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The North Korean Regime
under Kim Jong-un
Edited by
Byung-Yeon Kim
The North Korean Regime under Kim Jong-un
 Byung-Yeon Kim
Editor

The North Korean

Regime under Kim
Jong-un
Editor
Byung-Yeon Kim
Department of Economics
Seoul National University
Seoul, Korea (Republic of)

ISBN 978-981-99-8524-1 ISBN 978-981-99-8525-8 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8525-8

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
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 Acknowledgments

This book is the outcome of a research project initiated in 2019 by Kyung

Hoon Leem, who was then the Director of the Institute for Peace and
Unification Studies (IPUS) at Seoul National University (SNU). He moti-
vated us to write the most updated and comprehensive account of the
Kim Jong-un regime. Without his leadership, this book would not have
been published. For the last four years, the authors have revised the draft
several times due to unexpected changes in North Korea’s policies and
external circumstances. The Editor would like to thank the authors for
their diligent scholarship.
This book is a part of the project “Laying the Groundwork for Unifi-
cation and Peace” funded by IPUS at SNU. The authors are deeply
grateful to IPUS, which financially supported this project. We are also
thankful to Bumsoo Kim, Director of IPUS, for his encouragement and
support. IPUS was established in 2006 and has become one of the major
research institutes in the world within the fields of peace and North
Korean studies. The Editor would like to recognize excellent editorial
assistance from Seho Son and administrative support from Mi Sug Jang,
Seon-hye Kwon, and Jeonghee Lee.

v
 About This Book

This book, which is one of the most updated accounts of the North
Korean regime, covers not only nuclear policies but also “inside North
Korea” including politics, the economy, society, and religion under Kim
Jong-un’s era. In this book, we ask the following questions to compre-
hend North Korea as a whole. How has Kim Jong-un managed the
socialist regime? What external and internal policies have been used
to keep the regime alive? What conditions should be met to induce
North Korea to start denuclearization? To what extent have the economic
sanctions imposed by the United Nations and the United States been
successful? What social conditions are necessary for North Korea to
become a normal state? What implications can be drawn from the explo-
sive growth of fortune-telling? What kind of future lies ahead for North
Korea? Answering to these questions is vital to understanding “real North
Korea” and to designing appropriate policies for denuclearization and
improving human rights.

vii
 Introduction

More than ten years have passed since Kim Jong-un assumed power in
North Korea. In spite of an initial prediction of possible instability, he
has proved himself to be a competent leader at least for maintaining the
socialist regime. Indeed, socialist North Korea, which continues to exist
for 75 years since 1948, surpasses the Soviet Union in that it became the
longest-surviving country based on central planning and state ownership.
Nevertheless, the North Korean economy, which has significantly changed
from the 1990s, is not a traditional Stalinist-type economy any longer. A
majority of households engage in various types of market-related activities
such as commerce and smuggling. Moreover, despite that the regime still
adheres to the socialist economic principles, de facto privatization of small-
scale businesses occurred as a result of the collusion between the rich
and government officials. The former pays bribes to the latter in order to
protect their illegal businesses.
Kim Jong-un’s surprise does not end with the longevity of the
regime. A series of tests of nuclear weapons and the intercontinental
ballistic missiles from 2016 to 2017 shocked the international community,
which led to the strong economic sanctions adopted by the interna-
tional community including the United Nations Security Council, the
United States, and the European Union. However, a dramatic turnaround
occurred during 2018–2019 when Donald Trump, President of the
United States, held two summits with Kim Jong-un in Singapore and

ix
x INTRODUCTION

Hanoi and discussed how to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Never-

theless, they failed to achieve the objective of denuclearization, and North
Korea criticized that the United States should bring “a new way of
calculation” to further discussions on the objective with North Korea.
Subsequently, North Korea announced a new policy line of self-reliance
and stopped to respond to calls of the United States for continued talks.
An unexpected event pushed North Korea further into economic isola-
tion. To prevent the spread of Covid-19, North Korea forbade foreign
trade starting from the end of January 2020 and engaged with much
smaller international transactions when compared to the previous period.
However, it appears that economic self-reliance does not apply to the mili-
tary sphere. In 2021, North Korea launched cruise missiles three times.
Such military aggressions became much more frequent in 2022. In every
month, North Korea fired missiles from January to October. Especially,
in October and November 2022, North Korea resumed a series of mili-
tary provocations against South Korea, Japan, and the United States by
firing several types of missiles and artillery shells. Some claim that there
will be heightened tension in the Korean Peninsula similar to the one we
observed during 2016–2017.
Outside watchers tend to focus on North Korea’s nuclear weapons,
military aggression, and the abuse of human rights. Although these issues
deserve to attract attention, North Korea’s other dimensions, especially
its inside features and dynamics, should be equally investigated. North
Korea is a country where 25 million people live with their experiences
and social norms, possibly different across actors and across time. Particu-
larly, changes in society affected by marketization, which intensified under
Kim Jong-un’s rule until 2018, should not be underestimated. Without
understanding “inside North Korea” together with its external policies,
it would be difficult to design appropriate policies for denuclearization
and improving human rights. Hence, we ask the following questions to
understand North Korea as a whole. How has Kim Jong-un managed
the socialist regime? What external and internal policies have been used
to keep the regime alive? What conditions should be met to induce
North Korea to start denuclearization? To what extent have the economic
sanctions imposed by the United Nations and the United States been
successful? What kind of future lies ahead for North Korea?
This book introduces such multi-dimensional aspects of North Korea,
explains how they have evolved, and predicts how they will proceed. It
covers not only nuclear policies but also the political regime, the economy,
 INTRODUCTION xi

society, and religion under Kim Jong-un’s era. It further investigates the
extent to which his policies are different from his father’s and whether
and why they have changed during the course.
Chapter 1 by Kyung Hoon Leem and Sun-Woo Lee looks at the
basis of North Korea’s political system, the Suryeong system from the
perspective of comparative politics on dictatorships. Among the models
of comparative autocracies, the Suryeong system can be best conceptu-
alized as a totalitarian socialist dynasty. The Suryeong system has been
firmly consolidated and now displays enormous durability despite the
crisis-driven marketization and loosening of its socio-cultural grip on
the population. In the Kim Jong-un era, there has been neither insta-
bility in the autocratic regime nor symptoms of relaxing repression under
North Korea’s miserable economic conditions. Underlying this stasis is
the persistence of the Suryeong system, the very core of the North Korean
autocracy. Since the Suryeong system is so formidably entrenched, even
the Suryeong himself cannot revise it without undermining the very foun-
dation of his rule itself. An attempt to revise the system will undermine
the legitimacy of the Baekdu descendants’ rule and create enormous
institutional pandemonium. Kim Jong-un and the hard-liners’ obsession
with developing nuclear and missile programs at the cost of anything
whatsoever including the economic welfare of people should be judged
as a rational one in terms of their political survival and monopoly of
power. Hence, this chapter maintains that the expectation for North
Korea’s denuclearization and opening as well as a softening of totalitarian
repression is unlikely in the foreseeable future.
In Chapter 2, Sung Chull Kim reviews the history of North Korea’s
nuclear weapons development and the strenuous international efforts
to solve the issue. The official use of the term “denuclearization” can
be traced back to the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula, which was signed by South Korea (Republic of Korea,
ROK) and North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK)
in December 1991. The effect of the document was virtually nullified
by North Korea’s nuclear development and the failures of the negoti-
ations to solve this issue, but the term has continued to be used for
three decades without clarification of the meanings and implications. This
chapter analyzes the three elements of denuclearization in relation to
the North Korean nuclear issue: restoring the nonproliferation regime
on the Korean Peninsula, achieving verifiable arms control, and ending
North Korea’s nuclear deterrence. This analysis also helps to identify the
xii INTRODUCTION

roadblocks that impede the negotiation processes. From the nonprolif-

eration perspective, restoring the nonproliferation regime must address
the security assurance of North Korea and South Korea. From the arms
control perspective, denuclearization needed verifiable procedures, failure
of which resulted in the breakdown of all negotiations with North Korea.
The United States’ emphasis of verification and North Korea’s unilateral
approach originated from the distrust between them. Thus, cumula-
tive interactions through small deals seem the only way to progress.
From the deterrence perspective, North Korea should demonstrate the
intention to give up the strategy of nuclear deterrence. In reality, Kim
Jong-un expresses his determination to develop a nuclear doctrine and to
strengthen nuclear deterrent forces. Also, Pyongyang’s coercive behavior,
backed by nuclear armament, toward Seoul raises South Korea’s security
concern, thus stimulating their pro-nuclear public opinion.
In Chapter 3, Byung-Yeon Kim evaluates Kim Jong-un’s economic
policies on markets, outlines the economic activities of North Korean
households in markets, and analyzes the effects of economic sanctions
on such activities. First, the chapter argues that Kim Jong-un has adopted
a pragmatic approach to utilize markets for an economic recovery from
2012 to 2018. Nevertheless, such an approach is still within the bound-
aries of socialism and not a transition toward a market economy. Second,
the chapter confirms that marketization is prevalent in North Korea
in terms of participation rates and earnings. Indeed, the participation
rate in market activities was over 70% and the share of market income
in total household income exceeded 90% in 2012–2019. Third, the
economic sanctions imposed against North Korea in reaction to its
nuclear and ICBM tests diminished average household income by 25%,
with households belonging to the top and bottom 20% income quintiles
hit particularly hard. Fourth, Kim Jong-un abruptly switched his policy
from utilization of markets to its repression in 2019. Policies aiming
to establish state monopoly in the distribution of foods and consumer
goods intend to weaken and eliminate private market activities, if possible.
However, the success of these new policies is doubtful.
Philo Kim investigates changes in the decade of Kim Jong-un’s reign
with the concept of a “normal state” in Chapter 4. North Korea has long
been referred to as a rogue state and an axis of evil. Kim Jong-un, well
aware of these criticisms from the outside world, attempted several times
to transform North Korea into a normal state during his tenure. He tried
to return his father’s Military-First Politics to People-First Politics. He
 INTRODUCTION xiii

attempted to normalize the economy by declaring a new strategic line to

end the parallel development and to concentrate all efforts on economic
development. He also attempted to cultivate a more globalized mindset
and worldview among North Koreans. However, the normalization of a
country cannot be realized without a fundamental change in the system. A
country needs to create the social capacity to drive change. Nevertheless,
it appears that North Korea currently lacks the human resources necessary
to progress significantly toward “normalization.” This chapter examines
what social conditions are necessary for North Korea to become a normal
state.
Heonik Kwon analyzes spirit fortune-telling practices prevalent in the
current North Korea in Chapter 5. It is widely regarded that religious
freedom does not exist in North Korea. The country’s early state-building
process involved a vigorous political struggle to achieve the ideal of
a radically enlightened society without religion and superstitions, as in
Soviet Russia and other revolutionary polities under the Soviet influ-
ence. However, this does not mean that religiosity and spirituality are
absent from North Korea’s social space. Notable are spirit fortune-telling
practices that are now an intimate part of everyday life decision-making
among many North Koreans. Extremely popular at the grassroots level,
the return of this traditional popular religious culture at the turn of
the twenty-first century, if properly understood, can provide interesting
insights into North Korea’s society and politics in transition.
As the five authors discuss, North Korea is a multifaceted country.
Some sectors of the state are interconnected and mutually reinforcing,
while others are disjointed and may even conflict with one other. Specifi-
cally, the political system and nuclear development are closely intertwined.
North Korea’s political system might have affected to acquire nuclear
weapons, which are viewed as an important instrument to support the
regime. Kyung Hoon Leem and Sun-woo Lee assert that North Korea
is highly unlikely to undergo fundamental change given its rigid polit-
ical system rooted in Suryeong ideology. In line with this assessment,
Kim Sung-chull suggests that the possibility of reaching a comprehen-
sive denuclearization agreement is remote even if negotiations were to
resume, and that pursuing gradual denuclearization through the accumu-
lation of small deals is a more realistic strategy. The most recent revision
of North Korea’s constitution in September 2023 reinforces these views,
as it frames the advancement of the state’s nuclear force as a right that is
necessary for both its survival and development.
xiv INTRODUCTION

While North Korea’s political system remains rigid, its economy and
society have undergone major changes. The socialist economic system was
heavily damaged during the Arduous March, which triggered a strong
wave of grassroots marketization. According to Byung-Yeon Kim, market
activities now account for more than 70% of household income. Heonik
Kwon points out that marketization is one reason why fortune-telling and
shamanism have increased in in North Korea since such practices are often
combined with the pursuit of commercial interests. Likewise, the everyday
life of North Koreans has undergone significant change.
From 2012 to 2018, Kim Jong-un aimed to transform North Korea
into a “normal” state while utilizing market activities to stimulate
economic growth. However, this attempt to revive the economy experi-
enced a major setback due to the international economic sanctions levied
in response to North Korea’s nuclear weapon and ICBM tests, as well as
the breakdown of the Hanoi negotiations between Donald Trump and
Kim Jong-un. Philo Kim points out that North Korea’s fixation on its
nuclear program, rigid political system, and lack of capacity prevented
Kim Jong-un’s from realizing his vision of a “normal” state.
Can North Korea be integrated into the global community without
giving up its nuclear program? Can bottom-up change undermine the
political system based on Suryeong ideology? Can the rigid political system
endure even when it is clearly misaligned with economic or societal reali-
ties? North Korea stands at a critical juncture, and thus, it is an important
time to pay careful attention to these questions.

