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Plato s Sophist Revisited 1st Edition Beatriz Bossi Digital
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Author(s): Beatriz Bossi, Thomas M. Robinson
ISBN(s): 9783110287134, 3110287137
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Language: english
Plato’s Sophist Revisited
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Plato’s Sophist Revisited
Edited by
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Thomas M. Robinson

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 Preface
This book consists of a selection of papers presented at the International
Spring Seminar on Plato’s Sophist (26 – 31 May 2009, Centro de Ciencias
de Benasque ‘Pedro Pascual’, Spain) with the financial support of MI-
CINN, CSIC, Universidad de Zaragoza and Gobierno de Aragón.
The Conference was organized by the editors, under the auspices of
the Director of the Centre, Prof. José Ignacio Latorre, who provided
invaluable assistance at every stage of the Conference, up to its close
with a lecture on Quantum Physics for Philosophers.
The aim of the conference was the promotion of Plato studies in
Spain in the framework of discussions with a number of international
scholars of distinction in the field, whilst at the same time looking afresh
at one of Plato’s most philosophically profound dialogues. Readers will
find papers by scholars from Spain (Bernabé, Bossi, Casadesús, de Garay,
Monserrat, Solana), France (Cordero, Narcy, O’Brien), Italy (Fronter-
otta, Palumbo), Portugal (Mesquita), Mexico (Hülsz), Chile (Sandoval)
and the Anglo-Saxon orbit (Ambuel, Dorter, Robinson).
The papers included fall into three broad categories: a) those dealing
directly with the ostensible aim of the dialogue, the definition of a so-
phist; b) a number which tackle a specific question that is raised in the
dialogue, namely how Plato relates to Heraclitus and to Parmenides in
the matter of his understanding of being and non-being; and c) those
discussing various other broad issues brought to the fore in the dialogue,
such as the ‘greatest kinds’, true and false statement, difference and mim-
esis.
The volume opens with a paper by T. M. Robinson which argues
that the final definition of the Sophist might well reflect the (very neg-
ative) views of the later Plato on sophists, but is unlikely to reflect the
views of Socrates, who would almost certainly have wished to exclude
Protagoras from so drastic a portrayal. F. Casadesús lays stress on Plato’s
description of sophists as slippery Proteans, who, though greatly skilled
in evading capture, can still be captured in the end by dialectic. J. Mon-
serrat and P. Sandoval argue that the search to define a sophist leads tan-
gentially but very fruitfully to a description of what a philosopher is, i. e.,
an endless enquirer into Being. And A. Bernabé offers evidence to show
that religious concepts anchor the whole argumentation of the sixth def-
VI Preface

inition of the sophist (26b-231c); a sophist is at base ‘a false prophet of a

false religion who promises a false purification’.
A paper by M. Narcy offers a careful description of the first five at-
tempts to define a sophist, concluding with a strong statement of how
Socrates might meaningfully have considered himself a sophist (as he ap-
parently was by some Eleans), though with the caveat, voiced by the
Stranger, that his own sophistry, unlike that of others, is ‘faithful to its
lineage’. The idea that there might be different types of sophistry is fur-
ther pursued by J. Solana, who, like Bernabé, examines the famous sixth
definition of a sophist, where sophistry is said to purify the soul by a
maieutic method which seems remarkably if not indeed uniquely Soc-
ratic, and he contrasts the (epistemological) catharsis brought about by
such genuine sophistry (characterized as that of ‘noble lineage’) with
that of the other forms of sophistry which Plato scrutinizes. A final
paper in this section, by K. Dorter, examines the question of the pecu-
liar technique of division employed by Socrates to reach a definition of
the sophist, that of bisection, by contrast with the method of natural
joints between species which we find in the Phaedrus and Philebus.
In the book’s central section, E. Hülsz argues that a brief but signif-
icant reference in the Sophist to Heraclitus offers evidence that Plato was
aware of the intimate relation between being, unity and identity in Her-
aclitus, and that this serves as a useful counterweight to the stress on his
doctrine of flux which we find in the Cratylus and Theaetetus. On the
question of whether Parmenides’ doctrine of non-being is destroyed
by Plato in the Sophist, D. O’Brien argues colourfully and at length
that no such thing happens; B. Bossi that something is indeed demolish-
ed, but that what is demolished is in fact a caricature of Parmenides’
thought put together by the Eleatic Stranger; and A. P. Mesquita that
Parmenides’ doctrine of non-being is merely re-fashioned in the Sophist,
i. e., as something ‘other’; it is never refuted. In this re-fashioning, he
maintains, Plato sets out to show that one can talk without contradiction
of being either absolutely and ‘in itself’ or relatively and ‘in relation to
something other’. The section concludes with a paper by N. L. Cordero
which discusses at length the centrality of the doctrine of separation of
Forms and sense-world in Plato, and shows how, in the Sophist, the ‘rel-
ative non-being’ of each Form makes it constitutively ‘other’ than any
and all other Forms, and how this opens up the possibility of meaningful
thought and speech.
The final section of the book begins with a closely-argued discus-
sion, by F. Fronterotta, of ontology, predication and truth in the Sophist,
 Preface VII

