A CANARA BANK AND ORS.

V.

SHRI DEBASIS DAS AND ORS.

MARCH 12, 2003

B [SHIVARAJ V. PATIL AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.]

Service law:

Canara Bank Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976-

C Regulation 6(18)-Charge sheet against employee-Report by Inquiry Officer
without giving him opportunity offiling written brief under the Regulation-- -'
Employee given personal hearing at appellate stage-Dismissal from service-
Writ Petition-High Court held order of dismissal violative of principles of
Natural Justice and violative of the Regulation which is mandatory provision--
D Case not decided on merit-Order ofSingle Judge upheld by Division Bench-
On appeal, held: Principles of Natural Justice not violated as no prejudice is
proved by the employee-Regulation does not require opportunity being granted
to the employee to file written brief-In the facts of the case post-decisional
hearing obliterated the procedural deficiency of a pre-decisional hearing-
Remitted back to High ·Court to decide the case on merit-Administrative
E law-Principles of Natural Justice.

Administrative law:

"Natural Justice" and "legal Justice "-Co-relation between-Discussed

F Maxims:

"Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa sua"; "Aliquis non debet
judex in propria causa quia non palest esse judex at pars"; "nemo pot est esse
simul actor at judex "and qui aliquid statuerit parte inandita al/eram act quam
licet dixerit, hand acquum facer it "-Meaning of
G
Words and Phrases:

Natural justice_' and 'Civil consequences '-Meaning of

Respondent-employee was issued four charge-sheets. After enquiry

H 968
 CANARA BANK 1•. DEBASIS DAS 969
in respect of one of the charges, disciplinary authority directed dismissal A
of the employee. The order of dismissal was set aside by High Court and
the employee was reinstated. After his reinstatement office orders were
issued to proceed with the inquiries regarding the remaining three charges.
Employee first requested to exonerate him from the charges, but later on
the basis of a letter from the bank dated 13.9.1989, took the stand that he B
had already been exonerated of the three charges. Photocopy of the above
letter which was written by Acting General Manager, was sent. Alleging
the letter to be fabricated document further charge-sheet was 'issued to
the employee. The employee wrote to the Acting Deputy General Manager
that the letter was signed by Deputy General Manager and not Acting
General Manager. During enquiry, employee wanted to make further C
submissions in his written briefs in terms of Regulation 6(18). Inquiry
Officer directed the Presenting Officer to submit his written briefs and to
send the same to the employee. Employee was directed to submit his
written brief within I 0 days from the receipt of the written briefs from
the Presenting Officer. On not getting written briefs from the employee,
Inquiry Officer sent.his report to the disciplinary authority who sent the D
report of the Inquiry Officer to the employee and asked for his submission
on the Report. Employee refused to make his submissions in the absence
of written brief of the Presenting Officer. Subsequently on getting the
written brief of the Presenting Officer the employee refused to file
submissions to the finding of the Inquiry Officer and took the stand that E
his written brief should be first considered by the Inquiry Officer
whereafter he should give a finding. Disciplinary authority on not getting
the submission of the employee on the Inquiry Report, held the employee
guilty and dismissed hiin from service. After one round of unsuccessful
litigation initiated before High Court by the employee against the dismissal
order passed by the disciplinary authority, he filed departmental appeal. F
Appellate authority, after giving a personal hearing to the appellant,
upheld the order of dismissal. Appellant filed writ petition which was
allowed by Single Judge of High Court holding that not affording
opportunity to the appellant by the Inquiry Officer was violative of
principles of natural justice. It was also directed that the disputed G
document be sent to Government Handwriting and Questioned Documents
Expert. Bank's appeal to Division Bench of High Court was dismissed
holding that the provisions of Regulation 6(18) are mandatory and the
same was not complied with as opportunity was not given to the employee
to file his written briefs; and that unfair trial cannot be cured by a fair
ap~L H
 970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) 2 S.C.R.

A In appeal to this Court, appellant-Bank contended that High Court

did not consider true import of Regulation 6(18) as no prejudice is caused
-
to the employee by the act of disciplinary authority and there was full
compliance of principle of audi alteram par/em; that even if deficiency in
the order of disciplinary authority is assumed, the same was made good
B by appellate authority by granting personal hearing; and that post
decisional hearing is permissible.

Respondent-employee contended that the Inquiry Officer was bound

to consider his written brief as he had given him opportunity for filing•
the same; that opportunity of personal hearing granted at appellate stage
C did not cure the incurable defect in the proceedings; and that the direction
of Single Judge to send the disputed document to Handwriting expert
stands as no prejudice is caused to the appellant-Bank.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

D HELD: I.I. A bare reading of sub-regulation (18) of Regulation 6

makes the position clear that there is no requirement of the employee being
granted an opportunity to file written briefs after the Presenting Officer
files written briefs. On the contrary, as the provision postulates, after
completion of production of evidence two options are open to the Inquiry
Officer. It may hear the Presenting Officer appointed and the concerned
E employee or in the alternative permit them to file written briefs within 15
days of the date of completion of the production of evidence if they so
desire. The written briefs are relatable to the cases of the party concerned;
otherwise the expression 'respective case' would be meaningless. It is not
required that one party has to wait till the filing of written briefs by the
F other. The expression "respectively", means belonging or relating
separately to each of several people. It is a word of severance.
1980-G, H; 981-A, Bl

1.2. In the appeal before the Appellate Authority findings of the

Inquiry Officer were challenged and, therefore, the question of any
G prejudice does not arise. Since employee had the opportunity to meet the
stand of the Bank, it was to his advantage, and opportunity for personal
hearing was also granted, though Regulation 6(18) does not even speak
of granting such an opportunity. Thus, there was no question of violation
of principles of natural justice. 1981-B, Cl

