Edgar E.

Ramírez de la Cruz Daniel Cravacuore

Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas Universidad Nacional de Quilmes
Eduardo José Grin Arturo Orellana
Getulio Vargas Foundation Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Pablo Sanabria-Pulido
Universidad de los Andes

The Transaction Costs of Government Responses to the COVID-19

Viewpoint
COVID-19 Emergency in Latin America

Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic has created a crisis that is challenging national and local governments to Edgar E. Ramírez de la Cruz is professor and
department chair in the Public Administration
innovate in their responses to novel problems. Despite similarities to the challenges confronted in developed countries, Division at the Centro de Investigación y
for Latin American governments, these problems are amplified by structural obstacles such as social inequalities. These Docencia Económicas (CIDE, Center for

countries must respond with capacities and resources that are often limited by spoils systems and by social and political Research and Teaching in Economics), Mexico
City. His primary research interest is urban
polarization. This essay provides an overview of some innovative practices in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and governance. He is editor in chief of Gestión y
Mexico. In particular, this essay concentrates on some salient collaborative efforts in the region. To draw lessons from Política Pública and associate editor of Public
these practices, the authors focus on the formal and informal institutions that facilitate or obstruct collaboration across Administration Review. He earned his PhD in
public administration and policy from the Askew
jurisdictions. The findings are discussed in terms of the transaction costs of collaboration identified in these experiences. School at Florida State University.

L
Email: [email protected]

ocal innovation has been relevant to facing the challenges because of excessive fragmentation (in cities Eduardo José Grin is professor and
researcher at the Getulio Vargas Foundation,
challenges generated by the COVID-19 such as Mexico City, São Paulo, Buenos Aires, and São Paulo, Brazil. He holds a PhD in public
pandemic. This crisis has challenged Santiago). This region includes several monocentric administration and government. He has carried
municipalities to implement new solutions to metropolitan areas, with some exceptions resulting out research projects supported by UNESCO, the
British Embassy in Brazil, the Global Initiative
respond to a novel problem. In this context, creativity from either intentional design (Lima) or the historical for Fiscal Transparency, and the Latin American
understood as the implementation of modern manners dominance of the central city (Bogotá) (Frey 2014; Development Center for Administration.
to face specific issues (Kruyen and van Genugten 2017) Nickson 2011). Although certain aspects of urban His areas of interest are local governments,
inter-municipal cooperation, federalism and
seems to be an essential administrative and institutional governance problems faced in Latin America are intergovernmental relations, and state capacity.
capacity that provides more effective actions from similar to those encountered in the United States, Email: [email protected]
local governments. At the same time, agile-adaptive Canada, and Europe, some are unique. For example, Pablo Sanabria-Pulido is associate
government can be a useful concept (Moon 2020) contextual factors such as limited professionalization, professor and director of graduate programs
in the School of Government, Universidad
since municipalities confront enormous and wicked particularly in less developed cities, spoils systems, de los Andes, Colombia, and affiliate
problems. Governments need to be faster and more corruption, limited financial resources, involvement professor in the Public Administration
transparent, and they need to cooperate with many of national governments, and political risk aversion Division of the Centro de Investigación y
Docencia Económicas (CIDE, Center for
social actors developing new technologies and tools from local officials are more salient in urban regions Research and Teaching in Economics),
that generate and increase collective benefits. of Latin America. Mexico City. His areas of interest are public
management, policy analysis, organizational
behavior, corruption and transparency, local
Besides innovation, the response to the COVID-19 The institutional collective action (ICA) framework government, and public affairs education.
crisis requires interaction between local authorities could help identify mechanisms for mitigating He received his PhD in Public Administration
and different levels of governments, which has been a these problems by identifying elements that could and Policy from American University.
Email: [email protected]
concern of public administration scholars for a long time, facilitate collaborative efforts (Feiock 2013; Woods
Daniel Cravacuore is associate professor
for instance, by looking at intergovernmental relations and Bowman 2017). Although the classic public in the Department of Economy and
(Kincaid and Stenberg 2011; Wright 1974). Interaction administration literature emphasized centralized Administration and director of the Center

between levels of governments or jurisdictions is a solutions to the problems of collective action for Territorial Development at the National
University of Quilmes, Argentina. He is
significant issue because it often produces inefficiencies in in urban areas, several alternative governance Distinguished Senior Research Scholar in
complex urban problems such as economic development mechanisms may also be available (Feiock and the Institute for Public Management and

(Agranoff and McGuire 1998, 2003). Integrated Scholz 2010). ICA dilemmas are political as Community Service at Florida International
University and president of the International
solutions to complex problems are difficult to adopt and well as administrative, since they result from the Foundation for Local Development (Argentina
implement because government’s individual pursuit fragmentation of political and administrative and Chile). His research focuses on local

of goals and interests frequently results in collectively authority; they are also more complicated when governments and municipal autonomy.
Email: [email protected]
inefficient outcomes for urban areas. government action at one level overlaps with
the functions or territory of actions pursued by Public Administration Review,
Vol. 80, Iss. 4, pp. 683–695. © 2020 by
Similar to many regions in the world, Latin American governmental bodies at a higher or lower level of The American Society for Public Administration.
local governments face significant governance government (Feiock 2013). DOI: 10.1111/puar.13259.