Byung-Yeon Kim
 Contents

1 Making Sense of the North Korea’s Suryeong System 1

Kyung Hoon Leem and Sun-Woo Lee
2 North Korea’s Nuclear Armament and the Triad
of Denuclearization 29
Sung Chull Kim
3 Marketization during Kim Jong-un’s Era 59
Byung-Yeon Kim
4 Normal State and Social Requisite in North Korea 93
Philo Kim
5 Popular Religion in North Korea 123
Heonik Kwon

Bibliography 139
Index 149

xv
 Notes on Contributors

Byung-Yeon Kim is Distinguished Professor in the Department of

Economics at Seoul National University. He published a number of arti-
cles in international journals and wrote an influential book on the North
Korean economy (Unveiling the North Korean Economy, Cambridge
University Press, 2017). He was awarded with Excellence in Academic
Achievements granted by the National Academy of Sciences of Republic
of Korea and T. S. Ashton Prize by the Economic History Society. He
has served as a member of various government committees including the
Policy Advisory Committee for the Ministries of Unification and Foreign
Affairs. He is a regular columnist on North Korean issues in a South
Korean newspaper, The JoongAng.
Philo Kim is Associate Professor at the Institute for Peace and Unification
Studies, Seoul National University. His main research areas include devel-
opment and political ideology of North Korea as well as unification issues
and peace studies. He had formerly served as a Senior Fellow and Director
of North Korean Studies Division at a government-funded research
institute, Korean Institute for National Unification, and also served as
President of the Korean Association of North Korean Studies. He is
currently serving or served as advisory committee members in Ministry of
Unification, Ministry of Defense, National Intelligence Service, National
Unification Advisory Council, Korean Council for Reconciliation and
Cooperation, etc.

xvii
xviii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Sung Chull Kim is Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute for Peace
and Unification Studies, Seoul National University, where he previously
held the position of Humanities Korea Professor until his retirement in
2021. His primary research interests encompass North Korea, alliance
politics, nonproliferation, the nuclear environment, and peace studies. He
has authored several recent books, including China and Its Small Neigh-
bors: The Political Economy of Asymmetry, Vulnerability, and Hedging
(2023) and Partnership within Hierarchy: The Evolving East Asian
Security Triangle (2017). His scholarly articles have been featured in
numerous academic journals, such as Systems Research and Behavioral
Science (formerly Behavioral Science), Journal of Communist Studies and
Transition Politics. Currently, he serves as the editor of the Asian Journal
of Peacebuilding.
Heonik Kwon is Senior Research Fellow of Social Science and Distin-
guished Professor of Social Anthropology, Trinity College, University
of Cambridge. A Fellow of British Academy, he is also a member of
the Mega-Asia research group in Seoul National University Asia Center.
Author of prize-winning books on the social history of the Vietnam War
and Asia’s Cold War, his After the Korean War: An Intimate History
(2020) received the 2022 James B. Palais prize from the Association for
Asian Studies. His other works include North Korea: Beyond Charismatic
Politics (2012), co-authored with Byung-Ho Chung, and Spirit Power:
Politics and Religion in Korea’s American Century (2022), co-authored
with Jun Hwan Park that explores Korea’s Cold War experience from a
religious cultural angle.
Sun-Woo Lee is Associate Professor in the Department of Political
Science and Diplomacy at Jeonbuk National University. His research
interests include comparative regime types, comparative political institu-
tions (presidentialism in particular), and South and North Korean politics.
He published several academic papers on North Korea and Korean Penin-
sula in English as well as in Korean, for example, “A Subtle Difference
between Russia and China’s Stances toward the Korean Peninsula and
Its Strategic Implications for South Korea” (Journal of International
and Area Studies (2018) co-authored with Hyungjin Cho, “Military-
First Politics’ and ‘North Korean’ Economic Reform” (Review of North
Korean Studies, 2009) and so forth.
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xix

Kyung Hoon Leem is Professor in the Department of Political Science

and International Relations at Seoul National University. His research
interests cover democratization and economic reform, comparative post-
communist transitions, Russian politics, and political and economic
change in North Korea. He previously held various positions including
Director of the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, and now
serves as the Chair of the Governance Reform Commission at Seoul
National University. He currently leads the Democracy Research Cluster
at Seoul National University’s Institute for Future Strategy, focusing on
the global trend of democratic erosion and autocratization.
 List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Changes in the Suryeong System Source Kim (2014: 58)
(with minor modifications) *Thickness of lines indicates
the relative intensity of influence from respective institutions 5
Fig. 1.2 Evolution of socialist regimes Source Park et al. (2013: 22)
(with minor modifications) 22
Fig. 3.1 Income Shock to Jobs related to the External Economy
and Trade. (a) Income shocks to jobs in the external
economy (b) Income shocks to market trade jobs 80
Fig. 3.2 Income Shock to Jobs unrelated to the External Economy
and Trade 80
Fig. 4.1 Key Elements of the Concept of a Normal State (Source
Min et al. (2009: 68)) 97

xxi
 List of Tables

Table 2.1 US-North Korea Standoff, 2001–2017 34

Table 3.1 North Korean defectors in South Korea: total number
and number of samples 66
Table 3.2 Main economic variables 68
Table 3.3 Jobs that were the largest source of income 72
Table 3.4 Participation Rate and Income: Comparison
between the Official and Market Sectors using Resampled
Data 78
Table 3.5 Changes in total income between the pre-sanction period
and post-sanction period according to income quintile 79

xxiii
 CHAPTER 1

Making Sense of the North Korea’s Suryeong

System

Kyung Hoon Leem and Sun-Woo Lee

More than 10 years have passed since Kim Jong-un took power after Kim
Jong-il, his father, died in December 2011. The Economist, reflecting on
North Korea’s past decade, assesses that “North Korea is more North
Korean than ever” (The Economist December 13, 2021). This evalua-
tion rings true more than ever. Kim Jong-un has not turned out to be
the enlightened and reform-minded young leader who would change the
inexplicably anachronistic and closed country into a “normal” state as
expected. Neither has there been instability in the autocratic regime nor
symptoms of relaxing repression under the country’s miserable economic
conditions. North Korea has been concentrating on the development of

K. H. Leem (B)
Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National
University, Seoul, South Korea
e-mail: [email protected]
S.-W. Lee
Department of Political Science and Diplomacy, Jeonbuk National University,
Jeonju, South Korea
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
B.-Y. Kim (ed.), The North Korean Regime under Kim Jong-un,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8525-8_1
2 K. H. LEEM AND S.-W. LEE

its nuclear and missile capabilities instead of opening and reforming the
country.
Underlying this stasis is the persistence of the Suryeong system, the
very core of the North Korean autocracy. The word “Suryeong ” means
“charismatic head” or “supreme leader.” Kim Jong-un, following his
father, did not claim the title of Suryeong , as a way of displaying his
filial piety and deep respect to Kim Il-sung, his grandfather. But, in 2021
North Korean media began to call Kim Jong-un the Suryeong . The eleva-
tion of Kim Jong-un as the Suryeong confirms not only his consolidated
power but also the solidity of North Korea’s political system where both
the Suryeong and the ruling elites are entrenched. How can we explain
the nature and resilience of the Suryeong system and make a reasonable
prediction about the paths North Korea is likely to take in the foreseeable
future?
In our view, studies of comparative politics on dictatorships and
transitions provide heuristic yardsticks for understanding the Suryeong
system and the behaviors of its major supporters. Among the models
of comparative autocracies, the Suryeong system can be best conceptu-
alized as a totalitarian socialist dynasty. It has been firmly consolidated
and now displays enormous durability despite the crisis-driven marketi-
zation and loosening of its socio-cultural grip on the population. Given
the growing contradictions between the rigid political regime and the
changing socioeconomic infrastructure, it is not unreasonable to expect
the current North Korean political system to change. But, since the
Suryeong system is so formidably entrenched, even the Suryeong himself
cannot revise it without undermining the very foundation of his rule itself.
This leads us to a pessimistic forecast regarding the prospects of North
Korea’s denuclearization and opening, as well as a softening of totalitarian
repression.

North Korea as a Socialist Dynasty

While North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK) is
officially declared to be a republic, it is a de facto hereditary monarchy.
Hereditary succession itself is not a rare phenomenon, even in the modern
political world; there have been more than 250 hereditary successions
worldwide since World War II. What distinguishes North Korea from
others is that it is the only socialist country that has achieved hereditary
succession (Brownlee 2007).1 Hereditary succession tends to be more
 1 MAKING SENSE OF THE NORTH KOREA’S SURYEONG SYSTEM 3

difficult to achieve where the ruling party predates the ruler. It was neither
attempted nor realized in the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party)’s
Mexico or Communist China. Despite the presence of a communist party,
three generations of Kim Il-sung’s family have ruled the country for more
than 70 years. Kim Il-sung’s son, Kim Jong-il, was designated as the heir
in the early 1970s, and then Kim Il-sung’s grandson, Kim Jong-un, was
chosen as the official next leader in 2008, and took over as the supreme
ruler just after his father died in 2011.2
It was the socialist system, the Stalinist system more exactly, that was
initially implanted in North Korea. At first, Kim Il-sung alone neither
founded nor fully controlled the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK). Various
political factions, including the pro-Soviet and pro-China groups and so
forth, took part in forming the party together with Kim Il-sung’s Partisan
clique. North Korea’s evolution toward the Suryeong system began in the
early 1960s, hand in hand with further centralizing the management of its
command economy. Since then North Korea has evolved along a unique
path which substantially differentiates itself from other socialist countries.
It refused de-Stalinization and has never seriously implemented market-
oriented experiments. To the contrary, it tried to make its command
economy more “refined and perfect” in the 1960s and 1970s, exactly
when its East European brothers relaxed their rigid plan economies by
adopting a considerable number of market elements, however partial they
were.
In early 1970s Kim Il-sung and his son finally removed all the potential
challengers and installed the unique Suryeong system that would insti-
tutionally warrant the Kim family’s monopoly of power. Accordingly,
the state formation of North Korea substantially diverged from other
socialist countries. North Korea ceased to be a conventional socialist
party-state as early as the beginning of the 1970s despite the leading
role of WPK in society. Instead, it became a Suryeong -state, in which the
Suryeong is located at the top of the state and even possibly outside of
the party (See Fig. 1.1). In other words, the status of the North Korean
Suryeong is above all the major pillars of the state, i.e., party, military,
and government. In particular, the second Suryeong , Kim Jong-il, even
marginalized the party structures including the Politburo and placed his
position far above the WPK. The Suryeong as such, it is asserted, purports
to unify all the people and the institutions into a permanent “socio-
political organism.” The emergence and consolidation of the Suryeong
system eventually transformed this socialist republic into a subtype of
4 K. H. LEEM AND S.-W. LEE

neo-patrimonial dynasties based on the extremely centralized socialist

system.
The Suryeong system indeed is an innovative solution to the dilemma
that every dictatorship cannot avoid, that is, uncertainties inherent in
succession. Charismatic leadership by its nature is an extraordinary and
impermanent talent, which is hardly routine or replaceable. North Korea’s
astonishing innovation, as Kwon and Chung (2012) show, is that it
has successfully routinized the supreme leader’s charismatic persona into
an institutionalized hereditary succession and thereby solved the funda-
mental dilemma of the irreplaceability of charismatic leadership, creating
a “theater state.” That is how Kim Il-sung’s son and grandson have been
able to act as the de facto Suryeong, even if the title of Suryeong was
permanently reserved only for the late Kim Il-sung leadership.
After Kim Jong-un’s takeover of power, even the core norms and code
of conduct supporting the Suryeong system were reinforced.3 As a matter
of fact, differently from other socialist regimes, North Korea abandoned
Marxism-Leninism a long time ago and instead created Juche Ideology
(now Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il-ism) as its unique official ideology under-
pinning the Suryeong system. Now, so-called Ten Principles, as revised
in 2013, emphasize the absolute authority of both Kim Il-sung and Kim
Jong-il and the “Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il-ization” of North Korean poli-
tics and society as a whole. An interesting point is that, compared with
the previous version, the WPK’s authority has been somewhat elevated as
well. Nonetheless, the very core of the new Principles is still the urge to
“keep the Party and Revolution through the Baekdu bloodline (meaning
Kim Il-sung’s descendants),” which would permanently absolutize the
authority of Kim’s family. To use Kantorowicz’s analogy, Kim Il-sung’s
political body became an immortal one through the Baekdu bloodline
(Armstrong 2005). In a nutshell, the party, state, and official ideology all
have been extremely tightly woven into the Suryeong system completely
appropriated by Kim’s family and its closest aides.4 In this way, North
Korea became the first country where a dynasty grew out of an originally
socialist republic, a dream not even Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong could
realize.
 1 MAKING SENSE OF THE NORTH KOREA’S SURYEONG SYSTEM 5

