823 Phil.

358 ← click for PDF copy

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 207354. January 10, 2018 ]
CHARLIE HUBILLA, JOEL NAYRE, NENITA A.
TAN, PEDRO MAGALLANES, JR., ARNEL
YUSON, JANICE CABATBAT, JUDY PAPINA,
VANESSA ESPIRITU, NOEMI YALUNG,
GENALYN RESCOBILLO, FIDEL ZAQUITA, NYL
B. CALINGASAN, JANICE MIRADORA,
EVANGELINE CHUA, ROSCHELLE MISSION,
MELANIE BALLESTEROS, MARILYN
BACALSO, RENALYN ALCANTARA, FEDERICO
B. VIERNES, CHRISTOPHER B. YARES, ANA
MARY R. AGUILAR, MELANIE SAN MARCOS,
EMERLOVE MONTE, CHONALYN LUCAS,
THERESA MALICOSIO, MA. FE CERCARES,
RUBELYN R. CLARO, JONALYN M. YALUNG,
MARY ANN V. MACANAG, RESLYN L. FLORES,
CRISTEL C. ROQUE, TERESA G. MUNAR,
SUSAN A. DELA CRUZ, SHEENA KAY P. DE
VERA, ARLENE R. ANES, GINA B. BINIBINI,
CHERINE V. ZORILLA, MA. CRISTINE
MAGTOTO, FRANCIS MARIE O. DE CASTRO,
VANESSA R. ESPIRITU, RACHELLE V.
QUISTORIA, JULIE ANN ILAN, ANGELIE F.
PANOTES, ANABEL PAYOS, MELISSA M.
PERLAS, MELANIE B. BERSES, BARVI ROSE
PERALTA, RESIE AQUE, ROWENA RIVERA,
MELANIE M. DY, CHERYLYN CORO, RANELYN
SUBONG, ANGELA SUBILLAGA, THELMA
 BARTOLABAC, MICHELLE C. ILAGAN,
PRECIOUS MAE DE GUZMAN, MARY
CAROLINE COLINA, FRELYN HIPOLITO,
MYLINE A. CALLOS, JANETH B. SEMBILLO,
LEA LYN F. FERRANCO, MAY C. SANTOS,
ROSELLE A. NOBLE, JENNIFER D. SUYOM,
WARREN PETCHIE C. CAJES, ROWELYN F.
CATALAN, RIEZEL ANN A. ALEGRE,
DEMETRIA B. PEREZ, GENALYN OSOC,
JUVILYN N. NERI, JOY B. PIMENTEL, AIRENE
LAYON, MARY JOY TURQUEZA, MARY ANN
VALENTIN, ROSIE L. NIEBRES, MELCA
MALLORCA, JOY CAGATCAGAT, DIANA
CAMARO, MARIVEL DIJUMO, SHEILA DELA
CRUZ, ELIZABETH ARINGO, JENALYN G.
DISMAYA, MELANIE G. TRIA, GRETCHEN D.
MEJOS, AND JANELIE R. JIMENEZ,
PETITIONERS, V. HSY MARKETING LTD., CO.,
WANTOFREE ORIENTAL TRADING, INC.,
COEN FASHION HOUSE AND GENERAL
MERCHANDISE, ASIA CONSUMER VALUE
TRADING, INC., FABULOUS JEANS & SHIRT &
GENERAL MERCHANDISE, LSG
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, UNITE
GENERAL MERCHANDISE, ROSARIO Q. CO,
LUCIA PUN LING YEUNG, AND ALEXANDER
ARQUEZA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:

When the evidence in labor cases is in equipoise, doubt is

resolved in favor of the employee.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assailing the
February 25, 2013 Decision[2] and May 30, 2013 Resolution[3] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP No. 126522, which upheld the
Labor Arbiter's finding that the employees voluntarily terminated
their employment. The assailed judgments also set aside the
National Labor Relations Commission's application of the
principle of equipoise on the ground that the employees failed to
present any evidence in their favor.

HSY Marketing Ltd., Co., Wantofree Oriental Trading, Inc., Coen

Fashion House and General Merchandise, Asia Consumer Value
Trading, Inc., Fabulous Jeans & Shirt & General Merchandise,
LSG Manufacturing Corporation, Unite General Merchandise,
Rosario Q. Co, Lucia Pun Lin Yeung, and Alexander Arqueza
(respondents) are engaged in manufacturing and selling goods
under the brand Novo Jeans & Shirt & General Merchandise
(Novo Jeans).[4]

Sometime in May 2010 and June 2010, several Novo Jeans

employees[5] went to Raffy Tulfo's radio program to air their
grievances against their employers for alleged labor violations.
They were referred to the Department of Labor and Employment
Camanava Regional Office.[6]