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Arturo Orellana is associate professor in Therefore, the COVID-19 pandemic response can year, 21 provinces elected governors and more than
the Institute of Urban and Territorial Studies,
Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, and
be framed as an ICA dilemma to provide insights 2,000 localities elected mayors, who took power
researcher of the Nucleus on Governance into how to improve the response from subnational under weak fiscal conditions.
and Territorial Planning. His areas of governments and interjurisdictional collaborations.
interest are urban and regional governance,
planning, and management.
Considering collaboration complications in The Argentine municipal system has severe problems,
Email: [email protected] overexpanded and more connected territories, we despite having an institutional framework with
concentrate on “transaction costs” (Brown and high levels of institutional and political autonomy.
Potoski 2003). Transaction cost analysis assumes that Scarcely endowed with resources, it allocates a high
opportunism is present in collaborative efforts and proportion to paying wages and current expenses,
that it is related to the costs of creating, monitoring, leaving investment to be resolved by transfers
enforcing, and governing agreements for delivering originating discretionarily at other government levels
public goods and services. The literature suggests (Cravacuore 2017). Local governments concentrate
several variables that could reduce transaction costs on service provision such as street cleaning,
and therefore increase collaboration in developed resource collection, street lighting, primary health,
countries (Col 2007; Klok et al. 2018; Thurmaier and disadvantaged social groups, and additional services
Wood 2002). In countries such as the United States, depending on resource availability (Cravacuore 2016).
transaction costs can be linked to the characteristics A more complex local agenda characterizes
and heterogeneity of subnational governments municipalities in metropolitan areas, while in rural
(Feiock 2007, 2013; Hawkins 2009, 2010; areas there are significant infrastructure and service
Ostrom 2010). In this vein, local population size shortages.
and socioeconomic differences should be considered
as relevant issues (Soukopová and Vaceková 2018; In the face of the pandemic, the most immediate
Tavares and Feiock 2018). Also, the absence of challenge has been to support health care. Although
institutional capacities and fiscal resources could be municipalities are usually in charge of primary health
associated with more considerable transaction costs for care, leaving more complex care to provincial and
collaborative arrangements (Lubell et al. 2002). private hospitals, health care is a concurrent function
among the three government levels (Belló and
Next, we present how local governments in five Latin Becerril-Montekio 2011). This coordination exists
American countries are dealing with their challenges despite the absence of formal mechanisms in the
during this crisis: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, municipalities of the Buenos Aires metropolitan area.
and Mexico. Each case includes three elements: This area is likely to be the most severely affected by
first, the institutional and social context in which the COVID-19 pandemic, given a combination of
governments confront the epidemic, with an emphasis population density, weakness of the complex health
on actions taken by subnational governments; second, system, and poverty levels.
an overview of local governments’ responses to the
crisis; and third, a brief example for each country In terms of competencies, the municipalities continue
of interjurisdictional collaboration that could help to support essential services: collection and final
identify insights for reducing transaction costs and disposal of waste; urban cleaning and maintenance;
increasing economies of scale. Seen as one significant food delivery to deprived parts of the population; and
experience, these examples provide valuable insight primary health care, particularly, the general influenza
into how public officials could use formal and vaccination. As a novel element, during the pandemic
informal institutions and innovative tools to improve the national government expanded municipal
the COVID-19 crisis response, and in particular, to capabilities, which allow price controls on food and
improve interjurisdictional collaboration. essential cleaning products (Decree 351/2020).

Argentina How Are Local Governments Reacting to the

Argentina faces the COVID-19 pandemic with two COVID-19 Pandemic?
weaknesses: a national government that only took Argentinian local governments have demonstrated,
office in December 2019, and a precarious economic in times of severe crisis such as 2002, an essential
situation. The Argentinian peso has lost 68 percent resilience because of a robust territorial network
of its value since April 2018, annual inflation exceeds (Clemente, Girolami, and Arias 2006). However,
50 percent, and, after a 2.5 percent drop in gross the recentralization process has complicated
domestic product (GDP) in 2018, the economy intergovernmental coordination, particularly for social
contracted an additional 2.2 percent in 2019 (World policies (Cravacuore 2017). In this crisis, their first
Bank 2020). In addition to these difficulties, the reaction was to limit access to localities in order to
federal government faces complications in paying concentrate control and implement checkpoints on
external debt, which could have an impact on roads to review documentation and assess drivers’
subnational governments. Moreover, during the past physical condition. However, mayors were warned of

