www.maritimeindia.
org
DEVELOPING A ‘DISASTER-RESILIENCE FRAMEWORK’ FOR CRITICAL
UNDERSEA COMMUNICATION CABLE INFRASTRUCTURE
Mr Soham Agarwal and Commodore Debesh Lahiri
The vagaries of climatic conditions and increased occurrence of natural hazards have brought into
focus the importance of ensuring resilient societies. Since infrastructure has become a key
component to the proper functioning of modern societies, inherent within the concept of resilient
societies is resilient infrastructure. This becomes more significant in the context of ‘critical’
infrastructure. Underpinning global communications, undersea communication cable systems have
garnered much attention globally, most recently in the context of ensuring greater ‘resilience’ and
security.1
Realising the importance of telecommunications infrastructure, especially for facilitating interactions
between first responders and disaster management agencies during disaster-response and recovery,
the Department of Telecommunications, Government of India, in conjunction with the Coalition
for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI), launched a report assessing the disaster risk and
resilience of India’s telecommunications sector (“DoT-CDRI Telecom Assessment”).2 Undersea
cables and fibre-optic cable landing stations have been identified in this report to be a part of the
“national backbone (core) network” which provides “first mile connectivity” within the national
telecommunications network.3 Further, submarine cables and cable landing stations have been
identified as the “weakest elements” of the telecommunications network, particularly vulnerable to
coastal erosion, floods, cyclones, and earthquakes.4 Therefore, ensuring the resilience of the first
mile connectivity is critical in ensuring the resilience of the telecom network as a whole.
Consequently, this paper seeks to develop a framework within which disaster-resilience of undersea
communication cable infrastructure can be systematically assessed and addressed. While the
1 United Nations General Assembly. “Oceans and the Law of the Sea.” A/RES/66/231, adopted April 05, 2012
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_66_
231.pdf
Also See: Office of the Spokesperson, US Department of State, “The New York Joint Statement on the Security and
Resilience of Undersea Cables in a Globally Digitalized World”, September 26, 2024 https://digital-
strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/new-york-joint-statement-security-and-resilience-undersea-cables-globally-
digitalized-world
2 PWC, National and Sub-national Disaster Risk and Resilience Assessment and Roadmap for Telecommunications Sector, India, (New
Delhi: Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, 2025)
https://www.cdri.world/upload/pages/1823666979417817_202502101045telecomreport.pdf
3 Ibid p13, 25
4 Ibid, p57
2
previous paper by the authors identifies the disaster, i.e., the potential natural hazards that may
threaten the functioning of the cable landing infrastructure, this paper seeks to understand how
‘resilience’ of cable landing infrastructure may be assessed and consequently enhanced. It begins by
offering an understanding of the term resilience, especially in the context of submarine cable landing
infrastructure. It then identifies frameworks developed to assess and apply these concepts and
finally develops a more detailed and specific framework for cable landing infrastructure.
Understanding Resilience
Resilience, especially climate-resilience in the context of critical infrastructure has been referred to as
“as “the ability of a building, structure and its component parts to minimise loss of functionality and recovery time
without being damaged to an extent that is disproportionate to the intensity of a number of current and scientifically
predicted future extreme climatic conditions”.5 This includes the ability of a system to (a) reduce the
chances of a shock, (b) absorb the shock if it does occur, and (c) restore operations quickly after a
shock.6 Thus, in the case of critical infrastructure, climate-resilience is measured in terms of
continued system performance in the face of disruptions caused due to climate hazards. Similar
formulations of this concept have been made across available across open-domain literature and
require systems to have the strength to (a) anticipate (and hence avoid) hazards, (b) resist (and
hence absorb) the hazards, (c) reconfigure (and hence adapt) to the hazards, and (d) restore
functioning after any disruptive event.7 This has given rise to the “R4 framework of resilience of critical
infrastructure”, which includes8:-
1. Robustness: strength or ability of the infrastructure elements or systems to withstand a given level of
stress without suffering from loss of function. This is a characteristic of the engineering
approach, i.e., hard protective structures that rely on the strength of individual elements
of the system to withstand disruptive events.9 Functionality is, therefore, ensured by the
strength of individual elements to remain unaffected. Robustness is often a function of
the design of the infrastructure.