These employees claimed that on June 7, 2010, they were not

allowed to enter the Novo Jeans branches they were employed in.
They further averred that while Novo Jeans sent them a show
cause letter the next day, they were in truth already dismissed
from employment. They sent a demand letter on July 19, 2010 to
amicably settle the case before the Department of Labor and
Employment but no settlement was reached. They alleged that
upon learning that the Department of Labor and Employment was
not the proper forum to address their grievances, they decided to
file a notice of withdrawal and file their complaint with the Labor
Arbiter.[7]

On the other hand, Novo Jeans claimed that these employees

voluntarily severed their employment but that they filed
complaints later with the Department of Labor and Employment.
They alleged that the employees' notice of withdrawal was not
actually granted by the Department of Labor and Employment but
that the employees nonetheless filed their complaints before the
Labor Arbiter.[8]

On May 31, 2011, Labor Arbiter Arden S. Anni rendered a

Decision[9] dismissing the complaints. He found that other than
the employees' bare allegations that they were dismissed from
June 6 to 9, 2010, they did not present any other evidence
showing that their employment was terminated or that they were
prevented from reporting for work.[10] The Labor Arbiter likewise
ruled that the employees voluntarily severed their employment
since the airing of their grievances on Raffy Tulfo's radio program
"[was] enough reason for them not to report for work, simply
because of a possible disciplinary action by [Novo Jeans]."[11]
The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter Decision read:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED,

judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the above-
captioned consolidated cases for utter lack of merit and
for forum-shopping.

SO ORDERED.[12]

The employees appealed to the National Labor Relations

Commission.[13]
On June 25, 2012, the National Labor Relations Commission
rendered a Decision[14] reversing that of the Labor Arbiter and
finding that the employees were illegally dismissed. It ruled that
the allegations of both parties "were unsubstantiated and thus
[were] equipoised" and that "if doubt exists between the evidence
presented by the employer and that by the employee, the scales of
justice must be tilted in favor of the latter."[15] The dispositive
portion of the National Labor Relations Commission Decision
read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is

hereby rendered finding the appeal meritorious with
respect to the issue of illegal dismissal. Complainants-
appellants' respective employers are hereby found
liable, jointly and severally, to pay complainants-
appellants their backwages and separation pay plus ten
percent thereof as attorney's fees. Accordingly, the
decision of the Labor Arbiter dated May 31, 2011 is
hereby MODIFIED. All other dispositions STANDS
(sic) undisturbed.

The computation of the aforesaid awards is as follows:

....

TOTAL
Php30,969,426.00
AWARD

SO ORDERED.[16]

Novo Jeans moved for partial reconsideration[17] but was denied

by the National Labor Relations Commission in its August 24,
2012 Resolution.[18] Thus, it filed a Petition for Certiorari[19] with
the Court of Appeals.
On February 25, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision[20] reversing the Decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission and reinstating the Labor Arbiter Decision.
The Court of Appeals found that Novo Jeans' counsel, as the
affiant, substantially complied with the verification requirement
even if his personal knowledge was based on facts relayed to him
by his clients and on authentic records since he was not privy to
the antecedents of the case.[21]

The Court of Appeals stated that while the employees merely

alleged that they were no longer allowed to report to work on a
particular day, Novo Jeans was able to present the First Notice of
Termination of Employment sent to them, asking them to explain
their sudden absence from work without proper authorization. It
likewise found that the Notices of Termination of Employment
(Notices) did not indicate that the employees were dismissed or
that they were prevented from entering the stores.[22]

According to the Court of Appeals, the equipoise rule was

inapplicable in this case since it only applied when the evidence
between the parties was equally balanced. Considering that only
Novo Jeans was able to present proof of its claims, the Court of
Appeals was inclined to rule in its favor.[23] Thus, the Court of
Appeals concluded that the case involved voluntary termination of
employment, not illegal dismissal.[24] The dispositive portion of
its Decision read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant

Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated June 25, 2012 and Resolution dated August 24,
2012 rendered by the National Labor Relations
Commission in NLRC LAC No. 07-001930-11/NLRC
NCR Cases No. 08-10645-10, 08-10649-10, 08-
 10655-10, 08-10660-10, 08-10662-10, 08-10666-10
and 08-10670-10 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Corollarily, the Decision dated May 31, 2011
rendered by the Labor Arbiter is hereby
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.[25]

The employees filed a Motion for Reconsideration[26] but it was

denied in the Court of Appeals May 30, 2013 Resolution.[27]
Hence, this Petition[28] was filed before this Court.

