THOMAS AQUINAS ON SEXUAL PLEASURE

John Giles Milhaven

ABSTRACT

A key to understanding the sexual ethics of Thomas Aquinas is his position that
spouses sin whenever their purpose in having intercourse is the pleasure of it The
pleasure itself, Thomas declares, is not sinful, but necessary, natural and good
Nevertheless, it cannot be rational man's intended end Other sense pleasures can be,
inasmuch as they are pleasures of knowing something, e g , a beautiful color Sexual
pleasure is a pleasure of knowing, too, but the kind of knowing is so minimal and
negligible that it is not worthy of being an end intended by rational man In modern
critical dialogue one can ask Is Thomas' ethical thinking radically handicapped by a
model of knowledge that is valid, but unreahstically exclusive9

The moral appraisal Thomas makes of sexual pleasure is central to his

whole sexual ethics. Like the rest of his special ethics, his sexual ethics is
framed in terms of virtues and vices. ' The basic virtues and vices pertinent to
sexual ethics—temperantia, intemperantia, castitas, luxuria, virgimtas—are
defined in terms of their relation to sexual pleasure. Thomas does not define
them, as one might expect him to do, in terms of their relation to the right kind
of sexual activity or to the proper end of sexual activity. He speaks often
enough of right and wrong kinds of sexual activity and of the proper end to be
sought in sexual activity. But the basic virtues and vices pertaining to human
sexuality consist formally in the right and wrong dispositions towards sexual
pleasure.2
Even sympathetic modern commentators have judged (Fuchs, 1944:24-26,
55-56, 60, 66-71, 219, 226-27, 273; Doherty, 1966:278-79; Noonan, 1965:293-
95; Van der Marck, 1967:105) that the various statements Thomas makes
about sexual pleasure do not form a coherent, consistent whole. In certain

JRE 5/2 (1977), 157-181

158 MILHAVEN

passages, Thomas evinces a strongly negative evaluation of sexual pleasure; in

other passages, an unequivocally positive one. I will, however, try to show that
Thomas' total view of sexual pleasure is a remarkably coherent and consistent
one. On the other hand, I will eventually suggest that his view is a remarkably
narrow, limited one that invites the critical dialogue of the contemporary
Christian ethicist.3

The present essay centers on the only sexual pleasure that Thomas did not
consider to be necessarily sinful, i.e., the sexual pleasure of married people. At
first glance, Thomas does appear to be inconsistent in his different comments
on this pleasure. On the one hand, when he lays down certain moral rules for
married Christians, he seems to have an extremely low opinion of their sexual
pleasure. Adducing the nature of sexual pleasure, he prohibits or discourages
sexual intercourse at certain times in the lives of the Christian spouses. Their
sexual relations render inappropriate the reception of the Eucharist on the
following day (STIII, 80,7; Suppl. 64,1). They are not permitted on holy days
when one should devote oneself to prayer and spiritual matters {Suppl 64,5).
They are not appropriate during times set aside for religious meditation or
religious services or liturgy (Suppl. 41, 3).
These strictures coincide in part and differ in part in what is discouraged or
forbidden. But Thomas' reason for each stricture is the same: the nature of
sexual pleasure. In man's fallen state resulting from original sin, sexual
pleasure is not submissive to reason, but, powerfully absorbing the mind,
irresistibly distracts it from spiritual realities. Although conjugal sex,
generally speaking, is not sinful, the consequences of its pleasure make it
unfitting for times given to spiritual activity.4
In another passage, Thomas darkens further the picture of sexual
pleasure. He is advancing an argument why close relatives should not marry.
The pleasure of sexual intercourse "seriously corrupts the judgment of moral
wisdom " To multiply such pleasure, therefore, is contrary to good morals Now such
pleasure is increased by the love of the persons in the union. It would, therefore, be
contrary to good morals for close relatives to be united, because in their case the love
that comes from common origin and sustenance would be added to the love of
concupiscence And, the love being multiplied, the soul would be necessarily more
overcome bv the pleasure s

Thomas' view of natural human love, expressed in the passage just cited, is
curious. Why does he not discuss the possibility that this kind of love might
also make some positive contribution to the higher activities of man, including
his moral wisdom?6 What is to our present point, however, is that Thomas
sees conjugal sexual pleasure as corrupting moral wisdom. Here, as in the
strictures previously considered, Thomas premises that sexual pleasure has
considerable disvalue because of its effects on the mind of the spouse.
THOMAS AQUINAS ON SEXUAL PLEASURE 159

Other passages convey a yet more negative view of conjugal sexual

pleasure. In these texts, the premise for Thomas' argumentation is not the
deleterious effects of sexual pleasure, for he pronounces on all and any
conjugal intercourse. Some of this intercourse is necessary for procreation
and this presumably justifies any bad consequences. But whenever it is the
appetite for sexual pleasure {concupiscentid) that moves the husband to
intercourse with his wife, he sins, at least venially. He sins, therefore, not
because of what he does or because of the results of what he does, but because
of what moves him to do it. He sins because he is acting "out of" {ex) his
appetite or desire for sexual pleasure.7
This condemnation of the desire for pleasure as motive for conjugal
intercourse has drawn criticism from modern readers of Thomas. Moreover,
it seems to contradict positive utterances of Thomas which we are about to
consider. However, the burden of our argument will be that this
condemnation is no inconsistency, but, rightly understood, reveals the
coherent rationale of Thomas' systematic treatment of sexual pleasure and,
therefore, of Thomas' whole sexual ethics.

In apparent conflict with the negative statements just considered, Thomas'

moral appraisal of fallen man's appetite for sexual pleasure is a relatively
positive one in comparison with that of other medieval theologians and later
theologians of the Reform. He rejects the widespread medieval position that
this appetite {concupiscentid) is essentially sinful. He also denies—and is the
first medieval theologian to do so—that this appetite constitutes a flaw or
perversion of human nature. Original sin has "corrupted" the appetite only in
reducing it to its natural state. In its natural state, concupiscentia is no longer
completely subject to reason. Instead, it tends simply into its own object,
sexual pleasure, and can be governed by reason only to a limited extent. But
this spontaneous tendency is the "state befitting man according to his natural
principles." The total subjection of man's lower forces to his reason, the state
he enjoyed before the fall, was due not to his nature, but to the "original justice
given him over and above his nature by divine liberality." Christian virtue
need not and cannot regain this "supernatural" dominion over man's lower
nature. The virtue of chastity can coexist with this penalty {poena) of original
sin, i.e., with the purely natural reality of its sex appetite.8
Indeed, the virtue of chastity requires this natural sense appetite.
Deficiency in this particular sense appetite, i.e., a certain insensibility to
sexual pleasure, constitutes one of the vices opposed to the mean of chastity.9
Chastity is a virtue not merely of restraint, but also of promotion of sexual
activity. Chastity entails, for the married person, the sexual activity that
fulfills the goal of marriage: procreation. This activity properly proceeds from
two appetites: the sex appetite of man, which is one of his sense appetites, and
160 MILHAVEN

the general rational appetite of man, which is his will. Consequently, the virtue
of chastity disposes and orders both these appetites to the appropriate
activity. If the sense appetite, i.e., the individual's sexual passions, is not
habitually disposed and ordered in this way, he is not chaste. He is not chaste
even if his rational appetite is well developed enough to withstand the passions
and govern his sexual behavior so that he acts in an exemplary way.10 A
morally good bodily act calls for the contribution of a sense appetite as well as
of the rational appetite.

just as it is better that a man both will the good and do it in an external act, so, too, it
belongs to the perfection of a moral good that the man be moved to the good not only by
his will, but also by his sense appetite "

