Scandals Of Classic Hollywood Anne Helen
Petersen download
https://ebookbell.com/product/scandals-of-classic-hollywood-anne-
helen-petersen-53507554
Explore and download more ebooks at ebookbell.com
Here are some recommended products that we believe you will be
interested in. You can click the link to download.
Scandals Of Classic Hollywood Sex Deviance And Drama From The Golden
Age Of American Cinema Anne Helen Petersen
https://ebookbell.com/product/scandals-of-classic-hollywood-sex-
deviance-and-drama-from-the-golden-age-of-american-cinema-anne-helen-
petersen-4915158
Scandals Of Old Hollywood Horrifying Stories That Prove Classic
Hollywood Was A Living Hell Noury
https://ebookbell.com/product/scandals-of-old-hollywood-horrifying-
stories-that-prove-classic-hollywood-was-a-living-hell-noury-56961144
Father Brown Complete Collection 53 Murder Mysteries The Scandal Of
Father Brown The Donnington Affair The Mask Of Midas Classic
Literature Fiction Book 100 G K Chesterton
https://ebookbell.com/product/father-brown-complete-
collection-53-murder-mysteries-the-scandal-of-father-brown-the-
donnington-affair-the-mask-of-midas-classic-literature-fiction-
book-100-g-k-chesterton-230144838
Walking Chicago 31 Tours Of The Windy Citys Classic Bars Scandalous
Sites Historic Architecture Dynamic Neighborhoods Ryan Ver Berkmoes
https://ebookbell.com/product/walking-chicago-31-tours-of-the-windy-
citys-classic-bars-scandalous-sites-historic-architecture-dynamic-
neighborhoods-ryan-ver-berkmoes-46394656
Scandals Of The Father A Dark Enemies To Lovers Romance Cavalieri
Billionaire Legacy Book 1 Zoe Blake
https://ebookbell.com/product/scandals-of-the-father-a-dark-enemies-
to-lovers-romance-cavalieri-billionaire-legacy-book-1-zoe-
blake-48584598
Scandals Of The Bad Boy Billionaires 06 The Billionaires Secret Kiss
Layne
https://ebookbell.com/product/scandals-of-the-bad-boy-
billionaires-06-the-billionaires-secret-kiss-layne-61869776
Scandals Of The Windsors 4th Edition Magazines Direct
https://ebookbell.com/product/scandals-of-the-windsors-4th-edition-
magazines-direct-51566028
Scandals Of The Windsors Second Edition Philippa Grafton Editor In
Chief
https://ebookbell.com/product/scandals-of-the-windsors-second-edition-
philippa-grafton-editor-in-chief-43580086
Great Scandals Of The Victorians Disreputable Stories From The Royal
Court To The Stage Debbie Blake
https://ebookbell.com/product/great-scandals-of-the-victorians-
disreputable-stories-from-the-royal-court-to-the-stage-debbie-
blake-61254098
Another Random Document on
Scribd Without Any Related Topics
The Project Gutenberg eBook of Ordeal by Battle
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it
under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this
ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the
United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where
you are located before using this eBook.
Title: Ordeal by Battle
Author: Frederick Scott Oliver
Release date: May 24, 2017 [eBook #54776]
Most recently updated: October 23, 2024
Language: English
Credits: Produced by Al Haines
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ORDEAL BY
BATTLE ***
ORDEAL BY BATTLE
BY
FREDERICK SCOTT OLIVER
With that they looked upon him, and began to reply in this sort:
SIMPLE said, I see no danger; SLOTH said, Yet a little more sleep; and
PRESUMPTION said, Every Vat must stand upon his own bottom. And
so they lay down to sleep again, and CHRISTIAN went on his way.
The Pilgrim's Progress.
MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON
1915
COPYRIGHT
TO
THE MEMORY OF
HUGH DAWNAY
COMMANDING THE 2ND LIFE GUARDS
WHO WAS KILLED AT ZWARTELEEN ON THE 6TH OF NOVEMBER
1914
AND OF
JOHN GOUGH, V.C.
CHIEF OF THE STAFF OF THE FIRST ARMY
WHO FELL NEAR ESTAIRES ON THE 20TH OF FEBRUARY 1915
THEY WERE BROTHER-OFFICERS OF THE RIFLE BRIGADE
AND THOSE WHO KNEW THEM BOTH
WILL ALWAYS THINK OF THEM TOGETHER
Works by the Same Author
ALEXANDER HAMILTON (An Essay on American Union).
LIBRARY EDITION. Messrs. CONSTABLE & Co., London.
LIBRARY EDITION. Messrs. G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, New York.