5 Global Resiliency Dialogue, “Delivering Climate Responsive Resilient Building Codes and Standards”, November, 2021
https://www.iccsafe.org/wp-content/uploads/Delivering_Resilient_Building_Codes_and_Standards.pdf
6 Michel Burneau et al., “A Framework to Quantitatively Assess and Enhance the Seismic Resilience of Communities”,
Earthquake Spectra, Volume 19, No. 4, p733–752, November 2003.
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/epdf/10.1193/1.1623497
7 AM Madni and S Jackson, “Towards a Conceptual Framework for Resilience Engineering”, IEEE Engineering
Management Review, 39, p181-191 (2011)
8 Kathleen Tierney and Michel Bruneau, “Conceptualising and Measuring Resilience: A Key to Disaster Loss Reduction,
TR News (Transportation Research Board, 2007) https://trid.trb.org/View/813539
9 Stephen Tyler and Marcus Moench, “A Framework For Urban Climate Resilience”, Climate and Development, Vol 4, No
4, October 2012, p311-326
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/17565529.2012.745389?src=getftr&utm_source=sciencedirect_conte
nthosting&getft_integrator=sciencedirect_contenthosting
3
2. Redundancy: existence of elements or systems that may be used as substitutes i.e., assuming functions
in event of loss of functionality. This includes measures such as spare capacity, multiple
pathways, replaceable parts, and buffer stocks of requisite supplies.10
3. Resourcefulness: capacity and capability of system operators to identify problems, establish
priorities, and mobilise resources following an event. This is the human resources component in
the ensuring of resilience of the infrastructure system. Resourcefulness becomes
particularly important in preparing for disruptive events, i.e., creating redundancies and
when redundancies need to be manually activated during disruptive events.
4. Rapidity: capacity to restore functionality in a timely manner in order to contain losses and avoid
disruptions. This introduces a temporal element to the matrix, requiring that functionality
is not only restored but is done so in a “timely” manner. This component is particularly
important with respect to ‘critical’ infrastructure, where longer downtimes have greater
and wider consequences. It must, however, be noted that the rapidity in restoration of
performance is invariably a function of the first three characteristics. A robust system is
likely to endure less damage. Any damage that does occur could be absorbed by the
redundancies within the system which can be activated by a trained and knowledgeable
operator. Deficiencies in any of these components is likely to add to the restoration
time of the system.
Therefore, ensuring resilience requires infrastructure system owners to ensure the product, the
people, and the processes are geared towards resilience. Indeed, the concept of ‘resilience’ is unique
mostly due to the inclusion of the latter two concepts. Not only must the physical structure of the
infrastructure system be capable to withstand a hazardous event, but the system operators also must
have the requisite knowledge and training to ensure that adaptive and restorative efforts are
undertaken in a rapid manner. Thus, there is also a role of the requisite processes being in place
(e.g., Standard Operating Procedures) that can guide operators in preparing-for and taking
appropriate action.
The idea of resilience requires a different approach than does conventional risk management.11
Conventional risk management techniques are predicated on the basis that hazards can be identified,
estimated, and hence prevented. It undertakes an analysis either deterministically (consequence-
analysis of specific hazards) or probabilistically (consequence-analysis of all hazards including
probability of occurrence and severity) that may affect the system.12 The concept of resilience, on
the other hand, is more useful for a decision-making scenario characterised by deep uncertainty.