Fig. 1.1 Changes in the Suryeong System Source Kim (2014: 58) (with minor
modifications)
*Thickness of lines indicates the relative intensity of influence from respective
institutions
6 K. H. LEEM AND S.-W. LEE

Fig. 1.1 (continued)

North Korea as a Totalitarian State

The Suryeong system as such is the closest to totalitarianism among the
existing models of dictatorships. As we all know, the totalitarianism model
is a porous and blurry one. The origins, core properties, and dynamics
of totalitarianism are still subject to never-ending academic and ideo-
logical scrutiny and debates. However, compared with other available
categories of dictatorship, the totalitarianism model is the most appro-
priate in capturing the gist of the North Korean Suryeong -state. Indeed,
the North Korean political system displays all the core elements of total-
itarianism observed by Linz (2000) as well as Friedrich and Brzezinski
(1965).5
More than anything else, we need to understand how totalitarianism
completely differs from authoritarianism and other types of autocracy.
Linz (2000) stresses that the ultimate focus of the totalitarianism model
as a distinctive ideal type is laid on the regime form for “completely
organizing political life and society.” He accepts Furet’s definition of
totalitarianism as “the atomized regimes of societies made up of individ-
uals systematically deprived of their political ties and subject to the ‘total’
power of an ideological party and its leader.” Linz (2000) goes on to high-
light Furet’s argument that “there would be no reason why these regimes
 1 MAKING SENSE OF THE NORTH KOREA’S SURYEONG SYSTEM 7

must be identical or even comparable in every way; nor need the charac-
teristic in question be equally prominent throughout the history of such
regimes.” The very same totalitarian mythology Furet noted is the key of
the Suryeong system; that is, “the mythology of the unity of the people in
and by the party-state under the leadership of infallible guide” (cited from
Linz 2000: 4). In this regard, the Suryeong system is a perfect candidate
for the totalitarianism model which may take various forms.
While much criticism has been raised in arguing that the totalitarianism
model exaggerates the capacity of totalitarian regimes, the ubiquitous
failure of totalitarian states does not necessarily undermine the validity
of the totalitarianism model. Contrary to its omnipotent image, total-
itarianism has in fact failed to completely conquer, penetrate into, and
control society and individuals. Totalitarianism cannot help but fail; the
fanatic utopian aspirations of a total state are doomed to crumble.
But totalitarian power and dominance persist in all “failed totalitar-
ian” states (Walzer 1983). Here it is worthy to mention the words of
Malia (1990) who reminded us of this when criticizing the revisionist
Sovietologists’ sanitization of totalitarianism into post-totalitarianism or
authoritarianism.

Totalitarianism does not mean that such regimes in fact exercise total
control over the population; it means rather that such control is their
aspiration. It does not mean they are omnipotent in performance, but
instead that they are institutionally omnipotent. It is not the Soviet society
that is totalitarian, but the Soviet state. This conceptual confusion results
from taking as the defining criterion of regime the degree or quantity of
repression, not its nature or quality. (Malia 1990: 300–301)

Malia’s warning against the hasty adoption of a post-totalitarianism

perspective should be taken very seriously when we try to under-
stand North Korea. As it is commonly known, post-totalitarianism as a
distinctive regime type was included in Linz and Stepan’s typology of
nondemocratic regimes (Linz and Stepan 1996). Typically, it refers to the
de-Stalinized communist regimes in the Soviet Union and East European
countries. The waves of de-Stalinization changed those totalitarian states
into milder ones, with weakened ideology, limited (though not political)
pluralism, and/or dissident groups, and the absence of utopian aspiration
and terror. Mass mobilizations still persisted but became more ritualized,
and the initial revolutionary fanaticism was gradually replaced by cynicism,
8 K. H. LEEM AND S.-W. LEE

consumerism, and acquiescent “living within the lie” (Havel 1985).6

Personality cults subsided and instead the leadership became collective
and bureaucratic, often “gerontocratic” within the political leadership like
in Leonid Brezhnev’s period of the Soviet Union. And the ruling elites
became more secure as they were no longer subjected to purges and
terror. Thus, post-totalitarian societies saw the “stability” (or stagnation
in a negative sense) of a “mature Stalinist system” (Bialer 1980).
North Korea now displays some post-totalitarian features, especially
the changes forced on the regime in the face of chronic economic
difficulties. Most of all, the crisis-driven marketization has led to the
loosening of the Suryeong ’s control over society in this country (Smith
2015). The Suryeong cannot resort to massive mass mobilization in the
economy as before. Marketization has forced people to prioritize family
and private activities over public duties. And official institutions’ direct
involvement in businesses as well as spontaneous marketization from
below has transformed the Suryeong ’s society as a whole into a giant
rent-seeking patrimony where the population at large, including state offi-
cials, should engage in bribery and illegal or semi-legal market activities
to do businesses or just survive. The Suryeong has become a Sisyphus
who has to resist stealing and hollowing out his state. In addition, the
North Korean regime can no longer monopolize information about the
outside world, including South Korea. Before the outbreak of Covid-19,
it was not able to restrict illegal or semi-legal traders’ contacts with their
Chinese partners. Millions of people now use mobile phones and have
come to gain more information about the outside world than ever before.
The surveys from the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS)
report that ideological indoctrination has become ineffective and materi-
alistic consumerism is now widespread among North Koreans (Kim et al.
2020). The Suryeong ’s revolutionary discipline is now being replaced
by what Havel witnessed, that is, cynicism, consumerism, and acquies-
cent “living within the lie.” In this sense, North Korea reveals typical
symptoms of post-totalitarian societies.
Still, it should be remembered, the dividing line between a totali-
tarian and a post-totalitarian regime, and among different post-totalitarian
stages, cannot easily be drawn if the conceptualizations include political,
social, and cultural dimensions altogether. Therefore, we would suggest
not to stretch the category of post-totalitarianism, which is already quite
encompassing, too far. As Malia argued, “it is not the Soviet society that is
totalitarian, but the Soviet state” (Malia 1990: 300–301); the distinction
 1 MAKING SENSE OF THE NORTH KOREA’S SURYEONG SYSTEM 9

between totalitarianism and post-totalitarianism is more related to polit-

ical aspects of a regime rather than social or cultural characteristics. In this
view point, North Korea still obviously belongs to the category of totali-
tarianism, not post-totalitarianism. Just compare the case of North Korea
with post-totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe that actually existed.
In Poland, beginning in 1956, universities and research institutes could
enjoy some autonomy in studies on political economy, philosophy, history,
and so forth (Borowski 1975: 70–76; Bugajski and Pollack 1989). And
in Czechoslovakia, pluralist potential gradually emerged in the 1970s.
Under the international influence of the famous “Helsinki Process,” a
human rights group, the “Chart 77,” was organized and continued to
work for liberalization despite the party-state’s brutal oppression (Hunt-
ington 1991: 89–94). All these changes are simply not imaginable in
North Korea.
Related with this issue, Thompson (2002) provides a comparative
yardstick for understanding North Korea’s system, using Linz and
Stepan (1996)’s classification of post-totalitarianism: “early,” “frozen,”
and “mature” ones. Employing these subtypes, Thompson persuasively
accounts for the patterns in the path-dependent nature of various post-
communist transitions. If we follow this sort of categorization, North
Korea has yet to move to even the “early” stage of post-totalitarianism
because, more than anything else, the emergence of collective leadership
heralding the advent of a new era is simply impossible as long as the
Suryeong system firmly holds out.
Although McEachern (2010) presented the Kim Jong-il regime as
“post-totalitarian institutionalism,” noting different policy orientations
within the North Korean bureaucracies, this pattern could never be
regarded as a result of this kind of collective leadership. All the party
and state apparatuses competed with each other to prove their unshak-
able loyalty toward the Suryeong . As a matter of fact, McEachern himself
admits that the institutional pluralism itself was only an outcome of Kim
Jong-il’s deliberate “divide and conquer” strategy to fortify his rule. Now
there is no political faction challenging Kim Jong-un in North Korea.
Indeed, Kim Jong-un has boldly removed several influential figures, who
had accumulated strong career capital from the Kim Jong-il era, in the
form of a purge, and consequently consolidated his own authority and
power. The young Suryeong has also consistently increased the loyalty of
high-ranking elites toward himself, promoting and degrading their ranks
and positions frequently and suddenly (Lee and Park 2018: 231–238).
10 K. H. LEEM AND S.-W. LEE

The Suryeong system as totalitarianism may also be understood as a

subtype of the sultanism model that Linz and Stepan (1996) treat as a
distinctive type of modern dictatorship.7 In a sultanist regime, no indi-
vidual or organization in the state and society can ever be free from
the dictator’s tyrannical or arbitrary exercise of power. In addition, this
regime type has not only carried out symbolic manipulation for the
dictator but even stimulated the masses to endlessly admire him or her.
This model seems to adeptly capture conspicuous features of the person-
alist autocracy in three Kims’ North Korea and Nicolae Ceaus, escu’s
Romania. An interesting aspect of the sultanism model is that, unlike
other types, it can be compatible with and thus be used as an add-on
to other types of undemocratic regimes.8 Sultanism by itself lacks ideo-
logical goals for society, mobilization of the population into a mass single
party, a high level of bureaucratization, and commitment to the imper-
sonal purposes of the regime.9 Therefore, Linz and Stepan (1996) also
count Ceaus, escu’s Romania as a case of totalitarianism combined with
sultanism. Thus, North Korea’s Suryeong system can be another case of
totalitarianism-cum-sultanism.
A caveat here is that the exceptionalism of North Korea is even
more apparent when we compare it with Ceaus, escu’s Romania where
the equivalents of the Suryeong system or Juche Ideology were missing.
Compared with Ceaus, escu’s clan, the Kim family’s astonishing success in
institutionalizing an ultra-neotraditional rule has been aided by perceived
security threats from the Korean Peninsula’s division and the Cold War
geopolitics in the Northeast Asian region (Leem 2005). It embodies an
unprecedented systematic combination of the highest level of institution-
alization, ideological legitimization, and neo-sultanist rule, which can be
best conceptualized as a totalitarian socialist dynasty (also see Choi 2001:
33–40; Park 2004: 103–104).

Kim Jong-un, the Third Suryeong

Initially, there was some speculation that Kim Jong-un might be an
“avatar” Suryeong . There have been observations that Kim Jong-un’s
power was not the result of automatic hereditary succession but the
outcome of a compromise between Kim Jong-il and the ruling elites
including the military (Schäfer June 8, 2021). Indeed, unlike his father,
Kim Jong-un had only three years of training as the official heir, so
he seemed to lack enough career capital and solid autonomous political
 1 MAKING SENSE OF THE NORTH KOREA’S SURYEONG SYSTEM 11

power. But, surprisingly enough, Kim Jong-un swiftly purged his patrons
in the party as well as the armed forces his father lined up before his
death. He has steadily consolidated his power base for the past decade,
and eventually began to be called the Suryeong , the title long reserved for
his grandfather.
The Suryeong has always held a position above all the state pillars, i.e.,
party, military, and government since Kim Il-sung’s personalist dictator-
ship was established in the late 1960s. However, as Fig. 1.1 visualizes, the
relationships between the ruler and those pillars, and among the latter,
have changed to a significant extent during the rule of each of the three
Kims.
In the Kim Il-sung era, the party’s superiority over the military and
government was unquestionable, and the latter’s role was much less
autonomous than the former. The first Suryeong shared a significant part
of power and authority with the party. And, as a result, the party appa-
ratuses immoderately encroached on the functional areas of government,
which sometimes led to significant policy failures (Kim 2014: 57–58). In
the Kim Jong-il era, in contrast, the status of the party was no higher
than the military and government. In particular, the division of labor
among the three pillars was underscored via the introduction of the
“Military-First Policy” and the “Cabinet Responsibility System” (Kim
2014: 58). Though there have been different observations and inter-
pretations of the power relationship between the WPK and the Korean
People’s Army (KPA), Kim Jong-il’s role as the Chairman of National
Defence Commission directly steered the Secretariat of the WPK, inca-
pacitating the key decision-making bodies of the party such as the
Politburo, Central Committee, and Party Congress. As a matter of fact,
he became the General Secretary even without a formal election in the
Central Committee of the WPK. Relying mainly on the National Defence
Commission, he ruled the country without official approvals from the
party’s central decision-making body.
Kim Jong-un has sought several political and institutional changes
since he took power. He abolished the National Defence Commission
and strengthened the role of WPK. In the Kim Jong-un era, the party’s
leading role, vis-à-vis the military in particular, now seems to be more
prioritized than ever. In the early stage of his rule, he abandoned his
father’s “Military-First Policy,” and instead began to urge the “Parallel
Policy of Economic and Nuclear Development.” The monolithic leading
role of the WPK was emphasized in the revised “Ten Principles” along
12 K. H. LEEM AND S.-W. LEE

