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2024 SCC OnLine SC 2494

In the Supreme Court of India

(BEFORE SANJIV KHANNA AND R. MAHADEVAN, JJ.)

Civil Appeal No. of 2024

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 23320 of 2023)
Rohan Builders (India) Private Limited … Appellant;
Versus
Berger Paints India Limited … Respondent.
With
Civil Appeal No. of 2024
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 24489 of 2023)
Civil Appeal No. of 2024
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 26938 of 2023)
Civil Appeal Nos. of 2024
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 26990-26991 of
2023)
Civil Appeal No. of 2024
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 27353 of 2023)
Civil Appeal No. of 2024
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 1344 of 2024)
Civil Appeal No. of 2024
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2115 of 2024)
Civil Appeal No. of 2024
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 8131 of 2024)
Civil Appeal No. of 2024
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 12170 of 2024)
And
Civil Appeal Nos. of 2024
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 13975-13976 of
2024)
Civil Appeal No. of 2024 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No. 23320 of 2023); Civil Appeal No. of 2024 (Arising out of
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 24489 of 2023); Civil Appeal No.
of 2024 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 26938 of
2023); Civil Appeal Nos. of 2024 (Arising out of Special Leave
Petition (Civil) Nos. 26990-26991 of 2023); Civil Appeal No. of
2024 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 27353 of
2023); Civil Appeal No. of 2024 (Arising out of Special Leave
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Petition (Civil) No. 1344 of 2024); Civil Appeal No. of 2024 (Arising
out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2115 of 2024); Civil Appeal
No. of 2024 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 8131
of 2024); Civil Appeal No. of 2024 (Arising out of Special Leave
Petition (Civil) No. 12170 of 2024); and Civil Appeal Nos. of 2024
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 13975-13976 of
2024)
Decided on September 12, 2024
Advocates who appeared in this case :
Mr. Swarnendu Chatterjee, AOR, Mr. Nilay Sengupta, Adv., Mr. Ankit
Agarwal, Adv., Mr. Sujit Banerjee, Adv., Ms. Deepakshi Garg, Adv., Ms.
Mugdha Mallik, Adv., Mr. Nakul Dewan, Sr. Adv., Mr. Nirav Shah, Adv.,
Ms. Udita Singh, AOR, Mr. Soumya Ray Chowdhury, Adv., Mr. Bhushan
Panse, Adv., Mr. Satyender Saharan, Adv., Mr. Sathvik Chandrashekar,
Adv., Mr. Raunak Dhillon, Adv., Ms. Madhavi Khanna, Adv., Ms. Isha
Malik, Adv., Ms. Niharika Shukla, Adv., Mr. Jeezan Pakhliwal, Adv., M/s.
Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas, AOR, Mr. Soumya Dutta, AOR, Mr. Rajat
Joseph, AOR, Mr. Hrishikesh Chitaley, Adv., Mr. Vijay Kari Singh, Adv.,
Mr. Kaustubh Kadasne, Adv., Ms. Deeplaxmi Subhash Matwankar , AOR,
Ms. Deeplaxmi S Matwankar, Adv., Dr. Ravindra Chingale, Adv., Mr.
Ravi Kotian, Adv., Ms. Preetika Dwivedi, AOR, Mr. Sanjay Baid, Adv. and
Mr. Arindam Ghosh, AOR, for the Petitioner(s);
Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Sr. Adv., Mr. Samrat Sengupta, Adv., Mr.
Udayaditya Banerjee, Adv., Mr. Soumya Dutta, AOR, Mr. Siddhant
Upmanyu, Adv., Mr. Umesh Kumar Khaitan, AOR, Mr. Deepak Khurana,
Adv., Mr. Haren P. Raval, Sr. Adv., Mr. Abhishek Mehta, Adv., Mr. Milind
Kumar, AOR, Mr. Vikas Mehta, AOR, Mr. Apoorv Khathor, Adv., Mr. Ankit
Vashisht, Adv., Mr. Nishant Anshul, Adv., Ms. Madhumita
Bhattacharjee, AOR, Mrs. Debarati Sadhu, Adv., Ms. Srija Choudhury,
Adv., Mr. Anant, Adv., Ms. Sajal, Adv., Mr. Ashish Batra, AOR, Ms.
Aanchal Basur, Adv., Mr. Ivan, AOR, for the Respondent(s).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SANJIV KHANNA, J.:— Leave granted.
2. This common judgment decides whether an application for
extension of time under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation
1
Act, 1996 can be filed after the expiry of the period for making of the
arbitral award. The High Court at Calcutta in Rohan Builders (India) Pvt.
Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Limited2 has held that the application for
extension of time under Sections 29A(4) and 29A(5) of the A & C Act
can only be entertained if filed before the expiry of the mandate of the
arbitral tribunal. The High Court at Calcutta held that once the mandate
of the arbitral tribunal is terminated by afflux of time of twelve months,
or when so consented to by the parties after a further six-month
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extension, the power of the court to extend time under Section 29A(4)
cannot be invoked. A similar view has been taken by a Division Bench
of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in South Bihar Power
Distribution Company Limited v. Bhagalpur Electricity Distribution
3
Company Private Limited. However, a catena of judgments from other
High Courts have taken an opposite view. The High Court of Delhi in
ATC Telecom Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd.4,
Wadia Techno-Engineering Services Limited v. Director General of
5 6
Married Accommodation Project , and some other cases ; the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Nikhil H. Malkan v. Standard
Chartered Investment and Loans (India) Limited7; the High Court of
8
Kerala in Hiran Valiiyakkil Lal v. Vineeth M.V. ; the High Court of
Madras in G.N. Pandian v. S. Vasudevan9; and the High Court of Jammu
10
and Kashmir and Ladakh in H.P. Singh v. G.M. Northern Railways ,
have held that an application for extension of time limit for arbitral
award can be filed by a party even after the expiry of the term of twelve
months or the extended period of six months. Recently, the High Court
at Calcutta in a subsequent decision of the single Judge in Ashok
Kumar Gupta v. M.D. Creations11, on elaborated examination, has
12
concurred with this view.
3. For the reasons recorded below, we accept the view taken by the
High Courts of Delhi, Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, Bombay, Kerala,
Madras, and the subsequent view expressed by the High Court at
Calcutta in Ashok Kumar Gupta (supra). However, before we elucidate
our reasons, it would be appropriate to first quote Section 29A of the A
& C Act as it stands today:
“29-A. Time limit for arbitral award.—(1) The award in matters
