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Japan’s Foreign Relations in Asia

Japan’s Foreign Relations in Asia has been specifically designed to introduce stu-
dents to Japan’s foreign relations in Asia since 1990, a period in which there
have been dramatic developments in Japan, including the reinterpretation of
the Constitution and expanded US–Japan defence cooperation. The geopoliti-
cal dynamics and implications of these new developments are profound and
underscore the need for a new textbook on this subject.
Covering not only the key regional players of China and the Koreas, this
textbook also encompasses chapters on Japan’s relations with India, Myanmar,
Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Thailand, along with its multilateral
engagement and initiatives. Combined with transnational chapters on critical
issues, key themes covered by this book include:

•• An historical overview of key post-war developments.

•• Japan’s evolving security policy.
•• Analysis of the region’s escalating maritime disputes.
•• An evaluation of Japanese soft power in Asia.

Written by leading experts in accessible, jargon-free style, this new textbook

will appeal to undergraduate and postgraduate students of Japanese politics,
international relations and foreign policy and Asian affairs in general.

James D.J. Brown is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Temple

University Japan. His recent publications include Japan, Russia and their Territorial
Dispute (2016).

Jeff Kingston is Director of Asian Studies at Temple University Japan. His

recent publications include Press Freedom in Contemporary Japan (2017) and
Asian Nationalisms Reconsidered (2015).
Japan’s Foreign Relations
in Asia

Edited by
James D.J. Brown and Jeff Kingston
First published 2018
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
 2018 selection and editorial matter, James D.J. Brown and Jeff
Kingston; individual chapters, the contributors
The right of James D.J. Brown and Jeff Kingston to be identified as the
authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual
chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical,
or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval
system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks
or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN: 978-1-138-05544-5 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-138-05545-2 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-16593-6 (ebk)

Typeset in Bembo
by Swales & Willis Ltd, Exeter, Devon, UK
We dedicate this volume in honor of Columbia University’s
Professor Emeritus Gerald Curtis, who taught some of us
and inspired all of us through his writings and insights.
Contents

List of illustrations x
Notes on contributors xii
Acknowledgments xviii

Introduction xix
JAMES D.J. BROWN AND JEFF KINGSTON

PART I
Foundations 1

1 Japan’s foreign relations in Cold War Asia, 1945–1990 3

JEFF KINGSTON

2 International relations theory and Japanese foreign policy 18

GILBERT ROZMAN

PART II
Regional themes 33

3 Evolution or new doctrine? Japanese security policy in

the era of collective self-defense 35
DANIEL SNEIDER

4 Japan’s security policy in the context of the US–Japan

alliance: the emergence of an “Abe Doctrine” 49
CHRISTOPHER W. HUGHES

5 Japan’s disarmament tightropes and triangulation 61

BRAD GLOSSERMAN
viii Contents
6 China’s grandiose maritime ambitions challenge Japan 75
HOWARD W. FRENCH

7 Japan’s aspirational idea of inherency 88

ALEXIS DUDDEN

8 “Commitment by presence”: naval diplomacy and Japanese

defense engagement in Southeast Asia 100
ALESSIO PATALANO

9 The triumph of hope over experience: the false promise of

Japanese soft power in East Asia 114
THOMAS U. BERGER

10 Japan’s multilateralism in Asia 131

TINA BURRETT

11 Japan’s reconciliation diplomacy in Northeast Asia 144

TOGO KAZUHIKO

12 Japan’s rivalry with China in Southeast Asia: ODA,

the AIIB, infrastructural projects, the Mekong Basin
and the disputed South China Sea 158
LAM PENG ER

PART III
Bilateral relations 173

13 China in Japan’s nation-state identity 175

SATOH HARUKO

14 Post-Cold War Sino-Japanese relations and Japan’s

China policy: the rise of strategic realism 188
GIULIO PUGLIESE

15 Shadow boxing: Japan’s para-diplomacy with Taiwan 201

JEFF KINGSTON

16 Sour partners: Japan and South Korea’s uncomfortable

compromise for cooperation 218
CHEOL HEE PARK
 Contents ix
17 Japan–North Korea relations 233
AURELIA GEORGE MULGAN

18 Japan’s foreign relations with Russia: unfulfilled potential 248

JAMES D.J. BROWN

19 Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy toward Indonesia 262

HONNA JUN

20 Japanese–Thai relations: on a chessboard of domestic and

regional politics 276
PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN

21 The evolution of Japan–Myanmar relations since 1988 291

RYAN HARTLEY

22 Japan’s foreign relations with the Philippines: a case of

evolving Japan in Asia 312
MARIA THAEMAR TANA AND YUSUKE TAKAGI

23 Japan–Vietnam relations: implementation of the

“strategic partnership” 329
NAKANO ARI

24 Japan’s foreign relations with India 342

VARUN TOMAR AND GIORGIO SHANI

Index 357
Illustrations

Figures
9.1 South Korean views of Japan, 1973–2005 124
21.1 Japan’s total and sub-sectorial ODA provision to
Myanmar, 1995–2014 297
21.2 Total FDI into Burma, 1988–2017 (two periods: 1988–2002
and 2004–2016) 301
22.1 Japan’s ODA disbursement to the Philippines, 1970–98
(US$ million) 314
22.2 Japan’s exports to (solid line) and imports from (dotted line)
the Philippines, 1988–2016 (JPY1,000) 317
24.1 Japanese FDI to India between 2000 and 2016–17
(in US$ million) 348
24.2 Amount of FDI equity inflows (in US$ million) 349

Tables
9.1 GNI in East Asia, current US (PPP) 1980–2015 (US$ billions) 116
9.2 Average annual GDP growth rates in East Asia, 1980–2015 117
9.3 APT, 1990–2015, US$ million and share of total trade 117
9.4 South Korean public perception of Japan 2014–16 124
9.5 Chinese public views of Japan 2005–16 125
12.1 Foreign direct investment to ASEAN states in 2015
(US$ million) 159
12.2 Japan’s bilateral ODA in Asia (US$ million) 164
12.3 How favorably do Southeast Asians view Japan and China? 170
20.1 Japanese–Thai trade (yen: billion) 284
20.2 Japan to Thailand royal visits 285
20.3 Thailand to Japan royal visits 286
21.1 A periodisation of the post-World War II history of
Myanmar, and Japan–Myanmar relations 292
 Illustrations xi
22.1 Ratio of registered Japanese FDI in the BOI and PEZA (%) 315
22.2 Japanese FDI to the Philippines, 1996–2015 (balance of
payment base, net and flow, US$ million) 316

Map
0.1 Map of Asia xxiv
0.2 Map of selected maritime disputes in East Asia xxv
21.1 Burma’s three SEZs 303
Contributors