Petitioners point out that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding
grave abuse of discretion, considering that the petition filed before
it was a special civil action for certiorari. They aver that the Court
of Appeals should not have used the special remedy of certiorari
merely to re-evaluate the findings of a quasi-judicial body absent
any finding of grave abuse of discretion.[29]

Petitioners likewise argue that respondents were unable to

substantially comply with the verification requirement before the
Court of Appeals. They submit that respondents' counsel would
have been privy to the antecedents of the case so as to have
personal knowledge and not merely knowledge as relayed by his
clients.[30] They add that respondents "deliberately withheld the
Annexes of the Position Paper of the Petitioners submitted to the
Labor Arbiter[;] hence, said Position Paper cannot be considered
authentic."[31]

Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals had no factual basis to

rule in respondents' favor since there was no evidence to prove
that the Notices were sent to petitioners at their last known
addresses. The evidence on record merely showed sample letters
of the Notices.[32] Petitioners maintain that this is a situation
where the employees allege that they were prevented from
entering their work place and the employer alleges otherwise.
They insist that if doubt exists between the evidence presented by
the employer and the evidence presented by the employees, the
doubt must be resolved in favor of the employees, consistent with
the Labor Code's policy to afford protection to labor.[33]

On the other hand, respondents argue that a defect in the

verification will not necessarily cause the dismissal of the
pleading and that they had sufficiently complied with the
requirement when the affiant attested that the petition was based
on facts relayed by his clients and on authentic records.[34] They
also point out that only relevant and pertinent documents should
be attached to their pleadings before the courts; thus, the annexes
of petitioner, not being relevant or pertinent, need not be attached
to their pleadings.[35]

Respondents contend that the Court of Appeals recognized that

the issue in their Petition for Certiorari concerned the alleged
grave abuse of discretion of the National Labor Relations
Commission and thoroughly discussed the issue in the assailed
judgment.[36] They likewise submit that the Court of Appeals may
review factual findings of the National Labor Relations
Commission since the finding of grave abuse of discretion
requires a re-examination of the sufficiency or absence of
evidence.[37]

Respondents maintain that the receipt of the Notices was admitted

and recognized by the parties before the Labor Arbiter and was
never brought as an issue until the National Labor Relations
Commission made a finding that the Notices were never received.
[38] According to respondents, petitioners were estopped from
questioning the receipt of the Notices when they already admitted
to their receipt before the Labor Arbiter.[39] They argue that the
Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals did not err in finding that
the termination of employment was voluntary since petitioners
failed to present evidence of the fact of their dismissal.[40]

The main issue before this Court is whether or not petitioners

were illegally dismissed by respondents. However, there are
certain procedural issues that must first be addressed, in
particular: (1) whether or not the Court of Appeals may, in a
petition for certiorari, review and re-assess the factual findings of
the National Labor Relations Commission; and (2) whether or not
verification based on facts relayed to the affiant by his clients is
valid.

Before discussing the merits of the case, this Court takes this
opportunity to clarify certain doctrines regarding the review of
factual findings by the Court of Appeals.

Factual findings of labor officials exercising quasi-judicial

functions are accorded great respect and even finality by the
courts when the findings are supported by substantial evidence.
[41] Substantial evidence is "the amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."[42] Thus, in labor cases, the issues in petitions for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals are limited only to whether
the National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse
of discretion.

However, this does not mean that the Court of Appeals is

conclusively bound by the findings of the National Labor
Relations Commission. If the findings are arrived at arbitrarily,
without resort to any substantial evidence, the National Labor
Relations Commission is deemed to have gravely abused its
discretion:

On this matter, the settled rule is that factual findings

of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired
expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are
generally accorded not only respect but even finality
by the courts when supported by substantial evidence,
i.e., the amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. We emphasize, nonetheless, that these
findings are not infallible. When there is a showing
that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of
the evidence on record, they may be examined by the
courts. The [Court of Appeals] can then grant a
petition for certiorari if it finds that the [National
Labor Relations Commission], in its assailed decision
or resolution, has made a factual finding that is not
supported by substantial evidence. It is within the
jurisdiction of the [Court of Appeals], whose
jurisdiction over labor cases has been expanded to
review the findings of the [National Labor Relations
Commission].[43]

The Court of Appeals may also review factual findings if quasi­‐

judicial agencies' findings are contradictory to its own findings.
[44] Thus, it must re-examine the records to determine which
tribunal's findings were supported by the evidence.

In this instance, the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor

Relations Commission made contradictory factual findings. Thus,
it was incumbent on the Court of Appeals to re-examine their
findings to resolve the issues before it. The Court of Appeals also
found that the findings of the National Labor Relations
Commission were not supported by substantial evidence, and
therefore, were rendered in grave abuse of discretion.

Thus, in the determination of whether the National Labor

Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion, the
Court of Appeals may re-examine facts and re-assess the
evidence. However, its findings may still be subject to review by
this Court.

This Court notes that in cases when the Court of Appeals acts as
an appellate court, it is still a trier of facts. Questions of fact may
still be raised by the parties. If the parties raise pure questions of
law, they may directly file with this Court. Moreover,
contradictory factual findings between the National Labor
Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals do not
automatically justify this Court's review of the factual findings.
They merely present a prima facie basis to pursue the action
before this Court. The need to review the Court of Appeals'
factual findings must still be pleaded, proved, and substantiated
by the party alleging their inaccuracy. This Court likewise retains
its full discretion to review the factual findings.