other than international commercial arbitration shall be made by the
arbitral tribunal within a period of twelve months from the date of
completion of pleadings under sub-section (4) of Section 23:
Provided that the award in the matter of international
commercial arbitration may be made as expeditiously as possible
and endeavour may be made to dispose of the matter within a
period of twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings
under sub-section (4) of Section 23.
(2) If the award is made within a period of six months from the
date the arbitral tribunal enters upon the reference, the arbitral
tribunal shall be entitled to receive such amount of additional fees as
the parties may agree.
(3) The parties may, by consent, extend the period specified in
sub-section (1) for making award for a further period not exceeding
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six months.
(4) If the award is not made within the period specified in
subsection (1) or the extended period specified under sub-section
(3), the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate unless the court
has, either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified,
extended the period:
Provided that while extending the period under this sub-
section, if the court finds that the proceedings have been delayed
for the reasons attributable to the arbitral tribunal, then, it may
order reduction of fees of arbitrator(s) by not exceeding five per
cent for each month of such delay:
Provided further that where an application under sub-section
(5) is pending, the mandate of the arbitrator shall continue till the
disposal of the said application:
Provided also that the arbitrator shall be given an opportunity
of being heard before the fees is reduced.
(5) The extension of period referred to in sub-section (4) may be
on the application of any of the parties and may be granted only for
sufficient cause and on such terms and conditions as may be
imposed by the court.
(6) While extending the period referred to in sub-section (4), it
shall be open to the court to substitute one or all of the arbitrators
and if one or all of the arbitrators are substituted, the arbitral
proceedings shall continue from the stage already reached and on
the basis of the evidence and material already on record, and the
arbitrator(s) appointed under this section shall be deemed to have
received the said evidence and material.
(7) In the event of arbitrator(s) being appointed under this
section, the arbitral tribunal thus reconstituted shall be deemed to
be in continuation of the previously appointed arbitral tribunal.
(8) It shall be open to the court to impose actual or exemplary
costs upon any of the parties under this section.
(9) An application filed under sub-section (5) shall be disposed of
by the court as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be
made to dispose of the matter within a period of sixty days from the
date of service of notice on the opposite party.”
4. Earlier, the Arbitration Act, 1940, stipulated in its First Schedule
that the arbitral award must be made within four months from the date
of reference, or from the date the arbitrator was called upon to act by
notice, or within any extended time granted thereafter.13 Section 28(1)
of the Arbitration Act, 1940, empowered the court to extend the time
for making an award, irrespective of whether the original time had
expired or whether the award had already been made. As per Section
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28(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, parties could extend the time for
14
making an award by mutual consent. Prior to the enactment of
Section 29A, the A & C Act did not specify a time limit for making an
arbitral award. This was deliberate, given the fact that the First
Schedule and Section 28 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 led to litigation
and delay. Section 29A, as quoted above, was inserted by Act No. 3 of
201615 with retrospective effect from 23.10.2015. The Arbitration and
Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 aimed to ensure that arbitration
proceedings are completed without unnecessary adjournments and
delay.
5. Section 29A envisages two time limits for making of an arbitral
award. First, Section 29A(1) states that an award shall be made by the
arbitral tribunal within a period of twelve months. Secondly, Section
29A(3) stipulates that the parties by consent can extend the time for
making the award beyond twelve months, up to an additional period of
six months. Extension beyond six months, even by consent of the
parties, is not permitted. In terms of the Arbitration and Conciliation
16
(Amendment) Act, 2019 (Act No. 33 of 2019) , the time-limit for
making an arbitral award under Section 29A(1) is not applicable to
international commercial arbitration. As per the amendment made by
Act No. 33 of 2019, the twelve-month period commences from the date
of completion of pleadings under Section 23(4) of the A & C Act.
Earlier, Section 29A(1) had stipulated that the twelve-month period
would begin from the date the arbitral tribunal enters upon reference.
Section 29A(2) states that if the award is made within six months, the
arbitral tribunal will be entitled to receive such amount as additional
fees as the parties may agree.
6. Section 29A(4) is the provision which requires interpretation. It
states that where the award is not made within the specified period of
17
twelve or eighteen months, the mandate of the arbitral tribunal will
terminate. However, this provision does not apply if the court has
extended the period, either before or after the expiry of the initial or the
extended term. In other words, Section 29A(4) empowers the court to
extend the period for making of the arbitral award beyond a period of
twelve months or eighteen months, as the case may be. The expression
“either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified” is
unambiguous. It can be deduced by the language that the court can
extend the time where an application is filed after the expiry of the
period under subsection (1) or the extended period in terms of sub-
section (3). The court has the power to extend the period for making an
award at any time before or after the mandated period.
7. Section 29A(5) states that a party to the arbitration proceedings
can file an application in court for an extension of time for making the
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award. As per the second proviso to Section 29A(4), where an

