan, and China. It is
further highlighted that disputes with India are regarding territory and water resources
as far as smaller nations like “Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka” are concerned.

This book states that bilateral approach to peace making gets interrupted by the pleas
of third-party participation. However, India prefers bilateral approach in spite of the
fact that “the US and the United Nations” want to participate. India, which opted for
outside participation earlier, does not prefer it now. There is graphic mentions of the
matters resulting from nuclear explosions by India and Pakistan. Also mentioned is
the feud over Kashmir.

Harsh V. Pant in his chapter titled “India and The United States: An Emerging
Partnership” (2016) has discussed the evolution of Indo-US relations. He argues that
the Indo – US relations have undergone subtle but trailblazing changes from 1947
onwards till date. At the beginning of 1947 the US was an economic and military
power and India a struggling economic non-entity. After the end of the Cold War, the
visible hostility between the two started abating. Relations became better in trade and
defense. India became a part of Globalization. President Clinton recognized it. He

24
visited India in 2000. He assuaged Indian feelings somewhat; the feeling that were
created on account of the US sanctions imposed on India after the Indian nuclear
explosion in 1998. The next US President was more forthright and more farsighted.
His Secretary of State, Ms. Condoleezza Rice, had already spoken in favor of far
better relations with India even before the advent of the Bush Presidency. In 2004.
President Bush signed “the Next Step Strategic Partnership” with India. Many
sanctions imposed after the Indian nuclear explosion were waived. President Bush
also visited India in 2006. Many new military and trade agreement were signed.

Pant (2016) argues that the occurrence of 9/11 was one of the major landmarks in the
foreign relations of the two countries. The US moved closer to India for containing
Islamic terrorism in Asia. India would contribute liberally and readily to the various U
N - designated funds. India donated $ 10 million to the UN Global Democracy Fund.
There was one more spin off in the US – India relations. China became expansionist
and belligerent. It started intruding into the Indian Ocean territory of many
neighboring nations. This was inimical to the US military hegemony and trade
monopoly. US tried to enter into some reconciliations with China. It made G -2 (The
Group of Two) arrangement with China in the year 2005 for this matter. But, G – 2 is
not so worthwhile. There are disagreements in it. By this time, India had become
more stable and prosperous. For balancing the Chinese hegemonic designs, the US
signed many defense and trade agreements with India. Joint naval exercises consisting
of the US and the Indian navy are very frequent now. The US is India’s most
significant trading partner now.

Pant (2016) argues that the current situation is different from that of 1947. India has
its own admirable stature internationally and US is a super power in every respect.
The Indo - US foreign relations will become more friendly and fruitful undoubtedly,
but what remains to be seen is the footing on which India will place itself for this
purpose. India will strive to negotiate with the US as an equal, and the US will try to
display its own high stature in the globally changing conditions. Even then, the
relations between two greatest democracies of the world having sensitivity for human
rights will prosper and solidify.

Ashley J Tellis in his article titled “India – US Relations: The Struggle For An
Enduring Partnership argues that India – US relations”, (2015) began with subtle

25
disparity The reason was that the national priorities of these two nations differed. The
US, a superpower economically and financially, wished to remain so, and India,
newly independent, yearned for economic survival. However, the US valued the
Indian concept of “the right of all the people of the world to choose their
government.” And India started as a resilient and stable democracy. Cold War made
the disparity more specific and a bit hostile. India depended on the USSR for dire
military hardware and spares, and the US quest was for its economic growth and its
stature as the sole world power to control NATO and guide and safeguard all friendly
nations. But there was no total severance. The Cold War ended. President Clinton was
just slightly inclined favorably towards India because of Indian nuclear blast in 1998.
Many sanctions were imposed against India under President Clinton’s rule.

Tellis (2015) argues that the real steps towards enduring partnership began with the
advent of President Bush recognized India as a part of the solution of nuclear
proliferation issue. China became more assertive and menacing in the Asia Pacific
Region. Its control over Indian Ocean was becoming imminent. The US took note and
started vociferously the concept of enduring partnership. Civil Nuclear Deal was
signed in 2005 after three-year long research and groundwork. This agreement also
known as the 123 Agreement ended the struggle for enduring partnership and more
sanctions were lifted.

He argues that China’s intransigence and stubbornness became the next focal point for
making this partnership really and irrevocably enduring. Many military exercises
were conducted jointly. Some more defense and economic agreement were signed.
The matter of Indo – US enduring partnership is now settled owing to Chinese
uncertain and stubborn approach and India stable and democratic polity (Ibid.).

In his book titled, “Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy,
(2004)” C Raja Mohan argues that initial fifty years of the US – Indo dealings were
rather uneventful. The US being the most prominent nation did not pay much
attention to India. As per Mr. Jaswant Singh, former Indian Foreign Minister, this
period meant “Fifty wasted years.” Even then, some anti-imperialists criticized the
government of India for dealing with the US at diplomatic levels. However, they
never mentioned that China possessed considerably stronger ties with the US than
India. China dealt with the US even after being in war with it in the Korean War.

26
“India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (2002)” is a book by
George Perkovich. He argues that India, being surrounded by two very hostile
nations, made plans of becoming a nuclear-power state soon after its independence.
Indian scientists worked very earnestly and covertly for many years prior to the first
Indian nuclear test in Pokhran in 1974. Research went on, but it was stalled by the US
as their satellites had sighted Indian designs of conducting another nuclear test in
1995. However, after 1995, India was more cautious and clandestine. Another test
was conducted in 1998 because the scientists were ready, and secondly the BJP
government was also inclined to do so. Thus, this test was conducted successfully.
Now, India can load nuclear weapons in its fighter aircrafts as MIG – 27.

Yogesh Joshi in his article titled, “Between “Concern and Opportunity”: US Pivot to
Asia and Foreign Policy Debate In India, (2015)” argues that there is considerable
shift in the power fulcrum in the world. This fulcrum is now shifting to Asia. China is
becoming the new pivotal point of the world. The US is steadily losing is hegemony
over the world’s only super military power and super economic power owing to the
rapid rise of China in both the aforesaid domains, to wit military and economic
domains. The US is adamant to stem this tide of the Chinese domination as another
world power. It focuses India as a silent and unnoticed rival of China. Hence, there is
considerable sift of the US policy towards India; most of it is favorable. As far as
India is concerned, there are two schools of thought, namely “Traditional Nationalist
and Great Power Realizers”. In late nineties and early twenty-first century, it was
Traditional approach about “strategic autonomy”, but now India wants more and more
engagement with the US for countering the influence of the Chinese steady and
surreptitious advances.

He points out that the US has unequivocally declared India has its fulcrum for
stability and prosperity in Asia. The National Security Advisor of the US, Mr.
Thomas Donilon, categorically decorated as follows “the US and Indian interests
powerfully converge in Asia Pacific, where India has much to give and much to gain.”
Till finishing of the Cold War, Indo- US dealings were just ordinary, but now they are
on a favorable level. They are friendly even after Indian nuclear explosion of 1998 as
is clear from the Indo-US nuclear agreement. The significance of India for balancing
power equation between the US and China has been absolutely indispensable. The US
is assisting and negotiating with India frequently and favorably.

27
G Parthasarathy in his article titled, “Emerging Trends in India–US Relations” (2009)
argues that of late, Indo – US relation have become the most significant relation for
both the countries. The reason being economic, geographic, the end of the Cold War,
and above all China’s domineering and threatening role in Asia pacific. China is
trying to destabilize this very vital sea route in particular. It is fledgling its muscles
even with regard to Japan apart from a few very small nations. The US apprehension
is that these small nations may not become the proxies of China. There is co-
operation at government level by means of many government level and parliament
level agreements. This government based cooperation notwithstanding, there is
extensive and increasing between private business house of the US and India with
regard to such life-saving matters as agriculture, medicine, medical research, energy,
and above all defense. India does feel that at its end it should take care of about higher
education in the US along with complying with the provisions of Doha Round and
Climate Change.

He argues that the Indo – US relations started looking up when President Bush ignited
a new National Security Doctrine in 2002. He declared the unflinching unison
between these two nations owing to democracy, political freedom, religious freedom,
and above all representative Governments. President, in this declaration, cited India’s
economic growth. He further highlighted the common interest of both about retaining
peace in the Indian Ocean zone for free flow of trade. Another issue of commonality
was the fight against terrorism. Thus, the layout of Indo – US relations was founded
afresh on the basis of this expansion-based Doctrine.

K P Vijayalakshmi in her article titled “Indo–US Strategic Relations: Shifting

American Perspective On Engaging India”, (2018) argues that the US policy towards
India started changing for a more favorable one after the end of the Cold War. This
policy became more friendly in 1990s when the US became India-centric and the
when the US wished to stall China’s surreptitious moves for controlling the South
China sea and the Indian Ocean. During the end of the 1990, the US view was that
India both the nations had common interest in trade, nuclear non-proliferation,
counterterrorism, managing energy resources, human rights, and above all
maintaining stability in the entire Asian region. By March 2000, President Clinton’s
visit had categorically pinpointed that India had acquired the stature of a reliable and
good partner for commerce and for security in this region. This trend of enhancing

28
friendly relations continued even the Presidency of President Bush also. Then
happened the most unfortunate and brutal attack on the US which is known as 9/11.
Pakistan became the focus of the US for tactical support for attacking the Taliban of
Afghanistan. Even then, the Bush Administration did not ignore or sideline India.

She argues that the post 9/11 era brought many changes in the US foreign policy. The
Obama Administration considered the region of South East Asia as the poorest and
vulnerable. So, the attention got diverted to this region.

Joshy Paul in his article titled, “US and India: Emerging offshore balancing in Asia,
(2019)” argues that though the India’s relations with the US are very old, but they
were rather trivial till the late 1950s, deteriorated somewhat from late 1950s to 1970
owing to the Cold War era, and became somewhat relevant from 1980s to 1990. By
some quirks of fate in the early 1990s, these relations started looking up. The US
attention towards India increased after the Cold War came to an end. India came out
of the control of the USSR about military goods and services. The US Administration
under President Clinton acted very ably and wisely by signing many agreements.
President Clinton visited India in 2000, a US President visit after 22 years. Many
agreements were signed. Even the Indian nuclear explosion of 1998 did not deter the
progress of friendly Indo – US relations. Sanctions against were imposed, but they
were lifted one by one. Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, went to the US after
9/11 tragedy. Despite being excessively busy, the US Administration signed General
Security of Military Administration Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in 2002.
When President Bush came to power in 2004, the relations progressed more rapidly.
He also visited India, and he signed many agreements. The nature of the Indo – US
foreign relations became more cemented with the signing of the Indo – US Civil
Nuclear Deal. President Obama carried forward the wisdom of President Clinton and
President Bush. He declared India a “US pivot to Asia.” He made this landmark
statement in 2011. Chinese threat to various nations this region increased. The US
signed Defense Trade and Technology Treaty (DTTI) with India for making more
formidable against the increasing Chinese threat in the Asia Pacific region. One more
agreement was signed in 2016. It is known as “Logistics Exchange Memorandum
Agreement (LEMOA).” It is one very special pact solely for India by the US
Administration. In this manner, it is clear that the Indo – US foreign relations are
getting extending from mutually beneficial partnerships to the task of maintaining

29
peace and stability in Asia. This joint act of maintaining peace and stability in Asia is
most pronounced in the Asia Pacific so that China also follows the laws being
followed internationally. In this manner, India has become a pivot for the US for
peace and stability in Asia.

Sumit Ganguly in his book “Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947”,
(2002) has explored the Indo-Pak-US angle. India and Pakistan have been enemies
since 1947. They fought three major wars India conducted its second nuclear test on
May 11, 1998, and Pakistan conducted its first nuclear test on May 28, 1998. There
was intense international condemnation of both these tests. In 1999, there was low-
power conflict called the Kargil War between India and Pakistan, but the fear of
nuclear war remained distant. There can be some technological error in the operation
of nuclear weapons from any side. Missiles laden nuclear heads can fall anywhere.
Stringent and relentless safeguards are needed. These safeguards include robust
command by some competent and dedicated persons for safeguarding the nuclear
weapons sites, centralized communication system, and digital/computer based
intelligence. Such safeguards and some agreements between these two nations can
minimize, if not annihilate, the perils of a devastating and eternally crippling nuclear
war between two economically less developed nations. There will be some stability in
the form of abstinence from a full scale war owing to the apprehension of almost total
devastation of both the nations. There will be instability as one nation may wish to
overpower another over one issue or another. Hence, some ironclad monitoring
system and life-saving agreements are very necessary for resolving this long standing
conflict.

C Raja Mohan in his book, “Impossible Allies; Nuclear India United State and the
Global Order”, (2006) argues that India’s nuclear tests of 1998 did not resolve the
security problematique as it was followed by nuclear tests of Pakistan creating a
nuclear parity between India and Pakistan. These tests were followed by a strong
reaction by both China and USA and they issue a joint statement in June 1998
demanding that India and Pakistan should accept non-proliferation. He has explored
the hitches within and between the US and India as they signed the Indo-US Nuclear
Deal in 2005. He explores this deal in terms of the groundwork done during the Bush
Administration in US and Vajpayee administration in India. He argues that since Asia
is rising in global affairs, the elements that drive nations such as the United States and

30
India toward each other and the legacy of political burdens that hold them back will
become more and more enthralling stimulating more diplomatic relationships between
the India and US that will significantly change the world.

Dinshaw Mistry in his book: “The US–India Nuclear Agreement: Diplomacy and
Domestic Politics (2012)” argued that the sanction imposed by the US after nuclear
tests by India were very severe. Many of them were lifted as the Indian side could
convince the US about the dire need of nuclear assets for India’s safety. Apart from it,
the urgent of Pakistan help in war with Afghanistan facilitated the lifting of some
sanctions against India. Above all, the Bush Administration started realizing the
influence of India in this region and it was convinced that the influence of India was
for the progress of India and the region. However, Next Steps in Strategic Partnership
(NSSP) NSSP permitted better transfer of technology as compared what was provided
by High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) that was signed by the Bush
Administration after joint military exercise and some military hardware transfer to
India. NSSP permitted dual-technology transfer (2A); and civilian space cooperation
(2B); nuclear cooperation on balance –of-plant items (3A), safety technology (3B),
international research (3C).

Definitions, Rationale and Scope of Study

Summit diplomacy has been defined and interpreted differently by different people. It
has been defined by David H. Dunn as “a meeting of political frontrunners for
governmental matters, a task that comprises diplomacy at some very significant
level” (Dunn 1996: 20). Another definition is that of Charles H. Fairbanks Jr. who
defined summit diplomacy as “meetings held, for the real or nominal purpose of
negotiation, between heads of governments rather than their subordinates” (Fairbanks
1988: 69).

The research is primarily focused on athe extent of progress in the Indo-US

association during a tenure of NDA government with regard to the effect of the
dastardly and brutal attack of 9/11, the cooperation between the two countries about
terrorism, the extent of the improvement on them, and if more cooperation is needed
in this field and the improvement in strategic relations.

31
The history and credibility of the BJP as a party made the study more interesting. The
BJP was seen by many as a ‘realist alternative’ to the ‘idealist’ (Nehruvian) previous
governments at the centre. The use of summit diplomacy by the National Democratic
Alliance governments as a major diplomatic tool vis-à-vis USA presents a very
interesting point of the study. Whether the adoption of summit diplomacy by the
NDA governments in its relations with USA was contributed by the personality of the
leaders?

Hypotheses

1. India-US relations during the NDA government were largely driven by

systematic and security convergences.

2. Submit Diplomacy and post Pokharal-2 dialogue were the primary mode of
diplomatic interactions leading upward swing in India-US relations.

Methodology

The study is based on primary sources and secondary sources. Most of the published
documents, which were published in connection with this subject of Indo-US
Diplomatic Interactions, constitute the primary sources of this study. Secondary
sources of this study too are significant for it. Other relevant tools consist of
interviews, questionnaires, etc.

CHAPTERIZATION

Chapter 2- Historical Overview of Indo-US relations

This chapter historically analyzes the changes and shifts in Indo-US relations over the
years. It analyzes different dimensions of Indo-US relations such as strategic
relations, cooperation against terrorism, nuclear diplomacy and economic relations.

Chapter 3- Nuclear Diplomacy: Security Compulsions

There exist some disagreements between the US and India regarding nuclear weapons
and nuclear explosions. The two countries do not find much meeting ground in this
matter. These mutual relations became more strained after the Indian nuclear blast at

32
Pokhran in 1998. This chapter will indicate how the efforts made by the NDA
government facilitated some rapprochement in mutual relations. The Bush
Administration did not lay any unbearable stress on India about CTBT. Apart from it,
the chapter highlights the matter of Ballistic Missile Defence proposed by the Bush
Administration as a sign of improvement in these relations. This chapter will deal
with the reason why nuclear armament is indispensable for the safety and progress of
India.

Chapter 4- Strategic Diplomacy: India &US on Terrorism

One of the most brutal and devastating act of terrorism in the history of the US took
place “on September 11, 2001” when two of the most iconic buildings of the world
were razed by cruel terrorist air attacks. There were around 3000 deaths and many
more injuries. The entire world felt devastated along with the US This chapter tries
examining the manner in which the danger of terrorism offered India some chances
for improving foreign relations with the US It also examines how Indian diplomats
have been successful in gaining the attention of the US along with support from it
about the dread of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. This chapter highlights the
manner in which the US and India used diplomacy for fighting terrorism. This chapter
further indicates the “side effect” or spin off about the new diplomacy in getting some
positive response from Pakistan about recognizing and pruning terrorism.

Chapter 5- Conclusions

The concluding chapter summarizes the arguments of all the chapters and presents the
findings of the thesis.

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 CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE INDO-US RELATIONS

This chapter analyzes the changes and shifts in Indo-US relations from the onset of
cold war to the post-cold war era. It is indeed true that foreign policy plays a very
vital role in a nation’s stability and growth. So is the case of commerce and trade.
Every nation has domestic and foreign policy. Every nation has exports and imports
that are governed by various international laws or foreign policy. International laws
are the elements of foreign policy. In a given international law, all the parties are
signatories to a particular law. But domestic policies also preclude or impel a country
with regard to its foreign policy. Many times domestic policy matters deter and
preclude a nation from signing a given international law.

As far as India’s matters about the Indian foreign policy with various countries and
with the US in particular, it can be stated that domestic issues will play a more vital
role as compared to the role of external factors or external issues.

In this manner, this may be summed up that India’s foreign strategy has been
undergoing favourable changes subsequent to the independence of India. The current
foreign policy is particularly stable and progressive with the strongest nation of the
world, i.e. the USA. Indian foreign policy has become more vibrant and result-
oriented after the liberalization process, which started in India from late 1980s. The
end of Cold War has opened a few more opportunities for exercising the rules of its
foreign policy more fruitfully and beneficially. India has become a nuclear power
State, and it is a significant and effective deterrent for the nations, which are hostile
towards India. Thus, India’s steady advent as one military power as well as economic
power is very significant for India and the entire world because India is a peace-
loving nation of 1.3 billion with stable democracy, efficient manpower, sound
computer technology, and rich resources. Now, India can deal with all other nations
including the US with regard to the matters of foreign policy for its own progress and
stability which will be in the interest of all nations including the US

This is recognized worldwide that the US is a highly significant, steady, and

noteworthy partner of India with concerning India’s foreign policy. The said
association is getting more active and fruitful during the current period. Despite some

34
unexpected development in the international politics like some abatement in the US
economic power and the emergence of China as a formidable trading nation, the US
remains the world’s most prominent military and economic power. There is no
likelihood of any change regarding that position of the US as world’s most prominent
economic as well as military power in the near future, and also in India’s steady
foreign relations connected with the US.

Former Prime Minister of India, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, in the opening
observations during a talk held in the office of the House of Representatives’
Speaker, stated the common interests of India and US.
“Coming into contact with you once again is a matter of immense pleasure for
me. The extraordinary development between India-US dealings, during the
very recent past, came into being owing to the firm visualization and support
emanating from political governance within our two nations. The contribution
made by you in this course, and the contributions made by this august House,
has been colossal. Mr. Speaker, invitation sent by you to me during the
previous year for addressing a Joint Sitting of US Congress indicated your
reflection about commitment in you for greater acceptance amid our two
countries. The nearby undisputed resolve from the House after the elections in
our Parliament two years back was one manifestation regarding cohesion as
well as mutual backing which democracies ought to nurture for each other.
Indian people treasured that gesture immensely. My avowed and long-held
belief is that India as well as the USA are most well expected associates. That
political changeover in the United States did not alter the pace connected with
our determinations to shape a qualitatively novel association. We possess and
cherish a number of common goals. Cooperation between two us is capable of
adding considerably to the peace as well as the steadiness within Asia-Pacific
countries.”

“For the purposes of making sure our access to the resources of energy in Asia,
for the task of maintaining freedom and safety of the oceans, as well as for the
task of more economic progress both of our nations can work in unison.
Counter- terrorism also is a significant portion of extensive bilateral schedule of
our two nations. In addition to all this , during the forthcoming time , our
collaboration in the said field will be an important element in the long and

35
 multifaceted struggle that we ought to carry out against the groups and units
propagating terrorism and radicalism. During my speech in the Congress
during the previous year, I stated that remoteness is not any isolation for
surmounting terrorism. Those sad and disastrous happenings of September 11
have drawn global thoughtfulness toward the degree and influence of
terrorism as never prior to it. The current military operation will further bear
far-reaching results within the political domain as well as the security setting
globally, predominantly within Asia. It will mandate sturdier India-US
collaboration for the progress of concord, democracy, and wealth. I feel sure
that our two nations can rely on your ideas, leadership and backing as we make
efforts jointly in quest for shared goals.” “ (Vajpayee 2001).”

The notion and struggle of Indian independence challenged the US concept of,
idealism, political wisdom, and diplomatic skill as the US faced a dilemma of siding
with its avowed and strident partner, the UK, or support India in its independence as
India was not willing to help the UK fully in the W. W. II unless independence was
promised to India. It is true that President Franklin Roosevelt and the State
Department officers had sympathetic views about Indian independence movement as
per the aims contained in “The Atlantic Charter”, but their acceptance was
“wrathfully received” by the UK Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. The US support
and sympathy for Indian independence abated and almost disappeared in view of the
adverse reaction of the government of Great Britain. The all-time low point in this
period happened when, during the Indo-Pak war of 1971, a US enterprise-led force
entered the Bay of Bengal. It was deployed for use against India; if at all it was to be
used. This alarming and unwanted involvement of nuclear gunboat diplomacy batters
the minds of Indian people even now (Chari 1995). The United States lent support and
armaments for Pakistan at the time of the cold war, and this diplomacy constituted
one zero-sum game because it was at the cost of a democratic and non-aligned
country, India. Another case of this zero-sum game was undertaken by the United
States when it armed and financed Pakistan-based Mujahedeen fighters to waging
guerilla warfare against the Russian forces occupying Afghanistan. These arms were
used against India also (Ibid).

In the said US policy, India remained non-aligned. This policy of India enabled it to
get substantial help from the Russian side with regard to political and military side.

36
Even then, the non-aligned policy of India enabled it to carry forward trade,
educational, as well as cultural relations with America. Thus, this was a trend of the
zero-sum game played by India as well as America for many years. Apart from these
dealing with two super powers of the two designated blocks, India carried on its
programs connected with self-reliance and self-sufficiency in the arenas of high
technology such as space programs, defense, and atomic energy as per the policy
enunciated by the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM).

Third landmark of the relations of India and the United States indicates a pattern of
tensions and animosity between them in spite of the fact that they are democracies
with common pursuits and values for human welfare. They were inimical to each
other in spite of the said attributes as well as a strong sense of freedom of speech and
a free judiciary. “One chief cause may get discovered in the rift about national safety
matters of main prominence for each nation. Regarding India, one main obstacle
was the America-Pakistan liaison… Regarding America , the conclusive difficulty
was been India’s approach with regard to the Soviet Union.” These previously
mentioned asymmetries have become more intense and deep owing to the inability of
each one to understand the politico- economic compulsion each other. Apart from
these compulsions, geographic compulsion is also one factor of this dissonance on
this relation (Kux 1993).

One more factor is there. That factor is about non-proliferation apprehensions of

America. It is a matter of an unceasing and unending debate whether they should be
discussed ahead or they should be tackled part by part. India considers that the US
treatment of Pakistan in nuclear is not so intense as it is with India in spite of the fact
that Pakistan is in league with China with regard to the matter of nuclear supplies.

However, the US showed some uniform concern when the US President, Bill Clinton,
announced on Sept 27, 1993, in “the General Assembly of the United Nation
(UNGA)” his views in the words, “I have made non-proliferation (of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) a high-end significant matter of America . The US plans to
interlace it additionally intensely into a material of our dealings with various
countries of the world and with various establishments. The US wishes to create a
world of laying stress on non-proliferation” (Chari 1995). Again, President Bill
Clinton, in one another address of his to “the United Nations General Assembly

37
(UNGA)” during the year 1995, highlighted the challenges confronting the world in
the shape of terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and the proliferating of the
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (Ibid.).

Two years afterwards, “the First Committee of UNGA” was informed by the director
of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency that “Safety is a progressively
comprehensive idea, connecting not only security but also connecting such matters as
money matters and environment, science, as well as information, fighting drugs as
well as terrorism, and literacy along with human rights. However the regulation of
arms , non-proliferation as well as arms reduction persist as dynamic and most
indispensable elements.” (USIS Official Text 1995) In this manner, the US pursuit
for controlling the spilling over of “the Weapons of Mass Destruction (W. M. D. )” is
a continuing and steady process; more so after nuclear blasts by India as well as by
Pakistan. Both of them carried these nuclear blasts in the year 1998.

There have been perceptible changes in the Indo-US relations after the end of the
Cold War. India’s relations with the Russian government are no more so wide ranging
in commercial and foreign relation terms even though military hardware keeps
coming to India from Russia. The US interest in Pakistan waned further after the
Russians withdrew from Afghanistan. In due course of time, the United States
realized that it could not ignore India’s significant stature in the Asian sub-continent.
In fact, the Council of Foreign Relations suggested a “closer strategic relationship
with India, which has the potential to emerge as a full-fledged major power.” (Council
on Foreign Relations 1997). It pinpointed the need of the United States for increasing
relations with both the countries, Pakistan and India.

Advent of Cold War & Indo-US Relations

This term Cold War came into existence in 1945 at the finish and total conclusion of
“the World War II”. George Orwell was the person who coined this term. This term
came into existence because the world got divided into two Blocs as there developed
considerable ideological differences between the winners of the World War II. It is
called Cold War because the nations involved in it never fought any war, but
ideological undercurrents affected the affairs of the world considerably. They fought
this War ideologically for spreading their own concepts of governments in the world.

38
Each block remained under the apprehension that the form of the governments that
were prevalent in one block could influence and ultimately prevail over the other
(Appadorai and Rajan 1985).

In these two Blocs, one was led by the USSR. The other was headed by America. The
Soviet Union comprised many units called socialist republic before its disintegration.
The main nations of these two block defeated Nazi Germany and the allies of
Germany in that deadly and prolonged World War II. But after the conclusion of “the
World War II”, there developed a breach in their friendly relations mostly owing to
ideological concepts of the two blocks. The Soviet Union was the most ardent
Communist nation, and the US advocated democracy.

Hence, most of the major nations of the world got divided into two parts; one headed
by the Soviet Union., called Eastern Bloc, and another Bloc consisted a number of
nations was led by “the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)”. The US
became the most dominant part of the NATO. The USSR Bloc comprised of mostly
communist nations like Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, etc. The
NATO comprised “the US, Great Britain, France, West Germany, etc”. The US
became the most prominent nation of the NATO.

Bajpai and Matto (2000) examine India, after its independence in 1947, propagated
the abolition of colonialism in the world. It did not side with any Bloc. Even after this
stance of India, Indo-US relations were quite cordial by and large after the
independence of India. This was so because both nations were advocates and
adherents of democracy. They cherished and practiced human rights and social
welfare. They were concerned about such problems as Cancer, Aids, Drug Abuse,
Terrorism, etc. Apart from it, both these very big nations depended on oil from the
region of West Asia, and for them joint efforts about “the peace and stability in the
region” were paramount (Ibid.)

Hence, after India’s independence and adherence to democracy, the US realized the
enormous commercial potential of India. The US took note of India’s prominent role
in various developing nations who were the members of G-77 and NAM (Non-
Aligned Movement). G-77 is a collection of 134 developing countries for highlighting
their views in the United Nations and for the progress and pace of all of them. NAM
was a group of nations that were not a part of any of the two blocs aforesaid. Thus, the

39
US could work in unison with India for interaction with G-77 nations and the nations
connected with NAM with regard to various transnational matters (Bertsch 1999).

There took place some abatement in these friendly relations and a few critics
projected some negative view about these relations. These critics of foreign relations
contend and averred that India had propensity of being pro-Soviet. India was a Non
Aligned Nation, and voting in the UN was not as per the wishes of the US on many
occasions. This created some breach in these relations. The critics further averred that
relations between one super power and a developing country are that of a master and a
complying partner.

The critics aforesaid over-projected some dissonance amid the US and India relations.
They did not highlight some significant friendly interactions between the two even
during the Cold War. These interactions included the friendly visit to the US by some
Prime Ministers of India. Their visits were reciprocated by the friendly acts of the
various US Presidents. In the decade starting from 1970, India remained the biggest
receipt of the American aid for about fifteen years. During this year, the US aid
exceeded well over an amount of $400 million, irrespective of the reality whether “the
US President was from the Republican Party or the Democratic Party.” (Brands
1994).

When Eisenhower was chosen the next President of the US the amount of aid was
increased to $1.65 billion. This amount aid once again exceeded the amount of $1
billion when “Lyndon B. Johnson was the President of the US”. In 1962 and 1963,
when John F. Kennedy was the President, the total amount of the aid was to the tune
of $ 556 million and $ 444 million respectively. This quantum of the US aid started
declining from 1971 onwards, and after the period of 1980, the amount of aid became
nominal, i.e. comparatively very limited. There were many difficulties in these
relations, and these difficulties attracted criticism also. Criticism came both from
India and the US. Some of the criticism was reasonable, but the aid from the US
eclipsed that criticism and shortcomings considerably.

The US extended phenomenal help to India vide P.L. 480. P.L. 480 is a Food for
Peace programme of the US, which began in 1954. The US supplied food grains to
India under this programme to the tune of $ 4 billion during harsh and crippling food
shortage and famine conditions in India after independence. India could pay this

40
money in Indian currency though Indian currency in the US was of little worth. This
money was spent back in US for various welfare projects for the welfare of common
Indians (Dixit 2004).

This Food for Peace saved many millions lives in India in the years after
independence. Apart from this landmark help, the US also assisted India for many
years for getting loans and grants from IDA (International Development Agency),
World Bank, and other UN agencies. Apart from this friendly assistance, the US
designated some of the most eminent and erudite statesmen as the Ambassadors of the
US to India. They included Chester Bowles, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Daniel P.
Moynihan. These Ambassadors of the US to India interacted with the government of
India and Indian diplomats with consideration and sagacity. The mutual association
amid these two prominent “democracies of the world” started looking up. (Jindal
1994)

The Role played by Pakistan in US – India Incompatibility

During the period of mid 1940s, the US attention was diverted to South Asia. It
observed communal violence in India and saw that the partition of India was
inevitable. The US wanted to “wish both sides well separately”. It was more inclined
towards Pakistan for a few reasons. The Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru was
not much in favour of US- followed free enterprise, he was more inclined towards the
USSR-followed socialist pattern. In addition to it, the US was not happy with the
handling of the communal riots in India. Apart from it, India did not categorically
condemn the North Korean invasion of South Korea. India was not very vocal about
Russian intervention in Hungary uprising of 1956. (Rubinoff 2006)

India did not join either the Eastern Bloc (Russian Faction) or the NATO Bloc
(American dominated). It was an active member of NAM However, some prominent
US spokespersons did not like Indian stance of being not on the side of NATO very
clearly. John Foster Dulles, was one such critic of this Indian approach to the Cold
War. John Foster Dulles was one US diplomat who was working in the capacity of
“the Secretary of State also from 1953 to 1959”. He asserted very avowedly that the
ones not linked favorably the US were against it. (Mahpatra 1999).

Such stance and this kind of the stance of some others threw US in a fold of India’s
sworn enemy, to wit Pakistan. The US entered into some military and economic

41
agreements with Pakistan. Pakistan’s military might started matching with that of a
relatively very big and powerful country like India. Apart from it, the US did not
monitor Pakistan’s nuclear designs, and this proved very costly for the entire world
(Ibid.).

In this manner, it is clear that the US proximity with Pakistan became more and more.
After some time of the above-mentioned discordance, Kashmir became the litmus test
of the US – India relations. The US did not condemn the Pakistani intrusion and
attacks in Kashmir; probably on the prodding of the UK. This was neutral just as India
was in regard to North Korea and Hungary. Indian neutrality was construed as, “a
major obstacle of US efforts to rally and unite the free nations of Asia in the struggle
against Soviet world domination.” (Ibid.)

By the late fifties, India had become a dominant nation in the region. But, the US
gave importance to Pakistan for the strategic value of it. It was an avenue for access to
Muslim world. However, this US antipathy to India abated when Chester Bowles was
the US Ambassador to India. Even then, incompatibility soon cropped in when the US
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, averred that Russian communism was a
dominant factor of the Indian foreign policy. He brought Pakistan in the Baghdad
Treaty and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization without any thought of India’s
adverse reaction to it. There was one more fact of incompatibility, Indian occupation
of Goa. John Foster Dulles termed Goa as the territory of Portugal. These things
related to the US antipathy about India brought Russia more close to India. (Rubinoff
2006)

Martial law in Pakistan was to end with general elections which were duly conducted.
Nevertheless, the bloodbath because of trouble emanating from the installation of the
post-election government brought bloodshed in East Pakistan. India helped with
regard to the birth of Bangladesh from what was East Pakistan. Even, Pak – US
relations did not deteriorate in spite of the fact that Pakistani army was barbaric and
ruthless in killing and maiming the people of East Pakistan (later it became
Bangladesh.)

About a decade after the birth of Bangladesh, the USSR invaded Afghanistan. It
proved a blunder for the invading country. The US came close to Pakistan because it
wished to use its services for supporting the freedom fighters in Afghanistan. The

42
United States rendered much military and financial aid to Pakistan for fighting the
invading forces.

With regard to India, just one positive development took place in 1984 when an MOU
was signed about science and technology cooperation. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
visited the US in 1985. Nevertheless, not much improved in the relations of the two
nations took place during this time.

43
India-China-US trilateral relationships

This relationship will be a key determinant in studying the US India relationship

because trading between China and the US is colossal and both are great military
powers. It is very vital that these three nations remain “equilateral with politics,
economics, and security concerns balancing one another.” For this resonance between
these three nations, each component of the stated three components must be addressed
separately. China has phenomenal trade dealing with both the nations. In those
circumstances, all these three nations have a stake in creating a balance in these
relations and sustaining them.

There was a significant setback in the US – India relations after India annexed Goa.
However, these relations started looking up after Sino – India rift increased in 1950s
and 1960s. It was the time when the US started taking interest in South Asia with
regard to global security and the US interests and role in it. In view of the State
Department of the US the narrative runs as under:

“South Asia became a testing ground for the free world. In this area
will be determined whether nations can surmount tremendous
economic and social problems, can achieve far reaching changes in
their entire pattern of life without resorting to the totalitarian system of
communism.” (US Department of State 1959:6)

To this end, the biggest beneficiary of the US assistance was India. During the time of
1954 to 1964, the total US aid totaled to $10 billion. There was further rapprochement
during the Sino – Indian war. Ironically, this friendship between the US and India
drove Pakistan close to the USSR. Even then, the US approach of installing India as
an adversary of the communist system prevalent in China and Russia was not smooth.
Some more incompatibilities cropped in because India did not side with the US in the
Cold War era. (Rubinoff 2006)

Apart from the US admonished Indian stance of not terming China at the aggressor in
the Korean War. So much so that the aid of $500 million package of direct assistance
for a steel plant in Bokaro in Bihar was jeopardized in the year 1962. In addition to
this, there was some criticism from the Indian side of the US for its war against
Vietnam. President Johnson felt indignant, and he ordered for India for 36.5 per cent

44
currency devaluation. Thus, there was some more addition to the compatibilities
between the US and India. (Ibid)

Then, came the 1965 Indo – Pakistan War. It caused arms embargo in this entire
region. Regional matters started taking preference over “the Cold War calculus.” This
changeover in this region came for the first time. One document of Congress stated
averred, “After this period , military strategy of the US toward the region has
tracked a changeable and puzzling and patchy conclusion.” Pakistan was affected
more by this embargo as it depended almost totally on the US for military aid as
against India which had contact with British and French manufacturers also apart
from manufacturing at the indigenous level. (Ibid.)