which emphasizes the importance of separating falsehood from what-is-

not and situates it in the connection of subject and predicate. J. de
Garay, writing on a topic closely germane to this, discusses falsehood
and negation in the Sophist, but this time as understood by Proclus.
D. Ambuel, in a broad ranging discussion of the megista gene, argues
that the analysis by which the gene are differentiated in the dialogue is
an exercise in studied ambiguities informed by an Eleatic logic of strict
dichotomy that was underpinning of the Sophist’s method of division.
By this dialectical drill, Plato shows that the metaphysics underlying
the Visitor’s method fails to adequately distinguish what it means to
be a character, and therefore remains inadequate to track down the so-
phist or to distinguish him from the philosopher: Eleaticism, as critically
examined by Plato, proves to be means to disguise, not to discover the
sophist. The section (and the book) concludes with a wide-ranging
paper by L. Palumbo which sets out to show that in the Sophist falsity
is closely linked to mimesis, all falsity being for Plato mimetic though
not every mimesis false.
During the Conference there was a video presentation by C. Kahn
which provoked a fruitful debate with D. O’Brien and N. Notomi.
After the sessions, informal meetings gave young researchers the oppor-
tunity to discuss ideas with A. Bernabé, N. Cordero and T.M. Robin-
son.
Finally, we should like to thank Prof. Germán Sierra for his aid and
encouragement from the very beginning; without his support the Con-
ference would have never taken place. We are also deeply grateful to
Tracey Paterson, David Fuentes and Anna Gili for their warm hospital-
ity and for their valuable help with the overall organization of the Con-
ference, including a visit to the waterfalls, which took us out of the
‘Academy’ for a memorable afternoon in the woods.

The editors, Spring 2012

 Contents

I. Defining Sophistry

Thomas M. Robinson
Protagoras and the Definition of ‘Sophist’ in the Sophist . . . . . 3
Francesc Casadesús Bordoy
Why is it so Difficult to Catch a Sophist? Pl. Sph. 218d3 and
261a5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Josep Monserrat Molas and Pablo Sandoval Villarroel
Plato’s Enquiry concerning the Sophist as a Way towards
‘Defining’ Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Alberto Bernabé
The Sixth Definition (Sophist 226a – 231c):
Transposition of Religious Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Michel Narcy
Remarks on the First Five Definitions of the Sophist
(Soph. 221c – 235a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
José Solana
Socrates and ‘Noble’ Sophistry (Sophist 226b – 231c) . . . . . . . . 71
Kenneth Dorter
The Method of Division in the Sophist:
Plato’s Second Deuteros Plous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

II. Parricide: Threat or Reality?

Enrique Hülsz
Plato’s Ionian Muses: Sophist 242 d – e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Denis O’Brien
Does Plato refute Parmenides? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
X Contents

Beatriz Bossi
Back to the Point: Plato and Parmenides – Genuine Parricide? 157
Antonio Pedro Mesquita
Plato’s Eleaticism in the Sophist : The Doctrine of Non-Being 175
Néstor-Luis Cordero
The relativization of “separation” (khorismos) in the Sophist . . . 187

III. Mimesis, Image and Logos

Francesco Fronterotta
Theaetetus sits – Theaetetus flies. Ontology, predication and
truth in Plato’s Sophist (263a – d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Jesús de Garay
Difference and Negation: Plato’s Sophist in Proclus . . . . . . . . . 225
David Ambuel
Difference in Kind: Observations on the Distinction
of the Megista Gene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
Lidia Palumbo
Mimesis in the Sophist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
Index Locorum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
I. Defining Sophistry
 Protagoras and the Definition
of ‘Sophist’ in the Sophist
Thomas M. Robinson

I should like to begin by setting out as clearly as I can what seem to be

the main things that can be said about Protagoras, and offer an evalua-
tion of them. This will be in large part without reference to the final
definition of ‘sophist’ in the Sophist. I shall then turn to the definition,
and see where if anywhere it appears to fit into the picture, and what
can be said about the definition as a definition.
Let me begin with the claim that, like many sophists, Protagoras
thought that arete was teachable,1 and made it his business to teach it.
On the face of it, this does not seem too extravagant a claim, once
we realize that the basic meaning of arete was ‘efficiency’, as emerges
very clearly in a strong argument by Socrates in the closing lines of Re-
public 1 (352d ff.) A pruning knife has arete if it cuts well; a war-horse has
arete if it gets its rider safely into and out of battle, etc. A person has arete
if he/she has appropriate skills in the social and political sphere. And
particularly in the political sphere; we are talking of a world in which
as, Pericles put it, an idiotes, or person centered on himself, is of no
value to the polis.2
So a claim to teach arete in such a context is a claim to be able to
educate the young in, among other things, what it takes to make
one’s contribution to the life of the polis. This in itself seems unexcep-
tionable, unless one is convinced that the only persons qualified to do
the teaching are either parents themselves or persons selected by the pa-
rents in loco parentis. And there were certainly plenty of parents who
made that claim, as seems clear from Aristophanes’ Clouds (cf. Pl.
Prot. 325d7 – 9).
As it happens, in his dialogue Protagoras Plato puts into the mouth of
Protagoras an excellent defense of the view that the young can be given
a good moral and political education just as they can be given a good

1 Pl. Prot.323c3 – 324d1

2 Thuc. 2. 40
4 Thomas M. Robinson

education in mathematics, and the only way Socrates can attack it is in

terms of his own theory that ‘virtue is knowledge’. But the only philos-
ophers who have ever attempted to defend this extravagant view were
Socrates and Plato themselves; its weaknesses were rapidly pointed out
by Aristotle, with his careful distinction, in the Nicomachean Ethics, be-
tween moral and intellectual virtues,3 and it has never seemed convinc-
ing since.
So what we are left with (323c ff.) is Protagoras’ very fine defense of
what now seems to most people more or less self-evident, and that is
that there is such a thing as moral and political education. Naturally,
this does not involve the extravagant rider that such education can
make a person good, any more than one can compel a horse led to
water to drink. We remain free and responsible agents. So much so
that Protagoras, in the same dialogue, cites the educational value of pun-
ishment seen as deterrence. The passage is worth a second hearing
(324a ff.):
‘No one punishes those who do wrong, simply concentrating on the fact
that the man had done wrong in the past, unless he is taking blind venge-
ance like a wild animal. Someone who aims to punish in a rational way …
does so for the sake of the future, so that neither the wrongdoer himself nor
anyone else who sees him punished will do wrong again. A man who holds
this view considers that virtue can be taught by education. For at the very
least he is punishing in order to deter’.
If so far what Protagoras has been saying seems innocuous, and indeed
just common sense, what of the charge against him of impiety, which
led apparently to a conviction and the burning of his books (D. L. Pro-
tag. 3)? As it happens, we have what seems to be a quotation from him
on the matter, as follows:
‘Concerning the gods, I am not in position to know that (or : how) they
are or that (or: how) they are not, or what they are like in appearance; for
there are many things that get in the way of knowledge – the obscurity of
the subject matter and the shortness of life’. (fr. 4 DK)