Thomas U. Berger is a Professor at the Pardee School of Global Studies at

Boston University. He is the author of Cultures of Antimilitarism: National
Security in Germany and Japan (1998) and War, Guilt and World Politics after
World War II (2012) as well as co-editor of Japan in International Politics: Beyond
the Reactive State (2007). He has published extensively on East Asian and
European security, alliance politics, international migration, and the politics
of historical memory. He received his PhD in political science from MIT.
James D.J. Brown is Associate Professor of Political Science at Temple
University, Japan Campus. His main area of research is Japan–Russia rela-
tions. His work has previously been published in Asia Policy, the Asia-Pacific
Journal: Japan Focus, Europe-Asia Studies, International Politics, Post-Soviet
Affairs, Problems of Post Communism, and Politics. His book Japan, Russia and
their Territorial Dispute: The Northern Delusion was published by Routledge in
2016. He is co-editor of this project.
Tina Burrett is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of Liberal
Arts, Sophia University, Japan. Her recent publications include “Abe Road:
Comparing Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Leadership of his First and
Second Governments”, Parliamentary Affairs (2017); “Spin Over Substance?
The PR Strategies of Vladimir Putin and Shinzo Abe”, in Press Freedom in
Contemporary Japan, Jeff Kingston (ed), Routledge 2016; “Mixed Signals:
Democratisation and the Myanmar Media”, Government and Opposition (2017);
and Prime Ministerial Leadership in Britain and Japan (forthcoming).
Pavin Chachavalpongpun is Associate Professor at the Center for Southeast
Asian Studies, Kyoto University. The holder of a PhD from the School of
Oriental and African Studies, he is the author of numerous books, includ-
ing A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai–Burmese Relations and
Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin and His Foreign Policy. He currently teaches
Southeast Asian politics and international relations in East Asia, both at
Kyoto University and Doshisha University. He is also editor of an online
journal, Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia—the only journal in which all articles
are, besides English, translated into Japanese, Thai, Bahasa, and Vietnamese.
 Contributors xiii
Alexis Dudden is Professor of History at the University of Connecticut. She
publishes regularly about Japan and Northeast Asia, and her books include
Troubled Apologies Among Japan, Korea, and the United States and Japan’s
Colonization of Korea. She received her BA from Columbia University in
1991 and her PhD in history from the University of Chicago in 1998. She
has lived for extended periods of time in Japan and South Korea and is
an advisory council member of Harvard University’s Reischauer Institute’s
Research Project on Japanese Constitutional Revision. In 2016–17, she was
Fulbright US–ROK Alliance Visiting Professor at Yonsei University.
Howard W. French is a Professor at Columbia University’s Graduate School
of Journalism.His career in journalism began as a freelance reporter for the
Washington Post and many other publications in West Africa. He was hired
by the New York Times in 1986, worked as a metropolitan reporter for three
years, and from 1990 to 2008 reported for the Times as bureau chief for
Central America and the Caribbean, West Africa, Japan and the Koreas,
and China in Shanghai. He is the author of A Continent for the Taking: The
Tragedy and Hope of Africa (2004) and China’s Second Continent: How a Million
Migrants are Building a New Empire in Africa (2014), each of which was named
a non-fiction book of the year or cited among the year’s most notable books
by several newspapers. His most recent book is Everything Under the Heavens:
How the Past Helps Shape China’s Push for Global Power (2017).
Aurelia George Mulgan is Professor of Politics in the School of Humanities
and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Canberra. She is the
author of seven books on Japanese politics and political economy, includ-
ing The Abe Administration and the Rise of the Prime Ministerial Executive
(Routledge 2018). She was also the winner of an Ohira Prize in 2001 for
The Politics of Agriculture in Japan, and the Toshiba Prize in 2010.
Brad Glosserman is senior advisor for the Pacific Forum CSIS (Center for
Strategic and International Studies), where he previously served for 16
years as Executive Director. His most recent book is The Japan–South Korea
Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States (2015), which was co-
authored with Scott Snyder. and he is completing a book on the future of
Japan. Prior to joining the Pacific Forum, Brad was an editorial page editor
and writer for the Japan Times. He is also a Visiting Professor at the Center
for Rule-making Strategy, Tama University.
Ryan Hartley is Assistant Professor at Tohoku University’s International
Graduate School of Accounting Policy in Hirai, Tokyo. His research inter-
ests focus thematically on Japan’s foreign policy and global political econ-
omy, and empirically on Japan’s historical and contemporary relations with
Southeast Asia, particularly the Mekong region and its countries.
Christopher W. Hughes is Professor of International Politics and Japanese
Studies, and Pro-Vice-Chancellor, at the University of Warwick in the UK.
xiv Contributors
He has held visiting professorships at Harvard University, the University of
Tokyo, and Waseda University. He is the author of Japan’s Reemergence as
“Normal” Military Power (2004), Japan’s Remilitarisation (2009) and Japan’s
Foreign and Security Policy under the “Abe Doctrine” (2015). He is co-editor of
the Pacific Review.
Honna Jun teaches Southeast Asian politics at the College of International
Relations, Ritsumeikan University in Japan. He received his PhD from the
Australian National University in 1999. His publications include Military
Politics and Democratization in Indonesia (Routledge 2003); “Japan and the
Responsibility to Protect: Coping with Human Security Diplomacy”,
Pacific Review (2012); and “ASEAN–Japan Cooperation on Maritime Non-
Traditional Security Issues”, in ASEAN–Japan Relations, Takashi Shiraishi
and Takaaki Kojima (eds), 2014.
Jeff Kingston (PhD Columbia University), is Director of Asian Studies at
Temple University Japan. He has edited Press Freedom in Contemporary
Japan (2017), Asian Nationalisms Reconsidered (2016), Critical Issues in
Contemporary Japan (2014), and Natural Disaster and Nuclear Crisis (2012),
and is the author of Nationalism in Asia: A History Since 1945 (2017) and
Contemporary Japan (2013) and Japan’s Quiet Transformation (2005). He is
co-editor of this project.
Lam Peng Er graduated with first-class honors in political science from the
National University of Singapore and obtained his master’s degree at the
Australian National University and PhD at Columbia University. He then
taught at the Department of Political Science of the National University
of Singapore. Since 2000, he has been with the East Asian Institute at the
National University of Singapore, where he is currently Senior Research
Fellow. His primary research interest is Japanese domestic politics and
international relations. His articles have appeared in international journals,
including Asian Survey, Pacific Affairs, and Japan Forum. His single-authored
books are Green Politics in Japan and Japan’s Peace-building Diplomacy in Asia:
Seeking a More Active Political Role, both published by Routledge. His latest
edited book is China–Japan Relations in the 21st Century: Antagonism Despite
Interdependency (Palgrave Macmillan 2017). He is an executive editor of
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific and the Asian Journal of Peace-building.
Lam is also a singer-songwriter.
Nakano Ari received a PhD in political science from Keio Gijuku University
in 1992 and has been a Professor at the Faculty of International Relations,
Daito Bunka University, from 2010. Her major study fields are domestic
and foreign policy, democratization, and human rights issues of contem-
porary Vietnam. Her main works include Human Rights in Vietnam: The
Possibility of Pluralistic Democracy (2009) and Politics and Foreign Relations of
Contemporary Vietnam (2006).
 Contributors xv
Cheol Hee Park, who received a PhD from Columbia University, is Dean
and Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies at Seoul
National University. He served as a Director of the Institute for Japanese
Studies at the university from 2012–16. He teaches Japanese politics,
Korea–Japan relations, and international relations in East Asia. He has
written two books: Daigishi no Tsukurare Kata (How Japan’s Dietman
is Made), 2000; and Jamindang Jongkwon gwa Jonhu Cheje eui Byunyong
(LDP Politics and the Transformation of the Postwar System in Japan),
2011. He is a co-author of several books, including National Identities and
Bilateral Relations (2013) and Changing Power Relations in Northeast Asia
(Routledge 2011).
Alessio Patalano is Reader in East Asian Warfare and Security at the
Department of War Studies, King’s College London, and Visiting Fellow
at the Japan Maritime Staff and Command College, Tokyo, and Temple
University Japan. He specializes in Japanese naval history and strategy, and
Sino-Japanese maritime relations in the East and South China Seas. His
latest monograph, Post-war Japan as a Seapower: Imperial Legacy, Wartime
Experience, and the Making of a Navy, was published in 2015. Dr Patalano
regularly contributes to professional forums debating military affairs in
Australia, Japan, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea,
the Republic of China, and the US. He also regularly comments on East
Asian affairs on Radio Monocle 24, BBC World, Sky News, Al Jazeera,
and France 24.
Giulio Pugliese holds an MA from Johns Hopkins University’s School of
Advanced and International Studies and a PhD from Cambridge University.
He has spent five years in Japan, speaks Japanese, and has published articles
and contributed chapters concerning academic, policy-oriented, and com-
mercial themes in Italy, the US, and Japan. His most recent, co-authored
book is Sino-Japanese Power Politics: Might, Money, Minds.
Gilbert Rozman is Editor-in-chief of a bi-monthly, online journal about
international relations in the Asia-Pacific region, the Asan Forum, and the
Emeritus Musgrave Professor of Sociology at Princeton University, where
he served on the faculty from 1970 to 2013. He specializes in Northeast Asia,
including China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea. Since 2012 he has written
or edited a three-volume series on national identities and bilateral relations
in Northeast Asia, five volumes in the series Joint US–Korea Academic Studies
on international relations in Northeast Asia, a volume from his retirement
conference called Misunderstanding Asia: International Relations Theory and
Asian Studies over Half a Century, a volume on Japan–Russia relations, and
three books drawn from articles in the Asan Forum: Asia’s Alliance Triangle,
International Relations and Asia’s Southern Tier, and International Relations and
Asia’s Northern Tier.
xvi Contributors
Satoh Haruko is Specially Appointed Professor for Osaka University’s
Center for International Education and Exchange and the Osaka School
of International Public Policy. In the past she has worked at the Japan
Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, and the Gaiko Forum.
Recent publications include: “Japan’s Post-Modern Possibility with China:
A View from Kansai”, in Lam Peng Er (ed), Japan–China Relations in the
21st Century (2017); “Rethinking Security in Japan: In Search of a ‘Post-
Postwar’ Narrative”, in Jain and Lam (eds), Japan’s Strategic Challenges in a
Changing Regional Environment (2012); “Through the Looking-glass: China’s
Rise as Seen from Japan” (co-authored with Toshiya Hoshino), Journal of
Asian Public Policy (July 2012); “Legitimacy Deficit in Japan: The Road to
True Popular Sovereignty”, in Kane, Loy, and Patapan (eds), Politics and
Policy (June 2010); and “Japan: Re-engaging with China Meaningfully”,
in Tang, Li, and Acharya (eds), Living with China: Regional States and China
through Crises and Turning Points (2009).
Giorgio Shani, who received his PhD at the University of London, is Chair
of Politics and International Studies and Director of the Rotary Peace
Center at the ICU. Author of Sikh Nationalism and Identity in a Global Age
(Routledge 2008) and Religion, Identity and Human Security (Routledge
2014), he is currently serving as President of the Asia-Pacific region of the
International Studies Association.
Daniel Sneider is a Lecturer in East Asian Studies at Stanford University
and a Fellow at Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research
Center, where he served for a decade as Associate Director for Research.
He has written widely on Japanese foreign policy, US security policy in East
Asia, and wartime history issues. His most recent work, Divergent Memories:
Opinion Leaders and the Asia-Pacific War, co-authored with Gi-Wook Shin,
was published in August 2016. He is currently working on a diplomatic
history of the creation and management of the US alliances with Japan and
South Korea during the Cold War.
Yusuke Takagi is an Assistant Professor from the National Graduate Institute
for Policy Studies, Tokyo, Japan. His book Central Banking as State Building:
Policymakers and Their Nationalism in the Philippines, 1933–1964 was pub-
lished in 2016. He is presently studying policy reforms in restored Philippine
democracy, and his forthcoming journal article for the Philippine Political
Science Journal, “Policy Coalitions and Ambitious Politicians: A Case Study on
the Philippine Social Policy Reform”, is one of the first results of this project.
Maria Thaemar Tana is a PhD candidate from the Department of Japanese
Studies at the National University of Singapore. She is currently writing
her dissertation on Japan’s human security foreign policy in Southeast Asia,
which includes a case study of the Philippines. She has previously published
in the Philippine Political Science Journal, Asia-Pacific Social Science Review, and
East Asian Policy.
 Contributors xvii
Togo Kazuhiko, who received his PhD from Leiden University in 2009,
served in the Japanese Foreign Ministry from 1968. Half of his career was
devoted to Russia, and he retired in 2002 as Ambassador to the Netherlands.
Since then, he taught at universities abroad, including institutions in Leiden,
Princeton, Santa Barbara, Seoul, and Taiwan. His recent publications in
English include Japan’s Foreign Policy 1945–2009, Japan and Reconciliation in
Post-war Asia: The Murayama Statement and its Implications (editor), and East
Asia’s Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism
(co-editor).
Varun Tomar is pursuing his PhD in politics and international studies from
the International Christian University (ICU), Tokyo, Japan. His key inter-
ests include Indian foreign policy, especially India–Japan relations. He is
also currently working as a Research Assistant at the ICU’s Social Science
Research Institute. Prior to enrolling at ICU, he was enrolled as a Research
Fellow at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. He also holds a master’s
degree in Japanese culture studies from ICU and in Japanese language, soci-
ety, and culture from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
Acknowledgments

We would like to thank all of the authors for taking the time and effort to
contribute their insights and helping us produce what we hope will be an indis-
pensable textbook for students of international relations, Japan, and Asia. We
also thank Temple University Japan for its strong institutional support, provid-
ing us funding and time to conduct our research, writing, and editing. Our
librarian Tom Boardman deserves special thanks for his unstinting assistance.
Last but not least, we thank our families for their patience and encouragement.
Introduction
James D.J. Brown and Jeff Kingston

