The Difficult Realities of the BRICS’ Dedollarization Efforts—and the Renminbi’s Role | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

7/16/25, 03:47

PAPER

The Difficult Realities of the BRICS’

Dedollarization Efforts—and the
Renminbi’s Role
As the BRICS bloc expands, efforts by BRICS policymakers to increase
global use of non-dollar currencies—particularly the Chinese renminbi—
are accelerating. Washington should take note of how frustrations with the
dollar are helping enable the rise of the renminbi in emerging markets and
motivating strategic partners like India to push for greater use of non-
dollar currencies.

By Robert Greene
Published on December 5, 2023

Introduction
The expansion of the BRICS bloc beyond its original members Brazil,
Russia, India, China, and South Africa should reignite focus on the group’s
long-standing interest in reducing the dollar’s dominant role across
emerging markets. At an August 2023 BRICS summit where Argentina,
Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
were invited to join the bloc, frustrations with the dollar were an
important topic of conversation. 1 Participants discussed how to make
BRICS local currencies’ use in commerce and finance within and between
emerging markets more attractive than the dollar’s use 2 —in other words,
how to dedollarize. 3

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For over a decade, such ambitions have been a focus of BRICS

policymakers. Yet, today, the vast majority of cross-border transactions
involving BRICS members and other emerging markets continue to be
invoiced in dollars. Exchanging BRICS members’ and recent invitees’ local
currencies with each other and with other emerging market currencies
often requires using the dollar as an intermediary to be done efficiently,
and a large share of public and private debt in these economies is dollar
denominated. In short, dedollarization faces serious headwinds. Will
expanded BRICS membership and a renewed focus by BRICS members on
increasing local currency usage change this dynamic? BRICS finance
ministers and central bankers were tasked at the August 2023 summit
with considering the issues of local currencies’ use and payments
infrastructure and to report back next year. 4

Notably, the past few years were marked by significant efforts by BRICS
policymakers—particularly in China—to meaningfully increase the use of
non-dollar currencies. Some efforts to expand the use of local currencies in
trade and finance, especially involving Russia and Iran, are clearly aimed at
creating financial channels less vulnerable to U.S. and European economic
sanctions. Yet other efforts are in response to economic challenges
associated with recent historic shifts in U.S. monetary policy and public
sector fiscal problems in emerging markets; BRICS invitees Argentina,
Ethiopia, and Egypt are all confronting destabilizing, economy-wide dollar
shortages. As Washington contemplates how best to respond to the
geopolitical implications of initiatives aimed at increasing local currency
usage across BRICS economies and the bloc’s recent invitees, it is
important to better understand the varied motivations behind these policy
efforts, as well as obstacles to greater usage of the Chinese renminbi and
other BRICS currencies in emerging markets.

The Dollar’s Role in Emerging Markets

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Unlike the world’s other currencies, the dollar plays a dominant role in
cross-border trade and finance across many “third countries” where it is
not the official currency. 5 Indeed, for many emerging markets, the dollar is
more stable and more commonly accepted as a medium of payment in
cross-border trade than the local currency. Exports from and imports to
emerging markets, particularly commodities, are often priced in dollars.
External debts in these countries are also often denominated and paid in
dollars, reflecting belief in the dollar’s future stability and widespread
acceptance. Relative to emerging markets’ local currencies, particularly in
the context of cross-border trade and finance, the dollar often much more
completely fulfills the four functions of money, serving as a widely
accepted: (1) medium of exchange; (2) unit of account; (3) store of value;
and (4) standard of deferred payment. 6

The dollar’s widespread use in these regards is self-reinforcing, preserving

its dominant global role and impeding efforts to dedollarize. Although the
expanded BRICS bloc would be comprised of countries whose economies
together are larger than the U.S. economy, 7 dedollarization efforts will still
face major headwinds, in part because of the relatively higher costs and
inefficiencies of using many non-dollar currencies in cross-border trade
and finance. Across emerging markets, the dollar is still the preeminent
medium of cross-border trade and remains integral to financial markets.

Indeed, data from 2022 indicated that the dollar was on one side of the
trade for over 97 percent, 95 percent, 94 percent, and 88 percent of Indian
rupee, Brazilian real, Chinese renminbi, and South African rand foreign
exchange transactions, respectively. 8 Data also indicated that in 2022,
globally, the dollar was on one side of the trade for almost 90 percent of all
foreign exchange transactions. 9 Currency pairs involving the dollar are
generally far more liquid and thus less costly to exchange than emerging
market currency pairs. Indeed, no well-functioning markets for directly
exchanging many emerging market currency pairs even exist. The dollar is
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therefore oftentimes used to facilitate exchanges between emerging

market currencies. 1 0 As a result, even when cross-border trade is invoiced
in a local currency, the dollar may ultimately play a role in facilitating that
transaction.

These dynamics help explain why dollars are often used instead of local
currencies in emerging market trade payments. For example, a 2022 article
noted that 86 percent of India’s exports were dollar-denominated, even
though only 15 percent of Indian exports went to the United States. 1 1
Forty-seven percent of China’s cross-border payments (and likely a much
higher percentage of cross-border goods and services trade payments)
were in dollars in 2023, 1 2 even though 2021 data showed that only 17
percent of its exports were bound for the United States. 1 3 Data suggest
that a disproportionately high share of South African exports are invoiced
in dollars (relative to the share of exports bound for the United States), 1 4
and nearly all Brazilian exports are invoiced in dollars. 1 5

The usage of BRICS local currencies for cross-border trade payments is

disincentivized by inadequate financial infrastructure, which impedes the
ability or increases the relative cost of these currencies being used in
cross-border transactions. One important type of financial infrastructure
is a payment-versus-payment, or PvP, arrangement, which helps lower the
cost and increase the confidence in exchanges of certain currency pairs. 1 6
PvP arrangements help ensure that the final settlement of a payment in a
currency occurs if and only if final settlement of a payment in another
currency takes place; this mitigates settlement risk, which is when one
party to a foreign currency transaction fails to deliver currency owed. 1 7
The rand is the only BRICS currency eligible for settlement by the world’s
dominant PvP arrangement, which is controlled by a Switzerland-
incorporated company that counts major global banks as shareholders and
through direct central bank relationships facilitates PvP transactions using
central bank liabilities. 1 8 This PvP arrangement reportedly accounted for
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over 40 percent of global spot foreign exchange trading volume in recent

years, and it can be used to facilitate trading of the rand against seventeen
currencies, including the dollar. 1 9

For the real and the rupee, local systems regulated by the Brazilian and
Indian central banks are able to facilitate PvP foreign exchange settlement,
but only against the dollar. 2 0 The renminbi’s ability to be transacted
through PvP arrangements is also limited; it can be transacted through a
Hong Kong-based PvP arrangement for which a British commercial bank
facilitates settlement against the dollar, the euro, or the dollar-pegged Hong
Kong dollar. 2 1 In addition, small, Chinese-government-run PvP
arrangements exist for some renminbi pairs with emerging market
currencies, including the Russian ruble. 2 2 Despite these arrangements,
data from a 2022 report suggested that around 20–40 percent of renminbi
foreign exchange transactions may be exposed to settlement risk. 2 3

Another factor limiting BRICS local currency use is that most of the global
commodity trade is priced and settled in dollars. 2 4 This inherently
bolsters the importance of the dollar in commodity-dependent economies,
such as Argentina, Brazil, Ethiopia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. 2 5
Indeed, the UAE and Saudi Arabia peg their respective currencies to the
dollar. Russia, despite extensive U.S. economic sanctions imposed against
its economy in response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, still used the dollar
to settle one-third of exports by the end of 2022 (though Russia’s use of the
dollar for exports and imports likely declined further in 2023, 2 6 and the
Russian government is taking steps to reduce its usage 2 7 ). 2 8

The frequent usage of the dollar in trade reinforces its use in finance. 2 9
This dynamic contributes to the dollar’s global dominance as a standard of
deferred payment. For example, in China, nearly half of external debts
were dollar-denominated as of December 2022. 3 0 Likewise, as of mid-
2022, over half of India’s external debts were reportedly dollar-

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denominated. 3 1 Data from 2021 indicated that approximately half of the

public debt of Argentina and Ethiopia was denominated in dollars. 3 2

Taken together, the above dynamics help explain why so many central
banks’ foreign currency reserves are in dollars, particularly in emerging
markets. Foreign exchange reserves are often used by emerging markets’
central banks to, among other things, facilitate the servicing of foreign
currency liabilities in the economy, ensure that the economy’s foreign
currency supply is sufficient to make essential external payments, and
influence or stabilize the domestic currency’s value. 3 3 Overall, in 2022,
approximately 58 percent of disclosed global foreign exchange reserves
were dollar assets. 3 4 In China and India, that figure was likely around 50
percent, 3 5 while in Brazil, it was reportedly over 80 percent. 3 6

BRICS Members’ Macroeconomic Concerns

About the Dollar
For years, senior BRICS policymakers have expressed concerns over the
macroeconomic impacts of dollar dominance on emerging markets. 3 7
These concerns have grown louder in response to unprecedented increases
in advanced economies’ interest rates. This dynamic, South Africa’s central
bank governor warned in April 2023, means that emerging markets “run a
serious risk of becoming permanently more prone to currency
depreciation and higher inflation.” 3 8 A November 2023 article posted on a
platform hosted by the leading Chinese Communist Party (CCP) political
journal stated that recent U.S. monetary policy choices created a “dollar
tide” that “seizes the wealth of other countries and forces developing
countries to bear the huge economic losses and financial risks brought
about by the hegemony of the dollar.” 3 9 A paper published by India’s
central bank in 2023 argued that there is an “inherent defect” of the dollar’s
global role, whereby the weakening of the U.S. economy results in
“disorder” and disproportionate losses outside the United States. 4 0

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These perspectives are notable given that three BRICS invitees—