3 It should, however, be pointed out that the claim seems much less extravagant
once it is made clear that arete was heard by Greeks as an ‘efficiency’ word as
well as a word for ‘virtue’, and that epistasthai served frequently to indicate
knowledge ‘how’. In a word, efficiency in the sphere of action is know-how
in the sphere of action (and who would ever deny that efficiency is or involves
know-how?).
 Protagoras and the Definition of ‘Sophist’ in the Sophist 5

What is being claimed here is somewhat doubtful; a conjunction that

can be translated as either ‘that’ or ‘how’ leaves us in some doubt as
to whether he was saying whether the gods exist or not, or that it
was hard to say anything about the manner of their existence. The
phrase ‘or what they are like in appearance’ might be seen as a suasion
in favor of the latter interpretation, but if it is read as simply a short form
for the longer phrase, ‘or, if they exist, what they look like’, it is no lon-
ger such a suasion. Either way, it is hardly a statement of atheism, as one
ancient critic (Diogenes of Oenoanda) claimed.4 If anything, it might
have been understood as claiming agnosticism about the existence
and/or characteristics of the gods most Greeks believed in, a charge –
‘impiety’ – which was to bring Socrates, too, the death penalty. So in
this Protagoras was in fairly distinguished company, along with Socrates
and Anaxagoras (see D. L. Anaxag. 9).
But again it was something unlikely to endear him to conservative,
anti-Periclean elders alarmed at what the sophists might just be putting
into the heads of their children, especially during a time of a war to the
death with Sparta, when the social cohesiveness underpinned by com-
mon religious beliefs and common socio-political commitments seemed
to be an imperative, not something to be lightly discussed, and possibly
lightly dismissed, by some itinerant sophist.
A third thing that needs to be mentioned is that Protagoras ‘was the
first to say there were two arguments concerning everything, these
being opposed to each other’. (D. L. Protag. 3) And we may actually
have an example of what he was talking about in the Dissoi Logoi, a
document that looks like a little manual of arguments put out by
some sophist in the fourth century, around the time of Socrates’
death.5 In this document a set of arguments is proposed for saying
that good and evil, or beautiful and ugly, or true and false, and so on,
are one and the same, followed immediately by a set of arguments set-
ting out to show that they are different, with little or nothing by way of
discussion about the relative worth of any of the arguments being put
forward.
This sort of thing seems to have led to a lot of opposition, of the
type found in Aristophanes’ Clouds, where a personified ‘Just Argument’
is set up against a personified ‘Unjust Argument’. And one can certainly

4 See G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge 1981), 165

5 See T. M. Robinson, Contrasting Arguments: An Edition of the Dissoi Logoi (New
York: Arno Series, 1979)
6 Thomas M. Robinson

understand any critic who saw this sort of thing as mere intellectual
cleverness, at best worthless, and at worst possibly dangerous, and
Plato provides a good example of it in the logic-chopping of Dionyso-
dorus and Euthydemus in the Euthydemus.
But there is nothing in Protagoras’ own words to suggest support for
any such goings-on. His claim is in fact the perfectly respectable one that
arguments can invariably be found for both sides of any question. It is
not the claim of a Sextus Empiricus, many centuries later, that each
of the two arguments is of equal valence! On the contrary, it should
be read in conjunction with his belief – shared with other sophists,
such as Antiphon (B44 DK) – that some arguments are better or
more ‘straight’ (orthos) than others (A10 DK). Our job as thinkers is sim-
ply to give each side of a question the best run for its money, before
coming to a conclusion as to which side is the stronger.
The same, it might be added, goes for the notorious attribution to
Protagoras by Aristotle6 (possibly alluded to earlier by Aristophanes in
the Clouds [C2 DK]) that he used to ‘make the weaker argument the
stronger’. This may well have been the conclusion of elders hearing
their children, after a session with Protagoras, putting arguments in
favor of things which they were profoundly uncomfortable with. (An
example might just have been, ‘Wisdom is not necessarily something
that only the elderly can lay claim to’). But, as in the case of the ‘two
sides to every argument’ point just mentioned, Protagoras could have
easily defended himself by saying that, had they been participants in
the full discussion, they would rapidly have realized that he was merely
encouraging his students to put the best case for each side of an argu-
ment, including perhaps (or rather, very likely) the often unfashionable
and uncomfortable side. But this is in no sense an attempt to make a
weak-looking argument strong when, upon examination of the evi-
dence, it continues to seem weak. And it also looks remarkably like
what Socrates was up to, among other things, in his discussions with
the young.
Let us look finally at possibly the most famous thing ever attributed
to Protagoras, and that is the statement ‘man is the measure of all things,
of things that are that (or: how) they are, and of things that are not that
(or: how) they are not’. [D. L. Protag. 3] It is a statement rife with am-
biguities on many points.

