In the immediate aftermath of Wagner’s mutiny in June 2023 and even more so after Yevgeny Prigozhin’s

death two months later in August, plenty of speculation was offered concerning the fate of the group.
Wagner’s role in Ukraine effectively ended with the mutiny, but its large‐scale operations in Syria, Mali
and the Central African Republic (CAR), alongside several smaller‐scale ones, mostly in other African
countries, had come to represent one of the most visible faces of Russian foreign policy. Since 2023,
the Russian state has struggled to replace Wagner while retaining the flexibility and effectiveness of
its operations on the ground. In this paper, we examine the shifts in Russian policy in Syria, Mali and
the CAR, based on a series of interviews with Wagner personnel and other informed interlocutors. We
build on the extensive literature that has emerged analyzing Prigozhin's legacy and Wagner's future,
and what it might all mean for Russia at home and abroad.

The Russia Program’s Academic Policy Paper Series is a collection of policy reports produced by schol‐
ars using rigorous academic methodologies. The series aims to present cutting‐edge, policy‐relevant
research in a form that is both accessible and impactful for a broad audience.

The Russia Program at GW is a George Washington University‐based analytical center which innovates
in digital methods for Russian studies, facilitates research and data‐driven decision making and unites
Russia experts from all over the world.

© 2024‐Afer Prigozhin: Does Wagner Group have a future? by Antonio Giustozzi, David Lewis at The Russia
Program. This article is licensed under CC BY‐NC‐ND 4.0.

Photo: Monument to Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitri Utkin in Goriachii kliuch, Russia. Source : Razgruzka
Vagnera / T.me

Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (IERES)

1957 E St., NW, Suite 412,
Washington, DC 20052
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 SUMMARY

This report seeks to analyze developments related to Wagner Group in Africa and the Middle East
after Yevgenyi Prigozhin’s death, primarily on the basis of a series of interviews with current and
former Wagner staff, Russian and host country officials, and community elders in areas of Wagner
operations.
Russian government efforts to replace Wagner Group, drive by the 2023 mutiny, had mixed
results. In Syria and Libya, they were successful, not least because the conflicts affecting these
countries were frozen or had greatly diminished in intensity by then. The Russian government also
managed to get a new contract in Burkina Faso, without involving Wagner Group but relying on
Russian PMC Redut instead. During 2024, efforts to launch a new brand in the PMC business,
the Africa Corps, had limited success and in practice it was either Redut or Wagner that managed
the bulk of operations in Africa and Middle East.
In Mali, the only country where Wagner was seriously engaged in active conflict as of mid-
2023, the transition did not succeed, not least because the Malian junta insisted to keep Wagner
for the core mercenary business of actively fighting on its behalf. In the CAR, President Touadéra
too insisted to keep Wagner, this time to secure his regime. The Russian government, in the end,
had to accept a compromise and include Wagner Group in its revised contracts with Mali and
CAR. In the CAR, Wagner’s business interests were affected only in limited measure, while in
Syria, the other main focus of Wagner-related business schemes, the business was quickly taken
over by the Russian authorities. The key lesson here is that while there were aspects of Wagner’s
multi-spectrum activities that the MoD PMC department and partners such as Redut were able
to take over, such as support roles and training contracting, Wagner proved irreplaceable as far as
engaging in combat was concerned. In addition, some African regimes showed a clear preference
for trusting regime security to Wagner, even if in general having the Russian government involved
in the contracts was seen as a safer approach. Overall, the compromises worked out appeared quite
satisfactory for African clients.

3
4

Although in the end a compromise was worked out and Wagner-Russian MoD relations seemed
to be improving considerably during 2024, Pavel Prigozhin, who took over from his father, also
sought to establish the Wagner business on more independent footing. He and his marketing team
sought to find clients without the support of the Russian authorities, marking a break with previous
practice. Sources reported multiple contacts and negotiations with a variety of clients, although as
of summer 2024 no new contract had been signed. Under his management, Wagner Group also
sought to take steps towards building its own air wing, without which it would not be able to carry
out combat operations independently. For a period at least, Wagner group also sought to directly
compete with the Russian government in seeking contracts, for example trying to partner with
Chinese companies, but without success. In the meanwhile, those within the Russian apparatus
who saw Prigozhin’s ruthless and rapacious business approach seemed to be gaining ground in
advocating a more developmental approach.
 CONTENTS

Contents 5

1 Introduction 7

2 Background 9

3 Unravelling Wagner 11

4 Russia’s post-Wagner plans 15

4.1 The ‘Africa Corps’, Redut and the PMC department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2 Business takeovers and foreign aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.3 A change of direction? The Africa Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.4 Smooth transition away from Wagner in Syria and Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.5 Compromise in Mali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.6 Wagner retains its core business in the Central African Republic . . . . . . . . . 24
4.7 The first agreement after the mutiny: Burkina Faso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

5 Outlook 29
5.1 Is Wagner irreplaceable? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.2 Unstable arrangements? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.3 Pavel Prigozhin attempts a relaunch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.4 Wagner seeks to regain autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.5 Wagner learning lessons? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

6 Conclusion 35

5
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 1
INTRODUCTION

In the immediate aftermath of Wagner’s mutiny in June 2023 and even more so after Yevgeny
Prigozhin’s death two months later in August, plenty of speculation was offered concerning the
fate of the group. Wagner’s role in Ukraine effectively ended with the mutiny, but its large-scale
operations in Syria, Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR), alongside several smaller-scale
ones, mostly in other African countries, had come to represent one of the most visible faces of
Russian foreign policy. Since 2023, the Russian state has struggled to replace Wagner while retain-
ing the flexibility and effectiveness of its operations on the ground. In this paper, we examine the
shifts in Russian policy in Syria, Mali and the CAR, based on a series of interviews with Wagner
personnel and other informed interlocutors. In total, for this report we utilized 22 interviews with
current and former Wagner Group staff (9), Russian diplomats and military officers (2), Syrian,
Malian and Central African government officials, military officers, businessmen and local commu-
nity elders (8), as well as experts and analysts working on Wagner Group in various European and
North American countries (3). Some interviewees spoke in their official capacity or as external
observers, but the majority of the sources spoke off the record.
There are clear limitations to the research methodology adopted, with research by necessity
limited to oral sources, although with considerable support from news reports and reports pro-
duced by other researchers. There is very little access to primary written sources, such as the
Wager’s and Russian government records. Researching this topic required a number of method-
ological compromises given that conducting primary research in conflict-affected countries is dif-
ficult. However, the research team, which included several interviewers due to the need to use
several languages including Russian, English, French, Arabic) benefited from the aftermath of
Wagner’s mutiny in 2023, when many staff members left Wagner. This facilitated finding individ-
uals willing to concede interviews. Still, the body of data collected is inevitably incomplete and
follow up on specific themes was often not possible. The analysis contained in the paper inevitably
reflects this. Moreover, the three research teams were led by individuals with extensive experi-
ence and contacts in the field. Overall, obtaining access was not a major problem. The authors
are aware that interviewees might be affected by a social-desirability bias, resulting in overstat-
ing their achievements, capabilities and/or resources; or by reverse causation, leading sources to
provide prejudiced information about rival organisations.

7
8 1. Introduction

We build on the extensive literature that has emerged analyzing Prigozhin’s legacy and Wag-
ner’s future, and what it might all mean for Russia at home and abroad.
 2
BACKGROUND

Russia’s military intelligence (GRU) founded the paramilitary group known as Wagner in 2014
during the conflict in eastern Ukraine and Crimea. Although Yevgeny Prigozhin, a restaurant
owner and caterer from St Petersburg, became its manager, its real founder was Dmitry Utkin,
a GRU officer who would ultimately die alongside Prigozhin when a bomb blew up the plane on
which they were flying in August 2023. It was Prigozhin, however, who took the basic idea of
a state-linked Private Military Company (PMC) and turned it into a much bigger operation that
combined highly trained mercenary forces with illicit business networks, a global media operation
and a political advisory function to form a holistic support package for fragile regimes in the Middle
East and Africa.1
Within a few years, Prigozhin had built an ersatz multinational corporation across three con-
tinents. It included thousands of mercenaries fighting in half a dozen wars, a media network
comprising hundreds of websites and influencers, a political interference project that sparked a
crisis in US democracy, and a host of commercial deals, from providing school meals in Russia
to gold mining in Africa.2 This business was structured through myriad private companies, but it
was always closely linked to the Russian military and the Russian state.3
At the heart of his empire was a prosaic catering business. Through his political contacts
he won catering contracts for the Ministry of Defense (MoD), followed later by deals for mainte-
nance, heating and other services on military bases – quite lucrative considering Russia’s sprawling
military estate.4 After the mutiny, President Putin claimed that Prigozhin’s companies had earned
some $1 billion from contracts to feed the army between May 2022 and May 2023.5

1 Marten, K. (2023). Whither Wagner? The Consequences of Prigozhin’s Mutiny and Demise. Survival, 65(5), 45–64.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2261245
2 Galeotti, M., & Arutunyan, A. (2024). Downfall. https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/460781/downfall-by-galeotti-
anna-arutunyan-and-mark/9781529927351; Barabanov, I. (2024). «Nash biznes—Smert’»: Polnaia istoriia ChVK
«Vagner» i ee osnovatelia Evgeniia Prigozhina [‘Our Business is Death’: A Full History of the Wagner PMC and its
Founder Evgeny Prigozhin]. Meduza. https://shop.eastview.com/results/item?sku=2582644B
3 Stanyard, J., Vircoulon, T., & Rademeyer, J. (2023). The Grey Zone. Russia’s military, mercenary and criminal
engagement in Africa. The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. Retrieved September 2, 2024,
from https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/russia-in-africa/
4 Averbach, Z. (2016, August 22). Prigozhin podobral ostatki oboronnogo goszakaza. Fontanka.ru.
https://www.fontanka.ru/2016/08/17/153/
5 Team of the Official Website of the President of Russia. (2023, June 27). Meeting with Defence Ministry personnel.
President of Russia. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/71535