application for an extension of time under Section 29A(5) has been
filed and is pending, the mandate of the arbitral tribunal shall continue
till the disposal of the application. Thus, the second proviso to Section
29A(4), by specific mandate, allows the arbitration proceedings to
continue during the pendency of the extension application under
Section 29A(5) before the court. Lastly, the extension of time is to be
granted by the court only for ‘sufficient cause’ and on such terms and
conditions as may be imposed by the court. We will elaborate on the
last aspect, and why this interpretation is preferable. First, we will refer
to the ratio and reasoning in Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra).
8. The core of the ratio and reasoning of Rohan Builders (India) Pvt.
Ltd. (supra) is based on the use of the expression “terminate” in
Section 29A(4). The judgment relies on the recommendations made by
the 176th Report of the Law Commission of India, which had suggested
using the term “suspend”. Juxtaposing the words “terminate” and
“suspend”, it is noted that the use of the expression “terminate”
reflects the legislative intent of terminating the mandate of the arbitral
tribunal upon the expiry of the specified period. Therefore, the
reasoning observes that on the termination of the mandate, the arbitral
tribunal becomes de jure incapable of performing its function. Along the
same lines, it is argued before us that, as a sequitur, and in view of
Sections 14, 15, 29A and 32 of the A & C Act, a party must file an
application for an extension of time to make an arbitral award before
the culmination of the initial twelve-month period or the extended six-
month period.
9. In our opinion, the aforesaid reasoning is fallacious and
unacceptable. Language serves as a means to express thoughts and
18
intentions. Words can have various meanings and connotations; thus,
an interpretive exercise must be conducted with careful consideration of
both the text and the context of the provision. Therefore, sometimes
the court eschews a literal construction if it produces manifest
absurdity or unjust results.19
10. The word “terminate” in Section 29A(4) has to be read in the
context of the said provision.20 It should not be read as an isolated
word with a strict dictionary meaning, but rather in conjunction with
the surrounding words and expressions which warrant recognition and
consideration. This evinces the legislative intent. Secondly, the
legislative preference for the term “terminate” over “suspend” is
apparent, since the word “suspend” could cause incongruity and a legal
conundrum if no party files an application for an extension of time. In
such a scenario, the arbitral proceedings would stand suspended ad
infinitum. Therefore, the legislature by using the word “terminate”
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intends to affirm the principle of party autonomy. Resultantly, if neither