Argentina, Egypt, and Ethiopia—are facing severe dollar shortages and
high inflation. Dollar shortages reflect an imbalance between the
economy-wide demand for and supply of dollars. 4 1 Dollar shortages in
Argentina and Ethiopia were so severe at times in 2023 that black market
exchange rates were reportedly nearly double the official rates. 4 2 In Egypt,
the banking system’s net foreign assets (a measure of foreign currency
shortages) hit a record deficit in June 2023. 4 3

High and increasing debt levels in these countries, against the backdrop of
rising advanced economy interest rates, make it difficult to successfully
address dollar shortages by issuing debt in dollars, as there is little investor
appeal. 4 4 Rapidly rising interest rates in advanced economies have also,
broadly speaking, attracted capital away from emerging market assets and
helped strengthen the dollar relative to emerging market currencies. 4 5
This relative strengthening, as well as the Russia-Ukraine war’s spillover
effects on food and energy prices, contributes to the surging cost of
importing dollar-priced commodities in emerging markets, 4 6 further
draining these economies (such as Argentina, Ethiopia, and Egypt) of
dollars and exacerbating inflation, as the scarcity of dollars constrains the
ability to import food and energy and thus drives up prices. 4 7 In October
2023, Argentina’s inflation rate was 143 percent, Egypt’s was 36 percent,
and Ethiopia’s was 29 percent. 4 8 (High government borrowing and
spending is another important inflation driver. 4 9 )

International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs intended to address these

issues are in place in Egypt 5 0 and Argentina, 5 1 and one is being
negotiated with Ethiopia. 5 2 However, key policy goals associated with the
Argentine and Egyptian IMF agreements have not been reached. 5 3 Also,
the IMF’s responses to emerging markets’ economic difficulties have long
been heavily criticized by some BRICS policymakers. 5 4 For example, in
August 2023, Brazil’s president criticized IMF programs for “suffocating”
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Argentina. 5 5 In June 2023, Chinese state media suggested that the IMF’s
current structure advances U.S. “financial hegemony” and increases the
debt burden of emerging market economies. 5 6

Interestingly, shortly after that statement, the IMF allowed Argentina’s

government to use renminbi credit made available by China’s central bank,
the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), to facilitate the partial pay down of
IMF loans, and an IMF official indicated that renminbi IMF debt
repayments could become increasingly commonplace. 5 7 In October 2023,
renminbi credit extended by the PBOC was reportedly again used to
facilitate Argentina’s partial IMF debt repayment. 5 8 Some BRICS
policymakers seem to see greater local currency usage and non-dollar
currency interventions as a remedy to dollar-related economic problems in
emerging markets. Indeed, India’s commerce secretary branded an effort to
facilitate an increase in rupee-settled transactions with emerging markets
facing dollar shortages as a way to “disaster proof” these economies; in
2023, Indian officials reportedly engaged in negotiations related to this
effort with Egyptian counterparts. 5 9

How Geopolitical Concerns Push BRICS

Members Away From the Dollar
Across BRICS countries, the dollar and the euro are increasingly viewed as
exposed to geopolitical risks associated with increasingly broadening U.S.
and European economic sanctions. Specifically, some emerging markets
policymakers fear that future U.S. and European economic sanctions could
suddenly shut off dominant dollar- and euro-based financial channels used
for transacting with important trading partners and/or be used to freeze
the dollar and euro assets of a particular emerging market’s central bank,
major trading partners, or political leaders. These concerns are helping
drive an embrace of local currencies. Policymakers appear particularly
troubled by unprecedented U.S. and European economic sanctions that

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froze half of the Russian central bank’s gold and foreign exchange
reserves, 6 0 as well as U.S. and European government actions that cut off
major Russian banks from the world’s dominant financial messaging
system, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
(SWIFT). 6 1

Indeed, in August 2023, South Africa’s president implicitly critiqued these

actions, expressing concern that “global financial and payment systems are
increasingly being used as instruments of geopolitical contestation.” 6 2 A
report published by India’s central bank was more explicit, stating that
India should explore alternatives to the euro and the dollar in part because
“having strong foreign exchange reserves . . . in an increasingly polarised
world [] no longer seems a sufficient defence against the threat of
economic sanctions.” 6 3 Prominent economists at top Chinese research
centers have cited concerns over U.S. economic sanctions when endorsing
the further build-out of renminbi financial infrastructure and greater
renminbi use. 6 4

BRICS invitee Iran is already subject to significant U.S. economic

sanctions. Importantly, along with China, India, and Russia, Iran belongs to
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which in May 2023 announced
the development of a road map to expand use of non-dollar currencies. 6 5
Remarks by Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested that these efforts
are driven in part by a motivation to blunt the impact of U.S. and
European economic sanctions. 6 6 Likewise, Chinese state media reported
that Ethiopia’s government was partly motivated to join the BRICS due to
threatened U.S. government economic sanctions against Ethiopian
leaders. 6 7

The Renminbi’s Rise as a Common BRICS

Currency

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Against the backdrop of geopolitical tensions and dollar shortages, new

financial channels built upon BRICS local currencies are increasing in use.
This is particularly the case for the renminbi, although it is important to
contextualize the renminbi’s growth. As table 1 indicates, renminbi cross-
border payments are still quite limited relative to the dollar, which
continues to grow in global use. Meanwhile, the percentage point growth
of the renminbi’s share of global central bank reserves since 2016 is nearly
identical to the Japanese yen’s growth(albeit from a much smaller baseline);
in 2016 the renminbi (in addition to the dollar, British pound, euro, and
yen) was included in the basket of currencies that make up the value of the
IMF’s foreign exchange reserve asset (called Special Drawing Rights, or
SDRs). 6 8

Table 1. Use of Renminbi Remains Limited Compared to Other

Major Global and Regional Currencies
Share of SWIFT transaction messages Share of allocated global central bank
(percentages based on value) foreign exchange reserves

August August Percentage point Q4 Q2 Percentage point

2016 2023 change 2016* 2023* change

U.S. dollar 42.50% 48.03% +5.53 65.36% 58.88% -6.48

Euro 30.17% 23.22% -6.95 19.14% 19.97% +0.83

Japanese 3.37% 3.68% +0.31 3.95% 5.40% +1.45

yen

Chinese 1.86% 3.47% +1.61 1.08% 2.45% +1.37

renminbi

*First and latest quarters for which renminbi data is available.

Sources: “World Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves,” International Monetary Fund, last
updated September 29, 2023, https://data.imf.org/?sk=e6a5f467-c14b-4aa8-9f6d-
5a09ec4e62a4&sid=1408243036575
5a09ec4e62a4&sid=1408243036575; “RMB Tracker,” SWIFT, September 2016; and “RMB Tracker,” SWIFT,
September 2023.

The renminbi’s growth in cross-border payments largely stems from

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transactions involving a Chinese party on one side; between 2016 and

2022, its use in China’s cross-border transactions grew from around 20
percent to approximately 50 percent (with dollar payments largely
accounting for the rest). 6 9 Trade payments to and from Russia are also
helping increase renminbi usage. Data indicated that in 2022, Russian
exports invoiced in renminbi grew from near 0 to 16 percent, 7 0 and
although most of the related payments involved Chinese firms, some
renminbi trade payments were between Russian entities and Indian,
Japanese, or Southeast Asian businesses. 7 1 Thus, like the dollar, the
renminbi is in some instances being used to facilitate transactions
between two entities from countries where it is not a local currency.

The renminbi’s growing global use is being aided by renminbi clearing

banks, PBOC bilateral swap lines, and the Chinese Cross-Border Interbank
Payment System (CIPS). Table 2 illustrates the extent to which these
instruments of renminbi internationalization exist across BRICS members
and invitees. Offshore renminbi clearing banks enable greater renminbi
usage by offering foreign entities renminbi accounts outside of China
serviced by local people and in the local language, while also allowing
those accountholders to, in accordance with the local legal framework,
settle renminbi payments directly through that clearing bank rather than
through a China-based bank. 7 2 The PBOC’s bilateral swap lines act as a
line of credit, allowing other central banks to exchange local currency for
renminbi with the PBOC, and enable greater access to renminbi within an
economy. 7 3 These swap lines are intended to facilitate local currency
usage in trade, 7 4 but they can also be used to address central bank foreign
exchange reserves shortages during times of crisis 7 5 and are empirically
linked with higher usage of the renminbi by third countries in cross-
border trade with Russia. 7 6 CIPS, which was launched in 2015 and now
counts over 100 direct participants and over 1,300 indirect participants
globally, 7 7 meaningfully improved the efficiency of cross-border renminbi

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transactions relative to previous channels. 7 8 Average daily CIPS

transactions reportedly increased by 50 percent in 2022 after Russia
invaded Ukraine, 7 9 and they increased by about another 25 percent in the
first three quarters of 2023. 8 0 Looking ahead, a number of recent policy
developments involving Chinese state-owned banks, PBOC bilateral swap
lines, and CIPS could enable further renminbi usage across BRICS
countries and invitees.

Table 2. Renminbi Financial Infrastructure in BRICS Countries and

BRICS Invitees
Bilateral swap line with Chinese state-owned Direct CIPS participant
PBOC previously signed? renminbi clearing bank exists within country?
present?

Argentina Yes Yes Yes

Brazil Yes Yes Yes

Egypt Yes No No

Ethiopia No No No

India No No No

Iran No No No

Russia Yes Yes Yes

Saudi Yes Yes No

Arabia

South Yes Yes Yes

Africa

UAE Yes Yes Yes

Sources: “CIPS全球服务,” Cross-Border Interbank Payment System, accessed October 23, 2023,
http://www.cips.com.cn/cips/sy/index.html
http://www.cips.com.cn/cips/sy/index.html; 中国⼈⺠银⾏, ”2023年⼈⺠币国际化报告,”
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/5114765/index.html
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/5114765/index.html; and Perez-Saiz and Zhang,
“Renminbi Usage in Cross-Border Payments,” 10 and 12.