with the Suryeong ’s authority. He now calls for meetings of the Polit-
buro, Central Committee, and Party Congress more often than during
his father’s rule. In particular, unlike his father, he chose to be officially
elected by the Politburo of the WPK to the post of Supreme Commander
of the KPA. This means that Kim Jong-un has been attempting to control
the military and government by making full use of the party (Koo et al.
2016).10 As a consequence, under Kim Jong-un’s rule, the WPK has now
recovered an equal or even superior position vis-à-vis the military, not
solely the government.
Having seen these changes, some specialists expected North Korea to
move to a more or less “normal party-state” (Lee 2011; Wada 2014).
Especially, Wada (2014: 302–304), judging that Kim Jong-il strategi-
cally arranged the institutional superiority of the party over the other two
pillars before his death, evaluated this as a signal of the return to a normal
party-state. However, even with this significant change, it does not mean a
transition to a normal party-state or a model of Soviet collective leadership
has taken place. In fact, the WPK is still completely subordinated to the
Suryeong within the North Korean party-state. For instance, the Bureau
of Secretariat, to which the most powerful Organization and Guidance
Department and other offices of the WPK belong, continues to work only
in support of Kim Jong-un’s absolute rule. This was particularly evident at
the 8th Party Congress where Kim Jong-un was elected as General Secre-
tary of the WPK, the position he had not claimed because his father, Kim
Jong-il, had been called the “eternal General Secretary.” Kim Jong-un,
since his rise to power at the age of only 27, has surprisingly and success-
fully protected the totalitarian system in spite of political uncertainties
in the wake of rapid power succession as well as a continuing economic
crisis. Thus nobody is able to more or less have a horizontal relation-
ship with the Suryeong , and no plural factions are allowed in the regime.
Needless to say, the emergence of dissents, another symptom of post-
totalitarianism, is absolutely unthinkable in North Korea. North Korea’s
political system can be more aptly called the “Suryeong ’s party-state”
rather than a normal party-state as it is commonly called.
Kim Jong-un has skillfully monopolized power, utilizing a “divide and
conquer” strategy to command the top echelons of the regime. More than
anything else, Kim Jong-un boldly purged his father’s closest allies who
his father had strategically stationed to support him. The most conspic-
uous executed figures include Ri Young-ho, the Chief of Staff of the
KPA, and Hyon Yong-chol, the Minister of People’s Armed Forces, as
 1 MAKING SENSE OF THE NORTH KOREA’S SURYEONG SYSTEM 13

well as Jang Song-thaek, Kim Jong-un’s uncle and the Vice-Chairman

of the National Defence Commission, the second highest leader of the
state. Kim Jong-un still continues to execute, punish, and rotate his
top officials, preventing anybody from developing an autonomous base
of political assets and making them wholly and individually dependent
on the Suryeong . The ruling elites are subjected to permanent insecu-
rity as seen under the rule of Stalin in the Soviet Union. They only
compete with each other for a seat next to the Suryeong and for rela-
tively more economic rents. Kim Jong-un made it clear that there would
be no second-in-command in the Suryeong ’s country by staging a series of
unpredictable and ruthless “show trials,” public humiliation, and execu-
tions of his inherited old vassals. And he replaced them with younger
aides, promoting second-tier elites. Personnel reshufflings of second-tier
high-ranking cadres and officers are also frequently carried out in the same
context.11 So far there has been no significant symptom of change in the
Suryeong system, and it is too early to call North Korea a post-totalitarian
party-state as Lee (2011), Wada (2014), and other experts do.12
Kim Jong-un has inherited a society enormously transformed over
the previous two decades in socioeconomic and cultural terms. Indeed,
since the mid-1990s, the continued famines and economic crises have
certainly undermined the extremely centralized command economy which
was inseparably fused with the Suryeong system. Thus the North Korean
regime could not but lose some control over the population.
Now in North Korea, the state and party can no longer provide the
population with basic necessities including food and medicine. Ordinary
people have been forced to rely on “self-help” market activities. The
party, military, government, and state enterprises have transformed them-
selves into major agents of marketization as well. A number of party
cadres, government bureaucrats, and military officers have been increas-
ingly involved in illegal and semi-legal market activities (Smith 2015). As
a case in point, local governments’ bureaucrats often obtain daily neces-
sities, such as food or medicine, through bribes from illegal traders who
cross the border to China, and subsequently earn some extra money by
putting them on the market again. Officials and party cadres can easily
extract bribes in exchange for conspiring with people’s informal market
activities, even exempting them from the officially required burden of
ideological education programs. Military officers behave similarly. In a
sense, such “self-help” marketization tendencies can be more advanta-
geous to the military than the party or government sides. For example,
14 K. H. LEEM AND S.-W. LEE

the military can gain more chances to accept “presents” from the illegal
traders because of its sentry duty patrolling the border. In addition, the
military has been provided with relatively more resources, including daily
necessities, due to logistics supplies. Above all, while both the party and
military organizations themselves have created their own trading firms,
such as Daesung Trading Company, in order to earn foreign currency,
the military firms have relative advantages. Thanks to the available labor
force in army units, military firms get business orders such as construction
contracts from various government departments as well as foreign compa-
nies. Though, with the end of the “Military-First Policy,” the illegal
and semi-legal market activities involving the military have recently seen
restrictions.
In this process of crisis-driven marketization, the regime’s capacity to
effectively inculcate ideological fervor and enforce the so-called organiza-
tional life has now been severely curbed, though the party’s ideological
education and revolutionary discipline are still emphasized in official
terms. According to a survey by the IPUS, about 68 percent of North
Korean defectors said that they had preferred capitalism more than
socialism already when living in North; about 90 percent of them had
thought that freedom of economic activities such as commercial trans-
action and establishing businesses would be necessary for North Korea
as well (Lee 2021: 114–117). More than 80 percent of all respondents
thought the ruler’s improper policies such as overspending for national
defense and an absence of economic reform were the main causes of
North Korean economic failure. That is, the majority of North Korean
people think that Kim Jong-un, rather than external factors such as
Western sanctions and natural disasters, has been mostly liable for the
economic failure. About two-thirds of respondents had evaluated Kim
Jong-un’s performance negatively when they were living in North Korea
(Kim 2021: 106–114, 122–124).
But, at the same time, the majority of North Koreans still keep their
loyalty to the regime. Certainly, Kim Jong-un is not able to initiate
sweeping mass mobilization like his grandfather or father. Nevertheless,
he seems to have sufficiently monopolized power, repeatedly purging and
brutally punishing members of the core class as well as ordinary people
as his father did during his succession in the early 1970s. Violations of
human rights such as public executions, torture, and prison camps are
still the main instruments of his rule (Oh et al., 2021). Every year for
the past decade, the IPUS surveys report, about 60 to 70 percent of new
 1 MAKING SENSE OF THE NORTH KOREA’S SURYEONG SYSTEM 15

North Korean defectors surveyed guessed that Kim Jong-un seemed to

enjoy support from at least more than half of the population. Similarly,
those defectors judged that about 50 to 60 percent of the North Korean
population would have pride in the official Juche Ideology (Kim 2021:
104–105).13 Wintrobe (1998: 337)’s observation that “the use of repres-
sion doesn’t mean that dictators aren’t popular” applies to North Korea
as well.
Moreover, Kim Jong-un’s success in developing nuclear weapons seems
to have boosted the legitimacy of the Suryeong system. At the 8th Party
Congress in 2021, Kim showed off the strong national defense potential
of his country, mentioning the word “nuclear” no less than 36 times and
even holding a large-scale military parade displaying high-end weapons,
despite his self-reflection on the economic failure at the beginning of the
meeting. North Korea has made significant advances in developing not
only a sizable number of nuclear bombs but also upgrading weapon arse-
nals like hypersonic missiles, on top of intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). According
to the IPUS annual surveys, more than half of North Korean defectors
supported Kim Jong-un’s development of nuclear weapons while they
lived in North Korea (Kim 2021: 115–116).
Kim Jong-un has also been trying to raise his popularity in various
ways among the population at large, particularly with the younger gener-
ation. He seeks to display a new style of Suryeong , creating an image of
a friendlier and more accessible leader. Recently, Kim Jong-un expressed
his wishes to be the Suryeong with human charm rather than a mysti-
fied object of awe.14 Kim Jong-un has indeed remarkably increased direct
contact with the people, much more frequently conducting “field guid-
ance” over local governments, companies, factories, construction sites,
farms, mines, schools, and research institutes, etc., than his predecessors.
And, when finding any flaws or corruption in the units during the “field
guidance,” he immediately reproves or even punishes their officers or
senior managers (Lee and Park 2018: 247). The Suryeong ’s “field guid-
ance” as such proceeds according to a detailed plan that is undeniably
intended to boost his pro-people image. At the 75th anniversary of WPK
in October 2020, Kim Jong-un repeatedly thanked “public people” for
their dedication to the country, particularly in the difficult situation of the
Covid-19 pandemic. He even apologized to the people at the 8th Party
Congress, humbly admitting his failure in achieving economic develop-
ment goals, all of which was unimaginable during his predecessors’ rule.
16 K. H. LEEM AND S.-W. LEE

At the 8th Party Congress, most of all, Kim strongly emphasized his
deep affection for the general public, highlighting the “Public People-
First Policy” once again as one of the new core national strategies. But,
this does not mean that the essence of the Suryeong system has changed,
while the Suryeong ’s style has become more colorful than ever.

Where Next for North Korea?

It is hard to tell for sure which direction North Korea’s leadership intends
to head, given its extremely secretive nature. But it seems reasonable to
predict that for the foreseeable future North Korea is likely to hold out
as it is. The pessimistic prediction as such is based on implications of
the comparative transition literature, which shows that the survival of
dictatorships and modes of transition tend to be closely related to the
regime type. In this context, theories and comparative studies on dicta-
torship provide us with useful clues on how to approach the case of North
Korea. For instance, Geddes and her colleagues (Geddes 1999; Geddes
et al. 2018) classify the authoritarian regimes into three subtypes (mili-
tary, personalist, and one-party dictatorships) and argue that different
characteristics of regime types and different incentives facing the ruling
elites explain many diverging experiences of democratization.15 Wintrobe
(1998), assuming the rationality of dictators and other actors, offers
insightful models explaining the behaviors of dictatorships according to
the different combinations of the variables “loyalty” and “repression.”
These studies attribute prime importance to the configuration of incentive
structures the dictator and top elites face and their strategic calculations.
Taking into account these factors, we would argue below that Kim Jong-
un’s utmost priority is to monopolize power by maintaining a high level
of repression and distributing private goods to his close allies which would
secure loyalty and raise risks of defection on the part of the ruling elites.
Compared with military and single-party regime types, Geddes and
her collaborators observe, personalist dictatorships are relatively immune
to internal splits except for calamitous economic disasters and exogenous
shocks. Insiders of patrimonial regimes usually lack incentives to support
reforms and have little option but to cling to the regime. Hence, they are
least likely to negotiate a political transition. In other words, the begin-
ning of a more or less smooth transition, mostly led by political elites
in other types of dictatorships, is difficult to materialize in personalist
regimes. Instead, these regimes tend to end with shocks such as war or
 1 MAKING SENSE OF THE NORTH KOREA’S SURYEONG SYSTEM 17

death of the ruler, because the dictator wants to rule as long as he or she
wishes and because those in the ruling class have little incentive to defect
and compromise with the opposition. In the end, violent overthrow such
as a coup, assassination, or insurgency is the more likely trigger for a
transition, but such events typically lead to extreme uncertainty and insta-
bility even if they succeed. These regimes can rarely survive long after the
death of the ruler because this type of dictator eliminates all the compe-
tent potential rivals during his or her life in most cases. But, conversely,
as Brownlee (2007), Tullock (1987), and others imply, the personalist
autocracies may enjoy the stability if they succeed in institutionalizing
hereditary succession.
The Suryeong system is indeed very well equipped with the features
that, as Geddes and her colleagues find, significantly contribute to regime
durability. The personalization and concentration of power in a party-led
dictatorship usually tend to decrease its durability because it is difficult
to sustain the personalized rule after the dictator passes away. But, in
the case of North Korea, the consolidated Suryeong system substantially
reduced the uncertainties arising from succession struggle by institution-
alizing hereditary succession, which explains much of the stability the
North Korean regime showed in the wake of power successions. The
“monolithic rule of Baekdu bloodline successors” has been systematically
legitimized by the nationalist ideology, the main function of which is to
promote a cult for the Kim family’s anti-imperialist heroism. More impor-
tantly, Kim Jong-un also inherited the long-lasting party as well, which,
as Wintrobe (1998: 64) observes, functions as an institutional mechanism
that builds “a core of loyal supporters whose relationship with the regime
is primarily one of exchange rather than coercion.” The party’s exten-
sive networks aid the ruling elites to distribute privileges to those most
essential for their survival while effectively shifting the burden of the crisis
to weaker parts of the population (Geddes et al. 2018: 186–190). Kim
Jong-un’s choice to reduce his dependence on the military and instead
strengthen the role of the WPK is a rational strategy which is likely to
enhance the longevity of his rule.
The North Korean rulers have also developed diverse social control
systems and elaborate surveillance mechanisms to preempt challenges
including coups (Ahn 2016: 164–170). The North Korean regime still
keeps dividing the people into three categories depending on their loyalty
to the regime: basic (core), complex (wavering), and hostile. It also
classifies these categories further into more than 50 subgroups called
18 K. H. LEEM AND S.-W. LEE