The virtue of chastity requires, therefore, that the appetite for sexual pleasure
move the chaste spouse to intercourse.
Has Thomas contradicted himself? Concupiscentia is not sinful. It is not a
flaw or perversion of human nature. It is fully natural and should move the
chaste spouse to conjugal intercourse. On the other hand, as we saw earlier,
the spouse sins if concupiscentia moves him to conjugal intercourse. The
contradiction, however, is only apparent. As Joseph Pieper (1965:153-75)
points out, the impulse given by concupiscentia is understood differently in
the two statements. The impulse of concupiscentia required by the virtue of
chastity is one approved by man's reason. The impulse that is sinful is one
lacking any such approval. The spouse sins if his sexual appetite on its own,
without the concurrence of reason, moves him to intercourse. He acts
virtuously if the appetite does this under reason's governance. In condemning
pleasure as motive for conjugal intercourse, therefore, Thomas does not
contradict his assertion of the moral necessity and value of the sensual desire
for sexual pleasure. He is only insisting on the even greater moral necessity
and value that reason, seeing reality lucidly, be in command.
In this context, however, Thomas insists also on something else, which
Pieper ignores. In approving the exercise of the sexual appetite, reason cannot
have as its motive the motive of the sexual appetite. It is essential to virtue not
merely that reason approve the exercise of the spouse's sexual appetite. It is
equally essential, says Thomas, that that exercise never be "for the sake of
pleasure alone" (propter solam delectatwnem). Reason can never approve
such a purpose. The sexual appetite, itself, being a sense appetite, necessarily
seeks its pleasure, as it moves the spouse to engage in intercourse. But pleasure
is not the end (Jims) ordained by nature for sexual activity. Consequently, the
virtuous sexual activity of the spouse must be ordered by reason to some other
end.12
Thomas clarifies the principle in a further application of it. It is contrary to
virtue to refrain from intercourse now in order to enjoy it more later. The
rational agent would be "intending" the pleasure as at least part of one's end in
view (finem). He would be seeking the pleasure for its own sake (propter
seipsum). Reason cannot do this.13
THOMAS AQUINAS ON SEXUAL PLEASURE 161

We see here why Thomas condemns marital intercourse had "out of sexual
desire." His ground is not any intrinsic evil in the desire nor any harmful
consequences of the intercourse. Nor is Thomas simply condemning those
instances when reason does not endorse the satisfaction of the desire. In
condemning marital intercourse "out of sexual desire," Thomas condemns
any instance when the spouses have sexual pleasure as the purpose of their
intercourse because that is a purpose reason can never approve.
This is confirmed by the larger context of the chapter of the Summa
Contra Gentiles we have been examining. The central question of the chapter
concerns the afterlife of the blest once they have .been reunited with their
bodies. Will the blest then engage in sexual activity? In that beatitude, Thomas
tells us, God will make the body totally subject to the rational soul. All bodily
appetites, actions, passions, movements, etc. of the individual will be rendered
perfectly submissive to the soul. They will, therefore, in no way be able to
impede the higher life of the blest. They can have no harmful consequences in
man's spiritual life.14 And yet the argument that the blest should enjoy sexual
pleasure "lest any pleasure be lacking in their ultimate reward" is rejected by
Thomas. Even though it would have no harmful effects on man's spiritual
activity, sexual pleasure may not be sought for its own sake.15 Thomas'
negative judgment on sexual pleasure is, therefore, not based exclusively on
the power this pleasure has, as a result of Original Sin, to move man out of the
control of his reason and thus to disturb his higher life. A more fundamental
negativity of sexual pleasure is seen by Thomas even when the pleasure is
totally subordinated to man's reason and higher life and man's intellectual
contemplation goes on undisturbed. This is neglected by excellent
commentators such as Bailey (1959:134-38, 243). It is the principal subject of
the present essay.
Does Thomas, therefore, see something morally evil in sexual pleasure?
He has affirmed that the sense appetite for sexual pleasure is perfectly natural,
sinless and essential to virtue and to the perfection of moral good. But might
he not hold, at the same time, that sexual pleasure itself is intrinsically evil?
This would explain why it could not be the intended purpose of man acting
rationally. In opposition to earlier theologians, however, Thomas denies flatly
that sexual pleasure is a moral evil, and even implies that it is morally good.
This is reflected in Thomas' teaching that virtue need not restrain the amount
of sexual pleasure the spouse permits himself in intercourse. Virtue lies in
keeping the mean; the mean chastity observes lies between the vices of license
{luxuria) and insensibility. The chaste spouse, therefore, should enjoy the
pleasure of intercourse.I6 Moreover, the virtue of chastity does not restrict the
amount of sexual pleasure permitted the spouse in intercourse. The mean of
virtue is not a quantitative one determining an amount of sexual pleasure that
is neither too much nor too little. No "abundance" or "superabundance" or
"extreme intensity" of pleasure in conjugal intercourse offends chastity or
makes the intercourse sinful.17
Thomas even implies that sexual pleasure, in itself, is not just not evil, but
positively good.18 He affirms that, had there been no Fall, "this sense pleasure
162 MILHAVEN

would be so much the greater as human nature would be finer (purior) and the
body more sensitive (sensibile)" (STL, 98, 2; cf. Fuchs, 1949:26-27).
Moreover, God endowed sexual activity with its pleasure in order to motivate
men to this activity essential for the continuation of the human species.I9 If
virtue obliges the spouse to enjoy his sexual pleasure and if a superior human
nature would have even greater sexual pleasure than man can have now, and if
God has made the pleasure such as it is so that men may desire it, it must be
good in some real sense of the word. How, then, is it wrong for man acting
rationally to seek it for its own sake? Why cannot human reason approve
conjugal intercourse for the purpose of this pleasure?20

The statements of Thomas that we have been examining fit together when
located in the general framework of his complex but coherent anthropology.
The key is to distinguish all along the line between man's sense appetite based
on sensation and his rational judgment based on reality. Thomas makes his
more positive statements about sexual pleasure when he is considering the
sense appetite by itself. He makes his more negative statements when he is
concerned about the judgment of reason and the full reality on which it must
be based.
By its nature, the sense appetite seeks only one good: sense pleasure. This
pleasure is a real good and it is good and necessary that the appetite seek it.
This is God's and nature's intent. The sex appetite, therefore, of the virtuous
spouse should seek its pleasure for the sake of its pleasure. In this sense, one
can say that the sexual appetite properly seeks pleasure as its end (finis) and
moves the person to act for the sake of sexual pleasure (propter
deleftationem).21 Nevertheless, though the sense sex appetite seeks sexual
pleasure as its end, that pleasure is not its end. Sense appetites simply follow
on sense perception and sense perception does not attain reality or what is. It is
therefore quite consistent to hold that the real end of the sex appetite is
different from the end it seeks, pleasure. The real end of the sex appetite is
what God and nature have in view in affixing pleasure to the appetite as an
inducement for the appetite to move. The end God and nature have in view is
the conservation of the human species through procreation. For nature and
God and, therefore, in reality, the pleasure this sense appetite seeks is not its
end, but only an "instrument" to lead it to attain its true end: procreation.
The conservation of the species, in turn, has as its ultimate end the ultimate
end of the members of the species, i.e., the spiritual activity by which they have
their beatitude with God. The senses can know nothing of ends like these.
Conservation of the species is not perceptible or imaginable by the senses.
Neither is any spiritual activity of man. Consequently, no sense appetite can
seek these goals. The sex appetite thus contributes to its true end
unknowingly, as it seeks its pleasure as its end. But man's rational appetite
THOMAS AQUINAS ON SEXUAL PLEASURE 163

may seek knowingly only the true end of sexual intercourse, realized in
procreation.22