H Managing Director EC!L, Hyderabad and Ors. v. B. Karunakara and

 CANARA BANK r. DEBASIS DAS 971

Ors., 11993) 4 SCC 727, relied on. A

2.1. Natural justice is another name for commonsense justice. Rules
of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained
into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice
in a commonsense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural
ideals and human values. The administration of justice i~ to be freed from B
the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with
a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical
niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form.
[981-FJ

2.2. The expressions "natl!ral justice" and "legal justice" do not

c
present a water-tight classification. It is the substance of justice which is
to be secured by both and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this
solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural
justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical
pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated D
law. No form of procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the
presentation of a litigants' defence. [981-H; 982-AJ

2.3. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by

all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body
embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any E
administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These
principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is
commonly known as audi alteram par/em rule. It says that no one should
be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must
be precise and unambiguous. It should appraise the party determinatively F
the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate
so as to enable him to make his representation. hi the absence of a notice
of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes
wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice
of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of
the most important principles of nature justice. It is after all an approved G
rule of fair play. [982-B-D[

Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, [1963) 143 ER 414, referred

to.

2.4. Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid H
 972 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) 2 S.C.R.

A down by the courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the
individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a
judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order
affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority
from doing injustice. Justice should not only be done, but should be seen
B to be done. 1982-G; 984-Df

Ray v. local Government Board, 1191411 KB 160; General Council of

Medical Education and Registration of U.K. v. Sanckman, 119431 AC 627:
119481 2 All ER 337; Board of Education v. Rice (191 l) AC 179:80 LJKB
796 and Spackman v. Plumstead District Board of Works, 11985] lO AC 229:
C 54 LJMC 81, referred to.

2.5. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly
in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the
nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule
of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a
D given case must depend to a great extent on the fact and circumstances of
that case, and the framework of the statute under which the enquiry is
held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act
has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil
consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice.
Expression 'civil consequences' encompasses infraction of not merely
E property of personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations, and
non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects
a citizen in his civil life. 1984-E, Fl

Drew v. Drew and lebura, 118551 2 Ma cg.; James Dunber Smith v. Her
F Majesty the Queen, (1877-78) 3 App. Case 614,623 JC; Arthur John Specman
v. Plumstead District Board of Works, (1884-85) 10 App. Case 229, 240;
Vionet v. Barrett, 1885 (55) LJRD 39,41; Hookings v. Smethwick local Board
of Health, (1890) 24 QBD 712; Ridge v. Baldwin (1963) l WB 569, 578; Re.
R.N. (An lnfaot), 119671 2 8617, 530; Fairmoul71 investments ltd. v. Secretaiy
to State for Environment, 1976 WLR 1255 and Regina v. Secreta1y of State
G for Home Affairs Ex Parle Hosenball, (1977) I WLR 766, referred to.

Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1197812SCR621, referred to.

2.6. Over the years by a process of judicial interpretation two rules

have been evolved as representing the principles of natural justice in
H judicial process, including therein quasi judicial and administrative
 CANARA BANK 1•. DEBASIS DAS 973
process. They constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing, having their A
roots in the innate sense of man f(lr fair-play and justice which is not the
preserve of any particular race or country but is shared in common by
all men. The first rule is 'nemo judex in causa sua' or 'nemo debet esse judex
in propria causa sua' that is 'no man shall be a judge in his own cause'.
'Aliquis non debet esse judex in propria cause quia non pates/ esse judex at B
pars', that is, 'no man ought to be a judge in his own case, because he
cannot act as Judge and at the same time be a party'. The form 'nemo
palest esse simul actor at judex ', that is, 'no one can be at once suitor and
judge' is also at times used. The second rule is 'audi alteram partem ', that
is, 'hear the other side'. At times and particularly in continental countries,
the form 'audietur at altera pars' is used, meaning very much the same C
thing. A corollary has been deduced from the above two rules and
particularly the audi alteram partem rule, namely, 'qui aliquid statuerit parte
inaudits alteram actquam licet dixerit, haud acquwn facerit ', that is, 'he who
shall decide anything without tbe other side having been heard, although
he may have said what is right, will not have been what is right' or in
other words, as it is now expressed, 'justice should not only be done but D
should manifestly be seen to be done'. Whenever an order is struck down
as invalid being in violation of principles of natural justice, there is no
final decision of the case and fresh proceedings are left upon. All that is
done is to vacate the order assailed by virtue of its inherent defect, but
the proceedings are not tnminated. 1985-D-H; 986-Aj E
2.7. It is to be noted that legal formulations cannot be divorced from
the fact situation of the case. Personal hearing was granted by the
Appellate Authority, though not statutorily prescribed. In a given case
post-decisional hearing can obliterate the procedural deficiency of a pre-
decisional hearing. 1988-B, Cl F
Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of A.P. and Ors., AIR 119661 SC
828; Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India etc., AIR 11990) SC 1480; Managing
Director, EC/l, Hyderabad and Ors. v. B. Karunakara and Ors., 119931 4
SCC 727; Union Bank of India v. Vishwa Mohan, 119981 4 SCC 310 and
Punjab National Bank and Ors. v. Kun) Behari Misra, 119981 7 SCC 84, G
referred to.

2.8. At no stage the employee pleaded prejudice. Both Single Judge

and the Division Bench proceeded on the basis that there was no
compliance of the requirement of Regulation 6(18) and, therefore, H
 974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A prejudice was caused. In view of the finding that Regulation 6(18) has not
been correctly interpreted, the conclusions regarding prejudice are
indefensible. 1990-H; 991-AI

3. The matter is remitted to the High Court. It would be in the fitness

of things to direct examination of the documents by the expert in terms
B of Single Judge's order. The employee shall file originals of the documents
on which he relies upon, of which copies were placed before the High
Court. The appellant-Bank shall file originals of the documents on which
reliance was placed, if not already done. If the government expert is of
the view that documents produced by the employee are forged/fabricated
C or not authentic the order of dismissal shall stand. If, however, the report
of the expert is that the documents produced by the employee are genuine,
the order of dismissal has to be vacated. In case the originals are not filed
by the employee or the Bank, then the High Court shall pass necessary
orders, upholding the order of dismissal or setting aside the order of
dismissal, as the case may be. No other point shall be considered by the
D High Court. 1991-C-E]

M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 11999) 6 SCC 237, referred to. •

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7539 of 1999.