6 Ar. Rhet. 1402a5 – 28

 Protagoras and the Definition of ‘Sophist’ in the Sophist 7

– By ‘man’ does he mean ‘mankind’ or ‘any given man’? Both inter-

pretations are theoretically possible, and scholars have taken different
sides on the matter, though it is fair to say the majority have opted
for the interpretation ‘any given man’.
– Is he talking about the existence/non-existence of entities, or the
genuineness/non-genuineness of states-of-affairs? Both interpreta-
tions seem theoretically possible, given the fact that the verb einai
can be used of both existence and truth.
– Whether he is talking about existence of entities or genuineness of
states of affairs (or, to complicate things further, possibly both), is he
talking about the fact of such existence/non-existence or such gen-
uineness/non-genuineness or the ways in which various entities exist/
do not exist, or various states-of-affairs are genuine/non-genuine?
This is a very large topic, and worth a piece in itself. But I must be brief-
er. Notoriously, Plato, in the Theaetetus, interpreted the statement as a
claim that, as far as perception at any rate is concerned, I am the sole
arbiter of my own perceptions. If a particular item of food seems bitter
to me, then no-one can gainsay this; that perception is ‘true for me’, and
cannot be made untrue by any statement as to why I have that percep-
tion and others appear not to (for example, I have a sickness, and the
others don’t) [166e – 167a].
With this as his starting point Plato argues in the Theaetetus that the
natural consequence is that ‘all perceptions are true’ [167a – b]. From
this it is a natural step to argue that no perceptions are false; from
that point it is an equally natural-looking step to argue that it is not pos-
sible to say anything that is false; and from that position to conclude that
‘it is not possible to contradict’ (a move made by Dionysodorus and Eu-
thydemus in the Euthydemus).
But here we must demur. It is one thing to argue that these things
are natural conclusions to draw from Plato’s interpretations of Protago-
ras’ famous sentence about ‘man the measure’. But one needs to be sure
that Plato’s interpretation is itself plausible, and then whether, even if it
is plausible, those are indeed natural conclusions following from it. That
others might have been puzzled enough to finish up drawn to a different
interpretation is strongly hinted at when Plato describes the doctrine
(i. e., the doctrine of the infallibility of sensation) as a ‘secret’ doctrine
of Protagoras, to be ‘revealed’ <only?>to his disciples [152c].
As for the things supposedly stemming from the doctrine, it is only in
one dialogue, the Euthydemus, that Plato puts into the mouth of his Soc-
8 Thomas M. Robinson

rates-character the statement (286c) that he has ‘heard this argument

(i. e., about its being impossible to make a false statement and to contra-
dict, TMR) from many people on many occasions – for Protagoras and
those associated with him used to make great use of it, as did others even
earlier than him’. But this is very thin evidence; Socrates is operating
simply on hearsay, not from personally hearing Protagoras on the matter
or reading it in any of his works. The most we might wish to assert, and
then only on the basis of a very late source (Didymus the Blind, fourth
century A. D.), is that Protagoras’ pupil Prodicus did apparently draw
that conclusion.7
Which leads me back to Plato’s interpretation of the term ‘man’, in
the ‘man the measure statement’, as ‘any given man’ rather than ‘man-
kind’. Because, as we saw, both interpretations are linguistically possible.
And, in fact, I would claim, Plato himself was inclined to one or the
other interpretation, depending on what was most on his mind on
any given occasion. In the Theaetetus it is important for him to read
the term as ‘any given man’ to reinforce the view of the infallibility
of sensation. But he did admit that this was a ‘secret’ doctrine of Prota-
goras, and part of the secret, it turns out, may well have been that par-
ticular reading of the term ‘man’. Because on two occasions Plato con-
trasts the doctrine with other possibilities, once in the Theaetetus and
once in the Laws. In the Theaetetus he brings up as an absurdity the
counter-possibility that ‘pig’ might just as well have been proffered by
Protagoras as the measure of all things [161c], and in the Laws he affirms
magisterially, and in clear contradistinction to Protagoras, that, not man,
but God is more appropriately describable as the measure of all things
[716c].
This is, I think, remarkable on a number of counts, not least because
it seems to have as its basis a reading of ‘man’ in Protagoras’ famous sen-
tence as meaning ‘mankind’; what are being contrasted, it seems, are the
non-rational kingdom of animals, the rational kingdom of mankind, and
the supra-rational domain of the divine. On this interpretation of the
term ‘man’ in Protagoras’ statement, he is claiming that only man, the
sole creature that we know for certain to be rational (on occasion),
and no creature from the animal kingdom can claim to adjudicate in
matters of existence and truth. (Whether the gods exist, or whether,
if they exist, we can know anything about their supposed rationality,
he cannot tell, as we saw earlier).