Seongbun, literally meaning constituents, in order to monitor the popu-

lation effectively. Therefore, Kim Jong-un can easily localize and repress
mass protests even if they occur as long as the ruling elites including the
military are not internally divided.
The Kim family has also created various policing forces to prevent
the possible unity of the security forces and their defection (Byman and
Lind 2010). More specifically, for example, the task of domestic intel-
ligence activities is divided into the jurisdiction of two major agencies,
the Ministry of People’s Security as the police force and the Ministry
of State Security as the secret intelligence service. In addition, the Secu-
rity Command of the KPA has been in charge of military intelligence,
which is not controlled by the Chief of Staff of the KPA but directly
supervised by the President of State Affairs Commission, Kim Jong-un
himself. As for foreign intelligence activities, such a division of tasks is
also systemized as the United Front Department of the WPK and the
General Bureau of Reconnaissance under the Ministry of People’s Armed
Forces, which compete as well as cooperate with each other. Furthermore,
the Organization and Guidance Department of the WPK officially admin-
isters all security structures via its powers of ideological verification and
personnel reshuffling (You 2018). Such a complex system of “checks and
balances” has prevented any apparatus from monopolizing the security
or surveillance capacity and made each of them subordinate solely to the
Suryeong .
Thus, incentive structures embedded in the Suryeong system have
made it extremely risky to betray or challenge the ruler. Both elites and
the people are much too atomized and, if they have discontents, cannot
but exit individually rather than raise their voices collectively. North
Korea’s ruling elites in particular simply conform to the incentive struc-
ture of the system that motivates them to prefer sustaining status quo to
pursuing extremely risky options. The top elites within the ruling circle,
lacking independent political assets and incentives to take risks, would
prefer “to sink or swim” with the regime as Bratton and van de Walle
(1997: 86) observed in many other personalist regimes.
The Suryeong on his part has also little incentive to relax repression.
As Wintrobe (1998: 58–64) emphasizes, unlike “tinpot” dictators, total-
itarian leaders tend to increase rather than reduce repressions even when
their economic performance improves; and the use of repression tends
to increase the supply of loyalty to the dictator to the point where an
increase in repression begins to reduce the supply of loyalty. Totalitarian
 1 MAKING SENSE OF THE NORTH KOREA’S SURYEONG SYSTEM 19

dictators employ this strategy in order to raise the risks and costs of defec-
tion, particularly on the part of the ruling elites, who cannot help but rely
on the privileges granted by their notoriously capricious ruler.
All this means is that, more than anything else, the expectation for
North Korea’s “soft-landing” is simply unrealistic. The Suryeong system
indeed has well proven its robustness, persevering economic and inter-
national shocks. However, fatal flaws lurk behind its achievements; the
system is too inflexible to be reformed smoothly from within, either
from the top or from below. The genetic code of the Suryeong system
renders nearly impossible even a transition to the “early” stage of post-
totalitarianism. If Kim Jong-un intends to change his regime into a
post-totalitarian one, he needs to move to a normal socialist party-state
first; he should give up the brutal purges as an instrument of rule and
allow the emergence of collective political leadership, limited pluralism of
factions, and maybe even dissident intellectuals. These measures cannot
help but destroy the cornerstones of the Suryeong system. History
reminds us that there has been no case of a totalitarian regime volun-
tarily transforming itself into a post-totalitarian or authoritarian regime
without internal or external shocks.
It has turned out to be a wishful thinking that North Korea would
engage in negotiations for complete denuclearization and move on to
“reform and opening.” Kim Jong-un consecutively had summits with
South Korean President Moon Jae-in (April 27, 2018), and the US Pres-
ident Donald Trump twice in Singapore (June 12, 2018) and Hanoi
(February 27, 2019). The two summits between the US and North Korea
did not produce any meaningful deal, not to mention the so-called big
deal, that is, an exchange of a comprehensive denuclearization program
for sanction relief and economic aid. It became clear that North Korea
wanted to extract the most from the US in diplomatic and economic
cooperation, while procrastinating progress toward denuclearization for
as long as possible.
On the surface, Kim Jong-un has expressed his strong commitment to
the country’s economic development. This has been shown in the signif-
icant policy changes of North Korea since he began to have a firm grip
on the party, military, and government altogether in 2016. Firstly, on
April 20, 2018, the Plenary Session of Workers’ Party Central Committee
decided to revise the “Parallel Policy of Economic and Nuclear Develop-
ment” into the “All-out Concentration Policy for Economic Building”
as a new national strategy. Surprisingly, the words such as “nuclear” or
20 K. H. LEEM AND S.-W. LEE

“defence” were deleted from North Korea’s grand strategy, which could
be interpreted as a significant shift in North Korea’s foreign and domestic
policy lines. The slogan “Public People-First Policy,” which appeared
for the first time in 2013, has also been increasingly emphasized up
until the 8th Party Congress in 2021, and was even described as fully
replacing Kim Jong-il’s “Military-First Policy” (Kang and Ahn 2021).
This series of policy rhetoric in the Kim Jong-un era seemed to demon-
strate the new Suryeong ’s wish for North Korea’s economic development
and the improvement of the US-North Korea relationship. This led to an
expectation that this time Kim Jong-un might seriously engage in denu-
clearization negotiations with the US for the goals of lifting sanctions
needed for its economic development. But the expectation was based on
a shallow understanding of the nature of the Suryeong system.
Kim Jong-un and the hard-liners’ obsession with developing nuclear
and missile programs at the cost of anything whatsoever including the
economic welfare of people should be judged as a rational one in terms
of their political survival and monopoly of power. Seemingly bad policies
chosen by a dictator, as Bueno de Mesquita and his colleagues (2003)
argue, are usually good decisions for the dictator and his winning coali-
tion. North Korea has long aspired, ever since the Kim Il-sung era, to have
nuclear weapons as protection against their perceived security threats, and
has achieved the status of a de facto nuclear state that is also equipped
with missile capabilities. Now it is not only irrational but also almost
impossible for Kim Jong-un to give up the nuclear-weapons program that
has been the only vehicle for sustaining the legitimacy of the Suryeong
system since the economic collapse in the early 1990s. For Kim Jong-
un and his inner circle, the regime’s survival and monopoly of power are
best warranted by nuclear weapon capability. They witnessed how Saddam
Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi were killed. Perhaps they now judge the
Russian invasion of Ukraine as an example of their strategy to become a
nuclear-weapons state as being correct.
On the other hand, economic incentives such as sanction relief and
economic aid are of secondary importance for the survival of Kim Jong-
un and his allies (Schäfer June 8, 2021). As the probability of challenging
collective actions either from within the regime or from below is minimal,
economic incentives are not a critical variable in their strategic calculations
regardless of whether the already devastated economic conditions worsen
further or not. A comprehensive “reform and opening” of the economy
cannot but weaken the Suryeong ’s grip on society and eventually pose a
 1 MAKING SENSE OF THE NORTH KOREA’S SURYEONG SYSTEM 21

fundamental threat to the Suryeong system itself. Therefore, Kim Jong-

un’s seeming commitment to economic development should be seen as
one narrowly focused on rewarding a small group of ruling elites, not
as one oriented toward the Chinese or the Vietnamese type of economic
reforms (Fields 2021).
In our final analysis, it is evident that the solidity of the Suryeong
system that enabled it to persevere with a series of catastrophes has made
the system untouchable. An attempt to revise it will undermine the legit-
imacy of the Baekdu descendants’ rule and create enormous institutional
pandemonium. This is why it is reasonable to expect North Korea’s top
leadership to walk a unique path once again as shown in Fig 1.2. Still, we
cannot completely exclude a possibility of sudden leadership change. As
Svolik (2012: 7, 77) points out, established personalist, neo-patrimonial
dictators tend to lose power in ways that are unrelated with their inner
circle, for instance, due to external shocks such as sudden death, foreign
intervention, and popular uprising. If that happens, it will be an insur-
mountable challenge for any potential successors to persuasively claim
their legitimacy to govern; the North Korean elites will be unable to
find consensus among themselves about who will govern the country
excluding the Baekdu bloodline, given that the ideological support for
the Suryeong system is so deeply rooted in society.16 Subsequent severe
strife among the elites, if it happens, will not only create instability and
violence within North Korea but also seriously threaten the security of
the Northeast Asian region as a whole. This is a frightful scenario and
something we all want to avoid.
22 K. H. LEEM AND S.-W. LEE

Fig. 1.2 Evolution of socialist regimes Source Park et al. (2013: 22) (with
minor modifications)

Notes
1. Brownlee (2007) distinguished hereditary succession from other
forms of leadership change by the following three criteria: (1)
transfer of top governing authority from father to son; (2) prepa-
ration or initiation of power transfer prior to the ruler’s death;
(3) absence of formal democratic procedures (electoral democracy)
or legal stipulation of familiar rule (traditional monarchies). He
counted the case of North Korea before the death of Kim Jong-il
as one of nine non-monarchical modern autocracies.
2. See Kim (2015) for a detailed history of hereditary succession in
North Korea.
3. “The Ten Principles of Establishing the Monolithic Ideology
System of the Party” was adopted in 1974 when Kim Jong-il was
officially announced to be the successor to Kim Il-sung. It was
revised and renamed the “Ten Principles of the Monolithic Guid-
ance System of the Party” in 2013 after Kim Jong-un took power.
The “Ten Principles” are deemed to be more important than the
North Korean Constitution and Code of the WPK (Song 2019).
4. The changes in the Constitution and the Party Code have also
clearly reflected the appropriation of the party and the state by
the Kim family. The word “Juche Ideology” was first introduced
 1 MAKING SENSE OF THE NORTH KOREA’S SURYEONG SYSTEM 23

into the Constitution of 1972. 20 years later, the word “Marxism-

Leninism” was deleted in the Constitution of 1992. Then, after
the death of Kim Il-sung, the Constitution of 1998 was named
the Kim Il-sung Constitution. The Constitution of 2009 deleted
the word “communism.” After the death of Kim Jong-il, the new
Party Code defined the WPK as the Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il Party.
The Constitution of 2012 was even declared as the Constitution of
Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.
5. The well-known six components of Friedrich and Brzezinski’s
model are as follows: (1) An elaborate ideology, consisting of an
official body of doctrine covering all vital aspects of men’s exis-
tence to which everyone living in that society is supposed to
adhere; (2) A single mass party typically led by one man, the “dic-
tator,” and consisting of a relatively small percentage of the total
population; (3) A system of terror, whether physical or psychic,
effected through party and secret-police control, supporting but
also supervising the party for its leaders, and characteristically
directed not only against demonstrable “enemies” of the regime,
but also against more or less arbitrarily selected classes of the popu-
lation; (4) A technologically conditioned, near-complete monopoly
of control, in the hands of the party and of the government, of all
means of effective communications; (5) A technologically condi-
tioned, near-complete monopoly of the effective use of all weapons
of armed combat; (6) A central control and direction of the
entire economy through the bureaucratic coordination of formerly
independent corporate entities (Friedrich and Brzezinski 1965:
22). Linz revised Friedrich and Brzezinski’s model by removing
the terror, monopoly of combat weapons, and central control of
the entire economy through the bureaucratic coordination, thus
reducing the main pillars of the model to the following three:
(1) A monistic but not monolithic center of power; (2) An exclu-
sive, autonomous, and more or less intellectually elaborate ideology
with which the ruling group or leader, and the party serving the
leaders identify and which they use as a basis for policies or manip-
ulate to legitimize them; (3) Citizen participation in and active
mobilization for political and collective social tasks are encouraged,
demanded, rewarded, and channeled through a single party and
many monopolistic secondary groups (Linz 2000: 70).
24 K. H. LEEM AND S.-W. LEE