II

All petitions for certiorari are required to be verified upon filing.

[45] The contents of verification are stated under Rule 7, Section 4
of the Rules of Court:

Section 4. Verification. Except when otherwise

specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not
be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant

has read the pleading and that the allegations therein
 are true and correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a

verification based on "information and belief", or upon
"knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

Thus, for a pleading to be verified, the affiant must attest that he

or she has read the pleading and that the allegations are true and
correct based on his or her personal knowledge or on authentic
records. Otherwise, the pleading is treated as an unsigned
pleading.

Shipside Incorporation v. Court of Appeals[46] required that the

assurance should "not [be] the product of the imagination or a
matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith."
[47] However, verification is merely a formal, not jurisdictional,
requirement. It will not result in the outright dismissal of the case
since courts may simply order the correction of a defective
verification.[48]

Petitioners argue that respondents' verification was invalid since it

was not based on authentic records, alleging that respondents'
failure to attach petitioners' position paper annexes to their
Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals made their
records inauthentic.[49]

A pleading may be verified by attesting that the allegations are

based either on personal knowledge and on authentic records, or
on personal knowledge or on authentic records. The use of either,
however, is not subject to the affiant's whim but rather on the
nature of the allegations being attested to. Circumstances may
require that the affiant attest that the allegations are based only on
personal knowledge or only on authentic records. Certainly, there
can be situations where the affiant must attest to the allegations
being based on both personal knowledge and on authentic records,
thus:

A reading of the above-quoted Section 4 of Rule 7

indicates that a pleading may be verified under either
of the two given modes or under both. The veracity of
the allegations in a pleading may be affirmed based on
either one's own personal knowledge or on authentic
records, or both, as warranted. The use of the
[conjunction] "or" connotes that either source qualifies
as a sufficient basis for verification and, needless to
state, the concurrence of both sources is more than
sufficient. Bearing both a disjunctive and conjunctive
sense, this parallel legal signification avoids a
construction that will exclude the combination of the
alternatives or bar the efficacy of any one of the
alternatives standing alone.

Contrary to petitioner's position, the range of

permutation is not left to the pleader's liking, but is
dependent on the surrounding nature of the allegations
which may warrant that a verification be based either
purely on personal knowledge, or entirely on authentic
records, or on both sources.[50]

Authentic records may be the basis of verification if a substantial

portion of the allegations in the pleading is based on prior court
proceedings.[51] Here, the annexes that respondents allegedly
failed to attach are employee information, supporting documents,
and work-related documents proving that petitioners were
employed by respondents.[52] The fact of petitioners' employment,
however, has not been disputed by respondents. These documents
would not have been the "relevant and pertinent"[53] documents
contemplated by the rules.

Petitioners likewise contend that respondents' Petition for

Certiorari[54] before the Court of Appeals should not have been
given due course since the verification[55] signed by respondents'
counsel, Atty. Eller Roel I. Daclan (Atty. Daclan), attested that:

2. I caused the preparation of the foregoing petition

and attest that, based upon facts relayed to me by my
clients and upon authentic records made available, all
the allegations contained therein are true and correct[.]
[56]

Thus, the issue on verification centers on whether the phrase

"based upon facts relayed to me by my clients" may be considered
sufficient compliance. To resolve this issue, this Court must first
address whether respondents' counsel may sign the verification on
their behalf.

The rules on compliance with the requirement of the verification

and certification of non-forum shopping were already sufficiently
outlined in Altres v. Empleo,[57] where this Court stated:

For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court

restates in capsule form the jurisprudential
pronouncements already reflected above respecting
non-compliance with the requirements on, or
submission of defective, verification and certification
against forum shopping:

1) A distinction must be made between non-

compliance with the requirement on or submission of
defective verification, and non­ compliance with the
requirement on or submission of defective certification
against forum shopping.

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a

defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading
fatally defective. The court may order its submission
or correction or act on the pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the
Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of
justice may be served thereby.

3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with

when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the
truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition
signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct.

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-

compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need
to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial
compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or
compelling reasons".