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these checkpoints’ illegality if they were set on national or provincial In this exceptional period, the first meeting between mayors of the
jurisdiction routes, because local regulations are only legal if they do Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires, where a third of Argentinian
not contradict federal or provincial provisions. This situation even population lives, along with national ministers and governors of
motivated judicial decisions to reverse policies adopted by mayors. the Autonomous City and the Province of Buenos Aires, was a
remarkable event. A meeting on March 23 focused on sanitary
In terms of preventive measures, free alcohol gel and sodium conditions, the availability of hospital beds, mechanical respirators,
hypochlorite delivery for home use is standard. Many municipalities and places for isolation of mild patients, as well as territorial control
also produced educational materials for homes and businesses, of preventive and compulsory social isolation. “The meeting
distributing them on social networks. Local governments activated was incredibly positive, everything is being organized very well
production ventures dedicated to making chinstraps and clothing and quickly with the municipalities,” said an opposition mayor.
for health personnel. More recently, some have begun installing Another mayor of the same party added, “There were no chicanes
tunnels for vehicle disinfection and disinfecting public areas or political questions. Fear unites us” (Rosemberg 2020). A mayor
using chlorinated water. In larger municipalities, governments said after that meeting, “We are all working together, in permanent
are preparing isolation beds for mildly infected people in hotels, communication, so that the quarantine program works better every
universities, schools, and sports clubs, along with the preparation of day.” A week later, the president met again with these metropolitans
graves in cemeteries. In terms of health care, it is worth highlighting mayors: to the initial public health concern, they added the
the coordination between the three levels of government to build, municipal fiscal situation; given the fiscal collapse, the national
in 45 days, 12 modular hospitals in the most populous districts of government offered to support payments for wages and essential
the country. These hospitals added 350 new intensive care beds and services. After this videoconference, an opposition mayor declared,
650 intermediate therapy beds to the system; municipalities have “The funds for municipalities are guaranteed” (Llorens 2020). This
been responsible for soil movement and concreting. situation contrasts with the lack of coordination verified in the early
days, when many local governments advanced regulations that were
Several municipalities have advance social policies, for instance, stricter than those established by the national government regarding
by forming volunteer networks to assist older adults in purchasing the free transit of essential services.
food and medicine. They have also accelerated the delivery of
supplementary food for poor households, in the format of weekly Two weeks later, the president held an extensive virtual meeting
baskets or daily meals. Given the closure of school cafeterias, the with the mayors of several urban municipalities. According to
municipality of Berazategui provides a checkbook to use in local the press, President Alberto Fernández listened to the reports of
businesses. These grants complement the Food Card, a recently the municipal chiefs on the situation in each district, took notes,
implemented weekly food voucher for poor households. Regarding and asked them for details on some specific matters (Nuevo Jujuy
mental health care, some municipalities created telephone programs 2020). These mayors were from different parties and represented 25
for psychological attention. In the same direction, many cities percent of the national population.
reinforced telephone attention systems for domestic violence
reports, to prevent their increase. In the context of the quarantine, the federal government structured
rules to coordinate other collaborative actions in addition to Decree
Among tax relief actions, the collection postponement of 260/2020. An example is Decree 351/2020, which extended to
municipal taxes and fees is widespread, both for households and municipalities the power to control the supplies and maximum
affected businesses. Municipalities with higher economic capacity prices of food and essential products during the health emergency.
announced credits to help companies and jobs, mainly destined
for micro-, small, and medium-sized companies, with subsidized The ending of preventive and compulsory social isolation presents
interest rates. These measures supplement actions taken by the a new intergovernmental coordination challenge. Given that the
national government, which is providing part of the monthly salary COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic has not impacted 10 percent
for workers in companies whose sales income fell. of the country’s local governments, in some territories conditions
existed for a relatively accelerated opening of the economy. The
Finally, municipalities with more significant resources have mechanism defined in Decree 408/2020 indicated that governors
developed mobile applications to geolocate open stores; others must present protocols to the chief of the Cabinet of Ministers to
launched, even before the federal government, applications for self- reopen industrial, commercial, and leisure activities, which must
assessment and for detected COVID-19 follow-up cases. Finally, be authorized according to certain epidemiological conditions. The
others use technology to implement random controls to verify the same happens at the municipal level, where mayors must present
mandatory quarantine of people who returned from abroad. In reopening operation plans to provincial governments. This new
summary, the municipal system has responded to the COVID-19 institutional arrangement forced new interactions and revitalized
pandemic with creativity, although generally encapsulated within intergovernmental relations.
local jurisdiction, vocation and commitment from public officials,
and few resources (Cravacuore 2017). Brazil
Brazilian municipalities were the most favored federative entity with
Collaboration between Levels of Government the return of democracy and the new constitutional pact signed in
A remarkable case of collaboration for Argentina has been the 1988 (Wilson et al. 2008). They expanded their political autonomy,
various meetings between mayors and the president, which are not increased their revenues as well as intergovernmental transfers, and
frequent since the municipal regime is a provincial responsibility. thus became the main level of government responsible for welfare
Transaction Costs of Government Responses to COVID-19 685
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policy implementation, particularly in education, health, and How Are Local Governments Reacting to the COVID-19
social assistance (Arretche 2013). However, historical weaknesses Pandemic?
and other difficulties regarding their roles in the federation have Technology has been one of the primary weapons to fight
brought four significant challenges to light: municipal financing, COVID-19 in many municipalities. As an example, the city of
state capacities, provision of public services, and intermunicipal Campina Grande (State of Paraiban/northeast region) created a
cooperation. data management system to monitor, in real time, compliance with
home isolation. The software uses the GPS of users’ cellphones,
The challenge of fiscal sustainability is a structural issue for local along with free tools from Google Maps and Google Transit, to
governments. Available evidence shows that financial weaknesses monitor displacement of confirmed and suspected COVID-19 cases
of the vast majority of municipalities were already growing and registered in the municipality. The system was created through a
exposing their financing difficulties. In 2019, about 35 percent partnership between NGO Digital Citizenship Space, the State
of local governments did not maintain their administrative Court of Auditors, and the Public Ministry.
structure, and almost half of all cities spent more than 54 percent
of their revenues just on personnel (FIRJAN 2020). According Monitoring is done based on users’ email and cellphone data,
to the Observatory of Municipal Information (2019), in 2018, which are provided during the contact of health teams with patients
municipalities with fewer than 50,000 inhabitants (89 percent when collecting COVID-19 tests. When monitored people fail to
of the total) collected only 8.4 percent of their own revenue. As comply with home isolation recommendations, technicians from
for intergovernmental transfers, on average, 66 percent of local the Municipal Health Secretariat are notified of the patient’s travel
resources come from other spheres of government. This dependence to other areas outside their residence. Upon receiving notifications,
on transfers is high for cities with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants (87 health surveillance agents make immediate phone or text message
percent of the whole). The scarcity of financial resources is likely to contact, alerting patients of the risks caused by noncompliance with
stress municipalities even more in pandemic times. medical guidelines. Besides monitoring patients outside their home
areas, the system also allows health care teams to identify whether a
State capacity regarding management and planning is lacking patient is going toward a crowded area or to a neighborhood with a
in most localities, and many are ill prepared to deal with the larger high-risk population.
multidimensional effects of the pandemic. For instance, the
Millennium Development Goals and Agenda 21 (implemented in Other big cities have implemented necessary measures for
22 percent of municipalities in 2015) and the Master Plan (adopted sustainable local development. The municipality of Santo André
in 30 percent of municipalities in 2015) can be used as proxies for (State of São Paulo) implemented two emergency measures
local planning capacity (Grin and Fernandes 2019). Moreover, it through the Bureau Serviços Tecnológica, which is part of
is still necessary to link the constitutional planning instruments, the city’s Technological Park. The first aims to stimulate local
required by the Federal Constitution, to real government planning, development through a partnership between the city hall and a
as is the case with the multiannual budget and plan. According to start-up that makes it available to all existing companies in the
Veloso et al. (2011), the use of strategic planning is a privilege of city, to use the drive-thru system as a means to sell and deliver
the most organized and largest municipalities (63 percent), while it products and services. The aim is to ensure that the economy and
exists in only 27 percent of the smaller ones. local companies continue to sell, buy, and publicize their activities
while social isolation measures are in place. The project exempts
Regarding public service provision, there are two key issues. all establishments, stores, and service providers residing in the city
The Constitution mandates the decentralization of policies to from every fee. One of the incentives generated by the initiative is
municipalities in such areas as health, education, and social to expand the use of information technology as a resource to keep
assistance and by the mechanisms of financing and federal induction businesses operating. Among other facilities, a chat was installed
(Arretche 1999; Franzese and Abrucio 2013). A level below are so that interested entrepreneurs can have their questions answered
policies delivered with more discretion by cities, such as human quickly.
rights, environmental, and urban development policies. Only
affluent municipalities cover the second level of services and deal The second project is a Digital Volunteer Network that was
with problems of different social complexities. Thus, state capacities developed in partnership with a start-up and a federal agency to