6. For Havel, post-totalitarianism was still totalitarian in a way

different from Stalinist totalitarianism (Havel 1985: 27).
7. Linz (2000) initially did not count sultanism as a separate cate-
gory of nondemocratic regimes. Later in the book co-authored
with Stepan (Linz and Stepan 1996), he proposed it as a sepa-
rate category along with totalitarianism, post-totalitarianism, and
authoritarianism.
8. It is tricky differentiating the sultanist regime type from totalitar-
ianism or authoritarianism. So, Chehabi and Linz (1998: 9) find
“sultanist tendencies” in both totalitarianism and authoritarianism
while, at the same time, they differentiate sultanist regimes from
either totalitarian or authoritarian type.
9. See Linz (2000: 151–155), for his persuasive observation of the
fundamental difference between sultanist regimes and totalitari-
anism.
10. At the 8th Party Congress meeting in January 2021, Jo Yong-won,
a senior party official who often accompanied Kim Jong-un during
his “field guidance” in 2020, was extraordinarily promoted to a
member of the Presidium of the Politburo of the WPK, a posi-
tion held by only five people including the Suryeong himself. This
confirms that the party apparatus has become the main vehicle of
Kim Jong-un’s rule.
11. Although Kim Yo-jong has been regarded as the de facto “person
standing next” since 2017, even the sister of supreme leader seems
not free from his personnel policy pattern in that she was first
elected to the Politburo in 2017 but then dismissed in 2019, and
later appointed back to the alternative member of this body in
April 2020 but removed again at the 8th Party Congress in January
2021.
12. This will probably be one of the most controversial questions
among North Korean specialists in the foreseeable future. See Lee
(2011) for Kim Jong-il’s turn to the party before his death. Also
see Cheong (2014) for Kim Jong-un’s consolidation of power and
regression to a personalist regime.
13. Even if Kim Jong-un’s regime loses some legitimacy, it is not likely
to be a critical factor in the survival of the dictatorship. The dicta-
torships, even if they lose legitimacy, can remain stable as long as
no feasible alternatives would be politically organized in society
(Przeworski 1986: 50–53).
 1 MAKING SENSE OF THE NORTH KOREA’S SURYEONG SYSTEM 25

14. An additional interesting point is that Kim has often exposed his
wife, Ri Sol-ju, to the public. Considering that the wives of his
father and grandfather were barely officially disclosed to the public,
he seems to have an intention to emphasize that he is a leader of
normal state.
15. Their typology, however, has a flaw that these subcategories are
neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive; there is
substantial overlap among military, personalist, and single-party
dictatorships (Svolik 2012: 28–29). North Korea’s autocracy repre-
sents such a fusion of the three regime types, which resists falling
into only one cell. Their research was also made mainly with regard
to the transition from authoritarianism, so their single-party regime
type refers to authoritarianism by a hegemonic party like the PRI
in Mexico, which fundamentally differs from communist one-party
rule. Therefore, we need to be cautious in applying their findings
directly to the case of North Korea.
16. About 70 percent of the defectors surveyed by the IPUS in
2019 reported that North Korean people were proud of Juche
Ideology and supported Kim Jong-un’s rule (Institute for Peace
and Unification Studies 2019).

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Another Random Scribd Document
with Unrelated Content
Abbott, C. C., 132, 246
Aberdeen, Mississippi, 234
Abingdon, Virginia, 113, 189
Academy Natural Sciences Phila., 64, 242
Accomac Co., Virginia, 28, 29, 352
Acipenser sturio, 311
Adams, A. L., 181
Adams, C. C., 33
Adams, J. D., 339
Adams Co., Illinois, 335;
Mississippi, 40, 125, 180, 200, 208, 233, 264, 280
Addison Point, Maine, 23
Adelonycteris fuscus, 398
Adrian, Michigan, 80, 227, 237, 275, 331
Ænocyon, 14;
A. ayersi, 366, 382, 395;
A. dirus, 32, 187, 228, 257, 322, 334, 365, 404;
A. mississippiensis, 337
Aëtobatis narinari, 382, 383
Aftonian horizon, 2, 7, 8, 10, 11;
in Alabama, 385;
in Florida, 373, 381, 383;
in Indiana, 33;
in Long Island, 295;
in New Jersey, 301, 302;
in Ohio, 330;
in Pennsylvania, 317;
in South Carolina, 367;
in Tennessee, 400;
in Wisconsin, 344
Aftonian stage, 15, 33, 283, 302, 367, 372, 379, 384
Aftonius, 14
Agassiz, L., 148
Agriotherium, 15;
A. schneideri, 380
Alabama, 40;
Elephas imperator in, 164;
Equidæ in, 200;
extinct bisons in, 264;
geology of, 384;
mastodons in, 124;
Xenarthra in, 40
Alabama River, 385
Alachua clays, 15, 121, 224, 232
Alachua Co., Florida, 37, 121, 195, 206, 211, 224, 232, 262, 375
Alachua formation, 10, 375, 378
Alachua phosphates, 15
Alafia River, Florida, 123, 197, 379
Albany, New York, 266
Albany Co., New York, 56
Alce americanus, 311
Alces americanus, 311, 336, 337, 338, 364, 403, 404;
A. runnymedensis, 363, 364
Alden, W. C., 110, 306, 340
Alden and Leighton, 12, 142
Alexander Co., Illinois, 140
Allegan Co., Michigan, 83
Allegany Co., Maryland, 189, 204, 220;
New York, 60, 226, 236
Alleghany Co., Virginia, 114
Allegheny Co., Pennsylvania, 69, 150, 168
Allen, F. R., 37, 122, 194
Allen, G. M., 266, 292
Allen, J. A., 24, 230, 240, 246, 248, 251, 261, 264, 269, 270, 271,
402
Allen Co., Indiana, 95, 174
Alligator, 122;
A. mississippiensis, 363, 375, 381, 382;
A. sp. indet., 350
Alma, Michigan, 85
Almero Farm, Florida, 37, 122, 194, 375
Alton, Illinois, 12, 14, 33, 102, 187, 219, 254, 259, 279, 336, 337
Aluco pratincola, 382
Amanda, Ohio, 71
Amaranth, Ontario, 130
Amboy, Ohio, 137, 150, 329
Ameiurus nebulosus, 311
American Museum Natural History, 51, 56, 58, 79, 97, 101, 107,
139, 140, 160, 163, 197, 198, 201, 263
Amherst College, 58
Ami, H. M., 22, 45, 287
Amiatus calvus, 336, 382
Amiurus atrarius, 311
Amphicyon, 2
Amphiuma means, 382
Amyda sp. indet., 353
Anancus, 2, 14, 15
Anaptogonia hiatidens, 312
Anderson, Indiana, 93
Anderson, Netta C., 103, 104, 105, 109, 110, 176, 177, 240, 337
Andrews, E. B., 169
Andrews Island, Maine, 23
Anita, Arizona, 15
Annan, R., 53
Ann Arbor, Michigan, 228, 237, 275, 331
Anodonta, species, 303
Anomodon snyderi, 34, 218, 219, 343
Ansonia, Ohio, 74
Antilocapra, 337;
A. americana, 9, 343.
Aphelops, 9, 15;
A. longipes, 211, 375, 376, 377;
A. malacorhinus, 211;
A. sp. indet., 8, 9, 380
Appalachian Mountains, 351
Appomattox formation, 14
Arcadia, Florida, 39, 124, 160, 163, 198, 208, 233, 264, 380, 381
Arcadia marls, Florida, 15
Archer, Florida, 37, 195, 206, 211, 224, 232, 375
Arctodus pristinus, 363
Arctomys monax, 310, 311
Arctotherium, 315;
A. haplodon, 312, 313, 321
Ardea herodias, 382;
A. sellardsi, 382;
A. sp. indet., 382
Arden, New York, 50
Ardley, E., 18
Arkona Lake, 88
Armadillos, 5
Artediellus atlanticus, 287
Arvicola riparius, 310
Ashland, Illinois, 141
Ashley, F. W., 167
Ashley, Indiana, 95
Ashley River, South Carolina, 11, 15, 35, 118, 192, 242, 363
Asia, connection with, 3
Asphalt beds, California, 15, 33
Ashtabula Co., Ohio, 137, 150
Atractosteus lapidosus, 375
Attica, Indiana, 92;
Michigan, 276, 331;
New York, 61
Atwater, C., 72, 75
Atwood, Illinois, 177
Atwood, W. W., 7
Auchenia, 9, 195;
A. major, 224;
A. minima, 38, 158, 224;
A. minor, 224
Auglaize Co., Ohio, 227
Augusta Co., Virginia, 190, 221
Aurora, Illinois, 109;
Indiana, 91