5) The certification against forum shopping must be

signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case;
otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as
parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense, the signature of
only one of them in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
 6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping
must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his
counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable
reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must
execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his
counsel of record to sign on his behalf.[58]

The policy behind the requirement of verification is to guard

against the filing of fraudulent pleadings. Litigants run the risk of
perjury[59] if they sign the verification despite knowledge that the
stated allegations are not true or are products of mere speculation:

Verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless

formality. Its import must never be sacrificed in the
name of mere expedience or sheer caprice. For what is
at stake is the matter of verity attested by the sanctity
of an oath to secure an assurance that the allegations in
the pleading have been made in good faith, or are true
and correct and not merely speculative.[60]

Thus, for verification to be valid, the affiant must have "ample

knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint
or petition."[61] Facts relayed to the counsel by the client would
be insufficient for counsel to swear to the truth of the allegations
in a pleading. Otherwise, counsel would be able to disclaim
liability for any misrepresentation by the simple expediency of
stating that he or she was merely relaying facts with which he or
she had no competency to attest to. For this reason, the Rules of
Court require no less than personal knowledge of the facts to
sufficiently verify a pleading.

Respondents' counsel, not having sufficient personal knowledge

to attest to the allegations of the pleading, was not able to validly
verify the facts as stated. Therefore, respondents' Petition for
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals should have been
considered as an unsigned pleading.

Respondents' certification of non-forum shopping is likewise

defective. The certification of non-forum shopping must be signed
by the litigant, not his or her counsel. The litigant may, for
justifiable reasons, execute a special power of attorney to
authorize his or her counsel to sign on his or her behalf.[62] In this
instance, the verification and certification against forum
shopping[63] was contained in one (1) document and was signed
by respondents' counsel, Atty. Daclan.

Corporations, not being natural persons, may authorize their

lawyers through a Secretary's Certificate to execute physical acts.
Among these acts is the signing of documents, such as the
certification against forum shopping. A corporation's inability to
perform physical acts is considered as a justifiable reason to allow
a person other than the litigant to sign the certification against
forum shopping.[64] By the same reasoning, partnerships, being
artificial entities, may also authorize an agent to sign the
certification on their behalf.

Respondents include three (3) corporations, one (1) partnership,

and three (3) sole proprietorships. Respondents LSG
Manufacturing Corporation, Asia Consumer Value Trading, Inc.,
and Wantofree Oriental Trading, Inc. submitted Secretary's
Certificates[65] authorizing Atty. Daclan to sign on their behalf.
On the other hand, respondent HSY Marketing Ltd., Co.
submitted a Partnership Certification.[66] Meanwhile, respondents
Alexander Arqueza (Arqueza), proprietor of Fabulous Jeans and
Shirt and General Merchandise, Rosario Q. Co (Co), proprietor of
Unite General Merchandise, and Lucia Pun Ling Yeung (Yeung),
proprietor of Coen Fashion House & General Merchandise,
submitted Special Powers of Attorney[67] on their behalf.

However, sole proprietorships, unlike corporations, have no

separate legal personality from their proprietors.[68] They cannot
claim the inability to do physical acts as a justifiable circumstance
to authorize their counsel to sign on their behalf. Since there was
no other reason given for authorizing their counsel to sign on their
behalf, respondents Arqueza, Co, and Yeung's certification against
forum shopping is invalid.

While courts may simply order the resubmission of the

verification or its subsequent correction,[69] a defect in the
certification of non-forum shopping is not curable[70] unless there
are substantial merits to the case.[71]

However, respondents' Petition for Certiorari before the Court of

Appeals was unmeritorious. Thus, its defective verification and
certification of non-forum shopping should have merited its
outright dismissal.

III

When the evidence of the employer and the employee are in

equipoise, doubts are resolved in favor of labor.[72] This is in line
with the policy of the State to afford greater protection to labor.
[73]

Petitioners allege that they were illegally dismissed from service

when they were prevented from entering their work premises a
day after airing their grievance in a radio show. On the other hand,
respondents deny this allegation and state that petitioners were
never dismissed from employment.
In illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof is on the employer
to prove that the employee was dismissed for a valid cause and
that the employee was afforded due process prior to the dismissal.
[74]

Respondents allege that there was no dismissal since they sent

petitioners a First Notice of Termination of Employment, asking
them to show cause why they should not be dismissed for their
continued absence from work. However, petitioners argue that this
evidence should not be given weight since there is no proof that
they received this Notice.

Indeed, no evidence has been presented proving that each and

every petitioner received a copy of the First Notice of Termination
of Employment. There are no receiving copies or
acknowledgement receipts. What respondents presented were
"Sample Letters of Respondents"[75] and not the actual Notices
that were allegedly sent out.

While petitioners admitted that the Notices may have been sent,
they have never actually admitted to receiving any of them. In
their Position Paper before the Labor Arbiter and in their
Memorandum of Appeal before the National Labor Relations
Commission:

On June 7, 2010, all employees who went to complain

against the respondent[s] were not allowed to enter the
stores of respondent[s]. The next day, respondent[s]
sent letter[s] to the employees purporting to be a show
cause letter but the truth of the matter is that all
employees who went to the office of Tulfo to complain
against the respondent[s] were already terminated[.]
[76]
The lack of evidence of petitioners' receipts suggests that the
Notices were an afterthought, designed to free respondents from
any liability without having to validly dismiss petitioners.