are insufficient to successfully achieve homogeneous results in their support small businesses. People in need of support can download
activity areas (Grin and Fernandes 2020). the Helpers application and request assistance to purchase different
kinds of home services, online attendance, or aid in other sorts of
Finally, intermunicipal collaboration is widespread in Brazil, demands, preventing people from leaving their houses. These two
especially in smaller cities (Grin and Abrucio 2017; Machado cases of local innovation make use of the possibilities opened up
and Andrade 2014). However, the extension of the pandemic will by the digital economy, to meet two essential objectives: ensure
require regional responses, so territorial associations should be people’s lives, and reduce adverse effects on employment and
intensified in quantity and quality. A territorial response by each income, especially in the less favored social groups.
policy sector will be insufficient to deal with the various connected
dimensions that the pandemic will demand from local governments. Collaboration between Levels of Government
Thus, responses will require creating new intermunicipal consortia, Small or weak municipalities have relied on previous regional
deepening formulation and implementation of solutions, and partnerships to pull resources and fight the pandemic. An example is
moving toward multipurpose consortia. the Santa Catarina Interfederative Consortium (CINCATARINA),
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which is a public entity formally constituted for multiple purposes managerialist approach utilized since the 1960s, which consistently
since 2010 in this southern state. Municipalities need to sign a promoted urban entrepreneurship focused on multiple projects and
contract that defines rules on duties, rights of membership, and little urban and territorial planning (Harvey 1989). This approach
modest financial contributions to participate. Based on collective also supported governance mechanisms for public services in which
efforts, it develops programs, government projects, integration public organizations take risks and private enterprises capture the
initiatives, and it strengthens shared operations, innovation, and benefits of speculative market actions (Harvey 1989).
public management modernization.
The structural problems resulted in social protests that began
CINCATARINA includes 109 associated municipalities (36 on October 18, 2019, triggered by popular discontent toward
percent of the total in the state, mainly small towns with limited price increases of underground transportation and other essential
administrative capacities). Sixty-two percent of its members are services. The protests led to a crisis if confidence in the authorities
municipalities with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants, and another 17 and the political class that had not been seen since the recovery
percent have a population of fewer than 20,000 people. Since it is a of democracy. These protests forced authorities and legislators to
public entity, cities just pay a fee and formalize its adhesion through elaborate on a social agenda and commit to having a referendum on
the approval of the city council to participate in CINCATARINA, potential changes or reforms to the Political Constitution. Because
regardless of their limited taxing, financial, or bureaucratic the Constitution dates back to the dictatorship (1973–89), it is
capacities. considered by some to have norms that concentrate power among
the country elites, benefiting them by oppressing the rest of the
To support municipalities during the emergency generated by the population.
COVID-19 pandemic, CINCATARINA created a platform called
PANEL COVID-19 (https://www.cincatarina.sc.gov.br/covid19/) These problems have been blamed for maintaining social
so that information about products, services, and supplies needed inequalities despite stable economic growth and the alternation of
for the prevention and treatment of COVID-19 can be found political parties. This stability has allowed the country to reach a
quickly and easily. The panel seeks to promote the administrative GDP per capita of around $27,000, only surpassed in the region by
rationality of services to optimize the time of public and private Panama and four small Caribbean states. However, according to a
agents involved in tackling this pandemic. Also, it facilitates study published by the World Bank (2018), Chile maintains a Gini
communication between the public authorities, philanthropic coefficient of 0.47, which places it among the 10 countries with
entities, and companies by making transparent the purchasing of the worst income distributions in the world, sharing this condition
all materials and goods to face the health crisis. The goal is not in Latin America and the Caribbean with Haiti, Honduras, Brazil,
to generate a broker business, but to offer a participatory and Colombia, Mexico, and Costa Rica. Inequality is not expressed
collaborative database to help municipalities involved in COVID- in terms of extreme poverty, since its level reaches only 16.5
19 treatment to find supplies to cover current needs. Of particular percent, based on the new methodology of ECLAC (2019). This
interest for small towns is the support of the platform providing level is below almost all Latin American countries, where only
guidelines and records regarding administrative procedures for Uruguay presents a better result with 4.5 percent. The fundamental
acquisitions without the need for bidding. inequalities occur in the provision of public and private goods and
in services between communes, where diverse social, economic, and
The most important result of the platform is to enable a environmental realities are evident in broad gaps in socioterritorial
collaborative system between companies and suppliers that can inequality. In particular, in the Chilean case, its most significant
be quickly updated. The system already contains registered needs expression is manifested in metropolitan areas (Orellana Ossandón
for 125 products, of which only about 14 products do not have et al. 2013).
a certified supplier. The platform already includes 252 registered
suppliers, which can be the same for more than one product, but, The inequality between communes has been documented in
on average, there are more than two for each registered need. various studies of urban quality of life, especially in metropolitan
Thus, the search for suppliers is faster and can be mediated by areas (Orellana and Marshall 2019; Vicuña et al. 2019). The
CINCATARINA, even if purchases are locally executed. Therefore, metropolitan level is also characterized by the absence of leadership
the expedited procurement processes have helped ensure that because of the lack of regional authority to plan and manage
lives can be saved based on transparency, integrity, and ethics in the affairs of cities that involve two or more communes. In this
purchasing procedures for products and services, which is one of context, conflicts between local jurisdictions and the ministries that
the most relevant results from institutionalized intermunicipal depend on the central government are frequent. In particular, local
cooperation experience. Moreover, using the consortium’s expertise disputes are accentuated by the presence of “intendents,” who are
in shared bids is an essential aspect at this point. Still, it only administrators of regional governments appointed by the president.
became possible in a short time because of the previous existence of For this reason, intendents often lack political legitimacy and were
this cooperative arrangement. seen by protesters as repressors. For demonstrators in the streets,
mayors, who are democratically elected every four years, could play
Chile a role as mediators in the conflict.
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed Chile’s institutional
capacity because of problems of multilevel governance that affect Urban issues are highly relevant since two out of three people live
the ability to articulate and coordinate actions between different in the 10 metropolitan areas legally defined. The metropolitan
government levels (OECD 2017). The origin of this problem is the area of Santiago, Valparaíso, along with Concepción, are the most
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important because they represent 51.4 percent of the country’s decisions taken by municipalities before the central government.
population. In addition to this condition of high sociodemographic However, only a small number of more affluent communes located
concentration, inequality is added in terms of urban quality of in the metropolitan area of Santiago implemented programs such as
life in a country that has 90 percent of urban population but internet services to facilitate the access of children and adolescents
where municipalities only have authority to decide on 8 percent of to their online classes in public schools. Home services for influenza
public investment (Horst 2018). Also, differences in terms of per vaccination to the higher-risk population, sanitation at the entrances
capita budget by commune are substantial and fluctuate between of public offices, and even temporary accommodation for victims of
US$1,300 and $180 (Orellana and Marshall 2017). gender violence are examples of actions taken only by more affluent
cities. This situation has exposed the inequality of public services
How Are Local Governments Reacting to the COVID-19 managed at the local level in metropolitan areas.
Pandemic?
The COVID-19 virus arrived in Chile at the beginning of March, Finally, the coordination problems in multilevel governance
when local government officials and mayors were mediating the already evident in Chile (OECD 2017) added to the social crisis
conflict between civil society and the political class. In this dispute, that preceded the situation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
the main problems were complaints from social groups against The role of local governments has been key to containing and
actions of government authorities and members of Congress. directing citizens’ demands to the central government, taking
During the social unrest that led to almost daily demonstrations in advantage above all of the greater legitimacy that mayors currently
Santiago and other capitals of the country since October 18, mayors have concerning other political, legislative, judicial, religious, and
positioned themselves as mediators between these groups. The most uniformed authorities. Moreover, police and military officers have
significant expression of this leadership was organizing a voluntary been rejected, and their actions often disapproved by citizens in
citizen consultation on December 15, 2019, regarding the possible part because of the social situation prevailing before the crisis.
adoption of a new constitution. Some 2.15 million people in 226 Therefore, one of the lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic for local
communes participated in this consultation, and a clear majority authorities and society is that strengthening local capacities is urgent
(91.3 percent) voted in favor of enacting a new constitution. In and necessary to deal with issues such as those associated with the
this context, President Sebastián Piñera, whose disapproval reached COVID-19 pandemic. For that reason, it seems imperative to
more than 80 percent recently, saw an opportunity to reposition his introduce legal reforms to strengthen the country’s decentralization
leadership in the country by managing the COVID-19 crisis using and regionalization processes. Also, it is needed to allow the
the current institutional arrangement. The Constitution grants the existence of supramunicipal or intermunicipal institutions that give
president the authority to establish a state of emergency, which municipalities a more significant role to govern, plan, and manage
empowered the central government to confront and coordinate public policies that reduce the gap in urban quality of life between
under a single command actions to face the crisis. communes and cities, especially in metropolitan areas.