party moves an application for an extension of time for making the
award, the arbitration proceedings are terminated. Consequences
follow. Clearly, the use of the word “suspension” would have led to
infeasible ramifications.
11. The word “terminate” in Section 29A(4) makes the arbitral
tribunal functus officio, but not in absolute terms. The true purport of
the word “terminate” must be understood in light of the syntax of the
provision. The absence of a full stop after the word “terminate” is
noteworthy. The word “terminate” is followed by the connecting word
“unless”, which qualifies the first part with the subsequent limb of the
section, i.e. “unless the court has, either prior to or after the expiry of
the period so specified, extended the period.” The expression “prior to
or after the expiry of the period so specified” has to be understood with
reference to the power of the court to grant an extension of time.
12. Accordingly, the termination of the arbitral mandate is
conditional upon the non-filing of an extension application and cannot
be treated as termination stricto sensu. The word “terminate” in the
contextual form does not reflect termination as if the proceedings have
come to a legal and final end, and cannot continue even on filing of an
application for extension of time. Therefore, termination under Section
29A(4) is not set in stone or absolutistic in character.21
13. An interpretive process must recognize the goal or purpose of
the legal text.22 Section 29A intends to ensure the timely completion of
arbitral proceedings while allowing courts the flexibility to grant
extensions when warranted. Prescribing a limitation period, unless
clearly stated in words or necessary, should not be accepted. Bar by
limitation has penal and fatal consequences. This Court in North
Eastern Chemicals Industries (P) Ltd. v. Ashok Paper Mill (Assam)
23
Ltd. observed:
“When no limitation stands prescribed it would be inappropriate
for a Court to supplant the legislature's wisdom by its own and
provide a limitation, more so in accordance with what it believes to
be the appropriate period.”
Courts should be wary of prescribing a specific period of limitation in
24
cases where the legislature has refrained from doing so. If we give a
narrow and restrictive meaning to Section 29A(4), we would be
indulging in judicial legislation by incorporating a negative stipulation
of a bar of limitation, which has a severe annulling effect. Such an
interpretation will add words to widen the scope of legislation and
amount to modification or rewriting of the statute. If the legislature
intended such an outcome, it could have stated in the statute that -
“the Court may extend the period only if the application is filed before
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the expiry of the mandate of the arbitrator, not after”. Indeed, there
would have been no need to use the phrase “after the expiry of the
period” in the statute. In other words, a rigid interpretation would
amount to legislating and prescribing a limitation period for filing an
application under Section 29A, when the section does not conspicuously
so state. Rather, the expression and intent of the provision are to the
contrary.
14. In our opinion, a restrictive interpretation would lead to rigour,
impediments and complexities. A party would have to rush to the court
even when the period of arbitral mandate of twelve months has not
expired, notwithstanding the possibility of a consent-based extension of
six months under Section 29A(3). Narrow interpretation presents an
additional challenge by relegating a faultless party to a fresh reference
25
or appointment of an arbitrator under the A & C Act , thereby
26
impeding arbitration rather than facilitating it. The legislature vide
the 2015 Amendment envisions arbitration as a litigant-centric process
27
by expediting disposal of cases and reducing the cost of litigation. A
narrow interpretation will be counterproductive. The intention is
appropriately captured in the following observations made in the 176th
Report of the Law Commission of India :
“2.21.1 (…) But the omission of the provision for extension of time
and therefore the absence of any time limit has given rise to another
problem, namely, that awards are getting delayed before the arbitral
tribunal even under the 1996 Act. One view is that this is on account
of the absence of a provision as to time limit for passing an award.
xx xx xx
2.21.3 (…) The time limit can be more realistic subject to
extension only by the court. Delays ranging from five years to even
fourteen years in a single arbitration have come to the Commission's
notice. The Supreme Court of India has also referred to these delays
of the arbitral tribunal. The point here is that these delays are
occurring even in cases where there is no court intervention during
the arbitral process. The removal of the time limit is having its own
adverse consequences. There can be a provision for early disposal of
the applications for extension, if that is one of the reasons for
omitting a provision prescribing a time limit, say one month. Parties
can be permitted to extend time by one year. Pending the
application for extension, we propose to allow the arbitration
proceedings to continue.(…)
xx xx xx
2.21.4 It is, therefore, proposed to implement the
recommendation made in the 76th Report of the Law Commission
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with the modification that an award must be passed at least within

