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International Environmental Law
This book analyzes the law and policy for the management of global common resources. As
competing demands on the global commons are increasing, the protection of the environ-
ment and the pursuit of growth give rise to all sorts of conflicts. The book analyzes issues in
the protection of the global commons from fairness, effectiveness, and world order perspec-
tives. The author examines whether current policy making and future trends point to a fair
allocation of global common resources that will be effective in protecting the environment
and in the pursuit of sustainable development. The author looks at the cost effectiveness of
international environmental law and applies theories of national environmental law to inter-
national environmental problems. Chapters include analysis of areas such as marine pollution,
air pollution, fisheries management, transboundary water resources, biodiversity, hazardous
and radioactive waste management, state responsibility, and liability.
Elli Louka is the founder of Alphabetics Development & Investment (ADI), a company
devoted to environment and development. Louka was a Senior Fellow at the Orville H. Schell
Center for International Human Rights at Yale Law School and a Ford Foundation Fellow at
New York University School of Law. Dr. Louka is currently the recipient of a Marie Curie
Fellowship provided by the European Commission of the European Union. Other selected
publications by Dr. Louka include Conflicting Integration: The Environmental Law of the European
Union (2004), Biodiversity and Human Rights (2002), and Overcoming National Barriers to Inter-
national Waste Trade (1994).
International
Environmental
Law
Fairness, Effectiveness, and
World Order
Elli Louka
cambridge university press
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo
isbn-13 978-0-521-68759-1paperback
isbn-10 0-521-68759-4 paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls
for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not
guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Contents
v
vi Contents
6 Principles 49
6.1 Sovereignty over Natural Resources 49
6.2 Obligation Not to Cause Damage 50
6.3 Principles of Preventive Action and Precaution 50
6.4 Polluter Pays Principle and Equitable Sharing of Cost 51
6.5 Sustainable Development 52
6.6 Equitable Utilization 53
6.7 Common but Differentiated Responsibilities 54
6.8 Human Rights 54
7 Settlement of Disputes 55
8 Monitoring and Enforcement 57
Law, as Dr. Elli Louka vividly demonstrates in this extraordinary book, is most use-
fully conceived as a process of clarifying and implementing the common interests
of politically relevant actors. This conception is indispensable for understanding the
development of international environmental law. The spread of industrialization,
with its ever more intensive uses of the resources of the planet, followed by the
evolution of a global civilization of science and technology and, in part as a conse-
quence of those developments, the explosion of the population of the planet from
1.6 billion people in 1900 to 2.5 billion in 1950 and to more than 6 billion in
2000, have combined to put unprecedented and unrelenting stress on the ecological
systems on which the life of our species depends. No other area of lawmaking and
law-applying makes so clearly and vividly manifest the indispensable functions of all
law: the maintenance of minimum order, the allocation and regulation of the use of
scarce resources, and the conservation and allocation of the benefits and burdens of
the world’s resources in ways consistent with shared conceptions of equity.
Approaching this subject as if it could be studied as a body of static rules would be
sterile. Instead, Dr. Louka presents a dynamic picture, in which the diverse actors in
the international lawmaking process clarify key principles such as sovereignty over
national resources, precautionary principles with respect to equitable cost-sharing
of environmental externalities, principles of sustainable development, and common
as well as differentiated responsibilities. Dr. Louka then shows how those principles
are being applied in each of the major areas of international environmental law. Nor
can general international law be excluded from such an examination, for the legal
focus on the environment also has driven major changes in general international law,
which has acknowledged the “tragedy of commons” and in response has authorized
an increasing enclosure and nationalization of resources that for centuries had been
part of the res communis omnium.
Using as a framework this dynamic process in which international environmental
law is clarified, prescribed, and implemented, Dr. Louka reviews and synthesizes
past trends and projections of probable future trends with respect to (1) the marine
environment; (2) shared water resources; (3) fisheries resources; (4) the conservation
of biodiversity; (5) air; (6) trade and environment; and (7) the disposal of hazardous
and radioactive waste. Cutting across all of these trends and projection studies are
the international efforts to establish and police reporting and information-sharing
xi
xii Foreword
regimes, many now driven by the daunting challenge of prescribing for some measure
of liability in circumstances in which acts with the potential for causing significant
transnational damage are not prohibited by international law. One of the many
strengths of Dr. Louka’s book is that it presents in extraordinarily rich detail the
entire spectrum of the modern process of international environmental law.
Much of the writing in contemporary international environmental law is pas-
sionately and uncritically advocative. Although Dr. Louka’s book is plainly animated
by a deep concern for the preservation of the environment of the planet and the
realization that in the context of a global civilization of science and technology, it
can be protected only by effective international efforts, the stance adopted is not
uncritical and Dr. Louka never surrenders the scholarly role. Precisely because some
of the areas that Louka treats are – good intentions notwithstanding – marked by mis-
steps or – serious efforts notwithstanding – have registered no significant successes,
Dr. Louka’s book will be important for the practitioner in the vineyard of interna-
tional environmental law no less than for the political leaders who are charged with
its development.
Dr. Louka has produced a remarkable book that will be of great value to the
profession.
W. Michael Reisman
Yale Law School
New Haven, Connecticut
December 2005
Abbreviations
xiii
xiv Abbreviations
This study examines the rules of international law governing the global commons.
Because global common resources are shared among states, competition for the use of
such resources and the sharing of externalities from resource use are bound to increase
in the future. The book examines how the quest for a minimum order, fairness, and
effectiveness has guided the development of international environmental law and
policy making.
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to international law and international envi-
ronmental law. It provides an overview of the actors of international lawmaking, the
international lawmaking process, and the historical evolution of international envi-
ronmental law. Concepts of international environmental law, such as sovereignty
over national resources, the “polluter pays” principle, the precautionary princi-
ple, equitable cost-sharing of environmental externalities, sustainable development,
and common but differentiated responsibilities are explored. The chapter examines
human rights as the threshold principles of international environmental lawmaking.
Issues of monitoring and enforcement in international law are also introduced.
Chapter 2 examines the foundations of international environmental law. The pur-
suit of minimum order, equity, and effectiveness in international law is analyzed and
the interconnection among the foundations of international environmental law is
explored. The chapter examines how issues of distributive equity often determine the
effectiveness of international environmental lawmaking. Issues of cost-effectiveness
as they influence the success of international environmental regimes are also exam-
ined. The enclosure of national common pool resources is introduced and analyzed.
More specifically, it is examined how many national/local common pool resource
systems could acquire differing forms of governance ranging from common property
and state property to private property. The “Tragedy of Commons” rationale that
precipitated the enclosure of common pool resources in national systems is driving
the enclosure of global common resources. The gradual enclosure of global com-
mon resources – as it is taking place in fisheries, germplasm resources and related
knowledge, freshwater resources, air, sea, waste management, and national biodi-
versity resources – is analyzed. Chapter 2 examines the interrelationship between
the nature of different enclosures and the effectiveness of international environmen-
tal regimes. The inclusionary or exclusionary nature of enclosures as they affect
perceptions of distributive equity is analyzed.
1
2 Introduction
1 L. Oppenheim, International Law 177–78 (vol. 2, 7th ed., 1952). The issue of morality of war has
preoccupied commentators, though. See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument
with Historical Illustrations 3–13 (1977). See also Clarence Wilfred Jenks, Law, Freedom and Welfare
52 (1963).