The idea to produce this textbook originates from a course on Japan’s foreign
relations that is regularly taught to undergraduates at Temple University, Japan
Campus. In teaching this class over the past several years, we have found that,
while there is no shortage of material on this topic, there was no single text
that adequately served our needs for an engaging primer on Japan’s contem-
porary foreign relations. Many of the existing volumes were found to be too
US-focused, too dated, and, frankly, a little dull for new students of the sub-
ject. Our aim was therefore to produce a text that analyzes in greater depth
Japan’s foreign relations in Asia, is contemporary in focus, and is written in an
accessible style.
To explain further, there is no question that Japan’s relationship with the
US remains its most important. As faculty at an American university in Japan,
we are well aware of this. Nonetheless, it is our belief that highlighting Tokyo’s
close ties with Washington should not mean obscuring the significance of its
other relationships. This is especially true at a time when Asia has become the
world’s most dynamic region and questions have been raised about US willing-
ness and capacity to continue in the role of regional hegemon. This textbook
therefore does not ignore Japan’s relationship with the US; it features in almost
every chapter. Yet, we do attempt our own “pivot to Asia” by placing more
emphasis on Japan’s relations with its regional neighbours. This certainly entails
an emphasis on China and the two Koreas, but it also involves focusing on
Japan’s ties with Southeast Asia, Russia, and India, all of which have received
renewed attention in recent years. Additionally, while many textbooks include
only a single part on Japan’s interactions with Southeast Asia, this volume offers
dedicated chapters on Japan’s relations with Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar,
the Philippines, and Vietnam. What is more, to ensure a more Asian-focused
perspective, we have prioritized contributions from scholars who are either
from the region or based within it.
Any selection has its opportunity costs and, in this case, as well as having
less about US ties, this textbook does not cover Japan’s relations with Africa,
Europe, or the Middle East. This is not to dismiss the significance of these
regions to Japan. Africa is important as the location of Japan’s only overseas
military base (in Djibouti). It is also a focus of Japan’s development agenda, as
xx James D.J. Brown and Jeff Kingston
highlighted by the Tokyo International Conference on African Development,
held for the first time in Africa in 2016. With regard to Europe, the Japanese
government is keenly interested in the implications of the UK’s departure
from the European Union (EU) and in 2017 negotiated a Japan–EU eco-
nomic partnership agreement. The Middle East is also vital to Japan’s energy
security and a source of concern when it comes to international terrorism. We
fully acknowledge the relevance of these considerations, but we decided to go
deeper rather than wider. Any understanding of Japan’s foreign relations must
begin with a firm grounding in Japan’s ties with Asia, the region that is most
important to the country in terms of economic ties, Official Development
Assistance, security, and shared history. It is this core knowledge that this text-
book provides in thematic chapters and country case studies.
It was also with students’ needs to the fore that the format and style of the
textbook were decided. The starting assumption was that a majority of users
will have little existing knowledge of Japan’s foreign relations and that many
will not yet share our passion for the topic. Indeed, we consider that one
of our main functions as educators is to kindle this interest so that students
become self-motivated learners. This will not occur, however, if the first read-
ings to which they are introduced are dense tracts filled with intimidating
jargon. Undoubtedly students should be encouraged to engage with even the
weightiest of academic tomes, but the reality is that most will benefit from the
availability of a more accessible stepping stone.
In line with this ambition, contributors were asked to limit their chapters
to less than 7,000 words, a length that any student can be expected to read in
advance of a corresponding lecture. Authors were also instructed to include
explanations of basic concepts, to avoid esoteric language, and to prioritize
clarity of expression. Additionally, with the exception of one introductory
chapter, writers were requested to conduct their analysis with limited reference
to theoretical debates. In this way, we ensured that even students without an
existing understanding of international relations theory can fully benefit from
this text.
Lastly, the choice was made to give the textbook a contemporary focus,
meaning an emphasis on developments since the 1990s. This was for two
reasons. First, textbooks that attempt to cover too extensive a period of his-
tory have a tendency to become mere annotated timelines, failing to analyze
what is most important and leaving little impression on their readers. Second,
recent years, especially since Abe Shinzō’s return to power in 2012, have seen
a marked shift in Japan’s foreign relations, with the country becoming a more
assertive security actor and discarding many of its distinctive pacifist features.
The magnitude of these changes is such that particular attention is required to
describe their nature, explain the immediate context from which they emerged,
and outline their regional implications.
Evidently this does not mean that we have entirely ignored historical issues.
Rather, contributors were requested to include historical events to the extent
that they continue to shape Japan’s relations with Asian neighbors. This means
 Introduction xxi
that topics of contemporary significance—including the “comfort women”,
the origins of Japan’s territorial disputes, and the legacy of Japan’s 20th-century
relations with Southeast Asia—are all covered in detail.
Turning to the actual organization of the volume, there are 24 chapters
divided into three parts. The first of these parts is the shortest and is designed
to equip students with the foundational knowledge required to gain full ben-
efit for the remainder of the textbook. In the first chapter, Jeff Kingston takes
on the daunting task of providing an overview of Japan’s foreign relations in
Cold War Asia from 1945–90, thereby establishing a common historical basis
on which the more contemporary chapters can profitably build. In Chapter 2,
Gilbert Rozman adds a theoretical introduction, explaining how geostrategic,
geo-economic, and geo-cultural perspectives have framed Japan’s relations with
the US, China, North and South Korea, Russia, and Southeast Asia.
With these preliminaries complete, Part II presents thematic chapters.
These begin with three chapters on security, a topic that has attracted particu-
lar attention following the Abe government’s 2014 decision to reinterpret the
Constitution to permit collective self-defense, thereby allowing Japan’s forces
to take part in military action even if the country is not directly attacked.
Both Daniel Sneider and Christopher W. Hughes highlight the historic nature
of this decision, though their interpretations differ. Specifically, Sneider sees
the change as incremental, carried out within the framework of the Yoshida
Doctrine, the post-war strategy under which Japan concentrates on economic
development and outsources security to its US ally. In contrast, Hughes argues
that a larger break with the past has occurred, justifying talk of a new Abe
Doctrine. Accompanying these broad assessments of Japan’s security strategy,
Brad Glosserman offers a more focused look at the issue of nuclear disarma-
ment. In so doing, he demonstrates that the Japanese government walks a
diplomatic tightrope, balancing public demands that Japan is a loud voice in
the international campaign for disarmament on the one hand with the coun-
try’s continued reliance on the US extended nuclear deterrent on the other.
If security has been one prominent area for recent debate, the same can be
said of maritime issues in East Asia. Reflecting this, Howard French highlights
China’s pursuit of a kind of Lebensraum in the waters of the South China Sea
and East China Sea and how Japan has responded. This combines with Alexis
Dudden’s chapter on Japan’s assertive claims to “inherent territoriality” over
a range of islands and their surrounding waters. While French and Dudden’s
chapters therefore emphasize the causes and consequences of regional tensions
at sea, Alessio Patalano offers a more optimistic account. In particular, his chap-
ter highlights how the expanding scope of Japan’s naval diplomacy showcases
the country’s potential as a cooperative power and significantly contributes to
its security and political relations in Southeast Asia.
Rounding out the thematic part are four further chapters. In the first of
these, Thomas U. Berger addresses the topic of soft power, explaining that,
while Japan’s global appeal may be increasing, the country faces a much greater
challenge in fostering a positive image in East Asia and leveraging this to its
xxii James D.J. Brown and Jeff Kingston
advantage. Part of the reason is relative economic decline, but another is the
underdevelopment of regional institutions. This is a topic taken up in Tina
Burrett’s chapter on Japan’s multilateralism in Asia. She highlights Japan’s
policy successes and failures across a number of regional trade, financial, and
political forums, including the Asian Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank, Trans-Pacific Partnership, and Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership.
Another factor affecting Japan’s image in Asia is, of course, historical mem-
ory of Japanese imperialism. This important subject is addressed by Togo
Kazuhiko, who outlines Japan’s attempts at reconciliation diplomacy towards
China and Korea since the 1990s and explains why these efforts have failed.
Japan has, by contrast, had more success in promoting a favorable image in
Southeast Asia and this is an issue that Lam Peng Er picks up on in his chapter
on Japan’s rivalry with China in the region. He makes the case that contrary to
the general narrative of decline, Japan remains a formidable power in Southeast
Asia, economically, diplomatically, and culturally.
Having addressed these thematic topics, the third part turns to Japan’s bilat-
eral relations. We begin with two chapters on Japan’s relationship with the
People’s Republic of China and one on Taiwan. In the first of these, Satoh
Haruko discusses the impact of China’s renaissance on Japan’s post-war iden-
tity and considers how the two countries can improve mutual perceptions.
The second chapter by Giulio Pugliese then charts the evolution of Japan’s
post-Cold War relations with China with a focus on strategic thinking. Jeff
Kingston then examines Japan’s evolving relations with Taiwan since the sev-
ering of official ties in 1972, and how and why they remain vibrant.
After the Chinas come the Koreas. First, Cheol Hee Park describes the
complex new dynamics that emerged between Tokyo and Seoul after the
end of the Cold War and the emergence of democracy in South Korea.
In particular, Park describes how the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, “comfort
women” issue, and dissatisfaction with Japanese apologies for wartime behav-
ior continue to sour this relationship. This is followed by Aurelia George
Mulgan’s chapter on Japan’s relations with North Korea. As she explains, this
relationship is dominated by three Japanese concerns: rachi (abduction), kaku
(nuclear), and misairu (missile). Despite repetitive cycles of engagement and
estrangement, these issues continue to doom bilateral relations to a time warp
of “failed normalization”.
Another neighbor with which Japan’s relations have continued to disappoint
is Russia. In his chapter, James D.J. Brown explains why this has remained an
area of unfulfilled potential. He emphasizes not only the territorial dispute over
the Northern Territories/Southern Kurils, but also the role of Japan’s relations
with the US, negative public perceptions of Russia, and the absence of strong
economic ties.
The textbook has a contingent of five chapters on Japan’s bilateral rela-
tions in Southeast Asia. In the first of these, Honna Jun charts how Tokyo’s
policy toward Indonesia has evolved from the late Cold War era, through the
 Introduction xxiii
1997–98 Asian financial crisis, and into the 21st century. In particular, he draws
attention to how recent foreign policy has been shaped by Japan’s economic
stagnation, the aging population, and the rivalry with China.
From Indonesia we move to Thailand, where Pavin Chachavalpongpun
highlights Japan’s pragmatic approach to relations with Bangkok. Specifically,
he notes that, despite the military coup of 2014, Tokyo has continued to pro-
mote closer ties, thereby demonstrating Japan’s prioritization of commercial
and geopolitical considerations over democratization.
Next follows Ryan Hartley’s chapter on Japan’s “special relationship” with
Myanmar, a subject that has attracted particular attention since the Southeast
Asian country’s post-2010 liberalization. Hartley provides the historical back-
ground to these developments, identifies the key political actors and institutions
involved in bilateral ties, and explains why the Japan–Myanmar relationship is
so vital.
Yusuke Takagi and Maria Thaemar Tana showcase Japan’s “cozy relationship”
with the Philippines. This includes drawing attention to deepening economic
ties, plus migration issues. The authors also highlight Japan’s involvement in
the peace-building process in Mindanao, as well as Tokyo’s interest in broader
security cooperation in the context of growing tensions in the South China Sea.
Nakano Ari addresses Japan’s development of a “strategic partnership” with
Vietnam. As with Tokyo’s relationship with Manila, economic ties with Hanoi
are complemented by increasingly important security relations. These are the
result of shared anxieties about China’s hegemonic ambitions in the region.
Japan’s relationship with India is a source of optimism. As outlined by Varun
Tomar and Giorgio Shani, the two sides are brought together primarily by
common security concerns about China and the vast opportunities for Japanese
firms in India’s dynamic economy. Relations also benefit from the absence of
sensitive bilateral historical issues.
These chapters are organized to present a cohesive introduction for an
undergraduate course. All chapters also function as standalone primers to their
respective subjects. However they are used, it is our hope that this textbook will
contribute to students’ understanding of the dynamic field of Japan’s foreign
relations in Asia.
Map 0.1 Map of Asia.
Source: http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=66536&lang=en.
Map 0.2 Map of selected maritime disputes in East Asia.
Source: http://d-maps.com/m/asia/asieorientale/asieorientale02.pdf.
Part I

Foundations
1 Japan’s foreign relations in
Cold War Asia, 1945–1990
Jeff Kingston

This overview of Japan’s foreign relations in Cold War Asia spanning the period
from 1945 until 1990 aims to establish a common basis for subsequent chapters
covering post-1990s developments. Japan’s subordinate relationship with the
US that began with defeat and occupation was enshrined in the San Francisco
Treaty of 1951, a document that has left a complicated legacy for Japanese for-
eign policy and regional relations. The resulting security alliance with the US
looms over Japan’s presence in Asia, but there is more to the story. Below we
examine the Yoshida Doctrine, how it evolved and its influence on bilateral
ties with the US. Post-war reconciliation efforts to repair ruptured relations
with nations invaded, occupied and colonized by Japan pre-1945 are a major
factor in Japan’s subsequent regional relations because the legacies of this shared
past resonate divisively in the present. Japan’s regional reintegration during this
era featured expanding economic ties with varying consequences in China,
South Korea and Southeast Asia. Regional economic relations evolved con-
siderably from the 1950s to 1990, and initiatives such as the Fukuda Doctrine
enabled Japan to increasingly play an influential role despite various historical
impediments.

The San Francisco System

The US established a Cold War East Asian order at San Francisco that has
persisted despite the collapse of the Soviet Union and ostensible end to that
conflict. The San Francisco System is based on two treaties signed in 1951
that came into effect in 1952: a peace treaty and a security treaty (Dower
2014). They were negotiated while Japan was under US occupation amid Cold
War hysteria owing to the communist victory in China lead by Mao Zedong
and the Soviet Union’s first atomic bomb test, both in 1949, and Beijing and
Moscow’s subsequent alliance in 1950. Negotiations were conducted against
the backdrop of the Korean War (1950–53), which Washington viewed as a
proxy war orchestrated by Moscow. This succession of setbacks stoked anxi-
eties about an expanding communist menace in Asia inimical to US interests,
reinforced by Chinese entry into the Korean War four months after it began.
4 Jeff Kingston
The San Francisco System has guided Japan’s foreign relations in Asia in the
post-World War II era and defined the geopolitical landscape of the region
(Togo 2010). Under the aegis of the US, Japan was reintegrated into the
region on Washington’s terms and in support of its Cold War agenda. This
agenda was defined by rivalry with the Soviet Union/China and the US pol-
icy of containment aimed at stopping the spread of communism. Japan was
the designated showcase of the superiority of the US system and a base for for-
ward projection of US military power in Asia. The 1951 US–Japan Security
Treaty established an alliance with the US, with Japan agreeing to host bases
for US military forces, while the US encouraged Japanese rearmament. The
treaty stipulated the end of the US occupation, restoring Japanese independ-
ence with the exception of Okinawa, an island chain that remained under US
administrative control until 1972.
The San Francisco System also rested on the Treaty of Peace, an agreement
signed by 48 allied nations that formally ended hostilities with Japan. It stripped
Japan of its former colonies and possessions considered war booty, allocated
compensation to Allied civilians and prisoners of war (POWs), ended the
US-led Allied occupation of Japan and made various other dispositions about
the post-war order in Asia. But this was an incomplete peace because key
allies and foes did not sign the treaty, including the Soviet Union, Communist
China and Nationalist China (governed by the Kuomintang (KMT) based in
Taiwan), and South and North Korea. The absence of such key belligerents
and former colonies, as well as the treaty’s lack of clarity on several territorial
questions, sowed seeds of division between Japan and neighboring nations,
laying the foundation for a prolonged regional estrangement in Northeast
Asia that persists in the 21st century. India also did not participate because it
viewed some provisions of the treaty as an infringement on Japanese sover-
eignty and independence, sensitive issues for a nation that had only just gained
independence in 1947.
The exclusion of China from the peace conference deepened a rift that post-
poned reconciliation with the nation that suffered most from Japan’s wartime
depredations. Washington further complicated this situation by pressuring Japan
to sign a peace treaty in 1952 with the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan,
forcing Tokyo to join the US in recognizing the ROC as the legitimate gov-
ernment of China rather than the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that had
won the civil war and controlled all of mainland China. There were misgivings
in the business community and among some Japanese officials about US insist-
ence on isolating and not recognizing China while pretending that Taiwan was
really the legitimate power, but ending the US occupation and regaining sover-
eignty was the government’s priority (King 2016). This state of affairs persisted
until 1972, when Tokyo followed Washington’s lead and normalized relations
with the PRC, followed in 1978 by the Treaty of Peace and Friendship.
Given that the Korean War was ongoing, there was some logic to exclud-
ing representatives of the Korean people, but this also delayed a reckoning
over the oppression and indignities suffered by them under Japanese colonial
 Japan’s foreign relations in Cold War Asia 5
rule from 1910–45. It was not until 1965 that Japan normalized relations
with South Korea and paid compensation of $800 million in grants and soft
loans to settle all compensation claims related to the colonial era while rela-
tions with North Korea remained in abeyance.
The Soviet Union attended the peace conference, but did not sign the
treaty because it objected to the exclusion of China and Washington’s agenda
of enlisting Japan as an ally in the Cold War targeting Moscow. It further
complained that it had not been properly consulted in the drafting of the treaty
and objected to the denial of China’s rights to Taiwan. It welcomed Japan’s
renunciation of all claims to the Kuril Islands, but condemned the treaty’s fail-
ure to recognize Soviet sovereignty over South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands
as promised in the Yalta Agreement of February 1945.
The PRC was not invited, denounced the treaty as illegal and did not rec-
ognize it. Beijing also objected to the treaty’s failure to recognize Chinese
claims to Taiwan, as well as the Paracel, Pratas and Spratly Islands in the South
China Sea, issues that have become increasingly controversial in the 21st
century. The treaty is ambiguous about Taiwan’s status because it is not ceded
to any nation, although it required Japan to renounce its sovereignty. China
maintains that Japan accepted the Instrument of Surrender based on the terms
of the Potsdam Declaration and thus Taiwan should revert to Beijing. This is
because the 1945 Potsdam Declaration incorporates the Cairo Declaration of
1943, in which the Allied powers agreed to retrocession of sovereignty over
any territory “taken by violence and greed”.