Not only is the impact of climate change unpredictable, even more uncertain is the way this will
evolve over a period of time. Different emission scenarios will significantly alter the frequency and
intensity with which extreme weather events and natural hazards manifest themselves. Therefore,
10 Ibid
11 Louisa Marie Shakou et al. “Developing an Innovative Framework for Enhancing the Resilience of Critical
Infrastructure to Climate Change”, Safety Science Vol 118, p364-378 October 2019.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925753518309536?fr=RR-
2&ref=pdf_download&rr=9086336e48e859db
12 Ibid
4
the temporal element, too becomes an important consideration.13 Long-term impacts from climate
change need to be factored into the resilience matrix, especially for the duration of the life cycle of
the project. Therefore, it is important for cable-system owners to plan for both, short-term and
long-term contingencies. Moreover, climate-resilience requires possessing the ability to withstand
slow-onset events as well as unpredictable rapid-onset ones.14 Therefore, a “resilience framework’” is
probably the most appropriate one with which to approach the assessment of disaster-resilience
undersea communication cable infrastructure.
Figure 1 below breaks down the R4 framework into sub-processes that may contribute to each of
the four prongs of the framework.15 It also highlights that building critical infrastructure resilience is
a multi-stakeholder process. In addition to the infrastructure operator, governmental and non-
governmental organisations are critical to ensuring that the entire network remains resilient. This is
because the ambit of infrastructure operators is limited to their particular asset or system, while
governmental policies and standards can facilitate the implementation of standards / protocols /
practices across systems.
Fig 1: Risk Assessment and Resilience Framework for Critical Infrastructure
Source: Nikhil Kumar et al., “A Novel Framework for Risk Assessment and Resilience
of Critical Infrastructure Towards Climate Change
13 Louisa Marie Shakou et al. “Developing an Innovative Framework for Enhancing the Resilience of Critical
Infrastructure to Climate Change”
14 Nikhil Kumar et al., “A Novel Framework for Risk Assessment and Resilience of Critical Infrastructure Towards
Climate Change”, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Volume 165, April 2021.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2020.120532
15 Ibid
5
Rather intuitively, all the four metrics of resilience requires advance planning to anticipate the threats
and create the requisite physical and operational structures to enable the system to absorb and adapt
the impact, as also to restore functionality in a timely manner. This, therefore, requires an
understanding of threats to the undersea cable communications system. These are encapsulated in
the idea of “risk”. Risk assessment, too, is identified in Figure 1 as the first step to building
resilience.
It must be noted, however, that while this framework is generic and is potentially applicable across
infrastructures, the DoT-CDRI Assessment Report developed a “Disaster Risk and Resilience
Assessment Framework” (DRRAF) seemingly tailored to the telecommunication sector. While
retaining both elements of risk and resilience, a structural difference in DRRAF is treating risk and
resilience as two interactive yet distinct layers instead of integrating risk assessment as the first step
in achieving resilience. On the other hand, a potential advantage of the DRRAF approach is the
detail and structure it affords to the risk assessment process. Additionally, it may allow for the
possibility to more easily adapt to changing circumstances. However, the core concept of risk and
its primacy in the resilience process remains constant.
Disaster-Risk
The concept of “risk” is defined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as the
“potential for adverse consequences for human or ecological systems, recognising the diversity of values and
objectives associated with such systems”.16 Contextualised to natural hazards, “disaster-risk” is expressed as
the “likelihood of loss of life, injury or destruction and damage from a disaster in a given period of time”.17
Disaster-risk is a function of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability.18
Hazard: Likelihood and intensity of the potentially destructive natural phenomenon. 19 The nature
and frequency of the hazard can give rise to an ‘intensive’ risk (categorised by high-intensity, low-
frequency events) and ‘extensive’ risk (categorised by low-intensity, high-frequency events).20
Identifying and tracking hazard occurrences and developments is the first step in understanding
disaster-risk. Climate-change particularly affects this variable in the risk matrix by increasing the
unpredictability, intensity, and frequency of weather-related phenomena.