E From the Judgment and Order dated 20.4.1999 of the Kolkata High
Court in F.M.A.T. No. 11 of 1999.

P.P. Rao, Mukesh K. Giri, G. Balaji and R.C. Jha for the Appellants.

Jaideep Gupta, Rana Mukhe1jee, Siddharth Gautam, for Goodwill

F lndeevar, with him for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Cou11 was delivered by

ARIJIT PASAYA T, J. Scope and ambit of Regulation 6( 18) and 6(21)

of the Canara Bank Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations 1976
G (hereinafter referred to as 'the Regulations') fall for determination in this
-
appeal.

Filtering out unnecessary details, the factual background relevant for

adjudication for the present dispute is as follows:-

H Four charge-sheets dated 12.12.1987, 5.ll.1987, 23.3.1989 and

 CANARA BANK r. DEBASIS DAS [ARIJITPASAYAT,J.] 975
25.5. I 989 were issued to respondent no. 1-Debasis Das (hereinafter referred A
to as 'the employee') by the functionaries of the Canara bank, a Government
of India undertaking. Disciplinary proceedings were commenced. Charge-
sheet dated 5. I I. 1987 related to the non-vacation of residential quarter by the
employee after expiry of the lease period. On completion of inquiry in respect
of the said charge, disciplinary authority directed dismissal of the employee B
from the services of the Bank by order dated 28.8. 1989. The disciplinary
authority thereafter passed an order on I 3.9. I 989 which is the bone. of
contention of the parties. Details of the said order shall be dealt with infra
and after the recital of the factual position is completed. Order of dismissal
was challenged by the employee before the Calcutta High Court. By order
dated 14.12.1990 in writ petition CO No. 10514(W)/1989, the order of C
dismissal was set aside. Employee was reinstated on 28. LI 99 I. After
reinstatement three office orders were issued to proceed with the inquiries
relating to the other three charge-sheets. According to the employer-Bank the
proceedings were earlier suspended. Enquiry Officers and Presiding Officers
were aprointed in those proceedings. By letter dated 6.4.1991 employee
requested to drop the proceedings in the said charge-sheets and to exonerate D
him from the charges contained. On 23.4. I991 he was advised by the authority
to attend the inquiry proceedings. On 30.9.1991 list of the documents along
with the copies were sent to the employee. On 24. I 1.1992 employee for the
first time took the stand that he had been exonerated of the charges contained
in the three charge-sheets and all proceedings in connection therewith had E
been dropped. Along with his letter, a photocopy purporting to be a copy of
letter dated 13.9.1989 written by one Shri K.V. Nayak, officer of the Bank
was sent. According to the appellant the enclosure to employee's letter dated
24. I I .92 was a fabricated document and contents of the actual letter ·dated
13.9.1989 sent by the Bank had been interpolated. Treating the letter to be
a fabricated document further charge-sheet dated 21.5.1994 was issued where F
it was stated that during the progress of the pending three enquiries employee
had produced certain forged/fabricated documents before the disciplinary
authority and thus constituted misconduct. The charge-sheet along with
statement of imputation were served on the employee. On 7.6.1994 employee
wrote to the Acting Dy. General Manager that the proceedings dated 13.9. 1989 G
received by him from the Bank was singed by the Dy. General Manager and
not by the Acting General Manager or Shri K.V. Nayak as alleged or at all.
Enquiry into the charge-sheet was conducted, the documents relied upon by
the management were produced and the office copy of the letter issued under
the signature of Mr. K.V. Nayak, Acting General Manager was produced.
Certain witnesses were examined. During the inquiry employee was asked to H
 976 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A produce the original letter claimed to have been received by him, but his
stand was that he did not desire to part custody of the defence documents
-
since the same are very much required at a later stage. On 1.4.1995 the
minutes were accordingly recorded. The employee on that date made a
statement that he wanted to make further submissions in his written briefs
which he would be submitting in terms of Rule 6(18) and he was closing his
B evidence/defence. The Presenting Officer was directed by the Inquiry Officer
to submit his written briefs within 10 days i.e. before 12.4.1995. He was also
instructed to send a copy of his written briefs to the charged officer
simultaneously. Employee was further directed to submit his written briefs
within 10 days of the receipt of the written briefs from the Presenting Officer.
C The Presenting Officer subn:iitted his written briefs on 19.4.1995. Since no
written briefs were sent by the employee, the inquiry officer sent his report
to the disciplinary authority on 2.5.1995. On 19.5.1995 disciplinary authority
sent copy of the enquiry ceport to the employee and asked for his submission
in relation to the findings recorded by the Inquiry Authority. Employee took
the stand that he could not submit written briefs as he had not received copy
D of the Presenting Officer's written briefs. He requested for a copy. The
Disciplinary Authority on 2.7.1995 wrote to the employee that Presenting
Officer's briefs was sent to him on 2.5.1995 and as such he could make his
submission based on the findings of the enquiry officer and also on the oral/
documentary evidence which were recorded during the course of inquiry. He
E further informed that such submissions would be taken into account for final
decision in the matter. Employee by his letter dated 12.7.1995 stated that
without copy of the Presenting Officer's written briefs no effective submissions
could be made on the findings of the Enquiry Report. The Disciplinary
Authority sent copy of the briefs to the employee and asked him to make his
.submissions on the findings of the enquiry report. Employee asked for time
F till I0.8.1995. Finally on 4.8.1995 the employee stated that the written briefs
were being sent for consideration of the Enquiry Officer. On 7.8.1995 the
Disciplinary Authority asked the employee to file submissions to the findings
of the Inquiry Authority. On 12.8.1995 the employee took the stand that the
written briefs should be considered by the Inquiry Authority whereafter the
G findings of the Inquiry Officer should be made and he should be permitted
30 davs' time to give his submissions
J ~ I
on the findings of the said report. He
¥