At issue therefore is not so much Thomas' consistency as his dualism. All

anthropologies are inevitably dualistic or pluralistic; no one finds thè human
person to be a perfectly simple being of one piece. But Thomas' treatment of
sexual pleasure, as seen thus far, seems to suggest an underlying dualism
whereby man's sense life would have no value except in serving his spiritual
life. This is difficult to defend in terms of either ordinary human experience or
traditional Christian dogma. Is not the body with its sense appetites more than
a mere instrument of the rational soul? Does not reason know that the rich
sense life of man is worth seeking for itself and not solely to make possible his
spiritual activities? Does not the Christian belief in the resurrection of the
body require that the real ends of human activity and the proper purposes of
rational man include the sensual bodily as well as the spiritual? In the light of
Thomas' teaching on sexual pleasure seen thus far, one would expect Thomas
to reply negatively to these questions.
Instead, Thomas gives an unequivocally affirmative answer. All the senses
that men have they have in common with brute animals. Moreover, one
purpose of man's senses is the same as that of the brutes': to help acquire the
necessities of life for the individual and the species, mainly, food, drink and
sex. But man's senses have another purpose, unique to him, not shared by any
brute animal. The senses have been given man also for the knowledge they
yield. The knowledge to which the human senses are ordered is primarily the
rational knowledge they make possible. All man's rational knowledge must
take its beginning from sense knowledge. But the senses are also given man for
the sake of sense knowledge itself (STI, 91,3). Sense knowledge is, in itself, a
good (quoddam bonum) for man. Rational man knows this. He loves his
senses for {propter) the sense knowledge they give. Unlike the brutes, and by
virtue of his reason, he takes pleasure in his sense knowledge, i.e., both in the
sensible objects known and in the act itself of knowing.23 Sense knowledge is,
therefore, itself, an end of man. Man rationally endorses this end and acts for
the sake of it. In Thomas' ethical anthropology, it follows that the same is true
of the pleasure man takes in his sense knowledge. That pleasure, too, is, itself,
an end of man, and man rationally acts for the sake of it.24
This evaluation of sense knowledge in general and man's pleasure in it, is
diametrically opposed to Thomas' evaluation of man's sexual experience in
particular and its pleasure. The same opposition is reflected also in Thomas'
conception of the afterlife. Although, as we saw, there will be no sexual
pleasure in the afterlife, still all the bodily senses of the blest will be active and
give man knowledge and pleasure (Suppl., 82,3 and 4; 83,6; «STI-II, 3,3). The
beatitude of the blest does not consist formally in any bodily good and,
164 MILHAVEN

therefore, not in this sense knowledge and pleasure. Human beatitude is

essentially the immediate intellectual vision of the uncreated good. Essential
human beatitude is, therefore, purely spiritual. Moreover, in the beatific state,
man no longer needs sense knowledge to make possible any of his intellectual
knowledge, as he did in his terrestial life (STI-II, 2,5; 3,3 and 8). Nevertheless,
in the state of beatitude human nature will have the greatest perfection (in
maxima perfect i one) and this perfection necessarily includes the appropriate
activity and pleasure of the senses (SCG IV, 86; SuppL, 82, 4; 83, 6).
Thomas puts the same reasoning in yet another form that brings out
sharply the opposition between his appraisal of sense activity in general and
his appraisal of the sense activity of sex. Until the bodies rise from the earth at
the last judgment and join their souls in beatitude, the natural appetite of the
soul for its full perfection and happiness (naturale hominis desiderium ad
felicit atem) is not completely at rest. Since the soul is by its nature form of the
body, its basic appetite desires (appétit) and wants (vellet) that the body share
its enjoyment (fruitio) of God (SCG IV, 79; STI-II, 4, 5; CT 1, 151). The
rational soul, therefore, has a general appetite for sense activity and pleasure
for their own sake. And yet as we saw, the rational soul has no appetite for the
sense activity and pleasure of sex for their own sake.
Another argument of Thomas illustrates the same contrast. He argues that
the blest will have full sense activity and pleasure because their body and
senses must also have their eternal reward (SuppL, 82, 4). This is exactly the
same reasoning which, as we saw, Thomas rejected when applied to the sense
activity and pleasure of sex.

In sum, Thomas takes two contrasting positions on sense pleasure. In

general, man rationally acts for the sake of sense pleasure; it is an end for his
rational appetite. Man does not act rationally for the sake of the sense
pleasure of sex; it is not an end for his rational appetite. Thomas clearly
considers both positions essential to his ethics. Each is maintained on a good
number of occasions and in different contexts. Thomas is aware of the
contrast between the two positions; in fact, he underlines it. The pleasure of
sex is essentially different in its moral goodness from most of the pleasures
that the senses yield man. The question is: What is the difference?
To understand the difference, it is worth noting that sex is not the only
sense activity different in this regard from sense activity in general. Eating and
drinking receive the same negative judgments as sex. It is wrong to eat or drink
for the pleasure of it; the pleasure of eating and drinking is not an end for
human activity.25 Consequently, it is contrary to virtue to abstain from eating
and drinking at a given time in order to enjoy it more later (SCG IV, 83). In
man's beatific life with God after death, he will not engage in eating or
drinking or have their pleasures (SCOTÌI, 27; IV, 83; SuppL 81,4; STI, 97,3).
THOMAS AQUINAS ON SEXUAL PLEASURE 165

That the pleasures of food and drink receive from Thomas the same moral
treatment as the pleasures of sex is no accident. They have certain
characteristics in common, distinguishing them from the other sense
pleasures. The pleasures of sex, food and drink are peculiar pleasures of the
sense of touch.26 Their purpose is directly to serve nature, i.e., to incite the
appetites of the animal (whether brute or human) to seek activities which can
preserve the individual and the species. As a result, these pleasures have been
made so powerfully attractive that in man they need a special virtue to govern
them. The sole function of the cardinal virtue of moderation (temperantia) is
to govern the desires and pleasures of touch connected with sex, food and
drink.27 Finally, of the goods (bona) sought by man's different sense appetites
and passions, those giving the pleasure of touch basic to sex, food and drink
are the lowest (infima) (ST H I , 60, 5. Cf. NE III, 10, 17* 23-18* 8).
This last assertion of Thomas suggests an avenue for exploring further our
present question. The question is: What is the difference, in intrinsic moral
goodness, between the sense pleasure of sex (and we now add: food and drink)
and the general pleasure that the senses give man? Why does Thomas rate the
latter essentially superior to the former? In principle, the intrinsic moral
goodness of a pleasure is determined by the good (bonum) which gives the
pleasure, i.e., by the particular good in which pleasure is taken.28 Since, then,
the pleasures of sex, food and drink have been judged inferior to the generality
of sense pleasures, one is not surprised to hear that the goods in which the
pleasures of sex, food and drink are taken are of the lowest sort (infima). But
what makes them the lowest?
In the other sense pleasures, as we saw, sense knowledge is the good in
which man takes pleasure. The different kinds of sense knowledge are, in turn,
rated as more or less good according to the degree of knowledge they give.29
An internal sense is superior to an external sense because its object "is known
more."30 The external sense which man values most for itself is the sense of
sight, for this external sense is "more knowing."31 The senses whose object
man calls "beautiful" are those which are "the most knowing," i.e., sight and
hearing.32 If, therefore, the goods in which the pleasure of sex, food and drink
are taken are of the lowest sort, any sense knowledge contained therein must
be of a minimal degree of knowledge.
Thomas has told us that the pleasures of sex, food and drink come from
the knowledge by the sense of touch that the appetite now possesses its object.
But no text of Thomas to my knowledge affirms that this particular sense
knowledge is to any degree good in itself or that man takes any pleasure in it as
knowledge. One understands then why he rates the pleasures of sex, food and
drink as, in themselves, essentially inferior to all other sense pleasures. The
sense of touch when it gives rise to the pleasures of sex, food and drink must
be—to use Thomas' quantitative terminology—so little knowing that the
knowledge it gives has no intrinsic goodness worth the consideration of
rational man.33
166 MILHAVEN

