368 Phil.
791
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 131109. June 29, 1999 ]
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC. (MANILA), PETITIONER, VS. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES ALEX AND OPHELIA TORRALBA,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals,[1] dated June 23, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No.
42197, which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by International School (Manila), Inc.
(ISM) assailing the orders dated June 19, 1996 and August 27, 1996 of the lower court granting
a writ of execution pending appeal, and denying the subsequent motion to reconsider the same;
and the resolution dated October 14, 1997 of the appellate court denying ISM's motion for
reconsideration.
On February 14, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77[2] rendered a
decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-10653 entitled "Spouses Alex and Ophelia Torralba v.
International School, Inc. (Manila), Dr. Rodney C. Hermes, Noli Reloj and Danilo de Jesus"
involving a Complaint for Damages due to the death of plaintiffs' only son, Ericson Torralba
while in the custody of ISM and its officers. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered finding defendant International
School (Manila), Inc. liable to pay plaintiffs, the following:
1. The sum of P4,000,000.00 as and for Moral damages;
2. The amount of P1,000,000.00 by way of Exemplary damages;
3. The amount of P2,000,000.00 as Actual damages;
4. The sum of P300,000.00 as and for Attorney's fees; and
5. To pay the costs.
The complaint against the individual defendants is DISMISSED for insufficiency of
evidence. Likewise, the Counterclaim is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED."[3]
ISM appealed to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency thereof, the spouses Torralba filed a
motion for execution pending appeal before the lower court on the grounds that the appeal is
merely dilatory and that the filing of a bond is another good reason for the execution of a
judgment pending appeal.[4] Said motion was opposed by ISM.
In an order dated June 19, 1996, the lower court granted execution pending appeal upon the
posting of a bond in the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) by the spouses Torralba.
[5] In an ex-parte motion dated July 25, 1996, Deputy Sheriff Angel L. Doroni informed the
lower court that pursuant to the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal issued by the court on July
17, 1996, a Notice of Garnishment of ISM's bank deposits at Global Consumer Banking,
Citibank N.A. (Citibank) was served by him to Citibank on July 18, 1996; and that on July 24,
1996, he received a letter from Citibank informing him that ISM's bank deposits with the said
bank in the amount of P5,500,000.00 were on 'hold/pledge'.[6]
In the meantime, ISM filed a motion for reconsideration or for approval of supersedeas bond in
the amount of Five Million and Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P5,600,000.00) on July 23, 1996.
[7]
On July 25, 1996, the lower court issued an order directing Citibank to release to Deputy Sheriff
Doroni in cash or check the amount of Five Million and Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P5,500,000.00), subject of the Notice of Garnishment dated July 25, 1996.[8] The following
day, the spouses Torralba filed an urgent ex parte motion to encash and receive the proceeds of
the Citibank Manager's check representing the amount garnished in execution.[9]
However, on July 29, 1996, ISM filed an urgent motion to stop delivery of garnished funds to
the spouses Torralba.[10] On August 2, 1996, the lower court issued an order suspending the
execution process there being no opposition filed in relation thereto and pending resolution of
ISM's motion for reconsideration (or for approval of supersedeas bond).[11] The spouses
Torralba then filed an opposition to ISM's motion for reconsideration.[12]
In an order dated August 27, 1996, the lower court denied ISM's motion for reconsideration and
authorized and directed Deputy Sheriff Doroni to encash the Citibank Manager's Check payable
to the said court in the amount of Five Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P5,500,000.00)
and to turn over the proceeds thereof after deducting all legal fees and charges if any, to the
plaintiffs or their representative.[13]
In view of the above order of the lower court, ISM filed a motion to withdraw the supersedeas
bond.
Attempts to have the order of execution pending appeal set aside having proved futile and the
offer of a supersedeas bond having been rejected by the lower court, ISM filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals.[14] ISM sought the nullification of the assailed orders for
having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.