16 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of
Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (NY: Cambridge University
Press, 2022), pp. 3–33
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_SummaryVolume.pdf
17 UNISDR, Making Development Sustainable: The Future of Disaster Risk Management. Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk
Reduction, (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), 2015)
https://www.undrr.org/publication/global-assessment-report-disaster-risk-reduction-2015
18 Ibid
19 A L Simpson et al, “Understanding risk in an evolving world: emerging best practices in natural disaster risk
assessment”, Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, (2014. Washington DC, The World Bank)
https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/default/files/publication/Understanding_Risk-Web_Version-rev_1.8.0.pdf
20 “Intensive and Extensive Risk”, PreventionWeb, UNDRR, last accessed July 11, 2025
https://www.preventionweb.net/understanding-disaster-risk/key-concepts/intensive-extensive-risk
6
Exposure: This denotes valuable places, assets, people, and infrastructure, which are exposed to the
hazard.21
Vulnerability: This refers to the ‘susceptibility’ of an individual, community, asset, or system to the
impacts of the hazards.22 In the context of assets and systems, the more susceptible to loss and
damage a particular asset, the more vulnerable it is. Varying levels of vulnerabilities account for the
differences with certain assets withstanding high intensity hazards while certain assets suffering
severe losses from low-intensity events too.
Vulnerability vs Resilience. The concepts of vulnerability and resilience are interlinked, with
literature painting a relationship between them that ranges from their being antonyms, to being
subsets of one another, to being parts of an overlapping framework.23 What is common in these
frameworks is the treatment of each of the two concepts as distinct from the other. In essence,
vulnerability refers to the existing weaknesses or limitations either in the design, location, materials,
or operational processes of an infrastructural system. Inadequate design standards, poor
construction quality, hazard-prone locations and lack of adequate funding mechanisms for repairs
and maintenance will make assets more vulnerable. Naturally, these factors will affect the
‘robustness’ of the asset/infrastructure and have a bearing on its resilience, too. However, the
concept of resilience is a more dynamic and proactive concept and seeks to focus upon processes
that can enable resistance, continuity, and quick recovery. Resilience is, therefore, a more process-
oriented approach.
Systemic Risks. Systemic risk, i.e., risk emanating from critical interdependencies not only within
a system but also between systems and sectors, has evolved as a more dynamic approach to risk
assessment and management.24 Vulnerabilities within a particular system may have compounding or
cascading effects across systems and even sectors. Therefore, an understanding of these
interdependencies and associated cascading risks is extremely important for a holistic risk-
assessment and effective resilience mechanisms.
Disaster-Resilience Framework of Submarine Cable Landing Infrastructure
Identifying key components and key assets constitute the first step in assessing vulnerability and
potential resilience mechanisms. This paper is limited to offering an understanding of the
vulnerability and resilience of shore-based landing infrastructure associated with submarine cable
21 A L Simpson et al, “Understanding risk in an evolving world: emerging best practices in natural disaster risk
assessment.”
22 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), The Sendai Framework Terminology on Disaster Risk
Reduction, "Vulnerability". (2017), Accessed 28 May 2025. https://www.undrr.org/terminology/vulnerability.
23 Chih-Hsuan Hung et al, “Linking the interplay of resilience, vulnerability, and adaptation to long-term changes in
metropolitan spaces for climate-related disaster risk management”, Climate Risk Management Vol 44, 2024.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212096324000354
24 Arunabh Mitra, Chime Youdon, Pradeep Chauhan, Rajib Shaw, “Systemic risk capability assessment methodology: A
new approach for evaluating inter-connected risks in seaport ecosystems”, Progress in Disaster Science 22, (April 2024)
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590061724000152#bb0145
7
systems. Even within shore-based landing infrastructure, the focus of this paper is on the resilience
of the physical infrastructure. It does not include within its scope the resilience of human, social,
cultural, economic, political, and environmental components of submarine communication cable
systems. There will be a profound economic, political, and social impact upon societies on the
disruption of provision of internet services, which would clearly require an independent study.