9
10 2. Background

These generous contracts with the MoD included a quid pro quo. Prigozhin was encouraged to
spend some of the profits on expanding Russian influence overseas. Prigozhin himself claimed in
June 2023 that he had spent RUB147 billion ($1.7 billion) of earnings from his MoD contracts to
fund his various missions in Syria and Africa, to promote, as he put it, the “interests of the Russian
Federation.”6
From 2017 onward, Prigozhin crisscrossed Africa and the Middle East looking for potential
contracts for a mercenary force – one backed logistically and often financially by the Russian MoD.
Wagner forces cropped up in Syria, Libya, the CAR and Sudan, and more recently turned up in
Mali and the Sahel. As of early 2023, around 5,000 or so Wagner personnel were thought to be
deployed in Africa, mainly in Libya, the CAR and Mali, with at least several hundreds more in
Syria.7
Wagner was far from the first PMC to operate in Africa; indeed, it had reportedly been inspired
by the example of South Africa’s Executive Outcomes PMC. Yet Wagner’s offering was unique –
trained soldiers willing to pursue counterinsurgency warfare with few constraints.8 But Prigozhin
also offered a political package, including media management, influence operations and political
consultancy, to enable political leaders to defeat their opponents. All this came at a low up-front
price, as Prigozhin was willing to offer regime security in exchange for business deals, usually
denominated in gold, diamonds and/or high-value goods that were easy to sell.9
Prigozhin’s ambition was his undoing. He became a major player in the 2022 invasion of
Ukraine, with his forces, bolstered by convicts, playing a key role in seizing the town of Bakhmut.
But his frustration with the MoD, together with his efforts to expand his business back in Russia
and in Africa, ultimately led to his quixotic march on Moscow in June 2023 and his death in what
appears to have been an assassination by the Russian authorities.

6 Averbach, Z. (2023, July 10). Kukhnyu sdali. Prigozhin prosit Shoygu nayti novogo kormiltsa dlya voennykh na SVO.
Fontanka.ru. https://www.fontanka.ru/2023/06/10/72390323/
7 Faucon, B., Parkinson, J. (2023, February 13). Russia’s Wagner Deepens Influence in Africa, Helping Putin Project
Power. Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-wagner-deepens-influence-in-africa-helping-putin-
project-power-9438cfce
8 Croucamp, P. (2023, July 7). From Faust to Vikings and Vlad to Wagner, always follow the money. Vrye Weekblad.
Retrieved September 2, 2024, from https://www.vryeweekblad.com/en/opinions-and-debate/2023-07-07-follow-the-
money-with-military-contractors-like-wagner/; Kadlec, A. (2023, July 17). In Africa, Wagner Is Not the Only Game
in Town. New Lines Magazine. https://newlinesmag.com/spotlight/in-africa-wagner-is-not-the-only-game-in-town/
9 Guistozzi, A., & Lewis, D. (2024). Wagner Group: success or failure? [Paper in preparation]. RUSI.
 3
UNRAVELLING WAGNER

Immediately after Prigozhin’s mutiny in June 2023, the authorities began to pick apart his vast
network of companies. Some of his contracts with the MoD were snapped up by rivals, although his
son Pavel Prigozhin reportedly retained control of many of his father’s businesses inside Russia.10
Abroad, however, the situation was more complex. Wagner’s presence had become crucial to
Russia’s relations with African countries. Unpicking these deals while retaining Russian influence
would require deft diplomacy.
His media empire (Media Patriot) was quickly dissolved, although popular war-time Telegram
channels linked to Wagner kept going, including Grey Zone (more than 500,000 subscribers) and
Wagner Orchestra (nearly 1 million subscribers).11 In Africa, some of Prigozhin’s employees
joined new Russian media platforms. The US Department of State’s Global Engagement Cen-
ter reported on the activities of the so-called “African Initiative,” a media network that has re-
cruited African journalists and bloggers to carry out anti-Western and pro-Russian information
campaigns.12 According to Maxime Audinet, who provided the information in August 2024, it
is run by FSB’s 5th Service member Artyom Kureev. AI opened local offices in Ouagadougou
(Burkina Faso) and Bamako (Mali).13 This transition to new media projects, together with the
absorption of some of Prigozhin’s media operations, appears to have been rather painless, partly
because Russian media outlets and Russian intelligence agencies were already operating in Africa.
Dealing with Wagner’s military forces proved a bigger challenge, however. Soon after the July
2023 mutiny, Russia’s Foreign Ministry reassured governments in the CAR and Mali that there
would be no interruption in Russia’s support.14 But behind the scenes, the entire network was
thrown into uncertainty. One interviewee in Mali told us:

10 The calm after the storm. (2023, October 30). OSW Centre for Eastern Studies.
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-report/2023-10-30/calm-after-storm
11 RFE/RL. (2023, July 2). In Wake Of Mutiny, Prigozhin’s Media Empire In Russia Shuts Down. RFE/RL.
https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-prigozhin-media-empiren-shuts-down-mutiny/32485836.html
12 The Kremlin’s Efforts to Spread Deadly Disinformation in Africa. (n.d.). United States Department of State. Retrieved
September 2, 2024, from https://www.state.gov/the-kremlins-efforts-to-spread-deadly-disinformation-in-africa/
13 Eydoux, T., and Le Cam, M. (2024, March 7). African Initiative, le nouveau réseau de propagande russe en Afrique
après le démantèlement de Wagner. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/03/07/african-initiative-la-nouvelle-
tete-de-pont-de-la-propagande-russe-en-afrique6 2206093 212.ℎ𝑡𝑚𝑙
14 Caulcutt, C., & Kayali, L. (2023, June 26). Wagner and Russia are here to stay in Africa, says Kremlin’s top diplomat.
Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/wagner-africa-mali-operations-will-continue-russia-sergey-lavrov-vows/

11
12 3. Unravelling Wagner

Frustration and concerns were evident in the eyes of all the personnel on the day of the
Wagner mutiny in Russia. This was reported to me by several Malian soldiers stationed
that day at Sévaré international airport. According to witnesses, Wagner’s men spent the
whole day with their phones glued to their ears, followed by a cessation of operations
by Wagner staff for three to four days.15

The Russian authorities froze Wagner’s accounts, causing massive disruption for a period,
with salaries not being paid and logistics interrupted.16 In the CAR, the initial paralysis lasted two
months, during which time Wagner was unable to pay salaries and the Russian MoD stopped all
logistical support.17 Similarly, Wagner in Mali struggled to process payments and operated with
reduced logistical support.18
With Prigozhin’s death in August 2023, the road forward became clearer in some ways, though
the same issues remained. Despite the shock and acrimony generated by Wagner Group’s mutiny
in June 2023, at no time had the Russian authorities considered abandoning the African deploy-
ments.19 Their priority after Prigozhin’s death was crisis management, which meant prevent-
ing any further disruption to operations while also preempting any further threat from Wagner.
Moscow wanted to shut down Wagner, but it did not want to lose its influence in Africa. As a
result, the Russian government tried to maintain the existing footprint in Africa as much as possi-
ble while asserting control over Wagner structures.20 What followed was a balancing act between
these two imperatives.
Initially, it was not clear who was running Wagner after Prigozhin’s death. Different high-
ranking figures competed for control. Clients, meanwhile, were losing trust.21 Prigozhin’s son,
Pavel, tried to retain parts of his father’s business, including those in the Concord Group, which
operated inside Russia.22 He also took over as head of Wagner on September 16, 2023. In-
side Wagner, the authorities sought to purge senior personnel deemed too close to Prigozhin or
Utkin, such as Vitaly Perfilev in the CAR, while others remained in their posts.23 In September
2023, President Putin met with Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov, as well as An-
drei Troshev, one of Wagner’s top commanders. According to a BBC report, Troshev became the
Kremlin’s main “overseer” of Wagner.24

15 Interview with Fulani, local of Sevaré, working in public sector Based in central Mali.(2023, December). [Interview
carried out by the research team].
16 Interview with ex Russian military Wagner staff. (2023, December). [Interview carried out by the research team].
17 Interview with Wagner commander on Central African Republic. (2024, April). [Interview carried out by the research
team].
18 Caulcutt, C., & Kayali, L. (2023, June 26). Wagner and Russia are here to stay in Africa, says Kremlin’s top diplomat.
Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/wagner-africa-mali-operations-will-continue-russia-sergey-lavrov-vows/
19 Interview with Russian advisor based in Mali. (2023, December). [Interview carried out by the research team].
20 Masuhr, N. (2023). Russia’s Post-Prigozhin Footprint in Africa: Expected Continuities and Change. Russian Analyt-
ical Digest, 303, 7–11. https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000636561 ; Eledinov, S., & Lechner, J. A. (2024, September
5). Russia Doesn’t Want a War in Niger. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/25/prigozhin-putin-russia-
coup-niger/
21 Interview with ex Russian military Wagner staff. (2023, December). [Interview carried out by the research team].
22 Bryjka, F., & Czerep. (2024). Africa Corps—A New Iteration Of Russia’s Old Military Presence In Africa (p. 8).
PISM. https://pism.pl/publications/africa-corps-a-new-iteration-of-russias-old-military-presence-in-africa
23 Researcher and analyst, written notes shared on 30 May 2024.
24 Barabanov, I., & Lotareva, A. (2024, June 21). Chto proiskhodit s voennym naslediem Evgeniya Prigozhina i ChVK
“Wagner” cherez god posle myatezha. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c0dd3rp0344o
3. Unravelling Wagner 13

Besides these internal problems, Wagner had lost the official support of the MoD, which now
sought to take over the group’s contracts in the Middle East and Africa, using its own PMC-
type proxies. Deputy Defense Minister Yevkurov was dispatched to Syria and Africa to persuade
Wagner fighters to join structures under MoD control. Reportedly, he had always been a major
opponent of Wagner.25 Wagner had to start paying for using MoD weapons and equipment. As
of December 2023, according to one of our sources, Wagner and the MoD were not cooperating
at all.26 For instance, the MoD had supplied trainers prior to Prigozhin’s death, after which that
practice was stopped. Wagner even had to rent planes to fly to Africa, except when working under
MoD control.27