At that time, the central government unsuccessfully attempted Collaboration between Levels of Government
to exclude mayors from participating in the command and Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, one of the central
coordination panel formed to confront the COVID-19 crisis, claims of municipalities has been a lack of powers to help confront
relegating them to mere implementors of decisions taken at the the crisis. For example, municipalities did not have the authority to
central level. These exclusion efforts were unsuccessful, given the prevent people from breaking a quarantine already decreed by the
mayors’ legitimacy and their direct contact with social groups and national health authorities. Additionally, mayors of communes with
citizens. The so-called mayors’ rebellion has highlighted in Chile, the most vulnerable populations lack powers and resources to face
during the health crisis, the need to advance in administrative and the more significant social demands under this state of exception. In
fiscal decentralization toward the local level. This decentralization this regard, the president of the Security Commission of the Chilean
is requested by citizens and local authorities to resolve problems Association of Municipalities (AChM) and mayor of Talcahuano,
associated with the wide gaps in quality of urban life in terms of Henry Campos, said, “One of the important criticisms that we have
health benefits, job accessibility, and protection against crime— made is that today on the streets, according to what they have told
aspects affected by the health crisis. Given the level of segregation all the communes of the country, there is a great number of people
that exists between communes (Vicuña et al. 2019), it is challenging that circulate during curfew … crimes have been committed during
to apply measures such as quarantine. In many communes, heads of the curfew, and it seems that the health objective of the authorities
households need to work in the informal economy; otherwise, home is not being met, which is to reduce the number of people infected
overcrowding increases domestic and gender violence, especially with the coronavirus” (Claro 2020).
in the absence of programs to cover households’ requirements of
temporary confinement. For this reason, mayors’ knowledge of In this context, municipal associations have been important
local demands and activities is essential for ethical decision-making advocates of local authorities. Chile has had a significant tradition
regarding local matters such as restricting commercial operations or regarding municipal associations since its transition to democracy.
the transit of people. Today, there are around 46 associations based on thematic or
territorial issues. Two examples of these associations are the
Regardless of their capacity, many municipalities took measures Association of Municipalities of Chile and AChM. For instance,
even before the central government. Banning temporary operations AChM brings mayors from all political affiliations to professionalize
of large shopping centers, limiting access to public parks, or the local public service. Given this multiplicity of political views,
requesting people to wear masks in public places are some of the AChM is unique in Latin America, where political party affiliations
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often limit the formation of mayors’ associations. This variety of Thus, Colombia has three levels in its current multilevel
associations has allowed it to be influential on issues such as local governance structure: national, departmental (provincial/
finances, housing, health, education, and the environment, among state level), and municipal. Since they have incorporated new
others. functions, municipalities have become much more powerful
vis-à-vis the central government, particularly concerning the
The significant increase in leadership and legitimacy before the so-called departamentos. In Colombia, there are 32 departamentos,
public opinion of mayors has not been translated into associative one Capital District, Bogotá, and around 1,103 municipalities.
practices to combat the pandemic as in other countries. This lack Municipalities are classified in seven different levels according to
of coordinated efforts is mainly due to the centralist character their size and administrative capability. The special category and
of the Chilean state. However, media siding with mayors have category 1 gather the larger cities, whereas categories 2 to 6 include
questioned the institutional framework. For this reason, the national smaller municipalities, with categories 5 and 6 being the most
government, in agreement with municipal associations, recently frequent, since those are the ones with a smaller size (and with lower
signed a decree giving special funding and greater power for cities to institutional capacity).
police compliance with curfew and quarantine policies.
In this context, Colombia has faced a dynamic (and tense)
Given that policing social distancing seems to be critical to prevent intergovernmental relations scenario whereby the most developed
collapsing health systems, the new powers of the municipalities regions have alleged high levels of centralism, particularly in the
are a substantial accomplishment. The new regulations allow local executive branch. In this context, the COVID-19 emergency
governments to apply fines for the nonuse of masks in public spaces, response triggered tensions across government levels. It made
sanction those who do not respect the curfew and quarantines, more visible the expectation of larger subnational governments
issue permits to citizens to circulate for exceptional reasons, and (departmental and municipal) to adopt and implement local
prevent the formation of crowds or meetings including more than agendas that, in principle, did not necessarily conform to the goals
50 people. Although these powers were exercise previously by some and programs of the national government. Whereas the response
municipalities through special laws, standardizing these powers from subnational governments appeared more rapidly and with
constitutes a significant advance by the central government toward specific measures (school closing, mobility bans, local curfews,
recognizing the importance of municipalities for the implementation lockdowns, among others), the national government seemingly took
of national policies. Transferring public safety responsibilities to a bit longer to announce and execute actions. This gap in response
cities to confront the pandemic could be the first step toward greater times, and the assortment of the measures taken by municipal/
decentralization and more responsive public policies. provincial governments, created a perception of dissonance between
the different government levels.
In summary, through associative platforms such as AChM that
bring together almost all of the country’s municipalities, mayors How Are Local Governments Reacting to the COVID-19
from all parties have managed to reach agreements to support a Pandemic?
common strategy vis-à-vis the central government. These platforms The emergency response activated palpable frictions between
have also provided a forum for them to share experiences and work the national level—namely, the president and his cabinet—and
practices to confront COVID-19. some of the mayors and governors of the subnational units,
particularly the mayor of the Capital District of Bogotá. What
Colombia the responses elicited was a classic clash of competencies among
Colombia is a unitary decentralized country. This definition the national level and the government of the main geographic
implies a particular distribution of competencies and roles between unit of the country in terms of population, GDP contribution,
the national and the subnational governments (Sanabria 2015). and tax collection. While both actors have publicly attempted to
Whereas social policy is highly decentralized, and there is a high portray a collaborative relationship, decisions regarding mobility
proportion of resources transferred from the central government restrictions, closure of the country’s main airport, and the focus
to the subnational units, several aspects remain in charge of the of crisis management brought, in the beginning, public claims
national government. Notably, the executive branch concentrates and hostile exchanges between the two levels of government in
a greater proportion of power, vis-à-vis other branches and social networks and the media. This situation is not surprising
government levels. considering that the mayor of Bogotá is regarded as the second