Disputed territories
At San Francisco, the US sowed the seeds of contemporary territorial disputes
between Japan, Russia, China (Taiwan) and South Korea. The settlement left
issues of sovereignty over three sets of islands ambiguous, giving disputants a
basis for making overlapping claims. These disputes rouse nationalist passions
and are a source of bitter recriminations and diplomatic deadlock.

Dokdo/Takeshima
Competing claims to the islets known as Dokdo/Takeshima roil contem-
porary Japan–Republic of Korea (ROK) relations. Since 1953, South Korea
has administered Dokdo, a talismanic ground zero for anti-Japanese colonial
memory because Japan seized the territory in 1905, coinciding with Tokyo’s
imposition of a protectorate over Korea. Japan has challenged South Korea’s
claim to sovereignty, including during the 1965 negotiations that normalized
relations. Alexis Dudden (2008) argues that there is no clear basis for resolving
the controversy based on historical records, but that objective assessment has
not prevented attempts to do so.
Early drafts of the San Francisco Treaty specify the return of Dokdo to
Korea, but from 1949 it appeared Dokdo would be recognized as Japanese
6 Jeff Kingston
territory. In the final version in September 1951, however, Dokdo’s status was
left unresolved. Given that previous drafts had addressed the sovereignty issue,
the failure to so in the final draft has prompted speculation about why the
matter was not clarified. Some argue this was a deliberate US strategy aimed
at enhancing American leverage (Selden 2014). There were also concerns that
if North Korea won the ongoing war, recognizing South Korean sovereignty
might harm American interests and it did not want to alienate Japan.
Tokyo made a series of diplomatic protests about South Korea’s 1953 sei-
zure of Dokdo and erection of a lighthouse there in 1954, but to no avail.
US efforts to broker a compromise calling for joint administration made no
headway. By ignoring Dokdo, the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between
Japan and South Korea silently acquiesced to Seoul’s continued control over
the islets, a silence that has ended in bitter recriminations.
The importance of the islets (and the other disputed islands) increased with
the 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In
establishing the right to claim extension of territorial waters to 12 nautical
miles from the coast, and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) to 200 nauti-
cal miles from the baseline of territorial waters, the economic significance of
islands increased dramatically. Rich fisheries, and the potential for natural gas
and seabed minerals, raised the stakes for both Japan and South Korea.

Senkaku/Diaoyu
The Potsdam Declaration states, “The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be
carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu,
Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine”. In the
Sino-Japanese Joint Communique issued with the normalization of relations
in 1972, Japan agreed that, “it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the
Potsdam Declaration”. So, Beijing maintains that Japan, in maintaining admin-
istrative control over the islands, is not heeding what it has agreed to.
Tokyo asserts that the islets were terra nullius when they were seized in
January 1895, before the end of the Sino-Japanese war (1894–95) and the sign-
ing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended hostilities. At that time, Japanese
fishermen established a presence there and the islands were subsequently
administered as part of Japan’s new colony in Taiwan that Japan had claimed as
part of the peace settlement.
The Treaty of Shimonoseki, while granting Japan a substantial financial
award, Taiwan and other adjacent small islands, does not specifically mention
the Senkaku/Diaoyu (hereafter Senkaku) and thus Tokyo asserts that they are
not subject to the Cairo Declaration and therefore remain Japanese territory.
China counters that the seizure of the islets amid ongoing hostilities renders
them war booty.
Beijing also maintains that in 1972, when Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka
Kakuei and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai met in Beijing to normalize diplo-
matic relations, and again in 1978 when Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda
 Japan’s foreign relations in Cold War Asia 7
Sunao met with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, the question of the Senkaku
was discussed. China claims that the leaders agreed to shelve the question of
sovereignty for future resolution, while leaving the islands under Japanese
administration. The Japanese government maintains that there was no such
agreement, although a prominent confidante of Tanaka, retired Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) politician Nonaka Hirofumi, caused a stir in mid-
2012 when he announced that Tanaka had told him there was (Japan Times
2013). The British archives also confirm that in 1982 PM Suzuki Zenkō told
Margaret Thatcher about the Japanese government’s policy of shelving the
sovereignty dispute (Tiezzi 2015).
In 1972, with the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty, the Senkaku
were placed under Japanese administration. But the US State Department
made it clear that this move did not prejudice underlying claims to sovereignty.
China and Taiwan asserted sovereignty over the islands for the first time in
1971. While Japan regained sovereignty over Okinawa in 1972, it remained
a quasi-military colony because the massive US military presence was main-
tained as part of the bargain and the islands, and the Japanese-administered
Senkaku, came under the ambit of the US–Japan Security Treaty.

Kurils/Northern Territories
The four disputed islands—Kunashiri, Etorofu, Habomai and Shikotan—that
Japan calls “the Northern Territories” and Russia “the Kurils” are located
just off the coast of the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido. The Soviet
Union invaded and seized these islands at the end of World War II, after Japan
announced its surrender on August 15, 1945. From the Japanese perspective,
Soviet and now Russian claims are therefore illegal. Moreover, the Soviet attack
violated the neutrality pact signed with Tokyo in 1941. Moscow views its estab-
lishment of sovereignty as the spoils of war, an inducement to enter the war
against Japan offered by President Franklin D. Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference
in February 1945. Germany’s defeat was imminent, but Japan seemed far from
capitulating and so Roosevelt agreed to territorial concessions to secure Stalin’s
assistance. The Cold War between the US and Soviet Union had not yet
commenced so such cooperation seemed desirable. As agreed at Yalta, Stalin
launched his attack on August 9, 1945, three months after Germany’s surrender,
mounting a successful blitzkrieg through Japan’s depleted defenses in Manchuria
and Korea. The Soviet forces continued fighting even after Tokyo surrendered,
completing the seizure of the disputed islands in early September 1945. Whether
taking them as payback or spoils of war seemed less important to Stalin than
asserting Soviet interests in the Far East and making a claim for participating in
the occupation of Japan. Washington was reluctant to allow this as bilateral rela-
tions had deteriorated sharply in the summer of 1945, but equally it had no com-
pelling reason to challenge the Soviet presence in the Kurils and was war weary.
Since 1945, the Soviets (and now Russians) have maintained that the Yalta
Agreement with the Allied powers specifically granted them sovereignty over
8 Jeff Kingston
the Kurils in exchange for going to war with Japan. Moreover, in the 1951
Treaty of San Francisco, Japan specifically “renounces all right, title and claim
to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent
to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of
Portsmouth of 5 September 1905”. Moscow never signed the Treaty of San
Francisco, but interprets it as US affirmation of the Yalta Agreement. Japan
insists that the four islands are not actually part of the Kurils and thus they were
not renounced. In 1956, Tokyo and Moscow were on the verge of resolving
the impasse by splitting the four islands, but the US pressured Japan not to
strike a deal with the common Cold War enemy.
As a result, bilateral relations remained chilly, although there have been sev-
eral Japanese overtures. Under General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, during
the final years of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s, Japanese hopes for
a breakthrough rested on Moscow’s need for economic assistance. Gorbachev’s
political weakness and the strategically valuable location of the islands allow-
ing naval access to the Sea of Okhotsk, however, precluded any territorial
concessions. Since 1981, February 7 has been celebrated in Japan as Northern
Territories Day, coinciding with the anniversary of an 1855 treaty with Russia
that recognized Japanese claims to the islands.

Yoshida Doctrine
This was the most important pillar of Japanese security policy in the post-war
period, one that sparked tensions in the US–Japan alliance because Washington
sought a greater military contribution from Tokyo. Prime Minister Yoshida
Shigeru (1946–47, 1949–54), emphasized economic recovery and invoked the
war-renouncing Article 9 in the US-written 1947 Constitution to ward off US
demands that Japan reestablish a Japanese military force and participate in the
American-led United Nations war effort in the Korean peninsula (1950–53).
Article 9 states:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the

Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation
and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea
and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The
right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
(Constitution of Japan, 1947)

The US quickly came to regret this provision that it had insisted on to ensure
that unlike Germany in Europe, Japan would not wreak havoc in the Asia-
Pacific region again. Yoshida found it convenient.
The Yoshida Doctrine is an expression of Japanese unilateral pacifism based
on Article 9 that was made possible by the US security alliance. There seems to
 Japan’s foreign relations in Cold War Asia 9
be little ambiguity or scope in Article 9 for Japan to rearm as it incrementally
did in the post-war era. However, Japanese courts have upheld the constitu-
tionality of Japan’s military forces on the basis that the UN Charter grants all
states the right to self-defense (Samuels 2008). Tokyo stonewalled persistent
US pressures during the tense atmosphere of the Cold War, but gradually and
incrementally acceded to US demands for greater burden-sharing on defense
to ward off accusations it was free-riding at American expense.
The minimalist approach to security embodied in the Yoshida Doctrine,
doing the minimum required to assuage Washington, sought to dampen contro-
versies over security issues in Japanese domestic discourse. The major concern
of opponents to the alliance was that it violated the Constitution, would make
Japan a target and might embroil it in war. In 1960 there were mass pro-
tests against the revised Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between
the US and Japan that forced cancellation of President Dwight Eisenhower’s
planned visit and eventually brought down the government, but only after
Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke managed to get it passed in the Diet. The
popularity of pacifism remains manifest in Japan, drawing on widespread public
repudiation of Japan’s militarists and the debacle they inflicted on the nation,
and region, in World War II.
In the context of the Cold War, Japan was above all a showcase of the vir-
tues of US-style democracy and capitalism, a shining example that contrasted
with miserable conditions in the Soviet Union’s orbit of influence. The San
Francisco Peace Treaty allowed the US to retain its military bases in Japan and
gave it control over Okinawa, where most US bases and forces in the area are
still located. These bases enabled the US to project its military power in Asia, a
crucial Cold War battleground, and were the teeth in America’s containment
policy (1947–89) directed against the Soviet Union and the spread of com-
munism in the region. Japan thus played a crucial role in the US war effort in
Korea and later Vietnam, in the latter case sparking widespread protests and a
radicalized leftist student movement that targeted US imperialism and Tokyo’s
“betrayal” of fellow Asians.
The agreement on reversion of Okinawan sovereignty to Japan in 1972 also
provided for the US to retain its base rights there. So even if the 1947 Constitution
seems to limit the Japanese government’s security options, it never affected its
willingness to accommodate US demands for base privileges nor, it appears, con-
strain repeated US violations of Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles.
In 1967 Prime Minister Satō Eisaku (1964–72) first enunciated Japan’s
Three Non-Nuclear Principles, which prohibit the production, possession or
introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory. In 1974, he won the
Nobel Peace Prize for doing so, but subsequently it is clear that he was aware
of repeated US violations of these principles. There was a secret agreement
between Japan and the US that allowed US nuclear weapons into Japanese
territory, which was concluded when the US–Japan Mutual Security Treaty
was revised in 1960 and allowed US ships carrying nuclear weapons to transit
10 Jeff Kingston
Japanese waters and call at Japanese ports. There also was a similar secret agree-
ment allowing the US to bring nuclear weapons into Okinawa in a crisis, and
nuclear weapons were actually stored in Okinawa prior to reversion in 1972.
Overall, the Yoshida Doctrine constrained what Japan was prepared to do in
support of the US militarily, but over the decades US pressure on Tokyo led to
significant changes. From 1978, for example, Japan began paying omoiyari yosan
(sympathy budget), base-hosting support that defrayed the costs of stationing
US troops in Japan. And in the 1980s, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro
(1981–86) agreed to expand the surrounding maritime area that Japan would
defend and boldly declared that the nation was an “unsinkable aircraft car-
rier”, shrugging off pacifist criticisms and norms in a manner that his successors
would intermittently continue.
As Japan became the second largest economy in the world, expectations
overseas and in Japan began to build that it would assume a more prominent
role in the world. Yoshida’s emphasis on economic growth had borne fruit in
ways that catapulted Japan into the global limelight. It would not be until the
1990s that Japan began to discuss a “normal nation” security policy, one that
assumed Japan should play a role on the global stage commensurate with its
economic heft and interests. This was prompted by concerns that Japan had
only contributed money towards the Persian Gulf War (1990–91) and was
vulnerable to criticism that it was shirking risk while enjoying the benefits of
continued access to Middle East oil. Subsequently, Japan dispatched troops
overseas for the first time in 1993 under a new peacekeeping operations law
and in 1997 agreed to new US–Japan Defense Guidelines that expanded what
Japan’s Self-Defense Forces would do in the regional vicinity if the need arose.
These represented significant steps in the incremental loosening of constitu-
tional constraints and assuming security tasks that stretched the limits of the
Yoshida Doctrine.