25 Interview with member of Wagner Group‘s department of finance. (2024, February). [Interview carried out by the
research team].
26 Interview with ex Russian military Wagner staff. (2023, December). [Interview carried out by the research team].
27 Interview with ex Russian military Wagner staff. (2023, December). [Interview carried out by the research team].;
Interview with Wagner staff on Mali. (2024, February). [Interview carried out by the research team].; Interview with
member of Wagner Group‘s department of finance. (2024, February). [Interview carried out by the research team].
This page intentionally left blank.
 4
RUSSIA’S POST-WAGNER PLANS

4.1 The ‘Africa Corps’, Redut and the PMC department

The Russian government’s plan was clear: try to keep the flexibility and expertise of Wagner
while ensuring tighter control of its structures and activities through the MoD. First, it set out to
bring existing contracts and operations under its direct control and replace Wagner contracts with
new ones with the MoD.28 By far the most widely advertised post-Prigozhin plan by the Russian
government was the so-called “Africa Corps,” which, according to its own Telegram channel, was
set up in the summer of 2024, after the Russia–African summit in St Petersburg in July, “to expand
Russia’s military presence on the African continent and in the Middle East.”29
The Africa Corps Telegram channel was launched in December 2023, openly claiming to be
directly affiliated with the Russian armed forces. It sought to recruit volunteers for deployment to
Africa, with tasks such as “régime protection, counter terrorism” and “building infrastructure and
providing humanitarian support.” Africa Corps’ recruitment pitch described the US and NATO as
the main opponents in Africa, whose influence it sought to reduce by providing full-scale military
operations to help countries looking to emancipate themselves from “neocolonialism” and gain
full sovereignty. Among the potential gains for Russia it cited “free leases” of bases, airfields
and ports, as well as “control” of deposits of “gold, platinum, cobalt, uranium, diamonds, oil,
rare earth elements and their development on mutually beneficial terms with African partners.”30
Commentators willing to take such claims at face value concluded that the ultimate aim of Africa
Corps was to “expand the Kremlin’s military, political and economic footprint.”31

28 Faucon, B. (2023, July 9). Kremlin’s Wagner Shake-Up Rattles Nerves in Africa, Middle East. Wall Street Journal.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/kremlins-wagner-shake-up-rattles-nerves-in-africa-middle-east-8c917a97; Faulkner, C.,
Parens, R., & Plichta, M. (2023). After Prigozhin: The Future of the Wagner Model in Africa. CTC Sentinel, 16(9),
13–21.; Bryjka, F., & Czerep. (2024). Africa Corps—A New Iteration Of Russia’s Old Military Presence In Africa (p.
8). PISM. https://pism.pl/publications/africa-corps-a-new-iteration-of-russias-old-military-presence-in-africa
29 Afrikanskiy Korpus. (2023, December 20). Reshenie o sozdanii Afrikanskogo Korpusa v sostave MO RF prinyato
letom 2023 goda... https://t.me/KorpusAfrica/5
30 Brennan, D. (2023, November 21). Russia launches “Africa Corps” as Putin looks to hurt US. Newsweek.
https://www.newsweek.com/russia-new-africa-corps-hamper-us-clout-libya-putin-sudan-wagner-1845516
31 Smith, E. (2024, February 12). Russia’s Wagner Group expands into Africa’s Sahel with a new brand.
CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/12/russias-wagner-group-expands-into-africas-sahel-with-a-new-brand.html;
Heinemann-Grüder, A. (2023). The Wagner Group after Prigozhin. Russian Analytical Digest, 303, 4–6.

15
16 4. Russia’s post-Wagner plans

In reality, Africa Corps appears to be a recruitment brand used by a structure affiliated with
the Russian MoD and intended to subsume Wagner operations.32 A former Wagnerite, now in
the Redut PMC, described Africa Corps in April 2024 as “not real… just a campaign.”33 The
underlying structure was repeatedly referred to by sources as the “PMC department” of the MoD.
A Russian source said it is “a paramilitary structure, a division of the Russian armed forces, falling
under the MoD. Military personnel serving under the ‘PMC department’ sign a contract with the
MoD.” The structure operates as an auxiliary structure under a separate chain of command from
the Russian armed forces while still being MoD-controlled and seemingly operating under a dis-
tinct regulatory framework.
The PMC department, which is said to run the Africa Corps and other state-controlled aux-
iliary forces, is funded from the Russian defense budget and headed as of mid-2024 by Colonel
General Yunus-bek Yevkurov (still deputy minister of defense). The entire point of the structure
is to retain control of any parastate forces while avoiding the constraints of standard MoD regula-
tions, bureaucracy and culture to better work with the “specialized expert groups, working groups
and other structures […] expected to accompany its activities.”34
The Africa Corps has often been described as a camouflaged Wagner Group, but as a Russian
source explains (and multiple Wagner sources confirm), “there is no direct continuity between
Wagner Group and the Africa Corps, other than… the preservation of certain traditions, symbols
and the recognition of past awards.”35 Facilitating this is the fact that the PMC department coopted
much Wagner Group staff and took over some Wagner operations. It also stands to note, as ex-
plained below, that Wagner Group itself ended up being contracted by the new PMC department.
At the same time, the PMC department/Africa Corps appears to have acquired other organiza-
tions, such as Redut, and immediately started recruiting new staff, so that the administrative and
support layers of the structure would be staffed by MoD personnel.
According to internal sources, the MoD made the decision to form the PMC department al-
ready in April or May 2023, formalizing what had been the informal management of Wagner and
PMCs by the GRU and other entities.36 The role that Prigozhin was supposed to have in that early
version of the department is unclear. Some MoD sources even alleged that he was supposed to head
it, even though at that time he was publicly sparring with Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and
Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov over the allocation of shells to Wagner in Bakhmut.
In this version of events, Prigozhin had already accepted that Wagner would no longer operate
as a standalone entity.37 That there was initially a connection between the PMC department and
Prigozhin is also confirmed by a Wagner source.38 The mutiny, followed by Prigozhin’s death, set
things on a new path.

32 Eledinov, S., & Lechner, J. A. (2024, September 5). Is Africa Corps a Rebranded Wagner Group? Foreign Policy.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/07/africa-corps-wagner-group-russia-africa-burkina-faso/
33 Interview with former Wagner staff, now in Redut. (2024, April). [Interview carried out by the research team].
34 Interview with Russian advisor in CAR. (2024, January). [Interview carried out by the research team].
35 Interview with Russian advisor in CAR. (2024, January). [Interview carried out by the research team].
36 Lakstygal, I. (2023, December 22). Chto izvestno ob «Afrikanskom korpuse» Rossii. Vedomosti.
https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2023/12/22/1012398-chto-izvestno-ob-afrikanskom-korpuse-rossii
37 Researcher and analyst, written notes shared on 30 May 2024.
38 Interview with member of Wagner Group‘s department of finance. (2024, February). [Interview carried out by the
research team].
4.2. Business takeovers and foreign aid 17

Russian media have highlighted plans for the Africa Corps to operate in five African countries:
Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, the CAR and Niger.39 In practice, as we explain below, the rollout has
been more complicated and partial than expected.
The other main auxiliary force used by the Russian MoD is Redut. Described as a creation of
“former employees of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Foreign Intelligence Service and the
Russian Special Forces,” Redut existed alongside Wagner for years but never enjoyed the same
autonomy. It is reportedly overseen by GRU General Vladimir Alekseev.40 After Prigozhin’s
death, the MoD tried to have Redut take over much of Wagner’s PMC business, seemingly in-
tending to completely replace Wagner with a mix of mercenaries directly contracted by the PMC
department and subcontractors such as Redut and similar entities.41 One of the tools the MoD
used to undermine Wagner was to charge it for military equipment and transport services while
offering them for free to auxiliary forces willing to work under the MoD’s control.42
It was a determined push, and as late as December 2023 fear persisted within Wagner that
all the old contracts would be lost. Interestingly, at that time Redut was seen as the main threat,
perhaps because the PMC department was unable to implement projects directly yet.43 The MoD
managed to convince (or force) many Wagnerites to join Redut; the uncertainty surrounding their
jobs was a decisive factor in a place like Syria, where Wagner was ordered to leave and both the
MoD and the Syrian government were hostile. However, there were also disincentives: Redut
paid less, imposed stricter discipline, had a more rigid environment, was under complete MoD
control and reportedly discriminated against former Wagner staff. Wagner had also offered a more
adventurous lifestyle and freedom than the suffocating discipline of the Russian armed forces,
whose style Redut tended to follow.44

4.2 Business takeovers and foreign aid

While the MoD’s PMC department and its contractors such as Redut would take over Wagner’s
military operations, they were not equipped to take over Wagner-linked businesses in Africa. The
initial instinct of the Russian government post-mutiny was to deprive Wagner Group of all its
civilian businesses in Africa and Middle East and replace Prigozhin’s business structures with other
Russian-government-linked groups.45
Wagner’s ability to work almost seamlessly with Prigozhin’s companies was a key asset. In the
CAR, Wagner’s fighting force worked alongside the company Lobaye Invest, which managed gold
mines, controlled diamond exports and ran a timber company, as well as various smaller com-
panies, including one producing vodka, as well as being active in the political influencing sphere.
39 Lakstygal, I. (2023, December 22). Chto izvestno ob «Afrikanskom korpuse» Rossii. Vedomosti.
https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2023/12/22/1012398-chto-izvestno-ob-afrikanskom-korpuse-rossii
40 Barabanov, I., & Lotareva, A. (2024, June 21). Chto proiskhodit s voennym naslediem Evgeniya Prigozhina i ChVK
“Wagner” cherez god posle myatezha. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c0dd3rp0344o
41 Heinemann-Grüder, A. (2023). The Wagner Group after Prigozhin. Russian Analytical Digest, 303, 4–6.; Interview
with former Wagner staff, now in Redut. (2024, April). [Interview carried out by the research team].
42 Interview with former Wagner staff, now in Redut. (2024, April). [Interview carried out by the research team].
43 Interview with ex Russian military Wagner staff. (2023, December). [Interview carried out by the research team].
44 Interview with former Wagner staff, now in Redut. (2024, April). [Interview carried out by the research team].
45 Interview with Russian advisor in CAR. (2024, January). [Interview carried out by the research team].
18 4. Russia’s post-Wagner plans