Submarine Cable Landing Infrastructure may be divided into three main components:
1) The Beach Manhole (BMH). Since the BMH serves as the landing point of the cables, it
often is the first point of vulnerability in the system especially from threats originating from
the sea. Key parts of the beach manhole are:
a. Internal Manhole
b. Reinforced Concrete Structure providing manhole furniture. The purpose of this
reinforced concrete housing is to enable access to the cable and manhole for repair
and maintenance.
2) The Cable Landing Station (CLS). The CLS constitutes the most important component
of the cable landing infrastructure. Functioning as the node of the entire system, the cable
landing station is a critical component to the function of not only individual cables, but the
entire cable system or even multiple cable systems. The primary key assets of a CLS are:25
a. Equipment Room. The Equipment Room houses, inter alia, the Submarine Line
Terminal Equipment, the Power Feed Equipment, and Optical Interconnectors, and
is the most critical component of the CLS. Proper functioning of the Equipment
Room is critical for the proper functioning of the CLS. Assets in the equipment
room will be regarded as “critical” if gauged in terms of impact of damage, and
cost/time taken for repairs.
b. Battery Room. This room— usually situated adjacent to the equipment room—
contains the batteries (both lithium-ion and lead-acid) that provide DC power to the
assets in the Equipment Room.
c. Network Operations Centre. Functioning as the coordination and management
node of the CLS, the Network Operations Centre ensures operational control over
the CLS and the cable system.
d. Power Room. The Power Room in the CLS as the name suggest is the point where
AC power is received within the CLS. It is the point at which the CLS is connected
to the local electricity grid and power for the CLS, and its auxiliary equipment is
received here.
25Protective Security Division, US Department of Homeland Security, “Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities
Infrastructure Category: Cable Landing Stations”, January 15, 2004, https://info.publicintelligence.net/DHS-UCL-
CV.pdf
8
e. Back-Up Diesel Generators. To mitigate against variable power supply, CLS have
their own captive back-up diesel generators that can ensure continued electricity even
if power is not available from the main grid.
3) The Terrestrial Cables from the BMH to the CLS. Frequently, CLS are not located right
at the beach due to space availability and safety concerns. Therefore, buried cables connect
the BMH to the CLS. Exposed cables on the surface and any competing civil works
undertaken during disaster recovery operations are the primary vulnerabilities in this
segment.
Table 1 creates a disaster-resilience framework by applying the “R4 framework” to the context of
submarine cable landing infrastructure. Moreover, the framework also incorporates certain elements
of the Design-Manage-Evolve paradigm developed within the Integrated Disaster Resilience
Framework.26 Since vulnerability assessment is critical to the ‘Robustness’ function within the R4
mechanism, the table first identifies how certain factors affect the vulnerability of key components
and assets. This falls within the ‘Design’ paradigm of the framework as it identifies factors that need
to be considered while planning and designing the cable landing infrastructure. The ‘Robustness’ and
‘Redundancy’ components are more effectively addressed within the design stage and have hence been
included within that paradigm. ‘Resourcefulness’ and ‘Rapidity’ are attributes that can be better attained
by the ‘Operational and Governance’ mechanisms put in place both at the governmental/policy level and
the operator’s processes. Finally, interconnected sectors are identified to account for systemic risks.
The ‘Resilience Framework’ identifies individual components within each segment of the cables,
identifies factors which affect their vulnerability, and how their robustness and redundancy may be
enhanced using design considerations. Thereafter, measures to increase resourcefulness and rapidity
through operations and management tools have also been identified.
Design
Segment Factors affecting Enhancing Robustness Redundancy Measures
Vulnerability
Cable Landing Structural Stability Structural Audit to be undertaken Disaster Recovery CLS as part of
Station (CLS) of Building and weak sections to be reinforced single cable system.