7 For details see Kerferd (above, n. 4) 89 – 90

 Protagoras and the Definition of ‘Sophist’ in the Sophist 9

As for that of which man is the measure, Protagoras’ statement, on

this interpretation, makes it clear that he is no absolute skeptic and no
absolute relativist. There are certain realities/states-of-affairs; but for
their adjudication the presence of a rational mind, that of man, is imper-
ative.
What all this means in practice, I think, is that we need to be careful
to keep separate at all times three different persons or sets of persons:
Protagoras himself and two sets of persons seeing him as in some meas-
ure their precursor. What Protagoras might reasonably be said to have
held, including very likely a doctrine of the infallibility of sensation, I
have just tried to set out. What one line of his would-be disciples, epit-
omized by younger sophists like Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, either
claimed he held, or thought naturally followed from what he held, is
there for all to read in the Euthydemus.
What a second set of followers, like the author of the Dissoi Logoi
and even in some measure, I would say, Socrates, took from him, is a
lot more interesting, and a lot more likely to reflect his real claims to
fame. Each is in agreement with Protagoras that there exist argument
and counter-argument for every question, and it could well be said
that the doctrine is in fact the very spirit of Plato’s dialogues. As for
his skepticism about things divine, Socrates made it very clear, in the
Apology, that this was his own stance, and he was prepared to die in
its defense.
On the matter of the infallibility of sensation, Plato, and very likely
Socrates before him, was very happy to take over the doctrine from Pro-
tagoras (if, that is, it really was his view). And finally, even the ‘man the
measure’ doctrine, which caused so much scandal, was almost certainly
something that Socrates, given his skepticism about things divine, could
easily have accepted.
What I am saying, in a word, is that Socrates, the great humanist,
had a significant predecessor in many regards – Protagoras, another
great humanist, and pride of Abdera.
So far I have painted a fairly positive portrait of Protagoras, in which
he comes across as more of what we might call a humanist than a so-
phist.
I turn now to comments about the sophist leading to Plato’s final
definition of a sophist in the Sophist.
He is, we are told (221c ff.) a hunter of men, who catches his prey,
not in the arena of public discourse (the domain of other huntsmen,
public orators), but by private persuasion in more intimate groupings.
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 BEGINNERS' BOTANY Fig. 6, — Flax Breeding. A '.s a plant
grown for seed production /; f'i.r lil.iv iinMlur.tioii. Wl'.y?
Suggestions. • — 6. Every pupil should undertake at least one simple
experiment in selection of s6ed. He may select kernels from the best
plant of corn in the field, and also from the poorest plant, — having
reference not so much to mere incidental size and vigour of the
plants that may be due to accidental conditions in the field, as to the
apparently constitutional strength and size, number of ears, size of
ears, perfectness of cars and kernels, habit of the plant as to
suckering, and the like. The seeds may be saved and sown the next
year. Every crop can no doubt be very greatly improved by a careful
process of selection extending over a series of years. Crops are
increased in yield or efficiency in three ways: better general care;
enriching the land in which they grow; attention to bre(>dinfT.
numbers of plants with more or less of the desired qualities; from
the best of these, he may again choose ; and so on until the race
becomes greatly improved (Figs. 5, 6, 7). This process of
continuously choosing the most suitable plants is known as
selection. A somewhat similar process proceeds in wild nature, and it
is then known as natural selection. Fig. 7. — Breeding. A, effect from
breeding from smallest grains (after four years), average head; B,
result from breeding from the plumpest and heaviest grains (after
four years), average head.
 CHAPTER IV PLANT SOCIETIES In the long course of time
in which plants have been accommodating themselves to the varying
conditions in which they are obHged to grow, tJiey have become
adapted to every different environment. Certain plants, therefore,
may live together or near each other, all enjoying the same general
conditions and surroundings. These aggregations of plants that are
adapted to similar general conditions are known as plant societies.
Moisture and temperature are the leading factors in determining
plant societies. The great geographical societies or aggregations of
the plant world may conveniently be associated chiefly with the
moisture supply, as : wet-7'egion societies^ comprising aquatic and
bog vegetation (Fig. 8); arid-region societies ^ comprising desert
and most sand-region vegetation ; mid-region societies^ comprising
the mixed vegetation in intermediate regions (Fig. 9), this being the
commonest type. Much of the characteristic scenery of any place is
due to its plant societies. Arid-region plants usually have small and
hard leaves, apparently preventing too rapid loss of water. Usually,
also, they are characterized by stiff growth, hairy covering, spines,
or a much-contracted plant-body, and often by large underground
parts for the storage of water. Plant societies may also be
distinguished with reference to latitude and temperature. There are
tropical societies^ temperate-region societies^ boreal or cold-region
societies. 9
 lO BEGINNERS' BOTANY With reference to altitude,
societies might be classified as lowland (which are chiefly wet-
region), intennediaie (chiefly mid-region), stibalpijie or mid-moimtam
(which are chiefly boreal), alpine or high-moimtain. The above
classifications have reference chiefly to great geographical floras or
societies. But there are societies within societies. There are small
societies coming within the experience of every person who has ever
seen plants Fig. 8. — a Wet-region Society. growing in natural
conditions. There are roadside, fencerow, lawn, thicket, pasture,
dune, woods, cliff, barn-yard societies. Every different place has its
characteristic vegetation. Note the smaller societies in Figs. 8 and 9.
In the former is a water-lily society and a cat-tail society. In the
latter there are grass and bush and woods societies. Some Details of
Plant Societies. — Societies may be composed of scattered and
iiitermingled plants^ or of dense chimps or groups of plants. Dense
clumps or groups are usually made up of one kind of plant, and they
are then
 PLANT SOCIETIES II called colonies. Colonies of most