There was no ready replacement to run these operations. It was difficult to replace Prigozhin’s abil-
ity to “[latch] onto informal local state structures and tie their elites to Russian interests,” which
is usually highlighted as crucial to his success.46 As John Lechner noted, ”replacing Wagner per-
sonnel in Africa would require finding new personnel who have the networks and experience that
keep operations going.”47
The CAR model appeared to be the most difficult to replicate by the Russian state, owing
to the needed “flexibility to navigate highly informal political settings and to fuse military and
nonmilitary tools in order to create Russo-African links at the level of local elites,” while the model
of Mali and Libya appears relatively easier to manage given the purer security, PMC focus.48
Even in Mali, however, Prigozhin was appreciated as a “Big Man,” somebody who could make
major deals happen quickly and smoothly.49 According to Maxim Shugalei, who was involved
in several Wagner operations in Africa, Wagner’s effectiveness came down to acting quickly and
adapting flexibly. He argued that any attempt to replace this with a centralized structure would
not work.50 Because of these issues, the MoD sometimes resorted to coopting old Wagnerites,
such as Dmitry Sytyi, who after Prigozhin’s death positioned himself as the main representative
of Russia’s “economic interests” in the CAR.51
Moscow seemed to be moving toward a more conventional approach in handling Wagner’s
business contracts in Syria, presumably at the price of giving up the big profits guaranteed by
Prigozhin’s “system.”52 One option was to bring in other Kremlin oligarchs to take over the net-
works. There was talk that Gennady Timchenko, a businessman close to the Kremlin, also active
in Syria, could absorb Prigozhin’s economic projects in the Syrian province of Homs and else-
where.53 As of mid-2024, it was not clear that this scheme had moved forward. Other initiatives,
involving, among others, oligarch Arkady Rotenberg, also proved problematic. One source told
us:

After the death of our leader, Prigozhin, the Ministry of Defense sent some of its trusted
people to control all the businesses linked to Prigozhin. They sent Konstantin Mirzayants
and Konstantin Pikalov, but they were not able to control them. Then, the Ministry of

46 Masuhr, N. (2023). Russia’s Post-Prigozhin Footprint in Africa: Expected Continuities and Change. Russian Analyt-
ical Digest, 303, 7–11. https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000636561
47 AFP. (n.d.). Wagner Model Will Remain In Africa After Prigozhin’s Death. Barron’s. Retrieved September 2, 2024,
from https://www.barrons.com/news/wagner-model-will-remain-in-africa-after-prigozhin-s-death-12610ca9; Siegle, J.
(2023, September 6). Inflection Point for Africa–Russia Relations after Prigozhin’s Death. Africa Center for Strategic
Studies. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/inflection-point-for-africa-russia-relations-after-prigozhins-death/
48 Masuhr, N. (2023). Russia’s Post-Prigozhin Footprint in Africa: Expected Continuities and Change. Russian Analyt-
ical Digest, 303, 7–11. https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000636561
49 Klaassen, L. (2024, March 27). Wagner’s next act in Africa. New Statesman.
https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/ukraine/2024/03/wagner-group-next-act-africa
50 Shugaley, M. (2023, September 29). Afrika eto budushchee planety, svoi pozitsii tam Rossiya sdavat’ ne sobiraetsya.
https://sobcor.news/29092023/4320/
51 Researcher and analyst, written notes shared on 30 May 2024.
52 Interview with Syrian MoFA official. (2024, February). [Interview carried out by the research team].
53 Mardasov, A. (2023, June 30). What’s next for Wagner in Syria, Africa after Putin mutiny? Al-
Monitor. Retrieved September 2, 2024, from https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/06/whats-next-wagner-
syria-africa-after-putin-mutiny.; Klaassen, L. (2024, March 27). Wagner’s next act in Africa. New Statesman.
https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/ukraine/2024/03/wagner-group-next-act-africa
4.3. A change of direction? The Africa Alliance 19

Defense sent Arkady Rotenberg to control the businesses linked to Wagner, but he was
not able to control them.54

Konstantin Pikalov was a Wagner leader who had helped set up another PMC, Konvoi, and
been on several visits to Africa previously.55 Konstantin Mirzayants, a former Russian paratrooper,
is reported to head Redut. These figures, from the paramilitary world but considered loyal to
the Kremlin, appear to have been unable to take control of the businesses in more challenging
environments, such as the CAR. Arguably, Moscow still needed the entrepreneurial nature and
flexibility of the Wagner business empire. Neither MoD representatives, such as Mirzayants, nor
loyal businesspeople, such as Rotenberg, seem to have been able to replicate Prigozhin’s model.

4.3 A change of direction? The Africa Alliance

In any case, another new initiative of the Kremlin seemed to be going in a different direction.
According to multiple current and former Wagner sources, the Russian authorities decided to set
up a dedicated structure to implement a new approach toward economic engagement in Africa.
Described as “a structured interface for Russian businesses to work in Africa,” the Africa Alliance
(AA) is meant to carry out “political technology projects” in particular and “soft power” in general,
with the aim of “increasing the political influence of the Russian Federation and creating favorable
conditions for the participation of the Russian Federation in state infrastructure projects.” Among
its reported tasks is the “implementation of diverse humanitarian projects aimed at fostering a
positive image of the Russian Federation while simultaneously strengthening its position in civil
society and developing networks that include agents of influence.”56 Thus, the AA appears to be
a hybrid between the development departments and ministries of Western countries and Soviet
development aid. Our source acknowledges that ultimately the aim is to gain “higher priority
access to infrastructure projects.” What is innovative, however, is the linkage to Africa Corps and
the PMC/PSC department of the MoD: the idea is to bring stability and development to Africa.57
The new structure was still being developed as of January 2024, but it brought together former
specialists from Prigozhin’s networks and structures associated with government agencies in the
areas of culture, education, mass information and public medicine. There was no indication at the
start that a fixed, centralized, vertical structure was the goal, though groups had already been set up
to work on different projects.58 Lacking an overall strategic goal, the AA responds to immediate
tasks at hand. There are multiple, sometimes duplicative, groups. On the other hand, such features
may make AA more adaptable and flexible down the road. But such features also make financing
more complicated, as any one structure will have to be funded from multiple budget sources.59
The AA might have been in incubation for years. In 2021 the High College of the Economy
in Moscow published a report in cooperation with the Russian ministry of Foreign Affairs, The
54 Interview with former Wagner staff, now in Redut. (2024, April). [Interview carried out by the research team].
55 Putin Chef’s Kisses of Death: Russia’s Shadow Army’s State-Run Structure Exposed. (2020, August 14). Bellingcat.
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2020/08/14/pmc-structure-exposed/
56 Interview with Russian advisor in CAR. (2024, January). [Interview carried out by the research team].
57 Interview with Russian advisor in CAR. (2024, January). [Interview carried out by the research team].
58 Interview with Russian advisor in CAR. (2024, January). [Interview carried out by the research team].
59 Interviews with four current and former Wagner staff. (2024, June). [Interview carried out by the research team].
20 4. Russia’s post-Wagner plans

Duma’s Committee for International Affairs and the Council for Foreign Policy and Defence.60
The report criticised the lack of a real Russian strategy in Africa and criticised reliance on hybrid
actors and “political adventurers” acting under the Russian flag, seemingly referring to Wagner.
The report noted that this erratic approach resulted in these actors benefiting from the state budget,
operating with precarious means, attracting a disproportionate attention on Western media and
hurting Russia’s image.61
At the time of this writing, the Russian authorities had not gone public with the AA initiative
yet and the structure was only being mentioned by current and former Wagnerites. As portrayed by
these sources, the AA could represent a long-term strategy that differs significantly from Wagner’s
own original plans.62 Yet it is likely that any such state-led initiative will struggle to make headway.
Russia has no resources to fund significant development aid, while it is keen not to repeat the Cold
War experience of providing billions of dollars in aid to African countries for limited political
gain. Although it has forgiven more than $20 billion of Soviet-era loans, its direct development
aid to Africa is tiny, amounting to no more than $27 million in annual spending in the period
2012-17. Moreover, Russia makes minimal contributions to UN programs. Moscow does not
even have a dedicated development agency, with most aid comprising ad hoc contributions on a
bilateral basis.63
Russian investment in Africa is also small – less than 1% of total foreign direct investment goes
to Africa – and Russian-African trade amounts to less than $20 billion. Russia has tried to boost
economic engagement through new initiatives. In 2019, Russian conservative ideologue and busi-
nessman Konstantin Malofeev announced the creation of the International Agency of Sovereign
Development (IASD), designed to be a new Russian investment platform that would broker deals
between Russian companies and African governments. It was reported to have agreed to finance
$2.5 billion of infrastructure deals in several African countries, including Niger, DR Congo and
Guinea.64 But after an initial flurry of publicity, the IASD disappeared from the news.