Building
(1) Age of Specific Indian Building Codes to be A disaster recovery CLS allows for
Building evolved for coastal and near-coastal the control of the entire operations
(2) Standards used critical infrastructure of the cable system from an
Distance from Indirect Measure – a minimum alternative CLS in the system.
shore distance, of 3 kms from the coastline
needs to be specified for locating the
CLS.
This provides for sufficient
protection from tsunami run-ups,
and extreme wind speeds.
26 Ibid
9
Relief/Mean Subject to economic and technical
elevation feasibility, the CLS should be located
at a height above sea level factoring
in the projected combination of
storm surges, sea level rise and
tsunami run-ups.
Cyclone/ Tsunami barriers to be
erected.
Equipment Room Location within Cement concrete room preferably on Developing interconnections with
CLS the first/second floor, with all six other landing stations for
sides isolated from direct impact of continued data transmission.
wind and rain
Water Ingress Entry and exit of cables must be
Routes through cable glands and these
glands must be sealed for water-
proofness.
Entry and Exit doors must be
rubber-lined and have watertight
integrity.
Flood sensors should be installed on
the floor to detect any ingress of
water.
Equipment Equipment consoles should be clear
Consoles of the floor and must be mounted on
shock and vibration mounts.
Cables inside the equipment room
should be laid out — below the
ceiling and above the equipment —
on cable trays which must be
supported on load hangars.
Fire and smoke detection sensors
must be installed with automatic fire
fighting and suppression systems also
installed.
Power Supply to Primary Power Physical barriers or nature-based Liaise with electricity distribution
CLS Supply solutions like plantation of densely company for an alternate power
growing trees to reduce direct supply.
impact.
Minimum two DG sets with both
Robustness of the primary power being independently capable of
supply is integrated with the meeting the power requirements of
robustness of the power generation, the CLs and should have
distribution, and transmission sector continuous duty rating. These DG
marking a key example of systemic sets should be connected to the
risks. power switchboard with provision
Back-Up Power Diesel Generator (DG) sets to be in for automatic/manual changeover.
Supply a weather-proof enclosure, preferably
on the first floor or minimum 10 feet An alternate switchboard may be
above ground level. planned.
Location of Should be in a weather-proof
Switchboard, enclosure, preferably on the first
Power Receiver
10
and Back-up floor or minimum 10 feet above Adequate stock of diesel to be
Power Supply ground level. maintained especially for CLS in
Diesel Supply Supply should be in sealed oil drums island locations
Availability and located in a weather-proof
enclosure close to the DG sets with
ease of supply from the drums to the
ready-use tank of the DG sets with
the help of gravity/manual
pump/aerodynamically
operated/electric motor driven
pump.
Beach Manholes Total Number More than one BMH is usually a A cable splitter to be used to
consequence of in-built redundancy connect with minimum two
within the system due to two BMHs.
pathways for the submarine cable
Cyclone/Tsunami barrier walls or
retaining walls
Nature-based solutions like
plantation of mangroves etc.
Sediment Cyclone/Tsunami barrier walls
Deposition
Protective Sealed Manhole covers
Measures
Terrestrial Total Number Minimum two independent cables Each BMH should have two
Component to Cable Burial Protective sheathing, conduits independent terrestrial cables each
CLS Depth following a different path to the
Exposed Cables Protective sheathing, metal/cement CLS
concrete conduit
Damage due to
physical impact (e,
g., earth-moving
equipment, road
accidents etc.)
Competing Civil Easy availability of mapped locations
Works of cables/pipes and other
subterranean utilities to enable
improved planning and coordination
Earth-moving between public authorities/private
equipment, digging agencies.
activities of other
public/private Improved planning between public
agencies during authorities and private agencies with
disaster recovery respect to digging permits
operations
Resourcefulness and Rapidity – Operations and Governance
Availability of While the CLS should be continually staffed by technically competent personnel. On receipt of
Personnel Adverse Weather Event (AWE) warning, augmentation with suitably competent personnel
should be done.