The crux of the matter, therefore, in understanding Thomas' appraisal of

sexual pleasure, is his failure to accord more than a minimal, negligible kind of
knowledge to sexual experience. Even in his own historical context, this
epistemological lacuna is curious. It runs counter to familiar Biblical language
where "knowing" is a synonym for sexual union (Gen., XXIV, 16; Luke, 1,34.
Cf. Thielicke, 1964:66-67). The corollary of this incomplete
epistemology—namely, that sexual union is, of itself, a blind, purely
subjective experience, and, therefore, considered simply in itself, of minimal
human value, runs counter to the familiar Biblical understanding of sexual
union as profoundly interpersonal (Gen., II, 24; Matt., XIX, 3-6; Mark, X, 5-
9; / Cor., VI, 13-20; Eph., V, 31-33). The resultant view of conjugal sex runs
counter to language frequently employed by medieval mystics (e.g., Bernard
of Clairvaux and Mechtilde of Magdeburg; see O'Brien: 103-4, 119-20) in
which the sexual union, knowledge and pleasures of spouses are seen as a
worthy analogate of the most intensely, profoundly and sublimely personal
union, knowledge and pleasure possible to man on earth. A similar high
esteem of conjugal sex is implied in the allegorical interpretations of the Song
of Solomon, "the book most read and frequently commented on in the
medieval cloister."34
Historians of Christianity and Christian dogma, psychosocial historians
of the Middle Ages, cultural anthropologists, et al. may be able to probe more
deeply the causes of this blind spot of Thomas' epistemology. But the historian
of western religious thought can also cast light, for Thomas, as we have seen,
expounds his sexual ethics philosophically. Thomas' low opinion of any
knowledge given by sexual experience is of a piece with his whole
philosophical scale of human values. The sole norm, ideal, model and crown
of all human values is human reason (cf. NEI, 7-8; Χ, 6-8). Sexual experience,
of all human experiences, is the least like human reason.
One has noted the quantitative terminology Thomas employs in
evaluating kinds of sense knowledge: "is known more," "more knowing," "the
most knowing." To be able to express relative value simply in terms of "more"
or "less" presupposes a single scale of values, determined by a single norm of
fullness or perfection. For Thomas, that norm is "reason." A given kind of
sense knowledge will be more or less knowing to the degree to which it "shares
in," i.e., takes on some of the attributes of the knowledge of reason.35 Like any
two neighboring levels of the hierarchy of being, sense knowledge and rational
knowledge cannot be contrasted in simple, blanket fashion. In its higher
reaches, a level of being always approximates more and more to the next
highest level in nature and worth. Subspecies of the lower level have more
intrinsic value to the degree to which they are more similar to the higher level.
Of the different kinds of sense knowledge, that involved in the pleasures of
sex, food and drink shares and resembles least the higher rational level. It is
the "furthest from reason."36 In these pleasures, "is seen least of all the
brightness and beauty of reason (5711-11, 142,4; cf. 141,2 ad3; NEX, 5,15b
35-76° 3). Indeed, the whole process of sex appetite, knowledge and pleasure,
THOMAS AQUINAS ON SEXUAL PLEASURE 167

unlike other sensory processes, has no share in reason at all, but is totally
sense.37 This is the reason why, of all man's sense pleasures, the pleasures of
sex, food and drink—and preeminently, that of sex—most immerse man in
the sensible and draw him away from intelligible reality.38 With most of these
statements of fact, i.e., of the practically complete arationality of the pleasures
of sex, food and drink and the knowledge involved therein, the context makes
clear that they are eo ipso judgments of value, i.e., of the inferiority of this kind
of pleasure and knowledge.
The decisive cause why sexual pleasure is the lowest of human pleasures
and lacks all intrinsic value for the human person is thus clear. The decisive
cause is not that sexual pleasure interferes most with the exercise of human
reason. It does so interfere in man's purely natural state but the cause lies
deeper. Indeed, we saw that in the afterlife, as in Thomas' hypothetical
paradise without the Fall, God could eliminate the interference and sexual
pleasure would still lack all intrinsic value. The crucial reason for sexual
pleasure's lack of intrinsic value is that it has in it nothing resembling rational
knowledge. Unlike higher sense pleasures, it is grounded in pure sense
knowledge that has no share in reason.
This judgment of fact is all the more crushing a judgment of value because
the value of reason, in turn, lies in its being a participation of the knowledge of
the higher, purely spiritual beings and ultimately of God (DV15,1; In II Sent.,
16, 1, 3; In III Sent., 35, 1,4; In X Eth. Nie. 11, 2110; VI, 4, 1807. Cf. NEX, 7
and 8). God's own knowledge, therefore, is the ultimately determining norm,
ideal and model of all human knowledge and thus of all human values. To say
that the knowledge had in sexual experience is most unlike the rational is to
say that it is most unlike the divine, the participation in which gives all
meaning and worth to human life.

The crux of the matter, therefore, in understanding Thomas' appraisal of

sexual pleasure is his exaltation of the rational as sole norm and model for all
human values. But what does Thomas mean by the "rational"? Luther,
Galileo, Descartes, Newton, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and myriad others have
passed this way since Thomas' time. The modern understanding of "reason" is
not likely to be identical with Thomas'.
There is no place left in the present essay to undertake to trace out what
Thomas means by his all-holy reason. Let me, however, point to one set of
clues appearing in the texts dealing with the value of sexual pleasure.
Frequently Thomas asserts the inferiority of the pleasures of sex, food and
drink on the basis of the fact that they, unlike other human sense pleasures, are
enjoyed by man in common with brute animals. This fact follows, of course,
from the arationality of these pleasures, since man is "the rational animal."
But at times Thomas does not mention the arationality of these pleasures. He
168 MILHAVEN

adduces simply the fact that they are had in common with brute animals and
this suffices to prove their inferiority and lack of intrinsic value.39
Correspondingly, the sense pleasures worth having for their own sake, e.g., in
the afterlife of the bleast, are pleasures, which, Thomas makes clear, animals
do not have (SCG III, 27 and 63). The content of the all-determining norm,
reason, is derived negatively from observation of what brute animals do as
well as positively from observation of what men do and brutes cannot.
Parallel to and intertwined with the brute animal, a second negative face of
Thomas' supreme norm, reason, is easily seen: the human being unformed by
civilization. In his value judgments, Thomas often substitutes for, or adds to,
the criterion "man as man" (or "reason") vs. "the animal." The criterion he
adds or substitutes is "man as man" (or "reason") vs. "the child," "the boy,"40
"The fool,"41 "the slave,"42 "the peasant,"43 or even "most men."44 The way in
which the unformed, uncivilized masses think, feel and determine their actions
is little different from the life of the brutes. It does not compare in worth to the
life of that relatively rare human being, the fully developed and civilized adult.
One understands why Thomas treats as essentially superior to the pleasures of
sex, food and drink the pleasures of seeing beautiful forms and beautiful
colors, hearing sweet melodies, smelling excellent fragrances, savoring sweet
or combined tastes, and experiencing the general bodily pleasure had in
gymnasium sports. 45 They are the pleasures of the civilized man. Brutes,
children, the uncultured, the masses are not capable of such pleasures.
Conversely, pleasures they are capable of cannot be really worth pursuing.
One understands why the spouses having intercourse for the sake of its
pleasures sin at least venially. They are letting themselves act on the kind of
motive that moves brute animals, children, and the unformed masses.
When, therefore, Thomas prizes a particular kind of human knowledge or
a particular kind of human pleasure because it has a certain share in reason,
we know something of what he is thinking of. Behind the word "reason," in the
forefront of his mind stands the ideal adult envisaged by the civilization and
education of his time. It stands out in sharp contrast to the childish barbarism
and animality from which medieval civilization had emerged, which still
infested that civilization, and against which the civilization continually
struggled.