This tilt towards India as against relations with China did not last for long. There took
place some thaw in the US – China relations. In addition to it, India was instrumental
in the creation of Bangladesh during the 1971 Indo – Pakistan War. The US Congress
supported the Indian action because they considered Pakistani Army’s clampdown on
the people of Bangladesh brutal, inhuman, and barbaric although the US President,
Richard Nixon was not so much forthright in this regard. On the contrary, the US
President was on the side of Pakistan and the Congress against it. According to Henry
Kissinger, “The Indian government relished the affinity from the in Congress of the
US A, and but Indian became subject to Presidential irrelevance (while Pakistan’s
situation was exactly the reverse.” (Ibid: 84)

In this 1971 war, the US even sent its naval force in the aid of Pakistan because at that
time Pakistan was a conduit for good relations with China. In addition to it, the US
resented immensely the recent Indian leaning towards the USSR. Many US policy
makers were against the working of the then Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi. It
was so because Indira Gandhi was opposed to the US intervention in Vietnam, and
also because her role about the Afghan invasion by the USSR was not in the favour of
the US (Ibid.).

China attacked India in Oct, 1962. Every country and the US also felt exasperated at
this stance of China. It was very surprising that the US offered India considerable
help. The US gave India military aid worth $373 million. Many Non-Aligned Nations
as well as Russia were not readily forthcoming to India’s help. President Kennedy,
who was pro-Indian, was assassinated on November, 1963. The successor of President

45
Kennedy was Lyndon Johnson who differed with India because India did not approve
of the Vietnam War and the US involvement in it in such a big military way. The US
forces were fighting this war in Vietnam and the number of the US soldiers was
considerable.

Defense Relations

During the period of the past fifty years, the US – India diplomatic relations have
witnessed many vicissitudes. These relations began with a solemn note when India
attained independence in 1947 as India also opted for the democratic form of
government. However, this feeling did not get converted into lasting good relations.
They were rancorous during the Cold War when India did not join the block headed
by the US, and the US gave more preference and assistance to Pakistan which joined
the block lead by America.

Then, what happened is called the termination of Cold War and the USS.R.’s
disintegration. There took place some breathtaking revolution about information and
technology. India opened its markets after 1991. India acquired nuclear weapon
capability. Growth and progress of Asia as well as approach of India in this change
altered the diplomatic scenario for the US as well as India. Military relations cannot
be separated from the domain of defense relations.

India and the US followed very different ways of dealing with foreign relations
depending on worldwide political scene and the position of each nation in the global
setup . Strategic importance of a nation carried out some vital part at the time of
Cold War. That was one reason why the US supported Pakistan in the Kashmir issue
when it was discussed in the UN in 1948. Strategic relations between the US and
Pakistan were another reasons why American supplied weapons as well as military
assistance to Pakistan in1954.

America needed the support of Pakistan for controlling the spread of communism. On
the contrary, India realized that Pakistan used the US military aid for attacking India
in 1965. The US even sent its very significant battleship, the USS Enterprise when
India was at war with Pakistan in 1971. This ship was a part of the formidable 7th
Fleet of the US Navy. The US considered India far from being neutral in spite of the
policy of Non-Alignment espoused by Indian because the Government of India

46
remained silent during the Russian invasion of Hungry in 1956 and during the
Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in1968.

Containment Strategy and Cold War Alliance of the US with Pakistan

The Korean War made the US aware of the fact that Communism could be beyond its
control if it did not follow the policy of containment. It meant that the United States
has to take such curative steps as were capable of debarring the inroads of the
communist-related education and spread of communism within South Asia in
particular.

India was in the camp of NAM, and it was not inclined to side with the US led
consortium. In that case, Pakistan was the obvious choice. There was martial law in
Pakistan, but it proved more favoruable for the US in roping in Pakistan. The US
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, felt much impressed by the Pakistani military
ruler, Ayub Khan. Even prior to his becoming the military ruler, the US had made
decision to supply arms to Pakistan.

The US gave Pakistan modern artillery, Patton tanks, howitzers, F – 86 jet fighters, B
– 57 bombers, etc. by means of “an aide memoire”. The US wanted to build Pakistan
as a counterweight to India. Pakistan gave the US some basis near Peshawar. India
bought MIG – 21 from the USSR on very favourable terms. The US – India relations
plummeted more when India joined NAM.

In 1961, Indian forces entered Goa and captured it. Goa was under the occupation of
Portugal. The US and many other countries of the world expressed their resentment
and surprise at this annexation of Goa by the Indian Armed Forces. In this manner,
the mutual relation between India and the US were at very low ebb from 1950 to
1962.

Disengagement

Some disengagement in the relations took place in the 1970s also. Many steps taken
by India in the early 1970s were not in consonance with the US foreign policy. Otto
Passman (D – La.) and Clarence Long (D – Md.) of the US Administration assured
“the House Appropriations Sub Committees” that the US provided aid to non-
conformist governments only grudgingly. Apart from these two, Jonathan Bingham D
– N. Y.) started realizing that foreign aid was a stumbling block in domestic progress.

47
The overseas investment in South Asia in the 1970s was just around one per cent of
the total US overseas investment. The US Ambassador to New Delhi during this time
even pruned the staff of the US embassy in New Delhi (Ibid).

The detonation of the nuclear devise by India in May, 1974 further antagonized the
US administration. The clamping of Emergency Rule in 1975 in India was another
matter responsible for disengagement with the US. This was so because human rights
violations were rampant and dissent in public against the government was rife.

The US feared that India could give the USSR a naval base around India and could
oppose the installation of the US naval base in Diego Garcia. In addition to all these
matters, India antagonized some US Congressmen by being averse to the policies of
Israel because it wanted the support of Muslim populated Arab nations, and it wanted
to placate its very large Muslim population. Thus, disengagement was rife during this
decade of 1970. (Ibid)

During the period of 1970s, a number of US Congressmen highlighted Indian nuclear

proliferation and human rights violations as the cause of breach in the US – India
relations. The US used sanctions as a tool for containing nuclear proliferation. In
1974, the Administration of President Gerald R Ford stalled the supply of fuel
shipments meant for the Tarapur Civilian Nuclear installation until the US could
determine that the material had not been used for detonation by India.

In the month July, 1974, the US authorities instructed its officers working in the
International Development Association for not approving loans to countries which
exploded nuclear weapons, but which did not sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT). This aid to India was resumed only when the then Prime Minister of
India during the short lived Janata Government, Morarji Desai, assured that India
would not develop any nuclear weapon. This aid was released in April, 1977.

The terms of assistance from the US became more severe when President Jimmy
Carter assumed the office of the US Presidency. The US Congress passed a resolution
that nation not having nuclear weapons and importing material related it must place
their sites for inspection. Otherwise, the US will not give them any grant or
assistance. The US refused to sell 110 A – 7 attack aircraft to Pakistan and persuaded
France to cancel the shipment of nuclear-fuel processing system to Pakistan. Pakistan

48
that had just seen a military coup faced the scourge and the devastating effect of the
termination of the US aid for the third time.

However, the scene changed when the US embassy in Tehran, Iran, was seized. This
seizure took place on Nov. 4, 1979 and went up to January 20, 1981. In addition, the
contributor to this change was the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR in December
1979. Now, the global concern was replaced by regional concern. Pakistan became a
frontline nation for the US for confronting the USSR. India became a victim of this
US policy and was relegated as an antagonist. India became an antagonist of the
United States because it was not categorical in its clear pro-US stance against the
USSR with regard the Afghanistan, Cuba, as well as Kampuchea.

The occupation of Afghanistan by the USSR forced the US to seek Pak assistance in
arming the Afghan guerillas. The US did not want the USSR to become the de facto
ruler of Afghanistan as that would mean a grave threat to the US interests. It ignored
the Pak nuclear activities. It agreed to sell F 16 fighter bomber aircrafts to Pak, and
India considered this supply a grave peril of India as nuclear delivery system was
possible by these bomber aircrafts. This help to Pakistan notwithstanding, President
Jimmy Carter approved the supply of some fuel shipments and spare parts for India’s
Tarapur Reactor. There was much opposition in the US itself. Nevertheless, the
President’s decision was approved by a very narrow victory of 48 to 46 in the US
Senate.

Thereafter, President Reagan tried to help India by asking France to restore supplies
to Tarapur Reactor. Later on, the US promised to be the last resort of these supplies.
However, a package of $3.2 billion for Pakistan was approved by the US in1976. This
was with the view that Pakistan will have conventional weapons, and it will not care
about nuclear weapons in the near future. There was stiff opposition to it; But
President Reagan got it passed because of the role of Pakistan in the ongoing guerilla
and military warfare in Afghanistan.

Later on, in Houston, a Pak national was caught when he was trying to export
electronic switches that trigger nuclear bombs. Pressler Amendment was passed in
1985. It meant that Pak must have annual Presidential approval about not possessing
nuclear arm capability for the US aid, and this Amendment further stated that the

49
moment the President found that Pakistan had tried to smuggle US nuclear material,
the assistance would be stopped instantaneously.

The news came that Pak was near to making a nuclear bomb, and some Congressmen
wanted the six-year long $4.02 billion aid to Pak to be scrapped. However, Pak could
avert this sanction with the help of its influence in the US Administration and the
Capitol Hill. All this was the result of the Pak help to the US in Afghanistan. The US
Congress ignored the Pak designs about nuclear armament against the Pak aid to the
US In addition to it, nations hostile to India could exploit the wedge between the US
and India owing to Pakistan’s advantageous position.

The US ignored India in spite of India’s economic and strategic significance for one
more reason. That reason was that during the Cold War, Pak was on the side of the
US The human rights violations in Pakistan were overlooked and the US too
overlooked Pakistan’s hostility towards Israel. All this, even when Pakistan’s nuclear
proliferation activities were much more sinister than that of Delhi. Hence, India duly
realized that the US was applying double standards with regard to its policy in the
subcontinent and that the US was being adverse towards Indian concerns and Indian
viewpoint.

Assisting Pakistan became a priority of the US even the cost of so many adverse and
insidious activities of Pakistan and that too at the cost of a peaceful democratic
country like India. Even though, “the Festival of India” took place in America in
1985 for assuaging the feeling of Indians, the US still considered the US – India
relations as poor and not encouraging. It was predicted about these relations that they
would remain poor for a long time owing to some drawbacks in Indian foreign policy.
The US started feeling that India was making efforts for becoming one strong
international entity instead of remaining an area-related power, and this stance of
India was contrary to the US interests. This feeling came to the mind of the US also
because when Rajiv Gandhi was the Prime Minister of India, India was “world’s
biggest importer of arms.” India intervened in Sri Lanka and Maldives militarily.
This development persuaded the administration of the Pentagon to assert that Amerian
government, “ought to dissuade the government of India from its hegemonic
objectives” as far as the other nations of in the region of South Asia as well as the
Indian Ocean were concerned. (Foran 1999: 14)

50
The History of Sanctions and Incentives to India

The process of sanctions against India started just after the advent of the Cold War in
the early 1950s. India did not side with any of the two Blocs initially. It became a part
and parcel of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). However, the influence of NAM
started abating in the 1960s, and India leaned towards the USSR for its trade and
defense material needs. This help from the USSR came in return of barter or grant
basis. This was the first phase of the restrictions (sanctions) by the United States
against India. These restrictions related to trading and military hardware.
Nevertheless, India was not much affected by them. It continued its nuclear power
pursuits when China became nuclear in 1964 (Foran 1999).

Sanctions specific with regard to the matter of the nuclear non-proliferation were
started by the United States when India tested its first nuclear device in 1974. These
sanctions were meant to deny India the availability of nuclear goods, technology, and
thereby stalling India nuclear power ambitions. India, however, did not stop its
nuclear development program. India considered that developing nuclear technology
for a big and significant country like India was a source of challenge and pride (Ibid).

There was one COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls)
Organization of some US backed and controlled countries dealing with the matter of
multilateral exports amongst nations. COCOM did not deal with the USSR – led Bloc
nations with regard to military hardware and technology. However, India was not a
specific target COCOM. The US was concerned about its supremacy in trade and
commerce. Hence, it imposed some restrictions about technology transfer on a few
COCOM countries also apart from India. Even then, India was not in the US list of
the nations that were in American Export Controls Suffered Category. India was in V
category states that were not subjected to majority of the United States-controlled
export controls and restrictions. India, as such, did not share the vision of COCOM
objectives, and it was considered as a nation having weak control over exports to
various nations of both the Blocs in the Cold War era (Destler 1980).

The Arms Export Control Act gives the Department of State the authority to control
the export of military equipment and technology. The regulations of these exports are
compiled in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). This ITAR is
based on the US Munitions List, which is maintained by the Department of Defense.

51
In this manner, the decision of granting any license for export involves a number of
agencies in the United States.

Until the nuclear blast of 1974, India did not face much resistance in the matter of
export by the US Administration. Apart from it, India considered the transfer of
technology as a developmental tool. Indian government would not generally permit
imports of technology unless permission was granted to develop that technology in
India later on. That was one reason of the restrictions imposed on India. Restrictions
on India were also imposed during the Cold War because of India’s not so veiled
support and approval for Soviet Union in some political and diplomatic matters.
About one-half of the aid from the United States came in the form of grain and
agricultural commodities. Loans were also provided for industrial expansion and
infrastructure, including transport, irrigation, and energy (Ibid: 84-85).

Later on, in the era beginning with 1960s, the actual economic performance of India
stagnated owing to the rising prices and growing population. The US thought of
discontinuing the aid. However, the US stopped the idea of restrictions when there
was a devastating famine in India in 1966 and a crippling drought in that year owing
to the failure of the monsoon (Chellaney 1993).

The US President Johnson responded personally by sanctioning massive food grain

assistance to India (14 million tons during the period of 1965 -67). The US President
hoped that India would make some changes in its foreign and commerce policies, and
make Indian polices in consonance with the US polices. India paid due attention to the
US directives, and amended foreign investment regulations to permit majority control
of certain industries in the agricultural sector (Ibid).

India did give some concessions to the United States with regard to commerce and
trade. There erupted some objections from the political parties for extending these
concessions. Gradually, some concessions were kept in abeyance, and this act
displeased the US. They curtailed the shipments of grains to India. Out of the
protection of its self-esteem, India explored some other sources for its needs of food
grain. Thus, the Indian policies did not favor much the American desire to invest in
India (Foran 1999).

Restrictions and disagreements were there throughout the time of the Cold War. The
United States was of the opinion that the nations seeking its aid should abide by its

52
instruction and become totally dependent on the United States. It wanted that those
beneficiaries’ states should prefer the United States on the US terms. India did not
like that anyone should force India into this type of dealings. India became suspicious
of the US policies more so because the US linked food grain aid with the political
conditions of that time in India (Ibid.).

The government of India nurtured a view that the United States was an unreliable and
tricky partner in trade and food grain assistance. This view became fortified when the
US started supply military hardware to Pakistan in 1953. The United States formed a
military alliance with Pakistan after arms supplies. The trend of helping Pakistan
continued when the arm embargo against India was continued during the 1965 Indo –
Pakistan war (Chellaney 1993).

The US – Pakistan alliance started way back in 1953. It supplied Pakistan huge
quantity of arms after that even though it was aware that those weapons were for use
against a fellow democratic peace loving country. The Indian Prime Minister,
Jawarhar Lal Nehru, responded in a very measured manner for highlighting the
sinister aspect of the Pakistan – US relations by stating:

“A military pact between Pakistan and the United States changes the
whole balance in this part of the world and affects India more
especially The United States must realize that the reaction in India will
be that this arming of Pakistan is largely against India or might be used
against India, whether the United States wants it or not… They
imagine that such an alliance between Pakistan and the United States
would bring such overwhelming pressure on India as to compel her to
change her policy of Non-alignment. That is a rather naïve view
because the effect on India will be just the opposite, that is, one of
greater resentment against the United States.” (Chari 1995: 62)

Another discordant situation took place when the additional military hardware that
was promised to India during the Chinese invasion of 1962 was not really fulfilled. In
addition to it, during this time between 1962 to 1965, the export of all major weapons
systems and military hardware to India was prohibited. The British Prime Minister,
Harold Wilson, asked India to return the military hardware supplied to it for fight

53
against China. He ordered so because he thought that military hardware could be used
against Pakistan in the 1965 Indo – Pakistan war.

Thus, it appeared that the West or the NATO - allied countries were trying to punish
India because of Indian stance on Non-Alignment and some inclination toward the
USSR. The US asked India to sign the NPT in 1966. India declined because it was
fearful of its hostile neighbors. India requested for some security guarantees from the
US and the USSR in the event of any attack from China (Eldridge 1979).

However, no such directive was received. In 1968, the US, USSR, and the UK made a
proposal at the United Nations saying just the words that they would assist the non-
nuclear states that was a party to the NPT. These countries would treat that nation as
if it was “a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear
weapons are used.” Even then, India did not sign the NPT more so because India was
aware of unfriendly and acrid overtures of the US and the UK about arms supplies
and about recalling some military hardware.

Nuclear Non-proliferation Restrictions

The United States was indeed disappointed when India did not sign the NPT despite
the US persuasion. However, the peak of this anger and discontentment erupted when
India conducted a nuclear test in 1974. This test ignited a number of laws. These laws
restricted the sale or export of high-technology products which could be used in
generating nuclear capability by a non NPT- member. These laws further restricted
the exports to India and some other countries from the US. These laws are: The
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978
(NNPA), Sections 101, 102, and 73 (a) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA),
which incorporated parts of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, The Export
Administration Act (EAA), The Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994, The
Export – Import Bank Act of 1945.

The two laws, namely the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) earmarked conditions under which nuclear
cooperation agreements could be signed with the United States. This meant that the

54
material has to be for peaceful purposes under the full-scope supervision of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). (Appadorai and Rajan 1985)

Sections 101, 102, and 73 (a) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), which
incorporated parts of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This Act stated that the US
couldn’t provide aid to any country that transfers or acquires uranium enrichment
facilities that are not under the safeguards stated by the IAEA. In this law, there is a
provision of the debarment of economic and defense assistance to any nation that
transfers or acquires uranium reprocessing materials or that transfers or explodes a
nuclear device. This legislation did not affect India as it had already developed its
enrichment and reprocessing technology indigenously. However, the same cannot be
said of Pakistan.

The Export Administration Act (EAA) of the year 1979 gives the President of the
United States far reaching powers to regulate the export of “goods or technology for
sensitive nuclear uses.” (Ibid)

The Export – Import Bank Act of 1945 makes a provision that the bank can deny
credit to the nations when the President determines that such a denial is in the interest
of nuclear non-proliferation. The bank is debarred from taking part in transactions that
will support exports to the nations or parties that have violated non-proliferation
agreements or norms.

These sanctions did not affect India much apart from just a few notable exceptions.
The major effect of these sanctions came only after the 1998 nuclear test by India. It
ought to be noted that sanctions were there against India even before the 1998 tests.
India has not been receiving some of the material it needs for keeping its nuclear
facilities operating at full capacity. Now that India has conducted its nuclear tests and
if there is no dramatic change in India’s nuclear policy, these rules and Acts will
continue to affect India in one adverse manner or another.

In this matter of the effect of sanctions, it was found that the sanctions did not have
any considerable effect on India’s nuclear program. This observation is of no surprise
because studies have concluded that if there are sanctions; India is able find some
other source of the supply of the material. Apart from it, India is quite capable of
developing the material in-house. In addition, the effective of sanctions is breached by

55
means of the responses of the sender of the material or the receiver of the material.
These responsive are generally unintended (Chari 1995).

The End of the Cold War - New Cooperative Security Environment

The end of the Cold War has totally changed and taken a new shape of the “concept
of security” and the “arrangement of military powers” among various nations of the
world. There are three main reason of this change. The first reason for this change is
that rapid and trailblazing changes have taken place in science and technology and in
the field of “information technology.” The second reason is that earlier there was
bilateralism (two Blocs in the pre- Cold War era) and a bit of trilateral-ism (NAM).
Now, all that has been replaced by multilateralism. There is globalization and there is
regionalism. The third reason is that in this expanded concept of security, there is
concern for peace, development, and cooperative security.

After the US led attack on Iraq, the debate dealing with bilateralism and
multilateralism has intensified. The concept of cooperative security through
multilateralism is gaining ground. New challenges are diverse as in the case of
terrorism, drugs, arms smuggling, etc. The stoppage of these inimical and devastating
menaces needs only multilateralism. In this manner, the world is moving towards
multilateralism.

The Cold War put a lot of pressure on India, as it did not interfere in the matters of
Russian expansionism and the Chinese adventures in Asia. Nevertheless, when the
Cold War ended, situation changed, and dealings started becoming better. Lt. Gen.
Clause M. Kicklighter, of the American Army visited India and initiated the now
famous “Kicklighter Proposal”. The proposal included army to army exchanges as
well as cooperation in defense framework of India and the US Executive Steering
Groups (ESGs.) came into being for this purpose. Army and Navy ESGs were
established in 1992. Military – to – Military level exercises were conducted. Indian
and the US navies carried out combined exercises Malabar I in 1992, Malabar II in
1995, and Malabar III during 1996. Thus, defense relations that are important for
strategic relations started looking up significantly owing to the Kicklighter Proposal.
(Ibid)

American defense secretary, William Perry, visited India in1995. The Defence
Secretary met the Indian Minister of State for Defense, Mallikarjun Khadge. He later

56
signed “Agreed Minutes of Defense Relations.” Cooperation was planned at various
levels of the government of the US and India. It was agreed that a “Defense Policy
Group” will also be established. In 1995, the Indian Air Force and the US Air Force
exchange combat pilot instructors at their respective Air Force Academies Around the
year 1991, “the Cold War” concluded by some startling breakdown of the USSR. The
USSR split into many countries. The US became the only Super Power or the Hyper
Power (a term coined by Hubert Vedrine, the French Foreign Minister). India made
earnest and assiduous efforts to adjust to the newly created situation. India fine-tuned
the chronology of its foreign policy very carefully. Iraq invaded and occupied the
territory of its oil rich neighbour Kuwait. There was chaos all around the world
because the modern day civilization is dependent on oil. American the Hyper Power
imposed sanctions on Iraq. India supported the US-led UN resolution that imposed
sanctions on Iraq. The Government of India put into practice these UN sanctions very
meticulously; rather much more carefully than many other signatory countries of the
resolution. India did not oppose or criticize the existence of American forces in Gulf
region of Asia.

Apart from aforesaid act in unison with the US, India allowed it to use Indian air
space for taking civilian and humanitarian supplies only to its bases in the Gulf from
its basis in East Asia. India even offered the US airplanes the facilities of refueling the
aircrafts. All these facilities would be there at the time of highly disturbing
confrontation in “the Gulf between the US and its enemies”.

During the year 1991, India voted in favour of striking down one resolution of the UN
General Assembly for condemning Zionism as a type of racism. In due course in this
period of post cold war, India established full-scale diplomatic relations with Israel
with whom America has been and still is exceedingly close in every respect of mutual
dealings. Above all, India agreed to another US proposal and formed a Direction-
finding Group about defence-related collaboration and tactical interchange with the
US (Ibid.).

India wanted to remain in a right region of the US in more than a few issues. During
“the 1993 Session of the UN General Assembly”, then current government in India
co-sponsored with the US the “Comprehensive Nuclear Ban Treaty (CTBT)” and
Freeze on the Production of Fissile Missiles sans inclusion of the common

57
disarmament clause. This was different from the earlier stance of NAM-related
resolutions.

Vivekanandan (1999) highlights India’s avowed views with regard to the matter of
not signing “CTBT (the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty)”. Some analysts of
India are in approval of “India’s signing the CTBT” just for the sake of pleasing a few
foreign powers including the US However, no Indian government will think of it or
dare about it as it would be tantamount to betrayal of the country’s safety. India
favours total nuclear test ban for weapons (total nuclear disarmament) along with the
destruction of all existing nuclear weapon stocks. Without total nuclear disarmament
and destruction of the existing nuclear weapon stock, CTBT will not be complete, on
the contrary it will be redundant as per the Indian point of view.

The US too changed its stance towards India. It extended help to India with regard to
tiding over India foreign exchange crunch on account of the Gulf War. The US
supported every Indian request for loans from “the IMF, the World Bank, and the
Asian Development Bank”. The US also recommended India’s case with other
developed nations for monetary and technical assistance because of the progressive
foreign policy of India.

All the previously mentioned development happened owing to the sifting of doubts
and rediscovery of each other’s worth after “the end of the Cold War”. This is,
however, true that some of these developments could have happened with the
happening of changed situations as well. For example, the support to the US in Gulf
War was needed by India, as stability in the Gulf region is imperative for India too.
Escalation of Gulf crisis could jeopardize Indian economy also to a considerable
extent. Establishing full diplomatic relations with Israel was a corrective diplomatic
measure in order to get eminent position in world politics, and negotiations for this
were underway much before the formal establishment. India was just waiting for this
right opportunity, and the end of the Gulf war engendered this much needed
opportunity for India, and the result of this opportunity found favour with the US also.

Some persons are of opinion that the reason why US interest in these matters is very
limited is that prior to the conclusion of the 20th century, the Americans did not want
India to be a military power. This was so because the US thought that in becoming a
military power, Indian resources and money would be diverted to military-related

58
activities and not development and welfare of the people of India. These could be the
reasons why the US did not want India to be a military power in the region, also they
could not tolerate any military power during those years of the 20th century. The third
reason of this apprehension from the side of the US was “that the US was the sole
super power and military power”, and India’s appearance as some military power was
“not in the interest of the US hegemony” in dictating terms to various nations of the
world. The Cold War ended very abruptly. The USSR disintegrated and became a
fraction of what it was in the Eastern Bloc. India suffered owing to this disintegration
of the USSR because most of its military supplies and aircrafts came from there.
Political support too became diminished. However, there took place one favourable
spin off in the Indian political framework. Rajiv Gandhi, a young and dynamic man,
became India’s Prime Minister. He was a technology geek. He introduced computer
and telecom revolution in India. The US appreciated this innovative stance of Prime
Minister, Rajiv Gandhi.

Sunit Francis Rodrigues was appointed the Chief of Army Staff of India. He had an
upright and forthright meeting with Lt. Gen. Kicklighter when the later visited India.
The Indian Chief straightaway proposed to the US Lt. General to come up with a
military-to-military cooperation. It was in November, 1990. Later on, Lt. Gen.
Kicklighter returned to India in1991 with a comprehensive “cooperation plan.” This
included a common “strategic vision and a framework for future army to army
expanded relations.” (Banerjee 2006: 65)

Apart from it, the Indian Defense Minister, K.C. Pant visited the US, it was the first
by any Defense Minister of India after 25 years. A high-level delegation went with
him and negotiations were held on many matters. One more meeting was held in1992
in Virginia. The Defense Secretary of India led this delegation. An announcement
about joint naval exercises was made there. It was known as Malabar series of joint
naval exercises. (Ibid)

The Kicklighter – Rodrigues initiative was taken ahead. In 1995, the US Defense
Secretary, William Perry, visited India. An “agreed minute” was signed whereby a
Defense Policy Group and a Joint Technology Group were created. Then in the year
1999, Kargil War took place between India and Pakistan. (Ibid)

59
The end of the Cold War was responsible for the removal many understandings
between the US and India because during the Cold War India did not abide by many
policies of the US Even after that, some misunderstandings and differences persisted
particularly with regard to the matter of Iran. The US wanted that India should severe
all diplomatic relations with oil rich Iran, India could not do it because Iran is its
neighbor, a friend, and a major oil supplier. India is heavily dependent of Iran for its
requirements of energy. Any talks with US on meeting Indian energy demands in the
absence of supplies from Iran will be futile.

India realized that the matter needed quick resolution. India started making suitable
amends in marketing and trading fields in the 1990s. A number of measures about
liberalizing the Indian economy were initiated. These steps opened markets of the US
“The Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi”, visited the US in 1985 and 1987. Prior to
it, there took place Indira Gandhi-Reagan Science & Technology Initiative of 1982.
Agreements were signed for obtaining advanced US technology for civilian and
military applications as the sequel of the previously mentioned initiative of 1982.
Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, made concerted efforts for cementing friendly
connections with the US, also he could establish good diplomatic and personal rapport
with President Reagan. In addition to high-level meetings and agreements, there were
concerted efforts at the diplomatic levels also. New avenue of co-operation in trade
and commerce were explored.

The foreign policy of India was undergoing drastic changes owing to the changed
world panorama and owing to “dire threats from China and Pakistan”. However, the
US Administration from early 90s under the Presidency of Bill Clinton did not pay
any heed to it. It was more inclined towards retaining its hegemony over the matters
concerning the entire world. The Administration of the US also wished to maintain
and enhance the living standards of its people. It did not take note of the matter that
nuclear umbrella was absolutely imperative for India in view of impending threats
from two highly deceptive and dangerous neighbours. The US demanded nothing
short of capping, rolling back, and finally completely eradicating Indian nuclear
ability (Jha 2004).

The US Administration insisted that India must sign CTBT. CTBT (Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) came into existence in1996 under the control of the United

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Nations. It started with 168 nations. It directed the ban of nuclear tests totally. India
did not sign it owing to clear threats from its two neighbours. Apart from it, the US
also wanted that India must sign NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty). This treaty is highly
discriminatory for India in particular. It came into existence in 1970. It has been
signed by 191 nation-members of the United Nations.

This treaty is controlled “by IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)” which is
an organ of the United Nations. NPT identifies Nuclear Weapons States. These are
“the US, the USSR, China, France, Britain”. They all acquired nuclear weapons prior
to 1967. This treaty debars other nations from acquiring nuclear weapons. These other
nations can use the nuclear technology only for peaceful purposes subject to sharing it
and subjecting it to inspection by the IAEA.

The Republican Administration of the US threatened sanctions against those nations,

which did not accede, to many U.S commands about signing of the NPT In the year
1992 on 28th April, an editorial appeared in “the New York Times” that the US
Administration was on its way with regard to the matter called “Stop the
Subcontinent’s Bomb”. It wanted that India’s nuclear bomb making capacity must be
curtailed through international pressure. In the period of 1992-93, the US
Administration dissuaded the government of the Soviet Union from supplying to India
cryogenic engines and the technology of developing such engines (Joshi 1994).

With regard to the matters of trading, the US Administration initiated some

revengeful measures against India under “Section 301 of the Trade and
Competitiveness Act. The US Administration” withdrew concessions related to
matters concerned with the trade that were handed over under the various provisions
of “the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)”. The products covered under the
aforesaid head were the items of Pharmaceutical and chemical exports. The US
further threatened India that India must open its market for the goods and services
from the US One more demand was regarding the protection connected with the US
patents in India. A subtle accusing finger was pointed out by two most significant
officials of America, namely "the President and the Secretary of the State of the US”
in the political front also. The accusation was against human rights infringements
taking place within India predominantly there was a very clear mention of “the State
of Jammu and Kashmir.”

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During whole of decade of 1990, the relations related to India with the US
Administration were to a visible extent discordant and unfriendly. This time was the
era of “the Presidency of Bill Clinton” who remained the President of the US for
terms numbering two, to wit for eight years. This discordant relationship existed as
India was pursuing its goal of nuclear ambition for military use. And this acrimony
reached its zenith at the time of Indian detonation of the nuclear explosion in Pokhran,
Rajasthan, during the month of May in 1998. The US administration tried its utmost
for imposing sanctions against India. Very strict measures against India were initiated
and applied; just short of direct military intervention against India. They were bent
upon precluding India from becoming a nuclear power State.

Subsequent to that nuclear explosion by India, the American Administration became

extremely hostile. It imposed many financial and military sanctions against India. A
number of financial deals with the US Administration were either annulled or put on
hold. However, supplies of medicine and medical equipment were not stopped. It
dissuaded various international financial bodies from extending financial help and
loans to India for various projects connected with India’s much needed development.
These financial institutions were within an indirect power of the US. They duly
complied with the US instructions. India started facing grave difficulties.

The US Administration worked in unison with its allies in the western world, China,
and Russia for punishing India in international forums like the UN It got resolution
passed against India in G – 8 summits. The forum of “the Permanent Members of the
UN Security Council and the European Union” passed resolutions against India. The
Indian nuclear explosion was called a threat to peace intending to disturb the existing
world order. This resolution called for complete roll-back by India. These
international organizations ordered India to sign CTBT and NPT.

The most disturbing point of this criticism and sanctions happened when President
Clinton visited China. China was asked to monitor various military activities in the
region with regard to maintaining world order. This resolution irked and annoyed
India as China had attacked and invaded India very deceptively, and brutally and
occupied so much of its territory. Thus, relations with the US Administration were
very strained and full of anxiety. The hostility was immense in the financial front. The
US and its western partners applied ruthless pressure on India through “the World

62
Bank and International Monetary Fund”. Bilaterally, the US Administration set-up
including that Exports Imports Bank of the US

There was complete and full bar with regard to any military aid whatsoever. The US
considered itself a sole as well as the mainly influential nation throughout the world.
It wished to preserve world peace at its own terms. Thus, the Indo-US relations
reached its nadir in this decade; much owing the matter of Indian nuclear explosion
that India could not avoid at any cost. The US President, George H.W. Bush, became
more skeptical about world order after "the Gulf War in 1990-91”. The US
Administration thought that the nuclear non-proliferation regime presided over by it
could be shattered by nuclear explosions by some other countries, particularly by
India and Pakistan.

As far as some matters of foreign policy, the Bush presidency seemed a bit slow prior
to the incident of 9/11 assault on “the World Trade Centre”. Later on this President
became active and focused and carried some inspiring steps about foreign policy
matters (Greenstein 2003).

The Historical Legacy of Non-Proliferation

About “the non-proliferation area”, the dealings amid America and India may get
divided into five phases (Chari 1995):

1. The first phase of the said “non-proliferation area” started in the year 1964. It
was the time when China became nuclear. India started counter measures for
confronting the menacing Chinese government.

2. The second phase began when the United States adopted the “technology
denial mode”. It gave some raw material to India for its Tarapur Atomic Plant, and
then stopped these supplies around 1980.

3. In the third phase after 1980, Pakistan was making surreptitious and steady
progress towards acquiring atomic power. India was buttressing its missile defense
system. The United States found itself unable to contain this march of these two
hostile nations towards larger nuclear capability and missile technology.

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4. The fourth phase happened when the Clinton Administration took strident
steps for reversing this nuclear race of Pakistan and India by becoming very active in
nuclear proliferation matters.

5. The fifth phase deals with the efforts of the Clinton Administration for
freezing nuclear programs of these two adversaries. The effort did not succeed as both
these nations conducted nuclear tests in 1998. Indo- US relations acquired a
discordant state. However, it can be reconsidered by the US on account of “India’s
perception of nuclear threat and the policy choices available to it” (Ibid.)).

Disagreements of the Past and the Impact of those disagreements

Tellis, who is a specialist in international security and US foreign policy, has

identified four areas of disagreement between the US and India. These areas are: “a
competing perception of the global order; the nature of the Soviet Union; the value of
nuclear weapons; and the role of Pakistan.” (Tellis 2004: 8-9) Raja Mohan (2004)
points out that India defied US overtures from 1996 to 1998 resolutely.

Thus, those wasted fifty years took some beneficial turns owing to the powerful
Indian origin people, globalization, the end of the Cold War, and India’s genuine need
of remaining nuclear.

India-US relations are poised for progress ahead because of the end of Cold War, the
end of the USSR occupation of Afghanistan, and the beginning of the process of
counterterrorism. Both the armies have proved their competence, and the Bush
Administration is very much impressed by the stance of India about counterterrorism
and global peace.

Measured normalization of the US-India foreign relations

Some normalization started in the US – India relations after the end of the Cold War
and after the end of the USSR occupation of Afghanistan. The US took some action
against Pakistan by reducing the quantum of the foreign aid from $564 million to
$208 million per year by invoking the Pressler Amendment of 1985. The Indian
government under Prime Minister Chander Shekhar allowed the US the facility of
refueling en route to Middle East during the US war with Iraq in 1991. The US did

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not diminish its foreign aid to India on that account. India allowed Pespico entry in
India although it did not open insurance and investment for the US companies in
India. Still some improvement took place between the two countries.

India faced acute foreign exchange crisis in 1991 after the Gulf War. The Indian
Finance Minister recognized the worth of the US investment in India. India deviated
from the USSR style of business and trade, and it opted for open market. India took
steps to normalize relations with Israel also. It voted in favour of Israel in the UN
when a resolution came up for repealing a clause, which equated Zionism with
racism. This step was carried out although the earlier resolution of 1975 about
equating Zionism with racism was co-sponsored by India. India also established full-
fledged diplomatic relations with Israel in the year 1992. The entrenched hostility
towards India started abating gradually in the US circles.