Korean relations
The divisive legacies of Japanese colonial rule over the Korean peninsula have
bedeviled Japan’s relations with Seoul and Pyongyang since the end of World
War II. Due to the Cold War and Korean War, when Japan was used as
a base for US military operations, relations with North Korea were limited.
Between 1959 and 1984, the International Committee of the Red Cross repat-
riated 93,340 ethnic Koreans who were resident in Japan to North Korea,
including 49,000 in 1960 alone. This mass repatriation resulted from negotia-
tions between North Korea and Japan beginning in 1955, Tokyo’s vigorous
promotion of the exodus and North Korean propaganda channeled through
ideologically sympathetic organizations in Japan (Morris-Suzuki 2011). Some
repatriates also desired to contribute to their preferred homeland, a choice
many suffered for given grim conditions in North Korea.
Japanese airplane hijackers associated with the radical leftist Red Army
found refuge in North Korea from the 1970s, meaning Pyongyang was
 Japan’s foreign relations in Cold War Asia 11
harboring what Tokyo viewed as fugitives from justice. Finding them partners,
along with identity theft and tutoring in Japanese, are some of the reasons
why in the 1970s and 1980s North Korean commandoes abducted dozens
of Japanese nationals from Japan and brought them back to North Korea
(Boynton 2016). Few observers believed scattered reports about this abduction
program at the time, but President Kim Jong-il confirmed it in 2002 when he
met Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō in Pyongyang.
In 1965, Japan normalized relations with South Korea through the Treaty
on Basic Relations that was negotiated in seven rounds of talks between 1951
and 1965. This treaty came two decades after the end of Japanese colonial rule
and at the behest of the US in order to enhance cooperation with and between
its two regional allies. The treaty provided for compensation by Japan to South
Korea intended to resolve all issues and claims arising from Japanese colonial
rule. Tokyo disbursed $500 million in loans and granted $300 million in eco-
nomic aid. The money was used to jumpstart South Korea’s heavy industry
and to build infrastructure.
In the decades following the 1965 treaty, Japan–ROK relations remained
fraught. Indeed, historical conflicts surfaced repeatedly and have intensified
since democratization of South Korea at the end of the 1980s. In 2005, the
ROK government released diplomatic documents covering negotiations
about the 1965 agreement that revealed Japan had proposed offering com-
pensation directly to individuals, but Seoul took charge of such disbursements
(Underwood 2008). Although accepting a large sum of Japanese compensation
for 1.03 million Koreans conscripted as laborers or soldiers in exchange for
waiving all future claims, it paid victim families only modest sums of 300,000
won (approximately $1,200) for each death, and spent most of the Japanese
redress on industrialization and infrastructure projects. While normalizing dip-
lomatic relations, the treaty provided no substantial basis for overcoming the
contentious colonial past or paving the way for reconciliation.
From a South Korean perspective, the historical issues—notably the com-
fort women, forced laborers and Japanese textbook treatments of colonialism
and war—require unqualified Japanese recognition of wrongdoing, acceptance
of responsibility and compensation. In 1965, these issues were not officially
recognized and thus not covered in negotiations, only becoming salient from
the 1990s.

Reparations and reintegration

Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) was sympathetic to Japan’s situation and lobbied for
a magnanimous peace while refusing any reparations. The Philippines ratified
the peace treaty in 1956 after signing a reparations agreement in the same year,
followed by South Vietnam in 1959. Burma and Indonesia were not signato-
ries to the San Francisco Treaty, but signed bilateral peace treaties that included
reparations in 1955 and 1958 respectively. In 1972, China renounced all claims
to war reparations in the spirit of friendship.
12 Jeff Kingston
The amount of war-related compensation Japan paid to nations that it
occupied between 1941 and 1945 totaled just over $1 billion, including $200
million to Burma, $550 million to the Philippines, $223 million to Indonesia
and $38 million to South Vietnam. Reparations were paid mostly in the form
of export credits that recipient nations could use to import goods from Japan,
and thus helped stimulate Japan’s economic recovery while facilitating its post-
World War II economic penetration of the region. This economic reinte-
gration through reparations enabled Japanese firms to gain market share that
steadily increased over the following decades.
In 1966 Japan played a key role in establishing the Asian Development
Bank (ADB), and every president of this key regional financial institution
since then has been Japanese. Initially, the main recipients were Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines and South Korea—nations with which Japan sought
to expand trading ties. ADB funding helped promote regional development
and earned goodwill while also benefitting Japanese firms as they accounted
for 42% of total procurements from ADB loans between 1967 and 1976 (Ming
1995–96, 509–528).

Fukuda Doctrine
In January 1974, PM Tanaka Kakuei made a trip to Southeast Asia and was
greeted by anti-Japanese protests in Jakarta and Bangkok. This unanticipated
welcome was partly driven by domestic political factors in Indonesia and
Thailand, but angry protestors clearly denounced Japan’s neocolonial economic
relations with the region. Japanese companies’ dominance of regional econo-
mies, and close ties with crony capitalists under authoritarian regimes, conjured
up memories of the 1940s when Japan had tried to establish the Greater East
Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, a system that aimed to place the region’s natural
resources at the disposal of Japan and its war effort. It is remembered for inflict-
ing considerable damage and loss of life while worsening living conditions.
In August 1977, in response to the riots and such concerns, Japanese Prime
Minister Fukuda Takeo declared in Manila that Japan would never become a
military power, would nurture trust with Southeast Asian countries and pro-
mote peace and prosperity in the region. He also sought to offer reassurance
in the wake of the US withdrawal from Southeast Asia following defeat in
the Vietnam War. Known as the Fukuda Doctrine, these principles heralded
a significant strengthening of cooperation between Japan and Southeast Asian
countries as Tokyo embraced what it called “heart-to-heart” diplomacy and
promoted enhanced cultural and educational exchanges (Lam 2013). It empha-
sized the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), prom-
ised to play a role in promoting rapprochement with Indochina (Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia) and pledged investment to promote heavy industry in
the region. The Fukuda Doctrine aimed at transforming Japan’s reputation
for being exclusively interested in economic policy and maximizing profits by
building soft power through vigorous cultural diplomacy.
 Japan’s foreign relations in Cold War Asia 13
In his speech, Fukuda acknowledged that there was a lack of reciprocity in
commercial ties, bluntly declaring that, “Even when viewed from our country
there was an impression of economic aggression and arrogant manners, and it
was a situation which was symbolized by the expression ‘economic animal’”.
However, while trying to dispel such concerns, the Fukuda Doctrine
was a means to nurture a more positive atmosphere to facilitate intensified
economic relations. These remained an essential aspect of Japan’s ties with
Southeast Asia as rising labor and energy costs prompted a significant shift
towards offshore production facilities in the region, especially involving labor
and energy intensive industries. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries-induced oil shocks of the 1970s led to sharp increases in oil prices
that undermined the viability of Japan’s heavy industries. Aluminum smelting,
for example, was shifted to Indonesia, where bauxite and energy was abundant.
Moreover, environmental regulations were not as strict, sparking local protests
targeting the export of polluting industries as Japan began in the 1970s to grap-
ple with the environmental devastation caused by its economic miracle of the
1950s and 1960s.
The transfer of textiles, electronics and vehicle assembly operations led to
a surge in foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology transfer initiatives
while the government boosted Official Development Assistance (ODA), from
$3.3 billion in 1980 to $9 billion in 1990 with 60% flowing to Asia. ODA
focused on building infrastructure deemed necessary for economic devel-
opment and facilitating the so-called “flying geese” model of development
(Hatch 2010). Japan would be the leading goose in the regional flock, help-
ing its neighbors develop economically in ways that tapped into and nurtured
synergies with Japan. The hierarchical model focused on the evolution from
labor- to capital-intensive production with Japan assisting transitions in the
second-tier Newly Industrialized Countries (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore
and Hong Kong) and third-tier ASEAN economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines and Thailand) with China bringing up the rear.
In 1985 Japan agreed to a sharp appreciation of the yen in the Plaza Accords,
an unsuccessful attempt to rectify trade imbalances with other advanced indus-
trialized nations that gave added incentive for Japanese firms to relocate pro-
duction facilities to offshore locations in Southeast Asia. Indonesia, Singapore
and Thailand were the main beneficiaries of rising Japanese FDI in the region
and by 1992 Japan had become the largest investor in Southeast Asia except for
the Philippines, where the US remained dominant. The Fukuda Doctrine had
facilitated Japan’s emergence as the region’s leading economic partner in terms
of trade, investment and ODA.
Fukuda also promised to play a role in promoting rapprochement between
capitalist ASEAN nations and communist Indochina. To this end Japan pro-
vided small amounts of economic assistance aimed at helping Indochina
overcome war devastation, but in 1979 these programs were suspended fol-
lowing Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. Tokyo refused to recognize the
new government in Phnom Penh installed by Hanoi, and followed US policy
14 Jeff Kingston
in the matter. Here the realpolitik limits on Japanese foreign policy auton-
omy constrained the Fukuda Doctrine.
By the 1980s, Japan’s economy was an admired and feared juggernaut, but
it seemed to be punching below its weight on the international stage, where
its diplomacy was tentative and fumbling. Southeast Asia, however, was one
region where Japan assumed an international role commensurate with its eco-
nomic stature (Sudo 2002). A decade after the Fukuda Doctrine was announced,
in 1987 PM Takeshita Noburu announced the New Partnership for Peace and
Prosperity, designed to boost ASEAN development and cultivate soft power.
This involved a $4 billion development fund, an expanded exchange program
targeting civil society organizations, scholars and the opening of Japanese cul-
ture centers under the auspices of the Japan Foundation and the Japan–ASEAN
Investment Fund. Moreover, Japan’s growing ODA budget in the 1980s prior-
itized Southeast Asia, sparking some criticism because it was “tied aid” requir-
ing purchases of goods and services from Japanese firms and concerns that the
emphasis on infrastructural projects came at the expense of basic human needs.

China
There was a China-sized hole in Japan’s foreign policy towards post-1945 Asia.
It was the nation that suffered most from Japanese wartime depredations, but
overcoming this bitter legacy was complicated by the US Cold War policy
of isolating China. Chinese leaders admired Japan’s economic modernization
and wanted to emulate that, but Tokyo’s alliance with the US put it into
the enemy camp. The convulsions in China associated with Mao Zedong’s
Great Leap Forward (1958–61) and Cultural Revolution (1966–76) reinforced
Tokyo’s dim view of communism. In 1964, China detonated a nuclear device,
sending a shiver up Japan’s collective spine. Experts debated whether Japan
should follow suit, but concluded that nuclear weapons would not make Japan
safer and instead decided to rely on the US nuclear umbrella.
Even though Japan and China were in opposite camps during the Cold War,
King (2016) explains how Japan became the essential economic partner in the
aftermath of war. Beijing condemned Japan’s slavish relationship with the US
while seeking to secure industrial goods and technical expertise. Even during the
convulsions of the Cultural Revolution Japanese exporters were still selling signif-
icant amounts of high-tech products and building manufacturing plants in China.
By 1970, trade with Japan accounted for 20% of China’s total trade and 60% of its
industrial plant and technology contracts; in key respects Japan had replaced the
Soviet Union’s economic role following the 1960 rupture in relations between
Moscow and Beijing over ideology and territory (King 2016). From $823 million
in 1970, Japan’s trade with China surged to $22 billion by 1985, demonstrating
the impact of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms (King 2016).
The 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China opened
the spigots of Japanese ODA and facilitated a surge of investments and technol-
ogy transfer to what was then a backward economy. China then was a far cry
 Japan’s foreign relations in Cold War Asia 15
from the factory of the world that it later became, but this was a crucial time
for putting in place the infrastructural building blocks that made that possi-
ble. While Beijing rejected reparations for wartime destruction from 1931–45,
more than $30 billion in Japanese ODA over the ensuing three decades fulfilled
the same function, and coupled with large investments and technology transfer
played a crucial role in launching the Chinese economic miracle. Ironically,
booming economic relations were accompanied by chillier political ties as the
shared wartime past became ever more divisive.
Mao had downplayed this past and singled out Japanese militarists for their
role in wartime depredations while sympathizing with the Japanese people
for the suffering they endured due to Tokyo’s imperial aggression. His suc-
cessors, however, politicized this past from the early 1980s. A rising Japan
was seen to be unrepentant and with Mao no longer around, the history wars
heated up rather rapidly, beginning with a 1982 row over allegedly evasive
depictions of Japan’s invasion of China in Japanese textbooks (Rose 1999).
Prominent Japanese politicians also threw fuel on the fires of recrimination by
denying, downplaying and shifting responsibility for the prolonged rampage.
The brutal repression of the pro-democracy Tiananmen Square demonstra-
tions in 1989 made the history card even more useful as a way to boost the
Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy and redirect popular ire away from the
“butchers of Beijing” and towards Japan. The ensuing anti-Japanese patriotic
education has played a key role in worsening mutual perceptions and recrimi-
nations despite intensified economic engagement.