There is likewise no proof that petitioners abandoned their

employment. To constitute abandonment, the employer must
prove that "first, the employee must have failed to report for work
or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and
second, [that] there must have been a clear intention on the part of
the employee to sever the employer-employee relationship
manifested by some overt act."[77]

Abandonment is essentially a matter of intent. It cannot be

presumed from the occurrence of certain equivocal acts.[78] There
must be a positive and overt act signifying an employee's
deliberate intent to sever his or her employment. Thus, mere
absence from work, even after a notice to return, is insufficient to
prove abandonment.[79] The employer must show that the
employee unjustifiably refused to report for work and that the
employee deliberately intended to sever the employer-employee
relation. Furthermore, there must be a concurrence of these two
(2) elements.[80] Absent this concurrence, there can be no
abandonment.

Respondents have not presented any proof that petitioners

intended to abandon their employment. They merely alleged that
petitioners have already voluntarily terminated their employment
due to their continued refusal to report for work. However, this is
insufficient to prove abandonment.

Where both parties in a labor case have not presented substantial

evidence to prove their allegations, the evidence is considered to
be in equipoise. In such a case, the scales of justice are tilted in
favor of labor. Thus, petitioners are hereby considered to have
been illegally dismissed.

This Court notes that had petitioners been able to substantially

prove their dismissal, it would have been rendered invalid not
only for having been made without just cause[81] but also for
being in violation of their constitutional rights. A laborer does not
lose his or her right to freedom of expression upon employment.
[82] This is "[a] political [right] essential to man's enjoyment of his
[or her] life, to his [or her] happiness, and to his [or her] full and
complete fulfillment."[83] While the Constitution and the courts
recognize that employers have property rights that must also be
protected, the human rights of laborers are given primacy over
these rights. Property rights may prescribe. Human rights do not.
[84]

When laborers air out their grievances regarding their

employment in a public forum, they do so in the exercise of their
right to free expression. They are "fighting for their very survival,
utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution—the
untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights."[85]
Freedom and social justice afford them these rights and it is the
courts' duty to uphold and protect their free exercise. Thus,
dismissing employees merely on the basis that they complained
about their employer in a radio show is not only invalid, it is
unconstitutional.

However, there not being sufficient proof that the dismissal was
meant to suppress petitioners' constitutional rights, this Court is
constrained to limit its conclusions to that of illegal dismissal
under the Labor Code.

Petitioners were not dismissed under any of the causes mentioned

in Article 279 [282][86] of the Labor Code. They were not validly
informed of the causes of their dismissal. Thus, their dismissal
was illegal.

An employee who is found to have been illegally dismissed is

entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges.[87] If reinstatement proves to be impossible due to the
strained relations between the parties, the illegally dismissed
employee is entitled instead to separation pay.[88]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The February 25,

2013 Decision and May 30, 2013 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR. SP No. 126522 are SET ASIDE.
Respondents are DIRECTED to reinstate petitioners to their
former positions without loss of seniority rights or other
privileges.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Bersamin, Martires, and Gesmundo,

JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 10-51.

[2] Id. at 53-64. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice

Franchito N. Diamante and concurred in by Associate Justices
Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and Melchor Q.C. Sadang of the
Fifteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

[3] Id. at 66-68. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice

Franchito N. Diamante and concurred in by Associate Justices
Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and Melchor Q.C. Sadang of the
Fifteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
[4] Id. at 163, Labor Arbiter Decision.

[5] Id. at 163-165, Labor Arbiter Decision and 205-207, NLRC

Decision. These employees were Charlie Hubilla, Joel Nayre,
Nenita A. Tan, Pedro Magallanes, Jr., Arnel Yuson, Janice
Cabatbat, Judy Papina, Vanessa Espiritu, Noemi Yalung, Genalyn
Rescobillo, Fidel Zaquita, Nyl B. Calingasan, Janice Miradora,
Evangeline Chua, Roschelle Mission, Melanie Ballesteros,
Marilyn Bacalso, Renalyn Alcantara, Federico B. Viernes,
Christopher B. Yares, Ana Mary R. Aguilar, Melanie San Marcos,
Emerlove Monte, Chonalyn Lucas, Theresa Malicosio, Ma. Fe
Cercares, Rubelyn R. Claro, Jonalyn M. Yalung, Mary Ann V.
Macanag, Reslyn L. Flores, Cristel C. Roque, Teresa G. Munar,
Susan A. Dela Cruz, Sheena Kay P. De Vera, Arlene R. Anes, Gina
B. Binibini, Cherine V. Zorilla, Ma. Cristine Magtoto, Francis
Marie O. De Castro, Vanessa R. Espiritu, Rachelle V. Quistoria,
Julie Ann Ilan, Angelie F. Panotes, Anabel Payos, Melissa M.
Perlas, Barvi Rose Peralta, Resie Aque, Rowena Rivera, Melanie
M. Dy, Cherylyn Coro, Ranelyn Subong, Angela Subillaga,
Thelma Bartolabac, Michelle C. Ilagan, Precious Mae De
Guzman, Mary Caroline Colina, Frelyn Hipolito, Myline A.
Callos, Janeth B. Sembillo, Lea Lyn F. Ferranco, May C. Santos,
Roselle A. Noble, Jennifer D. Suyom, Warren Petchie C. Cajes,
Rowelyn F. Catalan, Reizel Ann A. Alegre, Demetria B. Perez,
Genalyn Osoc, Juvilyn N. Neri, Joy B. Pimentel, Airene Layon,
Mary Joy Turqueza, Mary Ann Valentin, Rosie L. Niebres, Melca
Mallorca, Joy Cagatcagat, Diana Camara, Marivel Dijumo, Sheila
Dela Cruz, Elizabeth Aringo, Melanie G. Tria, Gretchen D. Mejos,
and Janelie R. Jimenez.