In its challenged decision dated June 27, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied due course and
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.[15] The Court of Appeals found that the grounds relied
upon by the lower court in granting execution pending appeal, and which were raised by the
plaintiffs-spouses in their motion - that the appeal taken by the defendant school is merely
dilatory and the filing of a bond - constitute good reasons. The Court of Appeals agreed with the
lower court that ISM's appeal appears to be dilatory in view of its "virtual admission of fault
when it adopted the project "Code Red" consisting of safety and emergency measures, only after
the death of plaintiffs-spouses Torralba's only son"; and that the delay has already affected the
plaintiffs-spouses Torralba financially. In a resolution dated October 14, 1997, the Court of
Appeals denied ISM's motion for reconsideration.[16]
Hence, this petition: To sum up the grounds raised in the petition, the question now is whether
or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in finding that the lower court did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion in granting execution pending appeal of its decision.
However, we shall deal first with the procedural issues raised by the private respondents-
spouses in their memorandum. Private respondents-spouses contend that herein petitioner ISM
is engaging in forum-shopping in filing the instant petition for review on certiorari seeking the
same reliefs as those prayed for in their pending appeal with the Court of Appeals. Further, they
contend that petitioner ISM improperly availed of the special civil action for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals considering that an appeal and/or the posting of a supersedeas bond are
both adequate remedies precluding resort to the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is identity of parties,
rights or causes of action and reliefs sought.[17] While there is an identity of parties in the appeal
and in the petition for review on certiorari filed before this Court, it is clear that the causes of
action and reliefs sought are unidentical, although petitioner ISM may have mentioned in its
appeal the impropriety of the writ of execution pending appeal under the circumstances
obtaining in the case at bar. Clearly, there can be no forum-shopping where in one petition a
party questions the order granting the motion for execution pending appeal, as in the case at bar,
and, in a regular appeal before the appellate court, the party questions the decision on the merits
which finds the party guilty of negligence and holds the same liable for damages therefor. After
all, the merits of the main case are not to be determined in a petition questioning execution
pending appeal[18] and vice versa. Hence, reliance on the principle of forum-shopping is
misplaced.
Coming now to the issue of the propriety of a special civil action for certiorari filed before the
appellate court to assail an order for execution pending appeal, this issue has been squarely
addressed in Valencia vs. Court of Appeals[19] as follows:
"xxx, we have ruled in Jaca, et al. vs. Davao Lumber Company, et al. that:
"xxx Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special
civil action for certiorari may only be invoked when `there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the (ordinary) course of law,' this rule is not
without exception. The availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not
constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial,
speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy-not the mere absence of all other legal
remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that usually determines
the propriety of certiorari."
Thus, we held therein, and we so reiterate for purposes of the case at bar, that
certiorari lies against an order granting execution pending appeal where the same is
not founded upon good reasons. Also, the fact that the losing party had appealed
from the judgment does not bar the certiorari action filed in respondent court as the
appeal could not be an adequate remedy from such premature execution.
That petitioner could have resorted to a supersedeas bond to prevent execution
pending appeal, as suggested by the two lower courts, is not to be held against him.
The filing of such bond does not entitle him to the suspension of execution as a
matter of right. It cannot, therefore, be categorically considered as a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy. Hence, no rule requires a losing party so circumstanced to
adopt such remedy in lieu or before availment of other remedial options at hand.
Furthermore, a rational interpretation of Section 3, Rule 39 should be that the
requirement for a supersedeas bond presupposes that the case presents a
presumptively valid occasion for discretionary execution. Otherwise, even if no good
reason exists to warrant advance execution, the prevailing party could unjustly
compel the losing party to post a supersedeas bond through the simple expedient of
filing a motion for, and the trial court improvidently granting, a writ of execution
pending appeal although the situation is violative of Section 2, Rule 39. This could
not have been the intendment of the rule, hence we give our imprimatur to the
propriety of petitioner's action for certiorari in respondent court."[20]
Verily, a petition for certiorari lies against an order granting execution pending appeal where the
same is not founded upon good reasons.