2 See also D.W. Bowett, The Law of International Institutions 15–16 (1963).
3 See infra notes 13–15.
5
6 Introduction to International Environmental Law
1.2. States
1.2.1. Sovereignty
The United Nations Charter is based on the principle of sovereignty of states.
According to the Charter, each state is sovereign and no state is to violate the
4 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, reprinted in Basic Documents on Human
Rights 106 (Ian Brownlie, ed., 1971).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 16) at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), reprinted in 999 UNTS 171, entered into force Mar. 23,
1976.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21
U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), reprinted in 993 UNTS 3, entered into
force Jan. 3, 1976.
See also African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter), June 27, 1981, reprinted
in 21 ILM 58 (1982); Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights, April 2, 1993, A/CONF.157/ASRM/8.
5 Initially controversial, this right is now more or less accepted as a legitimate right. For an articulation of
the right in the Rio Declaration, see infra note 149.
6 The right to live in a decent or a healthy environment has been the subject of debate, see, e.g., Dinah
Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights and the Right to Environment, 28 Stanford Journal of
International Law 103 (1991). See also Günther Handl, Human Rights and Protection of the Environ-
ment: A Mildly “Revisionist” View, in Human Rights, Sustainable Development and the Environment
117 (Antonio Augusto Cancado Trindade, ed., 1992).
7 Maria Stavropoulou, The Right not to Be Displaced, 9 American University Journal of International
Law & Policy 689 (1994). For the right not to be displaced, see also infra note 290.
8 See Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of
Public Order, 53 American Journal of International Law 1 (1959).
The World Community and International Law 7
sovereignty of another state.9 This principle of legal equality based on the sovereignty
of states should not be confused with an assumption of equal power. In fact, the
concept of sovereignty is fairly new in international affairs. Historically, sovereignty
was not a given. Instead, states had to obtain the right to be called sovereign.10
Sovereignty denotes the ability to self-govern, and many states today do not really
possess that ability. In fact, some states are weaker than corporations and nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs) in their capacity to run their own affairs.
As the reality of international politics indicates, certain states have more power,
self-government, and control and, thus, yield more influence in the configuration of
international relations than other states. The imbalance in the actual power of states
is enshrined into the UN Charter. The Security Council of the United Nations, the
body that makes decisions regarding war and peace, was formed by the victors of
World War II.11 The structure of power in the Security Council may be anachronistic
but, nevertheless, reflects that even the constitutive organs of the international system
could not have afforded to be oblivious of the importance of power in the making
of international relations. Sometimes this power is authoritative. In other cases, it
lacks legitimacy but, nevertheless, could still be effective in shaping the future of
international order.12
The principle of sovereignty implies that states “shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state.”13 But, as explored later in this book, this principle
contains its own antinomy in the UN Charter, as well as in the way that the Charter
has been interpreted including the cases of use of force, self-defense,14 or anticipatory
self-defense.15
It is provided that the United Nations must not intervene “in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. . . . ”16 The International
Court of Justice, however, in the Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees case,17 ruled that
the scope of a state’s domestic jurisdiction is relative and depends on the development
of international law. The mere inclusion of a matter in the agenda of the General
Assembly or the Security Council does not in itself constitute intervention within the
meaning of article 2(7). The United Nations has engaged in activities considered
9 Art. 2(1) & (4), United Nations Charter, June 26, 1945 available online at http://www.un.org/
aboutun/charter [hereinafter UN Charter].
10 B. Buzan, National Security in the Post Cold War Third World, Paper presented at the Conference on
National Security in Developing Countries, Jan. 26, 1994, Institute for Strategic Studies, University of
Pretoria, South Africa.
11 Art. 23, UN Charter, supra note 9. Permanent members of the Security Council are China, France,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
12 W. Michael Reisman, Law from the Policy Perspective, reprinted in International Law Essays 1, 7 (Myres
S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, eds., 1982).
13 Art. 2(4), UN Charter, supra note 9.
14 Art. 51, id.
15 Myres S. Mc Dougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and the Minimum World Public Order: The Legal
Regulation of Coercion 231–41 (1961). See also Philip C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations 166–67
(1948); Oscar Schachter, The Rights of States to Use Armed Force, 82 Michigan Law Review 1620,
1633–35 (1984).
16 Art. 2(7), UN Charter, supra note 9.
17 Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees, Feb. 2, 1923, (1923) PCIJ, Ser.B, no.4, at 24.
8 Introduction to International Environmental Law
1.2.2. Wealth
After the wars of decolonization were fought, new states became members of the
international community. There was, therefore, the danger of a potential clash
between the new states and those states that are, so to speak, the founders of most
international law. New states generally have not adopted an outlook of international
law that fundamentally undermines the traditional view of such law by Western
states. The new states, however, came into international fora with a new set of
interests and demands. Developing states have pursued the right to development, for
instance, as a fundamental human right that is a precursor of other human rights.
18 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (Advisory Opin-
ion), June 21, 1971, (1971) ICJ Reports 16.
19 E.S. Reddy, United Nations and Apartheid: Forty Years (1987).
20 The United Nations and Somalia – 1992–1996, Blue Book Series, Vol. VIII (UN Publication Sales No.
E.96.1.8).
21 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, reprinted in 729 UNTS 161. See
also Edward L. Miles, Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1945 to 1995, in Environmental Regime Effectiveness:
Confronting Theory with Evidence 273 (Edward L. Miles et al., eds., 2002).
22 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 66 (1986).
23 Some view the Antarctic Treaty regime as a sectoral res communis, a property that is held in trust by
the few for the benefit of many, something like an international trusteeship system. However, there
have been skirmishes in the development of the regime as some excluded countries have sought to be
included as Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. Efforts to make the area a true res communis have been
rejected by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. See Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International
Law and Institutions 402–04 (1997).
The World Community and International Law 9
Developing states often espouse the view that environmental protection should not
jeopardize their pursuit of wealth and development.
As new states came to the fore of the international arena, the economic gap
between developed states and developing countries became a permanent feature
of international relations. This division between developed states and developing
states intensified the challenge against some rules of international law developed
by the economically prosperous Western states. The division between developed
and less developed states created demands for a new international economic order
(NIEO) based on notions of sharing in wealth creation by all states. Ideas for the
development of a new international economic order eventually faded. Demands for
sharing prosperity, however, have not ceased to present themselves under different
disguises in various international fora, including that of environmental lawmaking.