[6] Id. at 166, Labor Arbiter Decision.

[7] Id.
[8] Id. at 166-167, Labor Arbiter Decision.

[9] Id. at 161-172.

[10] Id. at 169.

[11] Id. at 170.

[12] Id. at 172.

[13] Id. at 174-191.

[14]Id. at 205-230. The Decision was penned by Presiding

Commissioner Joseph Gerard E. Mabilog and concurred in by
Commissioners Isabel G. Panganiban-Ortiguerra and Nieves E.
Vivar-De Castro of the Sixth Division, National Labor Relations
Commission, Quezon City.

[15] Id. at 212.

[16] Id. at 215-230.

[17] Id. at 233-256.

[18]Id. at 257-261. The Resolution was penned by Presiding

Commissioner Joseph Gerard E. Mabilog and concurred in by
Commissioners Isabel G. Panganiban-Ortiguerra and Nieves E.
Vivar-De Castro of the Sixth Division, National Labor Relations
Commission, Quezon City.

[19] Id. at 275-325.

[20] Id. at 53-54.

[21] Id. at 61.

[22] Id. at 61-62.

[23] Id. at 62.

[24] Id. at 63.

[25] Id. at 63-64.

[26] Id. at 467-473.

[27] Id. at 66-68.

[28] Id. at 10-51. Respondents filed their Comment on September

30, 2013 (rollo, pp. 494-524) to which petitioners filed their
Reply on February 12, 2014 (rollo, pp. 526-541). The parties were
then directed by this Court to submit their respective memoranda
(rollo, pp. 544-582 and 583-607) on March 31, 2014 (rollo, pp.
543-543-A).

[29] Id. at 589-590.

[30] Id. at 599-A-600.

[31] Id. at 603.

[32] Id. at 594-597.

[33] Id. at 598-599.

[34] Id. at 552-554.

[35] Id. at 555-556.

[36] Id. at 560-567.

[37] Id. at 569-570.

[38] Id. at 571.

[39] Id. at 572.

[40] Id. at 574.

[41]See Norkis Trading Corporation v. Buenavista, 697 Phil. 74

(2012) [Per J. Reyes, First Division].

[42]Norkis Trading Corporation v. Buenavista, 697 Phil. 74, 91

(2012) [Per J. Reyes, First Division].

[43] Id. citing Prince Transport, Inc. v. Garcia, 654 Phil. 296
(2011) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division] and Emcor Incorporated
v. Sienes, 615 Phil. 33 (2009) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].

[44]See General Milling Corporation v. Viajar, 702 Phil. 532

(2013) [Per J. Reyes, First Division].

[45] See RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, sec. 1 provides:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any

tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or
 his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true

copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject
thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant
and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-
forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of
Section 3, Rule 46.

[46] 404 Phil. 981 (2001) [Per J. Melo, Third Division].

[47] Id. at 995.

[48]See Jimenez vda. De Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil.

157 (1996) [Per J. Vitug, First Division].

[49] Rollo, p. 603.

[50]Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, 544 Phil. 431, 438-439
(2007) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division] citing Bautista v.
Sandiganbayan, 387 Phil. 872, 881-882 (2000) [Per J. Bellosillo,
Second Division] and China Banking Corporation v. HDMF, 366
Phil. 913 (1999) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division].
[51]See Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, 544 Phil. 431 (2007)
[Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division]

[52] Rollo, p. 102.

[53] RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, sec. 1.

[54] Rollo, pp. 275-325.

[55] Id. at 313.

[56] Id.

[57] 594 Phil. 246 (2008) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].

[58]Id. at 261-262 citing Sari-Sari Group of Companies, Inc. v.