Brazil’s first renminbi clearing bank was authorized by the PBOC in

February 2023 and recently began to settle cross-border renminbi

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payments. 8 1 Brazil’s sole CIPS direct participant (one of two in South

America), a Brazilian bank controlled by a Chinese state-owned bank, was
also established this year, 8 2 and in September 2023, the first ever direct
real-renminbi commercial transaction took place. 8 3 With the renminbi
accounting for over 5 percent of Brazil’s foreign currency reserves at the
end of 2022 (more than the euro, and up from zero in 2018), 8 4 it seems
quite likely that Brazilian officials will continue working to grow the
renminbi’s use in the country.

In Russia, about thirty banks had reportedly joined CIPS as indirect

participants by May 2023, 8 5 and there is seemingly pressure by some
Russian industry groups for more Russian banks to join CIPS. 8 6
Importantly, articles in Chinese media outlets have indicated that CIPS
indirect participants could begin to transmit payment instructions via
CIPS without using SWIFT. 8 7 (CIPS indirect participants generally use
SWIFT to send payment instructions to the system’s direct participants. 8 8 )
Were this to happen, Russian banks blocked from SWIFT would have an
important reason to use CIPS to facilitate cross-border payments in
renminbi. Similarly, were large Russian banks ever permitted to join CIPS
as direct participants (one large Russian bank already expressed interest in
doing so), the effect could be similar, as direct participants do not need to
use SWIFT to conduct cross-border payments. 8 9 Already, according to
Russia’s finance minister, 70 percent of China-Russia trade was settled in
renminbi during the first three quarters of 2023. 9 0 Russian companies
increasingly use renminbi debt financing, 9 1 and between January 2022
and March 2023 Chinese banks’ exposure to Russian banks reportedly
quadrupled. 9 2

The renminbi’s significance in Argentina also grew in 2023, although this

trend may soon slow or reverse. In June 2023, Argentina’s central bank
announced an agreement doubling its swap line with the PBOC to $10
billion. 9 3 It was through a PBOC swap line that Argentina’s government
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was able to facilitate partial IMF debt repayments with renminbi in

2023. 9 4 Argentina’s central bank also announced in June 2023 that it will
allow Argentine commercial banks to open renminbi-denominated
customer accounts, one week after its securities regulator allowed the
issuance of renminbi-settled securities in the local market. 9 5 Notably,
China’s largest state-owned commercial bank says that it maintains over
100 retail-facing outlets across Argentina, 9 6 and dollar shortages in 2023
were so severe that U.S. firms in Argentina were reportedly considering
the renminbi for payments there rather than dollars due to the
comparative abundance of renminbi. 9 7 Despite all these developments, the
election of Javier Milei as Argentina’s next president in November 2023
could lead to policies that stunt the renminbi’s growth in the country—on
the campaign trail, he pledged to dollarize Argentina’s economy, and his
foreign minister-designate has indicated the Milei administration will
reject Argentina’s invitation to join the BRICS bloc and end various
economic deals with the Chinese government. 9 8

In South Africa and Egypt, recent initiatives to increase renminbi use were
comparatively modest. In August 2023, a major South African bank and
China’s largest state-owned bank renewed a long-standing partnership
that facilitates renminbi use across fifteen African markets through,
among other things, short-term renminbi credit facilities and renminbi
accounts. 9 9 Similarly, in 2019, several of Egypt’s major commercial banks
were permitted to offer renminbi accounts to Egyptian businesses. 1 0 0 In
October 2023, Egypt’s government issued approximately $500 million
worth of renminbi-denominated debt (with a large Chinese state-owned
bank acting as the lead underwriter), and its central bank signed a
renminbi loan agreement worth approximately $1 billion with a Chinese
state-run development bank. 1 0 1

Perhaps most significantly, 2023 was marked by a long-anticipated deal in

November between the Chinese and Saudi central banks to establish a
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bilateral swap line, following high-level Chinese-Saudi discussions aimed

at facilitating renminbi oil payments to energy suppliers in Saudi Arabia,
which reportedly exports approximately 25 percent of its oil to China. 1 0 2
Also in 2023, two new Chinese state-owned bank branch offices opened
in Saudi Arabia, coinciding with memoranda of understanding and
agreements between Chinese state-owned banks and major Saudi firms, as
well as Saudi government entities, aimed at growing the renminbi’s cross-
border use. 1 0 3 An October 2023 list of foreign cooperation projects
released by the Chinese government in connection with its Third Belt and
Road Forum for International Cooperation included a renminbi working
capital loan project agreement with a Saudi commercial bank, as well as a
memorandum of understanding on global strategic cooperation between a
Chinese state-owned bank and a large Saudi energy firm. 1 0 4

The list also included a memorandum of understanding between the

PBOC and the UAE’s central bank on strengthening digital currency
cooperation, as well as a digital currency cooperation memorandum of
understanding between a Chinese state-owned bank and a large Emirati
bank. 1 0 5 An ongoing central bank digital currency project called mBridge
co-led by China’s and the UAE’s central banks reportedly piloted renminbi
payments for oil and gas in late 2022. 1 0 6 This project also aims to support
greater local currency use in cross-border transactions by enabling PvP
settlement between the Emirati dirham and the renminbi, among other
currencies. 1 0 7

As for heavily sanctioned Iran, the renminbi has reportedly been used to
facilitate China-Iran trade since 2012, 1 0 8 and a 2022 “25-year
comprehensive cooperation” plan between the countries will, according to
Chinese state media, “boost the status” of the renminbi in global trade
settlement. 1 0 9 During an early 2023 meeting in Beijing, Chinese and
Iranian officials reportedly again discussed growing the renminbi’s cross-
border usage. 1 1 0 In May 2023, Russian authorities were reportedly
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considering using the renminbi to facilitate trade with Iran. 1 1 1

The Usage of Other BRICS Currencies in

Cross-Border Trade
Compared to the renminbi’s growing global use in recent years, changes in
the share of cross-border payments made in other BRICS members’ and
BRICS invitees’ local currencies have been relatively smaller. For example,
SWIFT data indicated that the rand’s share of cross-border payments
remained quite low between September 2021 and September 2023, falling
from 0.33 to 0.28 percent. 1 1 2 (For comparison, South Africa’s share of
global gross domestic product, GDP, is around 0.6 percent. 1 1 3 ) Also, as
table 3 shows, although the respective dirham and Saudi riyal shares of
SWIFT cross-border trade finance payments (not all cross-border
payments) grew meaningfully since January 2022, overall levels generally
remain low, particularly when compared to the UAE’s and Saudi Arabia’s
respective shares of global GDP. Since January 2022, growth in these
currencies’ share of cross-border trade finance payments has been less
rapid than the renminbi’s growth in both absolute and relative terms.

Table 3. Selected BRICS Invitees Currencies’ Usage in Cross-

Border Trade Relative to China’s
Country currencies’ share of SWIFT cross-border trade finance Share of world GDP
transaction messages (percentages based on value) (based on PPP)

January September Percentage Percentage point 2023

2022 2023 change change

UAE 0.35% 0.41% 17.1% +0.06 0.51%

Saudi 0.37% 0.56% 51.4% +0.19 1.29%

Arabia

China 1.92% 5.80% 202.1% +3.88 18.82%

Sources: “GDP based on PPP, share of world,” International Monetary Fund, accessed October 24, 2023,
https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPSH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD
https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPSH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD; “RMB Tracker
Monthly Reporting and Statistics on Renminbi (RMB) Progress Towards Becoming an International Currency,”

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SWIFT, February 2022; and “RMB Tracker Monthly Reporting and Statistics on Renminbi (RMB) Progress Towards
Becoming an International Currency,” SWIFT, October 2023.

The data sources used to produce table 3 do not capture cross-border rupee
payments, but other data indicated that the rupee accounted for just 1.6
percent of foreign exchange transactions in 2022, 1 1 4 despite 2023 data
indicating that India’s share of world GDP being estimated at
approximately 7.5 percent. (By comparison, the same data indicated that
the renminbi’s share of foreign exchange transactions was nearly four
times larger and that China’s share of global GDP is two-and-a-half times
larger.) 1 1 5 SWIFT data also no longer capture ruble cross-border
payments, but data from January 2022, just before large Russian banks
were shut off from SWIFT, indicated that the ruble’s share of all cross-
border payments (excluding intra-eurozone payments) was 0.26
percent. 1 1 6 Interestingly, between January 2022 and mid-2023, the share
of Russian exports invoiced in rubles reportedly rose from roughly 10
percent to over 40 percent. 1 1 7 Yet the ruble’s use in import invoicing
appears to have declined modestly during this time, while the renminbi’s
use increased. 1 1 8

It remains to be seen whether the ruble’s use in exports will rise further, as
the renminbi could increasingly be used in trade with Russia rather than
the ruble. Indeed, data from a 2023 European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development working paper indicated that by year-end 2022 over 5
percent of Russia’s imports from third countries were invoiced in
renminbi, 1 1 9 and as mentioned above, officials have reportedly considered
using the renminbi in Iran-Russia trade. Nevertheless, several steps have
been taken in recent months to increase ruble usage among BRICS
economies and recent invitees. For example, in January 2023, the Russian
central bank reportedly began to publish an official exchange rate for the
ruble against the dirham and the Egyptian pound. 1 2 0 Yet given significant
U.S. and European economic sanctions targeting large Russian financial

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institutions, as well as the ruble’s volatility, 1 2 1 in the near- to medium-

term the ruble is unlikely to be used in transactions not involving Russia,
as is happening with the renminbi’s use by Russia and third country
trading partners.

Significant international usage of the riyal and the dirham is also currently
unlikely; the dollar-pegged nature of these currencies inherently limits
their attractiveness as tools of dedollarization. However, against the
backdrop of sanctions-related restrictions on the dollar’s usage in trade
with Russia, the dirham rather than the renminbi has reportedly become a
dominant currency of India-Russia trade, partially in response to Indian
officials’ discomfort with use of the renminbi by Indian importers. 1 2 2
Notably, the mBridge aims to make the dirham’s use as a payments
currency more attractive by mitigating foreign exchange settlement risk
through PvP transactions. Additionally, in September 2023, the UAE’s
central bank signed a bilateral swap agreement with Egypt’s central
bank, 1 2 3 perhaps to facilitate the dollar-pegged dirham being used to help
relieve Egypt’s dollar shortages.