most important political position in the country. However,
The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed an increasing level of ultimately the government of Bogotá has adhered to the guidelines
tension in intergovernmental relations, in a country with a strong of the national government.
tradition of central versus local government bargaining and
historical claims from the regions to increase their autonomy. Furthermore, after the larger cities (Bogotá, Medellín, Cali,
The 1991 Political Constitution paid attention to those claims Barranquilla) started to individually design and adopt local
and adopted an extensive decentralization focus. In this context, measures, the national government issued a substantial number
through the new constitution, municipalities acquired a broader of regulations and policy guidelines, amid a state of emergency
set of functions and received greater autonomy (Sanabria 2019). declaration, mainly through decrees and circulares (directives) from
They became the locus of social policy, and more specifically, the presidency and the ministries. The most active stage of the issue
assumed the implementation of education, health, sanitation, and of new regulations and guidelines from the national government
public utilities. started after the risk level increased from low to moderate on
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February 24 (Minsalud 2020b), but it particularly accelerated in of health devices and personal protective equipment (Decree
March 2020. 499/2020), as well as to streamlined the process for regional
investment projects funded with royalties from the extraction of oil
Considering the perception of anarchy in the various measures and other natural resources (Decree 513/2020). Accordingly, this
taken by local governments, novel guidelines from the national indicates that not all the measures from the executive branch were
government attempted to outline a framework for action for intended to curtail local/subnational responses.
local governments and to establish clear standards for issues
such as subnational plans for contagion control and mitigation Yet, it has been evident that the competition to provide timely
(Minsalud 2020a). Among these measures, we can mention the responses remains, even for worthy purposes. For instance, the
closing of schools (Directive 03/2020, Ministry of National Colombian model of conditional cash transfers, which has been
Education), public events (Circular 11/2020, Health and running for the last two decades at the national level (implemented
Trade Ministries), law and order measures (Decree 418/2020 by subnational governments), generated essential lessons that
and Decree 420/2020), the closing of bars and restaurants have been materialized during the emergency. Both national and
(Resolution 453/2020, Health and Trade Ministries), lockdown subnational level agencies (particularly in the largest cities) have
and confinement of senior citizens over 70 years old (Resolution designed and implemented relatively sophisticated schemes to
464/2020, Ministry of Health), guidelines for health services provide money and in-kind aid to vulnerable households and
delivery during the COVID emergency, and action plans by local individuals. The implementation process has proven effective
secretaries of health (Circular 5/2020, Resolution 502/2020, and during the emergency and has showed the capacity that the country
Resolution 536/2020, Ministry of Health), such as lockdowns has to identify potential beneficiaries effectively and to transfer
among other restrictions (Decree 457/2020). The almost continued aid to them. All in all, the context in which such programs have
issuance of regulation and guidelines depicts a context in which taken place as part of the emergency response revealed a sort of race
the national government was intending to establish national between the national and local governments about who arrives first.
convergence in measures and intensity. Until now, the decentralization model of Colombia has proven
effective for the most developed regions, and particularly for the
Moreover, several of those measures attempted to clarify and main cities and their surrounding metropolitan areas.
reaffirm the preeminence of national-level policies over subnational
ones, in response to the created confusion between government Collaboration between Levels of Government
levels guidelines, particularly regarding the lockdown and The results of the attention to the emergency of COVID so
restrictions to mobility. Those measures reveal how the presidency far show important divergences across cities and regions. One
deliberatively aimed to play, and display, a predominant role over key factor to review is the strength of the national-subnational
subnational authorities. In fact, the Decree 418/2020 explicitly relationships and the ability of mayors and governors to collaborate
states that, during the emergency, all national government with the presidency of the country and the central government.
definitions regarding law and order are superior to those of local Two key examples epitomize the differences in numbers in terms of
authorities and that departmental level definitions supersede the pandemic and regarding intergovernmental relations strategies:
municipal level regulations. Also, that all actions were taken by the Capital District of Bogotá and the city of Medellín. By the end
governors and mayors regarding security, public order, and so on, of May 2020, Bogotá had around 7,000 cases of COVID infection,
must be reported first to the Ministry of the Interior; otherwise, whereas Medellín had barely exceeded 100 cases. Although both
any violation would imply stringent sanctions upon subnational cities have evident differences in size (Bogotá has approximately
authorities attempting to violate such mandates. eight million inhabitants and Medellín nearly four million in the
metropolitan area), they concentrate together a high portion of the
Nonetheless, multilevel governance has eventually worked economic activity in the country and show very different approaches
despite the struggles mentioned earlier. The national government to public policy and management. For instance, while Bogotá has
enacted a series of measures that aimed to provide some leeway been more active in pursuing tertiarization and private provision of
and autonomy on certain local government issues. That seems public services, Medellín keeps an almost exclusively public model
reasonable considering that a number of response measures are of public service provision that is the foundation for a renowned
either jointly taken, regulated, or either implemented by national local bureaucracy.
and subnational authorities alike. For instance, the national
government rules (Decree 419/2020) allowed governors (heads of The approach of the local governments’ relationship with the
departmental governments) and mayors (heads of municipalities) national government has been dissimilar. On the one hand, the
to extend for an extra month the period in office for hospital mayor of Bogotá initially adopted measures that were implemented
managers who were about to finish their periods (March 2020). faster than the central government definitions, and it started rivaling
Also, amid the declaration of economic and social emergency some of the national measures in the media. On the other hand,
(special powers to the president), by Decree 512/2020, the national both the mayor of Medellín and the governor of the Departamento
government allowed subnational governments to temporarily make of Antioquia, of which Medellín is its capital, adopted a more
budgetary changes according to the emergency needs. Furthermore, collaborative outlook with the central government and the
as part of the emergency response, the national government presidency of the republic. The latter approach has been mentioned
provided local authorities with special powers to temporarily several times by those authorities as one of the key elements that
enhance health services, eased the process to contract out human explain the more successful results of the Medellín strategy toward
and equipment resources (Decree 538/2020) and the procurement COVID-19 (Diario Económico Portafolio 2020).
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Although there are other factors that, by all means, could help suspension of classes in the entire national education system to the
describe the effectiveness of the anti-COVID-19 strategy in suspension of economic activities that may be of state or municipal