What we have just touched on is, of course, far from exhausting what
Thomas means by "reason" and what he finds so valuable there. We are still
just starting to explore the Thomistic concept of reason when we add other
well-known traits of Thomistic reason: clarity, distinctness, recognition of
order and proportion, grasp of the necessary, universal and eternal, as
opposed to the contingent, singular and temporal, etc.46 Nevertheless, all these
characteristics suggest a hypothesis with which I would like to conclude.
THOMAS AQUINAS ON SEXUAL PLEASURE 169

I take it that a historian of Western religious thought may do more than

record past thoughts. He may choose to enter into dialogue with a past
thinker. Max Müller (1958:141-42) has remarked:
Dialogue with a thinker thinks about what he shows and what he hides, what he has to
hide precisely in carrying out his task of showing.
. . . one has to show . . . what had to remain hidden to such a thought. It may
well. . .have justifiably remained hidden at that time because of. . . what was coming
to light. But today it may be precisely what has to be thought about, perhaps, even the
task and the salvation.

What does Thomas have to hide precisely in carrying out his task of
showing? Might one thing be a second model of knowledge and thus a second,
autonomous norm of values? Could one argue the following? Thomas' model
of knowledge is useful, true, and incomplete. Reason, in Thomas' sense of the
word, is a valid model, ideal and norm of human knowledge, but not the sole
one. A given kind of human knowledge, therefore, is not to be evaluated
exclusively according to the degree to which it approximates this single model.
Man has also a second kind of knowledge that has its own value and, in its
fullness, is a model, ideal and norm in its own right. The two kinds of
knowledge are essentially different, each valuable in its own way, not
comparable, but complementary to the other. For example, a human being
can know in two essentially different ways mothering love, the imminence of
punishment, his or her personal autonomy. The two ways of knowing each
have their own value, not comparable, but complementary to the other.
The second kind of knowledge, the kind Thomas did not show, is had by
the civilized adult, but it is not knowledge civilization has taught him. It is like
the knowledge had by children, the uncivilized, the "masses," and even
animals, so far as we can judge. It is unlike what one calls "rational"
knowledge. What is known in this second way is known dimly and obscurely,
narrowly singular, immersed in time and place. Although it does not have all
the limitations Thomas attributes to sense knowledge, it is sense knowledge,
or at least is indistinguishably interfused with sense knowledge. The sense
most often operative is the sense of touch, paradigmatically exercised in sex,
food and drink. The second kind of knowledge resists, though not with
complete success, the first kind's (reason's) efforts at clarifying and analyzing
it. The hard-won rational schemata, concepts and words can point to and to
some extent bring further into the light the original, elementary experience.
They can distinguish some of its elements, but they cannot take their place.
What Thomas does not and in his time could not show is not the fact, but
the autonomous value of this second kind of knowledge. He recognizes it and
its characteristics, but places it at the bottom of his scale of values,
constituting a purely negative pole, furthest from the single model and norm.
He fails thereby to recognize that this pole is not a negative one, but a second
positive one. Man has two, contrary kinds of knowledge, each with its own
internal value. Suppose one wishes to compare two particular acts of
knowing, e.g., a physicist's knowing physics and his knowing his wife's present
170 MILHAVEN

feelings about him. One cannot simply say, as Thomas would: in knowing this,
the physicist knows more than in knowing that. At most, one might be able to
say: in knowing this, he knows more with one kind of knowledge; in knowing
that, he knows more with the other kind. Even this, though, could be
misleading since man's best knowledge is not centered at either pole, but in a
tension, interrelationship, balance of the two.
Sexual union yields eminently this second kind of knowledge. The
pleasure of sexual love is worth seeking because, among other reasons, it
involves this kind of knowledge.47 Today one might prefer to call it, not
"knowledge", but "experience" or "awareness" or "openness" or
"communion." What is essential is that one does not understand and assess it
using as sole model some kind of knowledge epitomized by one's civilization.
I suggest all this as a hypothesis for critical discussion. Whether it has any
truth to it can be determined only by the critical discussion. But, true or not, it
may give some focus to current discussion of sexual pleasure in Christian
ethics. I have argued elsewhere that that discussion is in disarray, with
unattended confusions and strange silences. In invoking the value of non-
rational experience, contemporary Christian thinkers may well be showing
something Thomas could not. But they are not showing it as well as he showed
what he did show (cf. Milhaven, 1976 and 1974). Current ethical discussion of
sexual pleasure would gain if dialogue with Thomas inspired them to emulate
his lucidly probing, rigorously coherent synthesis even as they widened its
perspective.
THOMAS AQUINAS ON SEXUAL PLEASURE 171

NOTES

!
For the framework of Thomas' special ethics, see the prologue and table
of contents of his Summa Theologiae, II-II. D. S. Bailey (1959:158-59) finds
in this part of the Summa the fullest medieval treatment of questions of sexual
morality.

2STII-II, 141, 3 and 4; 142, 1 and 4; 151, 2 and 3; 152,1 and 3; 153,1,3,4
and 5; 154,1. At times, Thomas expresses the object of these virtues and vices,
not as the pleasure, but as the appetite (concupiscentia or appetitus)
convertible terms, since Thomas defines pleasure simply as the resting of
appetite in the possession of its desired good (e.g., Summa Theologiae, MI, 2,
6; 4,1 and 2; 31,1 and 2). Not all virtues and vices of Thomas' special ethics are
specified by particular pleasures and corresponding desires. For example,
justice and injustice concern directly, not any pleasure or passion, but certain
outward actions of man (STIMI, 58, 9).
3
That Thomas' view of sexual pleasure is the coherent, limited one I claim
to find in his text is further supported by comparison with a source he draws
on repeatedly for his ethics: Aristotle. Essentially the same consistent, narrow
understanding of sexual pleasure appears in the Nicomachean Ethics.
This should also give matter for reflection to those who explain Thomas'
view of sex by motifs from other sources: Manichaean dualism, or the
mysticism, eschatology, and otherworldliness of Augustine and other
Platonists, Christian and pagan, or Christian dogmas concerning divine law,
the purpose of sex and marriage, the fallen nature of man, the evil of sin, the
supernatural end of man, etc. All these are lacking in Aristotle. This suggests
that the understanding of sexual pleasure common to Thomas and Aristotle
may determine Thomas' sexual ethics more than the other motifs do.
The limits of space of the present essay prevent me from doing more than
referring to the more evident parallels in the Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter:
NE) as I proceed with analyses of the Thomistic text.
4
The broad lines of the argument and conclusions are also Aristotle's.
Aristotle does not restrict morally permissible sex to marriage. His idea of
spiritual activity does not include prayer, worship, or the Eucharist.
Nevertheless, as Thomas notes, his argumentation is basically the same: even
in permissible sexual activity, the pleasure so absorbs the mind as to conflict
with the higher activity of the soul. Consequently, the virtuous man limits the
exercise of sexual activity. Cf. NE III, 12, 19* 6-15; VII, 12, 53* 28-37.
5
Summa Contra Gentiles (hereafter: S CG), III, 125. Unless otherwise
indicated, all translations are mine. Cf. STIMI, 154, 9. Thomas cites NE VI,
40* 10-20.
172 MILHAVEN
6
The same silence of Thomas can be observed in De Perfectione Vitae
Spiritualis, 8, where the affection spouses may have for each other is treated
solely as an obstacle to perfection in the spiritual life.
1
De Ventate (hereafter: DV\ 25, 5, ad 7; Super Primam Epistolam S.
Pauli ad Corinthios Expositio, 7, 1; Suppl. 41,4 and 49, 6; S7TMI, 154,2, ad
6; De Malo, 15, 2, c; De Duobus Praeceptis Caritatis et Decern Legis
Praeceptis, "De sexto praecepto legis." Cf. STIMI, 154, 1,4; 8, ad2. My use
of the masculine pronoun throughout this essay reflects the androcentric
focus of Thomas.