did not make or send submissions on the findings of the Inquiry Officer. lly
order dated 29.9.1995 Disciplinary Authority held the employee guilty and
imposed punishment of dismissal from service agreeing with the findings of
the Inquiry Officer. On I I.I 0.1995 Howrah Branch of the appellant-Bank
H received order for effecting service on the employee. But he left the Bank
 '1-··
I CANARA BANK 1·. DEBASIS DAS [ARIJITPASAYAT,J.] 977
{
along with certain keys. Complaint was. lodged before the police on 13. I0.1995 A
regarding the removal of the keys. On 6.11.1995 employee filed writ petition
before the Calcutta High Cou1t. Learned Single Judge of the High Court
passed interim order restraining the Bank from giving effect to the final
order. Thereafter on 8.11.1995 the employee attended the Bank. An appeal
was preferred against the interim order by the Bank and the Appellate Court B
vacated the interim order. Employee filed a Special Leave Petition before this
Court which was dismissed. The order of dismissal was given effect on
-'_c. 5.2.1996 operative from 29.1.1996. Employee filed an appeal before the
prescribed departmental appellate authority. On 8.1.1997 the employee was
informed that the Appellate Authority would give personal hearing to him on
27.1.1997. During personal hearing, employee submitted a written statement C
and submitted some documents, one of them purported to be copy of letter
dated 13.9.1989, which was at variance with one which was produced by the
employee earlier and was also at variance with the original letter produced
by the management during the inquiry. According to the appellant, this letter
was another forged and fabricated document and this tim·e the letter was
claimed to have been signed by the Dy. General Manager and not by the D
Acting General Manager. In any event, it is not necessary to deal with the
aspect in detail. The Appellate Authority passed an order upholding the order
of dismissal. Employee filed a writ petition No. 9707 (W) of 1997, with
application for return of the documents produced by him before the Appellate
Authority. Learned Single Judge disposed of the interim application directing E
the appellant-Bank to return the original documents produced by the employee
before the Appellate_ Authority. When these documents were returned to the
employee he refused to accept them stating that he had not filed them before
the Appellate Authority. The Learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition
holding that Inquiry Officer had given an opportunity to the Presenting Officer
to file his written briefs and similar opportunity ought to have been given to F
the employee and thus there has been violation of principles of natural justice.
Further direction was given to send the disputed documents to the Government
Handwriting and Questioned Documents' Expert. It was observed that, if so
desired, the parties may pray for adducing fresh evidence before the Enquiry
Officer which shall be considered. The said order was challenged before the G
Division Bench. The appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench, inter alia,
with the conclusion that provisions of Regulation 6(18) are mandatory in
nature and the employee did not get an opportunity to file his written briefs
before the Inquiry Officer. Prejudice is patent as the author of the disputed
documents was not produced to prove or disprove his signature and contents

-
"
of the letters in question. Written briefs had to be considered by the Inquiry H
I
 978 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A Officer in terms of Regulation 6( 18), and order of dismissal shows that written
briefs of the employee had not been considered. An unfair trial cannot be
cured by a fair appeal. There was no question of directing the proceedings
to commence de novo from the inquiry report stage. Though Learned Single
Judge had not given specific directions regarding payment of back wages
B upon quashing of disciplinary proceedings, the consequences had to follow.

In support of the appeal, Mr. P.P. Rao, learned counsel for the appellant
submitted that the true import of Regulation 6(18) has not been considered
·~

by the High Court. As no prejudice was caused to the employee by the action
taken by the Disciplinary Authority, and there was full compliance with the
C principles of audi alteram partem. Even if it is conceded for the sake of
argument that there was any deficiency in the order passed by the Disciplinary
Authority, same was abundantly made good by the Appellate Authority which
granted personal hearing to the employee. Post decisional hearing is permissible
and in fact personal hearing was granted though there was no such requirement.
No prejudice has been shown.
D
In response learned counsel for the employee submitted that the Inquiry
Officer had permitted filing of the written briefs by the employee after written
briefs was submitted by the Presenting Officer. As the employee had not
received the copy of written briefs, therefore, there was delay and the Inquiry
Officer was duty bound to consider the written briefs of the employee. Merely
E because the Appellate Authority granted opportunity of personal hearing that
did not cure the incurable defect in the proceedings. Furthermore, the directions
of the Learned Single Judge for sending the disputed documents to the expert
stand and the Bank is not prejudiced in any manner. He in essence supported
the High Court's judgment.
F Since Regulation 6(18) is the provision round which the controversy
centers, it would be appropriate to quote the same. So far relevant it reads as
follows:

"Regulation 6(18): The Inquiring Authority may, after the completion

of production of evidence hear the Presenting Officer, if any, appointed
G
and the Officer employee, or perm it them to file written briefs of the
respective cases within 15 days of the date of completion of the
production of evidence if they so desire."

It would be also relevant to extract Regulation 6(21) which reads as

H follows:
 CANARA BANK"· DEBASIS DAS [ARlnTPASAYAT,J] 979
"Regulation 6(2 /): (i) On the conclusion of the inquiry the inquiring A
authority shall prepare a report which shall contain the following:

(a) a gist of the article of charge and the statement of the imputations
of misconduct or misbehaviour;

(b) a gist of t~e defence of the officer employee in respect of each B

article of charge;

( c) an assessment of the evidence in respect of each article of charge; ·

(d) the findings on each article of charge and the reasons therefor.