Piglas-Kamao, 583 Phil. 564 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez,
Third Division]; Rombe Eximtrade (Phils.), Inc. v. Asiatrust
Development Bank, 586 Phil. 810 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr.,
Second Division]; Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of
the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation, 573 Phil.
320 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Juaban v.
Espina, 572 Phil. 357 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third
Division]; Pacquing v. Coca-Cola Philippines, Inc., 567 Phil. 323
(2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Marcopper
Mining Corporation v. Solidbank Corporation, 476 Phil. 415
(2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division]; Fuentebella v.
Castro, 526 Phil. 668 (2006) [Per J. Azcuna, Second Division];
and Eslaban, Jr. v. Vda. de Onorio, 412 Phil. 667 (2001) [Per J.
Mendoza, Second Division].

[59] See REV. PEN. CODE, art. 183 which states:

 Article 183. False Testimony in other cases and perjury
in solemn affirmations. The penalty of arresto mayor
in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any person
who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not
being included in the provisions of the next preceding
articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit,
upon any material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the
law so requires.

[60]Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, 544 Phil. 431, 439
(2007) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division] citing Grogun,
Incorporation v. National Power Corp., 458 Phil. 217, 230-231
(2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division] and Clavecilla v.
Quitain, 518 Phil. 53 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, First
Division].

[61]
Altres v. Empleo, 594 Phil. 246, 261 (2008) [Per J. Carpio
Morales, En Banc].

[62]
See Altres v. Empleo, 594 Phil. 246 (2008) [Per J. Carpio
Morales, En Banc].

[63] Rollo, p. 313.

[64]See BA Savings Bank v. Sia, 391 Phil. 370 (2000) [Per J.

Panganiban, Third Division].

[65] Rollo, pp. 314-315, 320-321, and 322-323.

[66] Id. at 317-318.

[67] Id. at 316, 319, and 324.

[68]
See Mangila v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 870 (2002) [Per J.
Carpio, Third Division].

[69]See vda. De Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 157 (1996)

[Per J. Vitug, First Division].

[70]
See Altres v. Empleo, 594 Phil. 246 (2008) [Per J. Carpio
Morales, En Banc].

[71]
See Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 442 (2000) [Per J.
Kapunan, First Division].

[72] Mobile Protective & Detective Agency v. Ompad, 494 Phil.

621, 635 (2005) [Per J. Puno, Second Division] citing Asuncion
vs. NLRC, 414 Phil. 329 (2001) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].

[73] See LABOR CODE, sec. 4 and CONST., art. II, sec. 18.

[74] See Ledesma v. National Labor Relations Commission, 562

Phil. 939 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].

[75] Rollo, p. 56, see footnote 3.

[76] Id. at 103 and 177.

[77]MZR Industries v. Colambot, 716 Phil. 617, 627 (2013) [Per J.

Peralta, Third Division] citing Samarca v. Arc-Men Industries,
Inc., 459 Phil. 506, 515 (2003) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third
Division]; MSMG-UWP v. Hon. Ramos, 383 Phil. 329, 371-372
(2000) [Per J. Purisima, Third Division]; Icawat v. NLRC, 389
Phil. 441, 445 (2000) [Per J. Buena, Second Division]; Standard
Electric Manufacturing Corporation v. Standard Electric
Employees Union-NAFLU-KMU, 418 Phil. 411, 427 (2005) [Per
J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division]; Seven Star Textile
Company v. Dy, 541 Phil. 468 (2007) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Third
Division].

[78] See Samarca v. Arc-Men Industries, 459 Phil. 506 (2003) [Per
J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division].

[79]See Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association-

NATU v. The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., 147 Phil. 194
(1971) [Per J. Castro, En Banc].

[80]See Hodieng Concrete Products v. Emilia, 491 Phil. 434

(2005) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division].

[81]See LABOR CODE, art. 282 on the acts and omissions

constituting just causes for termination.

[82] See CONST., art. III, sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging
the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances.

[83] Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization v.

Philippine Blooming Mills Co., 151-A Phil. 656, 675 (1973) [Per
J. Makasiar, En Banc].

[84]See Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization v.

Philippine Blooming Mills Co., 151-A Phil. 656 (1973) [Per J.
Makasiar, En Banc].
[85] Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization v.
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., 151-A Phil. 656, 678 (1973) [Per
J. Makasiar, En Banc].

[86] LABOR CODE, art. 297 [282] provides:

Article 297 [282]. Termination by employer. An

employer may terminate an employment for any of the
following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the

employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his
duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee
against the person of his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized
representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

[87]See LABOR CODE, art. 294 [279]. See also Pepsi Cola
Products v. Molon, 704 Phil. 120 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe,
Second Division].

[88]See Kingsize Manufacturing Co. v. National Labor Relations

Commission, 308 Phil. 367 (1994) (Per J. Mendoza, Second
Division).
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