Later on President Clinton pursued the policy of encouraging democracies. However,

Indian aid was reduced by 20 per cent, in addition to this reduction, the supply of
some vital items was stopped. The US embassy in New Delhi remained without an
Ambassador for sixteen months (Rubinoff 2006). President Clinton recognized the
advent of India in the international arena because of stable democracy, globalization
process in India, the end of the Cold War, and the increasing number of professional,
dedicated, and honest NRIS in the US. Thus, in late nineties the US made friendly
overtures and deals with India. The Indian Nuclear Test created acrimony and breach
in these relations. Sanctions were imposed. Even then, President Clinton visited India
in 1998. His visit was preceded by the visit of the then Secretary of State, Madeline
Albright, in the year 1997. As the result of these visits sanctions were lifted in a
number of items. Also, a number of people, who were inclined towards India in a
friendly way, were inducted in the Clinton team. Prime Minister, Vajpyee, too visited
the US in 2000. But, some friction remained as India declined to sign the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Otherwise, the progress was steady in
mutual relations (Hathaway 2003).

Continuity of Divergent Views in Some Matters

With regard to mutual association amid the US and India, this can be observed that
discordant voices existed since long, i.e. even from the time of India’s independence.

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They were there during the era of “the Cold War” when India did not join any block
and when America extended “commercial and armed help to Pakistan” as Pakistan
sided with the US block. These differences abated during the era of 1980s and saw
considerable improvement after “the Cold War” came to an end when the US became
the sole super power. Even then, each country follows its own goals and at times these
goals clash with one another. Thus, divergence of views in the Indo-US foreign
relations does exist in some matters discussed below:

Status Quo Approach of the US and India- After “the Cold War” the United States
became only super power. Now, the hold of the Americans over many international
bodies like “the UN, IMF World Bank, NATO” is phenomenal and iron clad. It
wishes to let the status quo remain to continue. It will not really like India to enter in
these domains and establish its presence and get eminence. On the same lines, India is
a member of G-77 and NAM. “The Group of 77 or G – 77 was established in 1964”
through 77 developing countries. NAM (Non- Aligned Movement) is an organization
of 134 countries that are not connected with any block. India holds good sway over
these organizations.

India too in a subtle manner wishes no change in India’s position in these bodies and
in some other bodies where India is dominant. India has become more competent and
competitive after the policy of liberalization adopted by it in 1990s. India can exercise
its new found facility and well established goodwill for better trade ties and
diplomatic leverage. Thus, divergence lies in the Indo-US foreign relations with
regard to inclination of status quo of each nation.

Adherence to International Laws- India is a strong adherent to various international

laws under the patronage and control of the UN, India does not violates those laws
and adheres to them very scrupulously in dealing with all nations, particularly matters
relating to military and terrorism. On the contrary the US plays a very dominant and
arbitrary role and violates these rules by bending them on many occasions. The US
carries military attacks on other nations without UN sanctions at times, but India
never does it. Therefore, that is another divergence in policies of the Americans and
Indians.

Role of Multilateralism- Multilateralism means participation of three or more

countries in any matter of international importance or for that matter any dispute

66
between the members of the UN. This concept has been initiated and propagated by
the United Nations. India is a strident advocates of multilateralism in any matter
mandated by the UN Opposed to the view of India, the US is authoritative and
dominant in this matter. It settles any international dispute by itself even though
multilateralism is mandatory and the only option. The US will abide by the ruling or
advice coming out of multilateralism only when that advice or directions suit the
requirements of the US Therefore, one more divergence exists in the matter of foreign
relations amid the Americans and Indians.

The Security Council Role- “The Charter of the United Nations” very categorically
and unambiguously mandates that its very vital body called “the Security Council” is
the ultimate authority in the matters relating to international disputes, including
disputes wherein invasion of any UN-member country is involved. India is a strict
follower of this dictate of the UN Charter. On the contrary, the US does not follow
this direction of the UN Charter, and settles disputes without going to the Security
Council for the solution of various disputes including disputes involving military. The
US has even used force against some nations without the sanction of the Security
Council, and it took with it the help of some other friendly countries including NATO

Control of Various International Monetary Organizations- Multilateralism makes

the core of “the UN Charter.” It means that in a matter involving international issues
as many countries as possible should participate, and the findings and outcomes of
this should be binding on all. India is a strong advocate and supporter of this
mechanism. Multiculturalism is most important in financial matters. The US has
become an overbearing and dominant entity in many financial and trading
organizations as “the IMF, the World Bank, and WTO”. There is no multilateralism in
the dealing of these organizations because the US has its say in these organizations.
Its partners and friendly nations follow the wishes of the US This approach of
America is contrary to many requirements of UN that advocate active role of
multiculturalism. It is contrary to Indian point view also. Many nations expect a
country of India’s stature to work in unison with the UN for restoring
multiculturalism in the aforesaid financial and commercial matters too. Thus, one
more divergent view of India and the US is there in international relations.

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On the Matter of Nuclear Disarmament- India is the most peace-loving country of
the world. It is a strong proponent of non-violence. India has been persuading the
world to abandon nuclear arm race. It wants the “elimination of Nuclear weapons
from the face of the earth”. On this point too, the US and India follow divergent
views. President Barack Obama gave a speech in Prague on April 1, 2009 on the
matter of complete elimination of nuclear weapons. He stated that the retention of
nuclear weapon was justified in the case of a few designated nations.

The Role of the US Lobby in India

There is one strong US lobby stationed in India. It knows all “the pros and cons of
Indo-US relations”, as well as how these relations can be there for the betterment of
the lobby as well as the US. It does not want any harm as such for India, but at the
same time wants that new developments should work in favour of the US This lobby
consists of people from industry, trade, and media. The people of this lobby enjoy
good rapport with the authorities in the US; the authorities that are official as well as
non-official in the US hierarchy. This lobby wants to alter Indian foreign policy
approach drastically in favour of the US Administration. It is doing so by numerous
activities related to India’s eminent position in various international forums and
organizations.

This lobby highlights and pinpoints that the provisions of NAM are outdated for India
and these provision ought to be discarded. It does so because it knows that NAM is no
more very active. It says that India should not be very idealistic in the arena of world
politics because incase India remains dominant in world bodies, it will be on the
wrong side of the US. One statement made in India by a very high ranking US officer
is there, and the lobby highlights it. That statement was made by “the US Secretary of
State, Condoleezza Rice”, during March 2002. The statement articulated that US
intends to see India as one vital entity in this region if India follows a pragmatic
foreign policy in consonance with the wishes of the US

However, there is one favourable spin-off in India foreign policy towards the US, and,
owing to that spin-off, the US is a bit more considerate and less obdurate about Indian
foreign policy matters and pronouncements. That spin-off is beneficial for India. India

68
should take into due consideration those benefits. The US lobby in India too is aware
of these new developments in India’s economic and military might.

The spin-off is that during the last decades, i.e. of 1980 and 1990 Indian economic
stature has become significantly big and Indian military capability too has increased;
more so because of a reality that now India is one formidable military power after its
decisive and conclusive nuclear blasts. India now has nuclear weapons also. India’s
economy is making steady and sure progress owing to India’s firm democracy and
public welfare laws. This economic growth and more and more international trading
by India will give India leverage in its “foreign policy vis-à-vis the US” Also another
tool, of course a friendly tool against the US, is India credible nuclear deterrent power
against the enemies of India and the enemies of the mankind.

Conclusion

The “end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR.” did created numerous
economic trading avenues for India because Indian economy has been progressing
considerably after liberalization and digitalization of Indian economy. Now, it all
depends on the way in which India is able to use leverage of India’s economic might
with regard to trading matter with the US including the matter of export and import
duties on various Indian and US goods and military hardware. At this time, linkage
with American economy and American access to the expanding Indian market will be
considerably significant.

Apart from linkage and market admittance in America, linkage as well as dealing with
the emerging market of Asia too have considered while forming the norms of foreign
relations with the US. It is true that new Indian economic norms will permit trading
by Indian companies in America, and based on this “the US Administration” too will
demand some concessions with regard to the entry of the US Companies in India. The
Americans will demand some more concessions for granting Indian access to
American technology and capital. All these matters are quite significant and need care
by India.

With regard to granting access to Indian Companies in the matter of free market in the
US technology and capital, the US may put pressure on India for initiating and
implementing so called “third-generation reforms.” “Third generation reforms” entail
liberalization of investment by foreign-based Companies in the retail market. It also

69
includes liberalization in the insurance sector, full capital account convertibility, and
reforms in the labour market. However, this should not pose much of a problem as
India is already moving forward with regard to many of the previously mentioned
reforms. These steps form a part of the process of further liberalization of the Indian
economy. Even then, there exist a few compulsions with regard to “full capital
account convertibility”. There are some restraint and roadblocks with regard to labour
reform in the Indian market.

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 CHAPTER 3
NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY: SECURITY COMPULSIONS

This chapter analyzes nuclear diplomacy amid India as well as America, and it
discusses various Indo- US relations subsequent to Indian nuclear tests during 1998
and the sanctions imposed by the US on India. A number of clichés or phrases
describe the fundamental nature of Indo-US relations. These relations passed through
a number of landmarks.

BJP in his election manifesto 1998 emphasized its opposition to nuclear apartheid:

“The BJP denounces that concept of nuclear isolation. The BJP will vigorously
compete against efforts to force any domineering nuclear system through CTBT,
FMCR and MTCR. The BJP shall not get bullied or surmounted through any person
or establishment in substances connected with safety-related necessities and in any
exercise of nuclear option” (BJP Manifesto 1998).

From the time of carrying out Pokhran nuclear tests, NDA election manifesto in
1999, emphasized on a policy of nuclear deterrence. It stated:

“Our just launched National Security Council will suggest to the government about
this matter and also about the creation of one dependable deterrence about nuclear
weapons. The aforesaid matters constitute a bare minimum need about the now
prevalent era of international disparity and the augmented defenselessness (NDA
Manifesto 1999)”.

Jaswant Singh in his book talks about the imposition of nuclear apartheid after the
Pokhran tests. He stated:

“In the election of 1998, the BJP emerged as the clear leader, though again not with
an absolute majority. I was again to be sworn into office, but could not be
immediately, because of a last-minute difficulty. This arose from a sudden objection
that was raised by senior and responsible quarters about 96 Challenge and Response
my inclusion in the ministerial ranks. When I was informed about it, I immediately
stepped aside. I was sworn in as external affairs minister a few months later. This was
the government, under the premiership of Vajpayee, that led the country until 2004,
though in 1999 it was forced to face yet another election following a snap defeat, by
just one vote, in Parliament. That led to a comment in the House: “Atalji, you may
71
have lost the vote in the House, but you have won the heart of India!” This was
prophetic. We were again returned to office, and I continued as the Indian foreign
Minsiter.

Confronted with a challenging pronouncement, the Indian government resolved that

the only criterion for India would be the State’s safety. The nuclear tests, which
were carried out by India on May 11 and 13, 1998, were definitely inevitable, and
these tests constituted a kind of extension of a strategy starting nearly from the
initial period of India’s Independence. This policy was there on account of a
rudimentary principle: India’s safety in a world full of proliferation of nuclear
weapons rests either in complete worldwide disarmament or in exercising the code of
identical and genuine safety for each nation. So, what was the reason of the conduct
of the tests? Nuclear know-how had by now transmuted global safety. Nuclear arms,
theorists articulated, were not essentially weapons of...” (Singh 2006).

The United States reacted angrily to the Indian nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998.
The new BJP-led government left Washington feeling deceived. The failure to notice
the test preparations increased to the Clinton administration's dismay. Washington
said that key officials in the Vajpayee government misled it into believing that India
would not rock the boat and that controversial nuclear policy decisions would be
made only after a full review of the nuclear strategy. With President Clinton
announcing his intention to visit India later in 1998 as part of the United States' new
intensified engagement with the subcontinent, India's choice was perceived as a
political slap in the face. Washington was also more tolerant of Pakistan's decision to
test after India, while holding New Delhi accountable for the subcontinent's overt
nuclearization and endangering the worldwide non-proliferation regime (Rajamohan
2003: 90).

The Clinton administration implemented mandatory penalties and rallied other

countries, particularly Japan, to reduce economic aid to India. Although France and
Russia were more sympathetic to India, they were unable to prevent the United States
from establishing an international framework in the shape of unanimous United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1172 on June 11, 1998. This created the stage
for India to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and address the core source of Indo-
Pakistani tensions, the Kashmir conflict. Clinton hailed a new strategic alliance with

72
China and criticised nuclear proliferation in the subcontinent during a visit to China in
June 1998. The greatest worries of Indians who feared nuclear tests would be
counterproductive looked to be realised. While not necessary, the demands of UNSC
Resolution 1172 created the ground for future action by the international system.
India was subject to US and Japanese sanctions, and the UNSC had enacted a
resolution under Chapter VI. Furthermore, the decision appeared to pave the way for
the long-desired internationalisation of the Kashmir dispute and UN intervention in
Kashmir. The apparent Sino-American confluence of interests in bringing down the
newly nuclear-armed India was the final straw (Ibid.: 91).

However, within a month of the nuclear tests, there was a tentative interaction
between the US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, and the Planning
Commission's Deputy Chairman, Jaswant Singh. The two agreed to start a dialogue to
reconcile India's security concerns with the US's non-proliferation goals. Talbott
claimed that the US was not looking into a compromise that would resolve the
countries' seemingly incompatible aims. Rather, he said, the US was looking for
Indian compliance with five UNSC Resolution 1172 benchmarks: signing on to the
CTBT, participating in FMCT negotiations, tightening Indian controls over sensitive
technology and commodity exports, adopting a non-threatening nuclear weapons
posture, and reducing Indo-Pakistani tensions through dialogue. Singh also indicated
that he was not in talks with Talbott to craft a solution that would denigrate India;
rather, New Delhi was engaging Washington to make it understand India's security
concerns.Singh and Talbott began meeting nearly every month until early 1999, when
they began meeting less regularly until early 2000 (Ibid.:91-92).

Jaswant Singh in his book “ A Call to Honour” mentioned about his talks with Strobe
Talbott –“Carrying my thoughts, I left for the United States, with no illusions about
the enormity of the difficulties that lay ahead. Or, for that matter, what lay behind at
home - opinionated views, prejudice, sheer hostility and a propensity to remain
imprisoned in the past, as against shedding the irrelevancies of inherited thought and
adopting pragmatic realism as would enable us to meet today's challenges (Singh
2006: 280). I'd want to say a few words regarding prevalent American knowledge,
opinion, and prejudices about the BJP, which are all unfortunately acquired and
secondhand. The United States administration pursued a nuclear-centric policy
towards India long before the BJP-led NDA government took office in March 1998.

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Washington has warned of terrible consequences if the party's electoral pledge of
making India a nuclear weapons power was carried through. Soon after the BJP
manifesto was revealed in December 1997, the then-American ambassador to India
reacted on it. 'If an Indian government chooses to weaponize, declare India a nuclear
weapon state, and especially if such a government tests a nuclear weapon, I believe
that would have very unsettling consequences in terms of India's relations with its
neighbours and would be of great concern to my government. The actions we should
take in relation to India would have legal ramifications under my country's laws. " I
hope this is carefully considered before any decision is made to actually move down
that road." (Ibid.: 288). The US stance, attitudes, and policies towards India shifted
carefully. For it, this interaction with India was an exercise in removing roadblocks to
universal subscription to the NPT and CTBT, which was their stated and
acknowledged national goal at the time (Ibid.: 289). For me, failure to properly
represent India's point of view, to reduce current tensions, to stumble in carrying
conviction with the rest of the international community was not at all an option. I had
only one try, no more, and mistakes were irreversible. I had to succeed, and in the
public eye, there was just no scope to fail, that would amount to failing India, to a
further belittling of India. That simply could not be, also there was no way that India's
national interests, prestige or standing in any fashion could conceivably be remodelled
by others.These were the intellectual, historical, diplomatic assets (and liabilities)
with which I left for that land which Christopher Columbus had found when he was
actually on his journey of discovering India (Ibid.: 290).

The overwhelming notion that accompanied me to New York in June 1998 was not
one of tremendous concern. I felt certain that India's position was fundamentally
correct. Of course, I was aware of the challenges that lay ahead, but that was no
deterrent: all I wanted was a chance to engage honestly with the international
community, and I was convinced that India could not fail. The events of May 11 and
13 had inevitably preceded my visit to the United States; they had also occupied the
international media's attention for some time (Ibid.).

The only way to address this was to talk selectively to some of them, not the'sound
bite' seekers, but those who wanted to examine India's perspective. George Perkovich,
the author of India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation, chatted with

74
me on the phone for several hours. Soon after the tests, Prime Minister Vajpayee
clearly stated that India would observe a unilateral moratorium on any further testing,
as well as that we were ready to talk about the CTBT. I did share with Perkovich, who
had specialised in this subject, that attempting to hustle India would be counter-
productive: 'We need to talk to the Americans first. We have concerns that must be
addressed, and the US appears to want us to sign first and speak afterwards... If you
point a gun at my head and say. "Sign on the dotted line!" makes things extremely
difficult. India has a long history of colonial dominance; we have only been free of it
for fifty years. Now, fifty years later, we are unwilling to accept another form of
colonialism. If you say, "First, I have to crawl - India has to crawl before we can talk
to you," that reminds us of Amritsar." (Ibid.: 291)

On June 12, 1998, I arrived in Washington, DC, anxious to formally begin a dialogue.
Ambassador Naresh Chandra met me at the airport, and protocol officers took me
away to downtown Washington. Ambassador Chandra then briefed me on the
atmosphere, the State Department's expectations, and the characters I would be
dealing with (Ibid.: 293-294).

I woke up very early on the morning of the 13th, as is my habit, and-" yet again I
watched life along the banks of the Potomac, early morning rowers already
practising. Later that morning I drove to the State Department with Ambassador
Chandra and Alok Prasad of the Ministry of External Affair We were ushered in with
the usual protocol and courtesy. With charming American informality Strobe then
invited me to make myself at home. We were very soon on first name terms I had
already been introduced to some others in the team, Inderfurth and Riedel and
Einhorn. Sandy Berger, the national security adviser, had also come in for a short
introduction (Ibid.: 294).

Strobe and I reached a conversational informality fairly quickly. I do 1 not have to

rely much on my diary notes of that period, for the recollections are still vivid. I soon
shared with Strobe that I was not there to negotiate, to either give or to ask for
anything. I was really there much more to engage in a dialogue'. 'We could," I said to

75
Strobe, either go back over the years and carry out a detailed analysis and a damage
audit of the past fifty years, the years that the rats ate away, those wasted years and
only thereafter, once we have satisfied ourselves about that "audit", only then come
to "dialoguing" about present-day events Alternatively. Without sacrificing our
separate fundamental and immutable national positions, we could try to harmonise
our positions so that the first need - a restoration of confidence - is met, even if only
partially. For this, I added, we would need to first reach an agreement on
confidentiality; we needed to combine openness and accountability with essential
confidentiality. Strobe agreed, adding that the US wanted to focus on three areas:
nonproliferation, India-Pakistan and related issues, and the rectangle of the US,
China, Pakistan, and India. This conversation, the first between Strobe and me, was
not planned in advance. It was more of a reciprocal study of thoughts, perspectives,
and attitudes towards the upcoming challenges. In summary, it was an evaluation of
the interlocutor's personality as well as the brief he was carrying. As a result, it
lacked an aggressive tone. Besides Strobe made clear early enough that the United
States was not set upon a course to 'punish anybody: "We are trying to limit what
[has] happened to South Asia... [the] tests though dangerous are not disastrous, but
what happens next might be disastrous. I responded by explaining India's stand,
briefly. and that India considered weaponisation more as a contingency than as an
immutable necessity: 'It was not a question of arranging just a display What India
had demonstrated in May cannot be rolled back. And because it was not just a
display, I could not 'foreswear weaponisation either'. 'But I assure you, I told Strobe,
'we do not intend to reinvent the Cold War with all its archaic phraseology (Ibid:
295).

I then moved on to several worrisome aspects of American strategy, such as the fact
that the US continued to view India through the Cold War lens'. Bruce Riedel stepped
in to emphasise that the US had 'no intention of setting up China as an umpire'. I
replied that I was glad and added. India is evolving at an alarming rate. That is why
the rest of the world must come to recognise a transformed India. The phrase "way to
the village" eventually became a kind of shorthand, a code for the entire attempt. But
there was another view that I shared, one that was less diplomatic and more
militaristic in nature. 'If we have to work together, as plainly we must, we must also

76
learn to accommodate the other,' I said Strobe. It's similar to military companionship
in that if you have to share a tent [as one frequently does in the military], you have to
accept the other person's habits, ways, and even quirks. Strobe ended the day by
saying, 'You tremendously encourage [me] both by the high tone and high standards
that we have set for "finding the way to the village." There is only one way to
reestablish confidence, and that is via communication; only through discourse can
trust be restored. We know that India will not pursue certain areas. Let us therefore
proceed with urgency but not speed.' The meeting, which was supposed to last an
hour, lasted two and a half hours, with the majority of it being one-on-one. This
meeting provided the groundwork for future discussions. As I stood up to leave,
Strobe presented me with a book, inscribed affectionately and quite flatteringly. My
new acquaintance - at the highest level - and I arranged to meet again shortly (Ibid.:
296).

We have moved, Sir, Ambassador Chandra said,'much faster and much farther than
we thought we would.' I had no illusions that the problems were in any way over.
Alok Prasad warmly shook my hand and remarked how I had gone into this meeting,
as I did for all subsequent meetings, with not a single paper, file, or folder in my hand.
But, as I noted in my diary at the time, "this is the turning point, the exact opening
that I had sought to restore dialogue, trust, and confidence between India and the
United States of America" (Ibid.: 297)

When we convened there on July 9 and 10, 1998, the Beijing statement of Presidents
Clinton and Jiang hovered over the entire dialogue like a gigantic question mark. How
could the US possible seek to dictate terms to India first and then urge Jiang Zemin to
behave as a 'umpire' in South Asian affairs? Was this a policy statement that would
eventually become a presidential directive? Was this an attempt by the US
establishment to recompense the NDA government, notably Prime Minister Vajpayee
and his foreign policy and security team, for the May 11 and 13 tests? The Frankfurt
summit produced yet another byproduct. I'm not sure how that came up, but we did
relocate to Jammu and Kashmir (Ibid.).

77
Within ten days of Frankfurt, Strobe and I met in Delhi. This was a far more
substantial meeting. If Frankfurt had been impromptu, inspired more to prevent any
adverse fall-out from the Clinton-Jiang statement, Delhi was a planned, fully-
prepared effort by the Americans. Strobe's delegation came strengthened by the
presence of the vice-chairman of their joint chiefs of staff, General Joseph Ralston. It
was also after a long gap that a full American delegation was in Delhi. On this
occasion, Strobe for the first time spelt out in full his government's 'benchmarks', as
he termed them) (Ibid.: 304)

(I employed the facilities of Delhi's stately Hyderabad House for this round of the
debate, and here Strobe enunciated the benchmarks," explicitly expressing what the
US sought from India. If India can demonstrate'success' in this area to the
satisfaction of the US and the White House, then more sanctions relief may be
forthcoming. The US benchmarks stated that they expected India to join the CTBT
and that an appropriate announcement in this regard should be made during Prime
Minister Vajpayee's visit to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1998.
Also, India, working with the US and "fully cooperating" with it at the Conference on
Disarmament, should help negotiate a treaty prohibiting the creation of fissile
material for nuclear weapons. The third benchmark - an innovative phrase, if I recall
correctly, used for the first time - was dubbed "strategic restraint." This ostensibly
meant limiting the development of missiles and missile technology, but neither this
nor the rules of the Missile Technology Control Regime were ever mentioned. The
phraseology was clever diplomatese for a catch-all provision, but in truth, the US was
addressing its concern about India sliding into the intercontinental ballistic missile
capabilities category. And this, it reasoned, would directly infringe on American
security concerns. This'strategic restraint' was such a catch-all word that if ever given
- and as read by the US - it might and would seriously emasculate India's alternatives.
It would be the polar opposite of the'strategic autonomy' I had mentioned, and
which India had sought with the 11 and 13 May tests. Strobe's requests for export
curbs were unnecessary. 'India's export control record is significantly better than
that of several of the P-5,' I told him. The ultimate 'benchmark' was the resolution of
the Jammu and Kashmir problem (Ibid.: 305).

78
I tried to understand the underlying rationale of the US position on all of this, the
timing of their putting forward these proposals, the unspoken but implicit hint that
these benchmarks were a list of 'dos and don'ts' for India to follow as conditions for
improving relations with the US. These were to be the litmus tests for our
commitment to non-proliferation. This was obviously unacceptable. As I explained
my point of view, it became clear to the US team that it had possibly expected too
much too quickly, and that such an approach would overload the system. India had a
specific position on the CTBT, and we were going to move in that direction
consciously but at our own time. The prime minister had already announced that
India would not conduct any additional nuclear tests. This was a self-imposed pause,
akin to a moratorium. The government had proclaimed its 'no first-use' Joctrine,
allowing it to adopt a 'credible minimum deterrent' policy (Ibid.: 306).

I explained, emphasising that the Treaty has both security implications and high
political sensitivities. So, how could India agree to terms like'strategic restraint' or
relinquishing its own future and technical achievements for good? For this'restraint
sought was not simply on ballistic missile development; implicit in it was a capping of
India's nuclear capabilities, a rejection, in effect, even of a "credible minimum
deterrent," for who was to assess that needed "minimum credibility" but India? (Ibid.)

"India had objected to the inclusion of Article XIV in the CTBT on several grounds."
These included its approach to nuclear disarmament, its perception of a potential
threat posed by nuclear weapons, its strategic circumstances, and, most importantly,
the unanimous rejection by the Indian Parliament of what was viewed as an unequal,
hazardous, and coercive deal (Ibid.).

But we had advanced, both the United States and India. At the very least, we were
meeting and talking, which was more progress than we had previously made. This
provided the necessary reassurance that India was not out to destroy the rest of the
world, that we were willing to sit and reason, not necessarily to negotiate away our

79
national interests, but certainly to share our concerns and accommodate such global
concerns as we could. During his stay in Delhi, Strobe presented Prime Minister
Vajpayee with a letter from President Clinton. This is when he summoned the prime
minister and informed him of the progress made in the talks: There is now a deeper
understanding of each other's concerns, and methods towards addressing those
concerns are being considered. However, there is still work to be done. We decided to
hold another round of talks in Washington in the second half of August. The
discussion had now been defined, and the stage of generalities, mutual goodwill,
desire for closer relations, and other preliminaries had passed. Though there was more
mutual trust, the difficult part was translating that general sense into action. However,
we did not have to begin with the first letter of the alphabet(Ibid:307)..

On Sunday, 25 August 1998, I reached Washington for the fourth round. we were
joined, as Strobe had earlier mentioned to me, by National Security Advisor Sandy
Berger The next day, we had a formal meeting at the State Department, when we went
over everything we had discussed previously, and then I left for New York., we were
joined, as Strobe had earlier mentioned to me, by National Security Advisor Sandy
Berger The next day, we had a formal meeting at the State Department, when we went
over everything we had discussed previously, and then I left for New York (Ibid.:
308-309).

Strobe had stated on August 29 at the annual meeting of the Indian American Forum
for Political Education that any removal of sanctions ought to be linked to a positive
outcome of the discussions. But there was a radical shift in Senator Jesse Helms'
previous position as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. It's difficult to say
what caused it, but it's flattering to think that our meeting contributed to his change of
heart. That same senator had stated shortly after India's testing that he would "never
support a repeal of the Glenn Amendment " sanctions placed on non-nuclear weapon
states that detonate nuclear explosions provoked by the Indian nuclear tests in May
1998 under the 1994 Glenn Amendment (also known as the Nuclear Proliferation
Prevention Act, or NPPA). Under the Brownback II Amendment, the President has
the ability to waive sanctions for non-military actions(Ibid.:310-311).

These sanctions, which primarily apply to the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms
Export Control Act, include the cessation of US foreign aid (except for humanitarian

80
programmes and other special programmes covered by 'notwithstanding authority,
such as counter-narcotics) and military exports; the denial of new financing assistance
from the US Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC), and the US Trade Development Agency (TDA); and the United States'
opposition to l Under the authority afforded by Brownback Amendment II, the
president may waive Glenn Amendment sanctions relating to economic programmes.

sanctions on India unless they (India) relinquish all nuclear ambitions, modified his
former attitude and talked of supporting the easing of sanctions, and offered to help
put US-India relations back on track after my visit. The senator praised Delhi's
perceptions of security threats and its need to test nuclear weapons in order to gain the
necessary "strategic autonomy." I briefly saw Strobe on September 3rd at New York's
Kennedy Airport. We agreed to meet later in the month, the date being determined by
the ease of travel for both of us, and the location was left undetermined. Strobe
phoned me at the beginning of November and utilised our pretty lengthy talk to both
consult and tell me about various events (Ibid.: 311)

On 8 November, while welcoming the partial relaxation of the ban, Prime Minister
Vajpayee charged Washington with making a 'discriminatory decision when it singled
out Pakistan for IMF loans but excluded India. On behalf of the State Department,
Inderfurth rejected this charge, explaining the decision was a one-time emergency
plan because Pakistan's economy was on the brink. But before the partial removal of
the ban, there was another event of some significance - a speech by Strobe further
clarifying the American position. He told his audience at the Brookings in
Washington that his speech was a response to my contribution to a Foreign Affairs
issue. He said, "The tests in May have increased tensions, highlighted the
consequences of misunderstanding and miscalculation, and posed a serious
challenge to the viability of the global non-proliferation regime. That means we must
modify the focus of our diplomacy accordingly, even though our long-term objectives
and interests remain unchanged. 'First, we remain committed to the common
position of the P-5, G-8, and South Asia Task Force, notably including on the long-
term goal of universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We do not

81
and will not concede, even by implication, that India and Pakistan have established
themselves as nuclear-weapons states under the NPT. Unless and until they disavow
nuclear weapons and accept safeguards on all of their nuclear activities, they will
continue to forfeit the full recognition and benefits that accrue to NPT members in
good standing. (Ibid.: 312-313)

On the morning of November 17, I left Delhi for Rome. The subsequent round of
debates brought me down to reality. Strobe pushed the pace and tried to "stick to a
game plan based on a timeframe." There had previously been no deadlines or
timeframes for agreements or their execution. Strobe defined the 'Big Package
Approach'. 'He stated that the US will support India's approach, and that the US aims
and non-proliferation role had been subserved. This was based on the tone and
content of our connection, as well as your graciousness, understanding, and
intrinsically gentlemanly sense of fairplay, he continued. He highlighted that India
would not be forced, and that it was widely acknowledged in the US that India would
not do anything under duress. I added a disclaimer that we could not expect to make
significant progress every time we met, and that there would be times when we
would need to pause, take stock, and reassess the entire issue(Ibid.:313-314).

Strobe returned to India in January 1999, this time with a huge team. This was the
seventh round, in addition to the plenary and expert-level conversations, and there
were many limited meetings between Strobe, General Ralston, and I. We were glad to
give General Ralston the opportunity to undertake separate meetings with senior
military authorities on a variety of matters, including the restart of bilateral military
cooperation in specific areas. I believe that the constrained meetings I had with Strobe
were more open in approach and hence more productive. I show using a single
example based on my notes, so the words may not be exactly those used, but the
thoughts and contents are. We were addressing the broad strokes of the conversation
when Strobe, quite rightly, stated that he would not accept "cherry-picking and a
selectivity of approach, your accepting what you prefer now." "I'll save the rest for
later." "What does it matter, Strobe? All cherries must ripen and be picked, or they

82
will rot on the branch or, possibly, on the ground, some now, others later.""But there
needs to be a period within which we deliver, you and me," you say. "Yes, true, but
this timeframe is not of our making today, we are How can the 'frame' of it be the
same if we are the inheritors of our separate ends of it?" (Ibid.: 315-316)

There was a brief pause. Then I added, "It would be a great pity if we consigned the
future of India-US relations to permanent uncertainty by failing to align our vision."
"Besides, I am not playing any devious end-game of chess by engaging in the dubious
tactics of sitzfleisch . Also, do not push for limiting India's capabilities, as this binds
my country's future.""Jaswant, you continue to strive for a high level of sincerity and
always through generality," Strobe said after a while. The essence was communicated
in the joint statement released on January 31, 1999. 'Both delegations are pleased with
the conclusion of the negotiations. As with previous meetings, the two sides' security
viewpoints were further extended and defined, and proposals for harmonising these
perspectives were considered. The delegations believe progress has been made on
several of the topics under discussion and remain determined to making further
progress in the coming weeks.A work plan for the next steps in the US-India
discussion was agreed upon in this respect. Expert-level teams from the United States
and India will meet in March [1999] for follow-up negotiations on export controls.
The US and Indian delegations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva will try
to meet often to discuss the state of discussions on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
(FMCT) and the prospect of other treaties.An expressive Yiddish word, literally
translating 25 'flesh for sitting It refers to the ability to sit there, hour after hour, and
grind out the game It means not losing concentration, and most importantly, it means
making sound, well-judged plays on every hand (Ibid.:315)

Finally, Mr Talbott and Mr Singh will maintain close touch. While these interactions
continue, both sides will strive to establish a good environment for furthering their
connections. A ninth round of talks is planned for the middle of the year, with the
dates and location to be decided in consultation between the two capitals.The two
sides acknowledge that the duration of these negotiations is unique in US-Indian ties.
Both delegations believe that this is time well spent, setting the groundwork for a
new, broad-based partnership that has eluded the US and India in the past, but that
both are committed to accomplish in the future (Ibid: 316).
83
During his visit to Delhi, Strobe spoke at the India International Centre, stating that
the US and India "should be natural partners," but that "all too often in history,
circumstances and incompatibilities of perspective seemed to have kept us from being
so." This is a fact. In an interview with India Tey, Strobe emphasised the progress
made at the talks, saying, 'I will tell you that we have in this round made some real
though not conclusive progress on several of the issues. I think the remaining work to
be done could, with imagination and political will, be accomplished in a matter of
months.' He hinted that the remaining sanctions might be lifted soon, saying, 'We are
prepared to reacquaint ourselves.' (Ibid.:317)

The Kargil River Watershed

If there were any questions about the Simla Agreement's demise, they were dispelled
by the Kargil War in the spring and summer of 1999. General Musharraf, the Chief of
Army Staff, ordered the seizure of the heights in the Kargil sector across the Line of
Control in early spring 1999, in what appeared to be a superb tactical action.
Musharraf carried out a scheme that had been brewing in the drawers of Pakistan's
army headquarters for some time. His forefathers were doubtful about its success.
Pakistan's decision to follow a course of action that had been deemed undesirable for
nearly two decades mirrored the new atmosphere in Islamabad. In Islamabad, there
was a notion that the licence to conduct unconventional warfare against India could be
expanded into a limited conventional conflict with a defined political goal. However,
Pakistan underestimated the strength of the Indian military response and the type of
international reaction that would isolate Pakistan in its conflict with India. Pakistan
suffered a political calamity as a result. A number of arguments have been advanced
for Pakistan's miscalculation in Kargil. These included its dissatisfaction with India's
lack of seriousness in negotiating with Pakistan over Kashmir, as well as the
significance of avenging India's seizure of the Siachen glacier, which Pakistan saw as
a violation of the Simla Agreement. A RAND report summarised the major objective
of the Kargil initiative(Rajamohan 2003:188-189)

It must be acknowledged that Kargil was a limited purposes conflict in the sense that
at least one of Pakistan's objectives was to secure land, however insignificant. Of

84
course, its second goal, internationalising the fight, was just as important, if not more
important, than these limited territorial goals.... Pakistan appeared to anticipate that
the international community would engage in a timely and strategic manner once it
had secured its operational objectives early in the fight (Ibid.: 189).

The Indian decision to respond with full military force on its own side of the LoC, the
US's relentless pressure on Pakistan to unconditionally and unambiguously restore the
status quo ante, China's reluctance to back Pakistan in any meaningful way, and Saudi
Arabia's entreaties to back down clearly surprised Pakistan's decision makers. Despite
its failure in Kargil, Pakistan has failed to recognise that Kargil was either a defeat or
that Kargil-like operations are unacceptable and detrimental for subcontinental
stability. According to the RAND assessment on the Pakistani discussion about the
Kargil event (Ibid.)