4.4 Smooth transition away from Wagner in Syria and Libya

In Syria, Wagner was quickly ousted from both military roles and civilian business. Its forces
were told either to sign contracts with the Russian MoD or leave.65 Its companies were seized in
exchange for a commitment by the Syrian government to pay back an undisclosed sum to Wagner
Group.66 Wagner accused then-Defense Minister Shoigu “and some of his close friends” of having
60 Afrika: Perspektivy razvitiya i rekomendatsii dlya politiki Rossii. (2021). Mezhdunarolnye Otnosheniya.
https://imobook.ru/book/mezhdunarodnye-ekonomicheskie-otnosheniya-2/afrika-perspektivy-razvitiya
61 Audinet, M., & Dreyfus, E. (2022). La Russie au Mali: Une présence bicéphale (No. 97; Étude, pp. 1–46). IRSEM.
62 Bryjka, F., & Czerep. (2024). Africa Corps—A New Iteration Of Russia’s Old Military Presence In Africa (p. 8).
PISM. https://pism.pl/publications/africa-corps-a-new-iteration-of-russias-old-military-presence-in-africa
63 Bartosiewicz. (2023, August 23). Controlled chaos: Russia’s Africa policy. OSW Centre for Eastern Studies.
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2023-08-23/controlled-chaos-russias-africa-policy
64 Maldonado. (n.d.). Russia’s Hardest Working Oligarch Takes Talents to Africa. PONARS Eurasia. Retrieved Septem-
ber 2, 2024, from https://www.ponarseurasia.org/russia-s-hardest-working-oligarch-takes-talents-to-africa/
65 Barabanov, I., & Lotareva, A. (2024, June 21). Chto proiskhodit s voennym naslediem Evgeniya Prigozhina i ChVK
“Wagner” cherez god posle myatezha. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c0dd3rp0344o
66 Interview with member of Wagner Group‘s department of finance. (2024, February). [Interview carried out by the
research team].
4.4. Smooth transition away from Wagner in Syria and Libya 21

taken over the companies, although at the same time a plan, supported by Putin himself, to inject
$2 billion into these industries was mentioned.67 The plan suggests something more than a mere
redistribution of assets between shadowy economic actors. Reportedly, the Russian government
was working with the Syrian government to bring the different companies working in the oil and gas
sector under one “corporate umbrella,” with the Syrian government being the driving force in this
effort.68 Even in Syria, however, simply replacing Wagner Group like this soon appeared unlikely
to be a viable option. The Syrian authorities seemed dissatisfied, aiming instead at reclaiming
some of the oil and gas business for themselves.69

As for the military and security dimensions of Wagner’s operation in Syria, Redut took over
many them, including guarding Russian investments, carrying out special operations and even
recruiting for the Syrian government.70 The fact that the Russian armed forces had a significant
presence and that Redut was already on the ground made it easier to replace Wagner.71 Still, though
the Russian authorities and Russian companies were pushing for Redut to take over Wagner’s role
in Syria entirely, the Syrian government resisted, no longer keen on having foreign PMCs on its
soil at all.72

The passing of the torch went relatively smoothly in Libya too. Early after the mutiny, a
Russian envoy rushed to Libya to reassure Khalifa Haftar that some 2,000 Russian fighters, tech-
nicians, political operatives and administrators deployed by Wagner in the country would stay,
notwithstanding some “changes at the top,” according to a Libyan source recounting a meeting
with a Russian envoy. Everything else would stay the same, including ”the people on the ground,
the money men in Dubai, the contacts and the resources committed to Libya.”73 As in Syria, Redut
obtained the contract for training local, Libyan National Army forces, supporting them militarily,
gathering intelligence and protecting oil and gas sites.74 But in other areas, the Wagner operation
was taken over by 1,000-1,500 troops reportedly badged as the Africa Corps.75 In Libya, the
ongoing ceasefire made the transition to PMC department control rather straightforward.76

67 Interview with member of Wagner Group‘s department of finance. (2024, February). [Interview carried out by the
research team].
68 Interview with Syrian MoFA official. (2024, February). [Interview carried out by the research team].
69 Interviews with Syrian officials. (2023, December). [Interview carried out by the research team].
70 Interview with former Wagner staff, now in Redut. (2024, April). [Interview carried out by the research team].
71 Mardasov, A. (2023, June 30). What’s next for Wagner in Syria, Africa after Putin mutiny? Al-
Monitor. Retrieved September 2, 2024, from https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/06/whats-next-wagner-
syria-africa-after-putin-mutiny.; Klaassen, L. (2024, March 27). Wagner’s next act in Africa. New Statesman.
https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/ukraine/2024/03/wagner-group-next-act-africa
72 Interview with Syrian MoFA official. (2024, February). [Interview carried out by the research team].
73 Burke, J. (2023, July 6). ‘It is like a virus that spreads’: Business as usual for Wagner group’s extensive Africa network.
The Guardian. Retrieved September 2, 2024, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/06/putin-wagner-
africa-business-yevgeny-prigozhin-kremlin
74 Interview with former Wagner staff, now in Redut. (2024, April). [Interview carried out by the research team].
75 Titus Jansen, J. (2024, June 13). The Expansion of Russia’s “Africa Corps” in Libya. Bloomsbury Intelligence &
Security Institute (BISI). https://bisi.org.uk/reports/the-expansion-of-russias-africa-corps-in-libya
76 Researcher and analyst, written notes shared on 30 May 2024.
22 4. Russia’s post-Wagner plans

4.5 Compromise in Mali

Foreign minister Sergei Lavrov was quick to reassure the Malian government in the summer of
2023 that Russia remained committed to its mission in the country.77 In Mali, Wagner’s typical
business of bartering security for gold mines had been slow to get off the ground. Instead, the
Malian government was paying cash to Wagner for its military presence, as much as $200 million
between late 2021 and mid-2023, according to US sources.78 Unlike Libya and Syria, the Russian
authorities appear to have been forced to let Wagner keep operating in Mali, perhaps partly because
it feared that other actors closer to the MoD would get dragged into a potentially risky situation.
There was also a lack of enthusiasm for MoD contracts, whether directly with the PMC depart-
ment or Redut. The Malian government resisted too.79 In Mali, Wagner’s position was strength-
ened by the offensives that it successfully led in autumn 2023 in the north of the country, capturing
Ber, Anefif, Tessalit and Kidal from the militias of the “Cadre stratégique permanent,” which has
been at war with the Malian government since August 2023.80
Lengthy talks ensued between the Malian president, the Malian minister of defense, and the
main Russian interlocutor, Andrei Averyanov, the GRU General running among other things the
MoD PMC department, as well as Konstantin Pikalov from Wagner and Konstantin Mirzayants
from Redut. The Russians advocated the wholesale transfer of Wagner staff in Mali to Redut, a
proposition still being pursued in early February 2024.81 A meeting with Defense Minister Colonel
Sadio Camara and Air Force Chief of Staff Colonel Alou Boi Diarra eventually led to a settlement,
it was reported. The Russian MoD agreed to keep Wagner in Mali, but the latter agreed to operate
under some degree of MoD control. The MoD in particular insisted on having a role in choosing
the commanders without taking into account the opinions of the units themselves, as it used to be
under Prigozhin.82 In other words, Wagner’s mercenary status in Mali has not changed, but the
administrative procedures governing the contingent have.83 One source within Wagner quantified
the terms of the deal as the Russian MoD gaining direct control over 20% of the contract and
Wagner retaining 80% of it.84 In 2020-23, Wagner in Mali was renting heavy weaponry from the
MoD, but after the settlement was reached the MoD started providing it, along with ammunition,
for free. This contributed to the MoD gaining more say. As of late February 2024, Wagner Group
was coordinating with Russian military officers, even if

77 Burke, J. (2023, July 6). ‘It is like a virus that spreads’: Business as usual for Wagner group’s extensive Africa network.
The Guardian. Retrieved September 2, 2024, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/06/putin-wagner-
africa-business-yevgeny-prigozhin-kremlin
78 Burke, J. (2023, July 6). ‘It is like a virus that spreads’: Business as usual for Wagner group’s extensive Africa network.
The Guardian. Retrieved September 2, 2024, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/06/putin-wagner-
africa-business-yevgeny-prigozhin-kremlin
79 Caulcutt, C., & Kayali, L. (2023, June 26). Wagner and Russia are here to stay in Africa, says Kremlin’s top diplomat.
Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/wagner-africa-mali-operations-will-continue-russia-sergey-lavrov-vows/
80 Interview with Member of National Guard, Tuareg, based in Gao. (2023, December). [Interview carried out by the
research team].
81 Interview with Wagner staff on Mali. (2024, February). [Interview carried out by the research team].
82 Researcher and analyst, written notes shared on 30 May 2024.
83 Interview with Tuareg working in civil society organisation, based in Gao. (2023, December). [Interview carried out
by the research team].
84 Interview with Wagner staff member, working on new contracts. (2024, May). [Interview carried out by the research
team].
4.5. Compromise in Mali 23

we do not trust [MoD staff], and the majority of our fighters and commanders are not
interested in working with them anymore.85

A Malian foreign ministry official confirmed that his government insisted on Wagner remaining
in Mali.86 The Malian preference for Wagner does not mean, however, that the local government
had no grudges – it appears to have used the opportunity offered by the post-Prigozhin transition
to delink it from local militias, which it had sought to do for some time.87
Reportedly, Wagner-MoD cooperation gradually improved after the first difficult months.88
Still, Wagner Group deeply resented being under MoD control:

Wagner group is not interested in being controlled by the Russian Defense Ministry,
and we are in secret talks with the Mali government to become an independent group
in Mali.89

The reluctance was not just on Wagner’s side – as late as April 2024, Redut negotiators were
still trying to convince the Malians to completely replace Wagner with Redut.90
Wagner has not had it easy after signing the new contract, however. The Malian regime ap-
peared to be struggling to maintain a base of support in 2024, having had to ban all political
parties and cancelling discussions to end the “transition” back to an elected civilian government.
Well-known figures like Mahmoud Dicko, a charismatic imam, started criticizing the junta. The
junta’s undermining of local peace agreements with insurgents risked escalating the violence, as
did the reliance of the regime on violent methods against communities suspected of supporting the
jihadists, which Wagner was happy to endorse and even enforce.91 As one analyst commented,

there is less confidence among Russian military planners that the counterinsurgency
in the center of the country will prove a success. Russian military planners are also
well aware of the tense, polarized political environment in Bamako itself. Were the
counterinsurgency to ultimately fail, it would be better for it to fail as a private (Wagner)
operation than as an official MoD operation. Second: given the scale of the abuses and
some of the reputational costs associated with the operations in Mali, MoD planners
feel it is easier to not officialize the operation.”92