POPULAR EDITION. Messrs. THOS. NELSON & SONS.
FEDERALISM AND HOME RULE (Letters of Pacificus).
THE ALTERNATIVES TO CIVIL WAR.
WHAT FEDERALISM IS NOT.
MR. JOHN MURRAY, LONDON.
MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
LONDON * BOMBAY * CALCUTTA
MELBOURNE
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
NEW YORK * BOSTON * CHICAGO
DALLAS * SAN FRANCISCO
THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD.
TORONTO
PREFACE
It is hardly necessary to plead, in extenuation of those many faults which
any impartial reader will discover in the following pages, the impossibility
of discussing events which are unfolding themselves around us, in the same
detached spirit as if we were dealing with past history. The greater part of
this volume has been written in haste, and no one is more alive to its
shortcomings than the author himself.
Faults of style are a small matter, and will be easily forgiven. It has not
been the aim to produce a work of literary merit, but solely to present a
certain view of public affairs. It is to be hoped that actual errors of fact are
rare. Inconsistencies however—or apparent inconsistencies—cannot be
altogether avoided, even by careful revision. But the greatest difficulty of
all is to keep a true sense of proportion.
In Part I.—The Causes of War—an attempt has been made to state, very
briefly, why it has hitherto proved impossible to eliminate the appeal to
arms from human affairs; to set out the main incidents which occurred at
the opening of the present European struggle; to explain the immediate
occasions, as well as the more permanent and deep-seated causes, of this
conflict; to consider some of the most glaring miscalculations which have
arisen out of misunderstanding between nations.
In Part II.—The Spirit of German Policy—an attempt has been made to
understand the ambitions of our chief antagonist, and to trace the manner in
which these ambitions have been fostered, forced, and corrupted by a
priesthood of learned men. The relations which exist between this
Pedantocracy and the Bureaucracy, the Army, the Rulers, and the People of
Germany have been examined. It would appear that under an academic
stimulus, healthy national ambitions have become morbid, have resulted in
the discovery of imaginary grievances, and have led the Governing Classes
of Germany to adopt a new code of morals which, if universally adhered to,
would make an end of human society. On the other hand, it would also
appear that the German People have accepted the policy of their rulers,
without in any way accepting, or even understanding, the morality upon
which this policy is founded. It is also important for us to realise the nature
of the judgment—not altogether unjustified—which our enemies have
passed upon the British character, and upon our policy and institutions.
In Part III.—The Spirit of British Policy—our own political course since
the beginning of the century has been considered—the difficulties arising
out of the competition for priority between aims which are not in
themselves antagonistic: between Social Reform, Constitutional Reform,
and Imperial Defence—the confusion which has resulted from the
inadequacy of one small parliament, elected upon a large variety of cross
issues, for dealing with these diverse needs—the lowering of the tone of
public life, the depreciation in the character of public men, which have
come about owing to these two causes, and also to a third—the steadily
increasing tyranny and corruption of the party machines.
The aim of British Foreign Policy has been simply—Security. Yet we
have failed to achieve Security, owing to our blindness, indolence, and lack
of leadership. We have refused to realise that we were not living in the
Golden Age; that Policy at the last resort depends on Armaments; that
Armaments, to be effective for their purpose, must correspond with Policy.
Political leaders of all parties up to the outbreak of the present war ignored
these essentials; or if they were aware of them, in the recesses of their own
consciousness, they failed to trust the People with a full knowledge of the
dangers which threatened their Security, and of the means by which alone
these dangers could be withstood.
The titles of Parts II. and III. are similar—The Spirit of German Policy
and The Spirit of British Policy; but although the titles are similar the
treatment is not the same. Confession of a certain failure in proportion must
be made frankly. The two pieces do not balance. German Policy is viewed
from without, at a remote distance, and by an enemy. It is easier in this case
to present a picture which is clear, than one which is true. British Policy, on
the of other hand, is viewed from within. If likewise it is tinged with
prejudice, the prejudice is of a different character. Both Parts, I fear, diverge
to a greater or less extent from the main purpose of the book. Mere excision
is easy; but compression is a difficult and lengthy process, and I have not
been able to carry it so far as I could have wished.
In Part IV.—Democracy and National Service—an attempt has been
made to deal with a problem which faces us at the moment. Democracy is
not unlike other human institutions: it will not stand merely by its own
virtue. If it lacks the loyalty, courage, and strength to defend itself when
attacked, it must perish as certainly as if it possessed no virtue whatsoever.
Manhood suffrage implies manhood service. Without the acceptance of this
principle Democracy is merely an imposture.