Distinctions between developed and developing states (the North-South division)
are made in most international instruments and are prevalent in the international
discourse. Most recent distinctions are those made between newly industrialized
states (including mostly the southeast Asian states) and least-developed states (certain
states in Africa). There is also the addition of states with economies in transition,
states that came about after the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Because developing states do not have the same economic power as developed
states,24 they have formed the group G-77 (which now includes more than seventy-
seven states) to confront the power of the elite with the power of numbers. This
cluster of developing countries presenting a unified façade against developed states
should not obfuscate the fact that there are divisions and disagreements among
developing states as well. Sometimes developing states remain unified – under the
umbrella of G-77 – both in appearances and in substance. Frequently, however,
although appearances remain, the substance crumbles under the reality of different
interests. An example in the environmental field involves the climate change nego-
tiations. During these negotiations, small island-states fought for a strong normative
treaty as a means to protect their islands from the real danger of flooding. By con-
trast, other developing states (including those perceived to be regional powers, such
as China and India) pursued the usual path in international environment negotia-
tions, reiterating their right to development and putting the blame on industrialized
countries.25
The gap between developed and developing states continues to be wide. Although
citizens of a minority of states are quite affluent, the citizens of the majority of states
live under conditions of abject poverty. Citizens of the majority of states, for instance,
have an income of less than $1 per day. Although some states have been able to break
through the barrier between them and developed states, such is not the case for all
states, especially certain states located in vulnerable regions including sub-Saharan
Africa.
Despite the absence of a global war, states frequently engage regional conflicts that
involve violations of human rights. Furthermore, even developed democratic states –
which could be considered founders of human rights instruments – often engage in
24 The GNP of a developing state may be less than the revenues of a multinational corporation.
25 Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 Yale Journal
of International Law 451 (1993).
10 Introduction to International Environmental Law
human rights violations.26 States that are more powerful mingle in the affairs of –
and even invade – less powerful states under the real threat or the pretext of a threat
to their national security27 or by simply pursuing the appropriation of other states’
resources.28 Many states are ravaged by a number of diseases, including AIDS and
malaria. Under these global circumstances, the question that emerges is what the
role of international law is, and, more specifically, what the role of international
environmental law is. This is a question that Chapter 2 will attempt to answer.
1.2.3. Cooperation
States are not equal in their power and authority.29 Whereas in decisions affecting
war and peace, the hegemonic power of some states is obvious, in the everyday affairs
of state interaction hegemonic tendencies tend to be subtler. Because war is not an
option for most societies under normal conditions, states have tried to cooperate
to achieve desirable outcomes. Even hegemonic states find it costly to affirm their
position constantly through the use of force. Often, therefore, they engage in some
sort of cooperative behavior with other states.
In game theory parlance, states find themselves captured in repeated games in
which the number of players is limited. Such players usually possess quite substantial
information about the past performance of other players. The international com-
munity is comprised of a small number of states; this community becomes even
smaller if one only counts states actively participating in most international matters.
States are avid collectors of information about the performance and general circum-
stances of other states, especially that of states that affect their interests. Thus, one
could conceive state interaction as one in which cooperation is the expected norm
rather than the exception.30 The reluctance to use force, the absence of a centralized
enforcement authority, reciprocity, and cooperative patterns of behavior make the
international arena look like alternating from hierarchy to coarchy and vice versa.31
A result of cooperation is the establishment of networks or clubs among certain
states. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was, in effect, a trade
club among industrialized states. Various security regimes connect allies that happen
to possess similar ideological outlook and development orientation, for instance,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Such organizations often lack
transparency, but the lack of open and transparent procedures is viewed as the key
to organizational effectiveness. This lack of transparency gives freedom to officials
26 See U.S.: Abu Ghraib only the “Tip of the Iceberg,” Human Rights Watch, Apr. 27, 2005. See also
David Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, in 97 American Journal of International Law 842 (2003) (on
the law of occupation and the potential liability of occupying states).
27 See General Assembly Resolution 38/7, The Situation in Grenada, A/RES/38/7, Nov. 3, 1983. See
also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), (Merits),
June 27, 1986, (1986) ICJ Reports 14. See also John Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq,
97 American Journal of International Law 563 (2003). But see Richard Falk, What Future for the UN
Charter System of War Prevention, 97 American Journal of International Law 590 (2003).
28 Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was allegedly performed to take over Kuwait’s oil resources. See also Security
Council Resolution 661, S/RES/661, Aug. 6, 1990.
29 See Reisman, supra note 12.
30 See, e.g., Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984).
31 W. Michael Reisman, Sanctions and Enforcement, reprinted in International Law Essays 381, 405 (Myres
S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, eds., 1981).
The World Community and International Law 11
involved in these organizations to put together package deals without being con-
stantly scrutinized by the media and the public.32
The club model of international cooperation has been challenged by the excluded
states. Developing countries have engaged in efforts to participate in the clubs of
developed states so as to obtain advantages previously not available to them. India
and China engaged in substantial lobbying to enter the World Trade Organization
(WTO) club. Eastern European countries have engaged in efforts to participate in
the NATO and the European Community (EC) clubs.
Environmental problems have, as a general rule, transboundary effects. Therefore,
states realized early that cooperation, common rules, and standards are better than
unilateral action. The outcome of cooperation in the environmental field can be
seen in the number and quality of treaties and other instruments that have been put
in place for the protection of environment. Not all these treaties are well monitored
and enforced.33 Nevertheless, treaties affirm the will of states to cooperate for the
achievement of desirable outcomes. In the environmental field, developed states have
been willing to compensate developing states for their participation in cooperative
arrangements that are to have global beneficial environmental effects but that may,
at the same time, slow the pace of growth.
32 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Between Centralization and Fragmentation: The Club
Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy 2, KSG Working Paper
No. 01-004, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Feb. 2001 available online
http://ssrn.com/abstract=262175 (Social Science Research Network).
33 United States General Accounting Office (GAO), International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored
(GAO-RCED-92–43, 1992).
34 Art. 23, UN Charter, supra note 9.
35 Art. 27(3), id.
36 Arts. 39 & 41, id.
37 Para. 16, Security Council Resolution 687, S/RES/687, April 3, 1991.
38 See arts. 25 & 103, UN Charter, supra note 9.
39 Art. 24. “In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on
the Security Council primary [not exclusive, though] responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security . . . ” Id.
12 Introduction to International Environmental Law
40 Art. 9, id.
41 There are have been claims, however, that votes should be weighted based on the population of each
state. See Shaw, supra note 22, at 597.
42 See infra note 224.
43 Art. 92, UN Charter, supra note 9.
44 Art. 93, id.
45 Arts. 34 & 36(2), Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945 available online at
http://www.icj-cij.org.
46 Art. 36(2)–(5), id.
The World Community and International Law 13
Declarations may include the possibility of dispute settlement by other means and
may provide that the ICJ does not have jurisdiction in matters falling under domes-
tic jurisdiction (“self-judging” clause).47 Several declarations exclude disputes arising
under multilateral treaties unless all parties to the treaty affected by the decision are
also parties to the case before the Court. A few declarations exclude disputes aris-
ing out of hostilities in which the declarant state is entangled or disputes that have
to do with national security issues. An increasing number of states have included
clauses in their declarations designed to avoid surprise lawsuits by states that accept
the Court’s jurisdiction and, immediately after that, bring a case against another
state. Some states have excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court any dispute that
was brought by a state less than twelve months after that state had accepted the
jurisdiction of the Court. In order to further protect themselves, many states have
reserved the right to modify or terminate a declaration peremptorily by means of
notification to the Secretary General of the UN with effect from the moment of
notification.48
A few treaties give the Court appellate jurisdiction. The 1944 Convention on
International Civil Aviation, for example, provides for appeal to the Court of deci-
sions of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization.49
The International Court of Justice is comprised of a body of fifteen independent
judges elected, regardless of their nationality, although no two of these judges can
be nationals of the same state.50 Judges are persons of high moral character who
possess qualifications for appointment in the highest judicial offices of their respective
countries.51 Members of the Court are elected by the Security Council and the
General Assembly, each body voting separately.52 Nominations are made by national
groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration.53 An informal agreement among
members of the United Nations generally governs the distribution of seats among
the various regions of the world. Judges serve for nine years, with five judges rotating
every three years.54 Judges may be reelected and this is often the case. If a party in
a case does not have a judge of its nationality sitting at the bench, it may designate
an ad hoc such judge.55 The Court generally has decided cases by full bench. It
may, however, form chambers composed of three or more judges to deal with a
particular case or a category of cases.56 The ICJ has established a chamber devoted
to environmental matters.