one year of the arbitrators entering on the reference. The initial
period will be one year. Thereafter, parties can, by consent, extend
the period upto a maximum of another one year. Beyond the one
year plus the period agreed to by mutual consent, the court will have
to grant extension. Applications for extension are to be disposed of
within one month. While granting extension, the court may impose
costs and also indicate the future procedure to be followed by the
tribunal. There will, therefore, be a further proviso, that further
extension beyond the period stated above should be granted by the
Court. We are not inclined to suggest a cap on the power of
extension as recommended by the Law Commission earlier. There
may be cases where the court feels that more than 24 months is
necessary. It can be left to the court to fix an upper limit. It must be
provided that beyond 24 months, neither the parties by consent, nor
the arbitral tribunal could extend the period. The court's order will be
necessary in this regard. But in order to see that delay in disposal of
extension applications does not hamper arbitration, we propose to
allow arbitration to continue pending disposal of the application.
2.21.5 One other important aspect here is that if there is a delay
beyond the initial one year and the period agreed to by the parties
(with an upper of another one year) and also any period of extension
granted by the Court, there is no point in terminating the arbitration
proceedings. We propose it as they should be continued till award is
passed. Such a termination may indeed result in waste of time and
money for the parties after lot of evidence is led. In fact, if the
proceedings were to terminate and the claimant is to file a separate
suit, it will even become necessary to exclude the period spent in
arbitration proceedings, if he was not at fault, by amending sec. 43
(5) to cover such a situation. But the Commission is of the view that
there is a better solution to the problem.
The Commission, therefore, proposes to see that an arbitral award
is ultimately passed even if the above said delays have taken place.
In order that there is no further delay, the Commission proposes that
after the period of initial one year and the further period agreed to
by the parties (subject to a maximum of one year) is over, the
arbitration proceedings will nearly stand suspended and will get
revived as soon as any party to the proceedings files an application
in the Court for extension of time. In case none of the parties files an
application, even then the arbitral tribunal may seek an extension
from the Court. From the moment the application is filed, the
arbitration proceedings can be continued. When the Court takes up
the application for extension, it shall grant extension subject to any
order as to costs and it shall fix up the time schedule for the future
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procedure before the arbitral tribunal. It will initially pass an order