Baddeck, Cape Breton Island, 46

Bagg, R. M., 106, 107, 110, 268
Bailey, T. L., 42, 394
Baird, S. F., 320, 321
Baker, F. C., 103, 104, 176, 230, 303, 333, 334
Baker, P. L., 154
Balænoptera, sp. indet., 19, 159
Balmville, New York, 52
Baltimore Co., Maryland, 112
Bancroft, Michigan, 86
Bannister, H. M., 109, 279
Barada, Michigan, 83
Barbour, E. H., 152
Bartholomew Co., Indiana, 172, 251
Barton, B. S., 63, 69, 114, 119, 128, 155, 168, 223
Bartow, Florida, 180
Bertram, J., 128
Bartsch, P., 383
Bassariscus astutus, 314
Batavia, Illinois, 110, 240, 269;
New York, 61
Bath Co., Virginia, 114
Bay Co., Michigan, 84
Bear, 209, 268, 395
Beaucoup, Illinois, 101
Beaufort, South Carolina, 15, 35, 118, 155, 191, 363, 366
Beaufort Co., South Carolina, 35, 118, 155, 191
Beaver, 43, 56, 268, 280, 285, 334, 337
Beaverdam, Pennsylvania, 133, 323
Beaver Lake, Indiana, 96, 252, 334
Beaver River, Pennsylvania, 355
Bechdolt, A. F., 112
Bedford, Pennsylvania, 69
Bedford Co., Pennsylvania, 69
Beecher, C. E., 60
Beecher, Illinois, 107, 241
Beede, J. W., 217
Beetles in Port Kennedy Cave, 317
Belding, Michigan, 215, 331
Bell, R., 130, 166, 235
Bellevue, Michigan, 81
Beluga catodon, 18;
B. vermontana, 19, 20
Belvidere, New York, 60
Benedict, Maryland, 220, 347
Bensley, B. A., 256
Berea, New York, 53
Bering Sea, 3
Berkeley Co., South Carolina, 119, 162, 367
Berkeley River, South Carolina, 156
Berks Co., Pennsylvania, 69
Berrien Co., Michigan, 82, 137, 171, 275
Berry, E. W., 188, 383, 385
Berwick, Pennsylvania, 69, 324
Beverly, Ohio, 169, 327
Bexar Co., Texas, 14
Bic, Quebec, 21
Bigbone Cave, Tennessee, 41
Bigbone Lick, Kentucky, 43, 128, 146, 160, 181, 202, 209, 234, 243,
255, 265, 270, 401
Biggin Swamp, South Carolina, 119, 156, 162, 367
Big Twin Creek, Kentucky, 161
Biloxi formation, 384, 385
Bison, 24, 109, 175, 188, 237, 337;
B. alleni, 256;
B. americanus, 256, 257, 310;
B. antiquus, 14, 34, 257, 258, 260, 265, 403;
B. appalachicolus, 249;
B. bison, 249, 257, 266, 267, 268, 270, 292, 295, 298,
304,310, 403, 404;
B., extinct species in North America, 256;
B. latifrons, 14, 68, 159, 160, 184, 197, 199, 233, 248, 256, 257,
259, 260, 261, 263, 264, 265, 268, 269, 328, 363, 364, 379,
384, 391, 392, 393, 404;
B. occidentalis, 14, 259, 265;
B. regius, 15;
B. sp. indet., 32, 38, 41, 122, 157, 158, 160, 187, 200, 204, 228,
257, 258, 259, 262, 263, 264, 312, 313, 321, 334, 339, 342,
343, 347, 352, 353, 359, 363, 370, 371, 374, 376, 378, 379,
381, 382, 385, 398, 406;
B. sylvestris, 32, 257
Black spruce, 85
Black Warrior River, Alabama, 385
Blackwelder, W., 111
Bladen Co., North Carolina, 190
Blainville, H. M., 88, 90
Blair Co., Pennsylvania, 31, 69, 185, 203, 214, 227, 321
Blanchard, C. A., 177
Blanco fauna, 2
Blanco formation, 1, 15
Blarina, 316;
B. brevicauda, 350;
B. brevicauda peninsulæ, 382;
B. simplicidens, 312;
B. sp. indet., 322, 353
Blatchley, W. S., 99, 100, 107, 174, 239
Bloomfield, Illinois, 106
Bloomington moraine, Illinois, 107, 110, 138, 238, 335
Bluelick Springs, Kentucky, 44, 128, 182, 234, 243, 255, 271, 405
Bluemounds, Wisconsin, 111, 219, 270, 341
Bluff formation in Mississippi, 387
Bodine, D., 92, 99, 173
Bogue Chitto, Alabama, 124, 164, 200, 385
Bolivar Co., Mississippi, 124
Bond Co., Illinois, 187
Bondville, Illinois, 253
Bone Valley formation, 10, 378
Bone Valley phosphates, 15
Boone Co., Indiana, 277, 334;
Kentucky, 128, 146, 160, 181, 202, 209, 234, 243, 255, 265,
270, 400, 401, 402
Boonville, New York, 236
Boötherium, 14, 96;
B. bombifrons, 255, 322, 403;
B. cavifrons, 254, 391;
B. sargenti, 83, 331;
B. sp. indet., 252
Borden, W. W., 89, 91
Borophagus, 2
Bos, 41, 175, 262;
B. bombifrons, 255;
B. pallasii, 255;
B. sp. indet., 312
Bovidæ, 312
Bovina, Mississippi, 125
Bowers, Indiana, 92
Bowling Township, Rock Island Co., Illinois, 104
Boyd, C. H., 23
Brachylagus browni, 9
Brachyprotoma putorius, 322
Bradley, F. H., 60, 96, 106, 108, 252
Brevard Co., Florida, 159, 196
Brevoort, J. C., 49
Brewster, Florida, 197, 211
Bridgeton formation, New Jersey, 15, 299, 301
Briggs, C., 78, 168
Briggs and Foster, 147, 168
Brighton, Ohio, 74
Brimley, H. H., 115, 116, 117, 145
Bringhurst, Indiana, 152
Bristol, Connecticut, 48;
Tennessee, 209, 394
Britton, N. L., 47
Broadhead, G. C., 268
Brooke Co., West Virginia, 254
Brookfield, Pennsylvania, 133
Brookville, Indiana, 90, 172;
Pennsylvania, 324
Brooklyn Institute, New York, 52
Brookton, New York, 57
Broome Co., New York, 57
Brown, B., 12, 38, 44, 97, 159
Brown, S., 223, 406
Brown Co., Ohio, 257
Brownhelm Township, Lorain County, Ohio, 79
Brunswick, Georgia, 11, 15, 20, 36, 120, 193, 243, 261, 280
Brunswick Canal, Georgia, 36, 157, 193, 370
Bryant, W. L., 131
Buchanan, Michigan, 82, 171, 331
Buckley, E. R., 343
Bucks Co., Pennsylvania, 237, 246, 267
Bucyrus, Ohio, 78
Buffalo, 102, 111, 219, 229, 240
(See Bison bison)
Buffalo, New York, 63, 131
Bullville, New York, 53
Bureau Co., Illinois, 105
Burlington Co., New Jersey, 64, 227, 245
Burlington Heights, Ontario, 166, 167, 235, 285
Bush, N. D., 80
Butler Co., Ohio, 71, 135
Byron, Illinois, 105
Bystra, H. G., 158
Cairo, Illinois, 140
Calhoun Co., Illinois, 175
Caloosahatchee River, Florida, 15, 40, 163, 380, 384
Calvenia, Florida, 198, 380
Calvert Co., Maryland, 189, 220, 259
Calvin, S., 11
Cambridge City, Indiana, 238
Cambridge, Illinois, 104
Camden, Indiana, 238;
New Jersey, 184
Camden Co., New Jersey, 184, 301
Camelidæ, 5, 224, 312;
in Florida, 224;
in Pennsylvania, 224;
in Tennessee, 225
Camelops, 14, 15, 377;
C. sp. indet., 43, 225, 363, 364, 382, 395, 399
Camels, 7, 11
Camelus, 14, 15
Campbell, M. R., 322, 354
Campbell Co., Kentucky, 182
Canastota, New York, 272
Canidæ, 312
Canimartes, 2
Canis, 15;
 C. armbrusteri, 350;
C. dirus, 204, 312, 314;
C. floridanus, 365;
C. indianensis, 312, 314;
C. latrans, 9, 334, 337, 342, 343;
C. lupus, 310;
C. lycaon, 310;
C. mississippiensis, 341, 342, 343;
C. nubilus, 9, 337, 342, 343;
C. occidentalis, 341, 343, 365;
C. primævus, 32;
C. priscolatrans, 312, 322;
C. riviveronis, 382;
C. sp. indet., 9, 321, 350, 363, 366, fig. 19, 382;
C. virginianus, 310
Cannon, G. H., 86
Cannonsburg, Michigan, 83
Canton, Ohio, 80, 170
Cape Breton Island, 289;
mastodons in, 46
Cape Cod, Massachusetts, 15, 266
Capelin, 23
Cape May, 304
Cape May formation, 66, 299, 301
Caranx, 383;
C. hippos, 382;
C. sp. indet., 382
Carcharodon sp. indet., 370
Caretta caretta, 382, 383
Carey, Ohio, 78
Cariacus virginianus, 231
Caribou, 112, 244, 344
Carleton Co., Ontario, 17
Carlisle, Pennsylvania, caves near, 320
Carmichaels formation, 322
Carroll Co., Indiana, 152, 277
Carteret Co., North Carolina, 117, 145, 179
Case, E. C., 87, 250
Caseilla, Mississippi, 124
Cass Co., Illinois, 141;
Indiana, 97, 278
Castor, 128;
C. canadensis, 295, 299, 310, 311, 312, 339, 348, 363, 395;
C. fiber, 310, 311, 312, 353;
C. sp. indet., 8, 350
Castoridæ, 312
Castoroides, 14, 81, 94, 128, 169, 327, 400;
in eastern North America, 272;
in Georgia, 280;
in Illinois, 278;
in Indiana, 276;
in Michigan, 275;
in Mississippi, 280;
in New York, 272;
in Ohio, 273;
in Pennsylvania, 272;
in South Carolina, 279;
in Tennessee, 280
Castoroides ohioensis, 43, 70, 72, 175, 227, 237, 238, 295, 299,
310, 329, 337, 339, 363, 370, 392, 393, 395
Catawba, Ohio, 74
Cathartes aura, 382;
C. aura septentrionalis, 382
Caton, J. D., 229
Cattaraugus Co., New York, 62, 226
Cave deposits, 14
Cavetown, Maryland, 14, 189, 220, 231, 348
Caviidæ, 5
Cedar, red, 72
Celina moraine, 326
Center Lisle, New York, 57
Cervalces, 13, 14, 107, 241, 283, 284, 336;
C. borealis, 226;
C. roosevelti, 338, 339;
C. scotti, 207, 306, 403, 404;
C. sp. indet., 229, 321, 352
Cervidæ, 225, 234, 312
Cervus americanus, 207;
C. canadensis, 235; 247, 295, 299, 304, 310, 311, 337, 338,
342, 347, 363, 364, 395, 403, 404;
in Florida, 243;
in Georgia, 243;
in Illinois, 239, 240;
in Maryland, 242;
in Michigan, 237;
in New Jersey, 237;
in North Carolina, 242;
in Ontario, 235, 284, 285;
in Pennsylvania, 237;
in South Carolina, 242;
in Vermont, 235;
in Wisconsin, 241;
C. sp. indet., 8, 370, 398;
C. tarandus, 247;
C. virginianus, 230, 233, 247, 310, 311, 391;
C. whitneyi, 343.
Cetaceans in eastern North America, 17;
 in Florida, 20;
in Georgia, 20;
in New Brunswick, 19;
in North Carolina, 20;
in Ontario, 17;
in South Carolina, 20;
in Vermont, 19;
Pleistocene, 17
Chadd’s Ford, Pennsylvania, 133
Chætodipterus faber, 381
Chalfants, Ohio, 215, 328
Chalmers, R., 289
Chamberlin and Salisbury, 7, 341, 389, 392
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, 69, 168, 324
Champaign Co., Illinois, 33, 106, 152, 253, 268;
Ohio, 74, 249
Champlain Lake, Vermont, 235
Champlain Sea, 22, 285, 291
Champlain stage, 286
Chapman, E. J., 45
Charles Co., Maryland, 188, 220
Charleston, South Carolina, 11, 20, 29, 35, 118, 155, 162, 192, 231,
242, 260, 279, 363;
Illinois, 279;
Indiana, 91
Charleston Co., South Carolina, 118, 155, 162, 192, 205, 221, 231,
242, 260, 279
Charleston Museum, South Carolina, 30, 35, 162, 192, 232, 260
Charlotte, Vermont, 20
Charlotte Co., Florida, 263;
New Brunswick, 19
Charlotte moraine, 81, 83, 137, 330
Chasmaporthetes, 15;
C. ossifragus, 9
Chatham Co., Georgia, 120, 157, 194, 262
Chattanooga, Tennessee, 43
Chautauqua, New York, 63
Chautauqua Co., New York, 236, 267
Chelonia couperi, 370;
C. mydas, 382, 383
Chelydra laticarinata, 382;
C. sculpta, 382;
C. serpentina, 310, 311, 347
Chemung Co., New York, 58, 149, 167
Cheney, T. A., 63
Chesapeake Beach, Maryland, 189, 220, 259, 347, 348
Cheshire, Connecticut, 47
Chester, Illinois, 101, 175;
New York, 50;
Pennsylvania, 133
Chicago, Illinois, 337;
Ohio, 136
Chicago Heights, Illinois, 153
Chillicothe, Illinois, 153
Chittenden Co., Vermont, 20, 167
Chlamytherium, 15, 159;
C. septentrionale, 38,39, 40, 376, 379, 381, 382
Chowan formation, 29, 356
Christian Co., Illinois, 175
Christina, Florida, 380
Cristivomer namaycush, 112, 344
Church, Michigan, 80
Cincinnati, Ohio, 71, 169, 185
Circleville, Ohio, 75, 170
Cistudo clausa, 310, 311
Citellus tuitus, 9
Citra, Florida, 121, 158
Citrus Co., Florida, 158, 196, 225
City Point, Virginia, 113
Claiborne Co., Mississippi, 125
Clapp, F. G., 290, 322
Clark, W., 401
Clark, W. B., 345, 351, 355
Clark and Miller, 15, 29, 113
Clark Co., Indiana, 91;
Kentucky, 255;
Ohio 74, 136
Clarke, J. M., 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 107,
226, 266
Claverack, New York, 55
Claypole, E. W., 32, 71
Clayton, Michigan, 81
Clear Spring, Maryland, 113, 349
Clemmys insculpta, 312, 322;
C. percrassa, 312
Cleveland, Ohio, 79, 136, 170
Climate of Don beds, Ontario, 282;
of Scarboro beds, Ontario, 283
Clinton Co., Ohio, 214, 273
Clubfoot and Harlowe Canal, 117, 179
Clyde, New York, 272
Coastal Plain, Atlantic, 13, 351;
in Alabama, 384;
in Florida, 372;
in Georgia, 368;
in North Carolina, 29, 355;
in South Carolina, 361
Coeymans, New York, 56
Cohansey sands, 300
Coharie formation, 356
Cohoes, New York, 56;
pot-holes, 296
Colbert Co., Alabama, 40
Coldenham, New York, 52
Coleman, A. P., 46, 147, 166, 167, 226, 244, 281, 283
Coleraine, Massachusetts, 47
Coles Co., Illinois, 279
Collett, J., 73, 92, 96, 106, 171, 172, 173, 17 228, 276, 277
Coluber acuminatus, 312, 314;
C. sp. indet., 314
Colubridæ, 312
Columbia, Tennessee, 181, 395, 399
Columbia Co., Florida, 121;
New York, 55;
Pennsylvania, 69
Columbiana Co., Ohio, 70, 135, 186, 203, 215, 325
Columbus, Ohio, 186, 214, 330
Columbus Grove, Ohio, 77
Conard fissure, Arkansas, 12, 14
Conewango, New York, 62
Connecticut, geology of, 292;
mastodons in, 47;
Rangifer in, 244
Connecticut River, 294
Connersville, Indiana, 173
Conrad, T. A., 64, 117, 190, 191, 359
Cook, C. C., 266
Cook, G. H., 65, 66, 67, 68
Cook Co., Illinois, 110, 153, 177, 230, 240
Coon Valley, Wisconsin, 259
Cooper River, South Carolina, 119, 156, 162, 363
Cooper, Smith, and DeKay, 202
Cooper, W., 36, 44, 146, 181, 243, 255. 270, 401, 402
Coosa River, Alabama, 385
Coosaw River, South Carolina, 35
Cope and Wortman, 218, 228, 258
Cope, E. D., 9, 11, 31, 43, 63, 64, 69, 154, 166 184, 185, 190, 203,
213, 217, 218, 220, 221, 228, 237, 242, 256, 258, 267, 301, 312,
316, 317, 318, 353, 354, 377
Copeland, M., 24
Copenhagen, New York, 56
Copley, O. N., 78
Coquina, Florida, 15
Core Creek, North Carolina, 358
Cornwall, Ontario, 18
Corriganville, Maryland, 14, 189, 204, 220, 349
Cortland Co., New York, 149
Cottle, T., 147, 148
Cottus uncinatus, 287
Couper, J. H., 36, 157, 261, 262, 369, 370
Covington, Indiana, 92;
Virginia, 114;
West Virginia, 354
Cox, E. T., 100, 172, 175
Crawford Co., Ohio, 78;
Pennsylvania, 150, 168;
Wisconsin, 111
Cricetidæ, 312
Crocodile, 207
Crocodylus sp. indet., 350, 352, 370
Croom, H. B., 117, 231, 359
Crotalus adamanteus, 382;
C. horridus, 348;
C. sp. indet., 314, 353
Crown Point, Indiana, 140
Cryptobranchus sp. indet., 322, 353
Cryptotis floridana, 382
Crystal Hill Cave, Pennsylvania, 213, 237
Cuba, New York, 226, 236
Cumberland Co., Maine, 24
Currituck Co., North Carolina, 29
Curry, J. C., 64
Cushing, H. P., 136
Cuvier, G., 69, 71, 119, 181
Cuyahoga, Ohio, 136
Cuyahoga Co., Ohio, 79, 170
Cyclopterus lumpus, 23, 287
Cystophora cristata, 26;
C. proboscidea, 26