I prefer 'National Service' to 'Conscription,' not because I shrink from the
word 'Conscription,' but because 'National Service' has a wider sweep. The
greater includes the less. It is not only military duties which the State is
entitled to command its citizens to perform unquestioningly in times of
danger; but also civil duties. It is not only men between the ages of twenty
and thirty-eight to whom the State should have the right to give orders; but
men and women of all ages. Under conditions of modern warfare it is not
only armies which need to be disciplined; but whole nations. The
undisciplined nation, engaged in anything like an equal contest with a
disciplined nation, will be defeated.
The Coalition Government
This volume was in type before the Coalition Government was formed;
but there is nothing in it which I wish to change in view of that event. This
book was not undertaken with the object of helping the Unionists back into
power, or of getting the Liberals out of power.
The new Cabinet contains those members of the late one in whom the
country has most confidence. Lord Kitchener, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Lloyd
George, and Mr. Churchill have all made mistakes. In a great crisis it is the
bigger characters who are most liable to make mistakes. Their superiority
impels them to take risks which the smaller men, playing always for safety,
are concerned to avoid.
The present Ministry also contains representatives of that class of
politicians which, according to the view set forth in the following pages, is
primarily responsible for our present troubles. Lawyer-statesmanship,
which failed to foresee the war, to prepare against it, and to conduct it with
energy and thoroughness when it occurred, still occupies a large share of
authority. Possibly ministers of this school will now walk in new ways. In
any case, they are no longer in a position of dangerous predominance.
The Coalition Government, having wisely refused to part with any of
those men who rose to the emergency, and having received an infusion of
new blood (which may be expected to bring an accession of vigour) starts
upon its career with the goodwill and confidence of the People.
What has happened, however, is a revolution upon an unprecedented
scale—one which is likely to have vast consequences in the future. The
country realises this fact, and accepts it as a matter of course—accepts it
indeed with a sigh of relief. But in other quarters, what has just happened is
hardly realised at all—still less what it is likely to lead to in the future.
During the 'Cabinet Crisis' one read a good deal of stuff in the
newspapers, and heard still more by word of mouth, which showed how far,
during the past nine months, public opinion has moved away from the
professionals of politics; how little account it takes of them; also how much
these gentlemen themselves mistake the meaning of the present situation.
In political circles one has heard, and read, very frequently of late,
expressions of regret—on the one hand that Unionists should have come to
the assistance of a discredited and bankrupt administration—on the other
hand that a government, secure in the confidence of the country, should,
through a mistaken sense of generosity, have admitted its opponents to a
share in the glory and prestige of office. One has read, and heard, cavillings
at the idea of appointing this, or that, public character to this, or that, office,
as a thing beyond what this, or that, party 'could fairly be expected to stand.'
Reports have appeared of meetings of 'a hundred' perturbed Liberals; and
very possibly meetings, though unreported, of equally perturbed Unionists
have also been held. An idea seems still to be prevalent in certain quarters,
that what has just occurred is nothing more important than an awkward and
temporary disarrangement of the party game; and that this game will be
resumed, with all the old patriotism and good feeling, so soon as war is
ended. But this appears to be a mistaken view. You cannot make a great
mix-up of this sort without calling new parties into existence. When men
are thrown into the crucible of a war such as this, the true ore will tend to
run together, the dross to cake upon the surface. No matter to what parties
they may have originally owed allegiance, the men who are in earnest, and
who see realities, cannot help but come together. May be for several
generations the annual festivals of the National Liberal Federation and the
Union of Conservative Associations will continue to be held, like other
picturesque survivals of ancient customs. When Henry VII. was crowned at
Westminster, the Wars of the Roses ended; the old factions of York and
Lancaster were dissolved, and made way for new associations. Something
of the same sort has surely happened during the past month—Liberal and
Conservative, Radical and Tory have ceased for the present to be real
divisions. They had recently become highly artificial and confusing; now
they are gone—it is to be hoped for ever.
Will the generation which is fighting this war—such of them as may
survive—be content to go back to the old barren wrangle when it is done?
Will those others who have lost husbands, sons, brothers, friends—all that
was dearest to them except the honour and safety of their country—will
they be found willing to tolerate the idea of trusting their destinies ever
again to the same machines, to be driven once more to disaster by the same
automatons? To all except the automatons themselves—who share with the
German Supermen the credit of having made this war—any such
resumption of business on old-established lines appears incredible. There is
something pathetic in the sight of these huckstering sentimentalists still
crying their stale wares and ancient make-believes at the street corners,
while their country is fighting for its life. They remind one, not a little, of
those Pardoners of the fourteenth century who, as we read in history books,
continued to hawk their Indulgences with unabated industry during the days
of the Black Death.