Pakistan's lessons are more complicated. Even as the overall failure of the Kargil
operation dominates the consciousness of many Pakistani stakeholders, several
important constituencies continue to rationalise Kargil, even if only as an
afterthought, as some sort of victory--the brilliance of tactical planning, the
effectiveness of operational performance, the conflict as the progenitor of India's
political dialogue with the Kashmiris--the conflict as the progenitor of India's political
dialogue with the Kashmiris--the conflict as the progenitor of (Ibid.)

The most important benefit for India from Kargil was that the world community
would not tolerate any military attempt to change the territorial status quo in Jammu
and Kashmir. When India learned of Pakistan's seizure of the Kargil heights and
began mobilising for military operations, it had little hope of receiving international
backing. When the first indications of American support for India arrived, they had to
be conveyed through unusual channels, including the author, to both signal a sceptical
security establishment in New Delhi and convince the public of America's changed
attitude towards the Kashmir conflict." Throughout June 1999, the United States
compelled Pakistan to cease its aggression unconditionally (Ibid. 189-190).

The impact of America's intervention in bringing the Kargil conflict to a quick

conclusion differs among Indian analysts. The prevalent view is that emphasising
America's diplomatic role undermines the fact that the Indian Army was advancing by
the end of June and could have quickly evicted the aggression on its own. This line of

85
argument undervalues the diplomatic space that American support provided in
isolating Pakistan internationally and limiting the costs of the military operation
(Ibid.: 190).

The Kargil conflict also provided India with three important long-term strategic gains
in relation to Pakistan. The first was the success in turning the nuclear flashpoint
argument on its head and limiting the benefits that Pakistan gained from the
nuclearization of the subcontinent. Although the Kargil aggression represented a kind
of culmination of Pakistan's post- nuclear strategy towards Kashmir, the
Subrahmanyam Committee suggests that the nuclear factor did not play a role ((Ibid.).

Because India did not cross the LoC and reacted solely within its own territory, the
attempt to incite an escalation that could lead to nuclear war failed. Despite its best
efforts, Pakistan was unable to link its Kargil incident with a nuclear flashpoint,
though some foreign observers believe it was close((Ibid.)..

While nuclear blackmail was implicit in Pakistan's Kargil strategy, an unexpected

development was India's readiness to use international fears of a nuclear flashpoint to
its advantage((Ibid.:191)..

India did not cross the Line of Control as a matter of choice in its military operations
to vacate the Kargil aggression and won widespread international approbation for the
restraint it had demonstrated during the crisis as opposed to Pakistan's nuclear
adventurism. But approbation alone, the BJP-led government understood, was not
enough in quickly vacating the aggression in Kargil and limiting the costs of the war
on the eve of an impending national election. Vajpayee's advisers understood the
value of the American position on Kargil but wanted more-direct and unremitting
pressure from Washington on Pakistan to withdraw from across the Line of Control.
They demonstrated restraint but did not rule out crossing the LoC. Pointing to the
domestic pressures to do so and the costs of fighting with one hand tied behind its
back, India kept up the message that its restraint could not be taken for granted. By
mobilizing its armed forces into a high state of alert and concentrating its naval power
in the Arabian Sea, India signalled that it was fully prepared for a horizontal
escalation of the conflict((Ibid.: 191-192)..

86
On June 16, 1999, during a meeting with US National Security Adviser Sandy Berger
in Geneva, India's National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra conveyed an explicit
message from Vajpayee that his country's patience was running out and that, unless
the aggression was reversed within a few weeks, India's hand might be forced."
Mishra apparently handed over what was later described by the American media as a
"alarming letter," which made the Clinton administration confounded General
Anthony Zinni, the top commander of Central Command, was dispatched by
Washington to inform Pakistani authorities, particularly Musharraf, that the US
desired a speedy pullout from Kargil. Following Zinni's talks in Pakistan, India was
informed that Islamabad had received a'sharp, unambiguous, and direct' message from
the Pakistani army brass that the status quo ante on the Line of Control must be
restored; India also refused to accept Pakistani demands for a linkage with a Kashmir
dialogue(Ibid.: 192).

Second, while the subcontinent's nuclearization provided Pakistan with new strategic
options in the late 1980s, the international context appeared to shift in India's favour
by the end of the 1990s. Despite the US judgement that it should not reward
Pakistan's nuclear adventurism, the definitive American pressure on Pakistan to
withdraw from Kargil was taking place as part of a redrawing of the bounds of
international involvement in the subcontinent. The turnaround of India's and
Pakistan's economic fortunes was a crucial cause. Throughout the 1990s, India grew
at a consistent rate of 6%, a historic departure from its customary rate of 3.5%. During
the same time period, Pakistan abandoned its customary high growth path of 5 to 5.5
percent. During the 1990s, Pakistan's economy stalled at a growth rate of roughly 3%.
Coupled with a continuing high population growth rate (2.4%), Pakistan began to find
itself in an increasingly difficult economic scenario (Ibid.: 192-193).

For the first time, India could bring its attractiveness as an emerging market with
tremendous development potential to bear on great power relations. In the 1990s,
India's simultaneous strengthening of political relations with all major nations ended
the cold war environment in which Pakistan had a particular relationship with the

87
West, China, and the Islamic world. While India promised a prosperous economy,
Pakistan was increasingly perceived as a failed state split apart by sectarianism, the
emergence of extremist Islamic forces, and the failure of the political class as a whole.
This fundamental shift in foreign perceptions of India and Pakistan was the
foundation of India's successful Kargil diplomacy. "This enabled India to raise its own
weight in the diplomatic calculus of key international constituencies aligned with
Islamabad during the cold war" (Ibid.: 193)

The third gain for India from the Kargil crisis was somewhat counter-intuitive, and
some would question if it is a benefit at all. The much-feared international
intervention had indeed taken place in the Kargil crisis, and surprisingly not against
India but in its favour. Some would see the intervention of the United States as being
purely contingent on the circumstances of the Kargil conflict rather than a
fundamental shift in its position. Yet the Kargil crisis appears to have been partly
instrumental in moving the United States towards the notion that the Line of Control
could be the most reasonable basis for a final settlement of the dispute over Jammu
and Kashmir. While the US might not prescribe such a solution formally and would
argue that any solution must come out of a negotiating process between India and
Pakistan, India after Kargil could be more sanguine in its assessment that the
international community would do nothing to facilitate a forcible change in the
territorial status quo in Jammu and Kashmi (Ibid:193-194.)

The Kargil crisis resulted in India neutralising, if not reversing, Pakistan's significant
strategic advantages from the subcontinent's nuclearization. Pakistan's attempt to
change the territorial status quo in Jammu and Kashmir was repulsed. While the
international community pressed Pakistan to end its aggression in the Kargil sector,
there was no real pressure on Pakistan to abandon cross-border terrorism(Ibid. 194).

The Kargil debacle does not appear to have dimmed Pakistan's confidence that
violence, particularly low-intensity conflict, remains the best tactic for putting
pressure on India over Kashmir and other pressing issues" (Ibid.)

Pakistan considers its diplomatic and military options for settling the Kashmir issue to
be relatively limited. Given these restrictions, Pakistan feels that one of its few
remaining successful methods is to 'calibrate' the intensity of the insurgency in

88
Kashmir and maybe push India by the expansion of violence in other parts of India's
territory"" (Ibid.)

In its post-Kargil diplomacy, the US urged for moderation on both sides, a resumption
of Indo-Pakistani dialogue, and a ceasefire along the Line of Control, but it did not
specifically demand that Pakistan discontinue cross-border terrorism" (Ibid.).

I met with Strobe for the ninth time in London on the 18th and 19th of January 2000,
drained and mentally weary by the strain of the hijacking. The mood had shifted
beyond recognition. We were relating to one another in a completely different way
after Kargil and Kandahar. It was no longer antagonistic; it was far more frank and
trusting. And, as is often the case, a regrettable and unneeded misunderstanding
occurred in London, establishing the truism that if things are to go wrong, they must.
As General Musharraf objects to the term "coup," claiming that it was a "counter-
coup." (Singh 2006: 317)

As our final session came to a close, we retreated into a corner for a few moments to
piece together the wordings of a brief press statement Alok Prasad and Rakesh Sood
of the Indian Foreign Service had worked on non-paper' which they were eager to
bring to the notice of Inderfurth and Einhorn. This document proposed initiatives such
as lifting all remaining restrictions imposed by international financial institutions.
This received a very uncommon burn from Strobe after he was given this manuscript.
We left it at that and let the joint statement issued at the conclusion of the meetings
say it all: They [Strobe-Jaswant] discussed disarmament and non-proliferation
problems, with a special emphasis on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),
the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), Control over Exports of Sensitive
Products and Technologies, and Defence Posture. These four concerns have been a
source of contention between the two delegations (Ibid.: 318).

Both parties recognise the seriousness of these issues and the necessity for tangible
progress. The two parties also agreed that the goal of the negotiations is to establish
the groundwork for a broad-based, forward-looking engagement between the US and

89
India. They expressed hope that the President of the United States' upcoming visit to
India would provide an opportunity to greatly increase mutual understanding and
collaboration... To that purpose, the two parties decided to step up their interactions at
all levels in the coming months (Ibid.).

At this conference in London, India and the US decided to form a Joint Working
Group (WG) on Counter-Terrorism. The talks remained focused on security and
nuclear non-proliferation, but terrorism had been thrust to the forefront, particularly
after Kandahar. One of the goals of this JWG was to guarantee that the hijackers were
brought to justice, and this began in early.
(Ibid.:318-319)

It is a source of personal sorrow for me that this dedication to bringing them to

'justice early' endures, owing mostly to a shift in US priorities for the region.The
formation of this Group was not just the result of the hijacking. It was more of a
laying out of what we both recognised as a worldwide threat. The CTBT and other
components of non-proliferation remained, but what had acquired prominence were
the 1999 events between India and Pakistan. The BBC asked me what I thought was a
"proper environment for dialogue with Pakistan." I had little hesitation in saying that
Pakistan would have to abandon violence: a visible demonstration of giving
up/stopping all cross-border terrorism, which is currently promoted by the state of
Pakistan and its agents. I stated that the war being launched against India was not a
proxy war, but rather a hidden war. Strobe had been curious about the Kandahar
incident. The most I could say was that it was a "near impossible hijack to negotiate in
Kandahar because we didn't even have a toehold." I then provided my opinions
concerning the American role before, during, and after the hijacking, which Strobe
had been very supportive of. We also discussed President Clinton's intention to visit
India in London. Strobe told me that the visit had nothing to do with NPT
development."An interpretation, rather a controversy, that persists even now in some
quarters is that, during this dialogue with the US, India came close to signing the
CTBT,' and that I was the 'principal architect' of taking India towards this course. Of

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course, signing the CTBT had been a principal US requirement, but it was the US
Senate that had derailed this on 13 October 1999 (Ibid.: 319).

Clinton visits India

Indo-American relations were transformed when President Clinton visited India in
March 2000 This presidential visit contributed more to a total transformation of Indo-
American relations than possibly any other single event of recent times. During
Kargil, for the first time in the India-Pakistan context, the United States had come out
clearly on the side of facts. President Clinton's statement that United States will not
mediate to resolve the issue of Kashmir - 'Only you (Pakistan) and India can do that
through dialogue was a pleasantly novel experience for us. He had also clearly. stood
against violence propagated from across the border, dismissing the idea of a plebiscite
in Jammu and Kashmir. As he told an audience in Pakistan, where he touched down
for a few hours following his visit to India, This era does not reward people who
struggle to redraw borders in blood ... There is no military solution to Kashmir
International sympathy, support and intervention cannot be won by provoking a
bigger, bloodier conflict.' (Ibid.: 320)

The Indian economy had also begun to demonstrate its strength by this time, its
autarkic nature having been transformed by Prime Minister Vajpayee's policies of
opening up trade and investment. A very important contribution to the India-United
States relationship was then made by the enhanced role and visibility of the non-
resident Indian community and its numerous successes in America.Clinton arrived in
Delhi on March 19 with his daughter, Chelsea, and an entourage of 63 officials and
over a hundred media. President Clinton held an official chat with Prime Minister
Vajpayee following a ceremonial welcome at Rashtrapati Bhawan and a visit to the
Gandhi Memorial. The meeting lasted an hour and a half.Clinton was tough but not
aggressive on nonproliferation. Although he accepted India's "right to determine its
own security needs," he urged India to avoid an arms race or additional nuclear tests.
The Indian prime minister responded by assuring his guest that 'India's policy posed
no threat to the US, (and that] India was not interested in a war with Pakistan or an
arms race.' The talks ended with a ten-minute discussion between the two leaders,
without any aides. Later, they issued a joint 'vision' statement setting out their'resolve

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to create a closer and cumulatively new relationship between the two countries'
(Ibid.:320-321)

In his address to a joint sitting of both Houses of Parliament, the president urged India
and the United States to 'respectfully listen to each other'. Ironically, he was
conveying that which India had so often complained the United States never did!
Clinton accepted that India would not choose 'a course of action simply because
others wish it to do so. When he said 'you will believe what I say and understand
better that America very much wants you to succeed or that the United States wanted
'India to be strong, to be secure, to be united, to be a force for a safer, more
prosperous, more democratic world', he was saying that which Indian
parliamentarians believed in but still wanted to hear from an American president.
When he concluded his eloquent address with such memorable phrases, President
Clinton was met by an applause in Parliament, a response from my hard- headed
political compatriots, of all parties, as I, in my political career had not seen accorded
to any visiting head of state. This was Bill Clinton's own achievement, the response
was what an immeasurably generous India, I knew, would always give to a visitor
who approached it with understanding and a spirit of respect for its soul (Ibid.: 321).

Prime Minister Vajpayee was equally eloquent and engaging, and when he concluded,
most imaginatively and movingly, it was an appropriate response:

"Mr President, your visit marks the beginning of a new voyage in the new century by
two countries that have all the potential to become natural allies. We can do no better
than recall the stirring words of the great American poet Walt Whitman, who, noting
that a 'Passage to India' is always a 'Passage to more than India,' urged our two
peoples to: 'Sail forth, steer for the deep waters only, - Reckless O soul, exploring, I
with thee, and thou with me, For we are bound where no mariner has yet dared to go?'
Mr William Jefferson Clinton, I conclude by extending my best wishes to you and the
people of your great country, and I hope your visit to India will be memorable
(Ibid.:322).

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In a press statement, the prime minister put the new relationship in perspective,
calling it 'a durable, politically constructive and economically productive partnership
between the world's two largest democracies". 'President Clinton and I have just
signed a vision statement. The statement outlines the contours of and defines the
agenda of our partnership in the twenty-first century. We both agreed that our
commitment to the principles and practice of democracy constitutes the bedrock of
our relations and for our cooperative efforts internationally for peace, prosperity and
democratic freedom... We have also concluded agreements and understandings on the
establishment of very wide-ranging dialogue architecture.' On the issues Strobe and I
had struggled over, Prime Minister Vajpayee added, 'President Clinton and I had a
frank discussion on the issues of disarmament and non- proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. The dialogue which is in progress between our two countries on
these issues has enhanced mutual understanding of our respective concerns. I've
explained to President Clinton the reasons that compel us to maintain a minimum
nuclear deterrent. I have reiterated our firm commitment not to conduct further
nuclear explosive tests, not to engage in a nuclear arms race, and not to be the first to
use nuclear weapons against any country. Soon after Clinton had reached India, there
had been a terrorist attack in Jamm(Ibid.)

On this, the prime, Terrorists killed 35 Sikhs in the village of Chati-Singhpura in the
Anantnag region of Jammu and Kashmir on March 20, 2000.The minister stated, "The
brutal massacre of thirty-six Sikhs in Jammu and Kashmir is further evidence of the
ethnic cleansing that has been underway for a decade, and is part of a pattern that we
have seen previously." "We and the international community reject the notion that had
can be a part of any civilised country's foreign policy."(Ibid.: 323)

A number of agreements were signed, and of course there was that absolutely
obligatory visit to Agra Here Madeleine Albright and I signed an agreement, at her
request As she put it, she wanted to do so at that indescribably romantic and beautiful
place and wanted to be photographed with me, with the Taj behind us. As the
president's Gulfstream took off for Jaipur, clouds began to gather and it rained, as if in
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celebration The remaining part of Clinton's visit was unofficial, comprising, among
other things, a leisurely trip to the Ranthambore wildlife sanctuary. Even the tigers
obliged, sauntering on to the trail the president was being driven on. On Holi, for that
festival coincided with the visit, President Clinton was regaled by the inhabitants of a
Rajasthani village and covered in colour Thereafter Bombay followed, from where,
on 25 March he left for Pakistan He travelled in a decoy plane, guarding against any
threat from terrorists linked to Osama bin Laden In his five-hour stopover, he held
talks with President Musharraf and told him that he should return Pakistan to
democracy, forcefully stating that the United States had irrefutable evidence of
Pakistan's ISI Agency's involvement in supporting terrorist groups such as the
Haikatul-Ansar in Jammu and Kashmir Addressing the people of Pakistan over
television and radio, Clinton warned the endless. costly campaign in Kashmir only
sets Pakistan back [from] economic development [and] the American people don't
want to see tensions rise and suffering increase We want to be a force for peace, but
we cannot force peace [The] Lahore meeting is the right road to peace for Pakistan
and India and for the resolution of the problem in Kashmir These or such thoughts
India had never heard from the US leave alone its President (Ibid.).

On 21 March, President Clinton left for a day's visit to Dhaka, but without the
obligatory tuxedo, his valet had forgotten to put it on hoard Great anxiety seized
officials of the Ministry of External Affairs when it was learnt that an aircraft from
the flight squad was returning I was informed of this in hushed tones and even
advised to keep the prime minister informed ( Ibid.)

Following President Clinton's visit, Prime Minister Vajpayee returned to Washington

between September 13 and 17, 2000, and his speech to a joint session of both Houses
of Congress is worth repeating:
"Many of you here in Congress have recently acknowledged a stark fact: no region is
a greater source of terrorism than our neighbourhood; indeed, in our neighbourhood in
this, the twenty-first century - religious war has not just been fashioned into, but has
been proclaimed to be, an instrument of state policy.You and I both know that such
wickedness cannot succeed, but even if it does, it would cause immense agony, which
is why the United States and India have begun to increase their collaboration in
battling terrorism. We must redouble our efforts" (Ibid.:324)
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Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit was, for me personally, greatly satisfying. He was
then suffering acutely on account of a knee ailment. An operation had been
recommended but deferred only so that he could complete this mission. It was an act
of courage and stoicism, for he stood the entire pressure and demands of a state visit,
and given the weight of his years, with exemplary fortitude As President Clinton
himself put it, the visit was 'a great success, it rounds off our efforts to take a different
turn in our relationship, to deepen and broaden them. The theme that underlined
Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit was a 'further deepening and widening of Indo-US
relations, as between two equals' There was scarcely any discordant note. It was this
isit that laid the foundation of Indo-American military cooperation. The endeavour
that had begun with Pokhran II had borne fruition. On 17 September, President
Clinton and first lady Hillary Clinton hosted a state banquet at the White House (in a
huge tent set up in the South Lawn) in honour of the Indian prime minister. More than
700 guests from various backgrounds gathered. It was the Clinton administration's
grandest banquet ever. Strobe and I both realised at that point that the project we had
begun would not be completed. We had set out on our adventure in search of a "way
to that village." We had located the road, I was certain, but we didn't have enough
time to complete the trek and reach the village. That mission remained unfinished.

Elections were held in the United States, and the Democrats lost the presidency.
Except for George Schultz, secretary of state during the Reagan administration and an
elder statesman in the Republican hierarchy, I had not met anyone from the most
recent Republican governments (1980-92). I also met Condoleezza Rice in September
2000, at a lunch in San Francisco that Schultz kindly and thoughtfully organised for
me. The village beckoned from somewhere in the distance (Ibid.).

By the time President Bush met Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in
November 2001, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the
high aspirations created by Republican control of the White House had faded. When
the Bush Administration began its stay in 2001, it saw China looming large and
considered India as a potential alternative to balance China's developing strength in
Asia. During a May 2001 visit to India to discuss President Bush's new strategic

95
framework, which included the missile defence plan, the U.S. Richard Armitage,
Deputy Secretary of State, alluded at the new worldview. He spoke glowingly of
India's burgeoning economic might and its enormous political and moral clout in
global affairs. He implied that the US viewed India seriously as an emerging great
power. Armitage further intimated that the remaining economic sanctions (placed
after India conducted a series of nuclear tests in 1998) would be lifted within the
next few months by the Bush administration. For its part, New Delhi appeared
receptive, as if America, under Bush, was finally ready to react to India's desire to be
acknowledged as a big power(Rajamohan 2006: 11)

Armitage stated that when Americans thought about the subcontinent, Pakistan was
no longer at the top of their minds. The perception that Pakistan was a disintegrating
state that was no longer a threat to US strategic calculus fueled the new American
attitude. In an interview with the Indian press following his talks with Prime Minister
Vajpayee, Armitage stated that he was in Delhi to open a new chapter in relations
with India (ibid.: 12).
September 11, however, quickly moved India from new expectations about the
relationship with the US to a sense of déjà vu. Despite the fact that India offered full
cooperation in -the incipient war on terror, geography and Pakistan's deep familiarity
with the Taliban meant the Bush Administration preferred cooperation from
Islamabad. Having compelled Musharraf to choose its side against the Taliban, the
Bush Administration was quick to revise its earlier views on Pakistan by placing it at
the front and centre of the war on terror. From a mere military coup maker, Musharraf
was now the most loyal ally in the fight against terrorism. As Pakistan returned to the
centre of American affections, the Indian debate on the relationship with the United
States turned sour. For many, this was a return to the good old days of a zero sum
triangular game between India, the U.S. and Pakistan (ibid.).

The first meeting between Bush and Vajpayee was a critical test for Blackwill, as it
was for the now wary Vajpayee government: could a new agenda of strategic
cooperation be built between India and the US, amidst Washington's preoccupation
with the war on terror? Blackwill recognised that the nuclear issue was one of the

96
most divisive between India and the United States, and he and his special adviser
Ashley Tellis, an India-born American academic, were quick to recognise that any
transformation of Indo-US relations would have to first address the "Text of the India-
US Relationship." Joint Statement on the occasion of Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee's official working visit to Washington DC", November 9, 2001, available at
www.mea.gov.in USIS, Washington File (New Delhi), November 10, 2001 the
challenge of nuclear reconciliation with India; they also saw that demonstrating early
progress on bilateral nuclear cooperation was one way of keeping the focus on Indo-
US cooperation amidst the return of Pakistan to the centre stage after 9/11 (Ibid.: 13).

The story of how the United States transitioned from condemnation to active support
for international nuclear cooperation with India spans five years and the bold
conceptual departures it was willing to make. Ever since its first test in May 1974,
India has steadily moved into the nuclear doghouse, being denied access to an ever-
increasing range of nuclear and other high technologies (Ibid: 15-16) .

Despite the failure to conclude a nuclear understanding President Clinton chose to go

ahead with his visit to India March 2000 and begin the process of a political
rapprochement with New Delhi (Ibid.: 19-20)

In thinking about India and non-proliferation, the Clinton Administration used

metaphors such as a dog house and a club house. The US saw Jaswant Singh's interest
in taking India to the nuclear club house, or the recognition one way or another of
India's new standing as a state in possession of nuclear weapons. Talbott and his non-
proliferation advisers, particularly Robert Einhorn, refused to countenance any such
move on the part of the US (Ibid.:21).

As a different agenda-of bringing India into the nucle club house came into the Indo-
U.S. dialogue, the principal nuclear negotiators too changed. The elegance of Jaswant
Sing yielded place to the forbidding dourness of Brajesh Mishra on the Indian side.
As he gathered control of the foreign polic Mishra's tough talk and decisive action
would become a legend in Delhi's power corridors. Mishra's American interlocut

97
would no longer be a deputy secretary of state but the national security adviser
Condoleezza Rice. Unlike the perorations Jaswant and Strobe, as they called each
other, Rice and Mishr were both direct and focused on finding ways to build a ne
partnership, including in the areas of high technology cooperation. After the meeting
between Vajpayee and Bosh in November 2001, Mishra and Rice met separately to
take the new agenda forward. They kept meeting frequently and their interaction
produced what was known to the two bureaucracies as the "Rice Mishra process" that
focused on advancing the agenda on the so-called trinity issues-high technology trade,
civilian space and civilian nuclear cooperation. Vajpayee and Mishra were pleased
enough with the developments in Washington at the end of the visit to state that:

“My discussions with President Bush focused on our future perspectives on the India-
US partnership. President Bush was unequivocal in his Administration's commitment
to a comprehensive and all-around intensification of our bilateral relations across a
broad spectrum. The lifting of economic sanctions should facilitate high technology
transfers, cooperation in space and defence, and collaboration in civilian applications
of atomic energy” (Ibid.:22).

What seemed a cautious hint in the fact sheet issued by the American side on
November 9 by the two leaders on nuclear energy cooperation was now gaining
momentum under the Rice Mishra talks. But the new focus on expanding bilateral
cooperation was quickly dissipated in the new crisis that developed between India and
Pakistan after the attack on Parliament on December 13, 2001. As India embarked on
coercive diplomacy against Pakistan through a massive military mobilisation, the US.
was keen to defuse the crisis, which finally occurred in June 2002. India and the U.S.
picked up the threads of the nuclear conversation only in September 2002, when
Vajpayee was once again in New York. Indian media reports on the Bush-Vajpayee
talks said the Indian side expressed "quiet satisfaction" at the outcome and the
renewed emphasis on the prospects for cooperation in the areas of civilian nuclear
energy, space and high technology commerce." As action on the Rice- Mishra paper
unfolded, the two sides agreed in November 2002 to start a High Technology
Cooperation Group. The Rice-Mishra process had made its first tangible progress. 12
98
In December 2002, the United States handed along the Rice-Mishra paper, which
underlined advanced technology cooperation in exchange for India's measures on
strengthening export controls on its own sensitive technologies (Ibid: 22-23).

Mishra, on the other hand, demanded greater and faster action. During his
negotiations with Colin Powell in New Delhi in July 2002, Mishra proposed for the
first time that India provide considerable concessions if Washington was willing to
open up civilian nuclear energy cooperation, particularly in resuming fuel supply to
Tarapur. Mishra appears to have indicated that he would be willing to subject a
number of India's nuclear reactors to international safeguards. This strategy will
eventually become the foundation of Indo-US relations. Cooperation on nuclear
matters. Powell, however, was not ready to accept Mishra's offer in July 2002. During
his May 2003 visit to the United States, Mishra repeated his call for progress on
civilian nuclear cooperation. An increasingly irritated Mishra spoke out at the Council
on Foreign Relations in New York on the eve of his talks with Rice in Washington
(Ibid.: 24).

We have had disagreements on subjects such as our nuclear programmes, but a

prolonged bilateral discussion with an open exchange of views has resulted in a far
greater mutual understanding on these issues(Ibid.).

I have stated unequivocally that a trinity of concerns - high technology commerce,

civilian nuclear energy cooperation, and space collaboration - can propel the Indo-US
relationship forward. relationship to an all new level of collaboration. India has
continuously pursued responsible policies aimed at preventing the proliferation of
nuclear and missile technologies, as well as rigorous export control regimes for dual-
use technologies. The stark contrast with others in our immediate and extended
community is visible to everybody. We believe that our negotiations with our
American colleagues on this subject are on the correct track, and we hope that the
road to free high-tech commerce will soon be free of misunderstandings (Ibid.: 24).
99
We must follow the same approach for civilian nuclear cooperation and space
partnership. Again, I must state that the hurdles stem from Cold War thinking and are
not in line with our common interests. India has often said, and the international
community has agreed, that its nuclear and missile development programmes are fully
indigenous. We have not broken any of our bilateral or international commitments.
We will continue to limit the scope of these programmes to the bare minimum
essential for national security (IBID.).

When the rest of the world recognises this truth, it defies logic to put impediments in
the way of civilian applications of our nuclear programme and development initiatives
of our space programme. These are regions with enormous commercial potential for
American companies (as well as companies from other countries). (We have, of
course, committed to removing foreign involvement from all nuclear power
programmes. I am aware that some US regulations and laws are restrictive, but rules
and legislation may be revised to response to changing circumstancesLet me also
consider the nuclear energy issue from an environmental standpoint. If the massive
additional power required for India's ambitious development goals is generated using
fossil fuels, the resulting dramatic increase in carbon dioxide emissions might have
severe consequences for the global environment. This is the reasoning behind our
choice to increase the proportion of nuclear power in our energy output (Ibid.: 24-25)

This lengthy remark from Mishra is required to see the contours of the July 18, 2005
agreement about two years before it was implemented. This was the first time that the
whole spectrum of reasons in favour of a nuclear deal was presented, from the
emphasis on India's reputation as a responsible nuclear weapons state to the good
impact on global warming of modifying the nuclear rules in favour of New Delhi. It
further said that in exchange for civilian nuclear energy cooperation, India would
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place all reactors produced under partnership under international safeguards. Mishra,
of course, did not promise the separation of civil and military facilities, a decision
made by Manmohan Singh in July 2005. Mishra would be ready to call this choice
into doubt. Mishra, on the other hand, proposed for the first time in 2003 that the US
consider changing its non-proliferation laws to promote nuclear cooperation with
India.

The urgency of Mishra's focus on nuclear energy cooperation, however, had to await
the outcome of a new inter-agency procedure launched by the Bush Administration in
Washington. It was the first detailed assessment of India's nuclear capabilities and
their consequences for the US. Ashley Tellis, a special assistant to Blackwill in India,
would later call to some of the Bush's "revolutionary" tendencies. In its review, the
administration demonstrated. Tellis writes about three new findings reached in
Washington during Bush's tenure (Ibid.)

For starters, the administration knew that India would not give up its nuclear weapons
as long as other regional opponents retained equal capabilities. The fact that the
administration first viewed both of India's adversaries--Pakistan and China--with great
distrust only added to senior US officials' sympathy for New Delhi's plight. Second,
the administration had come to the conclusion that India's nuclear weapons did not
constitute a threat to U.S. security or the greater geopolitical interests of the United
States, and could, under certain situations, actually assist American strategic
objectives in Asia and beyond. The administration's opposition to nuclear arms
control treaties like as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material
Cut-off Treaty (both of which coincide with Indian interests on these subjects).
Together with its high expectation of a resumption of great-power conflict, the
administration's realist and neoconservative groups were able to take a more relaxed
view of New Delhi's increasing nuclear capabilities. Third, the administration
recognised that the range of technological resources associated with weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems that existed in India in both the public
and private sectors posed a far more serious threat to American safety-were these
resources to be leaked, whether intentionally or unintentionally, to hostile regimes or
non-state actors than New Delhi's ownership of various nuclear assets. These
perceptions, which became dominant in administration thinking about India after
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9/11, made tightening the Indian export control regime far more important from the
standpoint of increasing US security than relying on the Indian state to cap or roll
back its strategic programmes. Together, the three assumptions, which evolved over
time, provided the basis for a radical break with Clinton's approach to India's nuclear
capabilities. Weeks after Mishra's visit to Washington, the Bush Administration
would finally move to advise the Vajpayee government of its willingness to support
new nuclear and other high-tech cooperation (Ibid.).

The NSSP as a Stopover

The United States declared war on Iraq in September 2003. Deputy National Security
Adviser Steve Hadley landed in New Delhi on a chartered plane, accompanied by
Under Secretary of Commerce Kenneth Juster. Their visit was unexpected. The media
picked up on the trip and deduced that it was about nuclear and high-tech
collaboration, but they couldn't pin down the nature of the conversations, which were
well guarded secrets.' Hadley and Juster met Brajesh Mishra, the National Security
Adviser. According to private accounts of the meeting, Hadley read from a document
explaining the new American approach to high-tech cooperation with India.
Following months of debates on the Rice-Mishra paper and the Bush Administration's
own internal review of its nuclear policy towards India, Washington was finally
taking the first major move towards fulfilling its vow to explore nuclear and high-tech
collaboration with India. Hadley appears to have developed a set of ten strange
principles that would govern future American engagement with India, as well as a
staged implementation strategy. These were broad principles that governed the scope
and bounds of American nuclear and high-technology collaboration with India.
Cooperation in dual-use high technology trade and civilian space missions would
come first in the three-phase strategy, with nuclear energy coming last (Ibid.: 27-28).

The Hadley proposal was actually a response to specific ideas supporting high-tech
collaboration proposed by India a few months before. The Vajpayee government
handed up to the Bush Administration specific ideas on how the US may improve
collaboration in space, nuclear, and high technology fields in June 2003. These
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recommendations required adjustments to US dual use licencing legislation, policies,
and processes, which, if implemented, would have been a substantial step forward and
demonstrated the US commitment to working towards the transformation of bilateral
relations. These would be practical, intermediate goals that could be reached without
requiring changes to American legislation or international nuclear norms, and which
would be fully within the US Administration's capabilities to implement. These
principles became the foundation of what became known as the Indo-US relationship.
The following steps in strategic partnership (NSSP). The Hadley suggestions,
however, fell short of what India had requested, but Hadley added missile defence to
the menu, turning the trinity of nuclear, space, and high technology discussions into a
quad. (Ibid.)

The NSSP was to be a phased programme that would gradually eradicate the lingering
effects of punitive sanctions while opening the door to high-tech collaboration in key
technologies within the restrictions of US international obligations and domestic law.
Even so, it did not go as far as it could have, but the US side stated unequivocally that
the three phases would not be the end of the road. India's goal in moving forward with
this agenda was to remove non-proliferation-related constraints on India, some of
which remained reminiscent of post-1998 punitive measures, and advance full
cooperation through a strategy aimed at reaching the ultimate goal of unfettered
cooperation through a series of concrete intermediate steps. The goal for the US was
to persuade India to tighten export controls through appropriate legislative and
administrative measures, as well as to embrace international norms. Despite its many
shortcomings, the NSSP was about India and the US breaking free from their old
ways of thinking and establishing mutual trust on matters connected to high-tech
cooperation and non-proliferation (IBID.: 28-29).

The renewed emphasis on high-tech cooperation provided India with much-needed

relief from the two sides' unsuccessful negotiations on sending Indian soldiers to Iraq,
which the Bush Administration desperately desired. Following its quick military
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victory in Iraq in March 2003, the Bush Administration sought troops from friendly
countries, notably India, to serve in the country. The notion was first offered by the
United States. The concept was not rejected by the top echelon of the Indian
establishment, which initiated a serious debate on the matter with the Bush
Administration. Embassy in Delhi to senior Indian officials, the first reply was that it
might be a "bridge too far." A succession of high-level visits to Washington,
including those of Brajesh Mishra and L.K. Advani has raised the issue of India
participating to Iraq's stabilisation activities in June 2003. Defence officials from both
countries met in fast succession to discuss the logistics and cost consequences of
sending soldiers to Iraq (ibid.:29).

As the administration considered deploying soldiers to Iraq, a heated public

discussion in India emerged about the appropriateness of sending troops to Iraq.
While some saw potential benefits from such a move in terms of Indo-US relations,
others saw risks. Others, though, were vehemently opposed to the proposal, seeing it
as playing second fiddle to the United States in the delicate Middle East. In response
to Indian concerns about the necessity for some UN cover, the Bush Administration
included language in its new Iraq resolutions at the UN that the Indian establishment
could use to justify sending troops. Specific Indian Army units were rapidly identified
for deployment to Iraq, and other preparations for troop deployment were undertaken
in the event of a political decision. However, the military leadership did not appear to
be excited about an operation whose aims were either unclear or dangerous. The
Cabinet Committee on Security, which became the primary decision-making
instrument during the Vajpayee administration, was deeply split. L.K.Advani, Jaswant
Singh, and Yashwant Sinha, three prominent members of the CCS, appeared to be in
favour. However, Defence Minister George Fernandes was said to be strongly
opposed. In the end, it was Vajpayee's decision. He and National Security Adviser
Brajesh Mishra were plagued by second thoughts about deploying soldiers to Iraq and
placing them in danger. The Indian decision not to send soldiers, announced on July
14, 2003, profoundly saddened the Bush Administration. India said it gave the
American request "careful thought" and that "were there to be an explicit UN
mandate," India "could consider the deployment of our troops in Iraq." It was also

104
reported that India was willing to risk the displeasure of the US government in
arriving at the "no-troops" decision (Ibid.: 29-30).