Shackles of the past

During the post-World War II era Japan has not been able to overcome the
troubling legacies of its colonialism and wartime aggression (Kingston 2017).
It has not convinced former victims of its contrition and has often seemed
to shirk the onus of perpetrator’s responsibility while appearing preoccupied
by the suffering it endured. It has evaded specific apologies about cases of
wrongdoing, leaving an equivocal impression about contemporary Japanese
attitudes towards this dark chapter. Instead of embracing a language of healing
and posture of reconciliation it has relied on money and the march of time
to heal the wounds of the past. As a result, Japan has had to tread carefully in
nations it once occupied and soft-peddle concerns about human rights viola-
tions, democracy and the rule of law.
While Japan’s policies towards ASEAN nurtured improved commercial
relations, Tokyo adopted a policy of non-intervention and accommodation
of authoritarian regimes. Japan generously supported the Suharto government
(1967–98) in Indonesia, leading a group of donor nations, the International
Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), to bolster its finances while
opening the spigots of ODA to this repressive regime. A series of military
coups in Thailand had little impact on bilateral relations or burgeoning com-
mercial ties. Tokyo also remained ambivalent about the disastrous military
16 Jeff Kingston
governments that dominated Burma (now Myanmar) since a coup in 1962.
It was a main provider of ODA and averted its eyes from incompetence,
corruption and repression. Even after the brutal repression of the 1988 pro-
democracy student uprising, Japan was a reluctant supporter of sanctions and
Aung San Suu Kyi’s quest for democracy. Despite these shortcomings, how-
ever, the Fukuda Doctrine did win hearts and minds and improved Japan’s
image among Southeast Asians.
Closer to home, the former colonies of Taiwan and South Korea offer an
intriguing contrast. Overall, the legacy of colonial rule in Taiwan (1895–1945)
is quite positive while in South Korea angry recriminations persist. In Taiwan,
the Japanese era evokes memories of modernization and relatively good gov-
ernance. These memories have been deployed to highlight misrule and repres-
sion under the KMT government since 1947. Local Taiwanese resented the
mainlanders who came and took over their islands and made invidious com-
parisons with the colonial era to undermine the KMT’s legitimacy. In South
Korea, $800 million in compensation did not dispel colonial-era grievances.
There is little acknowledgement of Japan’s modernizing role as the focus is
entirely on repression and humiliations endured. It does not help that Japan
concluded the deal with President Park Chung-hee, an authoritarian leader
who once served in the Japanese military and emulated Japan’s development
model. Tokyo remained silent about human rights violations under Park and
his military successors, knowing that its advice would be an unwelcome provo-
cation. Though the nostrum of shared values is often invoked as the bedrock of
the US–Japan alliance, Tokyo has been more reticent about a values-oriented
foreign policy, pursuing instead the pragmatic and expedient.

References
Boynton, Robert (2016). The Invitation-Only Zone: The True Story of North Korea’s
Abduction Project. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Dower, John (2014). “The San Francisco System: Past, Present, Future in US–Japan–
China Relations”. Asia-Pacific Journal, 12(8/2).
Dudden, Alexis (2008). Troubled Apologies Among Japan, Korea and the United States.
Columbia University Press.
Hatch, Walter (2010). Asia’s Flying Geese: How Regionalization Shapes Japan. Cornell
University Press.
Japan Times (2013). “Senkaku Row Shelved in ’70s: Nonaka”. June 5.
King, Amy (2016). China–Japan Relations after WWII: Empire, Industry and War. Cambridge
University Press.
Kingston, Jeff (2017). Nationalism in Asia Since 1945. Wiley-Blackwell.
Lam, Peng Er (2013). Japan’s Relations with Southeast Asia: The Fukuda Doctrine and
Beyond. Routledge.
Ming, Wan (1995–96). “Japan and the Asian Development Bank”. Pacific Affairs, 68(4),
509–528.
Morris-Suzuki, Tessa (2011). “Exodus to North Korea Revisited: Japan, North Korea,
and the ICRC in the ‘Repatriation’ of Ethnic Koreans from Japan”. Asia-Pacific
Journal, 9(22/2).
 Japan’s foreign relations in Cold War Asia 17
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet (1947). Constitution of Japan.
Rose, Caroline (1999). “The Textbook Issue: Domestic Sources of Japan’s Foreign
Policy”. Japan Forum, 11(2), 205–216.
Samuels, Richard (2008). Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East
Asia. Cornell University Press.
Selden, Mark (2014). “Territorial Disputes with Korea and China: Small Islets”, in Jeff
Kingston (ed), Critical Issues in Contemporary Japan. Routledge, pp. 149–160.
Sudo, Sueo (2002). The International Relations of Japan and South East Asia: Forging a New
Regionalism. Routledge.
Tiezzi, Shannon (2015). “China and Japan’s Abandoned Senkaku/Diaoyu Agreement”.
Diplomat, January 6.
Togo, Kazuhiko (2010). Japan’s Foreign Policy, 1945–2009: The Quest for a Proactive
Policy, 2nd ed. Brill.
Underwood, William (2008). “New Era for Japan–Korea History Issues: Forced Labor
Redress Efforts Begin to Bear Fruit”. Asia-Pacific Journal, 6(3).
2 International relations theory and
Japanese foreign policy
Gilbert Rozman

International relations theory was preoccupied with Japan in the 1970s to

1980s, and it has compelling reasons to refocus on Japan again (Rozman 2015a).
This would serve those who are concerned with the quality of the theory,
those intent on better understanding the Japanese case, and those who pri-
oritize resolving challenges in the East Asian region. Theoretical deductions
often influence foreign policy assumptions as well as policy decisions. Below, I
reflect on how analysts of Japan frame its relations with the US, China, North
and South Korea, Russia, and Southeast Asia, seeking the impact of theoretical
conceptions. While many examples are from the 2000s, this chapter offers an
overview too of how theory influenced foreign policy in the catch-up period of
the 1950s to 1970s, the confident “bubble” era of the 1980s, the post-Cold War
decade of regional aspirations in the 1990s, and the uncertainty in the 2010s.
Coverage of the most recent years is divided into three themes: geostra-
tegic, geo-economic, and geo-cultural. These roughly correspond to theo-
retical assumptions from realist, liberal economic, and constructivist (national
identity) perspectives. By realism is meant treating foreign policy as if it were
dictated solely by actual threats. Liberal economic theories see the drivers of
foreign policy as just the pursuit of economic advantage and multilateral coop-
eration. Constructivism introduces the role of perceptions into foreign policy.
Within this rubric, national identity theories ground the search for perceptions
in narratives about what makes a country distinctive. Japan has figured often
in all three lines of analysis. Doubts have been raised about its realist thinking,
since it has been guided by a “peace constitution” for 70 years (Green 2001).
The extent of its liberalism has been questioned (Hosoya 2012) due to pro-
tectionism against the international community—immigration, foreign direct
investment, non-governmental organizations, information flows, etc. Given
the revisionist leanings of many politicians, there has also been considerable
concern about identity themes that interfere with pragmatic foreign relations
(Chirot et al. 2014). During the “bubble economy” era, Japan was also at the
center of debates about convergence in the process of modernization and its
impact on foreign ties. More recently, under the Koizumi Junichirō (2001–06)
and Abe Shinzō (2006–07 and 2012–) cabinets, attention has turned to the
impact of a strong leader, in contrast to the brief tenure of prime ministers
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
 III

It is the common habit of nations at war to ascribe to the other side

all the cunning, as if the possession of a Ulysses were some sort of
discredit. Happily for us our chosen Ulysses in France, at the most
critical time, was of the first order. But no soldier can go far ahead of
his time; he has to work in it and with it. And so the rich new mine
of Intelligence work through the Press was not worked by either
side, in the Great War, for all it was worth. Only a few trial borings
were made; experimental shafts were sunk into the seam, and good,
promising stuff was brought to the top.
Here are a couple of samples. Some readers of popular science, as it
is called, may have been shocked to see in a technical journal, rather
late in the war, a recklessly full description of our "listening sets"—
the apparatus by which an enemy telephone message is overheard
in the field. "Why," they must have thought, "this is giving away one
of our subtlest devices for finding out what the enemy is about. The
journal ought to be prosecuted." The article had really come from
G.H.Q. It was the last thrust in a long duel.
When the war opened the Germans had good apparatus for
telephonic eavesdropping. We had, as usual, nothing to speak of.
The most distinctly traceable result was the annihilation of our first
attack at Ovillers, near Albert, early in July 1916. At the instant fixed
for the attack our front at the spot was smothered under a
bombardment which left us with no men to make it. A few days after
when we took Ovillers, we found the piece of paper on which the
man with the German "listening set" had put down, word for word,
our orders for the first assault. Then we got to work. We drew our
own telephones back, and we perfected our own "listening sets" till
the enemy drew back his, further and further, giving up more and
more of ease and rapidity of communication in order to be safe. At
last a point was reached at which he had backed right out of
hearing. All hope of pushing him back further still, by proving in
practice that we could still overhear, was now gone. All that was left
to do was to add the effects of a final bluff to the previous effects of
the real strength of our hand. And so there slipped into a rather out-
of-the-way English journal the indiscretion by which the reach of our
electric ears was, to say the least of it, not under-stated. Few people
in England might notice the article. The enemy could be trusted to
do so.
When the Flanders battle of July 31, 1917, was about to be fought,
we employed the old ruse of the Chinese attack. We modernised the
trick of medieval garrisons which would make a show of getting
ready to break out at one gate when a real sally was to be made
from another. The enemy was invited to think that a big attack was
at hand. But against Lens, and not east of Ypres. Due circumstantial
evidence was provided. There were audible signs that a great
concentration of British guns were cautiously registering, west of
Lens. A little scuffle on that part of the front elicited from our side an
amazing bombardment—apparently loosed in a moment of panic. I
fancy a British Staff Officer's body—to judge by his brassard and
tabs—may have floated down the Scarpe into the German lines.
Interpreted with German thoroughness, the maps and papers upon
it might easily betray the fact that Lens was the objective. And then
a really inexcusable indiscretion appeared—just for a moment, and
then was hushed up—in the London Press. To an acute German eye
it must have been obvious that this composition was just the
inconsequent gassing of some typically stupid English General at
home on leave; he was clearly throwing his weight about, as they
say, without any real understanding of anything. The stuff was of no
serious value, except for one parenthetic, accidental allusion to Lens
as the mark. As far as I know, this ebullition of babble was printed in
only one small edition of one London paper. Authority was then seen
to be nervously trying, as Uncle Toby advised, "to wipe it up and say
no more about it." Lest it should not be observed to have taken this
wise precaution some fussy member of Parliament may have asked
in the House of Commons how so outrageous a breach of soldierly
reticence had occurred. And was there no control over the Press? It
all answered. The Germans kept their guns in force at Lens, and
their counter barrage east of Ypres was so much the lighter, and our
losses so much the less.
 IV

If we did these things in the green leaf, what might we not do in the
dry? Mobilize our whole Press, conscribe it for active service under a
single control, a—let us be frank—a Father-General of Lies, the
unshaming strategic and tactical lies of "the great wars" which
"make ambition virtue," and sometimes make mendacity a virtue
too? Coach the whole multitudinous orchestra of the Press to carry
out the vast conceptions of some consummate conductor, splendide
mendax? From each instrument under his baton this artist would
draw its utmost contributive aid to immense schemes of concerted
delusiveness, the harping of the sirens elaborated into Wagnerian
prodigies of volume and complexity.
As you gaze from the top of a tree or a tower behind your own front,
in a modern war, all the landscape beyond it looks as if man had
perished from the earth, leaving his works behind him. It all looks
strangely vacant and dead, the roofs of farms and the spires of
churches serving only to deepen your sense of this blank deletion of
man, as the Roman arches enhance the vacuous stillness of the
Campagna. Your Intelligence Corps has to convert this first
impression, this empty page, into a picture, built up line by line, dot
by dot, of the universe of activities that are going on out there. Its
first and easiest task is to mark out correctly the place where every
enemy unit is, each division, each battery, each railhead, aerodrome,
field hospital and dump. Next it has to mark each movement of each
of these, the shiftings of the various centres of gravity, the changes
in the relative density and relative quality of troops and guns at
various sectors, the increase, at any sector, of field hospitals, the
surest harbingers of heavy attacks. The trains on all lines must be
counted, their loads calculated. Next must be known in what sort of
spirits the enemy is, in the field and also at home. Do the men
believe in their officers? Do the men get confident letters from their
civilian friends? Do they send cheerful ones back? Is desertion rare
and much abhorred? Or so common that men are no longer shot for
it now? So you may go on enumerating until it strikes you that you
are simply drifting into an inventory of all the details of the enemy's
wartime life, in the field and at home. And then you understand.
For what you want to know, in order to beat him, is no less than this
—to see him steadily and see him whole. In the past we have talked
of information "of military value" as distinct from other information.
But all information about either side is of military value to the other.
News of the outbreak or settlement of a strike in a Welsh coalfield
was of military value to Ludendorff. News of the day's weather in
Central Europe was of military value to Sir Douglas Haig. News of
anything that expressed in any degree the temper of London or
Berlin, of Munich or Manchester, helped to eke out that accurate
vision of an enemy's body and mind which is the basis of success in
combat. A black dot, of the size of a pin-head, may seem, when
looked at alone, to give no secret away. But when the same dot is
seen, no longer in isolation, but as part of a pen-and-ink drawing,
perhaps it may leap into vital prominence, showing now as the pupil
of the eye that completes a whole portrait, gives its expression to a
face and identifies a sitter.
Throughout the Great War our own Press and that of the Germans
were each pouring out, for the undesigned benefit of their enemy,
substantially correct descriptions of everything in the war life of their
respective nations, except a few formal military and naval secrets
specially reserved by the censors. Each nation fought, on the whole,
with the other standing well out in the light, with no inscrutability
about its countenance. If we were ever again in such risk of our
national life, would we not seriously try to make ourselves an
enigma? Or would we leave this, as we have left some other
refinements of war, to the other side to introduce first?
 V