It is necessary to offer a few words of explanation as to how this book
came to be written. During the months of November and December 1912
and January 1913, various meetings and discussions took place under Lord
Roberts's roof and elsewhere, between a small number of persons, who held
widely different views, and whose previous experience and training had
been as different as were their opinions.
Our efforts were concerned with endeavouring to find answers to several
questions which had never been dealt with candidly, clearly, and
comprehensively in the public statements of political leaders. It was clear
that there was no 'national' policy, which the British people had grasped,
accepted, and countersigned, as was the case in France. But some kind of
British policy there must surely be, notwithstanding the fact it had never
been disclosed. What were the aims of this policy? With what nation or
nations were these aims likely to bring us into collision? What armaments
were necessary in order to enable us to uphold this policy and achieve these
aims? How, and when, and where would our armaments be required in the
event of war? Assuming (as we did in our discussions) that our naval forces
were adequate, was the same statement true of our military forces? And if it
were not true, by what means could the necessary increases be obtained?
The final conclusion at which we arrived was that National Service was
essential to security. Under whatever aspect we regarded the problem we
always returned—even those of us who were most unwilling to travel in
that direction—to the same result. So long as Britain relied solely upon the
voluntary principle, we should never possess either the Expeditionary Force
or the Army for Home Defence which were requisite for safety.
It fell to me during the winter 1912-1913 to draft the summary of our
conclusions. It was afterwards decided—in the spring of 1913—that this
private Memorandum should be recast in a popular form suitable for
publication. I was asked to undertake this, and agreed to do so. But I
underestimated both the difficulties of the task and the time which would be
necessary for overcoming them.
When we met again, in the autumn of that year, the work was still far
from complete, and by that time, not only public attention, but our own, had
become engrossed in other matters. The Irish controversy had entered upon
a most acute and dangerous stage. Lord Roberts put off the meetings which
he had arranged to address during the ensuing months upon National
Service, and threw his whole energies into the endeavour to avert the
schism which threatened the nation, and to find a way to a peaceful
settlement. Next to the security and integrity of the British Empire I verily
believe that the thing which lay nearest his heart was the happiness and
unity of Ireland.
It is needless to recall how, during the ensuing months, affairs in Ireland
continued to march from bad to worse—up to the very day when the
menace of the present war suddenly arose before the eyes of Europe.
During August 1914 I went through the old drafts and memoranda which
had now been laid aside for nearly a year. Although that very thing had
happened which it had been the object of our efforts to avert, it seemed to
me that there might be advantages in publishing some portion of our
conclusions. The form, of course, would have to be entirely different; for
the recital of prophecies which had come true, though it might have
possessed a certain interest for the prophets themselves, could have but
little for the public.
Early in September I consulted Lord Roberts, and also such of my
friends, who had originally worked with me, as were still within reach.
Finding that their opinion agreed with my own upon the desirability of
publication, I laid out a fresh scheme, and set to for a third time at the old
task. But as the work grew, it became clear that it would contain but little of
the former Memorandum, and much which the former Memorandum had
never contemplated. So many of our original conclusions, laboriously
hammered out to convince the public in the spring of the year 1913, had
become by the autumn of 1914, the most trite of commonplaces. And as for
the practical scheme which we had evolved—endeavouring to keep our
demands at the most modest minimum—it was interesting chiefly by reason
of its triviality when contrasted with the scale of warlike preparations upon
which the Government was now engaged. Practically, therefore, the whole
of the present volume is new—not merely redrafted, but for the most part
new in substance.
The author's acknowledgements.
I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to the friends with whom I have
studied the problems of policy and defence for some years past. The
responsibility for the contents and publication of the present volume is mine
alone; but I have used their ideas without hesitation, and have drawn largely
upon the notes and memoranda which they drafted for my assistance. I wish
also to thank several others—one in chief—for the kindness with which,
upon the present occasion, they have given me help and criticism as these
pages were passing through the press.
There is also another source to which I wish here gratefully to confess
my obligations. During the past five years there have appeared in The
Round Table certain articles upon the relations of England with Germany[1]
which have been characterised by a remarkable degree of prescience and
sanity. At a certain point, however, there is a difference between the views
expressed in The Round Table and those expressed in the following pages—
a difference of stress and emphasis perhaps, rather than of fundamental
opinion, but still a difference of some importance. I have dealt with this in
the concluding chapter.