Dachnowski, A., 76
Dade Co., Florida, 384
Dall, W. H., 10, 38, 121, 195, 199, 224, 232, 360, 361, 380, 384
Dall and Harris, 361
Dallas Co., Alabama, 124, 164, 200
Dalton, Indiana, 94
Dana, J. D., 163, 244
Dandridge, Tennessee, 127, 209, 223, 395
Dane Co., Wisconsin, 111, 219
Danglade, E., 138
Danville, Indiana, 92
Darke Co., Ohio, 73, 136, 170, 274
Darlington, South Carolina, 193, 232, 366
Darlington Co., South Carolina, 119, 193, 232
Darton, N. H., 260
Dasyatis hastata, 363;
D. sp. indet., 370
Dasypodidæ, 5
Dasypus sp. indet., 38, 39, 378, 382
Dauphin Co., Pennsylvania, 185
Davenport Academy Sciences, 149
Davidson Co., Tennessee, 43, 127, 201, 225, 395, 396
Davis, C. A., 85, 111
Davis, J., 100
Dawson, J. W., 17, 18, 19, 22, 45, 46, 281, 288
Daxon, A., 104
Dayton, Ohio, 72, 135
Daytona, Florida, 20, 122, 158
Deal, New Jersey, 227, 237
Dearborn Co., Indiana, 91
Decatur Co., Indiana, 92
Decker mastodon, 81, 275
Defiance moraine, 88, 330
Deer, 43, 81, 103, 109, 117, 127, 187, 204, 225, 226, 237, 337, 358,
393, 399
Deirochelys floridana, 379
DeKalb Co., Indiana, 95
DeKay, J. E., 29, 49, 59, 61, 62, 131, 235, 245
DeKay, Van Rensselaer, and Cooper, 65
De Land, Florida, 378
Delaware Co., Indiana, 174;
Pennsylvania, 133
Delphinapterus leucas, 17, 18, 19, 20, 284, 288;
D. sp. indet., 289;
D. vermontanus, 17, 18, 20, 284, 288
Delphinid sp. indet., 381
Denham, Indiana, 96
Dennis, D. W., 252
Dennison, Virginia, 190
De Soto Co., Florida, 39, 124, 160, 198, 208, 233, 264
Deussen, A., 15
Dickeson, M. W., 40, 125, 264, 389
Dicotyles fossilis, 221;
D. lenis, 219, 222, 341, 342;
D. nasutus, 213, 216, 221;
D. pennsylvanicus, 213, 214, 310;
D. torquatus, 220, 221, 341
Didelphis virginiana, 363, 382
Dinobastis, 14
Diodon sp. indet., 381
Dismal Swamp, North Carolina, 15;
mollusks, of, 351;
in Virginia, 360
Disputanta, Virginia, 352
District of Columbia, 16;
Equidæ in, 188;
geology of, 344, 348;
Elephas sp. indet. in, 178
Dixon, S., 318
Don formation, Ontario, 167, 226, 256, 281
Don River, Ontario, 167
Dorr, Michigan, 83
Dover, Wisconsin, 110, 340
Drayton, J., 119
Drennon Springs, Kentucky, 129
Driftless area, Wisconsin, 259, 341
Dryer, C. R., 95, 174
Drymarchon corais couperi, 382
Dubois Co., Indiana, 88
Dubuque, Iowa, 342
Duchouquet Township, Auglaize Co., Ohio, 76
Dudley, J., 55
Dufferin Co., Ontario, 130
Duke, A., 130
Dumbbell Harbor, Grinnell Land, 21, 244, 248
Duncan Falls, Ohio, 135, 327
Dunn Co., Wisconsin, 111, 230, 247
Dunnellon, Florida, 15, 38, 122, 158, 162, 196, 207, 211, 223, 225,
263;
formation, 10
Dunnville, Ontario, 46
DuPage Co., Illinois, 109, 177, 279
Duplin Co., North Carolina, 115, 179, 357
Durham Cave, Pennsylvania, 237, 311
Dutchess Co., New York, 55
Duval Co. Florida, 122, 157, 232, 262, 374
Dwight, W. B., 55

Eager, S. W., 52, 53, 54, 55

Earle, C. J., 159, 197, 233, 379
Earlham College, Indiana, 94, 139, 229, 238, 252, 277
East Coldenham, New York, 53
East Lynn, Illinois, 107
East Saginaw, Michigan, 171, 331
East St. Louis, Illinois, 101
Eaton Co., Michigan, 81, 137, 171
Eaton moraine, 326
Eaton Rapids, Michigan, 137, 331
Eau Claire, Michigan, 82
Eau Gallie, Florida, 159, 196, 380
Eddings Island, South Carolina, 35
Edgar Co., Illinois, 106
Edgecombe Co., North Carolina, 117
Edisto River, South Carolina, 363
Edom, Virginia, 114
Edwards, J. J., 172
Edwards, T., 167
Elephant, 374, 401
Elephantidæ, 5, 312
Elephants, 5, 7, 11, 16
Elephas, 14;
E. americanus, 69, 131, 144, 168, 178;
E. columbi, 11, 38, 122, 146, 163, 164, 166, 172, 174, 180, 181,
194, 196, 197, 199, 200, 233, 235, 262, 263, 264, 293, 295,
299, 302, 305, 322, 323, 329, 334, 347, 348, 357, 363, 366,
370, 371, 374, 375, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 384, 392, 393,
403;
in Florida, 157;
in Georgia, 157;
in Illinois, 152;
in Indiana, 151;
in Kentucky, 160;
in Maryland, 154;
in Michigan, 151, 331;
in New Jersey, 149;
in New York, 149;
in North Carolina, 155;
in Ohio, 150;
in Ontario, 147, 284;
in Pennsylvania, 150;
in South Carolina, 155;
in Vermont, 148;
in West Virginia, 155
Elephas jacksoni, 161, 168, 169, 327
Elephas imperator, 11, 14, 15, 124, 157, 162, 165, 180, 200, 283,
363, 364, 367, 376, 379, 380, 381, 383, 384, 385, 393;
in Alabama, 164;
in Florida, 145, 162;
in South Carolina, 162
Elephas primigenius, 36, 59, 98, 100, 135, 151, 154, 165, 166, 167,
169, 172, 181, 182, 247, 251, 259, 261, 277, 283, 284, 295, 299,
302, 304, 306, 322, 323, 324, 327, 328, 334, 340, 347, 348, 353,
358, 379, 391, 395, 396, 403;
in Kentucky, 146;
in Illinois, 140;
in Indiana, 138;
in Maryland, 144;
in Michigan, 137, 331;
in New York, 131;
in New Jersey, 132;
in Not America, 130;
in North Carolina, 145;
in Ohio, 134, 329;
in Ontario, 130, 284, 285;
in Pennsylvania, 133;
in Tennessee, 146;
in Wisconsin, 143
Elephas sp. indet., 166, 354, 358, 384, 395, 399;
 in District of Columbia, 178;
in Florida, 179;
in Illinois, 175;
in Indiana, 171;
in Kentucky, 181;
in Maryland, 178;
in Michigan, 171, 331;
in Mississippi, 180;
in New York, 167;
in North Carolina, 179;
in Ohio, 168;
in Ontario, 166;
in Pennsylvania, 168;
in Tennessee, 181;
in Ungava, 166;
in Vermont, 167;
in Virginia, 178;
in West Virginia, 179;
in Wisconsin, 178
Elgin Co., Ontario, 45
Elizabeth, Illinois, 269
Elizabethtown, North Carolina, 190, 357
Elk, 81, 102, 108, 109, 117, 226, 228, 229, 235, 237
(See Cervus canadensis)
Ellenton, Florida, 379
Ellenville, New York, 54
Ellis, H., 88
Ellis, R. W., 91
Elmira, New York, 58, 149
Elrod and Benedict, 98, 174, 229, 239
Elroy, Tennessee, 41, 395, 397
Elsie, Michigan, 84
Emerson, B. K., 290
Eminence, Kentucky, 182
Emmons, E., 116, 118, 149, 167, 190, 191, 226, 235, 360
Emydidæ, 312
Englewood moraine, 326
Englishtown, New Jersey, 65, 305
Eptesicus fuscus, 310
Equality, Illinois, 175
Equidæ, 5, 312;
in Alabama, 200;
in District of Columbia, 188;
in Eastern North America, 183;
in Florida, 194;
in Georgia, 193;
in Illinois, 187;
in Indiana, 186;
in Kentucky, 202;
in Maryland, 188;
in Massachusetts, 183;
in Mississippi, 200;
in New Jersey, 184;
in New York, 183;
in North Carolina, 190;
in Ohio, 185;
in Pennsylvania, 184;
in South Carolina, 191;
in Tennessee, 201;
in Virginia, 189;
in West Virginia, 190
Equus, 9, 14, 15, 372;
 E. americanus, 186, 193, 200, 391;
E. caballus, 190;
E. complicatus, 32, 33, 43, 68, 159, 160, 184, 185, 186, 187,
189, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201,
202, 204, 208, 217, 228, 233, 256, 257, 263, 265, 283, 302,
308, 312, 313, 328, 330, 348, 352, 353, 359, 363, 366, 370,
379, 380, 382, 392, 393, 395, 403, 404, 406;
E. curvidens, 193, 202;
E. excelsus, 8;
E. fraternus, 38, 158, 160, 184, 185, 191, 192, 193, 196, 198,
199, 201, 264, 302, 312, 313, 362;
E. giganteus, 9, 183, 189, 348;
E. idahoensis, 8;
E. leidyi, 43, 124, 127, 158, 159, 165, 188, 189, 191, 192, 194,
195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 222, 224, 225, 233, 263,
283, 313, 348, 357, 360, 362, 363, 370, 371, 376, 378, 379,
380, 381, 382, 384, 385, 392, 393, 394, 395, 399;
E. littoralis, 159, 193, 195, 197, 199, 201, 232, 233, 263, 364,
370, 376, 379, 380, 381, 382, 395, 396;
E. major, 68, 183, 187, 192, 198;
E. niobrarensis, 190, 354;
E. occidentalis, 9;
E. pectinatus, 185, 187, 312, 313;
E. princeps, 199;
E. scotti, 194;
E. sp. indet., 9, 41, 158, 196, 202, 292, 295, 298, 301, 305, 310,
322, 339, 350, 352, 354, 375, 376, 399;
E. tau, 193, 199
Equus beds, 378
Equus zone, 11
Ereptodon priscus, 41, 392, 393
Erethizon dorsatum, 310, 311, 312, 313, 316, 348, 398;
E. sp. indet., 321
Erethizontidæ, 312
Erie basin, 296
Erie, New York, 63;
 Pennsylvania, 70, 324
Erie Co., New York, 131;
Ohio, 78;
Pennsylvania, 70, 133, 168
Eschatius, 14
Essex Co., New Jersey, 66;
Ontario, 45
Etchegoin-Tulare, 15
Euelephas jacksoni, 147
Euchœrus macrops, 223
Eutænia sirtalis, 311
Evanston, Illinois, 177, 230
Evansville, Indiana, 32, 186, 203, 228, 257, 334, 405
Everglades, Florida, 163
Evolution of Pleistocene vertebrates, 5
Extinct bisons in Alabama, 264;
in Florida, 262;
in Georgia, 261;
in Illinois, 259;
in Indiana, 257;
in Kentucky, 265;
in Maryland, 259;
in Mississippi, 264;
in Ohio, 257;
in Ontario, 256;
in Pennsylvania, 256;
in South Carolina, 260;
in Virginia, 259;
in Wisconsin, 259
Extinction of Pleistocene vertebrates, 6
Fairchild, H. L., 47, 49, 56, 58, 131, 147, 281, 285, 290, 291, 294,
297, 298
Fairmount, Illinois, 106;
Indiana, 139, 277
Fairmount Township, Grant Co., Indiana, 93
Falconer, H., 165
Farancia abacura, 382
Farmington, Connecticut, 48;
New York, 236
Farr, M. S., 132
Fauquier Co., Virginia, 178
Fayette Co., Illinois, 187;
Indiana, 173;
Kentucky, 129, 210;
Ohio, 74
Fayetteville, Tennessee, 128
Felidæ, 5, 312
Felis, 2, 14;
F. atrox, 265, 391;
F. canadensis, 310;
F. couguar, 337, 348;
F. eyra, 312, 314;
F. inexpectata, 312, 316;
F. veronis, 382;
F. sp. indet., 321, 376
Fellsmere, Florida, 122, 159, 381
Fenneman, N. M., 71, 135, 169, 328
Fenton, Michigan, 86
Ferguson, W. L., 126
Fiber zibethicus, 311
Fielden, H. W., 244, 248
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