Suppose us again at war with a Power less strong at sea than

ourselves. If we should want its fleet to come out and fight in the
open, why not evoke, some fine morning, from every voice in our
daily press, a sudden and seemingly irrepressible cry of grief and
rage over the unconcealable news—the Censor might be defied by
the way—that our Grand Fleet, while ranging the seas, had struck a
whole school of drift mines and lost half its numbers? Strategic
camouflage, however, would go far beyond such special means to
special ends as that. It would, as a regular thing, derange the whole
landscape presented to enemy eyes by our Press. There was in the
war a French aerodrome across which the French camouflage
painters had simply painted a great white high-road: it ran across
hangars, huts, turf, everything; and everything was amazingly
obliterated by it. Across our real life, as seen under the noonday rays
of publicity in ordinary times, the supreme controller might draw
some such enormous lines of falsification.
Most of the fibs that we used in the war were mere nothings, and
clumsy at that. When the enemy raided our trenches in the dead
winter season, took fifty prisoners, and did as he liked for a while—
so much as he liked that a court of inquiry was afterwards held and
a colonel deprived of his command—we said in our official
communiqué that a hostile raiding party had "entered our trenches"
but was "speedily driven out, leaving a number of dead." When
civilian moral at home was going through one of its occasional
depressions, we gave out that it was higher than ever. We did not
officially summon from the vasty deep the myth about Russian
soldiers in England. But when it arose out of nothing we did make
some use of it. These were, however, little more than bare
admissions of the principle that truthfulness in war is not imperative.
Falsification was tried, but it was not "tried out." Like really long-
range guns, the kindred of "Bertha," it came into use only enough to
suggest what another world-war might be. Vidimus tantum. And
then the war ended.
Under a perfected propaganda system the whole surface presented
by a country's Press to the enemy's Intelligence would be a kind of
painted canvas. The artist would not merely be reticent about the
positions, say, of our great training camps. He would create, by
indirect evidence, great dummy training camps. In the field we had
plenty of dummy aerodromes, with hangars complete and a few
dummy machines sprawling outside, to draw enemy bomb-fire. At
home we would have dummy Salisbury Plains to which a guarded
allusion would peep out here and there while the new unity of
command over the Press would delete the minutest clue to the
realities. Episodes like that of the famous Lansdowne letter would
not be left for nature to bungle. If at any time such an episode
seemed likely to touch any diplomatic spring with good strategic
effect, it would happen at that moment and no other. Otherwise it
would not happen, so far as any trace of it in the Press could betray.
By-elections, again, their course and result, may tell an enemy much
of what your people are thinking. But, for military purposes, there is
always some particular thing which you want him to believe them to
be thinking. So you would not leave it to the capricious chances of
an actual election to settle whether he should be led to believe this
or not. You would see to it. Just as you camouflage your real guns
and expose dummy guns, so you would obliterate from the Press all
trace of your real elections and offer to view, at the times that best
suited, dummy elections, ad hoc elections, complete in all their
parts.
We have imagined a case in which it would be our interest to raise
false confidence in the enemy, perhaps to draw a hurried attack on
our shores at a time of our own choosing. Then, if the whole of our
Press is held in our hand like a fiddle, ready to take and give out any
tune, what should prevent us from letting fall, in sudden distress, a
hundred doleful, forced admissions that the strain has proved too
great, the smash has come, the head of the State is in hiding from
his troops, the Premier in flight, naval officers hanging from modern
equivalents to the yard-arm, Ministers and Commanders-in-Chief
shaking their fists in one another's faces? Or take the opposite case,
that you mean to attack in force, in the field. Here you would add to
the preliminary bombardment of your guns such a bombardment of
assertion and insinuation, not disprovable before "zero" hour, as has
never yet been essayed; plausible proofs from neutral quarters that
the enemy's troops are being betrayed by their politicians behind,
that typhus has broken out among the men's homes, that their
children are dying like flies, and some of the mothers, insane with
famine and grief, are eating the dead in hope of nursing the living.
Oh, you could say a great deal.
And you could deliver your messages, too. The enemy's command
might try to keep the contents of your Press from reaching his
troops. But, thanks to the aeroplane, you can circularize the enemy's
troops almost as easily as traders can canvass custom at home. You
can flood his front line with leaflets, speeches, promises, rumours,
and caricatures. You can megaphone to it. Only in recent years has
human ingenuity thought of converting the older and tamer form of
political strife into the pandemonic "stunt" of a "whirlwind election."
Shall war not have her whirlwind canvasses no less renowned than
those of peace? Some rather shame-faced passages of love there
have been between us and the Rumour of Shakespeare, the person
"painted full of tongues," who "stuffs the ears of men with false
reports," to the advantage of her wooers. Why not espouse the good
lady right out? Make an honest woman of her?
 VI

Perhaps you would shrink back. Perhaps at any rate you do so now,
when for the moment this great implement is not being offered to
you, to take or leave, at an instant crisis of your country's fate. You
feel that even in such a case you would stand loftily aloof in your
cold purity? You would disclaim as a low, unknightly business the
uttering of such base coinage as cooked news, whatever your proud
chastity may cost anyone else? Or arrive, perhaps, at the same
result by a different route, and make out to yourself that really it
pays, in the end, to be decent; that clean chivalry is a good
investment at bottom, and that a nation of Galahads and Bayards is
sure to come out on top, on the canny reckoning that the body
housing a pure heart has got the strength of ten? That is one
possible course. And the other is to accept, with all that it implies,
the doctrine that there is one morality for peace and another
morality for war; that just as in war you may with the clearest
conscience stab a man in the back, or kick him in the bowels, in
spite of all the sportsmanship you learnt at school, so you may
stainlessly carry deception to lengths which in peace would get you
blackballed at a club and cut by your friends.
It may be too much to hope that, whichever of these two paths we
may choose, we shall tread it with a will. We have failed so much in
the way of what Germany used to call "halfness," the fault of
Macbeth, the wish to hunt with the hounds while we run with the
hare, that it would be strange if we did not still try to play Bayard
and Ulysses as one man and succeed in combining the shortcomings
of an inefficient serpent with those of a sophisticated dove. If we
really went the whole serpent the first day of any new war would
see a wide, opaque veil of false news drawn over the whole face of
our country. Authority playing on all the keys, white and black, of the
Press as upon one piano, would give the listening enemy the
queerest of Ariel's tunes to follow. All that we did, all that we
thought, would be bafflingly falsified. The whole landscape of life in
this island, as it reflects itself in the waters of the Press, would come
out suddenly altered as far past recognition as that physical
landscape amid which it is passed has been changed by a million
years of sunshine, rain, and frost. The whole sky would be darkened
with flights of strategic and tactical lies so dense that the enemy
would fight in a veritable "fog of war" darker than London's own
November brews, and the world would feel that not only the Angel
of Death was abroad, but the Angel of Delusion too, and would
almost hear the beating of two pairs of wings.
 VII

Well—and then? Any weapon you use in a war leaves some bill to be
settled in peace, and the Propaganda arm has its cost like another.
To say so is not to say, without more ado, that it should not be used.
Its cost should be duly cast up, like our other accounts; that is all.
We all agree—with a certain demur from the Quakers—that one
morality has to be practised in peace and another in war; that the
same bodily act may be wrong in the one and right in the other. So,
to be perfect, you need to have two gears to your morals, and drive
on the one gear in war and on the other in peace. While you are on
the peace gear you must not even shoot a bird sitting. At the last
stroke of some August midnight you clap on the war gear and
thenceforth you may shoot a man sitting or sleeping or any way you
can get him, provided you and he be soldiers on opposite sides.
Now, in a well-made car, in the prime of its life, there is nothing to
keep you from passing straight and conclusively from one gear to
another. The change once made, the new gear continues in force
and does not wobble back fitfully and incalculably into the old. But in
matters of conduct you cannot, somehow, drive long on one gear
without letting the other become noticeably rusty, stiff, and
disinclined to act. It was found in the Great War that after a long
period of peace and general saturation with peace morals it took
some time to release the average English youth from his indurated
distaste for stabbing men in the bowels. Conversely it has been
found of late, in Ireland and elsewhere, that, after some years of
effort to get our youths off the no-homicide gear, they cannot all be
got quickly back to it either, some of them still being prone to kill, as
the French say, paisiblement, with a lightness of heart that
embarrasses statesmen.
We must, to be on the conservative side, assume that the same
phenomenon would attend a post-war effort to bring back to the
truth gear of peace a Press that we had driven for some years on
the war gear of untruthfulness. Indeed, we are not wholly left to
assumption and speculation. During the war the art of Propaganda
was little more than born. The various inspired articles-with-a-
purpose, military or political, hardly went beyond the vagitus, the
earliest cry of the new-born method, as yet
An infant crying in the night,
And with no language but a cry.

Yet for more than three years since the Armistice our rulers have
continued to issue to the Press, at our cost as Blue Books and White
Papers, long passages of argument and suggestion almost
fantastically different from the dry and dignified official publications
of the pre-war days. English people used to feel a sovereign
contempt for the "semi-official" journalism of Germany and Russia.
But the war has left us with a Press at any rate intermittently
inspired. What would be left by a war in which Propaganda had
come of age and the State had used the Press, as camouflaging
material, for all it was worth?
It used at one time to be a great joke—and a source of gain
sometimes—among little boys to take it as a benign moral law that
so long as you said a thing "over the left," it did not matter whether
it was true or not. If, to gain your private ends, or to make a fool of
somebody else, you wanted to utter a fib, all that you had to do was
to append to it these three incantatory words, under your breath, or
indeed without any sound or move of your lips at all, but just to
yourself in the session of sweet silent thought. Then you were
blameless. You had cut yourself free, under the rules, from the
vulgar morality. War confers on those who wage it much the same
self-dispensing power. They can absolve themselves of a good many
sins. Persuade yourself that you are at war with somebody else and
you find your moral liberty expanding almost faster than you can use
it. An Irishman in a fury with England says to himself "State of war—
that's what it is," and then finds he can go out and shoot a passing
policeman from behind a hedge without the discomfort of feeling
base. The policeman's comrades say to themselves "State of war—
that's what it has come to," and go out and burn some other
Irishman's shop without a sense of doing anything wrong, either.
They all do it "over the left." They have stolen the key of the magical
garden wherein you may do things that are elsewhere most wicked
and yet enjoy the mental peace of the soldier which passeth all
understanding.
To kill and to burn may be sore temptations at times, but not so
besetting to most men as the temptation to lie is to public speakers
and writers. Another frequent temptation of theirs is to live in a
world of stale figures of speech, of flags nailed to the mast, of
standing to one's guns, of deaths in last ditches, of quarter neither
asked nor given. It is their hobby to figure their own secure,
squabblesome lives in images taken from war. And their little
excesses, their breaches of manners, and even, sometimes, of actual
law, are excused, as a rule, in terms of virile disdain for anything
less drastic and stern than the morals of the real warfare which they
know so little. We have to think in what state we might leave these
weak brethren after a long war in which we had practised them hard
in lying for the public good and also in telling themselves it was all
right because of the existence of a state of war. State of war! Why,
that is what every excitable politician or journalist declares to exist
all the time. To the wild party man the party which he hates is
always "more deadly than any foreign enemy." All of us could
mention a few politicians, at least, to whom the Great War was
merely a passing incident or momentary interruption of the more
burningly authentic wars of Irish Orange and Green, or of English
Labour and Capital.
 VIII

Under the new dispensation we should have to appoint on the

declaration of war, if we had not done it already, a large Staff
Department of Press Camouflage. Everything is done best by those
who have practised it longest. The best inventors and disseminators
of what was untrue in our hour of need would be those who had
made its manufacture and sale their trade in our hours of ease. The
most disreputable of successful journalists and "publicity experts"
would naturally man the upper grades of the war staff. The
reputable journalists would labour under them, trying their best to
conform, as you say in drill, to the movements of the front rank. For
in this new warfare the journalist untruthful from previous habit and
training would have just that advantage over the journalist of
character which the Regular soldier had over the New Army officer
or man in the old. He would be, as Mr. Kipling sings,
A man that's too good to be lost you,
A man that is 'andled and made,
A man that will pay what 'e cost you
In learnin' the others their trade.