Russia’s reputation would be at stake if it did not deliver the same benefits to host governments
as Wagner did.93 The Russian MoD might therefore have reasoned that in Mali, where the security
85 Interview with Wagner staff on Mali. (2024, February). [Interview carried out by the research team].
86 Interview with official in Mali‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2024, June). [Interview carried out by the research
team].
87 Interview with official in Mali‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2024, June). [Interview carried out by the research
team].
88 Interview with Wagner staff on Mali. (2024, February). [Interview carried out by the research team].
89 Interview with Wagner staff on Mali. (2024, February). [Interview carried out by the research team].
90 Interview with former Wagner staff, now in Redut. (2024, April). [Interview carried out by the research team].;
Interview with Wagner staff member, working on new contracts. (2024, May). [Interview carried out by the research
team].
91 Bryjka, F., & Czerep. (2024). Africa Corps—A New Iteration Of Russia’s Old Military Presence In Africa (p. 8).
PISM. https://pism.pl/publications/africa-corps-a-new-iteration-of-russias-old-military-presence-in-africa
92 Researcher and analyst, written notes shared on 30 May 2024.
93 Rynn, S., & Cockayne. (2023, August 2). Where Next for Wagner Group in Africa? RUSI.
https://rusi.orghttps://rusi.org.; Mardasov, A. (2023, June 30). What’s next for Wagner in Syria, Africa after Putin
24 4. Russia’s post-Wagner plans

situation looked the most complicated among all of Wagner’s deployments, keeping the Wagner
brand would after all be beneficial should things not go well. This risk was highlighted by an
attack on Wagner and government forces in northern Mali in July 2024 in which several Wagner
personnel were killed and which received considerable media attention.94
The commercial side of the Malian operation never got so far in the first place. The group is
thought to have struggled to make significant profits since deploying in December 2021. Diplo-
matic sources told the Guardian that Wagner had had trouble gaining access to the goldmines they
were allowed to exploit under the deal struck with the regime of military ruler Assimi Goïta, even
if the military regime was paying the bills regardless.95
In this regard, some observers suggest the emergence of a new (long-term) Russian policy of
helping countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso to set up larger gold refineries in exchange for
a share of the profits. For this policy to make sense in Mali at least, it implies a crackdown on
smugglers and the informal mining sector by the Malian state.96 There are indeed allegations that
the Kidal operation in November 2023 was motivated by the need to seize control of “around
100 points of manual/small-scale gold mining in the Kidal and Tessalite areas” exploited by local
actors – not just insurgents but even former rebels-turned-Bamako allies such as GATIA (Groupe
d’Autodéfense Tuareg Imghad et Alliés). In October 2023 and March 2024, Russia-Mali talks
were held about the future of mining in the country.97

4.6 Wagner retains its core business in the Central African Republic

The same dynamics applied to the CAR, where at one point Wagner Group’s predicament looked
as bad as anywhere else. Deputy Minister of Defense Yevkurov, Andrei Averyanov of the GRU,
PMC Konvoi leader Pikalov and PMC Redut leader Mirzayants reportedly had meetings with the
CAR authorities. They told them that Wagner was no longer supported by the Russian government
and Wagner Group was to be informed that it should solve its problems with the Russians before
continuing gold mining operations. The Russian government was thus trying to cut off all financing
for Wagner and put it under the control of the PMC department.98 According to one source, the
Russian defense minister personally communicated to officials in the CAR that the Wagner Group’s
economic activities should be curtailed, with it only permitted to participate in official security and

mutiny? Al-Monitor. Retrieved September 2, 2024, from https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/06/whats-next-

wagner-syria-africa-after-putin-mutiny.; Faulkner, C., Parens, R., & Plichta, M. (2023). After Prigozhin: The Future
of the Wagner Model in Africa. CTC Sentinel, 16(9), 13–21.
94 Ewokor, C., & Fleming, L. (2024, July 30). Mali army admits “significant” losses in joint battle with Wagner. BBC
News. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cq5xvl1111yo
95 Burke, J. (2023, July 6). ‘It is like a virus that spreads’: Business as usual for Wagner group’s extensive Africa network.
The Guardian. Retrieved September 2, 2024, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/06/putin-wagner-
africa-business-yevgeny-prigozhin-kremlin.
96 Bryjka, F., & Czerep. (2024). Africa Corps—A New Iteration Of Russia’s Old Military Presence In Africa (p. 8).
PISM. https://pism.pl/publications/africa-corps-a-new-iteration-of-russias-old-military-presence-in-africa
97 Bryjka, F., & Czerep. (2024). Africa Corps—A New Iteration Of Russia’s Old Military Presence In Africa (p. 8).
PISM. https://pism.pl/publications/africa-corps-a-new-iteration-of-russias-old-military-presence-in-africa
98 Interview with member of Wagner Group‘s department of finance. (2024, February). [Interview carried out by the
research team].; Interview with Wagner commander on Central African Republic. (2024, April). [Interview carried
out by the research team].
 4.6. Wagner retains its core business in the Central African Republic 25

training local forces.99 During the planned transition to Redut, the latter was also expected to get
involved in running businesses in the extractive sector.100
In fact, Wagner came out of the post-Prigozhin crisis in better shape in the CAR than Mali.
First, President Faustin-Archange Touadéra intervened with the Russian authorities and asked
them to keep supporting Wagner logistically, at least for some time.101 The Russian authorities
had to give way. There was no resigning of contracts with the MoD PMC structure and changes
were slight.102 Redut did take over some of the old Wagner contracts, in the extractive sector,
training and security provision for elites. Importantly, however, Wagner retained control over the
Ndassima gold mine and of most of the diamond trade.103 According to a Russian source,

Certain personnel deemed too close to Prigozhin or Utkin, such as Vitaly Perfilev, have
been replaced. Others, such as Dmitry Sytyi, have gone over to the new structure.104

Observers on the ground did not notice major changes. A Western expert concurred that “not
much has changed with the death of Prigozhin in the CAR… Operations are still conducted in the
countryside, albeit on a smaller scale.”105 A CAR paramilitary leader stated:

While there have been some drawdowns, Wagner continues to conduct operations in the
countryside, and we see a surprising amount of continuity… There was a withdrawal in
some town centers and a slowdown in operations in the countryside. There has been a
reduction in violence. Human rights violations are down… Equipment remains intact.
Issues with equipment are rare. We are not sure if this will become an issue in the
future.106

A CAR regime source also stressed the continuity.107 Reportedly, Denis Pavlov, ostensibly a
Russian diplomat, supervises everything from the Russian embassy.108 The matter might not be
completely closed, as the Russian authorities have reportedly sent inspectors to assess Wagner’s
economic activities.109
99 Interview with Wagner staff in CAR. (2024, May). [Interview carried out by the research team].
100 Interview with former Wagner staff, now in Redut. (2024, April). [Interview carried out by the research team].
101 Interview with Wagner commander on Central African Republic. (2024, April). [Interview carried out by the research
team].
102 Interview with international expert on Wagner and conflict in Central African Republic. (2024, February). [Interview
carried out by the research team].; Interview with Russian advisor in CAR. (2024, January). [Interview carried out by
the research team].
103 Interview with Wagner commander on Central African Republic. (2024, April). [Interview carried out by the research
team].
104 Interview with Russian advisor in CAR. (2024, January). [Interview carried out by the research team].
105 Interview with international expert on Wagner and conflict in Central African Republic. (2024, February). [Interview
carried out by the research team].
106 Interview with CAR paramilitary leader working with Wagner, former leader of named armed group, now part of the
Khartoum Agreement. (2024, February 27). [Interview carried out by the research team].
107 Interview with Advisor to CAR President Faustin-Archange Touadéra. (2024, February). [Interview carried out by
the research team].
108 Interview with western diplomatic background, based in Bangui. (2024, January 15). [Interview carried out by the
research team].
109 Interview with Wagner commander on Central African Republic. (2024, April). [Interview carried out by the research
team].
 26 4. Russia’s post-Wagner plans

Wagner, in this case, was helped by the fact that the MoD struggled to understand how all the
disparate economic enterprises of Prigozhin’s mini empire in the CAR fit together. At the same
time, the military threat represented by the rebel groups was minimal as of end 2023-early 2024.
This, and the perception of the CAR as being of limited strategic importance, allowed a certain
status quo to be sustained there – a decision has been made to avoid rocking the boat. Despite a
cut in personnel numbers, the stable situation has even allowed Wagner to reach Central African
towns where they had not had a presence before. As of May 2024, Wagner was working in Obo
and Zemio in southeast CAR, recruiting from Azande self-defense forces to head off a future
Azande rebellion.110
One Wagner administrative worker attributed Wagner’s resilience in Mali and CAR to the fact
that

the countries know that Wagner Group is strong; the good thing is that these countries
know that Wagner Group is capable of managing everything…111

The issue was not that African governments favored dealing with Wagner as such. One Rus-
sian expert noted that some African regimes prefer direct deals with Moscow rather than with
Wagner.112 Rather, the problem appears to have been that these government wanted the type of
“services” Wagner was providing – such as direct involvement in combat operations and placing
themselves at the complete disposal of the ruling elite – while the other organizations could not
deliver them.