After Hadley's visit to Delhi and before Vajpayee arrived in New York, a team of
high level officials led by Satish Chandra, the Deputy to the Indian National Security
Adviser, travelled to Washington to work out the details of the new framework for
high technology cooperation that India had sought for so long. Even as the Bush
Administration began the talks with India, there were murmurs of protest from the old
Clinton hands at the prospect of any change of the non- proliferation approach to
India. In an interview to this author, Strobe Talbott cautioned against too much
excitement in India. Talbott, who had conducted the nuclear talks with India in the
Clinton Administration, warned against any radical departures. "Continuity with the
approach of the Clinton Administration towards India is a sensible thing." Talbott
said. He suggested that "If India wants to be seen as part of the nuclear solution and
not the global nuclear problem, it must take strong and courageous steps on non-
proliferation and set an example for others," Mr. Talbott added. In other words, the
onus was on India to change the nuclear dynamic between the two states. Talbott's
emphasis on "going slow" reflected not merely the sentiments of the former Clinton
officials but also those of the non-proliferation bureaucracy which remained powerful
within the Bush Administration (IBID.: 31).

When Vajpayee and Bush met again in New York in September 2003, India was
relieved that Bush did not bring up embarrassing questions about Iraq, and the Indian
focus was on high technology cooperation. According to reports, Vajpayee was
typically silent, while Mishra and others nudged the conversation forward. In fact, it
was India which stepped back from finalising the NSSP in September 2003 in New
York. There was little public information on why India chose to let go of the
momentum just when a deal was in sight. Informed speculation had come up with a
number of reasons. One view was that Brajesh Mishra was not keen on an
announcement of the deal in New York. There were some concerns that a similar
arrangement would be tied up with Pakistan too, thanks to the new American
enthusiasm for General Musharraf. India was clearly not aware at that moment of the
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full American awareness of the A.Q. Khan scandal that was about to break in a few
months, in January 2004. The Bush Administration was in no mood to reward
Pakistan with a similar pact, without a full accounting of the activities of A.Q. Khan.
Another view was that the proposed agreement did not fully measure up to the Indian
expectations Mishra had set his heart on nuclear energy cooperation which was not
forthcoming in the Hadley plan. Mishra's critics however, said by delaying the
acceptance of the new framework for high technology cooperation, he gave space for
the nong proliferation bureaucracy in Washington to water down its content in the
following weeks. There was also the reality tha India's negative decision on Iraq had
undercut the political enthusiasm in Washington for big steps. In Delhi, too, the
growing political rivalry between Vajpayee and Advani probably fed into Mishra's
decision to postpone the agreement. Delhi was rife with speculation in mid-2003 that
the Prime Minister's Office was not amused by the American decision to lay out the
red carpet for Advani in Washington. They were not going to let the impression that
Advani had the last word on Iraq prevail in Washington, especially when Advani was
seen as trying to replace Vajpayee as Prime Minister (Ibid.: 32-33).

Despite the palpable sense of slowing in New York, the Bush Administration
continued to reaffirm its commitment to some form of high technology cooperation
with India. In an interview a few days after the Bush-Vajpaye meeting, U.S. Secretary
Colin Powell said the high technology agreement, now nicknamed "Glide Path," was
on track. "We've had a very productive set of discussions with the Indians over the
last almost two years now about these issues and how close we could get to satisfying
their interests without crossing our red lines", Powell said. And the glide path' was a
way of bringing this debate to a close", he added. This was the first time that the
broad contours of the emerging deal were publicly proclaimed by either side. Central
to it was the underlining of the "red lines" on non-proliferation that America had to
keep in mind when opening the door to high technology cooperation with India,
which naturally disappointed India (Ibid.: 33-34).

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The NSSP

Even before the agreement was finally announced in January 2004, enthusiasm on
both sides had virtually evaporated. In a set of similar but separate statements issued
by Bush and Vajpayee on January 13, 2004, the two sides announced the basic
framework of the agreement on high technology cooperation. The manner of
announcement itself-a joint statement issued from different places- suggested the
absence of special importance being attached to it. The name now changed from the
simple notion of a "glide path" to the ungainly, "Next Steps in Strategic Partnership"
or the NSSP. "Glide Path" apparently suggested, a lack of energy of its own. The
NSSP statement, issued separately by Bush and Vajpayee, claimed a shared interest in
combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery and that
the new steps they plan to take constituted a "important milestone" in transforming
their relationship. "India and the United States of America agree to expand
cooperation in three specific areas: civilian nuclear activities, civilian space
programmes, and high technology trade. In addition, we have agreed to broaden our
discussion on missile defence. Cooperation in these areas would strengthen our two
countries' commercial and friendship connections, as well as improve stability in Asia
and beyond," the statement stated (Ibid.: 34-35).

The statement especially underlined the element of reciprocity in the NSSP. On the
American part, the statement pointed to the Bush Administration's commitments to a
"expanded engagement on nuclear regulatory and safety issues and missile defence,
ways to enhance cooperation in peaceful uses of space technology, and steps to create
the appropriate environment for successful high technology commerce." India in turn
promised to step up its non-proliferation effort. "In order to combat the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, relevant laws, regulations and procedures will be
strengthened, and measures to increase bilateral and international cooperation in this
area will be employed." Limiting this overall reciprocal cooperation was the key
sentence which said, "These cooperative efforts will be undertaken in accordance with
our respective national laws and international obligations." This was a special
reference to the political premise that American cooperation with India on advanced
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technologies would have to be within the framework of the existing American laws.
This simple proposition was what might have limited the enthusiasm on the Indian
side. It clearly fell short of Mishra's exhortation a few months ago in the United States
that the U.S. should change its laws if necessary to allow civilian nuclear energy
cooperation with India. In any case there was not much of a nuclear energy
component in the NSSP, which was limited to regulatory and safety issues". In the
United States, senior administration officials briefed on the NSSP downplayed its
relevance and said that implementation could take years. (Ibid.: 35)

The introduction of the NSSP in India was met with much mistrust. In an editorial,
The Hindu highlighted every imaginable argument to the sale. The editorial argued
that "optimism was not warranted," and that nothing fundamental had changed in US
policy towards India. The cooperation will not be operational unless India develops its
legislative framework and enforcement mechanisms to prevent the "misuse" or re-
export of high-tech items. While the United States can and does impose sanctions on
Indian companies or entities that violate the terms of trade agreements in such items,
it wants India to bear the primary burden of policing this commerce." On the nuclear
front, the paper warned against "new pressures" on India's autonomous nuclear power
programme. If New Delhi wants to reap the benefits of the relationship, it may have to
make the difficult decision to open unguarded facilities. While noting that there are no
controversial elements in the proposed space cooperation, The Hindu stated, "One
advantage for India may be a general lowering of the price of key components for the
space programme as U.S. companies compete with their European counterparts as a
source of supply." The Indian Space Research Organisation, on the other hand, may
not want to disrupt the stable and fruitful relationship it has with European
companies." On missile defence, the paper warned of potential dangers. "This
proposal may have been tagged on to the partnership programme as a way of thanking
the Vajpayee government for the alacrity with which it greeted the Bush
administration's National Missile Defence venture." The start of the talks could have
an impact on the missile cooperation efforts that India is exploring with Israel and
Russia" (Ibid.:36-37)

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The paper summarised the risks, particularly in relation to potential Indian
participation in the new Proliferation Security Initiative, saying, "India will not gain
much from the new partnership if it gets entangled in procedures that will alienate it
from countries that are its, but might not be America's, friends." The Indian Express,
on the other hand, was much more optimistic, declaring that "While Washington is
unwilling to formally acknowledge India's nuclear weapon status, While the deal,
dubbed a "important milestone" by President Bush, opens the door to trade and
cooperation in areas previously considered taboo in US thinking, actual progress
would take some time to show benefits on the ground. However, it is crucial to
highlight that both parties have agreed to treat the situation seriously. Making
progress requires reciprocal steps" (Ibid.:37)

With India, however, plunging into an early call for elections for Vajpayee,
governmental follow-up on the NSSP had to be deferred; however, the problems with
the NSSP had begun even before it was announced. During the second half of 2003,
Delhi appeared to have made a conscious decision to slow down.Vajpayee's cautious
approach during this period had an ironic result: by the time Congress came to power,
Iraq had ceased to be a point of contention between the two governments, leaving
more room for Congress to focus on the NSSP. In terms of domestic politics, India's
nuclear diplomacy had come full circle. The Congress government led by Narasimha
Rao had completed all of the groundwork for nuclear tests by the mid-1990s (Ibid.:
38-39).

The surprising results of the elections saw the BJP being ousted from power and the
Congress being installed at the head of a large coalition that included a strong
contingent of left parties. Amidst the dramatic change in the power equations in
Delhi, there was widespread concern, and even consternation in Washington that the
departure of the BJP would have a huge negative impact on Indo-U.S. relations. The
establishment in Washington was deeply concerned that the elevation of Natwar
Singh as Foreign Minister, with all his presumed non-aligned and anti-imperialist
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baggage, would push New Delhi in an anti- American direction. The U.S. embassy in
Delhi began analysing a whole set of writings by Natwar Singh, who was a prolific
columnist when he was out of power, to make sense of where India's foreign policy
was now headed. The appointment of J.N. Dixit as the National Security Adviser,
however suggested that realists too were going to be in contention in defining the
foreign policy of the Congress government. The departure of the BJP. many from the
left liberal spectrum and foreign policy traditionalists in Delhi hoped would end the
much criticised tilt towards the United States during 1998-2004. Arguments that
improved relations with the U.S. were a result of structural changes in the
international system and were driven by national interests in both capitals had few
takers in either Washington or New Delhi. A little over a year later, the actions of the
Congress-led coalition would prove the structuralists right; that would not silence the
doubters in both capitals(Ibid.).

Conclusion

The fact is that a few things are clear. The first thing is that sanctions will not hinder
the process of engagement or incentives. In this manner, the escalation of tension
between the United States India is quite unlikely. Incentive will look good in the
presence of sanctions.

The second thing is that incentives do not make the sanctions very ineffective. The
sanctions that stay back do cause hardships.

Finally, the Indian government (1998-2004), a coalition government, was under

pressure for striking a strong nuclear bargain with the nuclear power states. Any
favorable and lasting outcome would bring more esteem to India in its status and
reliability. Therefore, all the facts indicate that India will join the international
community of nations by providing leadership on global disarmament while keeping
its nuclear capability at existential level. India, in this manner, will receive high
nuclear technology in return of its friendly policies and global services.

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 CHAPTER 4

STRATEGIC DIPLOMACY: INDIA AND US ON TERRORISM

Strategic diplomacy perform a very dynamic role in the foreign affairs of any
country. Therefore, strategic diplomacy is a very vital element in the relations
between the US and India. These two countries are two very significant and big
nations in the world. The US is a super power and India is a democracy with a
population of more than a billion people, with strong military force, and a dynamic
economy (Rubinoff 2006).

In this chapter, the contentious course of the US – India relations has been examined.
The US policy was highly diffused. It wished to befriend both Pakistan and India to
contain the communist influence of China. It wished to be close to various Muslim
countries with the help of Pakistan. The stance towards Pakistan became very friendly
when the USSR invaded Afghanistan in the year 1979.

Later on, the US did endorse the Indian policy of liberalizing business and trade in
1991. This attention became more focused when both India and Pakistan conducted
nuclear tests in 1998. In the meantime, the burgeoning influential and educated Indian
community in the US started becoming very prominent. It started highlighting Indian
progress with a considerable degree of success. The hostile involvement of Pakistan
in Indian affairs too was highlighted. The threat of terrorism is becoming more and
more insidious and dangerous. Many religious parties, political parties, religious sects,
and regional groups in some countries follow very rigid, exploitative, radical, and
regressive dogmas. These radical groups have their own dogmatic agenda, political
vision, and self-esteem as the uppermost thing in their ideology. They misguide and
indoctrinate their followers towards that agenda, and impel them for indulging in
terrorist attacks for furthering that agenda. Their followers are very brutal and
insensitive in carrying out terror attacks. They kill or seriously injure innocent and
defenseless people; even women and children. This threat of terrorism has become
more lethal with the advent of technology and fast communication methods. Apart
from such brutal norms of terrorism, this terrorism that was mostly confined to West
Asia. Later on, it started spreading to East Asia; to the region of India, Pakistan, and
Bangladesh in particular. This spread of the scourge of terrorism to the East Asian

111
region drew active attention and participation of the only super power in the world,
the US.

India and the US are among most noticeable and vibrant democracies in the world,
and they have been in constant dialogue with each other since long. Cooperation in
curbing terrorism is also an issue between them. Indian and US cooperation in
tackling terrorism took a new turn after the devastating “attack on the World Trade
Centre in New York on September 11, 2001. Around 3000 innocent and defenseless
persons died very sudden, brutal, and painful death. There were many more injuries in
this devastating terrorist attack. The US started reeling under shock and disbelief. The
entire world too felt shocked and despaired. The US Administration under the newly
elected President George W Bush became more concerned and active for tackling this
unprecedented devastation and to the ramifications of that unprecedented act of
terrorism (Kux 2001).

Backchannel diplomacy played a very significant role in the US India diplomatic

relations during a period of 1998 to 2004. Vajpayee was the Indian PM and Bill
Clinton was the US President. Indian Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh, met one key
aid of Clinton, Bruce Riedel, and he met the US envoy to India also for background
diplomacy under the instructions of Prime Minister Vajpayee. There was setback. The
US imposed sanctions after the 1998 Indian Nuclear Blast. Even then, President
Clinton continued dialogue with India. His Secretary of State visited India for some
backdoor talks and for making preparation of his visit to India in 2000. President
Clinton visited India in 2000. He was displeased with the Indian nuclear tests. The US
wanted India to sign the NPT and the CTBT, but India asserted its compulsion in the
presence of two very hostile nations in its neighborhood. The US did appreciate this
stance of India to some extent. Some sanctions were lifted, and President Clinton was
very vocal and forthright in forcing Pakistan to withdraw from Kargil area during the
Kargil War of 1999 (Chaudhaury 2013). President Bush succeeded President Clinton.
He was more personal for forging good relations with India. His National Security
Advisor considered India an emerging global power. She visited India in 2005 and
supervised the arrangement about the forthcoming visit of President Bush. India had
provided the US some military basis for war against terrorism. In lieu of it, some
more sanctions were lifted during the tenure of President Bush. However, in spite of
this, the US helped Pakistan militarily and financially. The US stated that the support

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of the US to Pakistan was not at the cost of its improving diplomatic and military
relations with India. The US wanted India to send Indian troops to Iraq war for
fighting along the US soldiers (Ibid.).

Mutual Efforts for Resolving the Impasse

Having undergone many travails and tribulations the US and India initiated some
negotiations for resolving the stalemate. There were many round of discussion amid
“the US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, and the Indian Foreign Minister,
Mr. Jaswant Singh.” These talks were held during the period when Mr. Jaswant Singh
was India’s foreign Minister from 1998 to 2002. Indian side was able to convince the
US regarding good intentions of India in the mater of the military use of nuclear
power of India. India expected that the US would persuade others too in this regard.
However, only limited progress could be made.

The US wanted that India must postpone its plan of producing weapon-grade fissile
material. India was not ready for such a commitment. Even then, India agreed to sign
“Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)” because therein it was agreed by the
Americans that that treaty would not cover any existing stock of weapon-grade fissile
material in India. The previously mentioned Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty was
signed by India also in 1993 along with many other countries in the office of the
United Nations. The treaty debarred the further production of two vital elements of
weapon-grade nuclear material. India also agreed to extend the dates related to the
planned test-firing of Agni I as well as it first firing of Agni II. India also agreed to
build some consensus in India for signing the CTBT. India further asked to lift some
sanctions imposed against India (Ibid.).

India carried the second nuclear test of its during May 1998. Some breach of friendly
relations involving the US and India was expected because of this nuclear test as the
US had become the only super power in the world prior to this nuclear blast. It
considered itself as the harbinger of world peace and harmony. It wished to monitor
the foreign affairs of the entire world as per its own interests. It did not want “any
proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world” After this explosion by India, not only
did the US protest against this, but the US also imposed economic sanctions against

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India. India started facing considerable problems, and the relations between two
significant democracies of the world became strained

However, with the passage of time, these economic sanctions were lifted. The US
lifted the economic sanctions which were imposed against India owing to the second
nuclear explosion. Apart from it, the US President Bill Clinton visited India in 2000.
Many agreements were signed during his visit to India. Mutual relations started
looking up.

A few factors were instrumental towards fostering good foreign relations between the
US and India. These elements included President Clinton’s strident and solemn
warning to Pakistan to withdraw from Kargil. Pakistan invaded the Indian Territory in
Kargil in 1999. A fierce and prolonged battle took place. President Clinton personally
warned Pakistan government against such a brazen and cruel aggression, and
Pakistan, which was otherwise facing defeat, withdrew from Kargil.

Kargil conflict brought about significant shift in US policy, and it continued after
terrorist attack on Mumbai. US were fully aware that ISI and Pakistani terrorists were
involved in the attack. Both the countries collaborated and exchanged important
technological help with each other. It was an important continuation (Chari 2011).
The most significant change from Kargil was the demonstration that India was a
nuclear state and had gone to great length to widening the Kargil war and on the other
hand Mr. Clinton told to Mr. Nawaz Sharif that India is deploying its Nuclear
weapons for possible war. This raised India’s stature as a mature and stable
international player. (Raghavan 2011)

“President Clinton visited India in March 2000”. His trip was considerably fruitful for
engendering some positivity in the Indo-US dealings. One among many ingredients of
a few positive changes in these relations was the new economic and trade policies
adopted by India in the decade starting from 1990. In its budget, the government of
India made foreign trade easy and friendly. The US felt that it had good chances of
trading with a vast nation like India with a population of more than a billion people.
They found that the new economic policy was very liberal and business friendly
(Ibid.).

President Clinton openly supported India. US General Zinni was active during the
war, he met both Nawaz Sharif and general Mushraff. Nawaz Sharif visited China for

114
help but US told china not to intervene. Clinton called Pakistani act as an aggression.
Clinton was actively involved to solve the Kargil conflict. He pressurized Pakistan for
withdrawal of Pakistani troops (Chari 2011)

Another incident was a brutal armed attack by Pakistani sponsored terrorists on the
Indian Parliament in 2001. Still another incident in forging these close relations was
the terror attack on “the World Trade Centre of New York in September 2001”, also
known as 9/11 attack. In this, the dastardliest and deadly terror air-attack about 3000
people died and many thousand were injured. This devastating attack shook the US
and its policy towards terrorism underwent a sea change.

9/11 Terrorist attack brought up the US to reality of International terrorism. The

attack was planned in Pakistan, and money was provided from Pakistan. Indian
intelligence within the days of the attack confirmed the name and agents from
Pakistan who made it. If there were any doubt on US Policy makers of India’s, those
doubts that Pakistan is involved in terror was clear. Even before 9/11 India had
materialized in the global view as an immense authority, stable democracy and stable
government. This led to a major shift in US Policy in favour of India, and on the other
hand US had no doubt that Pakistan has the source of international terrorism but its
policy did not change because of dependency due to Afghanistan (Raghavan 2011).

One more factor in the improvement of relations was exemplary and stellar work of
Indian technical and computer professionals in the US A trailblazing digital
revolution was ushered by them, and that kind of technology could facilitate trading
and commerce. During the visit of President Clinton, “the Federation of Indian
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI)” organized a meeting in Mumbai
wherein President Clinton was the Chief Guest. He was already aware of and
delighted about the technical advancement and exemplary knowledge of Indian
technical professionals in India and in the US The President remarked very cheerfully
in that meeting, “It will be difficult to imagine the world that I would like to leave for
my children without a deeper and better partnership with India” (Dubey 2015).

One factor that was not left untouched during President Clinton’s visit was that the
US was concerned about some other matters. These matters were India’s nuclear
ambitions, the WTO, and the Kashmir impasse. President Clinton addressed the
Indian Parliament. He asked the citizens from India to think about some adverse

115
consequences of the Indian nuclear explosion in Pokhran II. His assertion was that
acquiring nuclear weapons was something regressive as per the new world order. He
also stated that India should consider all the matters related to the WTO. These
matters related to trade in one side and labour and environmental standard in another.
He wanted a favourable link between the previously mentioned two. His assertion was
“those who believe that trade should contribute not just to wealth but also to fairness
in societies were speaking for a large part of society” (Ibid.: 93).

Before the 9/11 attack, the main American attention was on terror activities in West
Asia. However, the attack of 9/11 changed this notion of terrorism of the US
considerably. It shifted to East Asia where India position was significant. The
Americans realized some significance of the Indo-US friendship from a new
perspective. It is true that through the Presidency of President Clinton these mutual
relations underwent many favorable changes. During one combined press release at
the time of “President Clinton’s visit”, it was stated that both countries will work
more closely during the twenty-first century for endorsing international peace and
stability throughout the world. A proper framework of official level talks and meeting
was prepared for better economic and foreign policy related ties (Ibid.).

India's speedily censured of the terrorist attacks of 11 September on the USA, and
India offered support in catching its culprits. This was appreciated by the United
States and contributed towards engendering the impetus for creating a global alliance
for fighting terrorism (Ministry of External Relations 2002).

Specific assistance by India comprised intelligence distribution, help in the studies of

11 September against the US and logistical backing for “Operation Enduring Freedom
in Afghanistan in the shape of over-flight durance, refuelling services, berthing
services, medical help and search and salvage processes. The said services were
extended to other alliance partners also who were taking part in Operation Enduring
Freedom “(Ibid: 67). The United States recognized that the war against terrorism also
includes terrorism affecting India, including in Jammu & Kashmir. India-US
cooperation also stretched to the measures to accomplish a political settlement in
Afghanistan (Ibid.).

Unison of the US and the Indian Military

116
There exists extensive cooperation amid the US army as well as the Indian army all
through the tenure of the NDA government. A “defense policy group” was
established. Joint military exercises were conducted. The level of joint exercise was
agreed to be raised to “joint rescue and support mission for tackling terrorism in sea,
piracy, and smuggling of arms and drugs.” Also “Joint Steering Group” of army, air
force, and navy held numerous meeting during this time of the NDA government. The
last air force exercise of the two nations was held in 2004. A conference was held in
Bangalore from June21 to 25 in 2004 for Space Science, Applications and Commerce.
Thus, this chapter will examine how Indo-US improved with such interactions.

Sachar (2003) examines how the conducting of military exercises in unison by two
countries can help in military diplomacy and how it can be good for close ties of one
nation with another nation because such military exercises also address common
security concerns. The potential of military exercises is an indicator for all countries
for undertaking military exercises. He examines the manner in which India undertakes
military exercises along some added countries, and with the US in particular. It also
examines the areas in which cooperation can be enhanced by undertaking joint
military exercises in consonance with foreign policy.

Positive Tidings Post 2000

During the presidency of President Clinton, there took place some positive turns
within the policy of the US regarding its foreign-relations strategy towards India;
particularly regarding US approach about the troublesome Kashmir feud. The US
started realizing that violence and insurgency by Pakistan was not the solution of this
crippling feud. The US administration pleaded for negotiations with the participation
of the people of Kashmir. President Clinton decried violence very categorically and
emphatically in his lectures and talks. With regard to the 1948 UN Resolution about
the Kashmir feud, he said that many numbers of alterations happened after that time.
These changes included the 1971 war and the creation of a new nation, to wit
Bangladesh. The US was fully aware of the fact that continued violence and terrorist
activities could lead to staggering and crippling war within this region, and the war
could destabilize the whole region (Dubey 2015).

The US wished to let this region be conflict free because the US now was the sole
reigning world power, and would get involved in solving any dispute or war. As the

117
sole superpower it obliviously has its commercial and political interests in every
region of the world. This happens to be the reason why America shows inclination to
mediate in this matter. However, India remains categorical that “the Kashmir issue” is
just a bilateral issue between Pakistan and India as per the Shimla Agreement, and
this agreement precludes any third party intervention. However, the helping hand by
others was acceptable if demanded, as was the matter in the Kargil War in 1999 amid
Pakistan and India.

A much more important element about President Clinton’s visit was the
institutionalizing of a number of committees with regard to high level talks and
agreements about “a range of issues including security, international economic issues,
trade, finance, science and technology, and environment.” One advantage of this step
of President Clinton was these institutes/bodies were further strengthened during the
regime of President Bush. They were further diversified also. They have now turned
into exceedingly vital part of progress amid relations of the US and India (Ibid.).

A number of meetings and foreign visits from both sides took place. Indian foreign
minister, Jaswant Singh, held fourteen conferences in the company and the team of
“the US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbolt.” These fruitful meetings were
followed by the US visit of L. K. Advani, the then Indian Home Minister. L. K.
Advani visited the headquarters of “the F.B.I. and the C.I.A” also, which was a very
significant omen about working in unison in the matters of internal and external
security. Defence Minister, George Fernandis, and “Prime Minister, Atal Bihari
Vajpayee,” too went to the US for discussion and agreement on matters of bilateral
interest and world peace (Ibid.).

The US administration duly reciprocated the Indian sentiments and concern about
good mutual relations. Quite a few American high-ranking officers visited India.
These officers included “the US Secretary of State, Collin Powell, the US Secretary of
Defence, Rumsfeld, the US Assistant Secretary of State of South Asia, Christina
Rocca, and the US Army Chief, Eric K. Shinseki”. The visit of the US Army Chief
was more significant as it happened to be first ever stopover by any US Army Chief to
India. Thus, these mutual visit clearly showed that the importance and significance of
the foreign relations amid the US and India had acquired considerable and useful
value (Ibid.).

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Jaswant Singh – Strobe Talbott Strategic Dialogues

“The Strategy of Engagement” became the refrain of the US Administration and not
the strategy of “isolation” in spite of the fact that nuclear sanctions were in place.
Many important meetings were held between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott. The
US tried to convince India about signing CTBT and NPT, but it was not possible for
India. Fourteen rounds of meetings were held between the two countries from 1998 to
2000 (Talbott 2004).

It was for the first time that the US was willing to pay heed to the Indian security
concerns. American National Security Strategy of 2000, made out a method for
coming Indo–US collaboration. The article averred, “America has commenced a
change in its two-sided connection with India. It is based on an opinion that the US
interests need a resilient connection with India. These two nations are two largest
democracies dedicated to political liberty sheltered by representative administration.
India has been making strides toward better commercial freedom also . The US has a
shared concern in the unrestricted movement of commerce, also by means of some
vital sea-lanes within the Indian Ocean. Lastly, both of us share concern for
countering and defeating terrorism and for engendering a tactically steady Asia.”
(Malik 2006).

In Jaswant’s Singh’s public reflections on the dialogue, in an conference Jaswant

Singh stated to the Indian Express in 2003, he recalled using the proverb “When I
met Strobe for the first time. It was at Mr. Strobe charming office within the State
Department.... This trip was directed by a logic of influence and self-importance that
India is not excessively deferential to all the nations, and India speaks as equals”
(Talbott 2004: 88).

Talbott noted regarding these dialogues:

“Thus, even at the beginning, we saw our destination differently. For
Jaswant, the village was a place where India and the United States
would put behind them not just the estrangement of the cold war but
our dispute over nuclear issues in the post-cold-war era as well. We
would get there, he believed, once the United States finally accepted
India as a major power with an internationally recognized right to bear
nuclear arms”

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 (Ibid).
The significance and impact of this dialogue has been noted in the annual report of the
Ministry of External Affairs. More negotiations took place with the US, and these
were connected with many matters of mutual interest. These negotiations were in
addition to the ongoing dialogue about security as well as nonproliferation related
matters. Matters connected with regional safety as the armed incursion by Pakistan in
India, the news of military takeover in Pakistan, the developing situations in
Afghanistan, and hazards of terrorism too were in the agenda of discussion of the US
Administration. The Administration of the US government initiated some steps for
enhancing collaboration in energy sector. With regard to the Seattle meeting of the W
T O Ministerial Meeting from November 28 to December, 3 in 1999, , there were
fruitful discussion. On the contrary, the Americans have been carrying on with a
number of unilateral restrictions. These restrictions were imposed under the domestic
rules of the US A in the aftermath of Indian nuclear tests in May,1998. India got
considerable help from the US Congress on a number of matters about India welfare.
After the conducting of the nuclear tests, India took a stand about engaging some
more intensive discourse with Americans . Shri Jaswant Singh, External Affairs
Minister as well as Mr. Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State were nominated as
the Representatives to carry forward this discussion. The dialogues are getting
discussed on the foundation of the inclusive suggestions that India has state views on
disarmament and nonproliferation issues , our one-sided moratorium on explosive
nuclear tests, readiness to deliberate on changing this moratorium into a de jure
responsibility, our proposition to enter into positive discussions on FMCT and
reiterating our rules of severe control on export of profound technologies. The
interchange is motivated to four matters.

These matters are: "The CTBT, the FMCT, Export Controls and Defence stance.”
Indian Export Control matter , following the Export Control level conference in New
Delhi from 9 - 10 November 1998, additional expert level conference was conducted
in New Delhi from 29 - 30 March 1999. There was a wide discussion of opinions
between July 1998 as well as January 1999. Subsequent to the termination of Lok
Sabha, the opinion was that the Government which undertakes the office after
General Elections in September-October 1999 would take a verdict on additional
discussions with the US on the said matters. The discussion was restarted in a meeting

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among Shri Jaswant Singh and Mr. Strobe Talbott during November 16-17, 1999. It
was held in London. The discussion has resulted in some headway in producing a
better comprehension of India’s security apprehensions by the American authorities.
The two nations have approved that the discussion is beneficial for increasing mutual
trust. Owing to the US appreciative approach and for the reason of creating broad-
based connections between India and America, the discussion ought to continue.
Subsequent to Pakistan’s armed intrusion in Kargil and throughout the Operation
Vijay propelled to expel the intruders, India kept the US along with our other key
panelists, up-to-date on the progresses and the landscape of the intrusion. America
took a outspoken position concerning Pakistan’s armed intrusion in Kargil . Later on
the US demanded withdrawal of the intruders. The US further made known its
appreciation of the controlled and answerable way in which India directed Operation
Vijay. India’s situation got support from the American Congress as well as the US
media. India and America got a chance to discuss views on matters of mutual
anxiety at the time of those meetings ; the ones Shri Jaswant Singh, External Affairs
Minister, had with Ms. Madeleine Albright, America’s Secretary of State, on the
sidelines of the ARF Conference in Singapore on 24th July 1999 .They discussed
these matters later on also during 24th September 1999 in New York. It was during
the opening session of the United Nations General Assembly. At the time of these
consultations, America repeated its longing for better dealings with India. India and
America have further been engaged in discussions on the unruly matter of terrorism.
As a part of the discussion on issues connected with terrorism, official level
discussions were conducted in Washington. They were held form September 2-3,
1999 which were followed by additional round of official level discussions in New
Delhi on 17th September 1999. The two Government have agreed to strengthen
collaboration in this area., Having being signed on 25th June 1997 in Washington, the
Indo-US Extradition Treaty became operative after the give-and-take of the
Instruments of Ratification . It was on 21st July 1999 in New Delhi. The Treaty
embodies a significant step in the law enforcement cooperation amid India and
America in the domain of counter-terrorism. As a portion of the process of consistent
discussions on bilateral, regional and global matters , Shri Brajesh Mishra, National
Security Advisor, went to America from 26-28 October 1999. The American Deputy
Trade Representative, Susan Esserman came to India from 1st to 3rd November
1999. She came her for dialogue on WTO connected matters, in the background of
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the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle. It was held form 28th November to 3rd
December 1999. The American Secretary of Energy, Mr. Bill Richardson, came to
New Delhi on 26th October 1999. At the time his stopover, the American Secretary
of Energy deliberated about collaboration in the domains of energy as well as
environment. The External Affairs Minister. Shri Jaswant Singh as well as the
American Energy Secretary furthermore signed a Joint Statement on Collaboration in
Energy as well as Related Environmental Aspects. General VP Malik, Chief of the
Army Staff, visited America from 8th to 17th November 1999 for taking part in “the
Conference of the Defence Chiefs of Asia-Pacific Countries in Honolulu.” It was
hosted by the American Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Command. Subsequent
to the nuclear tests in May 1998, America imposed a few restrictive actions against
India. Having become operative from 1st December 1998, the US had somewhat
removed a few of the said restrictions till 21st October 1999. In fractional exercise of
the new renunciation authority given by the Defence Authorization Act 2000, passed
by the US Congress in October 1999, the American Government once again set aside
a few economic sanctions with effect from 27th October 1999. Nonetheless, non-
basic humanitarian funding from many-sided financial organizations is still subject to
American restrictions. India considers these one-sided preventive actions as baseless
and counter-productive, which ought to be lifted totally . Many members of the US
Congress, together with “the Chairperson of the House International Relations
Committee. Mr. Benjamin Gilman,” has written to the American President to get rid
of restrictions on the US support for loans to India by the World Bank and other
global financial institutes. (Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report: 1999-2000:
67) There was substantial upsurge in bilateral discussion amid India and America
during the era of January to March 2000. The discussion on Nonproliferation,
Security and Disarmament, which was restarted in London in November 1999, was
more sustained from January 18-19, 2000. It was in London. In addition to the
security matters , the two sides also held widespread deliberations on counter-
terrorism, the hijacking of IC-814, regional changes and President Clinton’s visit to
India. At London, the two sides announced the creation of the IndoUS Joint Working
Group on Counter-terrorism to institutionalise their cooperation in combating all
forms of terrorism. The Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism held its first
meeting from February 7-8, 2000 in Washington D.C. The two countries agreed to
share their expertise, experience, resources and information in countering terrorism
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and also agreed to work together to bring the perpetrators of the hijacking of IC-814
to justice. The Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Command, Admiral Dennis
Blair, visited India from January 8-12, 2000. This follows the visit of COAS General
Malik to Washington and Honolulu in November 1999 and together represents the
first steps in revitalising Indo-US Defence contacts. The US Treasury Secretary,
Lawrence Summers, visited India from January 17-19, 2000. Issues relating to trade
and investment between the two countries, the unilateral US restrictions imposed after
the nuclear tests and the resumption of the dialogue process in WTO, following the
collapse of the Ministerial Conference in Seattle, were discussed with Treasury
Secretary. Several US Congressmen visited India in January 2000. These included
influential Congressmen such as Senator Tom Daschle, Senate Minority Leader;
Representative Sam Gejdenson, Ranking Democrat in the House International
Relations Committee; and, Senator Sam Brownback, Chairman of the Senate Sub
Committee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs”. (Ministry of External Affairs,
2000: 65-67).

The Indian Army Chief visited the US in 2000, and he was invited to the Pentagon
and the State Department. This indicated a fresh start of military cooperation.

The Republicans: “Strategic Partnership.”

The Bush Administration assumed charge in January 2001. It was a positive and
satisfying event for India. President Bush made a very positive statement about India
just in the beginning itself. He said that he wanted more trade and investment in India
as India was opening to the world. He wanted India to be a force for stability in Asia.
The US National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, stated in an article in the
“Foreign Affairs” that India and the US should join to create much needed balance in
Asia. (Greenstein 2003)

The Indian Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh, visited the US in 2001. He was in a
meeting with Condoleezza Rice. President Bush walked in “accidently” and
cheerfully. After this “accidental” barging in, President Bush discussed the matter of
security in Asia and many matters concerned with India for quite some time. He was
obviously very wisely concerned with the significance of the ties of these two great
nations. The US Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, also showed his keenness for
better relations with India when he met Jaswant Singh. (Ibid)

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President Bush Presidency voiced his commitment towards “qualitative alteration in
India-American dealing in appreciation of India's rank as an developing world power
as well as numerous shared Strategic interests which the two nations share in Asia
and outside” (Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report, 2004: 88). The said
opinion was repeated by President Bush. It was done in the President’s meeting with
the Indian Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee on 9 November 2001. Also , this
view of Mr. Bush was officially incorporated in President Bush's National Security
Strategy Document in September 2002. The speech of the Secretary of State, Mr.
Colin Powell's, on foreign policy on 5 September 2003 defined “India as a key global
power with whom America ought to deal for developing its relationship” (Ibid.).

India and America endured intensive engagement in 2003 across a complete range of
issues: “fighting global terrorism, peacekeeping defence, tactical matters, science as
well as technology, health, trade, space, energy and environment” (Ibid.).

In the year 2003, the utmost significant advancement in two-sided Cooperation

happened in the area of two-sided tactical discourse between India and America on
the "Quartet Issues" consisting of co-operation in civilian space programme, civilian
nuclear programme, trade in "dual use" high technology and missile defence (Ibid.).