After the war was over he would return to his trade with an
immense accession of credit. He would have been decorated and
publicly praised and thanked. Having a readier pen than the mere
combatant soldiers, he would probably write a book to explain that
the country had really been saved by himself, though the fighting
men were, no doubt, gallant fellows. He would, in all likelihood, have
completed the disengagement of his mind from the idea that public
opinion is a thing to be dealt with by argument and persuasion,
appeals to reason and conscience. He would feel surer than ever
that men's and women's minds are most strongly moved not by the
leading articles of a paper but by its news, by what they may be led
to accept as "the facts." So the practice of colouring news, of
ordering reporters to take care that they see only such facts as tell in
one way, would leap forward. For it would have the potent support
of a new moral complacency. When a man feels that his tampering
with truth has saved civilization, why should he deny himself, in his
private business, the benefit of such moral reflections as this feeling
may suggest?
Scott gives, in Woodstock, an engaging picture of the man who has
"attained the pitch of believing himself above ordinances." The
independent trooper, Tomkins, finds his own favourite vices fitting
delightfully into an exalted theory of moral freedom. In former days,
he avows, he had been only "the most wild, malignant rakehell in
Oxfordshire." Now he is a saint, and can say to the girl whom he
wants to debauch:
Stand up, foolish maiden, and listen; and know, in one word, that sin, for
which the spirit of man is punished with the vengeance of heaven, lieth not in
the corporal act, but in the thought of the sinner. Believe, lovely Phoebe, that
to the pure all acts are pure, and that sin is in our thought, not in our actions,
even as the radiance of the day is dark to a blind man but seen and enjoyed
by him whose eyes receive it. To him who is but a novice in the things of the
spirit much is enjoined, much is prohibited; and he is fed with milk fit for
babes—for him are ordinances, prohibitions, and commands. But the saint is
above all these ordinances and restraints. To him, as to the chosen child of
the house, is given the pass-key to open all locks which withhold him from
the enjoyment of his heart's desire. Into such pleasant paths will I guide thee,
lovely Phoebe, as shall unite in joy, in innocent freedom, pleasures which, to
the unprivileged, are sinful and prohibited.

So when a journalist with no strong original predisposition to swear

to his own hurt shall have gained high public distinction by his
fertility in falsehoods for consumption by an enemy in the field, the
fishes that tipple in the deep may well "know no such liberty" as this
expert in fiction will allow himself when restored to his own more
intoxicating element.
The general addition of prestige to the controversial device of giving
false impressions and raising false issues would naturally be
immense. To argue any case merely on its merits and on the facts
would seem to the admirers of the new way a kind of virtuous
imbecility. In what great industrial dispute or political campaign, in
what struggle between great financial interests, would both sides, or
either, forego the use of munitions so formidable? Such conflicts
might almost wholly cease to be competitions in serious argument at
all; they might become merely trials of skill in fantastic false
pretences, and of expertness in the morbid psychology of credulity.
So men argued, surmised and predicted, talking and talking away in
the endless hours that war gives for talking things out. When first
they began to ask each other why so many lies were about, the
common hypothesis, based on prior experience, was that they must
be meant to save some "dud," up above, from losing his job. Then
they came to admit there was something more in it than that. Lies
had a good enough use for fooling the Germans. A beastly
expedient, no doubt; acquiescence in lying does not come quite so
easily to a workman of good character as it does to men of a class in
which more numerous formal fibs are kept in use as social
conveniences. Still, the men were not cranks enough to object.
"They love not poison that do poison need." The men had hated,
and still continued to hate, the use of poison gas, too. It was a
scrub's trick, like vitriol-throwing. But who could have done without
it, when once the Germans began? And now who could object to the
use of this printed gas either? Could they, in this new warfare of
propaganda, expect their country to go into action armed in a white
robe of candour, and nothing besides, like a maskless man going
forth to war against a host assisted by phosgene and all her foul
sisters?
It was a clear enough case: decency had to go under. But it was
hard luck not to be able to know where you were. Where were they?
If all the news they could check was mixed with lies, what about all
the rest, which they were unable to check? Was it likely to be any
truer? Why, we might be losing the war all the time, everywhere!
Who could believe now what was said about our catching the
submarines? Or about India's being all right? And how far would you
have to go to get outside the lie belt? Could our case for going to
war with the Germans be partly lies too? Beastly idea!
How would it be, again, when we came to play these major tricks
which the men were already discussing as likely to come into use?
Suppose it became part of our game to publish, for some good
strategical reason, news of a naval or military disaster to ourselves,
the same not having happened? To take in the enemy this lie would
have to take in our own people too; the ruse would be given away if
the Government tried to tip so much as a wink to the British reader
of the British Press. So men's friends at home would have the
agonies of false alarms added to their normal war-time miseries, and
wives might be widowed twice and mothers of one son made
childless more than once before the truth finally overshadowed their
lives.
And then, your war won, there would be that new lie-infested and
infected world of peace. In one of his great passages Thucydides
tells us what happened to Greece after some years of war and of the
necessary war morality. He says that, as far as veracity, public and
private, goes, the peace gear was found to have got wholly out of
working order and could not be brought back into use. "The
meaning of words had no longer the same relation to things, but
was changed by men as they thought proper." The pre-war hobby of
being straight and not telling people lies went clean out of fashion.
Anyone who could bring off a good stroke of deceit, to the injury of
some one whom he disliked, "congratulated himself on having taken
the safer course, over-reached his enemy, and gained the prize of
superior talent." A man who did not care to use so sound a means to
his ends was thought to be a goody-goody ass. War worked in that
way on the soul of Greece, in days when war was still confined, in
the main, to the relatively cleanly practice of hitting your enemy over
the head, wherever you could find him. The philosophers in our
dugouts preserved moderation when they expected as ugly a sequel
for war in our age, when the chivalrous school seems to have pretty
well worked itself out and the most promising lines of advance are
poison gas and canards. But the survivors among them are not
detached philosophers only. They act in the new world that they
foresaw, and the man whose word you could trust like your own
eyes and ears, eight years ago, has come back with the thought in
his mind that so many comrades of his have expressed: "They tell
me we've pulled through at last all right because our propergander
dished out better lies than what the Germans did. So I say to myself
'If tellin' lies is all that bloody good in war, what bloody good is tellin'
truth in peace?'"
 CHAPTER IX
AUTUMN COMES
I
 In the autumn of 1917 the war entered into an
autumn, or late middle-age, of its own. "Your young men," we are
told, "shall see visions, and your old men shall dream dreams." The
same with whole armies. But middle-aged armies or men may not
have the mists of either morning or evening to charm them. So they
may feel like Corot, when he had painted away, in a trance of
delight, till the last vapour of dawn was dried up by the sun; then he
said, "You can see everything now. Nothing is left," and knocked off
work for the day. There was no knocking off for the army. But that
feeling had come. A high time was over, a great light was out; our
eyes had lost the use of something, either an odd penetration that
they had had for a while, or else an odd web that had been woven
across them, shutting only ugliness out.
The feeling was apt to come on pretty strong if you lived at the time
on the top of the little hill of Cassel, west of Ypres. The Second
Army's Headquarters were there. You might, as some Staff duty
blew you about the war zone, be watching at daybreak one of that
autumn's many dour bouts of attrition under the Passchendale
Ridge, in the mud, and come back, the same afternoon, to sit in an
ancient garden hung on the slope of the hill, where a great many
pears were yellowing on the wall and sunflowers gazing fixedly into
the sun that was now failing them. All the corn of French Flanders
lay cut on the brown plain under your eyes, from Dunkirk, with its
shimmering dunes and the glare on the sea, to the forested hills
north of Arras. Everywhere lustre, reverie, stillness; the sinking hum
of old bees, successful in life and now rather tired; the many
windmills fallen motionless, the aureate light musing over the
aureate harvest; out in the east the broken white stalks of
Poperinghe's towers pensive in haze; and, behind and about you,
the tiny hill city, itself in its distant youth the name-giver and prize of
three mighty battles that do not matter much now. All these images
or seats of outlived ardour, mellowed now with the acquiescence of
time in the slowing down of some passionate stir in the sap of a
plant or the spirit of insects or men, joined to work on you quietly.
There, where the earth and the year were taking so calmly the end
of all the grand racket that they had made in their prime, why not
come off the high horse that we, too, in that ingenuous season, had
ridden so hard? It was not now as it had been of yore. And why
pretend that it was?
 II

One leaf that had gone pretty yellow by now was the hope of perfect
victory—swift, unsoured, unruinous, knightly: St. George's over the
dragon, David's over Goliath. Some people at home seem to be still
clinging hard to that first pretty vision of us as a gifted, lithe, wise
little Jack fighting down an unwieldy, dastardly giant. But troops in
the field become realists. Ours had seen their side visibly swelling for
more than two years, till Jack had become a heavier weight than the
giant and yet could not finish him off. We knew that our allies and
we outnumbered the Germans and theirs. We knew we were just as
well armed. We had seen Germans advancing under our fire and
made no mistake about what they were worth. Our first vision of
victory had gone the way of its frail sister dream of a perfect Allied
comradeship. French soldiers sneered at British now, and British at
French. Both had the same derisive note in the voice when they
named the "Brav' Belges." Canadians and Australians had almost
ceased to take the pains to break it to us gently that they were the
"storm troops," the men who had to be sent for to do the tough
jobs; that, out of all us sorry home troops, only the Guards Division,
two kilted divisions and three English ones could be said to know
how to fight. "The English let us down again"; "The Tommies gave
us a bad flank, as usual"—these were the stirring things you would
hear if you called upon an Australian division a few hours after a
battle in which the lion had fought by the side of his whelps. Chilly,
autumnal things; while you listened, the war was apparelled no
longer in the celestial light of its spring.
An old Regular colonel, a man who had done all his work upon the
Staff, said, at the time, that "the war was settling down to peace
conditions." He meant no bitter epigram. He was indeed unfeignedly
glad. The war was ceasing to be, like a fire or shipwreck, a leveller
of ranks which, he felt, ought not to be levelled. Those whom God
had put asunder it was less recklessly joining together. The first wild
generosities were cooling off. Not many peers and heirs-apparent to
great wealth were becoming hospital orderlies now. Since the first
earthquake and tidal wave the disturbed social waters had pretty
well found their old seemly levels again; under conscription the sons
of the poor were now making privates; the sons of the well-to-do
were making officers; sanity was returning. The Regular had faced
and disarmed the invading hordes of 1914. No small feat of audacity,
either. Think what the shock must have been—what it would be for
any profession, just at the golden prime of rich opportunity and
searching test, to be overrun of a sudden by hosts of keen
amateurs, many of them quick-witted, possibly critical, some of them
the best brains of the country, most of them vulgarly void of the old
professional habits of mind, almost indecently ready to use new and
outlandish means to the new ends of to-day.
But now the stir and the peril were over. The Old Army had won. It
had scarcely surrendered a single strong point or good billet;
Territorials and New Army toiled at the coolie jobs of its household.
It had not even been forced, like kings in times of revolution, to
make apparent concessions, to water down the pure milk of the
word. It had become only the more intensely itself; never in any war
had commands been retained so triumphantly in the hands of the
cavalry and the Guards, the leaders and symbols of the Old Army
resistance to every inroad of mere professional ardour and
knowledge and strong, eager brains. When Sir Francis Lloyd
relinquished the London District Command a highly composite mess
in France discussed possible successors. "Of course," said a Guards
colonel gravely—and he was a guest in the Mess—"the first point is
—he must be a Guardsman." Peace conditions returning, you see;
the peace frame of mind; the higher commands restored to their
ancient status as property, "livings," perquisites, the bread of the
children, not to be given to dogs. At home, too, peace conditions
were taking heart to return. The scattered coveys of profiteers and
job-hunters, almost alarmed by the first shots of the war, had long
since met in security; "depredations as usual" was the word; and the
mutual scalping and knifing of politicians had ceased to be
shamefaced; who could fairly expect an old Regular Army to practise
a more austere virtue than merchant princes and statesmen?
 III

Even in trenches and near them, where most of the health was, time
had begun to embrown the verdant soul of the army. "Kitchener's
Army" was changing. Like every volunteer army, his had sifted itself,
at its birth, with the only sieve that will riddle out, even roughly, the
best men to be near in a fight. Till the first of the pressed men
arrived at our front, a sergeant there, when he posted a sentry and
left him alone in the dark, could feel about as complete a moral
certitude as there is on the earth that the post would not be let
down. For, whatever might happen, nothing inside the man could
start whispering to him "You never asked to be here! if you do fail, it
isn't your doing."
Nine out of ten of the conscripts were equally sound. For they would
have been volunteers if they could. The tenth was the problem; the
more so because there was nothing to tell you which was the tenth
and which were the nine. For all that you knew, any man who came
out on a draft, from then on, might be the exception, the literal-
minded Christian who thought it wicked to kill in a war; or an anti-
nationalist zealot who thought us all equally fools, the Germans and
us, to be out there pasturing lice, instead of busy at home taking the
hide off the bourgeois; or one of those drift wisps of loveless critical
mind, attached to no place or people more than another, and just as
likely as not to think that the war was our fault and that we ought to
be beaten. Riant avenir! as a French sergeant said when, in an hour
of ease, we were talking over the nature of man, and he told me, in
illustration of its diversity, how a section of his had just been
enriched with a draft of neurasthenic burglars.
These vulgar considerations of military expediency never seemed to
cross the outer rim of the consciousness of many worthies who were
engaged at home in shooing the reluctant into the army. If a
recalcitrant seemed to be lazy, spiritless, nerveless, if there was
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