Explanation:. If, in the opinion of the Inquiring authority, the C

proceedings of the inquiry establish any article of charge different
from the original article of charge, it may record its findings on such
article of charge:

Provided that the findings on such article of charge shall not be

recorded unless the officer employee has either admitted the facts on D
which such article of charge is based or has had a reasonable
opportunity of defending himself against such article of charge.

(ii) The inquiring authority, where it is not itself the Disciplinary

Authority, shall forward to the Disciplinary Authority, the records of
. inquiry which shall include. E
(a) the report of the inquiry prepared by it under clause (i); ·

(b) the written statement of defence, if any, submitted by the

officer employee referred to in sub-regulation (I 5);
(c) the oral and documentary evidence produced in the course F
of the inquiry;

- (d) written briefs referred to in sub-regulation ( 18) if any; and

(e) the orders, if any, made by the Disciplinary Authority and

the inquiring authority in regard to the inquiry." G
It is to be noted that the Disciplinary Authority can himself be the
!~quiring Authority. In that sense the Inquiry Officer is an agent of the
Disciplinary Authority. The regulations make this position crystal clear in
Regulation (7). It reads as follows:
H
 980 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A "Regulation 7: Action on the fnquily Report:

(l) The Disciplinary Authority, if it is not itself the inquiring

authority may for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, rem it the
case to the inquiring au.thority for fresh or further inquiry and report
and the inquiring authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further
B inquiry according to the provisions of regulation 6 as far as may be.

(2) The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it disagrees with the

findings of the inquiring authority on any article of charge, record its
reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such
charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose.
c
(3) If the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to its findings on
all or any of the articles of charge is of the opinion that any of the
penalties specified in regulatior , 3hould be imposed on the officer
employee it shall notwithstanding anything contained in regulation 8,
make an order imposing such penalty.
D
(4) If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on
all or any ofthe articles of charge is of the opinion that no penalty
is called for, it may pass an order exonerating the officer employee
concerned."

E It is to be noted that both the expressions "may" and "shall" appear in

Regulation (7). The former expression is used when the Disciplinary Authority,
if it is not the Inquiring Authority can remit the case to the Inquiring Authority
for fresh or further inquiry and report and the latter expression is used vis-
a-vis the Inquiring Authority who is required to proceed to conduct further
inquiry according to provision of Regulation (6) as far as may be applicable.
F
Regulation 6(2 l)(ii) deals with the documents which are to be forwarded
r
to the Disciplinary Authority _in case it is not the Inquiring Authority. The
documents to be forwarded include the written briefs referred to in sub-
regulation ( 18).
G A bare reading of sub-regulation ( 18) of Regulation 6 makes the position
clear that there is no requirement of the employee being granted an opportunity t
'
to file written briefs after the Presenting Officer files written briefs. On the
contrary, as the provisions postulate, after completion of production of evidence
two options are open to the Inquiry Officer. It may hear the Presenting
H f
Officer appointed and the concerned employee or in the alternative permit •·

-'
 CANARA BANK 1•. DEBASIS DAS [ARIJITPASAYAT,J.] 981
them to file written briefs within 15 days of the date of completion of the A
production of evidence if they so desire. The written briefs are relatable to
the cases of the party concerned; otherwise the expression 'respective case'
would be meaningless. In other words, the written briefs must contain what
his case is. There is no requirement of filing written briefs one after the other.
It is not required that one party has to wait till filing of written briefs by the B
other. The expression "respectively", means belonging or relating separately
to each of several people. It is a word of severance.

It is to be further noted that in the appeal before the Appellate Authority

findings of the Inquiry Officer were challenged and, therefore, the question
of any prejudice does not arise. Since employe·e had the opportunity to meet C
the stand of the Bank, it was to his advantage, and opportunity for personal
hearing was also granted, though Regulation 6( 18) does not even speak to
grant such an opportunity. Keeping in view what was observed in B.
Karunakara 's case (supra) there was no question of violation of principles of
natural justice.
D
On that score the conclusion arrived at by the Learned Single Judge
and the Division Bench that there was violation of principles of natural
justice cannot be maintained.

Residual and crucial question that remains to be adjudicated is whe.ther

principles of natural justice have been violated; and if so, what ex.tent any E
prejudice has been caused. It may be noted at this juncture that in soine cases
it has been observed that where grant of opportunity in terms of principles
of natural justice do not improve the situation, "useless formality theory" can
be pressed into service.

Natural justice is another name for commonsense justice. Rules of F

natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into
the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration. of justice in a
commonsense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and
human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow
and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated G
law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the
'substance of justice which has to determine its form.

The expressions "natural justice;, and "legal justice" do not present a

water-tight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be secured
by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose,· H
 982 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal
justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical
prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord
Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude
the presentation of a litigants' defence.

B . The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by all

civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks
on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action
involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well settled.
The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram
C ·partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the
·first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should
appraise the party determinatively the case he has to meet. Time given for the
purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation.
In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the
order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party
D should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against
him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after
all an approved rule of fair play. The concept has gained significance and
shades with time. When the historic document was made at Runnymede in
1215, the first statutory recognition of this principle found its way into the
E "Magna Carta". The classic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of natural justice
requires to "vocate interrogate and adjudicate". In the celebrated case of
Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, (1963) 143 ER 414, the principle
was thus stated:

"Even God did not pass a sentence upon Adam, before he was
p called upon to make his defence. "Adam" says God, "where art thou
has thou not eaten of the tree whereof 1 commanded thee that though
should not eat".

Since then the principle has been chiselled, honed and refined, enriching
its content. Judicial treatment has added light and luminosity to the concept,
G like polishing of a diamond.

Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down
by the Courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual
against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-
judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those
H rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice.
 CANARA BANK 1•. DEBASIS DAS [ARIJITPASAYAT,J.] 983

- What is meant by the term 'principles of natural justice' is not easy to

determine. Lord Summer (then Hamilton, L.J.) in Ray v. Local Government
Board, (1914) 1 KB 160 at p.199:83 LJKB 86) described the phrase as sadly
lacking in precision. Jn General Council of Medical Education & Registration
A

of UK. v. Sanckman, (1943) AC 627: ( 1948) 2 All ER 337, Lord Wright

observed that it was not desirable to attempt 'to force it into any procusteam B
bed' and mentioned that one essential requirement was that the Tribunal
should be impartial and have no personal interest in the controversy, and
further that it should give 'a full and fair opportunity' to every party of being
heard.

Lord Wright referred to the leading cases on. the subject. The most C
important of them is the Board of Education v. Rice, (1911) AC 179:80
LJKB 796, where Lord Loreburn, L.C. observed as follows:

"Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have.

originated, the practice of imposing upon d~artments or offices of
State the duty of deciding or determining questions of various kinds. D
It will, I suppose usually be of an administrative kind, but sometimes,
it will involve matter of law as well as matter of fact, or even depend
upon matter of law alone. In such cases, the Board of Education will
have to ascertain the law and also to ascertain the facts. I need not
and that in doing either they must act in good faith and fairly listen E
to both sides for that is a duty lying upon everyone who decides
anything. But I do not think they are bound to treat such a question
as though it were a trial.. .. The Board is in the nature of the arbitral
tribunal, and a Court of law has no jurisdiction to hear appeals from
the determination either upon law or upon fact. But if the Court is F
satisfied either that the Board have not acted judicially in the way I
have described, or have not determined the question which they are
required by the Act to determine, then there is a remedy by mandamus
and certiorari".

Lord Wright also emphasized from the same decision the observation G
of the Lord Chancellor that the Board can obtain information in any way they
think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties to the
controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial
to their view". To the same effect are the observations of Earl of Selbourne,
LO in Spackman v. Plumsiead District Board of Works, (1985) 10 AC 229:54
H
 984 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A LJMC 81 ), where the learned and noble Lord Chancellor observed as follows:
----
"No doubt, in the absence of special provisions as to how the
person who is to decide is to proceed, law will imply no more than
that the substantial requirements of justice shall not be violated. He
is not a judge in the proper sense of the word; but he must give the
B parties an opportunity of being heard before him and stating their
case and their view. He must give notice when he will proceed with
.the_ matter and he must act honestly and impartially and not under the
dictation of some other person or persons to whom the authority is
not given by law. There must be no malversaiion of any kind. There
C would be no decision within the meaning of the statute if there were
anything of that sort done contrary to the essence of justice".

Lord Selbour-ne also added that the essence of justice consisted in requiring
that all parties should have an opportunity of submitting to the person by
whose decision they are to be bound, such considerations as in their judgment
D ought to be brought before him. All these cases lay down the very important
rule of natural justice contained in the oft-quoted phrase 'justi.ce should not
only be done, but should be seen to be done'.

Concept. of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in

E recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly
in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the
nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of
natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given
case must depend to a great extent on the fact and circumstances of that case,
the frame-work of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old
F distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered
away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must
be consistent with the rules of natural justice. Expression 'civil consequences'
encompasses infraction of not m'erely property or personal rights but of civil
liberties, material deprivations, and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide
G umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life.

Natural justice has been variously defined by different Judges. A few

instances will suffice. In Drew v. Drew and Lebura, (1855) 2 Macg. 1.8,
Lord Cran worth defined it as 'universal justice'. In James Dunber Smith v.
Her Majesty the Queen, (1877-78) 3 App. Case 614, 623 JC Sir Robort P.
i'H Collier, speaking for the judicial committee of Privy council, used the phrase
 CANARA BANK,.. DEBASIS DAS [ARIJITPASAYAT,J.] 985
'the requirements of substantial justice', while in Arthur John Specman v. A
Plumstead District Board of Works, (1884-85(10) App.Case 229, 240), Earl
of Selbourne, S.C. preferred the phrase 'the substantial requirement of justice'.
In Vionet v. Barrett, (1885 (55) LJRD 39, 41 ), Lord Esh er, MR defined
natural justic.e as· 'the natural sense of what is right and wrong'. While,
however, deciding Hookings v. Smethwick Local Board of Health, (1890 (24) B
QBD 712), Lord Fasher, M.R. instead of using the definition given earlier by
him in Vionet's case (supra) chose to define natural justice as 'fundamental
justice'. In Ridge v. Baldwin (I 963 (I) WB 569, 578), Harman LJ, in the
Court of ·Appeal countered natural justice with 'fair-play in action' a phrase
favoured by Bhagawati, J. in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978 (2)
SCR 621). In re R.N (An Jnfaot) (1967 (2) B617, 530), Lord Parker, CJ, C
preferred to describe natural justice as 'a duty to act fairly'. In fairmount
Investments Ltd. v. Secretary to State for Environment, (1976 WLR 1255)
Lord Russeil of Willowan somewhat picturesquely described natural justice
as 'a fair crack of the whip' while Geoffrey Lane, LJ. in Regina v. Secretary
of State for Home Affairs Ex Parle Hosenbal!, (1977 (l) WLR 766) preferred D
the homely phrase 'common fairness'.