This brings us now to the question on the validity of the appellate court's ruling upholding the
writ of execution pending appeal.
It must be stressed that private respondents-spouses' motion/application for an execution
pending appeal was premised on the following reasons: that the appeal was being taken for
purpose of delay and that they are filing a bond. In granting the motion for the exceptional writ
over the strong opposition of the ISM, the trial court adopted by reference the said grounds
adduced by the spouses Torralba in their motion in the first order dated June 19, 1996;[21] and
expressly reiterated the same grounds in the order denying the motion for reconsideration dated
August 27, 1996.[22]
In upholding the writ of execution pending appeal, the Court of Appeals observed that the lower
court had, prior to its issuance, duly noted the presence of the circumstances laid down by
Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,[23] allowing execution as an exception, or pending
appeal, even before final judgment, to wit:
(a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;
(b) There must be good reasons for issuing the execution; and
(c) The good reasons must be stated in a special order.[24]
Likewise, the Court of Appeals accepted as `good reasons' that ISM's appeal appears to be
dilatory in view of its virtual admission of fault when it adopted the project "Code Red" only
after the death of plaintiffs-spouses Torralba's son, and the delay of the case which already
affected plaintiffs spouses Torralbas financially.
This Court has ruled in Ong vs. Court of Appeals[25] that:
"where the reason given is that an appeal is frivolous and dilatory, execution pending
appeal cannot be justified. It is not proper for the trial court to find that an appeal is
frivolous and consequently to disapprove it since the disallowance of an appeal by
said court constitutes a deprivation of the right to appeal. The authority to disapprove
an appeal rightfully pertains to the appellate court xxx."[26]
The "admission of fault or negligence" adverted to in the lower court's order and subsequently
adopted by the appellate court in its decision, was based on the following exchange between the
private respondents-spouses' counsel and one of the defendants, ISM's swimming coach Noli
Reloj, which transpired during the hearing of February 18, 1994:
"ATTY. GUERRERO: Issue of Vol. 48, No. 2 of October 1993.
Mr. Reloj, you said that you have read this. There is here an article which says on the
front page "Introducing Code Red." And in this article it says and I quote "It was
introduced last year by the administration to prevent further incidents like the tragic
death of Freshman Ericson Torralba in August 1991 who collapsed while taking the
swimming competency test.
Due to school's lack of emergency procedures and equipments, valuable time was
lost in coordinating medical efforts in bringing him to the Makati Medical Center.
WITNESS: Yes, I read that portion.
Q. That's all I want from you.
Now likewise Mr. Witness on page 8 or Exhibit AA, by the way your Honor, may I
request the portion which I read be marked as AA-1. Likewise on page 8, there is
again mentioned here I quote "ISM has also acquired new equipment to deal with
emergencies such as oxygen tank, respirator, new buoyancy and life saving
equipment to the pool and a licensed ambulance to transport the victim to the Makati
Medical Center.
With the apparent success of Code Red, no one at ISM need worry any longer about
life or death emergency. Did you read these portions?
WITNESS: I read those articles."[27]
For purposes only of determining the correctness of the writ of execution pending appeal, we
cannot see how the lower courts came upon the conclusion of virtual admission of fault or
negligence by ISM based on the above-quoted exchange where ISM's swimming coach admitted
that he read the school paper article introducing "Code Red". As correctly pointed out by ISM,
the article was not an official statement of the school, but merely an opinion of its author.
Moreover, we cannot see how the statement of Mr. Noli Reloj that he read the article on "Code
Red" can be construed as an admission of liability by the school. Clearly then, the conclusion of
the lower courts that the appeal is dilatory based solely on the foregoing exchange rests on
shaky ground.
The next question to be resolved is whether or not the filing of a bond can be considered a good
reason to justify immediate execution under Section 2, Rule 39.