I should like to make one other acknowledgment of a different kind. I
have known the editor of The National Review from a date long before he
assumed his onerous office—from days when we were freshmen together
by the banks of the Cam. During a period of upwards of thirty years, I
cannot remember that I have ever had the good fortune to see absolutely eye
to eye with Mr. Maxse upon any public question. Even now I do not see eye
to eye with him. In all probability I never shall. At times his views have
been in sharp opposition to my own. But for these very reasons—if he will
not resent it as an impertinence—I should like to say here how greatly I
respect him for three qualities, which have been none too common among
public men in recent times—first, for the clearness with which he grasps
and states his beliefs; secondly, for the courageous constancy with which he
holds to them through good and evil report; thirdly, for the undeviating
integrity of his public career. Next to Lord Roberts, he did more perhaps
than any other—though unavailingly—to arouse public opinion to the
dangers which menaced it from German aggression, to call attention to the
national unpreparedness, and to denounce the blindness and indolence
which treated warnings with derision.
Lord Roberts.
Lord Roberts's responsibility for the contents of this volume, as for its
publication at the present time, is nil. And yet it would never have been
undertaken in the first instance except at his wish, nor re-undertaken in
September last without his encouragement. There are probably a good many
besides myself who owe it to his inspiration, that they first made a serious
attempt to study policy and defence as two aspects of a single problem. I
also owe to him many things besides this.
The circumstances of Lord Roberts's death were befitting his character
and career. The first great battle of Ypres was ended. The British line had
held its own against tremendous odds of men and guns. He had no doubt of
the ultimate result of the war, and during his visit to France and Flanders
inspired all who saw him by the quiet confidence of his words and manner.
After the funeral service at Headquarters a friend of his and mine wrote to
me describing the scene. The religious ceremony had taken place in the
entrance hall of the Maine at St. Omer. It was a day of storms; but as the
coffin was borne out "the sun appeared, and made a magnificent rainbow on
a great black block of cloud across the square; and an airman flew across
from the rainbow into the sunlight."
If I were asked to name Lord Roberts's highest intellectual quality I
should say unhesitatingly that it was his instinct. And if I were asked to
name his highest moral quality I should say, also unhesitatingly, that it was
the unshakeable confidence with which he trusted his instinct. But the
firmness of his trust was not due in the least to self-conceit, or arrogance, or
obstinacy. He obeyed his instinct as he obeyed his conscience—humbly and
devoutly. The dictates of both proceeded from the same source. It was not
his own cleverness which led him to his conclusions, but the hand of
Providence which drew aside a veil, and enabled him to see the truth. What
gave him his great strength in counsel, as in the field, was the simple
modesty of his confidence.
He was a poor arguer; I think argument was painful to him; also that he
regarded it as a sad waste of the short span of human life. It was not
difficult to out-argue him. Plausible and perspicacious persons often left
him, after an interview, under the firm impression that they had convinced
him. But as a rule, he returned on the morrow to his old opinion, unless his
would-be converters had brought to his notice new facts as well as new
arguments.
He arrived at an opinion neither hastily nor slowly, but at a moderate
pace. He had the gift of stating his conclusion with admirable lucidity; and
if he thought it desirable, he gave the reasons for his view of the matter with
an equal clearness. But his reasons, like his conclusion, were in the nature
of statements; they were not stages in an argument. There are as many
unanswerable reasons to be given for as against most human decisions.
Ingenuity and eloquence are a curse at councils of war, and state, and
business. Indeed, wherever action of any kind has to be determined upon
they are a curse. It was Lord Roberts's special gift that, out of the medley of
unanswerable reasons, he had an instinct for selecting those which really
mattered, and keeping his mind close shut against the rest.
It is superfluous to speak of his courtesy of manner and kindness of
heart, or of his unflagging devotion—up till the very day of his death—to
what he regarded as his duty. There is a passage in Urquhart's translation of
Rabelais which always recalls him to my mind:—He was the best little
great good man that ever girded a sword on his side; he took all things in
good part, and interpreted every action in the best sense. In a leading
German newspaper there appeared, a few days after his death, the following
reference to that event:—"It was not given to Lord Roberts to see the
realisation of his dreams of National Service; but the blows struck on the
Aisne were hammer-strokes which might after a long time and bitter need
produce it. Lord Roberts was an honourable and, through his renown, a
dangerous enemy ... personally an extraordinarily brave enemy. Before such
a man we lower our swords, to raise them again for new blows dealt with
the joy of conflict."