India’s Nascent Efforts to Grow the Rupee’s

Use
As for the rupee, a report published by India’s central bank in 2023
endorsed much greater rupee use in cross-border trade and finance. It
noted that bilateral central bank currency swap arrangements could play
an important role helping achieve this end, suggesting that the PBOC’s use
of these arrangements provides a “blueprint for reducing the dependence
on the US dollar for settling trade transactions” without needing to
embrace full capital account convertibility. 1 2 4 The report also endorsed
local currency settlement agreements, which India’s central bank is already
embracing. In July 2023, the central banks of India and the UAE signed
memoranda of understanding aimed at promoting rupee and dirham use

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in cross-border transactions, and the Indian central bank has reportedly

since nudged Indian firms to use the rupee or dirham in cross-border
transactions with Emirati firms. (In August 2023, the Indian government
announced that a state oil company purchased 1 million barrels of oil from
an Emirati supplier in rupees.) 1 2 5 In September 2023, Indian officials
began negotiations with Saudi counterparts aimed in part at growing local
currency settlement in bilateral trade. 1 2 6 Indian officials also reportedly
seek to sign local currency settlement agreements with the governments of
Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. 1 2 7

Increased cross-border rupee usage could potentially be aided by the

growing number of foreign commercial banks permitted to have rupee
accounts at Indian commercial banks. By August 2023, the Indian central
bank had approved commercial banks from over twenty countries to open
such special rupee accounts with Indian banks, 1 2 8 up from just three in
late 2022. 1 2 9 Thirty-four Russian banks were reportedly permitted to
open these types of accounts across fourteen different Indian financial
institutions. 1 3 0 Despite efforts to grow the rupee’s use in India-Russia
trade, the currency’s volatility appears to be an obstacle to its expanded
use 1 3 1 and is leading Indian refiners to reportedly prefer using other
currencies, particularly the dirham, in trade with Russian energy firms. 1 3 2
Russian officials’ belief that economy-wide rupee accumulation is not
desirable, driven in part by concerns over rupee convertibility, apparently
contributed to a mid-2023 breakdown of India-Russia negotiations aimed
at facilitating greater rupee use in trade between the countries. 1 3 3

It is possible that the rupee could increasingly be used to facilitate India’s

growing imports from Iran. India’s imports from Iran reportedly increased
by 60 percent between 2021 and 2022 and by another 5 percent year-over-
year during the first half of 2023. 1 3 4 At a 2023 meeting with Indian
officials, Iranian officials reportedly raised the issue of increasing local
currency usage in trade. 1 3 5 Also, a May 2023 meeting in Tehran between
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Indian central bank officials and counterparts from Iran, Russia, and
various South Asian countries culminated in an agreement on how the
rupee could be used to facilitate local currency settlement via a mechanism
called the Asian Clearing Union (ACU). 1 3 6 An anonymously quoted
Indian government official stated that this transition to rupee usage will in
the long run mitigate the impact of recent U.S. government actions aimed
at curbing Indian banks’ involvement in ACU-facilitated transactions to or
from Iranian entities. 1 3 7

Conclusion
As the August 2023 BRICS summit made clear, efforts to increase the use
of local currencies are hardly limited to China. India’s central bank is
seriously working to advance the rupee’s use in cross-border trade and
finance, and the UAE’s central bank is taking steps to increase cross-border
dirham usage. At the same time, BRICS currencies face significant
limitations to greater cross-border use, particularly between third
countries. There are still major concerns over rupee convertibility and
volatility, which appear to be preventing its use in trade with Russia. In
Brazil and South Africa, currency volatility and the relatively small size of
these countries’ economies and financial systems detract from their
currencies’ ability to grow globally as payment mediums and stores of
value. 1 3 8 The ruble’s attractiveness in these regards is hampered by U.S.
and European economic sanctions against Russia’s financial system.
Overall, exchanging BRICS’ currencies with other emerging market
currencies can often be costlier relative to the dollar and can involve
settlement risk due to the lack of financial infrastructure that mitigates
such risk. As for recent BRICS invitees, their economies are heavily
sanctioned, are on the verge of currency crises, or have dollar-pegged
currencies.

Against this backdrop, the renminbi is by far the most commonly used

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BRICS currency, and a variety of policy efforts in 2023 involving BRICS

countries and recent BRICS invitees profiled earlier in this paper signal
Beijing’s aim to further grow the currency’s global use. Nevertheless, the
amount of renminbi available outside of China remains quite limited
relative to the dollar, 1 3 9 and the currency’s cross-border usage in payments
is greatly eclipsed by the dollar’s role (and it could be negatively affected by
a weakening Chinese economy). Also, it remains to be seen the extent to
which Chinese policies restricting renminbi convertibility will limit the
currency’s growing use in cross-border trade and finance. Some at India’s
central bank and some prominent Chinese state-owned bank officials do
not view these restrictions as a major impediment to meaningful growth
in overseas renminbi use in cross-border payments, because of tools like
central bank bilateral swap lines. 1 4 0 Yet some economists note that for the
renminbi’s global use to grow significantly without a major loosening of
restrictions on convertibility, then renminbi held outside of China must be
easily exchangeable into dollars and the Chinese financial system must
maintain access to sizable dollar reserves. 1 4 1 (As explained earlier, China’s
dollar foreign exchange reserves remain substantial, and the vast majority
of renminbi trading takes place against the dollar.)

Geopolitical tensions could also ultimately limit the renminbi’s uptake. The
CCP’s October 2023 Central Financial Work Conference signaled that
China’s leaders seek for the country to become a global “financial power,”
with Chinese authorities having more political influence over China’s
financial institutions as well as global financial system rules. 1 4 2 Already,
the CCP can exert significant influence over the state-owned banks that
control most offshore renminbi clearing centers and upon which growing
renminbi cross-border financial infrastructure relies. 1 4 3 The Chinese
government is also developing sophisticated economic statecraft tools, 1 4 4
which could ultimately be quite impactful against those who rely upon
Chinese state-owned banks to intermediate transactions or hold renminbi

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assets. In countries where significant geopolitical tensions exist with

China, policymakers may be reluctant to embrace the renminbi’s growing
usage for fear of renminbi assets being frozen and renminbi payments
channels being shut off (or surveilled) as tensions rise. Indian
policymakers’ recent concerns over Indian companies’ renminbi payments
in trade with Russia could perhaps be driven by such concerns.

Another area of uncertainty that will influence the growth in global use of
BRICS currencies—particularly the renminbi—is how Washington
responds to the range of policy initiatives aimed at expanding the use of
non-dollar financial channels. Some of these channels are increasingly
being used to facilitate transactions with regimes and entities heavily
sanctioned by the U.S. government, as evidenced by a 2023 remark by the
head of Iran’s central bank that “the financial channel between Iran and the
world is being restored.” 1 4 5 Complicating any U.S. policy responses is the
reality that strategic partners like India are involved in efforts to build out
and use such channels. Also, it seems unlikely that U.S. President Joe
Biden’s administration will take actions that meaningfully target Chinese
institutions’ ability to facilitate renminbi trade payments to and from
Russia; without the ability to pay Russian firms in dollars, many U.S.
strategic partners appear to be using these channels.

It also remains to be seen whether U.S. policymakers will put in place

meaningful U.S. policy efforts to address the severe dollar shortages facing
many emerging markets, outside of actions taken through the IMF and
multilateral development banks. In addition to BRICS invitees Argentina,
Egypt, and Ethiopia, significant dollar shortages are facing a wide range of
African, South Asian, and South American emerging markets. 1 4 6 As
explained in this paper, in certain emerging markets, interest in and use of
the renminbi seems to be occurring as a direct response to dollar
shortages.

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These dynamics all help illustrate why, as Washington considers how to

respond to the renminbi’s growing global use, it is important to not only
focus on the build-out of new financial market infrastructure for the
renminbi, such as digital currencies and CIPS, but also focus on why
economies outside of China may under certain conditions find the
renminbi (or eventually the rupee) an attractive alternative dollar. In the
months and years ahead, it will be critically important for Washington to
engage with policymakers in emerging markets around the world that are
considering efforts aimed at increasing the use of non-dollar currencies
and articulate a clear strategy for how the United States’ government and
private sector can and should respond to the dynamics motivating such
efforts.

Notes
1
Carien du Plessis, Anait Miridzhanian, and Bhargav Acharya, “BRICS
Welcomes New Members in Push to Reshuffle World Order,” Reuters,
August 24, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/brics-poised-invite-
new-members-join-bloc-sources-2023-08-24/
new-members-join-bloc-sources-2023-08-24/; and Chris Anstey, “The
BRICS and Their Dollar Dilemma,” Bloomberg, August 23, 2023,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2023-08-23/global-
economy-latest-brics-and-dollar-alternatives
economy-latest-brics-and-dollar-alternatives;

2
Anstey, “The BRICS and Their Dollar Dilemma”; and Paul Vecchiatto,
“BRICS Currency Was Never On Table, South African Finance Chief Says,”
Bloomberg, August 24, 2023,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-08-24/brics-
currency-was-never-on-table-south-african-finance-chief-says
currency-was-never-on-table-south-african-finance-chief-says.

3
As researchers at the IMF have explained, “[d]edollarization entails a mix
of macroeconomic and microeconomic policies to enhance the
attractiveness of the local currency in economic transactions and to raise

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awareness of the exchange-risk related costs of dollarization, thus

providing incentives to economic agents to dedollarize voluntarily.” See
Annamaria Kokenyne, Jeremy Ley, and Romain Veyrune, “Dedollarization,”
International Monetary Fund, Working Paper no. 10/188, August 2010, 3,
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp10188.pdf
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp10188.pdf.