The Ministry of Defense Annual Report, 2002-2003 stated that after the end of the
Cold War as well as in reaction to the changing global environment, Indo-US
dealings are experiencing a qualitative change. Collaboration and discussions have
increased and diversified noticeably. Both the nations have acknowledged that closer
Indo-American relations can be significant and a positive issue both for steadiness of
the area and in the world affairs. There took place some important development in
defence and security association amid India and America during last year. As part of
the improved bilateral meetings on these issues, there were a number of significant
bilateral visits and conferences in the background of cross-border terrorism carried
out by Pakistan, and in quest of a shared goals of building a tactical connection. For
accelerating the stride of Indo-US defence collaboration, the top level Defence Policy
Group (DPG) held meeting for a second time in May 2002 after its recommencement
in December 2001. Apart from the DPG, two-sided Executive Steering Groups of the
Army, Navy and Air Force, the Security Cooperation Group (to advance a defence
supply relationship) and the Joint Technical Group (to advance R & D collaboration

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in defence) have too been gathering or are programmed to meet. The two nations
have carried mutually helpful joint exercises in India and America in addition to
stepping up training exchanges. Those terrorist attacks in the United States on
September 11, 2001 and on the Parliament on December 13, 2001 have engendered
the deepening of Indo-American cooperation in fighting global terrorism. India has
been a prey to terrorism for a number of decades, much before the Western nations
experienced its lethal reality on September 11, 2001. The terrorist danger in Jammu
and Kashmir has its origins in Pakistan and is reinforced monetarily and materially by
the government and institutions of that nation . The Indian Armed Forces have taken
care of the menace of cross-border terrorism with a multi-pronged approach. This
approach includes psychological warfare, inventive military maneuvers and counter
intelligence devices.

These exertions have met with sound accomplishment. Even then, this is a lengthy
battle. India’s extended experience in confronting terrorism can be of appreciative
help to other nations that are facing alike challenges at present . For any terrorist
crusade to be controlled, the Government’s determination and the security forces’
determination are a must. India’s fight against terrorism has been a long as well as
laborious one. In addition to all this, the Indian Armed Forces are fully capable of
handling any problem.

After the end of the Cold War and in reply to the altering global environment,
Indo-American relations are experiencing a qualitative change . Collaboration and
discussions have broadened and diversified significantly. Both the nations have
acknowledged that closer Indo-American dealing would be an imperative and a
optimistic issue both for stability of the area and in the worldwide affairs. There
has been some noteworthy growth in defence and security liaison between India
and America in the last year. In addition to this, the enhanced two-sided
meetings on these subjects , there were many vital two-sided visits and summits in
the background of cross-border terrorism by Pakistan, and in quest for a shared
aim of founding a strategic companionship. For the purpose accelerating the pace
of Indo-American defence collaboration, the apex level Defence Policy Group
(DPG) held a meeting for a second time in May 2002 after its recommencement in
December 2001. In addition to the DPG, bilateral Executive Steering Groups of
the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Security Cooperation Group (to advance a

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defence supply association) and the Joint Technical Group (to advance R & D
collaboration in defence) too meet often or are earmarked to meet. The two
nations have carried mutually useful combined exercises in India as well as
America apart from the stepping up training exchanges. The terrorist attacks in the
United States on September 11, 2001 and on the Parliament on December 13, 2001
created a deepening of Indo-US collaboration in fighting global terrorism. India
has been a prey to terrorism for a number decades, much before the West
experienced its lethal reality on September 11, 2001. The terrorist threat in Jammu
and Kashmir has its origins in Pakistan and is reinforced financially and materially
by the government and institutions of that country. The Indian Armed Forces have
dealt with the problem of cross-border terrorism with a multi-pronged plan that
includes psychological warfare, innovative military tactics and counter intelligence
methods. These struggles have got reasonable accomplishment. However, it is a
prolonged battle. India’s extensive experience in confronting terrorism can be of
cherished help to other nations which are facing similar challenges now. For a
given terrorist crusade to be contained, the Government’s steadfastness and the
security forces’ resolve are a prerequisite. India’s combating against terrorism has
been a long combating and difficult one and the Indian Armed Forces are fully
competent to handle any problem that may arise in future. It is significant that a
given Country’s backing for any form of terrorism must stop completely. Terrorist
groups have long arms and international reach. The world, hence, has to fight a
joint battle through the process of combining resources for obliterating this curse
from the face of the earth India stays as a well-founded and regular exponent of
general and total disarmament and given the highest importance to worldwide
nuclear disarmament. India’s strategy on disarmament also duly considers
variations that have taken place in the world, particularly in the 1990s. The
nuclear tests of May 1998 do not weaken India’s promise to this long-held aim. As
a nuclear weapon State, India is even more aware of its accountability in this
connection and, as in the past, endures to take initiatives in quest of global nuclear
disarmament both individually and jointly. The steps that were proclaimed after the
tests, and the creativities that India has taken after that reinforce this commitment.
India’s nuclear weapons competence is destined only for self-defence and seeks
only to make sure that India’s safety, independence and integrity are not
endangered in the future. India is not fascinated by any nuclear arms race. This is
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the foundation behind the two pillars of India’s nuclear policy – minimum
deterrence and no-first use. The resolve of the outline of this deterrent, including
precise and refined delivery systems, is a sovereign duty. After finishing the series
of tests of May 1998, India proclaimed a voluntary moratorium on additional
underground nuclear test explosions. In proclaiming this moratorium, India
accepted the core duty of a test ban and also addressed the general demand of the
global community to foreswear testing. This moratorium endures, subject to the
ultimate national interests, a provision granted under the CTBT to every nation.
India has further announced its inclination to move in the direction of a de jure
formalization of this voluntary undertaking. The security setting has been
emphasized above. It plainly brings out four key rudiments that are fundamental
elements of our security planning. These are: (a) the Indian Armed Forces have a
two front obligation, which obliges them to protect the security of our borders
with Pakistan and with China; (b) India is not a member of any military grouping
or strategic grouping, nor is this consistent with our guidelines necessitating a
certain independent deterrent capability; (c) owing to external abetment, Indian
Armed Forces are engrossed in internal security jobs on a comparatively larger
gauge than is normal. It needs a force assembly that will be able to tackle it; and
(d) India’s wellbeing in the North Indian Ocean, including the security of our EEZ
and Island lands, pinpoint the necessity for a blue water Naval competence
proportionate with our responsibilities” (Ministry of Defense Annual Report, 2002-
2003).

Sweeping Changes in the US Policy: Post 9/11

The terror attack of 9/11 was the most devastating and shocking in the history of the
US India offered its unconditional support for tackling it. The US lifted almost all the
sanctions vide Presidential Directive No. 2001 – 28. On September 22, 2001, the US
President certified to the Congress that lifting sanctions against India and Pakistan
was in the national interest of the US In this process, India signed “the National
Missile Defense Programme” that was unveiled by the Bush Administration in 2001.
(Malik 2006)

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The US started military operations against global terrorism called “Operation
Enduring Freedom”. India was one of the few first nations that offered help to the US
Over-flight was allowed to the US Air Force aircrafts. The naval ships of the US were
escorted in the Straits of Malacca. The US naval could use Indian ports for rest and
refueling. This was a very significant assistance, and the US duly appreciated this
substantial, timely, and indispensable help from India. (Raja Mohan 2004)

These steps led to military-to-military cooperation. India and the US signed “the
General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)” in 2002. It had been
pending for long even after so many discussions. This agreement stated that the two
nations will protect any classified information/technology shared between them. Thus,
India got access to the US military establishments and to greater use of some dual-use
technologies. The US also cleared the export licenses of 20 weapons systems. (Ibid)

In the month of February of 2002, both countries agreed to revive the Malabar series
of joint naval exercises that were suspended after the India nuclear blast. Search and
Rescue Exercises were conducted for helping any distressed naval ship. An agreement
for the sale of twelve “Raytheon Systems AN/TPZ-37 (V) 3 Firefinder artillery-
locating Radar System” was signed for $146 million. A subsequent sale included GE
F404-GE-F-2J3 engines and advanced avionics for India’s indigenous LCA projects.
(Ibid)

The process of the above-mentioned military and naval exercises gave impetus to
further defense cooperation. In the month of November, 2002, A “High Technology
Cooperation Group (HTCG) was founded with two primary goals, namely facilitating
and promoting of high-technology, nano technology, and defense technology, and
secondly, confidence building measures for additional strategic trade. The second
element of this agreement was a catalyst for trade of sophisticated good and
technology when the discussion related to the matter WMD was in progress. (Malik
2006)

The 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre and some other places in the US
changed the US point of view about its foreign policy towards India. Now, the US
wanted to have friendly relations with India as well as Pakistan, but having good
relations with both was a tight ropewalk because of the visible and long drawn
hostility between these two nations. This was one instance of incompatibility in Indo–

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US foreign relations. Another incompatibility was the US condition that India should
condemn the nuclear programme of Iran. The US was linking this condemnation of
the Iranian actions by India with the supply of material for Indian energy plans and
programmes (Rubinoff 2006). The non-participation of the Indian Defense Forces in
the War in Iraq

The military relations between the two nations have been looking up speedily and
noticeably even since 2000. There have been bilateral exercises, seminars, personnel
exchanges, discussion of military technology related sales. Both the nations agree that
military relations of the highest level are needed for security in South Asia. The US
attention about giving a new and favorable dimension to this relation was duly
highlighted by Admiral Dennis Blair who stated, “We believe that a robust US – India
defense relationship, of a kind that is unprecedented in our bilateral history, can play
an important part in contributing to peace, security, and freedom in Asia. We will
develop our relationship with India on the basis of India’s emergence as a rising
global power.”

In a paper, “People, Progress and Partnership: The Transformation of Indo – US

Relations” the goals of the US – India defense ties have been described as stated in
the passage stated below:

“The aim of the burgeoning bilateral defense ties is to develop

capabilities and confidence, jointly confront multilateral security
issues, such as the protection of energy supplies and sea lanes, conduct
peacekeeping and combat terrorism….. Clearly, the development of
inter-operable procedures, communications, and the doctrines is only
possible through familiarization, understanding and confidence
building, focusing on areas of mutual interest and enhancing the
professional development of personnel.” (Rubinoff 2006:)
The Bush Administration does appreciate India rising stature in the region, and it
recognizes the worth of fostering good diplomatic and defense ties with India.

It is well known that good military relations constitute a very vital determinant of
good foreign relations. They in fact complement each other. Indian foreign relations
were not so friendly with the US during the era of the Cold War; and so was the case
of military relations with regard to the Afghan war.

However, military relations between them started looking up with the end of the Cold
War. Thereafter, the two countries thought of and planned to sustain the productive

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growth in their matters related to defense interactions and find out the ways of
resolving matters about their armies. It is true that the military relations between two
nations depend on their country – to – country relationships, but this has not been the
case with India and the US India enjoyed good foreign relations with the US, but the
military relations have not been in proportion to that. For that reason, the military
relations should be merged with the matter of overall country–to–country relationship.
(Gill 2006)

Military relations of the highest order are very vital between the US and India because
both are stable and exemplary democracies in the world, and are dedicated to the
concept of individual freedom and welfare of their citizens. The militaries in these
countries follow civilian rules and guidelines of the civilian government. They are
role model for the world at large. Military relations have improved considerably in the
recent past after the Cold War, but even then, a few pertinacious impediments do take
place if these nations take matters for granted. Hence, there is the necessity to
examine the existing state of military relations, the goal where they can reach in the
near future, and what might hamper the process of continuous evolution.

There has been considerable growth between the military relations of the two nations
after the end of the Cold War. This process of rapid reconciliation and new defense
agreement took pace with a number of defense proposal initiated by Lt. Gen Clade
Kicklighter, the Commander of the US Army Pacific, in 1991. His suggestions were
formalized by means of an agreement titled “Agreed Minute of Defense
Cooperation.” It was signed in the year 1995. The activities related to this agreement
covered Naval Exercises and the training of Special Forces also. These exercises were
conducted offshore. The navy-to-navy exercises between them were called “the
Malabar Series” and they covered almost every aspect of naval exercises including
submarines and maritime patrol aircrafts from both sides.

“The Executive Steering Groups (ESGs)” were established, and they were structural
for each defense service. Senior officers from each country headed each group of the
defense forces. In the year 1995 “Agreed Minutes” placed these ESGs under one more
defense agreement called “Defense Policy Group” co-chaired by senior officers of
defense and civilian administration. (Ibid.)

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Many defense related initiatives were initiated between 1994 and 1998. In addition to
it, many agreements of the middle level and high level officers were signed. However,
a deadlock took place when India exploded its nuclear device in May 1998.
Nevertheless, the terrorist attack of 9/11 changed the US vision of tackling terrorism,
and it lifted many sanctions against India based on the previously mentioned
guidelines of 1994 to 1998. (Tellis 2004)

Many defense activities were truly unprecedented including “Cooperative Cope

Thunder” held in the summer of 2004 when the first Indian combat aircraft landed on
any foreign soils in peacetime. It was preceded by the deployment of F 15 fighter-
bombers of the US in India. Both the countries wished to build on the achievement of
the past and chalk out the future program. In addition, for this purpose they signed
“Defense Framework” agreement during the visit of the then Indian Defense Minister,
Pranab Mukherjee, in June 2005. It was an update of the “Agreement Minute” of the
year 1995, and it provided the defense matter of the forthcoming times “an element of
the broader US – India strategic partnership.” (Ibid:11)

This development of military cooperation started extending to all areas of defense. It

acquired speed and consistency during the administration of President Bill Clinton,
and this pace accelerated further during the regime of the Bush Administration from
2001 onwards. A series of visits by high-level officers from both sides enhanced this
cooperation. The Bush presidency was tumultuous in many ways such as 9/11 attack,
Afghan War, Iraq War, and rift with Iran. It had some redeeming features too as the
US focus on India for peace and stability in Asia. India had started emerging as a
global power and the US began to recognize it and promote it. Next Step Strategic
Partnership (NSSP) was signed between India and the US in 2004 after so many
meetings and discussions from 2001 to 2003. President Bush took this landmark step
in 2004 despite some roadblocks and sanctions after Indian nuclear tests in 1974 and
1998. The US started reckoning these tests as India’s compulsion against two very
hostile neighbors. NSSP was signed as India was no more dependent solely on the
USSR, and it was signed also because of India’s ability to monitor the Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD) all over the world. After NSSP, the US started the supplies
of F-16 and F-18, and even entered into agreements of in-house production of their
products in India. India did not bother much about the US support to Pakistan as long
as the US took care of India’s safety needs (Tellis 2005).

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Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, visited India during this period of the
Bush Administration, and she said, “I think we can accelerate the relationship, take it
to another level.” The Indian Foreign Minister, Natwar Singh, and the Indian Defense
Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, too visited the US, and they reiterated the thoughts of the
US Secretary of State. Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, visited the US in 2005, and
he in consultation with President George W Bush initiated many bold space, civil
nuclear energy, and dual-technology agreements. The visit of President George W
Bush in 2006 further made these agreements and pacts more lasting and more
comprehensive.

It is clear from the previously mentioned defense agreements and the visits of so
many US officers that the US wishes that India should become a world power which
will work in unison with the US in every defense-related task. The US Secretary of
State, Condoleezza Rice, visited New Delhi in 2005, and she offered valuable military
hardware to India including the offer to sell F – 16 fighter bomber aircrafts. There
were some differences when the US supplied F – 16 aircrafts to Pakistan. Resentment
in India was obvious, but President George W. Bush personally telephoned the Indian
Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, and assured him of the Us cooperation in this
matter.

In this manner, both the sides were committed for the long haul. In one of the
Congressional testimony, for example, the Under Secretary, R Nicholas Burns,
highlighted that the US – India defense relations are very important in spite of many
other pressing concerns. This American view is there because the global system is
steadily shifting towards Asia, and India is a stable, democratic, dependable, and good
partner in defense relations.

As per the US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, improvement is significant,

but the scars of historical acrimony exist. Indians consider the US as fickle about the
supply of military hardware. They are troubled because of the US inclination towards
Pakistan in spite of the fact that it has a domineering army, which is a violator of
human rights. This army is the de facto ruler of Pakistan. Both these shortcoming of
Pakistan violate the essence of democracy of which the US is a benchmark. (Talbott
2004)

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The US even considers Pakistan a “major non-NATO ally.” The US treatment of
democratic India is inequitable with regard to the treatment extended to China.
However, change is taking place. It is being realized at both the ends that the US
should realize the value of Indian concern about the history of US approach, and
make amends. There is a need of writing a “new history.”

Another obstacle in these relations is with regard to a matter that an able US

commentator once called “India’s Strategic Environment.” This term means that India
looks far beyond its own borders. However, it should be realized that India has very
vital and worldwide trade and security matters; particularly about the matter of oil
supplies from a number of Asian nations.

Apart from it, India has a Muslim population of about 15 million people. Hence, India
is sensitive to various matters related to the Islamic world. India has good relations
with many West Asian nations, and in spite of this fact, it imports military hardware
from Israel. India has cultural and trade relations with many countries in South East
Asia. China looms large in India’s relations with a foreign country. The Chinese
Premier Wen Jiabao visited India in March 2005. A joint statement was issued for
highlighting the importance that both the nations attach to good neighborly relations.

Now, considering India’s involvement in the Security of West Asia, South East Asia,
and many other neighboring countries, it will be in the benefit of the US
Administration to forge good military ties and good strategic relations with India for
the sake of safety and security of this region. It will be good in the context of larger
relationship. It was demonstrated in 2002 naval escort programme between the US
and India. They can discuss the future role of Iran and the ways of dealing with it.
Also included in it are the areas of terrorism, counterterrorism, drug paddling, oil
supplies and money laundering.

In addition to it, the relations between India and Pakistan pose a special challenge to
the US. Many Indians believe that the US should think beyond this stalemate of India
and Pakistan, and deal with India separately. The supply of military hardware and F
16 bomber aircrafts in particular to Pakistan is very despairing and bothersome for
India.

It is believed that many Indians wish that the US should think of India also when it
arms Pakistan. However, the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice once observed,

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“We have tried very hard, as a matter of fact, to make the point that this is not a
hyphenated relationship, the India – Pakistan relationship; this is a relationship with
India.” (Gill 2006:125)

The Government of President George W. Bush, like the preceding government

considered India’s status as “a growing world power with which we have common
strategic interests.” Even then, it is clear that the US will not jettison Pakistan, nor it is
in the interest of India also. As the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh once
observed very aptly, “We recognize, I think, the circumstances in which the United
States has had to strengthen its relationship with Pakistan… but we do not feel that
that should be a barrier or a bar to development of our own relationship.” (Ibid)

It is, in this manner, very true that the stability and progress of Pakistan is a good
omen of strengthening democracy in Pakistan, and it good for the stability of the
entire region. A constructive dialogue between the US and India about Pakistan can
be a good step in setting Pakistan in a more hopeful trajectory.

Another topic of discussion and cooperation between both should China’s rise the
world stage. However, it should not be against China. Teresita Schaffer, an American
scholar, has aptly summed up by saying, “strong Indo – US relations do not imply
hostility towards China, and an effective US – China relationship does not suggest
animosity towards India.” The US should consider China when dealing with India,
and the Americans should realize that India wished to be treated at par with China
with regard to the matter of foreign relations.

China should be a useful discourse in the relations of the US and India instead of
being an impediment. As Teresita Schaffer (2002) observed that the good relations of
the US and India can engender “a virtuous cycle” in the United States – India – China
triangle by promoting China to play a productive role in South Asia.

Impediments related to Organization Matters

The hierarchies related to the implementations of defense matters form a kind of

hindrance in them. The responsibility India – Pakistan dealing is largely with the
Pacific Command of the U.S/Unified Command. Apart from the Pacific Command,
some responsibility is also there with Central Command. This pattern of Command-
related control, precludes active planning of Indian role in the Middle East or the

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Persian Gulf. Now, the Central Command is absorbed in dealing with military
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Therefore, taking care of the matters of India –
Pakistan is a bit cumbersome for it. The US is making concerted efforts for
centralizing the matter. It invited India to “the Near East – South Asia Centre for
Strategic Studies” and discussed comprehensive plans to tackle this problem.
However, much is still needed for extending the military cooperation beyond the
region of South Asia.

One more hurdle is the “Byzantine Bureaucracy” in the United States. The process of
dealing with Indian requirements is opaque and frustrating as far as the opinion of
Indians is concerned. India is dealt with the office dealing with Middle East also.
Apart from it, the United States officers pay much attention to Japan, China, North
Korea, and South Korea. This structure of the US bureaucracy pinpoints to
“routinized interaction” between the United States and India, and it also pinpoints to
the necessity of durable military – to – military institutions that can create good,
progressing, and lasting relations for the security and stability of Asia. (Gill 2006)

The United States too has some problems with regard to bureaucratic set up of India.
Indian Ministry of Defense and the Indian Armed Forces have a rather limited role in
the sprawling Indian Governing Central Government. India could never develop such
good military relations the United States as the later had with so many other countries.
India was engrossed in dealing with the USSR for military aid and training, and the
Indian bureaucracy did not pay much heed to the significance of the US military
might. There is some organizational asymmetry between the United States
Administration and the Indian Administration with regard to India’s having such
commands of military as the United States has for foreign military deals. These
organizational asymmetries should be taken care of in the due process of the current
progress in relation of military strategy. (Ibid)

The content of military – to – military relationship is not streamlined. India is surer of

the support and supplies from the Russian government. Apart from it, military
strategy in India generally means material, technology transfer, and hardware. One
more content of this relationship is that India sees a contrast in the uniformity of the
US defense policy when it supplies arms, military hardware, and technology for many
neighboring nations, and not to India, a stable and progressing democracy.

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The Americans consider military relations in a broader term not just hardware and
technology. They think of defense pacts, diplomatic dialogues, and exchanges. As one
of the officials of the Indian Defense Ministry said, “The United States offered us
everything we do not require, but they have denied whatever important weaponry we
requested.” (Ibid: 126)

However, the relationship is too strong and lasting to flounder on the previously
mentioned conceptions. The sale of Raytheon AN/TPQ -37 Fire finder Radar System
to India is one such positive step. “The political disconnect that hampered American
defense sales to India remain a thing of the past.” This was the statement of Robert
Blake, the Deputy Chief of Mission in India, in the US embassy. (Ibid)

For India, it is patience and reasonable expectations and for the United States, it is
flexibility and determination to move ahead expeditiously. The United States should
interpose fewer objections when the military hardware of the US-origin is transferred
to India by some third parties.

This old pattern is changing now. Condoleezza Rice, in March 2005, offered F – 16
fighter planes and F A – 18 Multi-role Fighters to add to the P – 3 Orion Maritime
Surveillance aircrafts already under consideration for sale to India. The June, 2005,
“Defense Framework” particularly incorporates such significant promise as two-way
defense trade, technology transfer and collaboration in co-production, research and
development that could lead to new levels of cooperation in military to military
interactions.

In the end, it ought to be taken into account that both the countries are democracies,
and they have to face challenging domestic environs. The US government tells us
about its needs to pay heed to the White House as well as the Capitol Hill, but it
should think of Indian compulsions back home while dealing with Pakistan.

The impending challenge for both the nations is to overcome the impediments stated
above. Some conceptual text has to be prepared about the plans. Guidelines have been
earmarked for cementing and enhancing these relations. This means a long-term
investment in resources and a steady and persistent policy follow up. These should be
supplemented by high-level talks and agreements. The US policy should have a clear
focus in South Asia with India in particular.

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Secondly, the interaction has to be as elaborate as possible between the US and Indian
civil and military establishments. Both these countries have colossal armies. Indian
army is almost double of the size of the US Army. These two armies and their
respective civil officers should act in unison as per the agreements and concepts stated
in the foregoing paragraph. A level of familiarity between the civil and military
administration of the two is very much needed for taking the matter further.

Thirdly, as per the concept of the “broadening guidelines”, the US ought to explore
new avenues of partnership. It should involve India in bilateral as well as multilateral
activities. A bit has been done in this direction in South Asia, but extending it to West
Asia too is in the mutual interest of both of them. New Delhi should tie up with the
US outside the United Nations umbrella.

Fourthly, as the relations of the two nations develop, they must manage those
expectations and not react in haste when one or another expectation is not met.
Exaggerated hopes can lead to exaggerated despair. Therefore, both the nations
should focus on the concept of their relations, be positive, and resolve the stalemates
in case there are a few of them.

Finally, they should take note of one thing that relations are a two-way process; a
process of mutual interaction. This means that the US must undertake and fulfill such
tasks as are high on the Indian agenda but not so high on the US agenda. It should be
undertaken in the interest of India even then because Indian survival could be at stake.
The US should plan and execute some small tasks with small investment that are
mutually beneficial.

The areas of military-to-military cooperation are numerous. Two nations are already
undertaking Malabar naval exercises. Other topics of the impending cooperation are
counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, peacekeeping, and disaster response. Strategic
dialogue is also there as an important domain for better relations. In addition to it, the
US cannot find a better partner outside the NATO in terms of size, capability, and
professionalism. Hence, better prospects are there in mutual defense and military
strategic cooperation. Both sides have different experiences in defense matters, and
their institutional cultures differ. Creating unison between them in such circumstances
will enrich both of them and bring stability in Asia.

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The US should discard some vexing clauses of supplying defense hardware and
technology by paying heed to the recommendations of many eminent American
scholars and experts. It should create a system and select it for military aid to India. It
should follow such bold and forthright promise of Condoleezza Rice about supplying
P – 3 Orions, C – 130 J transports, or F – 16/F A – 18 fighter bomber aircrafts. (Gill
2006)

There are many US Army training and educational institutes. They can be useful
avenues in developing and integrating military hardware and system development
domains. The matter of the arm supplies under consideration or training programs
planned for the Indian armed forces can follow its usual course. That notwithstanding,
the US should focus of the sale process of some military hardware for providing some
boost in the initial stages. There should be persistent follow up of the arm supplies
from some high-level American leadership so that the legitimate Indian concerns are
addressed for mutual and lasting defense and strategic relations

In the year 2003, the US and its allied forces attacked Iraq. It was expected by the US
that India would contribute in the adding its soldiers to the number of coalition forces
for fighting that war in Iraq. India declined to do so because there were discordant
views in India and there were other political and diplomatic constraints. The US did
feel disappointment, but there was no resentment or anger in the US because the Bush
Administration understood the political and diplomatic compulsions of India.

This non-participation in the US-led Iraq War by India proved that there could be
matters that run contrary to the interests of any of these two nations. Many domestic,
diplomatic, and geographical dimensions have to be taken care of by the government
of the day. Hence, understanding those constraints was very vital for friendly
relations.

One more significant progress in defense matters took place in January, 2002. “The
Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) was announced between the two nations.
Both the parties agreed to cooperate with respect to civil nuclear and space
technology. Apart from it, the matter of “triad” came under consideration. It meant the
“issues of civilian space technology, dual-use high technology trade, and dialogue on
missile defense.” High technology transfer started between the parties. (Malik
2006:102)

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One more agreement “the High Technology Trade Agreement” was signed on
September 2004. It dealt with the measure to be taken by India to take care of
proliferation concerns and to ensure compliance of the US Export Controls. This
agreement further outlined that the partnership should be consistent with domestic and
international laws. However, a few constraints did remain even after the NSSP
agreement. India did not get the status that was accorded to China. India did not get
admitted to the formal Nuclear Club. (Ibid)

India and the US anchored for intensive military cooperation in 2004 in the wake of
the Tsunami Disaster on December 26, 2004. The two nations in accord with Japan
and Australia responded to the situation quickly and demonstrated the worth of “the
multilateral disaster management” efforts. It showed that India was swift and capable
in disaster management. Both the nations worked in unison for humanitarian efforts in
the Indian Ocean for the first time, and it indicated that joint operations were possible
without much bureaucratic formalities. The possibilities of “cooperative security” was
possible in any humanitarian calamity as more than 40000 soldiers from the US,
India, and many other countries participated in this relief work. The US and India can
be the most prominent in this kind of a security measure for the betterment of
humanity. (Ibid.)

India’s Strategic Priority and Transformed Indo- US Relations

India’s first and foremost priority is to fulfill the corporal needs of over a billion
people so that the people have access to basic necessities like food, water, shelter, and
literacy. The other need is relations with foreign countries for trade and security. In
this domain, the US is a very significant ally. India has to balance its ties with the
only super power in accordance with the views of various wings of political parties in
India and take everyone into confidence before passing various Acts and before
signing any agreement.

India has to examine and observe the US relations with Pakistan also in particular.
Indian relations with the US varied considerably from time to time during the last fifty
years. But owing to India’s strong democratic set up, the end of the Cold War, and the
disintegration of the USSR, these relations have improved to a very great and
beneficial extent. They are the best in the period of the last fifty years.

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A report by the Chairman’s from the “Independent Task Force on South Asia”
(supported by a Council on Foreign Affairs as well as by the Asia Society) points out
that fifty years after gaining independence, India and Pakistan remain at odds. Given
both countries' de facto nuclear capabilities, their continued rivalry flirts with disaster.
Yet to date Indo-Pakistani nuclear competition has remained within limits, direct war
has been avoided for a very long time , and both nations have experienced
noteworthy commercial progress . American interests within South Asia region ,
though not very great , are significant and developing . The said interests consist of
averting major war and averting additional nuclear proliferation; increasing
economic progress, trade, as well as investment; endorsing vigorous democratic
organizations; and collaborating on matters ranging from augmenting steadiness
throughout the region of Asia for fighting terrorism as well as drug trafficking. The
finishing of the Cold War ought to allow a substantial development of two-sided
dealings amid Washington and both New Delhi as well as Islamabad, and between
the two major South Asian nation . However, capturing this opening will need more
resourceful thinking and adroit diplomacy than was the median. It is the time to
finish the comparative US neglect of these two nations and the fifth of humanity they
denote. Numerous explicit findings and certifications materialized out of the Task
Force discussion. On many issues — particularly the issues dealing with nuclear
proliferation, American arms sales, as well as Kashmir— there was substantial
discussion and difference. Readers are stimulated to weigh the complete justification
for the Task Force's deductions obtainable in the manuscript below, as well as the
supplementary and nonconforming opinions adduced by a few Task Force members
that are stated at the conclusion of the report. Together, although, the endorsements
of the Task Force establish a valiant new US tactic toward India as well as Pakistan,
the approach that could be strengthened by working in an analogous way with the
European as well as the Asian governments. For it to develop into the definite policy
of America , nevertheless, the government would have to make the South Asia a
foreign policy priority and be ready to spend considerable effort discussing amid
India, Pakistan, other nations in the area, as well as the Congress. We persuade the
second Clinton management for carrying out such an work along the lines defined
here. In the previous few years, the American policy headed for India as well as
Pakistan has laid stress primarily on discouraging as well as withdrawing the nuclear
weaponization within the subcontinent. Congressional activities have subordinated
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other features of both bilateral dealings to the nuclear issue, most particularly in the
case of Pakistan. The Clinton organization, like its precursors, has annoyed these
legislative fetters and required prolonged bilateral dealings and a more truthful
method to non-proliferation subjects. It has worked with various members of the
Congress to alleviate a few present-day sanctions. Still, it has not invested
considerable political capital in bringing congressional as well as executive policies
completely into line. In spite of the US non-proliferation efforts, both India as well as
Pakistan are now de facto nuclear weapons-capable nations. In addition to it, these
nations show no sign of changing their views and actions . This kind of approach
has initiated US sanctions. These sanctions in turn have restricted US bilateral
dealings with both the nations. This is something ill-fated. It is ill-fated for the reason
that the current situation calls for additional, rather than less, US engagement. For
augmented engagement to take place, however, there needs to be an acceptance
across both the executive and the legislative outfits of the US government that
retreating these nations’ de facto nuclear weapons status is now tremendously
improbable. Within the non-proliferation amphitheatre, the American policy ought to
focus instead on founding a more steady and maintainable plateau for Indian as well
as Pakistani nuclear affairs. It will include focusing on encouraging both the
nations to abstain from testing nuclear weapons , arraying nuclear weapons, as well
as exporting nuclear weapon- or missile-related material, technology, or know-how.
America ought to further urge both nations to abstain from missile placements and
stop unsafeguarded production of fissile material. America should meaningfully
enlarge its two-sided commercial, political, as well as military relations with India
and Pakistan at the same time. It is both likely and needed to delink the two bilateral
dealings and surpass the zero-sum crescendos that have frequently plagued the area
(and US policy) in the past. Time is suitable, in particular, for America to propose a
nearer tactical connexion with India as India possesses the potential to arise as a full-
fledged main power. The association will be based on common values and
organizations, commercial collaboration including improved trade and investment,
and the aim of regional stability within Asia. Constant with the said interests, the
Task Force endorses that America should assume a declaratory policy that recognises
India's increasing power and prominence; maintain high-level thoughtfulness along
with consistent mutual visits of various cabinet members and some senior officials;
loosen one-sided US restraints about the handover of dual-use technologies; enhance
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military-to-military collaboration; collaborate on essentials of India's civilian nuclear
power package and additional energy-related subjects; and start restricted
conventional arms sales. America should further take care of India's entry within the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and consult with India about
India’s interest in the membership in other regional organizations and global
institutions. Along with this , the United States ought to work to reinstate normal as
well as close working dealings with Pakistan. This ought to include giving credits
for trade as well as investment; collaborating on energy-related matters ; assisting in
debt reduction or forgiveness; and offering aid to upkeep social welfare, commercial
modernization, privatization, as well as the reform of tax, electoral, and development
mechanisms all of which will stimulate Pakistan's political as well as economic
steadiness. America should further maintain its links as well as networks of
communiqué to the military of Pakistani, both helping it in training and boosting it
to assist in the growth of a more firmly entrenched democratic political system.
“International Military Education and Training (IMET)” ought to be extended to
assist in keeping Pakistan's armed armies professional as well as connected with
the West. America should also be prepared to recommence restricted conventional
arms sales to Pakistan. Military equipment sales should not add to Pakistan's (or
India's) nuclear weapons programs or delivery competences, nor, in accord with
recognized American policy, should they be undertaken to alter the military balance
in the region. A few of these steps should go forward unreservedly, as these steps
encourage US interests irrespective of other conditions. In some areas, nevertheless,
the wish and ability of America to expand relations will clearly be affected by Indian
and Pakistani approach . In this manner, India's latest choice to obstruct progress on
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and disclosures of Pakistan's
continuing work (with Chinese help) on a plant to manufacture ballistic missiles, are
palpably uncooperative. Destabilizing steps by either nation would practically surely
limit the potentials for collaboration and might even result in the reinstatement of
discerning, preferably international sanctions. This kind of verdict in any form ,
however, should be made by the executive branch, after discussion with the Congress
and other governments and only if sanctions make sense in light of the full range of
the American national security interests.

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Rigid, scarcely focused legislative orders are in overall a poor way of solving the
complex glitches involved in making foreign policy. In the matter of nuclear
proliferation in the South Asian region, such constraints have accomplished uncertain
achievement at best while holding a diverse range of American interests hostage not
merely to one issue area but to specific needs in that domain that have been
overtaken by events. Unqualified sanctions that cannot be waived or adjusted by the
president deny policymakers the aptitude to design and perform a foreign policy that
could assist in stabilizing Indo-Pakistani nuclear rivalry and encourage other
American interests. However, there was divergence within the Task Force about
how much of the legislative outline currently constraining US policy toward India and
Pakistan needs to be changed for applying the Task Force's general endorsements
about non-proliferation policy and better bilateral dealings. Views fluctuated from
cancelling the legislation to upholding it as is. Most of the Task Force, however,
merged around the decision of expanding relations as much as conceivable within the
current legislative structure while concurrently working to adjust pertinent legislation
as necessary in order to support the full range of initiatives defined below. Kashmir is
a main, but not the only, reason of tensions amid India and Pakistan. It is also a
thinking of their general state of hostility. If the Kashmir clash were decided
tomorrow, dealings between the two nations would still be slightly sour. Even then,
Kashmir stays a possible casus belli. Regrettably, there is no right or acceptable
solution to the conflict in sight. American . government does not have sufficient
leverage on this matter , and the time is not ripe for America to launch a major new
inventiveness. US interests in India and Pakistan are best served by dealing with
other governments on a step-by-step method toward a sequence of practical interim,
rather than final status or goals . An international contact group ought to pursue
mostly unobtrusive, multilateral diplomacy in this region , promoting unassertive
incremental steps to ease tensions, lessen friction amid the central characters, and re-
establish political normalcy within Kashmir. America should intensely take care of
the Indian and Pakistani in-house economic improvements, which themselves will be
the most significant issue in stimulating growth and progress in the area over the long
term. Since US-Indian economic dealings are expected to enlarge meaningfully in the
following years, potential fonts of economic abrasion should be touched whenever
possible by means of multilateral organizations like the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Almost half a century after independence, Indo-Pakistani dealings are less
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extensive than were those between the United States and the Soviet Union at the
height of the Cold War. The United States as well other interested governments and
organizations ought to inspire regular, sustained, and multi-layered contact between
India as well as Pakistan in a wide variety of domain comprising trade, energy and
resource growth, education, cultural exchanges, travel freedom, commercial projects,
telecommunications, and sports. Outsiders ought also to endorse informal regional
interactions, track diplomacy, and regularization of connection at every official level.
Distinct divisions connected with the South Asia region ought to be created in major
US agencies, with upright interdivision task forces used to address the region's
connections to other parts. Bureaucratic preparations only, though, cannot substitute
for the growth of a larger body of capable and dedicated persons with the South Asian
expertise. Nor can they substitute for a basic judgment to accord the area a higher
priority in years to come; something the Task Force, based on its appraisal of US

interests, supports unanimously and unequivocally” (A New US Policy Toward

India and Pakistan, 1997).