How then have the principles of natural justice been interpreted in the
Courts and within what limits are they to be confined? Over the years by a
process of judicial interpretation two rules have been evolved as representing
the principles of natural justice .in judicial process, including therein quasi E
judicial and administrative process. They constitute the basic elements of a
fair hearing. having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair-play and
justice which is not the preserve of any particular race or country but is
shared in common by all men. The first rule is 'nemo judex in causa sua' or
'nemo debet esse judex in propria causa sua' as stated in (1605) 12 Co.Rep.114
that is, 'no man shall be a judge in his own cause'. Coke used the form F
'aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa quia non potest esse judex at
pars' (Co.Litt. 1418), that is, 'no man ought to be a judge in his own case,
because he cannot act as Judge and at the same time be a party'. The fonn
.--
'nemo potest esse simul actor et judex', that is, 'no one can be at once suitor
and judge' is also at times used. The second rule is 'audi alteram partem', G
that is, 'hear the other side'. At times and paiticularly in continental countries,
the form 'audietur at altera pars' is used, meaning very much the same thing.
A corollary has been deduced from the above two rules and particularly the
audi alteram partem rule, namely 'qui aliquid statuerit parte inaudita alteram
actquam licet dixerit, haud acquum facerit' that is, 'he who shall decide
anything without the other side having been heard, although he may have H
 986 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] 2 S.C.R.

A said what is right, will not have been what is right' (See Bosewell 's case
( 1605) 6 Co.Rep. 48-b, 52-a) or in other words, as it is now expressed,
'justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done'.
Whenever an order is struck down as invalid being in violation of principles
of natural justice, there is no final decision of the case and fresh proceedings
B are left. upon. All that is done is to vacate the ord~r assailed by virtue of its
inherent.defect, but the proceedings are not terminated.

What is known as 'useless formality theory' has received consideration

of this Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, [1999] 6 SCC 237. It was
observed as under:
c "Before we go into the final aspect of this contention, we would
like to state that case relating to breach of natural justice do also
occur where all facts are no{ admitted or are not all beyond dispute.
In the context of those cases there is a considerable case-law and
literature as to whether relief can be refused even if the court thinks
D that the case of the applicant is not one of 'real substance' or that
there is no substantial possibility of his success or that the result will
not be different, even if natural justice is followed (See Malloch v.
Aberdeen Corpn: (1971) 2 All ER 1278, I-IL) (per Lord Reid and
Lord Wilberforce), Glynn v. Keele University: (1971) 2 A.II ER 89;
Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority: (I 980) 2 All ER 368, CA)
E and other cases where such a view has been held. The latest addition
to this view is R v. Ealing Magistrates' Court, ex p. Fannaran (I 996
(8) Admn. LR 35 I, 358) (See de Smith, Suppl. P.89 (! 998) where
Straughton, L.J. held that there must be 'demonstrable beyond doubt'
that the result would have been different. Lord Woolf in Lloyd v.
McMohan, (1987) (I) All ER I I 18: CA) has also not disfavoured
F
refusal of discretion in certain cases of breach of natural justice. The
New Zealand Court in McCarthy v. Grant (1959 NZLR 1014) however
goes halfway when it says that (as in the case of bias), it is sufficient
for the appiicant to shO\v that there is 'real likelihood-not certainty-
of prejudice'. On the other hand, Garner Administrative Law (8th
G Edn. 1996. pp.271-72) says that slight proof that the result would
have been different is sufficient. On the other side of the argument,
we have apart from Ridge v. Baldwin ( 1964 AC 40: ( 1963) 2 All ER
66, I-IL), Mcgarry, J. in John v. Rees (1969) (2) All ER 274) stating
that there are always 'open and shut cases' and no absolute rule of
proof of prejudice can be laid down. Merits are not for the court but
H
 CANARA BANK"· DEBASIS DAS [ARIJ!TPASAYAT,J.] 987
for the authority to consider. Ackner, J has said that the. 'useless .A
formality theory' is a dangerous one and, however inconvenient,
natural justice must be followed. His Lordship observed that
'convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms'. More
recently, Lord Bingham has deprecated the 'useless formality theory'
in R. v. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p.
Cotton ( 1990 IRLR 344) by giving six reasons (see also his article B
'Should Public Law Remedies be Discretionary?" I 991 PL. p.64). A
detailed and emphatic criticism of the 'useless formality theory' has
been made much earlier in 'Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow' by
Prof. D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL.pp.27-63) contending that
Malloch (supra) and Glynn (supra) were wrongly decided. Foulkes C
(Administrative Law, 8th Edn. 1996, p.323), Craig (Administrative
Law, 3rd Edn. P.596) and others say that the court cannot prejudge
what is to be decided by the decision-making authority. De Smith
(5th Edn. 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet
committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always
with the court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn. 1994, pp.526- D
530) says that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has
to be made according to the nature of the decision. Thus, in relation
to cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable facts,
there is a considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant
can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favour or E
he has to prove a case of substance or if he can prove a 'real likelihood'
of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some remote
chance of success. We may, however, point out that even in cases
where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is a
considerable unanimity that the courts can, in exercise of their
'discretion', refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or injunction F
even though natural justice is not followed. We may also state that
there is yet another line of cases as in State Bank of Patia/a v. S.K.
Sharma, [1996] 3 SCC 364, Rajendra Singh v. Siate of MP., [1996]
5 sec 460 that even in relation to statutory provisions requiring
notice, a distinction is to be made between cases where the provision G
is intended for individual benefit and where a provision is intended
to protect public interest. In the former case, it can be waived while
in the case of the latter, it cannot. be waived ..

We do not propose to express any opinion on the correctness or

otherwise of the 'useless formality theory' and leave the matter for H
 988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A decision in an appropriate case, inasmuch as the case before us,

'admitted and indisputable' facts show that grant of a writ will be in
vain as pointed by Chinnappa Reddy, J."

As was observed by this Court we need not go into 'useless formality

theory' in detail; in view of the fact that no prejudice has been shown. As is
B rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the appellants unless failure of
justice is occasioned or that it would not be in public interest to dismiss a
petition on the fact situation of a case, this Court may refuse to exercise said
jurisdiction (see Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of A.P. and Ors., AIR
(1966) SC 828. It is to be noted that i~gal formulations cannot be divorced
C from the fact situation of the case. Personal hearing was granted by the
Appellate Authority, though not statutorily prescribed. In a given case post-
decisional hearing can obliterate the procedural deficiency of a pre-decisional
hearing. (See Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India etc., AIR (1990) SC 1480.