The principle of stare decisis does not apply to the decisions of the ICJ. As men-
tioned in article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: “The decision
of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that
particular case.” However, the Court frequently refers to its own decisions and to
those of other tribunals.
Other Organizations
International institutions play multiple roles in the development of international
environmental law. They provide the coordinating fora under which most envi-
ronmental issues are discussed and decided. International organizations have some
lawmaking function because they issue recommendations, resolutions, and other so-
called soft law instruments that, although not binding on states, exert varying levels
of influence on the development of international environmental law.62
UNEP has provided the forum for the discussion of many international treaties,
such as the Basel Convention on the control of waste movements and the Biodiversity
Convention. UNEP has taken a leadership role in the regional seas programs. The
International Maritime Organization (IMO) has been instrumental in the production
of the regulatory framework for the control of pollution from ships. The Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has generated a number of guidelines on the
protection of public health from nuclear materials, and also has been instrumental
in the implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, generating rules for
the disposal of radioactive waste. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO)
has played a role in the climate change discussions. The World Health Organization
(WHO) has been involved in a number of environmental issues including the control
of pesticides and the trade in chemicals. The Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) is primarily involved in fisheries, agricultural and forestry development and
agrobiodiversity issues. The International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs)
have been involved in gene bank development. The World Trade Organization
(WTO) is involved in trade matters, but its broad jurisdiction over trade regulation
intersects often with environmental matters. The UN Economic and Social Coun-
cil (ECOSOC) and the UNDP have been taking into consideration environmental
concerns as they affect socioeconomic decisions. Various other permanent and ad hoc
institutions (e.g., various working groups, committees) have assisted in the growth
of international environmental law.
Environmental considerations have had an impact on the agenda of many inter-
national organizations. Environmental considerations affect various areas of the
economy including all sorts of development projects, agriculture and forestry. The
World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD]), for
instance, in its pursuit of development (that may involve construction of dams, roads,
or the development of protected areas) has found itself entangled in environmen-
tal and human rights matters. Similarly, the Global Environment Facility (GEF)
finances many development projects in which environmental considerations are
paramount.
Other organizations that have been involved in the development of interna-
tional environmental law include the International Tropical Timber Organization
(ITTO), which has been proactive in the sustainable management of tropical forests.
Regional organizations – such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (EBRD), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), the Organization of African Union (OAU), the Organization of Ameri-
can States (OAS), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asian
Development Bank and the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation
(SAARC) – have played an influential role in the development of international
environment law.
Some institutions have monitoring character, such as the EMEP system (Cooper-
ative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-range Transmission of
Air Pollutants in Europe), which was developed under the UN/ECE regime regard-
ing transboundary pollution in Europe. The Conference of the Parties (COP) –
an institution provided for in most international environmental law treaties – has
acquired increasing monitoring and enforcement powers in recent environmental
conventions. State parties to a convention have to report to the COP of that conven-
tion on measures they have taken to implement that convention. Failure to report –
depending on the will of other state parties – may trigger sanctions.63 Some conven-
tions establish dispute settlement mechanisms that may be optional or obligatory.64
The ICJ is the primary judiciary organ, but other international tribunals have been
established, such as the ITLOS (International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea) and
the Appellate Body of the WTO.
A plethora of international institutions with overlapping capacities and respon-
sibilities has generated demands to rationalize the international system and, more
specifically, the international system for the protection of environment. Such ratio-
nalization may be needed depending on advantages/disadvantages of redundancy
in the administration of international law. Given that some institutions are more
competent or resilient than others allowing for some form of institutional com-
petition by tolerating some redundancy in the international system may not be
ill-advised. Completely streamlined institutional systems could be susceptible to
failure in case of a challenge. Allowing for some jurisdictional overlap among
institutions that are not strictly identical yields more diversity and more flexibil-
ity in responses.65
One could claim, for instance, that the International Whaling Commission is a
redundant organization and its responsibilities should fall under the CITES secre-
tariat. A total bureaucratic streamlining would mandate to do away with the Com-
mission and devote its resources to the CITES Secretariat. To many environmental-
ists, such an outcome would not be the most effective outcome for the protection
of whales. It is questionable whether the CITES Secretariat would have the will
to defend the ban on whale hunting as forcefully as the Whaling Commission has
done.
Another example involves the jurisdictional overlap between the FAO and the
Conference of the Parties (COP) of the Biodiversity Convention. The institutions
have separate yet also overlapping jurisdiction, as the FAO is responsible for agrobio-
diversity, whereas the COP is concerned with the general protection of biodiversity.
In practice, the separation of jurisdictional reach has not worked well and there
has been friction in the cooperation between the two institutions.66 One could
conclude, however, that the jurisdictional overlap has had some positive outcomes.
The FAO has been able to broker a multilateral treaty on the dissemination of
agricultural resources that is a first step in creating some predictability with regard
to property rights over such resources. The Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture is now contributing in the development of the equi-
table sharing of benefits derived from the manipulation of food and agricultural
resources.67
Environmental NGOs
There are roughly two broad categories of actors in the environmental movement:
the mainstream environmentalists and the deep ecologists.
According to the official line of mainstream environmentalism, development has
to be sought, but standards must be developed so that environmental deterioration
is minimized for the benefit of public health and quality of life.
At the other end of the spectrum, deep ecologists have argued for a “protection
of environment for the sake of environment” approach based on the belief that the
“the interests of nature” override or, at least, are at the same footing as the interests
65 See Bobbi Low et al., Redundancy and Diversity in Governing and Managing Common-Pool Resources,
Paper Presented at the 8th Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common
Property 7, Bloomington, Indiana, May 31–June 4, 2002. See generally Jonathan B. Bendor, Parallel
Systems (1985); See also Herbert A. Simon, The Proverbs of Administration, 6 Public Administration
Review 53 (1946), reprinted in Classics of Organization Theory (Jay M. Shafritz & J. Steven Ott, eds.,
1992). For the role of administrative redundancy in fighting corruption and promoting accountability
in developing countries, see Stephen B. Peterson, Another Path to Customs Reform: Mexico’s Second
Inspection, Discussion Paper No. 632, Harvard Institute for International Development, April 1998.
The author argues that the system of double inspection in customs administration is designed to fight
corruption by building overlapping layers of administration that would be pitted against each other.
66 Chapter 7, Section 2.1.2.3.
67 Chapter 7, Section 2.1.2.4.
The World Community and International Law 17
The environmental movement had its birth in the developed world and has acted
as an opposition to untrammeled development by emphasizing the importance of
quality of life based on a clean environment. Environmental groups have lobbied
governments in developed countries to adopt stringent regulations for the reduction
of pollution and protection of natural resources. Although not always as successful
as intended, these efforts have borne fruits and have improved the quality of life in
many areas of the developed world.