A democratic India along political stability there and a ten-year long period of stable
economic growth carries the potential of a long- term political and security
association and significantly stretched trade as well as economic dealings with
America . Different from the time of the Cold War years, Indian and American
wellbeing largely match. A medium-term political trial is to fulfill the changeovers
from the past separation by means of positive activities on to an honest partnership.”
(Malik 2006:105)

It is clear now that the US has made categorical decisions about its policy towards
India that is reflected in the agreement of 2005. By means of this agreement, the US
agreed to supply advanced military equipment including allowing Lockheed Martin
and Boeings to sell F – 16s and F – 18s and to consider co-production of these
platforms in India. Secondly, a high level strategic dialogue of India’s energy security
issues is in progress. It includes nuclear safety cooperation and ways of integrating
India into the global nuclear regime for access to safeguarded nuclear fuel and related
collaboration as well as regional issues pertaining to security in and around south
Asia.

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The US is further interested in the economic growth of India. It will create new pocket
in its country for trading with India more and more. As per Ashley J Tellis, an
accomplished specialist in Asian Strategic Issues at the Carnegie Endowment in the
US:

“Washington (now) has clearly placed its biggest bet on New Delhi,
expecting that transformed bilateral relations would aid India in a
manner that would ultimately advance America’s own global interests
with respect to defeating terrorism, arresting further proliferation, and
preserving a stable balance of power in Asia over the long term.”
(Tellis 2004: 7-8)
It is true that the implementation of the proposed agreements and deals will depend on
the way the US executes them. China is very hostile to India. India must get US help
and guidance for countering its animosity with China because India – China collusion
against the US is not envisaged by anyone. In addition to it, China remains India’s
main rival and hostile neighbor.

Considering the differences in national and strategic interests of the two countries, it
is true that the Indo – US defense and military relations will remain “a strategic
partnership.” They will remain partners wherever there is convergence of views and
considerable domestic consensus in both the nations. The phrase “natural allies” is
very apt because there is stable and peaceful democracy in both the countries. They
are committed to political and economic freedom of all citizens in their countries.
Even then, this partnership cannot be open-ended as it is there with some European
countries. Such an expectation may cause disappointment. Indo- US relations will
depend on constructive dialogue between the governments and the approval of
various political and social organizations of both the countries. According to Ashley J
Tellis:

“Given its size, history, and ambitions, India will always march to the
beat of its own drummer….. a strong and independent India represents
a strategic asset, even when it remains only a partner and not a formal
ally…Consequently, transformed ties that enhance the prospect for
consistent ‘strategic coordinator’ between Washington and New Delhi
serve US interests just as well as any recognized alliance…(This) quest
for strategic independence, even as both seek closer bilateral ties, could
delay, divert, and at times dash the best plans laid out by foreign policy
strategists.” (Ibid:10)
Scope for future military relations

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The military relations between the two nations have been looking up speedily and
noticeably even since 2000. There have been bilateral exercises, seminars, personnel
exchanges, discussion of military technology related sales. Both the nations agree that
military relations of the highest level are needed for security in South Asia. The US
attention about giving a new and favorable dimension to this relation was duly
highlighted by Admiral Dennis Blair who stated, “We believe that a robust US – India
defense relationship, of a kind that is unprecedented in our bilateral history, can play
an important part in contributing to peace, security, and freedom in Asia. We will
develop our relationship with India on the basis of India’s emergence as a rising
global power” (Ibid.)

In the near future Indo – US defense deal will focus on restricted and special items
that are better than what Russia offers. It will be in the national interest of both to
waive the attendant regulations as soon as possible so that these restrictions do not
impede the progress in mutually and internationally beneficial defense cooperation as
well as in the matter of strategic partnership.

Interests and Benefits

As far as the US point on the said matters is concerned. The first thing is that the US
armed forces have much to gain from this cooperation of this deep and expanded
relationship. The second thing is that the US will be able to monitor its interest in
India and Asia in a better way. In some cases, military activities will be independent,
and will focus on the particular goal of one nation. In addition, in many other cases,
they will be related to the matter of mutual benefit and progress, i.e. missile defense
aspects of “The Next Steps in Strategic Partnership” initiative initiated by President
George W Bush and the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, in January,
2004. (Ibid)

At the regional level, military ties can help the United States in combating terrorism,
fostering regional stability, securing sea lines in the Indian ocean, limiting the spread
of the weapons of mass destruction, and controlling drug trade. The benefit of it was
visible in 2002 Joint Indo – US naval patrol in the Strait of Malabar and in tackling
Maoist insurgency in Nepal. Many of these steps are not measureable, but the effect
of them can be felt very clearly. Such military tie-ups can facilitate the matter of joint
operation in case of crippling and wholly unexpected natural disasters.

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A common civil goal can also be achieved with military-to-military cooperation as
happened in the case of Nepal crisis, but military support to that nation still is a matter
of some concern. Hence, civil and military matters do coincide in many cases. India
was helping the US army in the rebuilding and in the security of Afghanistan.
Counterterrorism and counter narcotics are other domains in which the armies can
work in unison. In this manner the US and India forces and military cooperation can
go a long way in accomplishing various objective related to the security of the two
nations and the world.

Many defense activities were truly unprecedented including “Cooperative Cope

Thunder” held in the summer of 2004 when the first Indian combat aircraft landed on
any foreign soils in peacetime. It was preceded by the deployment of F 15 fighter-
bombers of the US in India. Both the countries wished to build on the achievement of
the past and chalk out the future program. In addition, for this purpose they signed
“Defense Framework” agreement during the visit of the then Indian Defense Minister,
Pranab Mukherjee, in June 2005. It was an update of the “Agreement Minute” of the
year 1995, and it provided the defense matter of the forthcoming times “an element of
the broader US – India strategic partnership.” (Ibid:11)

India’s Role in Indo-US Cooperation After 9/11

India has itself been “a victim of terrorism” ever since the day of its independence.
Pakistan is the fountainhead of this terrorism. Indian government as per some good
leadership of “Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee” took notice about 9/11 attack,
and it offered the US its unconditional support for tackling terrorism. This ready
approval of support was partly driven by highlighting the harm being caused by the
Pakistan-supported terrorism in India, particularly with the active financial and
military support of the ISI (Inter Services Intelligence), a vital wing of the Pakistani
Army. India wanted to cast ISI in the “role of al Qaeda (the attackers of the World
Trade Centre)” and India as the victim. The Indian contention was to persuade
American government that the source related to terror-related activities was in
Pakistan (Ibid).

President Clinton’s Stance and Steps Favouring India in War Against Pak-
Sponsored Terror

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“The end of the Cold War increased the proximity of India and US” as is the norm
between democratic countries. A number of meetings took place after 1998 onwards
between “the US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott,” and the Foreign Minister
of India, Jaswant Singh. Strobe Talbott worked in the team of Secretaries of President
Clinton. These meetings were good omens for Indo-US cooperation in many matters
including the matter related to dangerous and speedy growth of terrorism. The
significant point to be noted about these meetings was that they were held after
nuclear blast at Pokhran by India. The relations between these two oldest and largest
democracies started looking up (the US being the oldest and India being the largest
(Bajpai and Matto 2000).

The watershed of these meetings and negotiations was the active and helpful stance of
the then President, President Clinton. Pakistani-sponsored terrorists and the Pakistani
Army attacked Indian Territory of Kargil in May. 1999. An intense war took place
from both sides. Many soldiers, terrorists, and civilians died in the ongoing war.
Situation started getting out of control, as both the fighting countries were nuclear-
power States. President Clinton is a very farsighted political leader. He categorically
and unequivocally warned Pakistan to withdraw from Kargil. His words and vision
carried meaning, weight, and power. The Pakistani forces had to withdraw
unceremoniously from that losing battle. That was the main example of the US
cooperation with India on terrorism. This association went further when President
Clinton visited India in 2000 on five-day very fruitful visit in which he looked very
concerned but cheerful about cooperation with India for better relations. He described
the aim of his visit as “strengthening the friendship that indeed is critical to the future
of the entire planet” (Minstry of External Affairs, 2001). The Indian Prime Minister,
Atal Bihari Vajpayee, also visited the US in the year 2000, and he held very useful
discussion with the authorities there (Kux 2001). It was the first time in the history of
Indo-US relations that the two countries had the state visits during the same year.

President George W. Bush & His Approach to Terrorism

President Bush assumed the office of the US President in January, 2001. He was quite
aware and concerned with the matter of terrorism that was being sponsored by
Pakistan through its Army and various religious sects. He carried forward the policy

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of rapprochement and friendship on the lines of the policy of President Clinton. So
much so that during his tenure President Bush, in the month of April, 2001, cheerfully
entered the venue of a meeting that was underway between the Indian team and the
“US National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice”. President Bush came prepared to
discuss some matters of mutual interest with the Indian team. Apart from such
meetings, the Indian government responded quite favourably when President Bush
initiated “the Nuclear Missile Defence Policy.” India did so despite resistance to this
policy from many other nations(Ibid).

During this period of the NDA government, a few advisors working with the
government of India advised Prime Minister Vajpayee that good relations with the US
will generate foreign investment, project India as a global power, and counterbalance
global forces that support Pakistan. As far as the US Administration of that time was
concerned, it respected India’s adherence to democracy despite so many handicaps of
vast population, religions, and regions. It further thought that India could be a good
strategic partner in case relations with China became unfriendly. Initially, the US
considered Pakistan as a member of its group, and it preferred Pakistan. Nevertheless,
“during the Presidency of George Bush”, the US separated Pakistan and India as two
separate and individual entities to be dealt with as per the “US interests in the region”
(Bruni 2002).

During the stated period, the effect as well as the concerns of the Cold War too abated
considerably. Indian dependence on Russia for military equipment and spare parts too
did not elicit much US concern. As far as Indian concern about the US predilection
towards Pakistan is concerned, the nuclear explosion by Pakistan in 1998 created
breach amidst the US-Pakistan relations. Pakistan exploded its nuclear devise in May
1998, and the “US imposed sanctions on Pakistan”. Pakistan’s nuclear test possessed
one spin off. The spin off was in the form of an indication that banning India from
nuclear tests could have been fruitless in the wake of a similar test by Pakistan.

The US Administration under President Bush understood the devastating effects of

terrorism after the 9/11 attack on the US After this tragedy, the Bush government’s
able and farsighted “Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwell”, averred, “War on
terrorism has transformed the US-India relations.” This term “transformed” may be
considered as an overstatement. However, it is true that after “this terrorist attack on

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the US in 2001”, the relations between the two countries came closer than they were
even during the very friendly Presidency of President John F. Kennedy. President
Kennedy visited India in March, 1962, and his administration helped Indian
considerably during India war with China when China invaded India on October 20,
1962(Banerjee and Gert 2003:11).

This “transformation” is most visible in the matters related to matters of security.

These matters about security were not very many for four decades prior to 2001. This
previously mentioned transformation came in the shape of the lifting of sanctions
imposed by the US in the wake of India’s Pokhran nuclear explosion. This beneficial
waiver of sanctions had some roots in the terror attack of September 11, 2001(Ibid).

The US took one more quiet but equally significant step in the favour of India. It was
the easing control of exporting to India “the dual-use technology”. This terms means a
technology which can be used both for military purposes as well as civil purposes.
Many persons who were the crusader of nuclear nonproliferation agenda protested
very vehemently about this new US stance in the favour of the government of India,
but the Bush Administration did not accede to the demands of those crusaders who
were campaigning against India (Ibid).

Thereafter, the likelihood of arms sales by the US to India also started being
discussed. This included the supply of “P-3 Naval Surveillance aircraft, sophisticated
counter-battery radars, and the General Electric engines for India’s Light Combat
Aircraft” This aircraft is a fighter plane that India has been developing for more than
thirty years. America also permitted Israel to install US technology in the radar that
Israel intends to install in Russian-made planes to offer India air surveillance and
early-warning abilities (Ibid).

Apart from the above-mentioned favourable developments in the Indo-US relations,

one more very significant step was in the direction of joint Indo-US military
exercises. The armies, naval forces, and air forces of both the countries agreed to hold
joint military exercise in all the above-mentioned spheres of military domain. It is
noteworthy that cooperation in the arena of joint naval exercises in moving with the
maximum speed. This reason of this development is that both the countries want to
keep Indian Ocean areas safe for trading goods and for transporting oil from Gulf and
African counties in particular. (Ibid).

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Shunning Diplomatic Pinpricks: The Effect of Cooperation on War against
Terrorism

“Terrorist attack on World Trade Centre” was a surprised and major shock after Pearl
Harbour incident for US. After 9/11 US adopted a long term strategy to curb
terrorism. US did not ask for any help from India, it was India which offered
unconditional support on the war against terrorism. Since India is a non-Muslim
country so there was a fear on US that if it accepts this offer there can be an alienation
from Muslim countries. The logistic and strategic importance of Pakistan was a major
factor for US to keep Pakistan with it to fight against Taliban in Afghanistan. (Chari
2011)

A positive dimension of the cooperation between America and India in war against
terrorism was that both the countries avoided public disapproval and criticism of
statements of one that were adverse to the interests of the other. For example,
President Bush included the name of Iran in the nations of what he called the “axis of
evil.” India did not choose to criticize this overwhelming and strident statement of
President Bush publicity in spite of the fact that India has very close relations with
Iran, diplomatically, commercially, and culturally. India imports bulk of its oil from
Iran. On the contrary, India indirectly and politely conveyed its point of view to the
US Administration. (Greenstein 2003)

In the same manner, the Bush Administration showed its dissonance to the Kyoto
Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol was signed and adopted in Kyoto, Japan, in the year
1997, and it is connected with regard to the guidelines of climate control. The Bush
Administration was critical of some of the provisions of it in February, 2002.
However, India refrained from criticizing the stance of the US Administration in spite
of the fact that some of the participating and signing countries did criticize the stance
of the US For obvious reasons, these countries expected that India would follow suit.
In spite of this expectation of those countries, India did not indulge in any criticism of
the US Administration. (Ibid).

Now, came the turn of the US for avoiding any pinpricks of diplomacy with regard to
India. New Delhi tested its Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile, the Agni. This
missile was test-fired in the year 2002. This military-related task of India was
criticized by many European countries. Japan too was critical of this test firing of

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Agni. The US Administration was not at all vocal and publicly critical of the Indian
action. The US reaction was measured and subdued (Ibid).

Terrorism & Pakistan: US-PAK Relations

Pakistan is the uppermost thing in the mind of India as far as terrorism is concerned.
The process of “transformation” in Indo-US relations brought in the hope that the US
will make efforts for restricting Pakistan from spreading terrorism in Kashmir and that
military supplies including F16 fighter-bomber would abate substantially. This hope
was so because in the past the US was the biggest and the most willing supplier of
military to Pakistan. There was a bit of difference between the US and India on this
front. However, India focused more on economic cooperation from the US and not
that much on military tie-up of the US with Pakistan. The reason why the Indian
interest in this dimension was less was that the then President of Pakistan, Pervez
Musharraf, was fighting terrorists within his own country very frantically. India
wanted that President Musharraf should succeed in controlling terrorists within
Pakistan and contain Islamic radicals there (Ganguly 2002).

So far, India kept a low profile when US was an ally of Pakistan in the US war against
terrorism in Afghanistan. However, the tragedy of 9/11 brought the US very close to
Pakistani President Musharraf. The US started giving more military and financial aid
to Pakistan for the purpose of fighting terrorist in Afghanistan. The US was waging a
grim battle against the Taliban and al Qaeda who were operating from Afghanistan.
The praise of Pakistani government by the US came as a blow to India as Pakistan
always overtly and covertly waged terrorist attacks against Indians in the Indian
territory. (Ibid)

The White House did not totally ignore Indian concern about Pakistan sponsored
terrorism. The US extended a red carpet welcome to the Indian Prime Minister, Atal
Bihari Vajpayee, when he visited the US in October, 2001. The Bush Administration
took due notice of India’s anxiety. It assured India that Indian concerns about
terrorism from Pakistan was in the knowledge of the US, and the US was concerned
about it. The US highlighted its necessity in tackling terrorist in Afghanistan prior to
taking note of this matter and handling it. There was a speck of solace in India. Even
then, a deadly terrorist attack took place in Kashmir State Assembly in October 2001
in which 38 people got killed. It was a time when the Indian Prime Minister was still

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in the US This brutal attack made India very concerned about the US stance against
Pakistan. India feared that the US could ignore Indian concern because the US was
ensnared in fighting terrorist in Afghanistan and Pakistan was helping it. (Ibid)

That Pakistan could be most brutal and inhuman in promoting terrorism against India
became very clear on Dec.13, 2001. Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attacked the Indian
Parliament on this black day. It was a suicide attack by a group of car-borne terrorist
inside the premises of Indian Parliament Complex. The terrorist wanted to kill the
Indian Prime Minister, the Home Minister, and many other MPs. for destabilizing and
annihilating the Indian government. However, timely and brave response by the
Indian security forces thwarted that attempt of these desperate and committed
terrorists (Kumar 2003).

The Government of India was quick to start its offensive for teaching Pakistan a
lesson. India resolved to go systematically in this direction, and even to go for war if
Pakistan did not respond in accordance to Indian requirements. The rail connection
with Pakistan was snapped, Indian diplomatic staff was curtailed in Pakistan, and the
Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan was called back to India. Nevertheless,
Pakistan remained adamant. India started amassing its troops along the Indo-Pak
borders. India made it clear to the entire world that for containing and eliminating
Pakistani sponsored deadly and brutal attack even war was an option for India in spite
of the fact that both the countries were nuclear powers (Ibid).

The US Stance on Dec 13 Attack on Indian Parliament

The Bush Administration took due notice of India’s belligerent but justified stance
against and the threat of war against Pakistan. The US did understand that a nuclear
war could ensue and that it would be deadly and catastrophic for the entire region and
the world. The Administration sprang into active action. The US Secretary of State,
Colin Powell, would telephone President Musharaaf regularly for taking notice of the
demands being made by the Indian side. Even President Bush would intercede in
these regular talks for highlighting and warning Pakistan about its perilous and
devastating stance and support for terrorism. In addition to these warning and
admonitions to Pakistan, the US authorities were in touch with the Indian government
for advising it to refrain from precipitating this volatile and catastrophic situation. In
addition, for assuaging Indian fears, the US took stern action against two terror-linked

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organizations in Pakistan. These are the Jaish-e-Mohammed and the Laskhar-i-Taiba.
The US listed these two organizations in the list of “the foreign terrorists.” There was
some consolation in India because these two organizations were very active and brutal
in carrying out terrorist attacks in Kashmir and in some other parts of India (Ganguly
2002).

As per the Indian point of view, the December 13 attack on Indian Parliament was a
test case of US affinity and concern with regard to India fight against terrorism. The
US Administration acknowledged that this attack had roots in the main plank of
Pakistan sponsored terrorism in Kashmir. It kept pressure on Musharaaf for
controlling these terrorist organizations. It is a fact that the US always urged India and
Pakistan to enter into mutual dialogue, even then the US never sidelined the existence
of ISI and Pakistan sponsored terrorist activities in Kashmir. This admonition of the
US to Pak came in the winter season when infiltration is at its lowest level owing to
relentless snowing. India waited patiently for the effect of US pressure to bloom in
summer time when the infiltration is at its peak from Pakistan. It was expected that
there would be some military strikes by the Indian Army across the line of control as
the then Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, made his resolve clear that infiltration
from across the border was beyond his tolerance, and Prime Minister Vajpayee
enjoyed unequivocal support of this public for such a task. (Ganguly 2002)

However, all the roadblocks imposed by India on Pakistan remained intact for some
more time. There was no restoration of rail links, air links, and resumption of
dialogue. Even the Indian military did not withdraw from the Line of Control for
some more time. During this time, the US did not insist that the US should participate
in resolving the issue of terrorism because it started fully appreciating the Indian stand
that terrorism from Pakistan was a matter between India and Pakistan only, and it
needed to be resolved on through mutual negotiations of these two countries. In spite
of this stance of the government of India, Indian diplomats did not look askance at
diplomatic relations of Pak with the US and any military support for Pakistan (Kumar
2003).

Underestimating the Threat From Al Qaeda

President George W. Bush became the President of the United States in January
2001after President Clinton demitted this esteemed office. President Clinton did face

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some criticism for ignoring terrorism during his tenure. Nevertheless, his
administration did try to challenge those assumptions. This notwithstanding, the initial
focus of the Bush Administration was on some other countries than Pakistan and
India. President Bush did not pay any attention to non-state entities of terrorism prior
to the incident of 9/11. He just underestimated the perils posed by such terrorist
organizations as al Qaeda. President Bush and his advisors considered that countries
and their governments were more dangerous as compared to non-State actors
preaching radicalism and bigotry. However, his stance changed after the tragedy of
9/11(Ganguly 2002).

Prior to 9/11 the outgoing National Security Advisor, Samuel R. Berger, met
Condoleezza Rice, and advised her of the danger of al Qaeda and other non-state
actors. Many other Clinton Administration advisors also advised the officials of Bush
Administration about these non-state actors. However, Rice did not hold high level
meetings that were proposed by Richard Clarke, a top NSC (National Security
Council) official in Clinton Administration. Richard Clarke handed over a
comprehensive dossier to Rice about the perils being posed by al Qaeda. However,
the official of the Bush Administration paid not much attention to his contentions and
submission (Nayak 2006).

The officers under President Bush did say that they monitored al Qaeda activities as
far as possible prior to 9/11. However, the attack of 9/11 could not be gauged or
monitored by them. Even President Bush once said, “There was significant difference
in my attitude after September, 11. I was not on point, but I knew he was a menace,
and I know he was a problem. I knew he was responsible, for the (previous) bombings
that killed Americans I was prepared to look at a plan that would be a thoughtful plan
that would bring him to justice, and would have given an order to do that. I have no
hesitancy about going after him. But I did not feel that sense of urgency, and my
blood was not nearly as boiling.” President Bush did not actually initiate and pursue
terrorism as his main agenda as the fear of it was not astronomical then. It just
happened (Raman 2006).

The Worldview After 9/11

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The deadly and dastardly attack of September 11, 2001, shook the President and the
whole of the US In fact, it shook the entire world. Support came from France, the UK
Germany, India, and countless other nations. The approach of unilateralism being
followed by President Bush got replaced by multilateral cooperation. His father,
George H.W. Bush, equated 9/11 with the attack on Pearl Harbour that impelled the
US to coordinate with other nations in the World War II. Now international
cooperation was considered as the sole effective method of combating what many saw
as the dark side of globalization. President Bush took numerous effective and cogent
steps for annihilating terrorism. (Ibid)

Many people think that the US did not pay much attention to various attacks by al
Qaeda and other terrorist groups. These attacks started from the Beirut bombing of
1983 and included the bombing of the USS Cole in the year 2000. “Weakness,
vacillation, and unwillingness of the United States to stand with our friends – that is
provocative,” averred Vice President Cheney. “It’s encouraged people like Osama bin
Laden … to launch repeated strikes against the United States, our people overseas and
here at home, with the view that he could, in fact do so with impunity.” Bush
Administration buttressed inland security and gave more powers to CIA. It created a
policy of attacking those States that gave shelter to various terrorist outfits.

President Bush became more forthright and assertive. He said, “Every nation, in every
region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the
terrorists.” He thought that various nations would side with the US as they did during
Kyoto Protocol and during ABM Treaty. He wanted to provide a clear lead to his
partners in this war against terrorism. His refrain was, “The best way we hold this
coalition together is to be clear on our objectives and to be clear that we are
determined to achieve them. You hold coalition together by strong leadership and that
is what we intend to provide.” He felt that the rest of the world considered the US as
the genuine leader of the world (Greenstein 2003:23).

For war against terrorism, the opposing party of President Bush, namely the
Democratic Party, blamed President Bush and his political party, namely the
Republican Party. However, President Bush was able to ward of any criticism by
taking a few wise and timely steps to bring to book the perpetrators of 9/11 and al
Qaeda. President Bush resolved to tackle the situation in Afghanistan, the

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fountainhead of terrorism, and he took one more step towards countering terrorism by
coining the phrase “axis of evil.” This axis of evil meant three nations, namely Iraq,
Iran, and North Korea. Now, his war on terror had clear guidelines, Afghanistan and
the three nations contained in the axis of evil (Ibid).

After the 9/11 attack, President Bush took quick and apt action. He knew that the
mastermind of 9/11 attack, Osama bin Laden, was stationed in Afghanistan, and that
he was there full and unremitting support of the Taliban. The Taliban took control of
the government of Afghanistan in1996. They were in power there in 2001 also.
President Bush signed a secret document on September 17 for war against
Afghanistan. However, the US defence agencies and armed forces were not really
prepared for such an unexpected war. This unpreparedness was there in spite of the
fact that Pentagon had fired missiles at the camps of al Qaeda after 1998 attack on US
embassy in Africa. Missiles were ready for attacking Osama bin Laden. But
preparedness for war was not really there. (Ibid)

Preparation for War Against Afghanistan

The strategy for war in Afghanistan started being finalized in the US Administration.
CIA Director, Tenet, presented a plan for this war titled “Going to War.” Tenet
proposed support for Northern Alliance in Afghanistan as this Alliance was fighting
against the Taliban. On September 17, 2001, President Bush directed his subordinates
about what they should do. Secretary of State, Collin Powell, would tell the Taliban to
hand over Osama bin Laden and his accomplices to the US Otherwise, the US will
launch the most damaging attack against Afghanistan. He asked his army to remain in
full readiness. He directed his secret agents to provide support to the Northern
Alliance also (Ibid).

Thereafter the above-mentioned announcement of President Bush about preparation

of war, the President made one more statement. He said, “The Taliban must act, and
act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.”
Many other countries also tried to persuade the Taliban government to act as per the
US desires. Nevertheless, the Taliban were adamant and defiant. They straightaway
rejected the US demand about this hand over of the terrorists holed up in Afghanistan
(Ibid).

The Start of Afghan War

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When the Taliban government showed its abstinence and defiance, the war began.
The first phase of the war started on Oct. 07, 2001. In this, phase, the US and British
air forces conducted air strikes on Afghanistan. Military installations of the Taliban
and terrorist hideouts too were bombed very intensely. “Special US forces joined the
Northern Alliance and other groups opposed to Taliban” and surrounded Taliban
forces in and around Kabul. Within a few days, the Taliban were routed and defeated
as they were crumbled in and around Kabul. Fighting continued until March 2002
because the US and allied forces faced some stiff resistance in “the Tora Bora
Mountains and in the Shah-e-kot valley in March 2002”. This phase of eliminating the
Afghan government stemmed from the fact that President Bush considered the
Taliban responsible for assisting Al Qaeda. His view was that ending terrorism inside
any country is the responsibility of that country’s government. The war was going on
with success of the US led forces, but al Qaeda could not be wiped out completely
from some parts of Afghanistan. The second and the third phase of the war too ensued
(Banerjee and Gert 2003).

In the second phase of the aforesaid war, the US decided to fight the war on its own
terms. It did not pay much heed to various UN resolutions and the pleas of its allies.
President Bush said, “At some point we may be the only ones left. That is okay with
me. We are America.” In this manner, the above-mentioned war continued on the
terms of the US Some of the recommendations coming from the NATO were also not
attended to by the US. The US Administration found these quite cumbersome. (Ibid)

In the third and final phase, President Bush ensured that the US public was not
involved much in the affairs of this devastating war. He took steps wherein the routine
life of the citizens of the US went of normally. President Bush sought the help of
Afghan people and Pakistani forces for fighting the terrorists connected with al Qaeda
instead of ordering the deployment more and more US soldiers for driving out Bin
Laden and his accomplices. The US made best efforts, but Bin Laden and many of his
accomplices escaped from Afghanistan. (Ibid)

The End of the Taliban Regime & the Outcome

The US and its allied forces were able to oust the Taliban government. Many Taliban
leaders and other mercenaries were killed. A new government of the people friendly
to the US was installed. Hamid Karzai became the new President of Afghanistan. The

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new government allowed the US forces to remain stationed in Afghanistan, and
requested the US forces to train Afghan army. However, not all dangerous terrorists
were killed or arrested. Not all the hideouts of them could be destroyed. Complete
peace and stability in Afghanistan did not prevail. There was no explicit mention of
funding for the reconstruction of Afghanistan in the budget of the US government in
the year 2004. (Sengupta and Kumar 2004)

Thus, it can be concluded that the US took due note of the threat of terrorism as a
worldwide threat. It realized that the specter and peril of terrorism had started
extending their fatal grip in South East Asia region also. It made a very elaborate plan
to end terror in this region. It began with a war against Afghanistan. This war was
successful in dislodging a very brutal and terror-spreading government in
Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the problem did not get completely resolved. Osama bin
Laden and some of this accomplices escaped, fighting still raged in some pockets, and
not much was earmarked in the US budget for the reconstruction, military training,
and development of Afghanistan. Thus, the US victory over terrorism in this region of
the world was not complete. (Ibid)

There was broad international support for the war against terrorism in Afghanistan. At
some junctures of the war, the US did not feel very comfortable and secure in
Afghanistan, and it let the more troops from its friendly countries join the US forces
in Afghanistan. After the period of 18 months of the fall of Kabul, more than fifty per
cent of the foreign troops were non-Americans. In the month of August, 2003, the
NATO assumed the command of the peace-keeping force in Afghanistan. This
widespread support from countless foreign countries lent legitimacy to the US war on
terror in Afghanistan. Thus, after the dastardly and cruel attack of 9/11 almost every
country sided with the US in war against terrorism. (Ibid)

Prospects for US-India Counterterrorism Cooperation (An American View)

Counterterrorism is the means of using military, intelligence, financial matters, and

law enforcement agencies in annihilating terrorist activities. The chapter highlights
the state of affairs about sharing counterterrorism information and about helping each
other in annihilating terrorism, which is a national as well as international problem.

This section highlights and gives details that such co-operations or partnerships are
undertaken with discretion and with secrecy in spite of the fact that there exist

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differences in some matter between the parties entering into any kind of mutual
beneficial cooperation. These matters of tackling counter terrorism overlap or go
together with such other matter as internal security measures, foreign policies, and
policies related to defence. These matters of cooperation add in them the current law
enforcement, military relations, or intelligence relations, which are very confidential,
matters.

Some analysis of the Indo-US cooperation in counterterrorism is possible from the

available record during the last fifteen years in spite of the fact that such matter is
carried out in a very secret and confidential manner. This topic examines those
counterterrorism measures taken by the US and India jointly in the light of those
broad guidelines. The first segment of this section deals with pre-1998 launch that
was completed in 2000. The second segment deals with the matter arising out of the
Indian nuclear blast in1998 till the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre in the US
and that attack is addressed as 9/11. The third segment is about a few changes or
widening gaps in bilateral relations between the US and India after 9/11. The fourth
segment evaluates the likely further of these ties and points out a few developments
that can significantly enhance or decrease this cooperation. All these four dimensions
have been examined in this section.

Pre-1998 Partnership Regarding Counterterrorism

A group called “the US-India Joint Counter Terrorism Working Group” was formed
in 2000. The US Administration under President Clinton laid the foundation of this
group in 1997. A meeting was held in 1997 between the US and Indian delegates
about forming a group. At a strategic meeting in the year 1997, the Indian Foreign
Secretary, K. Raghunath highlighted Indian anxiety about cross-border terrorism. The
Indian Prime Minister, I.K. Gujral, too pointed out the active participation of Pakistan
in encouraging and carrying out terrorist attacks against India. There were some
positive outcomes from the side of the US through the comments of Thomas
Pickering, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs of the US government.

Political commentator, Raja Mohan said about that stance of the US Under Secretary
in these words, “marking a new American sensitivity to the profound impact terrorism
has had on India’s security in the last decade and a half. India has welcomed the new
American approach and wants more follow-up action.” (Raja Mohan1997). This

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follow-up action did take place, and it did so two years later. This agreement of the
year 2000 was a sequel to the appeal of a new UN Counterterrorism Convention by
the then Union Commerce Minister of the government of India. Apart in the year
1995 both President Clinton, as well as the Indian Prime Minister, P.V. Narshima
Rao, made appeals to the UN for taking steps against the threat of global terrorism.
There did exist some discordant points between the US and India. The US had called
some nations as rouge nations, and Iraq was one of them. Indian relations with Iraq
were somewhat friendly as Iraq did offer some help to India when Pakistan based
terrorists carried out terror attacks in Mumbai in the early part of 1990s. In addition,
India did not send its troops against the US war against Iraq.

May 1998 to September 10, 2001: Impediments by US Sanctions Against India

Indo-US relations were progressing were steadily ahead prior to 1998.Many terrorist
groups Al Qaida had become very dangerous. Al Qaida declared publicly that both the
US and India were among a team of the enemies of Islam. Al Qaida considered both
these countries worthy of attacks by true Muslims. Pakistan was not willing to discard
the government in Afghanistan that was controlled by Taliban. The Taliban were very
closely in league with Osama bin Laden whom the US help responsible for one of the
US embassies situated in East Africa. In this manner, the US and India started
working in unison with regard to countering the menace and perils of terrorism.
(Shukla 2005)

However, India nuclear test in May, 1998 dampened this spirit of cooperation. The
US stopped the sale of military hardware to India. The process of dialogue too
became slow. The conduct of military exercises between the US and Indian forces
were postponed, and the sale of UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) too was
foreclosed by the US. The US also postponed the meetings connected with the US-
India Defense Policy Group (DPG).

Under these circumstances, India approached Israel for the necessary military
hardware for fighting cross-border terrorism. The Israeli Prime Minister, Shimon
Peres, visited India in 2001. It is believed that he was accompanied by a high-level
delegation consisting of Intelligence Officers in the Israel’s Anti-Terrorism
Department. However, some helpful undercurrents remained underway between the
US and India. A new US-Israel-India nexus started taking shape even though a few

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leaders in India were not very hopeful of this nexus as the US was in close links with
Pakistan in many matters that were inimical to India. Even then, the Government
made efforts for dissuading the US for supporting Pakistan. Some help from the
strong Israel lobby in the US was sought for debarring arms sales from the US to
Pakistan. Also, many Israeli ministers considered India a good and reliable friend, and
Yuval Steinitz, the Chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee
of the government of Israel was one such leader and spokesperson from the
government of Israel. (Schaffer 2002:29)

The Phase of After 9/11: Widening but not Deepening Relations in

Counterterrorism Teamwork

The attack of 9/11 was a watershed in the somewhat dormant but neutral approach of
the US towards India. After this dastardly attack, India was spontaneous and
forthright in offering help to the US with regard to the enquiry and action on this
front. The not so friendly relations with India after the 1998 nuclear blast by India
were replaced by the US attention towards Pakistan with regard to the scourge of
terrorism in the US. The US averred the common concern about “Islamic Terrorism”.
During the regime of a “Hindu national government” as well as by the Congress-
Leftist led government after 2004.This indicated that the US was keen about
cooperation about antiterrorism plans with the help of India. (Hindustan Times, 2004)

Countering Cyber Terrorism Initiative came into existence in 2001. President Bush
and Prime Minister Vajpayee met in 2002 again for more on it. Now, both the nations
work in unison about cyber terrorism. India is a benign power beginning to be another
super power. It is expected that the US will assist India in computer forensics,
network surveillance matters, and data acquisition systems also. More cooperation
between the US and Indian will reduce terrorism and foster peace in the world (Tellis
2005).

Apart from this categorical chance of stance from Indian nuclear pursuit, there took
place one more significant development, and that development was that the US started
recognizing the insidious and treacherous activities of Pakistan in Kashmir and in
other parts of India. The US imposed sanctions against a terrorist outfit named Jaish-

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e-Muhammad. It showed the US concern about terrorism beyond the boundaries of
West Asia, particularly Afghanistan.

The Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, visited the US, and the US declared
Lashkar-e-Taiba (Let) and Jaish-e-Muhammad as terrorist organizations. These two
organizations operated from the territory of Pakistan and from the territory of Pakistan
occupied Kashmir.

Indian Parliament faced a very lethal and well planned attack. This attack was
sponsored and financed by Pakistan. India expected some strong response from the
US, but the response was rather mild. Later on, the US rectified its stance, and called
this attack an act of global terrorism.