granting extension of time and fixing the time frame before the
arbitral tribunal and will continue to pass further orders till time the
award is passed. This procedure will ensure that ultimately an award
is passed.”
15. Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) highlights that an
interpretation allowing an extension application post the expiry period
would encourage rogue litigants and render the timeline for making the
award inconsequential. However, it is apposite to note that under
Section 29A(5), the power of the court to extend the time is to be
exercised only in cases where there is sufficient cause for such
extension. Such extension is not granted mechanically on filing of the
application. The judicial discretion of the court in terms of the
enactment acts as a deterrent against any party abusing the process of
law or espousing a frivolous or vexatious application. Further, the court
can impose terms and conditions while granting an extension. Delay,
even on the part of the arbitral tribunal, is not countenanced.28 The first
proviso to Section 29A(4) permits a fee reduction of up to five percent
for each month of delay attributable to the arbitral tribunal.
16. Lastly, Section 29A(6) does not support the narrow
interpretation of the expression “terminate”. It states that the court -
while deciding an extension application under Section 29A(4) - may
substitute one or all the arbitrators. Section 29A(7) states that if a new
arbitrator(s) is appointed, the reconstituted arbitral tribunal shall be
deemed to be in continuation of the previously appointed arbitral
tribunal. This obliterates the need to file a fresh application under
Section 11 of the A & C Act for the appointment of an arbitrator. In the
event of substitution of arbitrator(s), the arbitral proceedings will
commence from the stage already reached. Evidence or material
already on record is deemed to be received by the newly constituted
tribunal. The aforesaid deeming provisions underscore the legislative
intent to effectuate efficiency and expediency in the arbitral process.
This intent is also demonstrated in Sections 29A(8) and 29A(9). The
court in terms of Section 29A(8) has the power to impose actual or
exemplary costs upon the parties. Lastly, Section 29A(9) stipulates that
an application for extension under sub-section (5) must be disposed of
expeditiously, with the endeavour of doing so within sixty days from
the date of filing.
17. As per the second proviso to Section 29A(4), the mandate of the
arbitral tribunal continues where an application under sub-section (5) is
pending. However, an application for extension of period of the arbitral
tribunal is to be decided by the court in terms of sub-section (5), and
sub-sections (6) to (8) may be invoked. The power to extend time
period for making of the award vests with the court, and not with the
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arbitral tribunal. Therefore, the arbitral tribunal may not pronounce the
award till an application under Section 29A(5) of the A & C Act is sub-
judice before the court. In a given case, where an award is pronounced
during the pendency of an application for extension of period of the
arbitral tribunal, the court must still decide the application under sub-
section (5), and may even, where an award has been pronounced,
invoke, when required and justified, sub-sections (6) to (8), or the first
and third proviso to Section 29A(4) of the A & C Act.
18. While interpreting a statute, we must strive to give meaningful
life to an enactment or rule and avoid cadaveric consequences that
29
result in unworkable or impracticable scenarios. An interpretation
which produces an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute
if there is some other equally possible construction which is acceptable,
practical and pragmatic.
19. In view of the above discussion, we hold that an application for
extension of the time period for passing an arbitral award under Section
29A(4) read with Section 29A(5) is maintainable even after the expiry
of the twelve-month or the extended six-month period, as the case may
be. The court while adjudicating such extension applications will be
guided by the principle of sufficient cause and our observations in
paragraph 15 of the judgment.
20. We, accordingly, answer the question in the aforesaid terms. The
appeals are directed to be listed in the week commencing 30.09.2024
for final hearing and disposal.
———
1
For short, “A & C Act”.

2
AP/328/2023 and other connected matters decided on 06.09.2023.

3
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 20350 of 2021 and other connected matters decided on
26.04.2023.

4
2023:DHC:8078.

5
2023 SCC OnLine Del 2990.

6
ATS Infrastructure Ltd. v. Rasbehari Traders, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 8647, Power Mech
Projects Ltd. v. Doosan Power Systems India Pvt. Ltd., 2024:DHC:3769, KMP Expressways
Ltd. v. IDBI Bank Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine Del 2617, Reliance Infrastructure Limited v.
Madhyanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, 2023:DHC:5745 et al.

7
2023:BHC-OS:14063.

8
2023 SCC OnLine Ker 5151.
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9
2020 SCC OnLine Mad 737.

10
2023 SCC OnLine J&K 1255.

11
2024 SCC OnLine Cal 6909.

12
This Court while issuing notice in the Civil Appeal a/o SLP (C) No. 2115 of 2024 had
granted a stay on the operation of the common judgment in Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd.
(supra).

13
Paragraph 3 to the First Schedule of the Arbitration Act, 1940 reads:

“3. The arbitrators shall make their award within four months after entering on the reference
or after having been called upon to act by notice in writing from any party to the arbitration
agreement or within such extended time as the Court may allow.”

14
“28. Power to Court only to enlarge time for making award.—

(1) The Court may, if thinks fit, whether the time for making the award has expired or not
and whether the award has been made or not, enlarge from time to time the time for making
the award.

(2) Any provision in an arbitration agreement whereby the arbitrators or umpire may except
with the consent of all the parties to the agreement, enlarge the time for making the award,
shall be void and of no effect.”

15
Section 29A was inserted in the A & C Act vide the Arbitration and Conciliation
(Amendment) Act, 2015 (Act No. 3 of 2016) which read:

“15. Insertion of new Sections 29-A and 29-B.— After Section 29 of the principal Act, the
following new sections shall be inserted, namely—

‘29-A. Time limit for arbitral award.—

(1) The award shall be made within a period of twelve months from the date the arbitral
tribunal enters upon the reference.