Nor was this the only allusion of the kind which figured in German
newspapers 'to the journey of an old warrior to Walhalla,' with his final
mission yet unaccomplished, but destined to be sooner or later
accomplished, if his country was to survive. In none of these references, so
far as I have been able to discover, was there the least trace of malice
against the man who had warned his fellow-countrymen, more clearly than
any other, against the premeditated aggression of Germany. This seems very
strange when we recollect how, for nearly two years previously, a large
section of the British nation had been engaged in denouncing Lord Roberts
for the outrageous provocations which he was alleged to have offered to
Germany—in apologising to Germany for his utterances—in suggesting the
propriety of depriving him of his pension in the interests of Anglo-German
amity. What this section has itself earned in the matter of German gratitude
we know from many hymns and other effusions of hate.
Hugh Dawnay and John Gough.
I have dedicated this volume to the memory of John Gough and Hugh
Dawnay, not solely on grounds of friendship, but also because from both I
received, at different times, much help, advice, and criticism—from the
latter when the original Memorandum was in course of being drafted—from
both when it was being reconsidered with a view to publication. Whether
either of them would agree with the statement in its present form is more
than I can venture to say, and I have no intention of claiming their authority
for conclusions which were never seen by them in final shape.
In the first instance (November 1912-March 1913) Dawnay[2] and I
worked together. His original notes and memoranda are to a large extent
incorporated in Parts III. and IV.—so closely, however, that I cannot now
disentangle his from my own. The calculations as to numbers and probable
distribution of the opposing forces, were almost entirely his. I have merely
endeavoured here—not so successfully as I could wish—to bring them up
to the date of the outbreak of war.
Dawnay took out his squadron of the 2nd Life Guards to France early in
August. Already, however, he had been appointed to the Headquarters
General Staff, on which he served with distinction, until early in October,
when he succeeded to the command of his regiment. He fell at Zwarteleen
near Ypres on the 6th of November 1914—one of the most anxious days
during the four weeks' battle.
His friends have mourned his death, but none of them have grudged it;
for he died, not merely as a brave man should—in the performance of his
duty—but after having achieved, with consummate skill and daring, his part
in an action of great importance. On the afternoon of this day General
Kavanagh's Brigade of Household Cavalry[3]—summoned in haste—
dismounted, and threw back a German attack which had partially succeeded
in piercing the allied line at the point of junction between the French and
English forces. This successful counter-attack saved the right flank of Lord
Cavan's Guards' Brigade from a position of extreme danger, which must
otherwise, almost certainly, have resulted in a perilous retreat. The whole of
this Homeric story is well worth telling, and some day it may be told; but
this is not the place.
Dawnay was fortunate inasmuch as he lost his life, not as so many brave
men have done in this war—and in all others—by a random bullet, or as the
result of somebody's blunder, or in an attempt which failed. On the contrary
he played a distinguished, and possibly a determining part, in an action
which succeeded, and the results of which were fruitful.
He was not merely a brave and skilful soldier when it came to push of
pike, but a devoted student of his profession in times of peace. The mixture
of eagerness and patience with which he went about his work reminded one,
not a little, of that same combination of qualities as it is met with sometimes
among men of science.
Hunting accidents, the privations of Ladysmith followed by enteric,
divers fevers contracted in hot climates, and the severity of a campaign in
Somaliland, had severely tried his constitution—which although vigorous
and athletic was never robust—and had increased a tendency to headaches
and neuralgia to which he had been subject ever since boyhood. Yet he
treated pain always as a despicable enemy, and went about his daily
business as indefatigably when he was in suffering, as when he was entirely
free from it, which in later years was but rarely.
Dawnay had a very quick brain, and held his views most positively. It
was sometimes said of him that he did not suffer fools gladly, and this was
true up to a point. He was singularly intolerant of presumptuous fools, who
laid down the law about matters of which they were wholly ignorant, or
who—having acquired a smattering of second-hand knowledge—proceeded
to put their ingenious and sophistical theories into practice. But for people
of much slower wits than himself—if they were trying honestly to arrive at
the truth—he was usually full of sympathy. His tact and patience upon great
occasions were two of his noblest qualities.
In some ways he used to remind me, not a little, of Colonel Henry
Esmond of Castlewood, Virginia. In both there was the same hard core of
resistance against anything, which appeared to challenge certain adamantine
principles concerning conduct befitting a gentleman. On such matters he
was exceedingly stiff and unyielding. And he resembled the friend of Lord
Bolingbroke, and General Webb, and Dick Steele also in this, that he was
addicted to the figure of irony when crossed in discussion. One imagines,
however, that Colonel Esmond must have kept his countenance better, and
remained imperturbably grave until his shafts had all gone home. In
Dawnay's case the sight of his opponent's lengthening face was, as a rule,
too much for his sense of humour, and the attack was apt to lose some of its
force—certainly all its fierceness—in a smile which reminded one of
Carlyle's description—'sunlight on the sea.'