Additionally there was no material placed by the employee to show as

D to how he has been prejudiced. Though in all cases the post-decisional hearing
cannot be a substitute for pre-decisional hearing, iri the case at hand the
position is different. The position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in
Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. v. B. Karunakara and Ors.,
[1993] 4 sec 727 at para 31 which reads as follows:

E "Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer's report is not furnished
to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts
and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to
the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming
to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show
how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the
F report. If after hearing the pa1iies, the Court/Tribunal comes to the
conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no
difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the
Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment.
The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of
G punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is
regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting
to sho1i cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which will apply their
judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside
or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal
appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of
H
 CANARA BANK 1·. DEBASIS DAS [ARIJITPASAYAT,l.] 989
the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable A
opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds Iha: the furnishing
of the report would have made a difference to the resu It in the case
that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following
the above procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside the order of
punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct B
reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management
to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension
and continuing the inquiry from the state of furnishing him with the
report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the
back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the
date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be C
left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after
the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome.
If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be
reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to
law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the D
reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits,
he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting
aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated
as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from
the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh
inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law." E
The position was again reiterated in Union Bank of India v. Vishwa
Mohan, [ 1998] 4 SCC 310 at page 314 ). The relevant para 9 reads as follows:

"We are totally in disagreement with the above-quoted reasoning of

the High Comt. The distinction sought to be drawn by the High Court F
that the first charge-sheet served on the respondent related to the
period when he was a clerk whereas the other three charge-sheets
related to the period when he was promoted as a bank officer. In the
present case, we are required to see the findings of the enquiry
authority, the order of the Disciplinary Authority as well as the order G
of the Appellate Authority since the High Court felt that the charges
levelled against the respondent after he was promoted as an officer
were not of a serious nature. A bare look at these charges wou Id
unmistakably indicate that they relate to misconduct of a serious
nature. The High Court also committed an error when it assumed that
when the respondent was promoted as a bank officer, he must be H
 990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S. C.R.

A having a good repo1i otherwise he would not have been promoted.

This finding is totally unsustainable because the various acts of
misconduct came to the knowledge of the Bank in the year 1989 and
thereafter the first charge-sheet was issued on 17 .2 .1989. The
respondent was promoted as a bank officer sometime in the year
1988. At that time, no such adverse material relating to the misconduct
B
of the respondent was noticed by the Bank on which his promotion
could have been withheld. We are again unable to accept the reasoning
of the High Court that in the facts and circumstances of the case "it
is difficult to apply the principle of severability as the charges are so
inextricably mixed up". If one reads the four charge-sheets, they all
C relate to the serious misconduct which includes taking bribe, failure
to protect the interests of Bank, failure to perform duties with utmost
devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty, acting in a manner
unbecoming of a bank officer etc. In our considered view, on the
facts of this case, this principle has no application but assuming that
it applies yet the High Court has erred in holding that the principle
D of severability cannot be applied in the present case. The finding in
this behalf is unsustainable. As stated earlier, the appellant had in his
possession the enquiry report/findings when he filed the statutory
appeal as well as the writ petition in the High Court. The High Court
was required to apply its judicial mind to all the circumstances and
E then form its opinion whether non-furnishing of the report would
have made any difference to the result in the case and thereupon pass
an appropriate order. In para 31, this Court in Managing Director,
ECIL has very rightly cautioned: (SCC p. 758)

"The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order

F of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as
is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid
resorting to short cuts".

Strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for the employee on a

three-Judge Bench of this Court in Punjab National Bank and Ors. v. Kun) -
G Behari Misra, (1998] 7 sec 84. The said decision has no application and is
factually distinguishable. That was a case where the Disciplinary Authority
differed from the views of the inquiry officer. In that context it was held that
denial of opportunity of hearing was per se violative of the principles of
natural justice. The case at hand is founded on totally different factual
H backdrop.
 CANARA BANK 1•. DEBASIS DAS [ARIJITPASAYAT,J.] 991

It is to be noted that at no stage the employee pleaded prejudice. Both A

Learned Single Judge and the Division Bench proceeded on the basis that
there was no complianr.e of the requirement of Regulation 6(18) and, therefore,
prejudice was caused. In view of the finding recorded supra that Regulation
6(18) has not been correctly interpreted, the conclus_ions regarding prejudice
are indefensible.
B
It is further to be noted that case of the parties on merits was not
considered by Learned Single Judge or the Division Bench. Notwithstanding
the fact that there was no consideration of the respective cases, Learned
Single Judge directed examination of the documents by the expert.

The inevitable result is that the judgment of the Division Bench c

confirming that of the Learned Single Judge has to be quashed so far as it
relates to the ,question of violation of principles of natural justice. But that is
not the end of the matter. There was no consideration of the merits of the
case as noted above. It would be in the fitness of things to direct examination
of the documents by the expert in terms of Learned Single Judge's order. The D
employee shall file originals of the documents on which he relies upon, of
" which copies were placed before the High Court. The appellant-Bank shall
file originals of the documents on which reliance was placed, if not already
done. If the government expert is of the view that documents produced by the
employee are forged/fabricated or not authentic the order of dismissal shall
stand. If, however, the report of the expert is that the documents produced by E
the employee are genuine, the order of dismissal has to be vacated. In case
the originals, as directed above, are not filed by the employee or the Bank,
then the High Court shall pass necessary orders, upholding the order of
dismissal or setting aside the order of dismissal, as the case may be. No other
point shall be considered ·by the High Court. The matter shall be heard by the p
Division Bench by restoration of the writ appeal.

The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated.

K.K.T. Appeal allowed.