*DV, 25, 6 and 7; ST HI, 17, 9; 34, 1; 85, 5; Super Primam Epistolam S.
Pauli ad Corinthios Expositio, 7, 1; In Decern Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis
ad Nicomachum Expositio (hereafter: In Eth. Nie), VII, 6, 1389. Cf. Fuchs,
1949:19, 23, 53-56. Concupiscentia is the term Thomas uses for the general
human appetite for any sense pleasure, but he sees the effect of the Fall verified
preeminently in this appetite inasmuch as it is appetite for sexual pleasure. See
also DV25, 2; ST MI, 30. That Thomas is the first medieval theologian to
consider concupiscence's independence of reason to be natural may be
because he is one of the first medieval theologians to read the NE e.g., X, 9,
1179* 3-30 or VII, 14, 1154* 20-31.

9
The vice is a subspecies of the vice of "insensibility." In II Eth. Nie, 8,
342; ST III, 21, 630-31; STIMI, 142, 1, c. and ad 1; 152, 2, adi; 153,3, ad3;
De Malo, 15, 1, ad9. Cf. In IIEth. Nie, 2, 262; SCG III, 136. Cf. NElll, 10,
19e 1-20; 12, 19* 11-20; VII, 7, 50* 17-23.

10
S7T-II, 56,4,c.andu(i4;58,3,tífí/2;STIHI, 155,4; 156, ì,adì;DV, 14,
4, e; De Virtutibus in Communi (in Quaestiones Disputatae, II), 4; Super
Primam Epistolam S. Pauli ad Corinthios Expositio, 7,1. Since, as was noted
above, the human sex appetite after the Fall has a certain irremovable
independence of reason, the virtuous ordering by reason is not complete
domination. Reason rules the natural appetites, not as slaves, but as free men.
Cf. NE VII, 9.

11
ST H I , 24, 3, c. The sense appetite ("appetitus sensitivustf) differs from
the rational appetite \^appetitus intellectivus") or will {"voluntas") in that the
former is moved by what the senses perceive, the latter, by the intellect. See ST
1,80.
n
SCG IV, 83; Suppl.f 49, 6; 65, 3, c; cf. Compendium Theologiae (here-
after: C7), I, 156. On Thomas' restriction of the subjective purposes
permissible for conjugal intercourse, see the excellent, complementary
accounts of Noonan (1965:241-57, 284-95) and Fuchs (1949:208-27).
THOMAS AQUINAS ON SEXUAL PLEASURE 173
l3
SCG, IV, 83. On the basis of this ethical principle, Thomas concludes
that it would be wrong to act virtuously on earth in order to have sexual
pleasure in heaven. The virtuous Christians would, in this hypothesis, have
these pleasures somehow as their intention ("in intentione eorum . . .
aliqualiter delectationes praedictae") and end in view (fìmerì). What is wrong
is not that they would be intending sexual pleasure alone, for presumably the
virtuous Christians would be also intending procreation in their intercourse.
What is wrong is that they would be intending sexual pleasure at all for its own
sake (propter seipsam). Cf. Fuchs, 1949:212, 226. For Aristotle, see note 20.

"SCG, IV, 86; Suppl., 82, 3, ad 4; ST H I , 4, 6; CT, 1,167; De Virtutibus

in Communi, 4, 8 and ad 8.

l5
SCG, IV, 83. In the state of beatitude, there is no longer place for the
two purposes of conjugal intercourse permissible in man's terrestial life:
procreation and assistance to the spouse in avoiding sin. Thomas premises,
therefore, that if the blest would have sexual intercourse, it could only be for
the pleasure of it.

"tf ΓΙΙ-ΙΙ, 142, 1; 150, 1, ad 1; 152, 2, ad 2; 153, 3, ad3; In IIEth.Nic. 8,

342; STIII, 21,630-31. Cf. NElll, 11,19e 5-8; VII, 9,51* 22-52« 7; VII, 14,54e
17-19.

17
5ΓΙΙ-ΙΙ, 153, 2, adi; Suppl., 41, 3, ad6; 49,4, ad 3;cf. Scriptum Super
libros Sententiarum, II (hereafter: In Sent.) dist. 20, 1, 2, adi; SCG, III, 126;
STI-li, 34, 1, adì.

18
That Thomas does not merely deny that the sexual pleasure of the
marital act is evil, but even affirms that it is something good is maintained by
competent modern commentators (Fuchs, 1949:219, adducing Suppl, 49, 6;
Keper, 1965:27, adducing STII-II, 153, 2; Noonan, 1965:293, adducing In
Sent. IV, 31, 2, 1, ad 3.) One could cite equally well STI-II, 34, l,c. Itis worth
noting, however, as these commentators do not, that in the cited texts,
Thomas does not make the affirmation in so many words. That he makes the
affirmation implicitly is a reasonable interpretation, though one must
postulate in each text at least one tacit premise, e.g., that no human act is
moraDy indifferent. The remainder of the present article should suggest that
Thomas' concept of the goodness of conjugal sexual pleasure was so restricted
and refined that he may not have felt inclined to affirm it explicitly as such.

»Suppl., 49, 1, ad 1; 65, 3, c ; STI-II, 4,2, ad 2; SCG III, 26; In 11 Sent.,

dist. 38, 1, 2, ad6.
174 MILHAVEN

^This problem of interpretation posed by Thomas' text leads both Fuchs

(1949:226-27) and Noonan (1965:294-95) to postulate two conflicting
currents of Thomas' thought. For both Fuchs and Noonan, Thomas'
statement that God intends sexual pleasure to be an inducement contradicts
his position that to act for sexual pleasure in marriage is evil. Noonan
explains, "But Thomas' statement on inducement was a departure from
Aristotelian principle, according to which pleasure itself was always attendant
upon some act: one acted for the act itself, the pleasure followed."
a
But Aristotle himself expresses doubt about this principle (NEX, 4,75
15-22) and even affirms the contrary: ". . . but honour, pleasure, reason, and
every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from
them we should still choose each of them). . ." (NEI, 7,97* 1 -5). He raises the
same issue as Thomas when he distinguishes: "For not everyone who does
anything for the sake of pleasure is either self-indulgent or bad or incontinent,
but he who does it for a disgraceful pleasure" (NE VII, 9, 51* 18-23).
There are pleasurable things that are "worthy to be chosen for
themselves" (NE VII, 4, 47* 23-30; 48* 22-48* 5; VII, 7, 50* 16-21; VII, 9, 51*
18-23; Χ, 3,74 a 8-12; 1,7,97* 1-5). But the sexually pleasurable is not such; it is
not rightly chosen for itself (NE VII, 4, 47* 23-30; VII, 7, 50* 16-21; VII, 9,51*
18-23; Χ, 3, 74* 8-11). The man of virtue shuns this kind of pleasure while
seeking the higher kind (NE VII, 11, 53* 27-37).
And yet not only should the man of virtue enjoy his sexual pleasure (cf.
note 16), but he naturally will and should desire it (NEIII, 11,18*8-13; 19* 15-
21; 12, 19* 11-20; VII, 14, 54* 15-18). Aristotelian principles pose the same
dilemma of interpretation as the Thomistic. Sexual pleasure should be
enjoyed and desired; it is positively good. Sexual pleasure must not be chosen
for itself.
21
S7T-II, 4, 2, adi; 3, 4, ad4; 23, 1; STI, 81, 2. Cf. S7T-II,31,6,aí/3; In
VII Eth. Nie, 6, 1389. Q. NE III, 12, 19* 5-20; VII, 3, 47* 31-47* 5, 15-18.
22
STI-II, 2, 5; 4, 2, ad2; 31,6; 34,2, ad 1; 34,4; STIMI, 141,1,3,4,5 and
6; 153, 2 and 3; SCG, IV, 83; DV, 25, 5, ad 7. See also texts cited in Note 19.
Pace Fuchs and Noonan, there is no "contradiction . . . between the
statement that God intends sexual pleasure to be an inducement and the
statement that to act for sexual pleasure in marriage is evil" (Noonan,
1965:294). Sexual pleasure can be understood to properly induce the sense
appetite of the spouses and yet not be suitable to be the spouses' rational
purpose. It is no contradiction, but it presses the question of interpretation:
what, in the nature of sexual pleasure, the good and proper object of a natural
sense appetite, bars it from being a goal for human choice? The question is as
pertinent to the Aristotelian text as to the Thomistic.
Under the Pauline category of rendering the spouse what is his or her due
(/ Cor., VII, 3-5), Thomas acknowledges one other legitimate purpose for
conjugal relations: to aid the spouse to avoid sin. He refuses to accept as
THOMAS AQUINAS ON SEXUAL PLEASURE 175