The following extract from a letter written by one of his friends who had
attended the War Service at St. Paul's gives a true picture: "A sudden vision
arose in my imagination of Hugh Dawnay striding down the choir, in full
armour, like St. Michael—with his head thrown back, and that
extraordinary expression of resolution which he always seemed to me to
possess more than any one I have ever seen. His wide-apart eyes had more
of the spirit of truth in them than almost any—also an intolerance of
falsehood—or rather perhaps a disbelief in its existence...." This is true. He
was one of that race of men whose recumbent figures are seen in our old
churches and cathedrals, with hands clasping crusaders' swords against their
breasts, their hounds couching at their feet.
In physique and temperament Hugh Dawnay and John Gough[4] were in
most respects as unlike a pair of friends as ever walked this earth; but we
might have searched far before we could have found two minds which, on
most matters connected with their profession, were in more perfect accord.
Dawnay, younger by four years, had served under Gough in trying times,
and regarded him (an opinion which is very widely shared by seniors as
well as juniors) as one of the finest soldiers of his age. Though Dawnay was
slender and of great height, while Gough was rather below the middle
stature, broad and firmly knit, there was one striking point of physical
resemblance between them, in the way their heads were set upon their
shoulders. There was something in the carriage of both which seemed to
take it for granted that they would be followed wherever they might chose
to lead. In Lord Roberts, and also in a strikingly different character—Mr.
Chamberlain—there was the same poise, the same stable equilibrium,
without a trace in it of self-consciousness or constraint. It may be that the
habit of command induces this bearing in a man; or it may be that there is
something in the nature of the man who bears himself thus which forces
him to become a leader.
Gough took no part in the preparation of the original Memorandum; but
in March 1913 he discussed it with me[5] and made various criticisms and
suggestions, most of which have been incorporated here. His chief concern
with regard to all proposals for a National Army was, that the period of
training should be sufficient to allow time for turning the average man into
a soldier who had full confidence in himself. "When war breaks out"—I can
hear his words—"it's not recruits we want: it's soldiers we want: that is, if
our object is to win the war as speedily as possible, and to lose as few lives
as possible." Under normal peace conditions he put this period at a
minimum of two years for infantry; but of course he would have admitted—
and did, in fact, admit when I saw him last December—that under the stress
and excitement of war the term might be considerably shortened.
His chief concern in 1913 was with regard to shortage of officers. He
criticised with great severity the various recent attempts at reforming our
military system, not only on the ground that we had chosen to rely upon
training our national forces after war had actually broken out (in his view a
most disastrous decision); but also because we had not taken care to provide
ourselves against the very emergency which was contemplated, by having a
reserve of officers competent to undertake the training of the new army in
case of need.
I went to see him at Aldershot on the Friday before war was declared,
and found, as I expected, that he regarded it as inevitable. He had
undergone a very severe operation in the early summer, and was still quite
unfit to stand the strain of hard exercise. It had been arranged that we were
to go together, a few days later, to Sweden, for six weeks' shooting and
fishing in the mountains. He was very anxious to return to England for the
September manoeuvres. His surgeon,[6] however, forbade this, on the
ground that even by that time he would not be fit to sit for a whole day in
the saddle.
He was in two moods on this occasion. He was as light-hearted as a boy
who is unexpectedly released from school; the reason being that the Army
Medical Officer had that morning passed him as physically fit to go abroad
with Sir Douglas Haig, to whom he had acted as Senior Staff Officer since
the previous autumn.
His other mood was very different. The war which he had foreseen and
dreaded, the war which in his view might have been avoided upon one
condition, and one only—if England had been prepared—had come at last. I
don't think I have ever known any one—certainly never any anti-militarist
—whose hatred and horror of war gave the same impression of intensity
and reality as his. Not metaphorically, but as a bare fact, his feelings with
regard to it were too deep for words; he would suddenly break off speaking
about things which had occurred in his own experience; in particular, about
loss of friends and comrades. He was an Irishman, and had not the
impassive coldness of some of the great soldiers. But most of all he hated
war when it was not inevitable—when with foresight and courage it might
have been averted—as in his opinion this war might have been.
In radium there is said to be a virtue which enables it to affect adjacent
objects with its own properties, and to turn them, for a time, and for certain
purposes, into things of the same nature as itself. Certain rare human
characters possess a similar virtue; but although I have met with several of
these in my life, there is none of them all who seemed to me to possess this
quality in quite so high a degree as Gough. He was an alchemist who made
fine soldiers out of all sorts and conditions of men, and whose spirit turned
despondency out of doors.