Explanation.— For the purpose of this sub-section, an arbitral tribunal shall be deemed to
have entered upon the reference on the date on which the arbitrator or all the arbitrators, as
the case may be, have received notice, in writing, of their appointment.

(2) If the award is made within a period of six months from the date the arbitral tribunal
enters upon the reference, the arbitral tribunal shall be entitled to receive such amount of
additional fees as the parties may agree.

(3) The parties may, by consent, extend the period specified in sub-section (1) for making
award for a further period not exceeding six months.

(4) If the award is not made within the period specified in sub-section (1) or the extended
period specified under sub-section (3), the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate
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unless the Court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified, extended
the period:

Provided that while extending the period under this sub-section, if the court finds that the
proceedings have been delayed for the reasons attributable to the arbitral tribunal, then, it
may order reduction of fees of arbitrator(s) by not exceeding five per cent for each month of
such delay.

(5) The extension of period referred to in sub-section (4) may be on the application of any of
the parties and may be granted only for sufficient cause and on such terms and conditions as
may be imposed by the court.

(6) While extending the period referred to in sub-section (4), it shall be open to the court to
substitute one or all of the arbitrators and if one or all of the arbitrators are substituted, the
arbitral proceedings shall continue from the stage already reached and on the basis of the
evidence and material already on record, and the arbitrator(s) appointed under this section
shall be deemed to have received the said evidence and material.

(7) In the event of arbitrator(s) being appointed under this section, the arbitral tribunal thus
reconstituted shall be deemed to be in continuation of the previously appointed arbitral
tribunal.

(8) It shall be open to the Court to impose actual or exemplary costs upon any of the parties
under this section.

(9) An application filed under sub-section (5) shall be disposed of by the court as
expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to dispose of the matter within a
period of sixty days from the date of service of notice on the opposite party.’”

16
Section 29A was further amended vide the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act,
2019 (Act No. 33 of 2019) which read:

“6. Amendment of Section 29-A.— In Section 29-A of the principal Act,—

(a) for sub-section (1), the following sub-section shall be substituted, namely:—

‘(1) The award in matters other than international commercial arbitration shall be made by
the arbitral tribunal within a period of twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings
under subsection (4) of Section 23:

Provided that the award in the matter of international commercial arbitration may be made as
expeditiously as possible and endeavour may be made to dispose of the matter within a
period of twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings under subsection (4) of
Section 23.’;

(b) in sub-section (4), after the proviso, the following provisos shall be inserted, namely:—

‘Provided further that where an application under sub-section (5) is pending, the mandate of
the arbitrator shall continue till the disposal of the said application:
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Provided also that the arbitrator shall be given an opportunity of being heard before the fees
is reduced.’”

17
This includes the period of twelve months under Section 29A(1) and the extended period
of six months under Section 29A(3).

18
Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 716.

19
Babu Manmohan Das Shah v. Bishun Das, (1967) 1 SCR 836.

20
This Court in Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai, (2022) 5 SCC 1 at ¶66 held
that

“It is thus trite law that while interpreting the provisions of a statute, it is necessary that
the textual interpretation should be matched with the contextual one. The Act must be
looked at as a whole and it must be discovered what each section, each clause, each phrase
and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No
part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation.(…)”

21
Supra note 11.

22
Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla, (2016) 3 SCC 619.

23
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1649.

24
Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd., (1999)
6 SCC 82.

25
We have not examined and pronounced on the legal consequence when the proceedings
“terminate” in terms of Section 29A of the A & C Act and the legal remedy available to the
parties.

26
This Court in Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1 at para ¶94 held:

“The Arbitration Act represents the principles of modern arbitration, which seeks to give
effect to the mutual intention of the parties to resolve their disputes by a neutral third-party
Arbitral Tribunal, whose decision is final and binding on all the parties. Arbitration law allows
the parties to design arbitral procedures, which ensures efficiency and expediency of the
arbitration process. One of the reasons that business and commercial entities prefer
arbitration is because it obviates cumbersome judicial processes, which can often prove
expensive, complex and interminable. (…) It is the duty of this Court to interpret the
Arbitration Act in a manner which gives life to the principles of modern arbitration in India.”

27
See Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment)
Bill, 2015 inserting Section 29A.

28
Supra note 10.
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29
Franklin Templeton Trustee Services (P) Ltd. v. Amruta Garg, (2021) 6 SCC 736.

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