legitimate and sinless the intent of helping oneself avoid sin, of preserving
one's health, and of getting pleasure. Cf. Noonan, 1965:242, 248-49, 284-92,
and Fuchs, 1949: 138, 200-5, 221-27.

23
»STI-II, 31,5, c. and 6, c ; In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentarla, I,
1, 5. Cf. STI-II, 30, 3; 31, 3; 35, 2, ad 3; STII-II, 180, 7; SCG, III, 33; Ν E III,
10, 18a 1-20. To take pleasure in something precisely as known is, by
definition: to take pleasure in its beauty. Consequently, man alone takes
pleasure in the beauty of what he perceives with his senses. (STI, 91,3, ad 3;
STI-II, 27, 1, ad3; cf. CT, 1,165; STIMI, 141,2,a¿3; Kovach, 1961:232-67.)
Gf. ΛΈΠΙ, 10,18* 1-12,17-19,26-30; Χ, 3,74* 4-8; 74* 15-75* 2; Χ, 5,75* 24-
76a 3. In this line of thought, Thomas often echoes Metaphysics, 1,980* 22-28.
24
Inasmuch as a particular good is afìnis for man and that for the sake of
(propter) which he acts, so, too, one can say, is the pleasure he takes in
acquiring and possessing the good ( S r I-II, 2, 6; 25, 2; 34, 3; In IISent., dist.
38, 1, 2, c. and ad 6; In VIIEth. Nie., 6,1389, and X, 6). Cf. NE VII, 12,52* 33-
53* 15, 30-35; 14, 54* 15-20; Χ, 3, 73* 12-18; 74* 4-8; Χ, 4, 74* 15-75* 2, 10-22;
Χ, 5, 75* 24-76* 3. Thus the pleasure of sense perceptions is, in general (though
not in the case of sex) one of those pleasures to be "chosen for themselves" (NE
VII, 4, 47* 23-30; VII, 7, 50* 16-21; VII, 9, 51* 18-23; Χ, 3, 74* 4-11.

25SCG IV, 83; cf. Suppl 49,6, "Sed Contra"; STIMI, 148,2, α; De Malo,
14 (e.g., 1 and a d i ) ; 15, 2, ade. Cf. ΝEHI, 10;7V£'VII,4,47*23-30; VII, 7,50*
17-21; VII, 9, 51*20-23.
26
S r I-II, 31, 6, e; 60, 5, e ; S r i I - I I , 141 ff. passim. These pleasures of
eating and drinking which Thomas categorizes as pleasures of touch are not
pleasures of taste, but the pleasures of satisfying hunger and thirst where taste
is not important. The man excessively devoted to these pleasures is not the
gourmet but the gourmand or glutton. Cf. NE III, 10.
27
S7TI-II, 141, 2 and 4; STI-II, 31,6; 60, 5. It does not, however, pertain
to temperance to govern pleasures of touch of a higher nature and proper to
man alone, e.g., the pleasures of the gymnasium (In III Eth. Nie., 20, 617).
Similarly, although man will not have in the beatific life the pleasures of touch
of sex, food and drink, he will nevertheless have exquisite pleasures of touch
(Suppl. 83, 6, ad 3). Indeed, he may have there the pleasure of taste, though
not that of satisfying his hunger (Suppl. 82, 4, adi). Cf. NE III, 10-12; VII,
4, 47* 23-30; VII, 12, 52* 33-53* 15.

2*ST I-II, 34, 1, e. The reader will hopefully pardon the solecism and see
the utility in this context of rendering "bonum"axia "bona" literally, i.e., as the
nouns "good" and "goods." Pleasure, as was seen (note 2) is nothing but the
resting of an appetite in a given good. It is true that the goodness of the
operation with which the pleasure is connected can also determine the moral
176 MILHAVEN

goodness of the pleasure (STI-II, 31,1, c) But it does so either as being itself a
good in which this particular pleasure is taken (cf STI-II, 32,1) or as effecting
some further good result In this latter regard, the moral goodness of a sense
pleasure may come from the fact that its corresponding sense activity makes
possible intellectual knowledge or the procreation of a new member of the
species However, this latter way of determining the moral goodness of a
pleasure does not concern us, since we are comparing only the intrinsic moral
goodness of sense pleasures, ι e , the moral goodness of the pleasures
inasmuch as they would be sought for their own sake In NE X, 4 and 5, the
goodness of different pleasures is determined by the different activities they
complete Aristotle here treats only of the pleasures of sense perception and
thought and evaluates these activities according to the condition of the organ
and the excellence of the objects known

^Thomas evaluates all man's higher activities according to this norm

Man's ultimate end, supreme good, and most perfect activity must be "the best
activity" of which man is capable (STI-II, 3, 5) It must, therefore, be the best
knowledge of "the best object," God (STI-II, 3,4-8) The contemplative life is
superior to the active life because the former, unlike the latter, consists m
intellectual knowledge (In III Sent, dist 35, 1, 4, 5711-11, 152, 2, 182, 1)
Intellect is superior to sense because it knows "more perfectly" (STI-II, 2,6,
31,5) Cf ΝΕΧ,Λ, 74*15-75*2,75*36-76*3 Closer Aristotelian parallels can
be found outside NE, e g , Metaphysics I, 982a 3-7
30
S7T-II, 35, 2 and 7 Thomas draws a conclusion only about the internal
sense of "imagination " But he reasons from a universal principle bearing on
all internal senses Cf STI, 78, 4, DV, 25, 2, c

^InlMetaphvs Ans, 1, 5 through 9, STI, 91, 3, ad3, S7T-II, 31,6, De

Anima (in Quaestiones Disputatae, II), 13, In Aristotehs II Ubrum De Anima
Commentanum, 14, 417 Cf S7T-II, 27, \,ad3, STll-ll, 180,7, c , Suppl 91,
4, c and ad 1, S CG, III, 53 α iV£X, 5, 75* 36-76* 3
32
Sri-II,27, \,ad3, STI,5,4,adì Cf Kovachs, 1961 232-56 α NEX,
3, 74* 4-8, X, 4, 74* 15-20
33
1 η NE the pleasure-giving activity in the case of sex, food and drink is
not presented as a knowing activity at all, but as the replenishing activity of so
much of our state and nature as has remained unimpaired (NE VII, 12,52* 33-
53* 18, VII, 14, 54* 15-20, cf NEVll, 14,54* 35-54* 2, X, 3,73* 7-12) And yet,
the pleasures of sex, food and drink are identified by Aristotle as pleasures of
the sense of touch (see note 26)