plants are transient: after a short time other plants gain a foothold
amongst them, and an intermingled society is the outcome. Marked
exceptions to this are grass colonies and forest colonies, in which
one kind of plant may hold its own for years and centuries. In a
large newly cleared area, plants usually ^n-/ establish themselves in
dense colonies. Note the great patches Fig. 9. — a Mid-region
Society. of nettles, jewel-weeds, smart-weeds, clot-burs, fire-weeds
in recently cleared but neglected swales, also the fire-weeds in
recently burned areas, the rank weeds in the neglected garden, and
the ragweeds and May-weeds along the recently worked highway.
The competition amongst themselves and with their neighbours
finally breaks up the colonies, and a mixed and intei^mingled flora is
generally the result. In many parts of the world the general
tendency of neglected areas is to run into forest. All plants rush for
the
 12 BEGINNERS' BOTANY cleared area. Here and there
bushes gain a foothold. Young trees come up ; in time these shade
the bushes and gain the mastery. Sometimes the area grows to
poplars or birches, and people wonder why the original forest trees
do not return ; but these forest trees may be growing unobserved
here and there in the tangle, and in the slow processes of time the
poplars perish — for they are short-lived — and the original forest
may be replaced. Whether one kind of forest or another returns will
depend partly on the kinds that are most seedful in that vicinity and
which, therefore, have sown themselves most profusely. Much
depends, also, on the kind of undergrowth that first springs up, for
some young trees can endure more or less shade than others. Some
plants associate. They grow together. This is possible largely
because they diverge or differ in character. Plants associate in two
ways : by grvwing side by side ; by groiving above or beneath. In
sparsely populated societies, plants may grow alongside each other.
In most cases, however, there is overgrowth and undergrowth: one
kind grows beneath another. Plants that have become adapted to
shade are usually undergrowths. In a cattail swamp, grasses and
other narrow-leaved plants grow in the bottom, but they are usually
unseen by the casual Fig. io. — Overgrowth and Undergrowth in
Three Series, — trees, bushes, grass.
 PLANT SOCIETIES 1 3 observer. Note the undergrowth in
woods or under trees (Fig. 10). Observe that in pine and spruce
forests there is almost no undergrowth, partly because there is very
little light. On the same area the societies may differ at different
times of the year. There are spring, summer, and fall societies. The
knoll which is cool with grass and strawberries in June may be aglow
with goldenrod in September. If the bank is examined in May, look
for the young plants that are to cover it in July and October; if in
September, find the dead stalks of the flora of May. What succeeds
the skunk cabbage, hepaticas, trilliums, phlox, violets, buttercups of
spring } What precedes the wild sunflowers, ragweed, asters, and
goldenrod of fall } The Landscape.— To a large extent the colour of
the landscape is determined by the character of the plant societies.
Evergreen societies remain green, but the shade of green varies
from season to season; it is bright and soft in spring, becomes dull
in midsummer and fall, and assumes a dull yellow-green or a black-
green in winter. Deciduous societies vary remarkably in colour —
from the dull browns and grays of winter to the brown greens and
olive-greens of spring, the staid greens of summer, and the brilliant
colours of autumn. The autumn colours are due to intermingled
shades of green, yellow and red. The coloration varies with the kind
of plant, the special location, and the season. Even in the same
species or kind, individual plants differ in colour ; and this
individuality usually dstinguishes the plant year by year. That is, an
oak which is maroon red this autumn is likely to exhibit that range of
colour every year. The autumn colour is associated with the natural
maturity and death of the leaf, but it is most brilliant in long and
open
 14 BEGTNNEJiS' BOTANY falls — largely because the foliage
ripens more gradually and persists longer in such seasons. It is
probable that the autumn tints are of no utility to the plant. Autumn
colours are not caused hy frost. Because of the long, dry falls and
the great variety of plants, the autumnal colour of the American
landscape is phenomenal. Ecology. — The study of the relationships
of plants and animals to each other and to seasons and
environments is known as ecology (still written cccology in the
dictionaries). It considers the habits, habitats, and modes of life of
living things — the places in which they grow, how they migrate or
are disseminated, means of collecting food, their times and seasons
of flowering, producing young, and the like. Suggestions. — One of
the best of all subjects for school instruction in botany is the study of
plant societies. It adds definiteness and zest to excursions. 7. Let
each excursion be confined to one or two societies. Visit one day a
swamp, another day a forest, another a pasture or meadow, another
a roadside, another a weedy field, another a cliff or ravine. Visit
shores whenever possible. Each pupil should be assigned a bit of
ground — say lo or 20 ft. square — for special study. He should
make a list showing (i) how many kinds of plants it contains, (2) the
relative abundance of each. The lists secured in different regions
should be compared. It does not matter greatly if the pupil does not
know all the plants. He may count the kinds without knowing the
names. It is a good plan for the pupil to make a dried specimen of
each kind for reference. The pupil should endoavour to discover why
the plants grow as they do. Note what kinds of plants grow next
each other ; and which are undergrowth and which overgrowth ;
and which are erect and which wide-spreading. Challenge every
plant society.
 CHAPTER V THE PLANT BODY The Parts of a Plant. — Our
familiar plants are made up cf several distinct parts. The most
prominent of these parts are root, stem, leaf, flower, fruit, and seed.
Familiar plants differ wonderfully ift size a7td sJiape, — from fragile
mushrooms, delicate waterweeds and pond-scums, to floating
leaves, soft grasses, coarse weeds, tall bushes, slender climbers,
gigantic trees, and hanging moss. The Stem Part. — In most plants
there is a main central part or shaft on which the other or secondary
parts are borne. This main part is the plant axis. Above ground, in
most plants, the main plant axis bears the branches ^ leaves, diXidi
flowers ; below ground, it bears the roots. The rigid part of the