Living accommodation for key personnel should be preferably arranged within the CLS premises
or in close proximity.
Training of Theoretical and practical training to be imparted to all personnel for operation and maintenance
Personnel and of CLS equipment in emergencies.
Disaster Drills
11
Planned and surprise disaster drills should be practised in normal and off-working hours
(preferably silent hours during the night)
Early Warning CLS should be directly informed about likely AWEs by the National/State Disaster Management
Systems authorities
Disaster SOPs Standard Operating Procedures for AWE scenarios/contingencies should be written down,
practised/exercised at regular intervals and the SOPs should be revised by incorporating
solutions to observed shortcomings during the exercise
Inter-agency Co- Can be improved by regular periodic meetings, nominating suitably empowered single points-of-
ordination contacts and exchanging contact information including personal mobile numbers.
Policy Measures A comprehensive single policy on BMHs, terrestrial cables and CLSs needs to be formulated
including do’s and don’ts with respect to location, routing, structural stability, physical safety etc.
Incident Reporting Mandatory reporting of all AWEs by public and private operators in a standard format including
the actions taken, shortfalls observed, and lessons learnt. These should be widely disseminated to
all CLS operators.
Data Collection Mandatory reporting of important data at regular periodic intervals in a prescribed format to a
central data repository
Financial and Allocated budget for undertaking periodic risk assessments and implementing resilience
Insurance mechanisms for adaptive management. Innovative insurance mechanisms to be devised to cater
Mechanisms for AWEs and their consequences.
Interconnected Sectors
Power AWEs are likely to severely degrade main power distribution and transmission systems, therefore
local back-ups (DG sets, Battery storage systems etc) should be catered for minimum continuous
seven days operation
Transportation Public transportation systems are likely to be severely affected in AWEs, hence transportation for
key personnel to reach the CLS should be planned
Table 1: Resilience Framework for Cable Landing Infrastructure
Source: Prepared by Authors
The framework developed may be utilised to assess the resilience of brownfield or greenfield
projects. The factors developed for each landing station is a culmination of the observations made
by authors during their field visits to cable landing stations in India as part of their ongoing CDRI
Fellowship Programme of 2024-25. The final application of this framework to cable landing stations
in India, particularly those in Kochi, Chennai, Sri Vijaya Puram (erstwhile Port Blair), and Swaraj
Dweep (erstwhile Havelock Island) of the Andaman & Nicobar Islands, will be presented in a
subsequent paper.
About the Authors:
Mr Soham Agarwal, a Delhi-based lawyer, holds a Bachelor of Law (Honours) degree from the University of
Nottingham, UK. He is currently an Associate Fellow with the Public International Maritime Law Cluster of the
National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi. His research, which is focused upon issues relevant to the seabed,
maritime infrastructure, and seabed warfare, is rapidly gaining international traction. He is currently also a CDRI
Fellow of the Fourth Cohort. He may be contacted at
[email protected]Commodore Debesh Lahiri, a marine engineer by profession, has retired from active service in the Indian Navy
and after a three-year stint as a Senior Fellow and Executive Director of the National Maritime Foundation
(NMF), New Delhi, is presently an Advisor to the National Centre of Excellence for Green Ports and Shipping
12
(NCoEGPS) a co-action centre between the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways (MoPSW) and The Energy
and Resources Institute (TERI). He is a regular speaker at webinars, seminars, workshops, and conferences in India
and abroad. He has authored or co-authored several book chapters, technical project reports, and well-researched
articles, and was a member of the Expert Advisory Group on Blue Economy to the Ministry of Environment, Forests
and Climate Change (MoEF and CC) during India’s presidency of the G20. His areas of research-interest include
India’s transition to a ‘Blue’ economy in the face of climate change; disaster-resilience; marine pollution; Illegal
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF); shipbuilding, ship-repair and ship-recycling; green ports, green
shipping, amongst a host of others. He can be reached at [email protected] or [email protected]