*Jean Leclercq, The Love of Learning (New York, 1961), ρ 106, cited by
Phipps, 1974 87 Cf e g , Song of Solomon, IV-V, 5, VII
THOMAS AQUINAS ON SEXUAL PLEASURE 177
35
E.g., the memory and "cogitative" faculty of man (STI, 78, 4, ad 5). I
use "reason" throughout this essay as Thomas often does, i.e., not
distinguishing it from "intellect," but meaning by the term all man's spiritual
knowing powers (e.g., ST I-II, 58, 2 and 3). In other places, Thomas
distinguishes between the lower spiritual knowing capacity of man, "reason,"
and the higher "intellect" or "intelligence" (e.g., S T I M I , 180,4, ad 3). But he
makes clear that these are really just two different aspects of the same
"potentia" (e.g., DV, 15, 1;5ΓΙ, 79, 8; S T H I , 31, 7).

» S T I M I , 141,7, l a n d adì; DV, 15, Ι , α ; 25, 2, e ; 6, c a n d a d 2. It is the

pleasures and appetites of sex, food and drink that Thomas characterizes as
furthest from reason but the same would have to follow for any sense
knowledge essential to the pleasures. Similarly, touch is the most material
(maxime materiate) of all the senses, just as ocular vision is the most spiritual
and immaterial (Suppl, 82, 4, ad 1; 91, 4, ad 1; SCG III, 53; In Aristotelis II
Ubrum De Anima Commentarium, 14, 417).

37
S7TMI, 156,4, e ; S7T-II, 73,5, ad3; De Malo, 12,4, c. and ad5; In VII
Eth. Nie, 6, 1389; cf. DV, 25, 2; S T MI, 17, 9, ad 3; 30, 3; 31, 7; 46, 5.

™SCGIII,27,125,and 137,ad5; InIISent., 20,1,2,adì; S71I-II, 141,2,

ad 2; 153, 1 and 2. Cf. De Malo 14,1, e ; Suppl. 49,6, ad4. Correspondingly, it
is impossible for a man to have any rational thought during intercourse, so
absorbing is the sense pleasure: S71-II, 34, 1, ad 1; 37, 1, ad2; S T I M I , 53,6;
55, 8, adì; 153, 2, 2 and ad 2; Suppl, 41, 3, 6 and ad 6; In VII Eth. Nie, 11,
1477. See texts cited in notes 5, 6, 7, 9. Cf. NE VII, 52* 17-19, a favorite text of
Thomas.

*SCG, III, 63; IV, 83; ST MI, 2, 6, "Sed Contra"; 60, 5; In Matt. 22
(19:549*). Cf. SCG, III, 27; S7T-II, 3, 5, c ; 17, 9, ad3; 24, 1, ad 1; 31,4, ad3;
31, 5, c ; 32, 7, ad2; 34,1,ad2; 5711-11,141,7,ad 1; 182, Ι,α; Suppl., 49,1,erf
1; In VIII Eth. Nie, 12, 1723. Intemperance is, of all the vices, the most base
because it loves as the greatest good a kind of pleasure that animals love, too.
The sense of touch giving these pleasures is the most common of the senses; all
animals have it. These pleasures are to be distinguished from the pleasures of
the gymnasium which are "proper to man and rationally acquired." (In III
Eth. Nie, 20,616-17; S71-II, 73,5, ad3; S71I-II, 142,4, c ; 179,2, ad 1 and 3.)
Temperance is a particularly beautiful and worthy virtue because it moderates
these pleasures "common to us and brutes" (S71I-II, 141,8,1 and ad 1; cf. ST
IMI, 141, 1, ad 1; 2, ad 3). Since in the act of intercourse these pleasures
completely dominate man, he becomes a brute animal at this moment
(bestialis efficitus; I, 98, 2, ad 3); cf. Catena Aurea, "/« Matt. XXII." Cf. NE
III, 10,18 e 23-26,18*3-4; I, 5,95* 19-21; NEVI, 12,44* 8-10; NE VII, 12,53«
28-35; NE X, 9, 80* 10-12.
178 MILHAVEN

"STI-II, 32, l,ad2\ 34, 1, ad 2; S Τ IMI, 142,2; 151, 2, ad 2. Cf. # £ III,

12, 19*33-19* 15; VI, 13, 44* 8-10; VII, 12, 53* 28-35; Χ, 6, 11,76*15-25,32-
34; Χ, 9, 79* 30-35; Χ, 1, 72* 19-22.
41
STI-li, 30, 5; 46, 2 and 3.
42
S T I M I , 142, 4, e ; SCG, III, 124; In IIIEth. Nie., 20, 617. Cf. NEWl,
10, 18« 25-26; 18* 3-5; III, 11, 18* 20-21; I, 5, 95* 19-21; X, 6, 77« 5-10.
43
ST IMI, 152, 2, OÍ/ 2 (agricola); In II Eth. Nie, 2, 262 (homines
agrestes), Cf. NE II, 2, 04* 23-26.

" S T M I , 2, 6, ad 2; 30, 3, e ; 31, 5, ad 1; 32, 7, ad2. Cf. NEX, 9,79* lOff;

VII, 13, 53* 32-36, X, 1, 72* 23-26; I, 8, 99« 12-15.
4
Vrt X Eth. Nie., 6, 2023-29; S r MI, 21, 7, ad 3; CTI, 165; /« / / / De
Anima, 1, 2, 598; Sw/?/?/. 82, 4, ad 3; In III Eth. Nie., 20, 616-17.

*E.g., STI-II, 27, 2, ad2; 31,6, ad2; STI, 79,4,8,9; 91,3, ad3; In IAris.
Metaphvs., 1, 5-9. Cf. NE X, 5; VII, 14.
47
Cf. Milhaven, 1976.1 revise and expand the phenomenological analyses
of Chirpaz 1969 and 1970.
THOMAS AQUINAS ON SEXUAL PLEASURE 179

REFERENCES

Aquinas, Thomas
CT "Compendium Theologiae." In Opuscula Omnia, II.
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"De Anima." In Quaestiones Disputatae, II. Turin:
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"De Duobus Praeceptis Caritatis et Decern Legis
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"De Malo." In Quaestiones Disputatae, II. Turin:
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SCG Summa Contra Gentiles. Rome: Vatican, 1934.
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5ΓΙ-ΙΙ Summa Theologiae, I-II. Turin: Marietti, 1950.
STIMI Summa Theologiae, II-II. Turin: Marietti, 1948.
ST ill Summa Theologiae, III. Turin: Marietti, 1948.
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Bailey, D. S.
1959 Sexual Relation in Christian Thought. New York:
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180 MILHAVEN

Chirpaz, Francois
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Doherty, Dennis
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Fuchs, Josef
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Kovach, Francis J.
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Milhaven, John Giles

1974 "Conjugal sexual love and contemporary moral
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Müller, Max
1958 Existenzphilosophie im geistigen Leben der Gegenwart.
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Noonan, John T., Jr.

1965 Contraception. A History of Its Treatment by the
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O'Brien, Elmer (ed.)

1964 Varieties of Mystic Experience. New York: New
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Phipps, William E.
1974 "The flight of the song of songs." Journal of the
American Academy of Religion, 62/1 (March): 87
THOMAS AQUINAS ON SEXUAL PLEASURE 181

Pieper, Joseph
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Thielicke, Helmut
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Van der Marck, William H.

1967 Towards a Christian Ethic. New York: Newman.
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