Because many environmental problems have global dimensions, environmental
groups have tried to spread their activities in the developing world. Environmental
issues have received mixed response in the developing world. Sometimes govern-
ments support exclusionary protected areas for ecotourism or for achieving better
control over ethnic minorities. But, in most cases, developing countries’ govern-
ments balk at taking decisive action on other problems, such as marine pollution or
the supply of clean drinking water.
The NGOs of developing countries have been overwhelmed by the more pros-
perous NGOs of developed countries. In fact, much of the funding for developing
countries’ NGOs comes from developed countries’ foundations. Some economists
have claimed that developed countries’ NGOs have been able to set the agenda
of the developing countries’ NGOs and that, accordingly, such agendas have little
to do with the problems that developing countries face.77 Specific environmental
problems prevalent in developing countries, such as dwindling supplies of drinkable
water and malnutrition, are not adequately addressed.
Because of allegations of transposing developed world ideals to developing coun-
tries, many environmental organizations have changed their discourse and have pro-
posed that the management of environmental problems has to be executed with the
participation of local people. The participation of local communities, however, is
not always applied in practice.
To be fair, environmental NGOs in developed countries are not always mono-
lithic. Whereas for some members of these organizations, local participation is a sim-
ple switch in discourse to please new audiences, others view public participation as
the means to change the substance of environmental policies. Community-oriented
participation discourses, even if they do not end up in substantial public participa-
tion, are an important means of defining and legitimizing local interests. Community
participation dialogues provide room for maneuverability to local groups who view
the management of environmental problems as a way to address their economic and
social needs.78
Environmental NGOs have challenged further the club model of interstate rela-
tions and have sought to become involved in intergovernmental fora. Environmental
NGOs have had significant influence in the shaping of some environmental regimes.
The evolution of the London Convention, the Whaling Convention, the Basel
Convention, the CITES, and the World Heritage Convention has been influenced
substantially by the actions of environmental NGOs.
In other cases, the impact of environmental groups has been weaker but, nev-
ertheless, has remained influential. NGOs have attempted to infiltrate international
organizations that are not prima facie confronted with environmental issues, such as
the WTO, with less success. Interestingly, developing states, which are now entering
these club-type organizations, are less prone to welcome NGOs than their developed
countries’ counterparts.79
Industry NGOs
Industry NGOs are not as visible as environmental NGOs, but they are not less
powerful. Actually, in some fora, where expert advice is needed, industry could
appear more credible because it has the resources to put together the expertise and,
thus, provide an authoritative analysis of an environmental issue. It has been claimed,
for instance, that industry NGOs are successful in the European Commission –
the initiator of legislative proposals within the European Union.
Industry NGOs are generally perceived as reluctant to provide leadership for the
abatement of environmental problems for which industries are responsible. Industry
has attempted to delay or to curtail environmental action when such action is per-
ceived as too costly. Industry has claimed frequently that scientific uncertainty is a
valid reason for inaction. The standards that some industries apply for the protection
of environment in developing countries often lag behind those adopted in developed
countries.
Having said that, it would be wrong to classify all industries as culprits of environ-
mental deterioration. Some industries have been innovators and are at the forefront
of environmental engineering. Within an industry or a company are often dissenting
voices that attempt to reorient discourse to corporate responsible solutions and to
redefine the allegiance of corporations not strictly to shareholders but to a broader
category of stakeholders that includes employees, the surrounding communities, and
the general public. Industry has learned the hard way that environmentally irrespon-
sible behavior is not only costly in terms of liability but also in terms of reputation.
Scientists
The role of science has been prominent in the development of international environ-
mental law.80 Scientists, however, rarely agree on the definition of an environmental
problem or the prescriptions for its solution. Sometimes the disagreement is the
result of the use of different data (for instance, in fisheries) or of the application of
different models (climate change). Given the lack of scientific certainty, most deci-
sions on environmental matters have to be made based on political considerations.
However, scientific communities and informal networks among scientists81 often
frame the environmental discourse. UNEP, WMO, and national scientific institutions
(such as the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA])
have executed the research on ozone depletion. The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) was organized by UNEP and WMO to provide insights
on the climate change debate.
The positions of scientists are used often by proponents or opponents of an
environmental action to advance their own view. The climate change discourse
has been influenced by the inability of scientists to reach consensus on whether
climate change really exists and its possible repercussions. The lack of scientific
consensus has provided some countries with justification to delay purposive action
for the abatement of carbon dioxide emissions, the main culprit of climate change.
By contrast, scientific consensus on the ozone hole over Antarctica precipitated
decisive action to phase out ozone-depleting substances.
Environmental law could be conceived as a series of dialectic interactions between
what are perceived as opposing trends: one devoted to development as usual and the
other to the injection of ecodevelopment as “new” paradigm for development. The
role of science in these series of dialectic interactions is the role of facilitator.
Indigenous Peoples
The Indigenous Peoples Forum is an informal network of indigenous groups that
seeks to bring to prominence issues that affect indigenous peoples. The Indigenous
Peoples Forum lacks a clear legal personality. However, it has been able, through a
series of gradual steps, to establish itself as an influential international institutional
network.
Indigenous peoples have asserted their fundamental human rights through the
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.82 A number of ILO stan-
dards,83 which are currently in force, are not considered sufficient to guarantee
indigenous peoples rights. The interaction of indigenous peoples with environmen-
tal organizations has been ambivalent. Indigenous peoples have occasionally colluded
with the environmental movement against corporations whose pollution adversely
affects their traditional livelihoods. Other times, however, the indigenous people
movement has collided with the environmental movement, especially, with regard
to land-use rights. Environmental groups prefer state control over land, especially
forested land. Environmentalists are not convinced that indigenous groups, if left
to their own devices, would opt for environmentally sound solutions. Indigenous
peoples prefer to exercise control over the land through property rights and, thus,
to retain discretionary control over its use. The preference of environmental groups
for state control perpetuates, as should be expected, a rift between the indigenous
peoples’ movement and the environmental movement.
82 Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Aug. 26, 1994, reprinted in 34
ILM 541 (1995).
83 Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989,
reprinted in 28 ILM 1382 (1989).
International Lawmaking Process 21
regulate their behavior. Other times, states engage in practice under the perception
that such practice constitutes or should constitute law. If such practice is general and
is exercised under the opinion that it constitutes law, it is considered general custom
and, thus, a source of international law. Law could be derived from what are called
general principles of law, judicial decisions, and the teachings of the “most highly
qualified publicists.”84
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is cited most often
as the authoritative text on sources of law. According to that article:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such dis-
putes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 1.international conventions, whether general
or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; 2.interna-
tional custom, as evidence of general practice accepted as law; 3.the general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations; 4.subject to provisions of article 59, judicial deci-
sions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations as
subsidiary for the determination of the rules of law.
2.1. Treaties
International agreements, called “treaties,” “conventions,” “covenants,” and “char-
ters,” could be bilateral or multilateral. Usually, multilateral treaties signed by a
number of states are deemed to have lawmaking effects, whereas bilateral treaties are
viewed more or less the way contracts are viewed in domestic law (as having effect
between the parties that signed them).85 The process of multilateral treaty creation
involves a number of states that wish to resolve an issue of international importance.