Medellín (e.g. use of technology in virus tracing, a strong public competence. In each phase, different subnational governments
sector, an entrenched local/regional culture of abidance to collective would have to implement them and monitor their compliance
goals, a long-lasting model of collaborative governance between the in their territories. However, today, there are no guidelines or
public and the private sectors, a robust metropolitan governance standards that clearly define what should be the role of state and
structure), the higher level of coordination with the national municipal governments in these measures.
government has helped the implementation of crucial strategies
according to the mayor of Medellín. Medellín adopted the Without clear guidelines, state governments have taken various
national guidelines immediately after they were issued and received courses of action, in some cases confronting federal decisions within
some cooperation from the Ministry of Health and the National their jurisdictions. The main actions at the state level are diverse
Institute of Health to activate most of the testing and tracing containment and prevention measures. For example, some states
strategy. The city also followed (and even anticipated) key national began the isolation of people who tested positive for the virus and
measures regarding the health emergency and has continued in a established preventive measures earlier than the federal government,
collaborative model of the three levels of government towards the such as the reduction of educational, economic, commercial, and
subsequent gradual reactivation of vital economic sector. recreational activities. Also, various actions have been initiated
at this level to moderate the health emergency and alleviate the
Mexico local economy. However, the heterogeneity of capacities between
The country began to confront the emergency of COVID-19 in a states is remarkable. Metropolitan areas such as the Valley of
situation that is already exceptional in the government, particularly Mexico, Monterrey, Guadalajara, and Toluca have more significant
in the federal public administration. In late 2018, the new federal professional expertise, resources, and experience to face public
government began what it called the fourth transformation of health problems. For example, according to data from the National
Mexico. In the diagnosis presented by President Andrés Manuel Health Information System, most health facilities are concentrated
López Obrador, the main government problem is the level of in those urban metropolitan areas.
corruption, and its most direct and lacerating effect is inequality.
The severity of this situation can be summarized in examples. Inequalities between municipalities in Mexico is a highly recognized
First, according to CONEVAL (2019), in Mexico, almost 49 and studied topic. In the case of municipal governments, the picture
percent of the population lives on incomes below the poverty line. is bleaker because fragility of local governments is present in many
And, second, 14.6 percent of the adult population who were in ways. Municipalities are characterized by their lack of institutional
contact with a public servant experienced some act of corruption capacities to provide public goods and services, shortage of financial
(INEGI 2018). resources, limited periods of government, and lack of professional
public servants. The current institutional design favors that all local
Under these assumptions, the president’s office began a reform of actors (mayors, council members, officials, and even citizens) are
the federal public administration to reduce the size of government averse to cooperation dynamics and are generally not willing to
and increase the centralization of public policy decisions. For build sustained and committed public policies (Arellano et al. 2011).
example, with a new Austerity Law, the president introduced
ceilings on the salaries of federal public employees, equivalent to the How Are Local Governments Reacting to the COVID-19
salary of the president of Mexico. This law also eliminated medical Pandemic?
and retirement insurance for public officials. Also, the number Municipalities are responsible for guaranteeing the continuity of
of employees dismissed since the start of the current government public services such as water, sewage, garbage collection, sanitation
is unknown. However, according to a point of agreement of of public spaces, and monitoring and enforcing social distancing
the Senate, it is estimated that 200,000 public employees could measures, as well as in-home quarantines, cancellation of massive
have been fired exclusively from high positions (Senado de la events, and in some cases the transportation of medical personnel.
República 2019). This number is equivalent to approximately 12 Other actions vary according to the size and resources available to
percent of all federal government public officials (nearly 1.6 million the municipality.
officials). In the particular case of the Ministry of Health, dozens of
directors, deputy directors, and top and administrative workers lost In health matters, municipalities are restricted to preventive issues.
their jobs (San Martín 2019). Between December 2018 and July However, some generalized actions by municipal governments
2019 alone, 1,044 workers were discharged in 17 agencies. Also, include the dissemination of information. For example, some urban
intending to fight corruption, the federal government centralized cities carry out information campaigns about forms of COVID-19
the health policy and the purchasing of medicines and health contagion, emergency telephones, available hospitals, and other
supplies by restructuring the national procurement system. measures undertaken by different levels of government. Many
municipalities are distributing masks or antibacterial gel in public
In this situation, the National Health System has concentrated the spaces. Also, cities such as the municipality of Centro in Tabasco
response through public hospitals, which includes the social security placed thermostatic arches to detect fever in citizens.
institutions and the creation of the National Institute of Health for
people outside of social security. At the start of the pandemic, the Medium-sized local governments show coordinated care strategies
federal government centralized the response by defining different with state governments to complement their technical capacities.
phases for its attention, which include actions that range from the For instance, Aguascalientes established an emerging plan aimed
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at reviving the local economy. The first measures focus on With the support of UdeG, the state government installed a “Situation
discounts and extensions of tax payments such as property taxes, Room” and established advance preventive measures earlier than the
and fees for markets, sanitary landfills, and parking services, or pay federal government. The Situation Room developed a theoretical
deferment for licenses such as the sale of alcohol. This municipality model, different from the “sentinel model” of the federal government,
also requested loans to development banks to support local to estimate the rate of increase in the number of COVID-19 cases.
entrepreneurs by providing soft loans. In alliance with the private The model allowed defining scenarios and establishing measures such
sector, it created a digital business directory to form production as access controls to the Guadalajara metropolitan area, the second-
chains and online training. Also, the third group of measures is largest in the country, and administrative sanctions on people who
food support programs that provide daily portions of food based on violated mandatory confinement.
fortified soybeans and rice in coordination with nongovernmental
organizations. Another result of this collaboration has been the “Radar Jalisco”
program. Based on the recommendations of the World Health
Subnational governments of higher technical and financial Organization, the program performs as many tests as possible to
capabilities have used information technologies, innovation have a better diagnosis, locate potential outbreaks more effectively,
in services and processes, and intersectoral collaboration. For and give epidemiological follow-up to positive cases. Upon the
example, Mexico City established programs to support the local state’s request, the university developed an active surveillance model
economy through various actions such as loans. It also created the that includes running a call center, which uses an algorithm to