4
“BRICS Payment System Would Not Replace SWIFT -S. Africa Finance
Minister,” Reuters, August 24, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/brics-payment-system-
would-not-replace-swift-safrica-finance-minister-2023-08-24
would-not-replace-swift-safrica-finance-minister-2023-08-24.

5
The euro also plays a dominant role in cross-border trade and finance
across some non-eurozone economies, albeit in many fewer countries and
generally to a lesser degree than the dollar. See Hector Perez-Saiz, Longmei
Zhang, and Roshan Iyer, “Currency Usage for Cross-Border Payments,”
International Monetary Fund, Working Paper no. 23/72, March 2023, 11–12
https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2023/072/article-
A001-en.xml?ArticleTabs=abstract
A001-en.xml?ArticleTabs=abstract; and “International Role of the Euro:
A Monetary Policy View,” ed. Drazen Rakic, European Parliament, study
requested by the ECON Committee, June 2020, 14–15, 37–39, 69–70,
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/207682/Topic%202%20Co
mpilation%20complete.pdf
mpilation%20complete.pdf.

6
F. A. Hayek, “Denationalisation of Money -The Argument Refined,”
Institute of Economic Affairs 55, no.1 (1990):
https://cdn.mises.org/Denationalisation%20of%20Money%20The%2
0Argument%20Refined_5.pdf
0Argument%20Refined_5.pdf.

7
“Gross domestic product 2022,” World Bank, 2022,
https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/GDP.
pdf
pdf.

8
Figures calculated using data from tables 4 and 5 in “Triennial Central
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Bank Survey: OTC Foreign Exchange Turnover in April 2022,” Bank for
International Settlements (BIS), October 27, 2022,
https://www.bis.org/statistics/rpfx22_fx.pdf
https://www.bis.org/statistics/rpfx22_fx.pdf.

9
See table 4 in “Triennial Central Bank Survey,” Bank for International
Settlements.

10
Recent research indicates that roughly 40 percent of foreign exchange
turnover for the dollar is driven by its use to facilitate the exchange of two
other currencies. Fabricius Somogyi, “Dollar Dominance in FX Trading,”
Northeastern University D’Amore-McKim School of Business research
paper No. 4067388, September 9, 2023,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3882546
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3882546.

11
Sauradeep Bag, “BRICS’ Reserve Currency: An Attempt to Reduce the
Dollar’s Dominance?,” Observer Research Foundation, September 1, 2022,
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/brics-reserve-currency/
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/brics-reserve-currency/;
and Javed Iqbal, Misbah Nosheen, and Mark Wohar, “Exchange Rate
Volatility and India–US Commodity Trade: Evidence of the Third Country
Effect,” Indian Economic Review, June 5, 2023,
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41775-023-00182-z
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41775-023-00182-z.

12
Bloomberg News, “Yuan Overtakes Dollar as China’s Most Used Cross-
Border Currency,” Bloomberg, April 26, 2023,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-26/yuan-
overtakes-dollar-as-china-s-most-used-cross-border-currency
overtakes-dollar-as-china-s-most-used-cross-border-currency; and
“China’s Currency Rises in Cross-Border Trade but Remains Limited
Globally,” Goldman Sachs, July 23, 2023,
https://www.goldmansachs.com/intelligence/pages/chinas-currency-
rises-in-cross-border-trade-but-remains-limited-globally.html
rises-in-cross-border-trade-but-remains-limited-globally.html.

13
“Overall Exports and Imports for China 2021,” World Bank, 2021,
https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CHN/Year/
https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/the-difficult-realities-of-the-brics-dedollarization-effortsand-the-renminbis-role?lang=en Page 25 of 51
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LTST/Summarytext
LTST/Summarytext.

14
See table 1, which reports that 52 percent of South Africa’s exports are
invoiced in dollars even though only 5 percent of South African exports go
to the United States, in Camila Casas et al., “Dollar Pricing Redux,” BIS
Working Paper no. 653, August 2017,
https://www.bis.org/publ/work653.pdf
https://www.bis.org/publ/work653.pdf.

15
Casas et al., “Dollar Pricing Redux”; and Daniel Gersten Reiss, “Invoice
Currency: Puzzling Evidence and New Questions From Brazil,” Banco
Central Do Brasil Working Paper no. 382, March 2015,
https://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/ingl/wps382.pdf
https://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/ingl/wps382.pdf.

16
Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, “Facilitating
Increased Adoption of Payment Versus Payment (PvP),” Bank for
International Settlements, March 2023, 6 and Graph 2,
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d216.pdf
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d216.pdf.

17
Marc Glowka and Thomas Nilsson, “FX Settlement Risk: An Unsettled
Issue,” BIS Quarterly Review, March 2022,
https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2212i.pdf
https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2212i.pdf.

18
“Currencies,” CLS Group, accessed October 28, 2023, https://www.cls-
group.com/products/settlement/clssettlement/currencies/
group.com/products/settlement/clssettlement/currencies/; and
“Corporate Governance,” CLS Group, accessed November 3, 2023,
https://www.cls-group.com/about/corporate-governance
https://www.cls-group.com/about/corporate-governance.

19
Somogyi, “Dollar Dominance in FX Trading”; and Committee on
Payments and Market Infrastructures, “Facilitating Increased Adoption of
Payment Versus Payment (PvP),” Graph 2.

20
Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, “Facilitating
Increased Adoption of Payment Versus Payment (PvP),” 11.

https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/the-difficult-realities-of-the-brics-dedollarization-effortsand-the-renminbis-role?lang=en Page 26 of 51
The Difficult Realities of the BRICS’ Dedollarization Efforts—and the Renminbi’s Role | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 7/16/25, 03:47

21
Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, “Facilitating
Increased Adoption of Payment Versus Payment (PvP),” 9–10 and Graph 2;
and HSBC and HKICL, “Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures:
Disclosure for USD CHATS,” June 2023, https://www.hsbcnet.com/-
/media/hsbcnet/attachments/products-services/transaction-
banking/payments-cash-management/principles-for-financial-
market-infrastructures.pdf
market-infrastructures.pdf.

22
“Notice on the Launch of CNYIDR Regional Trading in the Interbank
FX Market,” China Foreign Exchange Trade System, September 6, 2021,
https://iftp.chinamoney.com.cn/english/xgpIEN/20210906/2054153.
html
html; “China establishes yuan-ruble payment system,” Reuters, October 12,
2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-yuan-rouble/china-
establishes-yuan-ruble-payment-system-idUSKBN1CH0ML
establishes-yuan-ruble-payment-system-idUSKBN1CH0ML; and 王晓
泉, “中俄经贸合作中扩⼤⼈⺠币结算⽀付的前景与路径,” BRGG,
December 15, 2021, https://brgg.fudan.edu.cn/articleinfo_4388.html
https://brgg.fudan.edu.cn/articleinfo_4388.html.

23
Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, “Facilitating
Increased Adoption of Payment Versus Payment (PvP),” Graph 1.

24
Georgios Georgiadis et al., “Fundamentals vs. Policies: Can the US
Dollar’s Dominance in Global Trade be Dented?,” European Central Bank,
Working Paper no. 2574, July 2021,
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2574~664b8e92
49.en.pdf
49.en.pdf.

25
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
identifies these six countries, as well as Iran, as having commodity-
dependent economies based on 2019–2021 data and uses a threshold of
commodity exports accounting for 60 percent of total merchandise
exports. See “The State of Commodity Dependence,” UNCTAD, accessed
October 28, 2023, https://unctad.org/topic/commodities/state-of-

https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/the-difficult-realities-of-the-brics-dedollarization-effortsand-the-renminbis-role?lang=en Page 27 of 51
The Difficult Realities of the BRICS’ Dedollarization Efforts—and the Renminbi’s Role | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 7/16/25, 03:47

commodity-dependence
commodity-dependence.

26
Иван Ткачёв, “Минэкономики раскрыло степень «юанизации»
торговли России без учета Китая,” RBC, September 28, 2023,
https://www.rbc.ru/economics/28/09/2023/651465e49a79473740bd
3834
3834.

27
Bloomberg News, “Russia Wields New Regulatory Tool to Banish
Enemy Currencies,” Bloomberg, March 22, 2023,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-22/russia-
targets-dollars-euros-anew-by-varying-bank-reserve-ratio
targets-dollars-euros-anew-by-varying-bank-reserve-ratio.

28
Bloomberg News, “Russia Still Uses ‘Toxic’ Euro, Dollar to Sell Nearly
Half of Exports,” Bloomberg, March 9, 2023,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-09/russia-still-
uses-toxic-euro-dollar-to-sell-near-half-exports
uses-toxic-euro-dollar-to-sell-near-half-exports; and “China’s Oil,
Commodities Import From Russia,” Reuters, May 11, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/chinas-oil-
commodities-import-russia-2023-05-11/
commodities-import-russia-2023-05-11/.

29
Robert Greene, “Southeast Asia’s Growing Interest in Non-dollar
Financial Channels—and the Renminbi’s Potential Role,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, August 22, 2022,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/08/22/southeast-asia-s-
growing-interest-in-non-dollar-financial-channels-and-renminbi-s-
potential-role-pub-87731
potential-role-pub-87731.

30
“SAFE Releases China's External Debt Data at the End of 2022,” State
Administration on Foreign Exchange, March 2023,
https://www.safe.gov.cn/en/2023/0330/2061.html
https://www.safe.gov.cn/en/2023/0330/2061.html.

31
PTI, “India’s External Debt Declines by USD 2.3 Billion in Q2 FY23,”
Economic Times, December 29, 2022,

https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/the-difficult-realities-of-the-brics-dedollarization-effortsand-the-renminbis-role?lang=en Page 28 of 51
The Difficult Realities of the BRICS’ Dedollarization Efforts—and the Renminbi’s Role | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 7/16/25, 03:47

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/in
dias-external-debt-declines-by-usd-2-3-billion-in-q2-
fy23/articleshow/96603524.cms?from=mdr
fy23/articleshow/96603524.cms?from=mdr.