These states usually request an international organization with authority on the sub-
ject matter (for instance, the World Health Organization, in matters of public health,
the International Labor Organization on labor matters) to establish a working group
to draft a treaty. This initiates a process of treaty negotiation and bargaining until
a consensus is established. Usually, states attempt to reach consensus during treaty
negotiations, which often results in the adoption of the lowest common denomi-
nator. Instances exist, however, in which states would adopt a convention without
a consensus. Lack of a consensus in the adoption of a convention is likely to affect
the lawmaking character of the convention. This is particularly the case if countries
explicitly refuse to sign or ratify the convention.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties86 is the document used
frequently to interpret the text of many international treaties. The Vienna Con-
vention has codified some of the general principles that are enshrined in the law
of the treaties such as pacta sunt servanda87 and that treaties must not in principle
have retroactive character.88 The Vienna Convention demonstrates a preference for
the peaceful settlement of disputes89 and requires parties to perform their treaty
84 See art. 38(d), Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 45.
85 See J.G. Starke, An Introduction to International Law 78–81 (1963).
86 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, May 23, 1969, reprinted in 8 ILM 679 (1969).
87 Art. 26, id.
88 Art. 28, id.
89 See article 65 of the Vienna Convention, which refers to article 33 of the UN Charter, id.
22 Introduction to International Environmental Law
obligations “in good faith.”90 The Vienna Convention provides for the establish-
ment of a Conciliation Commission in case a disagreement arises during treaty
performance,91 but the decisions of the Conciliation Commission are not binding.
The convention provides for the possibility of reference of a dispute to the ICJ or
arbitration.92
States are free to make reservations to specific articles of a convention.93 This
creates in effect an à la carte convention system. Too many reservations on the
text of a convention undermine the authoritative character of the convention. For
this reason, certain treaties prohibit reservations.94 Many environmental and human
rights treaties do so. The prohibition of reservations enhances the consistency and
uniformity of treaties but, at the same time, restricting the possibility of reservations
implies less state participation in the treaty regime. If reservations are allowed, without
any restriction, state participation is facilitated but the lawmaking attributes of a treaty
are diluted.
After a convention is signed, it enters into a process of ratification. This means that
states must ask their legislative organs (e.g., a parliament) to adopt the convention and
to incorporate it into the domestic legal order. Unless a state ratifies a convention,
the convention does not have binding effects on that state (provided that the rules
included in the convention have not become a rule of customary law).
A convention specifies in one of its articles the number of states that are required
for ratification. After this prespecified number of states ratify the convention, it is
said that “the convention enters into force,”95 that is, it has become binding law
among the states that ratified it. The number of states required to ratify a convention
varies depending on the reach of the convention. The Law of the Sea Convention
(UNCLOS), which is considered the constitutive instrument of the law of the seas,
required sixty ratifications.96 Because of its wide reach, it took fourteen years for the
UNCLOS to enter into force.97 For some conventions, ratification by certain states
is important because nonratification by these states would risk depriving these con-
ventions of a convincing legal authority. For instance, the civil liability instruments
for oil pollution attempt to ensure the participation of states where major carriers
of oil reside. The climate change instruments attempt to ensure the participation of
countries that are major emitters of carbon dioxide.
Many international environmental treaties are umbrella framework treaties – set-
ting the parameters of international environmental action – followed by protocols
defining the specific standards of state behavior. The model of a framework con-
vention followed by specific protocols has been adopted as the regulatory archetype
for a number of environmental problems, such as ozone depletion, acid rain, and
climate change. The rationale behind the framework-protocol approach is for states
to commit to engage, initially, in cooperative behavior to manage what seems to be
90 For the element of good faith, see art. 26, Vienna Convention, id.
91 See art. 66 and Annex to the Vienna Convention, id.
92 Art. 66, id.
93 Art. 2(d), id. See also art. 20, id.
94 Art. 19, id.
95 See art. 24, id.
96 See Chapter 4, Section 3.1.
97 Id.
International Lawmaking Process 23
2.2. Custom
The relevance of custom as a source of international law has been debated. Some
scholars maintain that custom is an authoritative source of international law,98
whereas others purport that custom is anachronistic and even hard to prove in an
international environment rich in bilateral and multilateral agreements among states.
According to article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, there are
two elements that are needed for the establishment of international custom: general
practice and opinio juris (opinio juris sive necessitatis). General practice could be derived
from a number of material acts, for instance, domestic law, newspaper reports, and
government statements. Opinio juris requires that states behave in a certain way under
the stated belief, which does not have to be a genuine belief, that their behavior
is law or is becoming law.99 The International Court of Justice has established that
some degree of uniformity is required for custom to become law.100 However, it is
possible for custom to develop if a number of states follow consistently a practice that
has had an impact on international relations because of the authoritative influence
of these states. The role of maritime powers in the establishment of the law of the
sea, and the role of the United States and the Soviet Union in the development
of space law are indisputable.101 Thus, even in the creation of international custom
that, according to article 38, must be based on general practice, one can decipher the
role of authoritative power in lawmaking. For the practice of a state to develop into
custom, it is not necessary for that state to believe that its behavior constitutes law.
What is necessary is that its behavior remains unchallenged by other states.102 For a
state not to be bound by customary international law it has to have objected consis-
tently to the creation of such law (the doctrine of persistent objector).103 Opposition
expressed for the first time after a rule has been established firmly will not generally
prevent a state from being bound.104
Eventually, one can never prove a rule of customary law in an absolute manner but
only relatively. After all, the Statute of the International Court of Justice speaks of
“general practice” – not universal practice. It has been maintained that the consent
of half of the states of the world is sufficient or that the consent of third world states
is necessary. Arguments also have been made about the existence of regional custom
that is established among the states of a particular geographic region.105
Special custom prevails over general custom – lex specialis derogat legi generali – unless
the general custom amounts to what has been called jus cogens or a peremptory norm
of international law.106 Examples of jus cogens include the prohibition of genocide and
slave trade and the principle of diplomatic immunity. Treaties can provide evidence
of customary international law – unratified treaties as well. This is so because treaties
provide irrefutable evidence that some states believe that a certain practice is law.
It is more difficult to try to assemble state practice found in disparate sources that
could provide convincing proof of the combination of elements of state practice and
opinio juris.
It is apparent from the development of customary international law that protest
and consent play a vital part in the formulation of international law. The weight
attached to protest and consent depends on the number and authoritative power of
states that support them.
Court Decisions
Decisions of the ICJ, arbitration tribunals, and national courts, although presented
in article 38 as subsidiary sources of international law, are of importance in shaping
expectations about the legitimacy and likelihood of success of different claims made
under international law. States in their pleadings before courts often refer to prior
decisions of international and domestic tribunals and the International Court of
Justice itself, although not bound by the principle of stare decisis, frequently refers to
its prior decisions.
Teachings of Scholars
The work of scholars is influential in further shaping the development of interna-
tional law. This is especially the case with new evolving concepts of international
environmental law, such as the polluter pays principle or the precautionary principle,
which require further clarification for their successful application.