4.7 The first agreement after the mutiny: Burkina Faso

Whereas in most African countries the Russian MoD sought to take over an existing Wagner mis-
sion, in Burkina Faso Wagner had never established a presence. An analyst familiar with the
Russian MoD and the African country noted that there had been long and rather unsuccessful ne-
gotiations with Prigozhin in the months preceding his death. It was only afterward that a contingent
of 400-500 personnel was deployed. The initial hesitancy of the Burkinabe was due, in part, to
their keenness to avoid the types of economic penetration they saw in the CAR. The government
of Burkina Faso appears to have decided that a partnership with the Russian MoD would come
with less baggage than that with Prigozhin’s networks. The Russians promised to implement hu-
manitarian projects and other programs to create a positive image of Russia and Russian influence
in the country.113
A brigade of special forces, dubbed the “Bears,” and reportedly based in the capital Oua-
gadougou, is likely part of Redut.114
110 Researcher and analyst, written notes shared on 30 May 2024.
111 Interviewwith member of Wagner Group‘s department of finance. (2024, February). [Interview carried out by the
research team].
112 Mardasov, A. (2023, June 30). What’s next for Wagner in Syria, Africa after Putin mutiny? Al-Monitor. Retrieved
September 2, 2024, from https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/06/whats-next-wagner-syria-africa-after-putin-
mutiny
113 Researcher and analyst, written notes shared on 30 May 2024.
114 Barabanov, I., & Lotareva, A. (2024, June 21). Chto proiskhodit s voennym naslediem Evgeniya Prigozhina i ChVK
“Wagner” cherez god posle myatezha. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c0dd3rp0344o
 4.7. The first agreement after the mutiny: Burkina Faso 27

Elsewhere, however, efforts at signing direct contracts with the PMC department or bringing
in Redut have not made much progress. A source in Redut claimed that, as of April 2024, the
group was negotiating new deals in Venezuela, Kenya, the CAR, Sudan and Congo.115 These
were mostly either minor or unlikely contracts. Even in Sudan, for example, there were conflicting
accounts about Wagner’s role after the start of the civil war there: though claims of Wagner’s
involvement on Hemetti’s side exist,116 one analyst claims that its activities appear to have been
largely halted during the conflict. Though the same analyst thought that there are likely various
Russian operatives still in the country, he believes that as of May 2024 Wagner did not appear to
have a force in Sudan. Hence, any transition to the MoD PMC/Africa Corps or Redut would not
have amounted to much.117

115 Interviewwith former Wagner staff, now in Redut. (2024, April). [Interview carried out by the research team].
116 Elbagir, N., Mezzofiore, G., Qiblawi, T., & Arvanitidis, B. (2021, April 21).
Exclusive: Evidence emerges of Russia’s
Wagner arming militia leader battling Sudan’s army. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/20/africa/wagner-sudan-
russia-libya-intl/index.html
117 Researcher and analyst, written notes shared on 30 May 2024.
This page intentionally left blank.
 5
OUTLOOK

5.1 Is Wagner irreplaceable?

It remains unclear whether these state-linked groups can replace Wagner in terms of their effec-
tiveness. What Wagner Group specifically brought to the table – the expertise that it developed
in 2014-23 – was the willingness to engage in actual combat extensively, for which neither the
Russian military nor Redut seemed to have any appetite in Mali, according to a Russian source.118
Because other so-called PMCs are only able/willing to secure facilities and provide training or
support, Wagner might remain indispensable.119 As one source noted: ”other Russian PMCs have
historically undertaken more low-risk tasks than Wagner, and until recently, were less involved
in direct combat operations. None approach the scale of personnel, arms and mission that has
characterized Wagner.”120
The cases of the CAR and Mali show that at least four other issues, all supporting some future
role for Wagner Group, can be identified:

• Redut’s expansion has been limited by a shortage of personnel;121

• Moscow has been unable to replace Wagner’s “special” expertise in delivering shadowy deals
and possibly also to replace it in information operations;
• Moscow is fearful of getting trapped in unmanageable conflicts, like the Soviet Union did
in the 1980s;
• client governments in some cases have insisted on keeping Wagner.

While Russia benefited from Wagner’s adventures in Africa in several ways, there are also risks
and downsides. Relations with the new generation of radical Pan-Africanists has allowed Russian
influence to spread fast,122 but, as Sergey Eledinov and John Lechner point out, at the risk of
118 Mardasov, A. (2023, June 30). What’s next for Wagner in Syria, Africa after Putin mutiny? Al-Monitor. Retrieved
September 2, 2024, from https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/06/whats-next-wagner-syria-africa-after-putin-
mutiny
119 Eledinov, S., & Lechner, J. A. (2024, September 5). Russia Doesn’t Want a War in Niger. Foreign Policy.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/25/prigozhin-putin-russia-coup-niger/
120 Margolin, J. (2023, August 21). The New Russian Mercenary Marketplace. Riddle Russia. https://ridl.io/the-new-
russian-mercenary-marketplace/
121 Interview with former Wagner staff, now in Redut. (2024, April). [Interview carried out by the research team].
122 Le Cam, M. (2023, August 6). The faces of Russia’s influence across the African continent.
https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/08/06/the-faces-of-russia-s-influence-across-the-african-
continent6 0825131 24.ℎ𝑡𝑚𝑙

29
 30 5. Outlook

Russia being dragged into more troublesome contexts than it can afford or manage. In Niger, the
Russians appear to have hesitated to commit, despite local groups appealing to them, and initially
even condemned the July 2023 coup. Eventually, however, Russia’s credibility as an alternative
security partner in Africa demanded that it respond positively to the Nigerien approaches.123
Western commentators sometimes argue that “Wagner’s African hosts regret letting them
in.”124 That has been argued particularly strongly in the case of Libya, but even assuming that
is true, there is little sign of it in the Sahel or Central Africa. This is due at least in part to the
lack of viable alternatives, at least from the perspective of the ruling elites there.125 The “regime
survival package” that Wagner offers “supersedes any other potential gains from traditional cooper-
ation agreements advanced by Western partners, which are usually based on institutional capacity
building instead of securing the authorities themselves.”126 Given the reluctance to let Wagner
go on the part of its African clients, combined with the unwillingness of its competitors to do
everything Wagner does, compromises have had to be made.

5.2 Unstable arrangements?

As discussed above, whereas the original ambition appears to have been to completely integrate
Wagner’s assets into Russian state structures, in a number of cases the end result has been a public-
private approach, combining some characteristics of the Wagner model with stronger state con-
trol.127128 The fact that the Russian army was, of course, busy fighting in Ukraine is likely to have
been a factor favoring compromise, as well.129
Though Moscow has demonstrated some skills in making virtue out of necessity, the new
arrangements worked out with the Malian and CAR governments are not necessarily stable. The
Malian authorities miss the assertive and self-confident Prigozhin-era Wagner and would like the
group to help build a strong air force and/or deliver direct close air support.130

Even if there are 500 Wagner fighters with the same confidence as they had under
Prigozhin, they could take all the mines controlled by the jihadists. But right now, I am
123 Eledinov, S., and Lechner, J. A. (2024, September 5). Russia Doesn’t Want a War in Niger. Foreign Policy.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/25/prigozhin-putin-russia-coup-niger/
124 Detsch, J. (2023, September 25). Wagner’s African Hosts Regret Letting Them In. Foreign Policy.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/25/wagner-africa-mali-libya-car-prigozhin-putin-russia/
125 Detsch, J. (2023, September 25). Wagner’s African Hosts Regret Letting Them In. Foreign Policy.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/25/wagner-africa-mali-libya-car-prigozhin-putin-russia/; Faulkner, C., Parens, R.,
Plichta, M. (2023). After Prigozhin: The Future of the Wagner Model in Africa. CTC Sentinel, 16(9), 13–21.
126 Droin, M., & Dolbaia, T. (2023b). Russia Is Still Progressing in Africa. What’s the Limit? CSIS, 1–13.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-still-progressing-africa-whats-limit
127 Masuhr, N. (2023). Russia’s Post-Prigozhin Footprint in Africa: Expected Continuities and Change. Russian Analyt-
ical Digest, 303, 7–11. https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000636561
128 Margolin, J. (2023, August 21). The New Russian Mercenary Marketplace. Riddle Russia. https://ridl.io/the-new-
russian-mercenary-marketplace/; Droin, M., & Dolbaia, T. (2023b). Russia Is Still Progressing in Africa. What’s the
Limit? CSIS, 1–13. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-still-progressing-africa-whats-limit
129 Schipani, A., Seddon, M., Adeoye, A., & Saleh, H. (2023, August 25). Wagner’s lucrative African operations thrown
into post-Prigozhin limbo. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/0476123a-b726-413b-9c70-0ba1e480fa0f
130 Interview with official in Mali‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2024, June). [Interview carried out by the research
team].; Interview with Wagner staff member, working on new contracts. (2024, May). [Interview carried out by the
research team].
 5.3. Pavel Prigozhin attempts a relaunch 31

not sure about that because I think that Wagner Group is under a lot of pressure, so it
would not be the same and easy for Wagner to retake the gold mines...131

The Russian MoD’s uncertain attitude and reluctance to give Wagner forces the green light for
operations is seen by the Malians as a major problem.132 Another potential element of instability
in the relationship was the Malians’ desire for more than what Wagner was still doing in 2024
(guarding the country’s leadership, training “some of the special forces” and supporting special
operations against insurgents) – they want a better air force, especially helicopters, and more and
better training, neither of which Wagner was able to deliver as of early 2024.133 A third poten-
tial instability driver was Wagner’s continuing interest in the mining sector. A Wagner source
noted that as of 2024 there were still plans to expand Wagner mining operations and enter other
industries.134
In the CAR, the arrangements seem more stable, as not so much has changed following
Prigozhin’s demise. Wagner believes the CAR government nonetheless wishes for even greater
engagement by the group, in securing the regime but also in the extractive sector. There is no
perception of divided views over Wagner within the CAR.135

We did a lot for them; we brought security for them; we stabilized the situation for
them, so they are happy with us. They have established good relations with us. They
respect Wagner Group. And they encourage local people to work with Wagner Group,
so it is not difficult for Wagner to work with Central African Republic officials.136

5.3 Pavel Prigozhin attempts a relaunch

A source in Wagner involved in negotiating new contracts said in May 2024 that, after some dif-
ficult months in the immediate aftermath of Prigozhin’s death, things were getting better. His son
Pavel reportedly invested some of his resources, while flows of funds resumed from some clients,
which the source cited as Libya, Sudan, Kenya, Madagascar, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
Cameroon and Mali. According to the same source, Wagner still retained several important con-
tracts, including one for gold mining in Sudan, several in the CAR, one in Madagascar for mining
gold and another for oil extraction, and one in Mozambique for natural gas (investigative reporters
were unable to confirm the Mozambique contract, nor those in Madagascar, though there were
reportedly discussions concerning Wagner’s involvement dating to 2018).137 New contracts were
reportedly being negotiated with Venezuela, Chad, Gabon, Niger, South Sudan, Pakistan, Nigeria
131 Interview with official in Mali‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2024, June). [Interview carried out by the research
team].
132 Interview with official in Mali‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2024, June). [Interview carried out by the research
team].
133 Interview with Wagner staff on Mali. (2024, February). [Interview carried out by the research team].
134 Interview with Wagner staff on Mali. (2024, February). [Interview carried out by the research team].
135 Interview with Wagner commander on Central African Republic. (2024, April). [Interview carried out by the research
team].
136 Interview with Wagner commander on Central African Republic. (2024, April). [Interview carried out by the research
team].
137 The Proekt team. (2019, March 14). Master and Chef: How Evgeny Prigozhin led the Russian offensive in Africa.
Proekt. https://www.proekt.media/investigation/evgeny-prigozhin-africa/
 32 5. Outlook