plant, which persists over winter and which is left after leaves and
flowers are fallen, is the framework of the plant. The framework is
composed of both root and stem. When the plant is dead, the
framework remains for a time, but it slowly decays. The dry winter
stems of weeds are the framework, or skeleton of the plant (Figs, ii
and 12). The framework of trees is the most conspicuous part of the
plant. The Root Part. — The root bears the stem at its apex, but
otherwise it normally bears only root-branches. The stem, however,
bears leaves, flowers, and fruits. Those Hving surfaces of the plant
which are most exposed to light are green or highly coloured. The
root tends to grow downward, but the stem tends to grow upward
tozvard light lb
 i6 BEGINNERS' BOTANY and air. The plant is anchored or
fixed in the soil by the roots. Plants have been called "earth
parasites." The Foliage Part. — The leaves precede the flowers in
point of time or life of the plant. TJie flowers always preeede the
fruits and seeds. Many plants die when the seeds have matured. The
whole mass of leaves of any plant or any branch is known as its
foliage. In some cases, as in crocuses, the flowers seem to precede
the leaves; but the leaves that made the food for these flowers grew
the preceding year. The Plant Generation. — The course of * a
plant's life, with all the events through which the plant naturally
passes, is known as the plant's life-history. The life-history embraces
various stages, or epochs, as dormant seed, gerin ination, grow thy
flowering, fruiting. Some plan ts run their course in a few weeks or
months, and some live for centuries. The entire life-period of a plant
is called a generation. It is the whole period from birth to normal
death, without reference to the various stages or events through
which it passes. A generation begins with the young seed, not with
germij&R. vt. — Plant of a Vhitib Sunflower. Fig. 12— Framework OF
Fig. h.
 THE PLANT BODY 1/ nation. // ends with death — that is,
when no life is left in any part of the plant, and only the seed or
spore remains to perpetuate the kind. In a bulbous plant, as a lily or
an onion, the generation does not end until the bulb dies, even
though the top is dead. When the generation is of only one season's
duration, the plant is said to be annual. When it is of two seasons, it
is biennial. Biennials usually bloom the second year. When of three
or more seasons, the plant is perennial. Examples of annuals are
pigweed, bean, pea, garden sunflower ; of biennials, evening
primrose, mullein, teasel ; of perennials, dock, most meadow
grasses, cat-tail, and all shrubs and trees. Duration of the Plant
Body. — Plant structures which are more or less soft and which die
at the close of the season are said to be herbaceous, in
contradistinction to being ligneous or woody. A plant which is
herbaceous to the ground is called an herb; but an herb may have a
woody or perennial root, in which case it is called an herbaceous
perennial. Annual plants are classed as herbs. Examples of
herbaceous perennials are buttercups, bleeding heart, violet,
waterlily, Bermuda grass, horse-radish, dock, dandelion, goldenrod,
asparagus, rhubarb, many wild sunflowers (Figs. 11, 12). Many
herbaceous perennials have short generations. They become weak
with one or two seasons of flowering and gradually die out. Thus,
red clover usually begins to fail after the second year. Gardeners
know that the best bloom of hollyhock, larkspur, pink, and many
other plants, is secured when the plants are only two or three years
old. Herbaceous perennials which die away each season to bulbs or
tubers, are sometimes called pseud-annuals (that
 I8 BEGINNERS' BOTANY is, jalse annuals). Of such are lily,
crocus, onion, potato, and bull nettle. True annuals reach old age the
first year. Plants which are normally perennial may become annual in
a shorterseason clhnate by being killed by frosty rather than by
dying naturally at the end of a season of growth. They are climatic
annuals. Such plants are called plur-annuals in the short-season
region. Many tropical perennials are plurFig. 13. — a Shrub or Bush.
Dogwood osier. annuals when grown in the north, but they are
treated as true annuals because they ripen sufficient of their crop
the same season in which the seeds are sown to make them worth
cultivating, as tomato, red pepper, castor bean, cotton. Name several
vegetables that are planted in gardens with the expectation that
they will bear till frost comes. Woody or ligneous plants usually live
longer than herbs. Those that remain low and produce several or
 THE PLANT BODY 19 many similar shoots from the base are
called shrubs, as lilac, rose, elder, osier (Fig. 13). Low and thick
shrubs are bushes. Plants that produce one main trunk and a more
or less elevated head are trees (Fig. 14). All shrubs and trees are
perennial. Every plant makes an effort to propagate^ or to
perpetuate its :^-^i^'$4 kind ; and, as far as we can Biff^f; see,
this is the end for which the plant itself lives. The seed or spore is
the final product of the plaftt. Fig. 14. — a Tree. birch. The weeping
Suggestions. — 8. The teacher may assign each pupil to one plant in
the school yard, or field, or in a pot, and ask him to bring out the
points in the lesson. 9. The teacher may put on the board th€ names
of many common plants and ask the pupils to classify into annuals,
pseud-annuals, plur-annuals (or climatic annuals), biennials,
perennials, herbaceous perennials, ligneous perennials, herbs,
bushes, trees. Every plant grown on the farm should be so classified
: wheat, oats, corn, buckwheat, timothy, strawberry, raspberry,
currant, tobacco, alfalfa, flax, crimson clover, hops, cowpea, field
bean, sweet potato, peanut, radish, sugar-cane, barley, cabbage,
and others. Name all the kinds of trees you know.
 CHAPTER VI SEEDS AND GERMINATION The seed contains
a miniature plant, or embryo. The embryo usually has three parts
that have received names : the stemlet, or caulicle ; the seed-leaf, or
cotyledon (usually I or 2) ; the bud, or plumule, lying between or
above the cotyledons. These parts are well seen in the common
bean (Fig. 15), particularly when the seed has been soaked for a few
hours. One of the large cotyledons — OF THE Bean, comprising half
of the bean — is shown at /?, cotyledon; <7, R. The cauliclc is at O,
The plumule is mutf i^'fim shown at A, The cotyledons are attached
nod*- to the caulicle at F: this point may be taken as the first node
or joint. The Number of Seed-leaves. — All plants having two seed-
leaves belong to the group called dicotyledons. Such seeds in many
cases split readily in halves, e.g, a. bean. Some plants have only one
seed-leaf in a seed. They form a group of plants called