In the case of Roxas vs. Court of Appeals,[28] this Court had occasion to address this issue
directly, as follows:
"xxx to consider the mere posting of a bond a `good reason' would precisely make
immediate execution of a judgment pending appeal routinary, the rule rather than the
exception. Judgments would be executed immediately, as a matter of course, once
rendered, if all that the prevailing party needed to do was to post a bond to answer
for damages that might result therefrom. This is a situation, to repeat, neither
contemplated nor intended by law."[29]
In fine, the rule is now settled that the mere filing of a bond by the successful party is not a good
reason for ordering execution pending appeal, as "a combination of circumstances is the
dominant consideration which impels the grant of immediate execution, the requirement of a
bond is imposed merely as an additional factor, no doubt for the protection of the defendant's
creditor."[30] Since we have already ruled that the reason that an appeal is dilatory does not
justify execution pending appeal, neither does the filing of a bond, without anything more,
justify the same. Moreover, ISM could not be faulted for its withdrawal of its supersedeas bond
inasmuch as the lower court granted the execution pending appeal and rejected its offer of
supersedeas bond.
Finally, we note that writ of execution pending appeal covered the moral and exemplary
damages adjudged by the lower court against ISM. In this regard, we likewise reproduce what
was said in Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) vs. Lantin, et al.[31] that
awards for moral and exemplary damages cannot be the subject of execution pending appeal,
under the following rationale:
"xxx The execution of any award for moral and exemplary damages is dependent on
the outcome of the main case. Unlike the actual damages for which the petitioners
may clearly be held liable if they breach a specific contract and the amounts of
which are fixed and certain, liabilities with respect to moral and exemplary damages
as well as the exact amounts remain uncertain and indefinite pending resolution by
the Intermediate Appellate Court and eventually the Supreme Court. The existence of
the factual bases of these types of damages and their causal relation to the
petitioners' act will have to be determined in the light of errors on appeal. It is
possible that the petitioners, after all, while liable for actual damages may not be
liable for moral and exemplary damages. Or as in some cases elevated to the
Supreme Court, the awards may be reduced."
Much as we appreciate the predicament of the bereaved parents, however, this Court is of the
opinion that the general rule still finds application in the instant case. In other words, the
respondent Court of Appeals committed reversible error in upholding the writ of execution
pending appeal absent the `good reasons' required by law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The writ of execution issued by the lower court pursuant
to its order of June 19, 1996 is hereby ANNULLED.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima JJ., concur.
Romero, J., (Chairman), on leave, on official business abroad.
[1]
Per Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros, with Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Hilarion L.
Aquino, concurring.
[2] Presided by Judge Ignacio L. Salvador.
[3] Rollo, p. 35.
[4]4 Ibid., pp. 112-114.
[5] Ibid., p. 62.
[6] Ibid., p. 155.
[7] Ibid., p. 135.
[8] Ibid., p. 156.
[9] Ibid., p. 158.
[10] Ibid., p. 160.
[11] Ibid., p. 165.
[12] Ibid., p. 166.
[13] Ibid., p. 63.
[14] Ibid., p. 45.
[15] Ibid., p. 34.
[16] Ibid., p. 44.
[17] Employees' Compensation Commission vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 717.
[18] City of Manila vs. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 98.
[19] 184 SCRA 561.
[20] At pp. 569-570.
[21] Supra, see note 5..
[22] Supra, see note 13.
[23] Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
"Execution pending appeal. - On Motion of the prevailing party with notice to the
adverse party the court may, in its discretion, order execution to issue even before the
expiration of the time to appeal, upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. If
a record on appeal is field thereafter, the motion and the special order shall be
included thereon."
[24] Provident International Resources Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 510.
[25] 203 SCRA 38.
[26] At p. 43.
[27] Rollo, pp. 86-87.
[28] 157 SCRA 370.
[29] At pp. 44.
[30] Ibid.
[31] 134 SCRA 395.
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