(for coal, gold and limestone) and even Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, not to mention talks
with the Chinese to secure projects in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These new clients were requesting
different types of services, such as military bases, security support, logistical assistance, mechan-
ical assistance and training, investment and mining, as well as fighting and training and supporting
military forces.138
However, the Russian authorities were unsupportive and in fact seemed to be trying to create
obstacles.139 Despite strong reservations about working with the Russian MoD, therefore, Wag-
ner considered the agreement on the Mali mission in February 2024 (see above) as an achieve-
ment. Not only was Redut seen by the Malians as an inadequate substitute for Wagner for most of
the functions it performs, but Wagner negotiators believed they had succeeded in convincing the
Malian government that it would be unwise to rely too much on the Russian MoD at a time when
it was very busy in Ukraine.140 The pragmatic approach grudgingly adopted in Mali seemed to be
paying off. Indeed, one strategy Wagner was considering as of April 2024 was to join hands with
Redut to quell MoD concerns.141 As a Russian newspaper noted, ”even just protecting assets from
hostile takeovers in the local market is extremely difficult without official status, support from the
Russian Foreign Ministry and the whole authority of Russia.”142 These hybrid arrangements suited
many of Wagner’s old clients. Even a source in Wagner acknowledged that African governments
were happy to have the Russian government involved in the contracts with Wagner, as it made
them feel more secure.143

5.4 Wagner seeks to regain autonomy

While Wagner rejoiced at having managed to carve out a short-term niche for itself within Rus-
sia’s new strategy, its longer-term prospects remained more ambitious. Even after the mutiny,
Prigozhin surely not only looked at his Africa business as viable but also tried to set it up on a
more autonomous footing, likely cutting out the Russian state whenever possible. For example,
Wagner started using UAE-based Kratol Aviation instead of Russian military aircraft, even if it is
unclear whether it was Wagner that rejected MoD support or vice versa.144

138 Interview with Wagner staff member, working on new contracts. (2024, May). [Interview carried out by the research
team].; Interview with Wagner commander on Central African Republic. (2024, April). [Interview carried out by
the research team].; Interview with member of Wagner Group‘s department of finance. (2024, February). [Interview
carried out by the research team].
139 Interview with Wagner staff member, working on new contracts. (2024, May). [Interview carried out by the research
team].
140 Interview with Wagner staff member, working on new contracts. (2024, May). [Interview carried out by the research
team].
141 Interview with Wagner commander on Central African Republic. (2024, April). [Interview carried out by the research
team].
142 Mardasov, A. (2023, June 30). What’s next for Wagner in Syria, Africa after Putin mutiny? Al-Monitor. Retrieved
September 2, 2024, from https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/06/whats-next-wagner-syria-africa-after-putin-
mutiny
143 Interview with Wagner staff member, working on new contracts. (2024, May). [Interview carried out by the research
team].
144 Faulkner, C., Parens, R., & Plichta, M. (2023). After Prigozhin: The Future of the Wagner Model in Africa. CTC
Sentinel, 16(9), 13–21.
 5.5. Wagner learning lessons? 33

Despite many departures, of February 2024 Wagner had 5,000 men and 600 contractors de-
ployed.145 Pavel Prigozhin saw further potential for interventions outside the MoD framework,
especially in areas that would be viewed as noncore in Africa. There were rumors of a possible
contract in Equatorial Guinea, for example.146 Opportunities might abound even in more geopo-
litically relevant areas. For example, according to a source in Wagner, the Malian government
was asking Wagner in spring 2024 to fully train the Malian armed forces, which would require an
expansion of Wagner’s presence.147 Here, however, Wagner would likely face an MoD veto.
A major issue, however, was the fact that for any operations outside the MoD framework,
Wagner could not count on MoD support, logistical or otherwise. To get around this, at least
partially, in early 2024 Wagner was discussing with different countries the possibility of purchasing
equipment there, especially helicopters. One such country was Pakistan, which has a number of
Russian made helicopters in its inventory.148 Overall, Wagner seemed to be trying to become more
autonomous from the MoD; one source mentioned Wagner now being able “to purchase drones,
rent planes, and purchase weapons.”149 How much equipment Wagner Group could mobilize
without MoD support remains debatable, however. In July 2024, a source within Wagner noted
how the relationship with the MoD was “getting better day by day” and noted with evident relief
that the MoD had just “provided two conflict choppers, weapons and ammo, and besides that, the
Russian defense minister promised that they would provide a cargo plane if needed to transport
Wagner fighters and logistics.”150

5.5 Wagner learning lessons?

Wagner nowadays accepts that it made mistakes in its operations in Africa and Middle East. The
Syrian experience, for example, where local powerbrokers felt undercut by Wagner, taught Wagner
to use subcontractors such as laborers, miners, guards and fighters more extensively in the CAR.
Wagner now sees value in working more extensively with subcontractors because that translates
into influence:151

We witnessed it in Syria, where Wagner Group was not interested in working with local
subcontractors, and it cost us a lot. So here in the Central African Republic, we want
to work with local subcontractors, and we want to expand our work with them… We
brought a lot of opportunity for the businesspeople, and they are happy with Wagner.152
145 Interview with member of Wagner Group‘s department of finance. (2024, February). [Interview carried out by the
research team].
146 Researcher and analyst, written notes shared on 30 May 2024.
147 Interview with Wagner staff member, working on new contracts. (2024, May). [Interview carried out by the research
team].
148 Interview with Wagner staff on Mali. (2024, February). [Interview carried out by the research teamn].
149 Interview with Wagner staff member, working on new contracts. (2024, May). [Interview carried out by the research
team].
150 Interview with Wagner staff member active in Africa. (2024, July). [Interview carried out by the research team].
151 Interview with Wagner commander on Central African Republic. (2024, April). [Interview carried out by the research
team].
152 Interview with Wagner commander on Central African Republic. (2024, April). [Interview carried out by the research
team].
 34 5. Outlook

In general, there was a feeling that Wagner Group should become more competitive. That
could also mean working with non-Russian partners. As discussed above, after the death of
Prigozhin, the Russian MoD took control of most of the companies linked to the group in Syria
and cancelled all the standing agreements with the Syrian government. Wagner tried to fight back
by opening talks with the Syrian government in alliance with Chinese firms, offering to run the
same contracts with a 10% share of the revenue, as opposed to the previous 25%.153 The idea
of working with China also surfaced during talks on taking over the security for various Chinese
projects in Pakistan.154

153 Interview with member of Wagner Group‘s department of finance. (2024, February). [Interview carried out by the
research team].
154 Interview with Wagner staff member, working on new contracts. (2024, May). [Interview carried out by the research
team].
 6
CONCLUSION

Prigozhin’s mutiny and demise last year had a major impact on both Wagner itself and the Russian
government’s plans for it. Issues and doubts were already emerging before June 2023, however.
While one can only speculate about what would have happened without those two fateful events,
they clearly accelerated the Russian authorities reckoning with the negative implications of relying
on Prigozhin’s “venture capitalism” model to conduct foreign policy.
The dilemma faced by Moscow was that Wagner Group quickly developed capabilities in areas
where the Russian MoD and other state agencies were lacking, but at the price of much-reduced
control and reliability. Without Wagner, Moscow would not have made major inroads in Africa.
Wagner dared to go places where Moscow was (at the time) very cautious and conservative. It
also bypassed the bureaucratic and organizational limitations of Russian state agencies. In these
regards, Wagner was an asset. At the same time, it was essentially driven by profit and the personal
ambitions of those involved, with the Russian state lacking effective means to supervise and control
it. Things were bound to go astray, and they did. The mutiny was an egregious case of Wagner
derailing, but there were growing problems elsewhere, first and foremost in Syria, where the Assad
regime was growing more and more skeptical.155
This dilemma took a new shape after Prigozhin’s demise. At that point, Moscow had a golden
opportunity to dissolve Wagner and either take over or hand over its projects to other nonstate or
semi-state actors as it pleased. But the unique or at least particular skills that Wagner demonstrated
remained as precious as ever. Though replacing Wagner in some roles proved feasible, there was
no appetite for taking over Wagner’s combat role in complex environments like Mali. The mutiny
also paradoxically restored some factor of plausible deniability around Wagner, incentivizing the
MoD to keep using it in the most troublesome contexts. Thus, after some months attempting to
figure out how to move on from Wagner, even the MoD ended up accepting that there was no real
alternative to Wagner in Mali and the CAR and that having Wagner take on the most controversial
jobs might continue to serve Moscow’s interests. Pavel Prigozhin appears to have been exploring
options for operating independently of the MoD, but in the end Wagner group might not need to
separate from the MoD completely.

155 Giustozzi, A. (2024, May 31). How the Wagner Group Lost Syria. RUSI. https://rusi.orghttps://rusi.org

35
 36 6. Conclusion

As for Wagner’s business empire, as of mid-2024 Moscow was still exploring options for
turning it into something looking less like a Russian version of the East India Company.156 Plans
were emerging, but none had really been tested by the time of this writing. It seems clear, however,
that Moscow would struggle with implementation, both on the ground and internally. They look
too much like Soviet development aid not to arouse opposition and suspicion in Russia, especially
at a time when resources are especially scarce due to the war in Ukraine.

156 The analogy has repeatedly been used with reference to Wagner Group from 2021 onwards.
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