monocotyledons. Indian corn is an example of a plant with only one
seed-leaf: a grain of corn does not split into halves as a bean does.
Seeds of the pine family contain more than two cotyledons, but for
our purposes they may be associated with the dicotyledons,
although really forming a different group. These two groups — the
dicotyledons and the monocotyledons — represent two great natural
divisions of the vegetable kingdom. The dicotyledons contain the
woody 20
 SEEDS AXD GEI:MI NATION 21 bark-bearing trees and
bushes (except conifers), and most of the herbs of temperate
climates except the grasses, sedges, rushes, lily tribes, and orchids.
The flower-parts are usually in fives or multiples of five, the leaves
mostly netted-veined, the bark or rind distinct, and the stem often
bearing a pith at the centre. The monocotyledons usually have the
flower-parts in threes or multiples of three, the leaves long and
parallel-veined, the bark not separable, and the stem without a
central pith. Every seed \^ provided zvith food \o support the
germinating plant. Commonly this food is starch. The food may be
stored in the cotyledons^ as in bean, pea, squash ; or outside the
cotyledojiSf as in castor bean, pine, Indian corn. When the food is
outside or around the embryo, it is usually called endosperm. Seed-
coats; Markings on Seed. — The embryo and endosperm are
inclosed within a covering made of two or more layers and known as
the seed-coats. Over the point of the caulicle is a minute hole or a
thin place in the coats known as the micropyle. This is the point at
which fig.i6.— exterthe pollen-tube entered the forming ovule nal
parts op and through which the caulicle breaks in germination. The
micropyle is shown at M in Fig. i6. The scar where the seed broke
from its funiculus (or stalk that attached it to its pod) is named the
hilum. It occupies a third of the length of the bean in Fig. i6. The
hilum and micropyle are always present in seeds, but they are not
always close together. In many cases it is difficult to identify the
micropyle in the dormant seed, but its location is at once shown by
the protruding caulicle as germination begins. Opposite the
micropyle in the bean (at the other end of the hilum) is an elevation
known as the raphe.
 22 BEGINNERS' BOTANY This is formed by a union of the
funiculus, or seed-stalk, with the seed-coats, and through it food
was transferred for the development of the seed, but it is now
functionless. Seeds differ wonderfully in size, shape, colour, and
other characteristics. They also vary in longevity. These
characteristics are peculiar to the species or kind. Some seeds
maintain life only a few weeks or even days, whereas others will
"keep" for ten or twenty years. In special cases, seeds have retained
vitality longer than this limit, but the stories that live seeds, several
thousand years old, have been taken from the wrappings of
mummies are unfounded. Germination. — The embryo is not dead ;
it is only dormant. When supplied with moisture^ warmth^ and
oxygen {air\ it awakes and grows : this growth is germination. The
embryo lives for a time on the stored food, but gradually the plantlet
secures a foothold in the soil and gathers food for itself. When the
plantlet is finally able to shift for its elf y germination is complete.
Early Stages of Seedling. — The germinating seed first absorbs
water ^ and swells. The starchy matters gradually become soluble.
The seed-coats are ruptured, the caulicle and plumule emerge.
During this process the seed respires freely, throwing off carbon
dioxide (COo). The caulicle usually elongates, and from its lower end
roots are emitted. The elongating caulicle is known as the hypocotyl
("below the cotyledons"). That is, the hypocotyl is that part of the
stem of the plantlet lying between the roots and the cotyledon. The
general direction of the young hypocotyl^ or emerging caulicle, is
downwards. As soon as roots form, it becomes fixed and its
subsequent growth tends to raise the cotyledons above the ground,
as in the bean. When cotyledons rise into the
 SEEDS AND GERMINATION 23 Fig. 17. — Pea. Grotesque
forms assumed when the roots cannot gain entrance to the soil. air,
germination is said to be epigeal (" above the earth "). Bean and
pumpkin are examples. When the hypocotyl does not elongate
greatly and the cotyledons remain under ground, the germination is
hypogeal (''beneath the earth"). Pea and scarlet runner bean are
examples (Fig. 48). When the germinating seed lies on a hard
surface, as on closely compacted soil, the hypocotyl and rootlets
may not be able to secure a foothold and they assume grotesque
forms (Fig. 17). Try this with peas and beans. The first internode ("
between nodes ") above the cotyledons is the epicotyl. It elevates
the plumule into the air, and the plumule- leaves expand into the
first true leaves of the plant. These first true leaves, however, may
be very unlike the later leaves in shape. Germination of Bean. — The
common bean, as we have seen (Fig. 15), has cotyledons that
occupy all the space inside the seed-coats. When the hypocotyl, or
elongated caulicle, emerges, the plumule-leaves have begun to
enlarge, and to unfold (Fig. 18). The hypocotyl elongates rapidly.
One end of it is held by the roots. The other is held by the seed-
coats in the soil. It therefore takes the form of a loop, and the
central part of the loop " comes up " first {a. Fig. 19). Presently the
cotyledons come out of the seed-coats, Fig. 18. — Cotyledons OF
Germinating Bean spread apart TO SHOW ELONGATING Caulicle and
Plumule.
 M BEGINNEKS* BOTAMY and the plant straightens and the
cotyledons expand. These cotyledons, or " halves of the bean,"
persist for some time {by Fig. 19). They often become green and
probably perform some function of foliage. Because of its large size,
the Lima bean shows all these parts well. Germination of Castor
Bean. — In the castor bean the hilum and micropyle are at the
smaller end (Fig. 20). The bean " comes up " with a loop, which
indicates that the hypocotyl greatly elongates. On examining
germinating seed, however, it will be found that the cotyledons are
contained inside a fleshy body, or sac {a, Fig. 2 1 ). This sac is the
endosperm. Against its inner surface the thin, veiny cotyledons are
very closely pressed, abFiG. 19. — Germination of Bean. Fig. 20. —
Sprout^ ING OF Castor Bean. Fig. 21.— Germination OF Castor
Bean. Endosperm at a. Fig. 22. — Castor Bean. Endosperm at a,n\
cotyledons at b. Fig. 23. — Germination Complete in Castor Bean.
sorbing its substance (Fig. 22). The cotyledons increase in size as
they reach the air (Fig. 23), and become functional leaves.
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