MERCOMUNA Program in coordination with alcaldias (small evaluate and determine the severity of cases. The process followed by
local governments) for the biweekly delivery of vouchers, which the system starts from the identification of patients in the call center
could be exchanged in food markets, bakeries, and grocery stores. who can set an appointment for testing in modules or through a
On the other hand, support is also provided to people who live, home visit; it also provides follow-ups for patients not meeting
transit, or temporarily live in the city and suffer some type of effect the testing criteria. This testing provides results within 72 hours
because of the measures adopted by the COVID 19 contingency, and gives epidemiological monitoring of infected patients. The
including sex workers. final results of the program will be seen in the following months;
however, as of today, the program allowed testing on a larger scale
Concerning sanitary measures, Mexico City offers different than what the capacities of the state government would allow.
communication channels such as text messages for medical guidance
(SMS COVID-19). This system is a first step for identifying Concluding Remarks
suspected cases of COVID-19 and, where appropriate, determines Subnational governments are decisive in reducing the health
who should be tested. Also, the city government developed the crisis severity and will be central to ensure the resilience of local
CDMX app that provides information about the available capacity economies. The cases presented here provide an overview of the
of public hospitals. Because of social distancing measures, the many actions taken by local public officials innovating within their
CDMX app has also been used to offer medical consultations by jurisdictional authority and their limited capacity. Heterogeneity
video calls to people with possible symptoms and to follow up on also characterizes the limited response. While affluent municipalities
people in quarantine confirmed with the virus. introduce technological innovations comparable to that of
developed countries, small or poor cities struggle to keep service
Collaboration between Levels of Government delivery in an unprecedented fiscal crisis. This heterogeneity is
However, not all subnational governments have an easy relationship associated with usual suspects, such as variations in the size of
with the federal government and look for alternative forms of the jurisdiction and local economy. However, in all the analyzed
confronting the crisis, such as Jalisco State. Despite being the fourth countries, there is a quick fiscal revenue deterioration, which will
subnational government in terms of the population and size of its ultimately limit local governments’ capacity to innovate and take
economy, Jalisco holds the 19th place for infections. One factor action to solve the imminent economic crisis.
that explains the temporary results is the early response. The state
began canceling massive events on day 1 of the first confirmed The difficulties of innovating and providing a coordinated response
case, the suspension of classes on day 4, the voluntary isolation of in the cases of the majority of countries are not only explained by
the population on day 6, and the request for the cancellation of the limited capacities at the local level. An essential characteristic
international flights on day 10. of the current environment is related to the high transaction costs
created by social and political cleavages between national and
Later, the Jalisco government came into conflict with the federal subnational governments. These cleavages are reflected in formal
government because it did not consider the information generated by and informal institutional arrangements that have their roots in a
the federal government timely or the actions implemented for social tradition of strong central governments in both federal and unitary
distancing sufficient, and, above all, it considered inappropriate governments. These institutional arrangements complicated the
the federal government’s screening strategy. This constant tension development of intergovernmental relations based on trust.
with the federal government encouraged the state government to
collaborate with the University of Guadalajara (UdeG), integrating For developed countries, the literature suggests some elements that
its technical advice in different capacities. The relationship between can reduce the transaction costs of establishing collaborative efforts.
UdeG and Governor Enrique Alfaro Ramírez originated in the late For instance, opportunities for participants to interact face-to-face,
1990s, when he was elected mayor of Tlajomulco and appointed the existence of political homophily among elected or appointed
several university officials to management positions. officials, the presence of professional communities of public
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servants that bridges across jurisdictions, as well as the preexistence governments must acknowledge that collaborative and coordinated
of agreements, contracts, policy networks, or even policy forums, actions will be crucial to success. Hence, countries need to start
all have a strong potential to reduce the transaction costs of adjusting their institutional arrangement to reduce transaction
collaboration (Carr and Hawkins 2013; LeRoux, Brandenburger, costs for collaboration by creating a more equal distribution of
and Pandey 2010; Lubell et al. 2017; Song, Park, and Jung 2018; Yi power and more homogeneous capacities between different levels of
et al. 2018). However, we know little about what factors can reduce government. These institutions will also require a better allocation
transaction costs in developing democratic countries. The cases here of financial resources and even capabilities and authorities to collect
presented provide insights regarding variables affecting transaction revenues and levy taxes. Moreover, local governments will, more
costs for collaborating across jurisdictions. than ever, need to invest heavily in existing and new associations,
both profit and nonprofit.
First, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico began the pandemic under political
polarization. Moreover, in all these countries, their national National governments will need to acknowledge that for local
governments are relatively newly elected since none of them took government to be more effective and efficient partners in their
office before 2018. In developed countries with stable bureaucracies, new responsibilities, they must help develop local professional
the combination of these two factors would not be a significant issue. bureaucracies, particularly in less affluent municipalities.
However, given the turnover of top positions in national bureaucracies, Collaboration and coordination will require professional public
the transaction costs of establishing collaborative agreements with servants isolated from political pressures and technically proficient
subnational governments tend to increase significantly. For instance, to be considered trustworthy partners. These bureaucracies will
for national public officials, it is complicated to identify partners in need to be more insulated from political pressures and trusted by
subnational governments and to develop trustworthy relationships the citizens they serve and by partners that could contribute to
with them if they remain characterized by a lack of professionalism. face the new challenges ahead. More than with any other crisis, in
Moreover, the centralist tradition and the resources and information confronting the COVID-19 pandemic, without a homogenous
asymmetries make it difficult for local officials to trust the behavior response, the health and the next economic recession will be
of national-level officials. An example of this lack of trust is the fact devastating for social equity.
that many subnational governments established stronger actions than
national governments and often earlier, too. References
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associations of mayors and in Argentina by the unprecedented face- Gobierno y Administración Pública Municipal: Un Panorama de Fragilidad
to-face virtual meeting between the presidents and local authorities. Institucionalizada. In Los Gobiernos Municipales a Debate: Un Análisis de la
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municipalities. This decision created a credible commitment, Arretche, Marta T.S. 1999. Políticas Sociais No Brasil: Descentralização Em Um
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