32
“Annual Public Sector Debt Portfolio Analysis for the Year 2021/22,”
Ethiopia Ministry of Finance, 2022, 16,
https://www.mofed.gov.et/media/filer_public/82/9a/829a0973-
048c-4347-8aa6-
3fe368a1c024/1final_ethiopias_dpa_no_23_2022.pdf
3fe368a1c024/1final_ethiopias_dpa_no_23_2022.pdf; and Paulina
Restrepo-Echavarría and Praew Grittayaphong, “Dollar-Denominated
Public Debt in Asia and Latin America,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
August 3, 2021, https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-
economy/2021/august/dollar-exposure-public-debt-asia-latin-
america
america.

33
John Nugée, “Foreign Exchange Reserves Management,” Bank of
England, https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ccbs/foreign-exchange-
reserves-management
reserves-management; and “Guidelines for Foreign Exchange Reserve
Management Accompanying Document and Case Studies,” International
Monetary Fund, 2005,
https://www.elibrary.imf.org/downloadpdf/book/9781589062610/97
81589062610.xml
81589062610.xml.

34
Carol Bertaut, Bastian von Beschwitz, and Stephanie Curcuru, “‘The
International Role of the U.S. Dollar’ Post-COVID Edition,” Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, June 23, 2023,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/the-
international-role-of-the-us-dollar-post-covid-edition-20230623.html
international-role-of-the-us-dollar-post-covid-edition-20230623.html.

35
A recent analysis finds that since 2015 “[a]fter netting out China’s
substantial holdings of U.S. equities, China’s holdings of U.S. bonds, after
adjusting for China’s suspected Euroclear custodial account, have

https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/the-difficult-realities-of-the-brics-dedollarization-effortsand-the-renminbis-role?lang=en Page 29 of 51
The Difficult Realities of the BRICS’ Dedollarization Efforts—and the Renminbi’s Role | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 7/16/25, 03:47

consistently been around 50 percent of China’s reported reserves.“ See

Brad W. Setser, “China Isn’t Shifting Away From the Dollar or Dollar
Bonds,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 3, 2023,
https://www.cfr.org/blog/china-isnt-shifting-away-dollar-or-dollar-
bonds
bonds. In March 2022, media reports stated that “the majority” of India’s
foreign currency assets are dollar assets. See Saikat Das, “Reason Behind
Rise in Foreign Currency Assets Despite Dollar Selling,” Economic Times,
March 15, 2022,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/finance/reaso
n-behind-rise-in-foreign-currency-assets-despite-dollar-
selling/articleshow/90208643.cms
selling/articleshow/90208643.cms. Goldman Sachs research identified
India as a country that at the end of October 2022 maintained $200 billion
to $299 billion in dollar currency reserves. (According to official data
reported in the press, India’s overall foreign exchange reserves were valued
at $524.5 billion in late October.) See Candice Tse and Simona Gambarini,
“Cause and FX: How the Strong Dollar Complicates Policy,” Goldman
Sachs, December 15, 2022,
https://www.gsam.com/content/gsam/us/en/institutions/market-
insights/gsam-insights/perspectives/2022/cause-and-FX_how-the-
strong-dollar-complicates-policy.html
strong-dollar-complicates-policy.html; and “India’s Forex Reserves Hit
Over 3-Month High, Rise for 4th Straight Week,” Economic Times,
December 9, 2022,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/in
dias-forex-reserves-hit-over-3-month-high-rise-for-4th-straight-
week/articleshow/96112887.cms/
week/articleshow/96112887.cms/.

36
Reuters Staff, “Yuan Tops Euro as Brazil’s Second Currency in Foreign
Reserves, Reuters, March 31, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/article/brazil-economy-fx/yuan-tops-euro-
as-brazils-second-currency-in-foreign-reserves-idUSL1N3632DU
as-brazils-second-currency-in-foreign-reserves-idUSL1N3632DU.

37
See, for example, “Brazil Blames ‘Monetary Tsunami’ for Rising Real,”
https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/the-difficult-realities-of-the-brics-dedollarization-effortsand-the-renminbis-role?lang=en Page 30 of 51
The Difficult Realities of the BRICS’ Dedollarization Efforts—and the Renminbi’s Role | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 7/16/25, 03:47

Reuters, March 1, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/brazil-

currency-rousseff/brazil-blames-monetary-tsunami-for-rising-real-
idUSE5E7KG05Q20120301
idUSE5E7KG05Q20120301; Michelle Caruso-Cabrera, “Banker
Showdown: Bernanke Tells Off India’s Rajan,” CNBC, April 10, 2014,
https://www.cnbc.com/2014/04/10/banker-showdown-bernanke-
tells-off-indias-rajan.html
tells-off-indias-rajan.html; and Lesetja Kganyago, “The Global Economy
and South Africa’s Challenges” (speech, Conference of the Industrial
Development Corporation, October 19, 2015):
https://www.bis.org/review/r151029f.htm
https://www.bis.org/review/r151029f.htm. Also, for years, BRICS
policymakers have worked to advance local currency usage across
emerging market economies. See Parv Aggarwal, “Barriers to De-
dollarization Within BRICS,” Fletcher Russia & Eurasia Program, February
1, 2021, https://sites.tufts.edu/fletcherrussia/parv-aggarwal-barriers-
to-de-dollarization-within-brics/
to-de-dollarization-within-brics/; “Delhi Declaration,” Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, March 29, 2012,
http://brics2022.mfa.gov.cn/eng/hywj/ODS/202203/t20220308_106
49515.html
49515.html; and “Xi Jinping Attends China-Latin America and the
Caribbean Summit and Delivers Keynote Speech, Comprehensively
Expounding China’s Policies and Propositions Toward Latin America,
Announcing Establishment of China-Latin America Comprehensive
Cooperative Partnership of Equality, Mutual Benefit and Common
Development, and Establishment of China-CELAC Forum,” Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, July 18, 2014,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/3376_665447/3
448_664958/3450_664962/201407/t20140722_594131.html
448_664958/3450_664962/201407/t20140722_594131.html.

38
Lesetja Kganyago, “Globalised Stagflation and the Emerging Market
Response” (speech, Peterson Institute for International Economics, April
11, 2023): https://www.bis.org/review/r230413c.pdf
https://www.bis.org/review/r230413c.pdf.

39
张忠胜 and 福佩吉, “共建“⼀带⼀路”倡议的原创性理论价值,”
Economic Daily, 求是⽹, November 3, 2023,
https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/the-difficult-realities-of-the-brics-dedollarization-effortsand-the-renminbis-role?lang=en Page 31 of 51
The Difficult Realities of the BRICS’ Dedollarization Efforts—and the Renminbi’s Role | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 7/16/25, 03:47

http://www.qstheory.cn/qshyjx/2023-11/03/c_1129955831.htm
http://www.qstheory.cn/qshyjx/2023-11/03/c_1129955831.htm.

40
“Report of the Inter-Departmental Group (IDG) on Internationalisation
of INR,” Reserve Bank of India, 2023,
https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/PublicationReportDetails.aspx?
UrlPage=&ID=1244
UrlPage=&ID=1244.

41
Raghuram G. Rajan, “Dollar Shortages and Crises,” National Bureau of
Economic Research, Working Paper no. 10845, October 2004, 13,
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w10845/w108
45.pdf
45.pdf.

42
Tadesse Simi Metekia and Messay Asgedom Gobena, “Ethiopia’s
Informal Currency Exchanges: Validate or Veto?,” Institute for Security
Studies, May 11, 2023, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/ethiopias-
informal-currency-exchanges-validate-or-veto
informal-currency-exchanges-validate-or-veto; and Belén Escobar,
“Dollar Blue Argentina: Black Market Exchange Rate Skyockets After
Primary Election,” Bloomberg Línea, August 14, 2023,
https://www.bloomberglinea.com/english/dollar-blue-argentina-
black-market-exchange-rate-skyockets-after-primary-election/
black-market-exchange-rate-skyockets-after-primary-election/.

43
Mirette Magdy, “Egypt Currency Squeeze Sinks Bank Foreign Buffers
to New Low,” Bloomberg, August 1, 2023,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-08-01/egypt-s-
currency-squeeze-worsens-as-banks-foreign-buffers-sink
currency-squeeze-worsens-as-banks-foreign-buffers-sink.

44
Mirette Magdy, “Egypt Lines Up $1.5 Billion in Funding With Capital
Markets Deals,” Bloomberg, October 12, 2023,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-12/egypt-lines-
up-1-5-billion-in-funding-with-panda-samurai-deals
up-1-5-billion-in-funding-with-panda-samurai-deals; and Colleen
Goko and Timothy Rangongo, “Ethiopia’s Eurobond Under Pressure as
Coupon Looms,” Bloomberg, August 2, 2023,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-08-02/ethiopia-s-
https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/the-difficult-realities-of-the-brics-dedollarization-effortsand-the-renminbis-role?lang=en Page 32 of 51
The Difficult Realities of the BRICS’ Dedollarization Efforts—and the Renminbi’s Role | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 7/16/25, 03:47

eurobond-under-pressure-as-coupon-payment-looms
eurobond-under-pressure-as-coupon-payment-looms.

45
Karin Strohecker and Sujata Rao, “The Dollar Problem: Emerging
Markets Count the Costs,” Reuters, May 11, 2022,
https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/dollar-problem-
emerging-markets-count-costs-2022-05-11/
emerging-markets-count-costs-2022-05-11/; and Duncan Miriri and
Marc Jones, “Analysis: Dollar Drought Haunts Frontier Economies,”
Reuters, June 29, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/dollar-drought-
haunts-frontier-economies-2023-06-29
haunts-frontier-economies-2023-06-29.