2.5. Content
After deciding on the type of instrument that would be most effective in addressing
an environmental problem, policy makers must make a choice about the policies
to be incorporated in that instrument. In domestic arenas, significant emphasis has
been placed on regulatory approaches, called command-and-control regulations,
that specify the standards and often the technologies that industry should adopt in
order to be in compliance.
Economic instruments are relatively new regulatory instruments, the purpose of
which is to provide incentives for industry to comply. Economic instruments can
take the form of taxes or subsidies. A particular fuel, for instance, such as petroleum,
could be taxed to discourage its use. Renewable technology could be subsidized to
encourage its wide application. Overall economic instruments that could be used
to change industry and consumer behavior include taxes on polluting products such
as fuels, fertilizers, pesticides, tax differentiation (between ecofriendly and polluting
products), user charges (charges for using water or for mineral exploitation), and
subsidies.
The problem with economic instruments is that political will needs to be invested
in them to be adopted and then implemented. In order for taxes to influence a specific
behavior, they often need to be set quite high; this could cause industry or con-
sumer backlash. The fate of carbon tax within the European Union is well known.113
Subsidies and other economic vehicles must be carefully calibrated; otherwise, they
may spur wasteful investment. Other instruments such as tradable discharge per-
mits114 and transferable quotas115 have been used in domestic arenas as more flexible
methods to reduce pollution.
There is another problem with economic instruments and their application in
the international arena. Economic instruments, such as tradable permits, tend to be
complex instruments and demand a level of institutional maturity that has yet to be
attained in many international institutions. Also, the more complex the instrument,
the harder it would be to enforce it, given the fragmented enforcement possibil-
ities available in the international system. And this is true not only for economic
instruments but also for any other complex regulatory instrument. For instance, the
MARPOL Treaty was initially based on effluent discharges and, as such, it was dif-
ficult to monitor and enforce. Since the treaty has switched from effluent discharges
to technological standards, it has functioned better. This is because the adoption of
new technology in a ship is easily monitored by a simple inspection, whereas what
ships do in the high seas and the types or quantity of pollutants they discharge can be
hardly monitored. Often, the effectiveness of international regimes has to do with
the straightforward nature of standards they provide.116
Most international instruments that have been adopted follow the conventional
command-and-control approach. With the exception of climate change and ozone
protection instruments, which marginally flirt with incentive generation,117 most of
113 A carbon tax is a tax on energy sources that discharge carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. The European
Union has been discussing the imposition of carbon taxes since the early 1990s, but carbon taxes have
yet to be adopted. In the meantime, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Norway have introduced carbon
taxes.
114 Tradable discharge permits operate as follows: a country or a group of countries sets a cap for the
emissions of a polluting substance. Then permits are issued to industries the aggregate number of which
must not exceed the cap. Industries that produce less pollution than that allowed by their permits could
sell their extra permits to other industries that exceed the amount of pollution allowed for in their
permits. It is hoped that the emission trading that takes place would achieve environmental results with
the least cost for the industry. On the issue of tradable discharge permits (TDPs) and trading of emissions,
see Chapter 8.
115 Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) work like TDPs. In this case, a country or a group of countries
set a cap on the amount of a resource that is to be harvested (i.e., fisheries). This cap is usually called
Total Allowable Catch (TAC). This TAC is distributed to fishers through permits that define how much
each fisher is entitled to harvest from the oceans. Fishers who fish less than their assigned permits could
trade their extra permits with fishers who wish to fish more. Regarding Individual Transferable Quotas
(ITQs) in fisheries, see Chapter 6.
116 Oran R. Young, The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural Resources and
the Environment, in Foundations of Environmental Law and Policy 315 (Richard L. Revesz, ed., 1997).
117 See Chapter 8, Sections 1 & 2.
PERSPECTIVES 27
3. PERSPECTIVES
(i) the constitution of national parks, strict natural reserves, and other reserves within
which the hunting, killing, or capturing of fauna, and the collection or destruction
of flora shall be limited or prohibited,
(ii) the institution of regulation concerning the hunting, killing, and capturing of
fauna outside such areas,
(iii) the regulation of the traffic in trophies,
(iv) the prohibition of certain methods of and weapons for the hunting, killing, and
capturing of fauna.132
The convention went as far as to establish a list of Class A (strict protection) and
Class B (less strictly protected than Class A species) species whose hunting must be
prevented even by the “natives.” According to article 8(1),
125 Beyond Compliance: What Motivates Environmental Behavior?, Overcompliance with Environmen-
tal Regulations (Proceedings of a Workshop sponsored by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s
National Center for Environmental Economics and National Center for Environmental Research, Wash-
ington, DC, June 4, 2001).
126 The UN/ECE CLRTAP in Europe is considered generally successful, see Chapter 8, Section 3.
127 Many developed countries are investing in sewage infrastructure, see OSPAR and HELCOM regime,
Chapter 4, Sections 4.1 & 4.2.
128 See Chapter 8, Section 1.
129 See Chapter 7, Section 1.
130 See, generally, Jack Westoby, Introduction to World Forestry (1989).
131 Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State, Nov. 8, 1933. The
countries involved included the Union of South Africa, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Egypt, Spain,
France, Italy, Portugal, and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. (Because of lack of ratifications, the convention
did not enter into force.)
132 Preamble, id.
PERSPECTIVES 29
Animals belonging to the species mentioned in Class B, whilst not requiring such
rigorous protection as those mentioned in Class A shall not be hunted, killed, or
captured, even by natives, except under special license granted by the competent
authorities.
Many governments that were established after the demise of colonialism adopted
similar exclusionary policies for protected areas. Exclusionary polices brought vast
land areas under state control and confirmed the authority of newly established
national governments over territories resided by people of diverse tribal and other
affiliations. Protected areas were pursued as a good source of foreign exchange –
income brought by tourism or safaris or donors willing to shoulder the cost of
land preservation. The exclusion of resident peoples from restricted nature reserve
areas was, and is still, such a constitutive element of preservation efforts that some
commentators have characterized it “coercive conservation.”133 Chapter 7 provides
more details on the phenomenon of coercive conservation and how it has affected
environmental policies.
Putting aside the pursuit of protected areas, however, most developing countries,
when they entered the international arena as independent sovereign states, were faced
with environmental problems that were of different nature than those experienced
by developed countries. Such problems included the spread of various infectious
diseases, unsafe drinking water, and a lack of adequate food supply and housing.
Some respected scientists have argued that the spread of malaria in some developing
countries justifies the use of DDT, a substance prohibited for use in many developing
and developed countries, underlying the different nature of problems and appropriate
solutions for different areas of the world.
Because of the urgent problems that many developing countries face, they have
been slow to adopt stringent environmental laws or have been reluctant, once they
adopt such laws, actually to enforce them. Lack of enforcement in developing coun-
tries is indicative of both the lack of capacity but also a certain lack of will, as
many developing countries are content to sacrifice more of their environmental
protection in the pursuit of their development goals. Developing countries often
have argued that developed countries were allowed to despoil their environment in
order to develop and that they, developing countries, should achieve some level of
development before they implement environmental measures. Developing countries
argue that, after some level of development and wealth is achieved, the pursuit of
environmental quality should follow, as it has happened in developed countries.