In the last part of the year 2003, to wit in September, 2003. Bush and Vajpayee held
very significant talks on the sidelines of the UNGA meeting. Condoleezza Rice is
stated to have told the reporters that President Bush talked to the Pakistani President
Pervez Musharraf and said to him, “need to stop cross-border terrorism in Kashmir.”
(Greenstein 2003:32)

These good omens engendered a framework consisting of government official in the

US as well as in India about countering global terrorism. India provided some lead to
the US about the background of the attackers of 9/11. The US provided intelligence
report about subversive and perilous activities and plan of Maoist terrorist in India.
However, in spite of such consonance in mutual relations some familiar
discontentment continued in these relations.

There were differences of opinion with regard to Nepal and Bangladesh. The US and
India did share intelligence information about terrorist activities in these countries, but
they differed on the type of action on those activities. India felt that the US
Administration was arming the government of Nepal for the purpose of fighting with
the Maoist rebels there while India wanted some dialogue between the Maoist rebels
and the government of Nepal.

There existed some disagreement with regard to the US approach in dealing with a
few adverse activities from the side of Bangladesh. The government of India kept of
informing the US government about anti-India activities and terrors modules in
Bangladesh working against India. Relations between India and Bangladesh became

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worse when Begum Khalida Zia assumed the post of the Prime Minister in
Bangladesh. In her government, there existed a party called Jammaat Islami which
was a hardcore militant organization. However, these frictions abated after 2006 as
Bangladesh government started taking action against various terrorist organizations
operating from there. In this manner, the third phase of the mutual relations about
counterterrorism cooperation brought some good and fruitful changes.

It can be concluded from the above mentioned facts that counterterrorism measures
bring about the desired results when the discussions are secret and discreet. The
outcome of the discussion about counterterrorism indicates that this cooperation
remains bounded by imagined differences in national interest of each nation. Mistrust
among various officers involved in these negations too it very vital. This is the most
significant indication out of the discussion that followed after the 9/11 attack on the
US.

However, it was also realized that more and more discussions generate confidence
and commitment for annihilating the burgeoning syndrome of terrorism. It was felt
that the US could take some steps about stationing its forces around India, and this
notion is not endorsed by India. There will be different approaches of India and US in
many respects of countering terrorism. The reason is that terrorism in India is based in
North East, Kashmir, and some parts of Orissa State. Terror groups in North East and
Kashmir have links with neighboring countries. India will deal with these groups and
these countries in a different manner. India has danger from some Maoist group
operating from the Nepalese soil. Thus, India has to face the problem of insurgency
and terrorism.

Apart from it, the Indian focus is also economic progress owing to its burgeoning
populations and other financial matters. The scope of more and more participation
with the US may not increase as rapidly as needed. “India aspires to achieve a greater
strategic autonomy for itself after emerging as a major economic player.” These are
the words of the Indian foreign secretary, Shyam Saran, who made this statement in
the context of Indo-US relations. Also, India will prefer to deal with these matters of
terrorism through the UN. There is SAARC (the South Asia Associations for
Regional Cooperation), and India is an active member of it. However, Indian and

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Pakistani feud is a severe stumbling block in SAARC backed anti-terror measures.
Even then, India role in it is very vital. (Kumar 2003:29)

With regard to the US, it can be stated that the US has a very dominant and well
spread role in countering terrorism. The US does not face any insurgency. It has far
superior military and technical power. It can afford to dictate terms to the UN and
other world bodies. To some extent, apprehension is there that some groups in Latin
America could pose danger to the US. There is a group called “the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC)” which can be a cause of concern for the US

There are apprehensions that Maoist groups in Nepal could topple the government of
Nepal, and then they could carry out acts of insurgency against India also. That is
another reason why India should continue dialogue and cooperation with the US. It is
a fact now that one of the operating points of Al Qaida is in Pakistan. The US will like
to dismantle this operating and training centers of Al Qaida. This is an opening and
opportunity for India for highlighting the role of Pakistan in promoting terrorism in
this region including India. It can be very safely concluded that substantial
cooperation between the US and India is needed for countering and annihilating
terrorism from the world as these two nations are models of democracy and public
welfare.

Indian-US Counterterrorism Cooperation (The Past, Present, and Future of it)

As we know that counterterrorism means the use of military, law enforcement and
intelligence for dismantling or annihilating terrorism. Counter terrorism is very vital
for India and the US. The reason is that India and the US are two great and highly
significant democracies in the world. Democracy gives importance to every human
life, other living beings, and environment also. Thus, these two nations are dedicated
in their pursuit of promoting democracy in their own countries on the previously
mentioned benchmarks. They cooperate with each other on these matters, and they
desire that democracy should be promoted throughout the world in a very peaceful
and friendly manner.

A new challenge has confronted these two nations, and that challenge is the scourge
of terrorism as well as insurgency. Cooperation and negotiations in the US and India

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relations about terrorism started right from the end of the World War II when two
blocks came into existence, The Eastern Block headed by the USSR, and the NATO
headed by the US In the race of supremacy by these blocks, India did not side with
any of these two blocks, and it headed NAM and promoted governments independent
of any rigid ideology, as was the case of these two blocks previously mentioned
above.

Considering these nefarious and deadly designs of the government and the Army of
Pakistan, the government of India tried to persuade the administration of President
Clinton to declare Pakistan a sponsor of international terrorism. However, the US did
not do so, but established a Joint Working Group (JWG) with India for twice a year
meeting between the US and the Indian officials. The ambit of the Joint Working
Group has been enlarged now with the addition of a few dimensions about terrorism.
Now, JWG covers counterterrorism cooperation between the US and India with the
help of all the concerned departments as well as agencies of the US and India. India
did not join the block headed by the US. Even then, some strands of cooperation
existed between intelligence sharing between India and the US as democracies have
natural affinity for one another. This attribute of these two great nations is clear from
one of the most noteworthy and educated political leaders of India, LK Advani, who
was the Home Minister of India. During his tenure of the Home Minister of India, LK
Advani, made the below-noted emblematic statement:

“I would like to describe India and America as ‘the Twin Towers of Democracy.’ The
terrorists may have destroyed the steel and concrete structures of the (WTC) World
Trade Centre, but they can never harm the structures and the spirit of our two
democracies.” (Sengupta and Kumar 2004:54)

The Indian Home Minister made this significant observation in Washington D C on

January 09, 2002. Indian and the US cooperation became more significance with the
advent of international terrorism and insurgency. India started getting the bouts of
terrorist attacks ever since the independence of India. Pakistan started initiating
terrorist activities from within, and it encouraged some groups inside India for
rebellion and terror activities right from the year of the Independence of India. (Ibid)

Indian Concerns about Sharing Terrorism Related Information

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There were some hindrances in sharing intelligence prior to the tragic incident of 9/11
particularly in the Indian context. Prior to this tragedy intelligence sharing was based
mainly on the interests of each block, namely the Eastern Block and the NATO
headed by the US. There was not much sharing in overcoming counter-subversion. In
this field, the focus was more on countering communism related terrorism.
Intelligence was hindered also by the defence of terrorism by various governments.
For instance, many groups in foreign countries colluded with the supporter of
Khalistan in India. There is considerable population of Indian immigrants in these
foreign countries.

While India vehemently opposed this support by the non-resident Indians for such
subversive tasks, the governments there did not cooperate much in intelligence
sharing because of the political and social influence of those sympathizers of the
movement of Khalistan. Similar was the case of a number of people residing in these
foreign countries; particularly in the UK. These foreign based people belonged to the
Pak occupied Kashmir. They have substantial population in the UK. They would
agitate vociferously and stridently against any assistance to India in dealing with the
terrorism in Kashmir that was a part of Indian Territory and Kashmir that was under
the illegal occupation of India. On many occasions these extremists elements from
Pak occupied Kashmir would be successful in stalling such assistance to India.

A number of European and other countries followed what is called “the over-
legislative approach” with regard to the matter of funding of the terror or radical
groups to other countries and to India as well. These rules were stopping India from
getting information and intelligence about foreign funding of the activities of terrorist
organizations in India. The main cause of this impediment was that the government of
those nations were constrained by the rules of regulation of finance and disclosed of
monetary dealing of various entities including the suspected funding offices of terror
groups.

The much needed sea change took place after the tragic and devastating attack on the
World Trade Centre of 9/11. The US changed it approach towards India. Some other
countries too followed suit. The US was the most strident entry in freezing the
account of persons suspected to be the supporters or financers of terror groups in the
US or abroad. It imprisoned many hundred persons suspected to be terrorists or

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supporters of terrorist in Guantanamo Bay without trial or without the due process of
law.

The US was in particular reluctant to sharing intelligence about counterterrorism with

India on many matters during the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. The
US thought that India was on the side of the USSR with regard to that occupation.
When India supported the pro-Moscow government of the Afghan President
Najibullah, the US became more aloof. However, this approach of the US underwent
a sea change when a group of six US and other western tourists were kidnapped by
Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA) under the name of Al faran in 1995.Later on the US became
more friendly with India with regard to the matter of sharing information of
international counterterrorism. (Ben 1996).

The Present Position of Cooperation between the US and India: From 2002
Onwards

Prior to the year 2000, the cooperation between the US and India in the realm of
terrorism was a closely guarded secret, and this was in a state of deniable mode. It
means that they could deny about being in unison for sharing intelligence information
between themselves. This spectrum closed door deals was brought out of the closet in
the month of January in the year 2000. A joint statement was issued at the end of a
meeting between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott in London. The statement said,
“the two sides agreed to work together to ensure that the perpetrators of the hijacking
of IC – 814 are brought to justice as part of their joint efforts to combat international
terrorism.” (Raman 2006:142)

There took place many significant changes in the way intelligence was carried by both
the countries and in the way it was shared. Some information about intelligence was
made public if it was not very secretive and if it was for the benefit of the world at
large.

Prior to 2000, India’s RAW and the USA’s CIA were pivotal agencies for it. After
2000, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, (MEA) and the US State Department
started completing these roles. At this phase, a formal tier was added to the secrets
deals and exchange of note so far. This tier prepared notes and agenda in writing for

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the second tier was informal, to wit secret dealing and exchanges between the higher
agencies of the US and India. The US-India Cyber Security Forum was established,
and this Forum held its first meeting in Delhi in April 2002; the next meeting was in
Washington D.C. in 2004. (Nayak 2006)

There was Jihadi terrorist attack on the Legislative Assembly of Jammu& Kashmir at
Srinagar on October, 01, 2001. Later on, there was an attack on the Indian Parliament
on Dec.13, 2001. These two terrorist attacks were most devastating. These attacks
brought some change in the US policy. However, the US did not totally agree with
India about Pakistan’s complete involvement in these terrorist attacks. This created
some breach in the confidence of Indian diplomats about the US approach towards
Pakistan. (Ganguly 2002)

However, the stance of the US underwent considerable and visible change after 9/11
and after the attack on Indian Parliament on Dec.13, 2001. The tragedy of 9/11 clearly
pointed out that counterterrorism has to be upgraded from time to time with
international team work of the like-minded nations to eradicate this deadly virus of
terrorism; nationally as well as internationally. Even then, it at some stages after 9/11,
it to Indian seemed that the US was soft with regard to the terror related activities of
Pakistan because it needed Pak support for its war in Afghanistan. (Ibid)

Terrorist-infested Pakistan and Indo-US Stance on that

There is one minor flaw in India’s foreign policy with regard to overdependence on
America about our hostile dealing about Pakistan as well as about the Kashmir
impasse. India is indeed tired of terrorism-related activities emanating from Pakistan
including so many terrorist camps just outside the Indian boundaries. Infiltration and
terrorist attacks are very frequent and fatal. Innocent men, women, and children get
killed, and that is very sad and tragic for any human society. This is the reason why a
peaceful and lawful State like India will expect a super power like the US to declare
Pakistan a rouge State, ask it for the handing over of the terrorists to India, and ask for
the closure of these terrorist camps. Some Indians even expect pre-emptive strikes
from the US against Pakistan or at least sanctions if not these strikes. But these results
have not borne much fruit although the US recognizes these unlawful and devastating
activities of Pakistan, but does not act decisively “for some compulsions”. US does

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warn Pakistan off and on, but not so stridently. Hence, excessive expectation from the
US administration is there in India despite very little response from it.

The dilemma is that the US is aware of entrenched terrorist set-up of Pakistan under
the tutelage and training by the ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) of the Pakistan Army.
The US also knows that Pakistan was actively involved in the 26/11/2008 Mumbai
attack in which a few American citizens too died in cold blood. The worst of all is that
the US knows that Pakistani Army has links with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The US
further knows that Pakistan initiates and carries out sham attacks against these two
terrorist outfits at times, but these attacks are just to please the US Administration
(Dubey 2015).

There is one more dilemma, and that dilemma is that the US Administration knows
that Pakistan is involved in numerous terrorist attacks in Afghanistan also. Pakistan
provides terrorists camps and training to terrorist for attacking Afghan territory and
the Afghan people. It is known to the Administration of the US that religious
fanaticism will one day engulf Pakistan into chaos. That is the reason why President
General Parvez Musharraf ordered action against some religious outfits which were
spreading terror and killing innocent citizens. But this attack by the Pakistani forces
also was an eye-wash and very late. Pakistani President General Parvez Musharraf, in
all probabilities, did so only to pacify and impress the US Administration so that he
could keep getting military and financial aid from the US.

There has been until every recently stances when US took Pakistan as a strategic
player in Afghanistan and in fact even accepted the idea to discuss with the moderate
Taliban. Pakistan supports both Talibani moderates & extremists and this put limit
that how they can cooperate with US. Because Pakistan has to worry about the whole
question of Pakhtoon as Taliban is rooted in Pakhtoon sites of borders. Therefore,
Pakistan has to control the Taliban and at the same time Pakistan has to use the
Taliban as a very clear player in Afghanistan vis-a-vis India which means that
Pakistan is as close to as other communities and cannot lonely control them.
Therefore, US have to look all these aspects. There have been unease after the
discovery of Osama Bin Laden. There is a tension and clash in Pak-US alliance,
which provides domestic problem in Pakistan, to which Pakistani
Government/Military has to respond (Vanaik 2011).

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At present time, problems related to Pakistan’s involvement with terrorism have gone
beyond any control even of the Pakistan government itself. Religious fanaticism has
reached its nadir in Pakistan. Terrorist groups in the garb of religious parties are in
charge. They dictate their brutal terms to the Pakistani Government, and the
government is helpless. The realm of terrorism is becoming more and more lethal.
Many hardliner religious fanatics have made inroads in the Pakistani Army also. The
domestic policy of Pakistan is at the mercy of religious parties full of terrorists.

In the circumstances stated above and in the light of a few more situations, it will be
impractical to expect the US to reign in Pakistan. It is very true that the US supplies
military equipment and monetary assistance to Pakistan, but that is for some more
reason than the ones that are apparent. The US needs cooperation from Pakistan in
order to maintain its hold over Taliban in Afghanistan, and Afghanistan houses al-
Qaeda and many other terrorist groups. This region is the focal point or heartland of
global terrorism. Hence, the US must control this region for its own sake because it is
the only super power now. Even then, the US is able to force Pakistan into actions
against these terrorists whenever the situation becomes tense of the US. This action is
taken by Pakistan because it wants military hardware and money from the US for its
very survival.

The US forces are engaged in fighting against many terrorist factions in the region of
South East Asia and Afghanistan also apart from doing so in Pakistan also. Pakistan
assists the US forces in fighting these terrorist organizations by means of land route
and air space. The US is well aware of the travails of India regarding Pakistani terror
network, and the US does help to India in the form of some agreements. These
agreements are regarding technology transfer, capacity building, and information
exchange. All these agreements are quite helpful in fighting the scourge of terrorism.

Even then, being an active part of India in fighting this deadly terrorism is not an
imperative segment connected with the US foreign policy. Thus, India should not
expect that the US will categorically choose India instead of Pakistan with regard to
foreign policy matters just because of Pakistani sponsored terrorism as the US has its
own interests in being on the side of Pakistan in many matters of military basis in
Pakistan and Pakistan air space.

Indian Approach to Terrorism in the Face of the US Approach to it

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Pakistan is a rogue State. Terrorism is managed and propagated by it in a number of
ways. There are Government sponsored terrorist camps, there are ISI run set-ups for
managing these camps, there are many non-State actors for carrying out terrorist-
related activities against India. The US attention and help is there but it is limited, and
the threat of terrorism from Pakistan is colossal and cruel. India should prepare its
own module for dealing with it so that terrorism is exterminated completely.

India should improve its intelligence set-up, manage border fencing more stridently,
interact with the local population in a bigger scale, improve law and order there, and
look after the minority communities there more intimately by teaching them skills and
through employment. In these matters of foreign policy, the US or any other foreign
country has little role to play. India has to do it itself for saving its citizen and for
highlighting Pakistani brutality against innocent and unarmed civilians in
international forums.

It is true that during the past decade, some very significant progress took place
between the two nations’ foreign and military relations. However, there are some
impediments in these relations with regard to history and with regard to perception of
each nation about the other nation.

With regard to the history of these obstacles, the matter is just historical, and it can be
stated that historically their relations were not very friendly owing to the Cold War
that started just after the end of the WWII. India had just attained independence. India
was much concerned about the development of its economy and about the ending of
colonization that had been playing havoc with toiling innocent masses of so many
other countries. In addition to these attributes of the newly independent India, India
was a bit inclined towards socialism and towards the USSR as such.

The Future of Cooperation Between the US and India in Counterterrorism

Cooperation in counterterrorism between these two democracies with a population of

1.5 billion people is very vital or indispensable. They ought to undertake mutual
training assistance for solidifying each other’s abilities about counterterrorism. There
should be joint multilateral platform of them for action against the financing of
terrorist activities and for effective implementations of the resolutions passed by the
UN Security Council. Now, working in unison in the field of cyber-crimes, aviation
security, maritime crimes, and the fallout from any WMD (Weapon of Mass

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Destruction) attack by any terrorist group is very significant. There should be regular
exchange of intelligence reports, the analysis of those reports must be done. After that
assessment of the result of gathering and analysis should be complied.

It is true that the future of effective counter terrorism lies in convergences of threat
perceptions of national interests and of national concerns. The US and India should
expand the arena of convergence and reduce the arena of divergence. The 9/11 attack
was one of the deadliest and brutal terrorist attacks in the modern history of the world.
It stirred the only super power, the US, to work in unison at bilateral level and at
multilateral level in the field of counterterrorism. There is need for this
multilateralism more because the terror groups work in tandem with criminals
involved in drug paddling, money laundering, arms trafficking and in international
crime.

There is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization. This

organization has expanded its ambit in the matter of counter terrorism in view of the
negative and harmful effects of terrorism in the regional economy. The APEC has set
up a Counterterrorism Task Force, Energy Security Initiative, and Cyber Security
Strategy. Even though there is not much scope of India’s becoming a member of the
APEC, some methods should be found out whereby India becomes associate with
counterterrorism measures of the APEC. The US can play a very significant role in
this matter.

Conclusion

The US approach towards working in unison with India about counterterrorism has
undergone considerable and favourable change. Earlier, India was not able to
persuade the US to take serious note of Pakistani involvement in terrorism with effect
from 1981 when some terrorist hijacked the Indian Airlines plane. Pakistan kept on
inflicting wounds and destruction through terrorism even after that hijacking incident
unabatedly and brutally.

However, this approach of the US underwent a colossal change after the attack of
9/11. Even the pro-Soviet and pro-China people do not question Indian leanings
towards the US for fighting terrorism. The US Indian partnership about confronting
and defeating terrorism is based on national consensus in India. No political party of
India can negate the process of this process. The US stance of countering terror

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against Pakistan is not based on its national consensus, but it largely based on the
stance of President Musharaaf of Pakistan, as he is the one who can deny access to US
forces for carrying out attacks and supplies for the Afghan war. Mushrraaf faces the
threat of radical religious parties in Pakistan, and the US has to keep him in power.

During the Presidency of President Bush, the U.S undertook three vital tasks. Firstly,
it tried to win the war against terrorism in Afghanistan. Secondly, it prevented Iran
from becoming a nuclear power, and finally it continued the US policy of making
North Korea totally bereft of Nuclear bomb capabilities as soon as possible.

Pakistan benefited from the first two tasks of the US Administration as Pakistan can
offer help in operating from its territory and in proving some intelligence output to the
US From the Indian point of view, India should not focus so much on the current
stance of the US help to Pakistan as the US cannot ignore Pakistan’s participation in
the US success in Afghanistan and in Iran. India should bring to the notice of the
future catastrophic results of Pakistan based terrorism and the use of the Weapon of
Mass Destruction (WMD) by any of the countless religiously inclined terrorist groups
in Pakistan.

India should make aware the US about the benefit of cooperation in cyber-crimes, in
arm smuggling, and in energy related crimes. These measures need strong naval force,
good cyber technology, and disciplined army. India possesses all these aforesaid
capabilities for becoming a good partner of India, and this partnership will be
beneficial for the US as well. So, in future both the US and India should draw a
concrete plan for success in counterterrorism.

In this future cooperation of the US and India, some non-government agencies too
will play a vital role. For example, the establishment of the US based Jewish Institute
for National Security Affairs (JINSA) is one such non-government organization. It
has already conducted three meetings on the matter of international terrorism and on
the various aspects of counterterrorism. It is advisable that the retired intelligence of
India, US and Israel should help such non-government organizations for defeating the
evil of terrorism inside a country and in the international arena.

Thus, the future of the US and India will be bright and progressive with regard to
defeating and finally annihilating terrorism in their own countries and internationally
if they work in unison in a multilateral system of governance.

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 CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

The purpose of writing this thesis is to examine various salient features of Indo – US
Relations with regard to terrorism, nuclear cooperation, in the context of the modern
world. The period covered in this study is primarily from 1998 to 2004. The
framework of this study deals also with the matters that were responsible for shaping
up political, military, cooperation between India and the United States. One very
significant and additional matter is nuclear non-proliferation and the perils of nuclear
proliferation within the subject of nuclear cooperation for world peace. The topics
emanating from these matters are mentioned below:

Indo-US Nuclear Diplomacy

The Indo-US Nuclear diplomacy has been a rollercoaster ride for both sides. This ride
has witnessed a number of landmarks starting from 1962 when the US offered another
democratic country, India, some arms in the wake of the Chinese aggression of India.
There was one very startling and worrying landmark when the US sent its battle ship
loaded with nuclear capability in 1971 when India was fighting a grim war with
Pakistan for the creation of Bangladesh.

There were a number of zero-sum games also between these two distant but stable and
vibrant democracies. The term zero - sum games mean that, you deal with another
country against your existing partner, and your stance causes loss to your partner.
This zero-sum game was played by the United States for a number of times. The
prominent example of this game is the supply of US arms to Pakistan against a
democratic country, to wit India. The second such game was played when the US
armed Pakistan during the Afghan War knowing that most the arms would be directed
against the United States’ real friend, India.

However, nuclear diplomacy is the most prominent part of the Indo – US defense and
nuclear-related matters and various factors relating to nuclear tests by India in the
context of the US policy of nuclear non-proliferation. It also indicates the events
leading to Indian acquisition of nuclear weapon capability. The US stance towards
India was not uniform. It sided with India at times, but at the same time it lent

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unremitting support to Pakistan, a military ruled State most of the time. At times, the
US ignored India at the cost of China.

Another good aspect of the Indo – US nuclear diplomacy was that the US was aware
of the Pak – China collusion in developing Pakistani nuclear bomb in violations of the
provisions of the non-proliferation norms. China supplied this nuclear material to
Pakistan in 1980s as per the report of “The House Committee on International
Relations of the US.” This was the second report in February, 1998.The US was fully
aware that China was supplying missile components and technology to Pakistan and
Iran. Being aware of these nefarious designs of India’s hostile neighbors, the US did
extend some concessions to India when India even after India conducted its second
nuclear test in 1998.

The Indian Prime Minister wrote a graphic letter to the US President, Bill Clinton for
highlighting India’s compulsion and for pinpointing its good intentions in the use of
nuclear technology. The US Congress passed “the South Asia Sanctions Flexibility
Act”. This Act gave President Clinton the authority to waive sanctions imposed on
wheat credit transactions and trade financing. Some more authority was provided for
waving sanctions up to one year. Some incentives were accorded to India for
refraining from weapon-zing and installing missiles. In the totality of the matter, the
US is working in unison with India for lessening the nuclear threat and finally
eliminating it in Asia.

The defense relations between the US and India started expanding and progressing at
a steady and heartening pace after the Cold war and particularly after the 9/11 terror
attack. This time factor needs to be examined by various surveyors and observers
engrossed in less than expected speed in the progress of mutual relations. A number
of high-level American and Indian leaders have time and again highlighted the
significance of these defense relations. Along with them, defense officers and military
personnel from both sides have instilled substance and a spirit of cooperation in these
relations. These efforts of the leaders and government officers resonate well with a
mutual drive to create what a senior US officer explained as “a productive and
sustainable strategic partnership.”

These efforts highlight the preliminary requisite of what the Indian Prime Minister,
Manmohan Singh, once said. His statement was “the best is yet to come.” It is true

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that there are attainments and significance in these relations, but in the words of
Tellis, it is, “still fragile and needs a lot of tending.” Tending is mandatory lest they
lapse into benign neglect “as an oddity many degrees removed from the core
geopolitical interests of the two friendly countries.”

Another American, a former defense official, made a remark in 2004 that the
governments of both the nations are “too focused on the downside risks rather than
the upside opportunities.” They need patience, hard work, perseverance, and
compromise on both sides for moving “the ties of defense” beyond narrow visions
staggered or impeded by the history. That is the only way of taking those relations to
a new level that is appropriate for the twenty-first century. (Tellis 2004:6)

India was partitioned into two countries in 1947. Pakistan wanted to occupy Kashmir
by illegal force. A grim war took place in 1948. After the ceasefire, Pakistan did not
abandon the policy of violence and force, and this attitude of Pakistan took the shape
of terrorism against India. India did take many steps to stall and crush this terrorism.
India sought the cooperation of all nations. The US did notice Indian concerns, but it
did not help much initially. The reason was that India was an active and prominent
member of the Non-Alignment Movement and Pakistan was a supporter and outside
member of the US –lead Western Block headed by the United States.

There were political and religious feuds in West Asia as well. Terrorism existed there
in a few East Asian countries also. The US being a Super Power of immense and
immeasurable military and economic might would take notice of all these terrorist
activities, but would not participate much in them.

Some terrorists belonging to West Asia and the region of Afghanistan and Pakistan
committed one of the most dastardly, cowardly, deadly, and devastating terrorist act
in the US on September 11, 2001; also painfully known as 9/11 attacks. The
contemporary Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, took solemn note of this
devastating and despairing tragedy in which around 3000 innocents, law-abiding, and
defenseless residents of the United States lost their lives. Many thousand other
citizens were injured very seriously. The Indian Prime Minister offered India’s ready
and complete assistance in dealing with this tragic attack on the people of the US.

The US appreciated the stance of India, and it realized the dimension and harm of
terror attacks against India. In this manner a new phase of the US – India cooperation

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against terrorism started. It gave rise to the concept and the norm of
“Counterterrorism.”

Counterterrorism means steps taken for averting any terrorist attack. A number of
measures are adopted for this purpose. They include espionage, information
gathering, use of technology, rescue operations in case of any terrorist activity, and
finally attacking the terrorist in their own dens diplomatically or militarily. After the
attack of 9/11, India and the United States signed many agreements about arms deals,
information sharing, and technology support for making progress in this new field
called “Counterterrorism.”

Pakistan based terrorists and many Pak soldiers occupied Indian territory in Kargil
area of India. A fierce war started. The war went on for many days, and it started
escalating into a full scale war at every front amidst India and Pakistan. The US
President, Bill Clinton, interceded on India’s behalf and forced Pakistan to withdraw.
He specifically summoned the Pakistani Prime Minister, Nawaz Sheriff, to the US and
persuaded him very diplomatically and categorically to withdraw immediately from
the areas occupied by his forces. This was one major and significant acts of India –
US/ Cooperation connected with counterterrorism.

The US supported some opposing groups in War in Afghanistan after the Soviet
Union had occupied Afghanistan. It supplied arms to Pakistan also. However, India
did not criticize or over blow this stance of the United States. India remained aware of
the US compulsion for using Pakistani territory for military and transport purposes.
This need of using Pakistani territory became more intense when the US –led forces
attacked Afghanistan in 2001 after the 9/11 attack. It used Pakistan territory for
military, military hardware storage, and transport. India did not raise any vehement
protests.

In this manner, the task related to terrorism and counterterrorism was handled by
deftly and sagaciously by India and the United States. They would not blow any
matter out of proportion if that matter were not in the interest of one of them. For
instance, the US declared Iran a rogue State, and the US was bent upon taking Iran to
task. Indian relations with Iran are very old, stable, progressive, and trustworthy. India
gets most of its energy needs from Iran on very good terms. India did not take up this
matter, but mildly made the US aware of its friendly and firm relations with Iran.

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Similarly, India test fired the Agni Missile in 2002. Many western nations were
critical of this test. They deprecated and denounced this test by India. They wished
that the US should join them, but the US was very measured because it understood the
compulsion of India surrounded by two hostile and dangerous neighbors.

Both India and the US signed many agreements for the purpose of tackling terrorism
as a team. The US even waived some sanctions imposed on India on account of the
Indian nuclear blast in 1998. It laid many conditions against Pakistan so that it could
not use some military hardware of the US against India. A number of technology
transfer agreements too were made for tackling terrorism.

The thesis makes three major arguments. The first argument of the thesis is that for
both these noteworthy countries, interaction in the matters of defense must be
ingrained in the overall web of bilateral ties. Bilateral ties form a critical and integral
constituent although these ties are not the driving force in the matter of defense. Even
then, bilateral ties are good for larger relationships. If the US–Indian defense relations
are solidly founded and watchfully cultivated, they will prove a priceless asset for
India and the United States because both of them face common threats in the form of
terrorism. In addition to common threats, they have common opportunities also in the
form the growth and stability of Asia. Above all, friendly US–India defense relations
will help in elevating both of them to economic prominence in the global stage.

The second argument of the thesis is that the US – India relations have been
practically on a rollercoaster, from antipathy to military and nuclear cooperation. The
Cold War set them apart with India differing with the US on many issues. India
remained focused on economic development and emerged victorious. The Cold War
ended around 1989, and the relations of these two big and great nations started
looking up.

The third argument of the thesis is that at this moment, the US – India mutual
relations are very friendly and trustworthy. They are working in unison in many fields
as trade, commerce, technology, information sharing, counterterrorism, military
exercise, and above all peaceful nuclear technology. Now, one challenge is to
maintain this status quo, and the bigger challenge will be to take this relation to a
higher pedestal. The visit of the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice to India in
2005 was very significant with regard to many matters of mutual concern. The second

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term of President Bush has also proved very beneficial to enhance the stature of this
friendly relation more by his visit of 2006.

In strategic cooperation with the US, a few matters take precedence over others. First
of all, India needs “India’s accommodation in the nuclear club”. India’s inclusion in
the non-proliferation treaty will not be able to help India in this matter. The provision
of this treaty should be amended to accommodate a progressive and peace-loving
country like India. Secondly, Indian position the global has to be identified very
clearly. It is sure that in the next 20 years India will become a global player. The
world should allow India to be so. This will be possible if India is appointed as a
permanent member of the UN Security Council. Therefore, the US, forth sake of good
strategic partnership with India, should also make efforts in this direction. Now, what
can India do on its part as a global player? India will highlight the essence and
benefits of democracy because India is a living example of it.

Finally, “how can India constructively contribute to global peace and security?” The
biggest challenge to global peace and security is terrorism, economic slowdown, arm
smuggling, and nuclear proliferation. The world will become a very insecure and
dangerous place to live in if these matters are not tackled urgently and efficiently.
Many radical groups and rouge States are encouraging these perilous and devastating
terrorist activities. It is a global challenge for India, and more specifically, it is a
challenge for India in Asia. India is a progressive and peace-loving democracy of with
a population of over 1 billion people; respected throughout the world. Hence, in all
the matters mentioned above in this paragraph, India should anchor for cooperating
with the US with care, sincerity, and earnestness for which it is respected by many
nations.

The ethical foundations of the topics connected with foreign policy state that dialogue
must continue in spite of some minor divergences. Hence, India, which has very good
relations with the US in many fields, ought to continue the process of dialogue with
the US wherever there is any discordant dimension in the relationship. The second
reason why India should be more friendly with the US is that India cannot afford to
withdraw from the aforesaid issues of discord because that will be detrimental for
both the parties and for the international community also. These divergences, however
colossal or varied, must not be any impediment in the way of the continuing process

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of foreign relations and booming bilateral trade. India should adopt such a position as
it thinks appropriate in every international issue, and then India should enter into a
dialogue with the US for sorting out differences.

India should highlight the fact to the US that in democracies the governments have to
make concessions to the people. Hence, they should not be restive towards each other.
In a democracy, a government has to extend some time-bound concessions to the
people for their survival. Later on, when the problem abates, the matter can be
implemented. India is one such democracy, and the US will be receptive to the
contentions of India. India is a peace-loving country where people of all religions live
in harmony. Nuclear attacks will devastate the members of every religion. There will
be despair and agony in the entire world. That is the reason why India advocates and
supports total nuclear-weapon disarmament. The US was earlier for partial nuclear-
weapon disarmament. Now, the US appreciates India’s concern for the entire
humanity and for the people of every religion. That is the reason why President Barak
Obama very recently made public the US policy about embracing and promoting the
concept of the total disarmament of nuclear weapons.

Maintaining constant and good level in foreign relations with a nation that is far more
economically, militarily, and politically strong is not easy for a nation that is far less
strong than that nation; all the more so when the stronger nation is a vast, vibrant, and
a technically phenomenal nation like the US Being even or constant with the US is
difficult not only owing to its exemplary military and economic might but also owing
to the overbearing and abrupt nature of the US foreign policy. One of the attributes of
the US Administration with regard to the foreign policy is that it divides the world
into two blocks or two categories; one block that follows the policies and instructions
of the US and the second block is the one that does not do so. The second group or
category of nations is presumed hostile towards the US

As per the American view, there is no middle of the path concerning the matters
related foreign policy. A nation is either with the US or that is against the US That is
how the world is perceived by the US. In addition to the concept of two blocks as per
the US foreign policy, the US expects that the nations of the blocks attached to the US
must remain at the disposal of the US with regard to the matters of foreign policy
being followed by the Americans. If we study a chronology connected with US

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actions in the world politics, we will find that a nation does not have the option of
negotiations or dialogue with the US in any foreign policy related matter. The US
expects the nations of its block to adhere to its foreign policy in letter and spirit.

Another irksome matter related to the American foreign policy is that America has
created some concept of “rogue States”. The US is determined to isolates these States
completely in the matters of foreign relations including economic, trading, and
military matters. The US even wants UN sponsored sanctions against these rouge
States. The US has one avowed belief that all the nations associated with it in friendly
matters must follows these dictates of the US straight away without even any minor
modification. Iran is one example of the hostility of the US towards one UN member
nation. The US has imposed crippling sanctions with regard to civil and military
matters against Iran. One of the very significant sanctions is the total ban on the sale
of aircrafts and spare parts for aircrafts. The second one is about trading it oil with
Iran (Dubey 2015).

India cannot follow these guidelines of the US in totality and break all relations with
Iran. Iran is very vital for India’s oil supply needs, and India’s oil supply requirements
are humungous. There are other matters related to India’s external security in which
Iran is a partner of India.

India must believe in the independence of its judgments relating to its dealing
connected to all nations in this world. India should take decision in the matter of
foreign policy in the light of the fact that it is a pivotal member (a fountainhead) of
the NAM movement. Not following the norms enunciated by the NAM will become
something self-defeating for India. It will denigrate India’s position as a nation with
immense geographical significance. Many nations will deprecate India’s blind
following of the US dictates, and they will not consider India as an emerging
economic and military super power that is democratic with a population of 1.3billion
people. India should highlight this fact for the US to see that India has issues of its
own national interest, and every issue has to be assessed separately by India for its
survival and growth. Thus, in the face of many divergences with the US, India should
take every issue individually and conduct dialogue with the US

For coping up with the matters of foreign relations with the only super power in the
world, India will need assiduous and relentless efforts on the part of India. After the

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end of the Cold War, the global trading and political panorama has altered
considerably. India has become quite stable and strong in computer technology. India
has been making rapid economic stride after the liberalization policy of 1980s and
after the advent of internet and computer revolution. India has taken due note of the
new geographical dimensions of the “post-Cold War world” for a purpose of trade as
well as for any purpose connected with its own security.

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