46
Strohecker and Rao, “The Dollar Problem: Emerging Markets Count the
Costs”; Rebecca Patterson, “The Dollar Has Joined the Commodity
Currency Club,” Financial Times, October 16, 2023,
https://www.ft.com/content/07b162c9-1b73-43fd-8c30-
9dfcea7e7eb5
9dfcea7e7eb5; Chelsey Dulaney, “Dollar’s Resurgence Is a Headache for the
Rest of the World,” Wall Street Journal, October 2, 2023,
https://www.wsj.com/finance/currencies/dollars-resurgence-is-a-
headache-for-the-rest-of-the-world-608e2f95
headache-for-the-rest-of-the-world-608e2f95; and Boris Hofmann,
Taejin Park, and Albert Pierres Tejada, “Commodity Prices, the Dollar and
Stagflation Risk,” BIS Quarterly Review, March 2023,
https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2303f.pdf
https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2303f.pdf.

47
Hofmann, Park, and Pierres Tejada, “Commodity Prices, the Dollar, and
Stagflation Risk”; Strohecker and Rao, “The Dollar Problem: Emerging
Markets Count the Costs”; Miriri and Jones, “Analysis: Dollar Drought
Haunts Frontier Economies”; and “Briefing: Argentina’s Debt Restructuring
and Economy Ahead of the 2023 Elections,” European Parliamentary
Research Service, September 2023,
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BR
I(2023)753938
I(2023)753938.

https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/the-difficult-realities-of-the-brics-dedollarization-effortsand-the-renminbis-role?lang=en Page 33 of 51
The Difficult Realities of the BRICS’ Dedollarization Efforts—and the Renminbi’s Role | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 7/16/25, 03:47

48
Valentina Romei and Alan Smith, “Global Inflation Tracker: See How
Your Country Compares on Rising Prices,” Financial Times, November 30,
2023, https://www.ft.com/content/088d3368-bb8b-4ff3-9df7-
a7680d4d81b2
a7680d4d81b2.

49
“Ethiopia’s Domestic Debt Skyrockets, Raising Concerns Over
Government Borrowing Practices,” Addis Standard, August 18, 2023,
https://addisstandard.com/ethiopias-domestic-debt-skyrockets-
raising-concerns-over-government-borrowing-practices/
raising-concerns-over-government-borrowing-practices/; and Patrick
Werr, “Analysis: As Deficit Soars, Egypt Expands Money Supply, Fueling
Inflation,” Reuters, July 14, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/deficit-soars-egypt-expands-
money-supply-fuelling-inflation-2023-07-14/
money-supply-fuelling-inflation-2023-07-14/.

50
“IMF Executive Board Approves 46-Month US$3 Billion Extended
Arrangement for Egypt,” International Monetary Fund, December 16, 2022,
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/12/16/pr22441-egypt-
imf-executive-board-approves-46-month-usd3b-extended-
arrangement
arrangement.

51
“IMF Executive Board Approves 30-Month US$44 Billion Extended
Arrangement for Argentina and Concludes 2022 Article IV Consultation,”
International Monetary Fund, March 25, 2022,
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/03/25/pr2289-
argentina-imf-exec-board-approves-extended-arrangement-concludes-
2022-article-iv-consultation
2022-article-iv-consultation.

52
David Herbling, “IMF Pins Ethiopia Funding Program on Debt-
Restructuring Progress,” Bloomberg, August 4, 2023,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-08-04/imf-pins-
ethiopia-funding-program-on-debt-restructuring-progress
ethiopia-funding-program-on-debt-restructuring-progress.

53
Eric Martin, Manuela Tobias, and Patrick Gillespie, “The IMF’s $43
https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/the-difficult-realities-of-the-brics-dedollarization-effortsand-the-renminbis-role?lang=en Page 34 of 51
The Difficult Realities of the BRICS’ Dedollarization Efforts—and the Renminbi’s Role | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 7/16/25, 03:47

Billion Argentina Problem Is About to Get Worse,” Bloomberg, October 6,

2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2023-10-06/the-
imf-s-43-billion-argentina-problem-is-about-to-get-worse
imf-s-43-billion-argentina-problem-is-about-to-get-worse; Mirette
Magdy, “Egypt Seeks to Boost IMF Loan to Over $5 Billion Amid
Currency Woes,” Bloomberg, October 13, 2023,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-13/egypt-seeks-
to-boost-imf-loan-over-5-billion-amid-currency-woes
to-boost-imf-loan-over-5-billion-amid-currency-woes.

54
See, for example, Benn Steil and Dinah Walker, “Is the BRICS
Contingent Reserve Arrangement a Substitute for the IMF?,” Council on
Foreign Relations, August 6, 2014, https://www.cfr.org/blog/brics-
contingent-reserve-arrangement-substitute-imf
contingent-reserve-arrangement-substitute-imf; and “BRICS Invite Is
‘Great Opportunity’ for Argentina, Outgoing President Says,” Al Jazeera,
August 24, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/24/brics-
invite-is-great-opportunity-for-argentina-outgoing-president-says
invite-is-great-opportunity-for-argentina-outgoing-president-says.

55
“BRICS Invite Is ‘Great Opportunity’ for Argentina,” Al Jazeera.

56
Song Wei, “Global Economic Governance System Should Not be
Reduced to a Tool of US Hegemony,” Global Times, June 22, 2023,
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202306/1292995.shtml
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202306/1292995.shtml.

57
Vincient Arnold, “Argentina: Emergency Liquidity Support Through
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Program on Financial Stability, August 30, 2023,
https://som.yale.edu/story/2023/argentina-emergency-liquidity-
support-through-chinese-central-bank-swap-line-and-qatari
support-through-chinese-central-bank-swap-line-and-qatari; and
Jorgelina Do Rosario, “Exclusive: Argentina to Use IMF Money to Pay Back
Part of a Currency Swap With China, Sources Say,” Reuters, August 24,
2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/argentina-use-imf-
money-pay-back-part-currency-swap-with-china-sources-2023-08-
23/
23/.

https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/the-difficult-realities-of-the-brics-dedollarization-effortsand-the-renminbis-role?lang=en Page 35 of 51
The Difficult Realities of the BRICS’ Dedollarization Efforts—and the Renminbi’s Role | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 7/16/25, 03:47

58
Jorgelina do Rosario, “Argentina Used China Yuan Swap to Pay the IMF
in October -Source,” Reuters, October 31, 2023,
https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/argentina-used-china-yuan-swap-
to-pay-the-imf-in-october-source
to-pay-the-imf-in-october-source.

59
Adrija Chatterjee and Ronojoy Mazumdar, “India Offers Rupee Trade
Option to Nations Facing Dollar Crunch,” Bloomberg, March 31, 2023,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-31/india-offers-
rupee-trade-option-to-nations-facing-dollar-crunch
rupee-trade-option-to-nations-facing-dollar-crunch; and Yeshi Seli,
“India, Egypt Call for Zero Tolerance Towards Terror, Discuss Trade in
Rupee,” New Indian Express, January 26, 2023,
https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2023/jan/26/india-
egypt-call-for-zero-tolerancetowards-terror-discuss-trade-in-rupee-
2541493.html
2541493.html.

60
“Russian Central Bank Plays Down Role of Dollar and Euro at Home
and Globally,” Reuters, May 31, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/russian-cenbank-
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61
Robert Greene, “How Sanctions on Russia Will Alter Global Payments
Flows,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 4, 2022,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/03/04/how-sanctions-on-
russia-will-alter-global-payments-flows-pub-86575
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62
Sumayya Ismail, “India ‘Fully Supports’ BRICS Expansion as Summit
Continues,” Al Jazeera, August 23, 2023,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/23/india-fully-supports-
brics-expansion-as-summit-continues
brics-expansion-as-summit-continues.

63
“Report of the Inter-Departmental Group (IDG) on Internationalisation
of INR,” Reserve Bank of India.

https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/the-difficult-realities-of-the-brics-dedollarization-effortsand-the-renminbis-role?lang=en Page 36 of 51
The Difficult Realities of the BRICS’ Dedollarization Efforts—and the Renminbi’s Role | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 7/16/25, 03:47

64
See, for example, “余永定：国际货币体系进⼊新历史阶段下，关于⼈
⺠币国际化的⼀些思考,” Sina, August 2, 2023,
https://finance.sina.cn/zl/2023-08-02/zl-imzeveku3973066.d.html?
from=wap
from=wap; and “刘晓春：‘正本清源’CIPS，它真的是SWIFT的替代吗？|
专家观点,” Sina, March 16, 2023,
https://finance.sina.cn/usstock/mggd/2022-03-16/detail-
imcwipih8803856.d.html?from=wap
imcwipih8803856.d.html?from=wap.

65
Xie Wenting, “SCO Working on Use of National Currencies in Mutual
Settlement, Says Secretary-General,” Global Times, May 10, 2023,
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202305/1290493.shtml
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66
C Krishnasai, “At SCO Summit, Vladimir Putin Calls for Trading in
Local Currencies to Blunt Western Sanctions,” WION, July 4, 2023,
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611896
611896.

67
Danny Haiphong, “The Rise of Global South Accelerates Decline of
American Exceptionalism,” Global Times, September 7, 2023,
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68
“IMF Adds Chinese Renminbi to Special Drawing Rights Basket,”
International Monetary Fund, September 30, 2016,
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NA093016IMF-Adds-Chinese-Renminbi-to-Special-Drawing-Rights-
Basket
Basket.

69
“Yuan Overtakes Dollar as China’s Most Used Cross-Border Currency,”
Bloomberg.