Given the different priorities of developing countries, it is not surprising that,
when developing countries understood that the North was attempting to impose,
through international lawmaking, its own environmental standards on them, they
were less than willing to comply. The different views of developing countries were
made evident during the Rio Conference and in the subsequent negotiations of
international regimes, such as the ozone regime and the climate change regime.
During these negotiations, developing countries asked in effect for compensation for
their participation in the functioning of international environmental laws that they
133 Nancy Peluso, Coercive Conservation: the Politics of State Resource Control, 3 Global Environmental
Change – Human and Policy Dimensions 199 (1993).
30 Introduction to International Environmental Law
deemed served primarily the interests and concerns of developed states. Financial
compensation in exchange for environmental performance became the cornerstone
of the ozone protection and climate change regimes.134
4. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
4.1. Stockholm
In the late 1960s, as the environmental movement was emerging, the Swedish dele-
gation asked the United Nations to convene a conference on the environment. The
immense coordinating effort that such a conference required was put together by
Canadian Maurice Strong, who was to become the first Executive Director of UNEP,
the first UN institution devoted exclusively to the protection of the environment.
The Stockholm Conference produced the Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment. Some believed that the declaration should begin with a sweeping
articulation of every human being’s right to a wholesome environment.135 A rights
approach, however, did not prevail. The declaration adopted an anthropocentric
approach to the protection of the environment, as the full title of the declaration
denotes: “Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment.”136
In the first article of the declaration, an explicit linkage is formulated between
human rights and the conditions of living in an environment of quality. According
to Principle 1:
Man has a fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life in
an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being [emphasis added].
The declaration contains the seeds of provisions that were espoused by subse-
quent legislative instruments. For instance, Principle 2, which refers to the rights of
“future generations,” could be considered a distant predecessor of the intergenera-
tional equity principle.137 Principle 9 refers to the special environmental problems
caused by underdevelopment, which “can best be remedied by accelerated devel-
opment through the transfer of substantial quantities of financial and technological
4.2. Rio
The UN Conference on Environment and Development (or Earth Summit) was
held in Rio de Janeiro between June 3 and June 14, 1992, with the participation of
an unprecedented number of NGOs. It produced a number of instruments that have
shaped the development of international environmental law until today – the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development,143 Agenda 21,144 the Non-Binding
Principles on the Sustainable Development of all Types of Forest,145 the Treaty on
Biological Diversity,146 and the Treaty on Climate Change.147
140 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Brundtland Report)
(1987).
141 Id. at 43.
142 General Assembly Resolution 44/228, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
A/RES/44/228, Dec. 22, 1989.
143 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 13, 1992, reprinted in 31 ILM 876 (1992).
144 A voluminous document that provides the course of action for the management and prevention of
many environmental problems. See Agenda 21, June 5, 1992 available online at http://www.un.org/
esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21 (Division for Sustainable Development, United Nations Department
of Economic & Social Affairs).
145 Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management,
Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, June 13, 1992, reprinted in 31 ILM
881 (1992).
146 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1982, reprinted in 31 ILM 822 (1992).
147 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, reprinted in 31 ILM 849 (1992).
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May 1894.
GLOSSARY.
Abye, to pay the penalty of, to atone for.
Aigrette, a plume of feathers.
Alembic, an old chemical apparatus or vessel, used for distilling.
Astucious, astute, shrewd, cunning.
Baaren-hauter, a nickname for a German private soldier.
Ban-dog, a large fierce dog.
Banneret, a standard-bearer.
Banquette, the walk behind the parapet of a fortress.
Barbican, the outwork defending the gate of a fortress.
Bartizan, a small overhanging turret or projecting parapet.
Brache, a kind of sporting dog.
Braggadocio, a blusterer, a boaster.
Caftan, a long robe worn by men in the East.
"Cour plénière," in ancient French history a gathering of all a king's
vassals.
Cresset, a large kind of candlestick for holding a small fire or
illuminant.
Dalmatic, dalmatique, a long ecclesiastical robe.
Diet, the national assembly.
Doomsmen, all who gathered at the doom, or great popular court
of the ancient Scandinavians.
Dorf, a village.
Double-ganger, Doppelgänger, a spectral counterpart of a living
person.
Earth-shoot, a landslip.
Emprise, feat, enterprise.
Espadon, a long heavy sword.
"Fain, to make one," to please, to give pleasure or joy to.
Faustrecht, the right claimed by the petty barons of the Empire to
wage private warfare.
Folter-kammer, a torture-chamber.
Gammon, a smoked ham.
Gauds, trinkets, ornaments.
Gear, business, affair; property.
Geierstein, vulture-stone.
Graffs-lust, the count's delight.
Hauberk, a shirt of mail.
Hauptman, a captain.
Hundred, an old subdivision of the English counties.
Kreutzer, a German copper coin, worth one third of a penny
English.
Lammer-geier, the bearded vulture.
Landamman, the chief magistrate in a Swiss canton.
Landvogt, a bailiff.
Lanzknecht, a German mercenary soldier.
Largesse, a free distribution of money.
Leaguer, a camp.
Losel, a slothful person.
Lyme-hound, a large dog.
"Maen Gorsedd," the stone of the British bards.
Mail, a trunk.
Mainour, a thing stolen, discovered in the hands of the thief.
Malecredence, mistrust.
Merlin, a kind of hawk, formerly trained to hunt game birds.
Minnesinger, a poet-minstrel of mediæval Germany.
Montero-cap, a horseman's scarlet cap of fine Spanish cloth
trimmed with fur.
Morisco, a Moor of Spain.
Palmer, a pilgrim to the Holy Land.
"Par amours," forbidden love.
Partisan, a kind of pike or halberd.
Peltry, skins and furs of wild animals.
Pight, pitched, placed, fixed.
Ptisan, a decoction of barley.
Rigadoon, a dance with a peculiar hopping step.
"Roba di guadagno," profitable goods.
Romaunt, a story or tale in verse.
Saltire-wise, two lines crossing one another diagonally like a St.
Andrew's cross.
Samite, a textile made of gold cloth or satin.
Schlaf-trunk, a sleeping-draught.
Schwarz-bier, black beer.
Schwarz-reiter, a German mercenary horse-soldier
Seigniory, the right of ownership vested in a feudal superior or
lord.
Shaveling, a priest.
Soothfast, true, worthy of belief.
Stoup, a drinking-cup.
Strappado, a cruel form of military punishment.
Strick-kind, the child of the cord—the prisoner on trial before the
Vehmic Tribunal.
Switzer, a native of Switzerland.
Thane, intermediate between a freeman and a noble.
Treillage, trellis-work.
Vail, to doff, to lower, to take off.
Verjämbt, condemned by the Vehmic Tribunal.
Vestiary, a room for keeping vestments.
Visne, venue, the place where a law action can be tried.
Wapentake, an old subdivision of the English counties.
Warrand, a defender.
Wassail, ale or wine sweetened and flavoured with spices.
Welked, marked with protuberances or ridges.
Wimple, a shawl worn by women out of doors.
Wroge, Vroge, lists of offences that called for the attention of the
court.
Yung-herr, Jung-her, Junker, a young man.
Zechin, a Venetian gold coin, worth from 9s. to 10s.
END OF VOL. I.
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