The clearness of his instinct and the power of his mind were not more
remarkable than his swiftness of decision and indomitable will. There are
scores—probably hundreds—of young officers who fought by his side, or
under him, at Ypres and elsewhere, who years hence, when they are
themselves distinguished—perhaps great and famous—and come, in the
evening of their days, to reckon up and consider the influences which have
shaped their careers, will place his influence first. And there are boys
looking forward to the day when they shall be old enough to serve in the
King's Army, chiefly from the love and honour in which they held this hero,
with his winning smile and superb self-confidence.
He has left behind him a tradition, if ever man did. You will find it
everywhere, among young and old—among all with whom he ever came
into touch. Nor is the tradition which he has left merely among soldiers and
with regard to the art of war, but also in other spheres of private conduct
and public life. He had strong prejudices as well as affections, which made
him sometimes judge men unfairly, also on the other hand too favourably;
but he banished all meanness from his neighbourhood, all thoughts of self-
interest and personal advancement. Duty, discipline, self-discipline, and the
joy of life—these were the rules he walked by; and if you found yourself in
his company you had perforce to walk with him, keeping up with his stride
as best you could.
We value our friends for different qualities, and would have their
tradition fulfil itself in different ways. Those of us who counted these two
—'Johnnie' Gough and Hugh Dawnay—among our friends will wish that
our sons may be like them, and follow in their footsteps.
F.S.O.
CHECKENDON COURT, OXFORDSHIRE,
1st June 1915.
[1] The Round Table (quarterly Review). Macmillan & Co., Ltd. Of the
articles referred to the chief are: 'Anglo-German Rivalry' (November
1910); 'Britain, France, and Germany' (December 1911); 'The Balkan
War and the Balance of Power' (June 1913); 'Germany and the Prussian
Spirit' (September 1914); 'The Schism of Europe' (March 1915). It is to
be hoped that these and some others may be republished before long in
more permanent form.
[2] Major the Hon. Hugh Dawnay, D.S.O., b. 1875; educated Eton and
Sandhurst; Rifle Brigade, 1895; Nile Campaign and Omdurman, 1898;
South Africa, 1899-1900; Somaliland, 1908-1910; 2nd Life Guards,
1912; France, August-November 1914.
[3] This Brigade was known during the battle of Ypres as 'the Fire
Brigade,' for the reason that it was constantly being called up on a
sudden to extinguish unforeseen conflagrations.
[4] Brigadier-General John Edmund Gough, V.C., C.M.G., C.B., A.D.C.
to the King; b. 1871; educated Eton and Sandhurst; Rifle Brigade, 1892;
British Central Africa, 1896-1897; Nile Campaign and Omdurman,
1898; South Africa, 1899-1902; Somaliland, 1902-1903 and 1908-1909;
France, August 1914-February 1915.
[5] At St. Jean de Luz, when he was endeavouring, though not very
successfully, to shake off the after-effects of his last Somaliland
campaign. He was then engaged in correcting the proofs of the volume
of his Staff College lectures which was subsequently published under the
title Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville (Rees)—a most vivid and
convincing narrative. In the intervals of work and golf he spent much of
his time in visiting Wellington's adjacent battlefields and studying his
passage of the Bidassoa and forcing of the Pyrenees.
[6] Gough's many friends will ever feel a double debt of gratitude to that
distinguished surgeon, Sir Berkeley Moynihan, who by this operation
restored him, after several years of ill-health and suffering, almost to
complete health; and who once again—when by a strange coincidence of
war he found his former patient lying in the hospital at Estaires the day
after he was brought in wounded—came to his aid, and all but achieved
the miracle of saving his life.
ORDEAL BY BATTLE
PART I
THE CAUSES OF WAR
PART II
THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY
PART III
THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY
PART IV
DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I
THE CAUSES OF WAR
CHAPTER I
PEACE AND WAR
PAGE
Peace is the greatest of British interests 3
Peaceful intentions will not ensure peace 4
Futility of Pacifism 6
Welcome to our website – the perfect destination for book lovers and
knowledge seekers. We believe that every book holds a new world,
offering opportunities for learning, discovery, and personal growth.
That’s why we are dedicated to bringing you a diverse collection of
books, ranging from classic literature and specialized publications to
self-development guides and children's books.
More than just a book-buying platform, we strive to be a bridge
connecting you with timeless cultural and intellectual values. With an
elegant, user-friendly interface and a smart search system, you can
quickly find the books that best suit your interests. Additionally,
our special promotions and home delivery services help you save time
and fully enjoy the joy of reading.
Join us on a journey of knowledge exploration, passion nurturing, and
personal growth every day!
ebookbell.com