70
Tamar den Besten, Paola Di Casola, and Maurizio Michael Habib,
“Geopolitical Fragmentation Risks and International Currencies,” in The

https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/the-difficult-realities-of-the-brics-dedollarization-effortsand-the-renminbis-role?lang=en Page 37 of 51
The Difficult Realities of the BRICS’ Dedollarization Efforts—and the Renminbi’s Role | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 7/16/25, 03:47

International Role of the Euro (European Central Bank, June 2023):

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/ire/article/html/ecb.ireart202306_0
1~11d437be4d.en.html
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71
Akira Yamashita and Kosuke Takami, “Russia Pays Sakhalin Dividends
in Chinese Yuan,” Nikkei, June 15, 2023,
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dividends-in-Chinese-yuan
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Official Says,” Reuters, July 14, 2023,
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guidance-resolve-rupee-trade-issues-official-2023-07-14/
guidance-resolve-rupee-trade-issues-official-2023-07-14/; and Maxim
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papers/exorbitant-privilege-and-economic-sanctions
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72
Hector Perez-Saiz and Longmei Zhang, “Renminbi Usage in Cross-
Border Payments: Regional Patterns and the Role of Swaps Lines and
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pdf.ashx
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73
Greene, “Southeast Asia’s Growing Interest in Non-dollar Financial
Channels”; and Joe Cash, “China, Saudi Arabia Sign Currency Swap
Agreement,” Reuters, November 20, 2023,
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central-banks-sign-local-currency-swap-agreement-2023-11-20
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74
“2022 RMB Internationalization Report,” People’s Bank of China, 2023,
40,

https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/the-difficult-realities-of-the-brics-dedollarization-effortsand-the-renminbis-role?lang=en Page 38 of 51
The Difficult Realities of the BRICS’ Dedollarization Efforts—and the Renminbi’s Role | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 7/16/25, 03:47

http://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/4666144/202
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75
Arnold, “Argentina: Emergency Liquidity Support Through Chinese
Central Bank Swap Line and Qatari SDR Loan”; and Jason Douglas, “China
Props Up Belt-and-Road Borrowers Via Unusual Channel,” Wall Street
Journal, December 11, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-
props-up-belt-and-road-borrowers-via-unusual-channel-11670727153
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76
Chupilkin, Peeva, and Plekhanov, “Exorbitant Privilege and Economic
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77
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October 23, 2023, http://www.cips.com.cn/cips/sy/index.html
http://www.cips.com.cn/cips/sy/index.html; and
Greene, “Southeast Asia’s Growing Interest in Non-dollar Financial
Channels.”

78
Greene, “Southeast Asia’s Growing Interest in Non-dollar Financial
Channels.”

79
Haruki Kitagawa and Akira Inujima, “Russia Speeds Shift to Ruble and
Yuan as Sanctions Bite,” Nikkei, February 23, 2023,
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speeds-shift-to-ruble-and-yuan-as-sanctions-bite
speeds-shift-to-ruble-and-yuan-as-sanctions-bite.

80
About 21,000 average daily CIPS transactions were reported in January
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81
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The Difficult Realities of the BRICS’ Dedollarization Efforts—and the Renminbi’s Role | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 7/16/25, 03:47

https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202304/12/WS64366b3fa31057c47
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82
Bloomberg News, “Brazil Takes Steps to Transact in Yuan as China Ties
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steps-to-transact-in-yuan-as-ties-with-china-grow
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83
“China, Brazil Trade in Local Currencies for First Time,” Xinhua, October
5, 2023,
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2a8/c.html
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84
Reuters Staff, “Yuan Tops Euro as Brazil’s Second Currency in Foreign
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85
Наталья Заруцкая, “Косвенными участниками китайской системы
CIPS стали 30 российских банков,” Vedomosti, May 26, 2023,
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kosvennimi-uchastnikami-kitaiskoi-sistemi-cips-stali-30-rossiiskih-
bankov
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86
Reuters Staff, “Russia Should Use China’s CIPS Platform to Resolve
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head-idUKL8N3873HF
head-idUKL8N3873HF.

87
南⽣, “SWIFT系统内是2.19%，加上CIPS，⼈⺠币国际⽀付⽐例能有
多少呢?,” Sina, April 13, 2023, https://finance.sina.com.cn/wm/2023-
04-13/doc-imyqfnhh6882419.shtml?cref=cj
04-13/doc-imyqfnhh6882419.shtml?cref=cj; and 南⽣, “CIPS直接参与

https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/the-difficult-realities-of-the-brics-dedollarization-effortsand-the-renminbis-role?lang=en Page 40 of 51
The Difficult Realities of the BRICS’ Dedollarization Efforts—and the Renminbi’s Role | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 7/16/25, 03:47

者占⽐超6%，与SWIFT统计的⼈⺠币重叠量预计降⾄90%,” 163.com,
July 8, 2023,
https://www.163.com/dy/article/I95F0UIM0517BT3G.html
https://www.163.com/dy/article/I95F0UIM0517BT3G.html.

88
Greene, “Southeast Asia’s Growing Interest in Non-dollar Financial
Channels.”

89
Greene, “Southeast Asia’s Growing Interest in Non-dollar Financial
Channels”; and Frank Chen and Frank Tang, “Russia’s Sanctioned VTB
Bank Wants to Build Ships With China, Defiant CEO Says on Trip With
Putin in Beijing,” South China Morning Post, October 23, 2023,
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-
economy/article/3238885/russias-sanctioned-vtb-bank-wants-build-
ships-china-defiant-ceo-says-trip-putin-beijing
ships-china-defiant-ceo-says-trip-putin-beijing.

90
Решетников заявил, “что доля национальных валют в торговых
расчетах РФ и Китая достигла 90%,” TASS, September 19, 2023,
https://tass.ru/ekonomika/18783091
https://tass.ru/ekonomika/18783091.

91
“Russian Companies Shift to Yuan as Flight From Dollar Accelerates,”
Nikkei, September 14, 2022,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Markets/Currencies/Russian-
companies-shift-to-yuan-as-flight-from-dollar-accelerates
companies-shift-to-yuan-as-flight-from-dollar-accelerates; and Barry
Eichengreen, “What It Will Take to Reshape the Global Monetary Order,”
Japan Times, March 26, 2023,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2023/03/26/commentary/wo
rld-commentary/chinese-yuan-payments
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92
Owen Walker and Cheng Leng, “Chinese Lenders Extend Billions of
Dollars to Russian Banks After Western Sanctions,” Financial Times,
September 3, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/96349a26-d868-
4bd1-948f-b17f87cc5c72
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https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/the-difficult-realities-of-the-brics-dedollarization-effortsand-the-renminbis-role?lang=en Page 41 of 51
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93
Eliana Raszewski, “Argentina Doubles China Currency Swap Access to
$10 Bln,” Reuters, June 2, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/argentina-renew-
expand-china-currency-swap-line-2023-06-02/
expand-china-currency-swap-line-2023-06-02/.

94
See notes 57 and 58 and accompanying text.

95
Ignacio Olivera Doll, “Argentina’s Central Bank Allows Banks to Open
Accounts in Yuan,” Bloomberg, June 29, 2023,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-29/argentina-s-
central-bank-allows-banks-to-open-accounts-in-yuan
central-bank-allows-banks-to-open-accounts-in-yuan.

96
ICBC, “ICBC Argentina,” accessed November 5, 2023,
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97
Patrick Gillespie and Ignacio Olivera Doll, “Dollars Are So Scarce in
Argentina That Yuan Use Is at a Record,” Bloomberg, June 23, 2023,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-23/whirlpool-
among-firms-in-argentina-considering-china-yuan-on-us-dollar-
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98
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to Milei,” Voice of America, December 1, 2023,
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s-personal-letter-to-milei/7380722.html
s-personal-letter-to-milei/7380722.html; Ryan Woo, “China Ready to
Work With Argentina Despite President-Elect Milei’s Criticism,” Reuters,
November 21, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/china-says-
would-be-serious-mistake-if-argentina-cuts-ties-2023-11-21/
would-be-serious-mistake-if-argentina-cuts-ties-2023-11-21/; and
Kevin Simauchi, Ignacio Olivera Doll, and Carolina Wilson, “Milei’s Bold
Idea Passes Test as Argentine Banks Reopen,” Bloomberg, November 20,
2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-20/milei-
s-dollarization-gets-first-test-as-argentine-banks-reopen
s-dollarization-gets-first-test-as-argentine-banks-reopen.

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and-insights/whats-happening/news/standard-bank-and-icbc-
celebrate-15%E2%80%93year-partnership
celebrate-15%E2%80%93year-partnership; and Standard Bank of South
Africa, “Standard Bank’s Africa-China Trade Corridor Links Africa and
China in World’s Next Big Growth Partnership,” ATMIA, December 13,
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100
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101
“Egypt Issues Africa’s First Sustainable Panda Bond Worth 3.5 billion
RMB Backed by African Development Bank and Asian Infrastructure
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issues-africas-first-sustainable-panda-bond-worth-35-billion-rmb-
backed-african-development-bank-and-asian-infrastructure-
investment-bank-65097
investment-bank-65097; and “Central Bank of Egypt Secures $956.6 Mln
Loan From China Development Bank,” Egyptian State Information Service,
November 1, 2023, https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/189601/Central-
Bank-of-Egypt-secures-%24956.6-mln-loan-from-China-
Development-Bank?lang=en-us
Development-Bank?lang=en-us.

102
Cash, “China, Saudi Arabia Sign Currency Swap Agreement”; Summer
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of Dollars for Chinese Oil Sales,” Wall Street Journal, March 15, 2022,
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yuan-instead-of-dollars-for-chinese-oil-sales-11647351541
yuan-instead-of-dollars-for-chinese-oil-sales-11647351541; Qin

https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/the-difficult-realities-of-the-brics-dedollarization-effortsand-the-renminbis-role?lang=en Page 43 of 51
The Difficult Realities of the BRICS’ Dedollarization Efforts—and the Renminbi’s Role | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 7/16/25, 03:47

Haifeng, “China Makes Constant Progress in RMB Internationalization,”

People’s Daily, June 2, 2023, http://en.people.cn/n3/2023/0602/c90000-
20026929.html
20026929.html; and Maha El Dahan and Aziz El Yaakoubi, “China’s Xi
Calls for Oil Trade in Yuan at Gulf Summit in Riyadh,” Reuters, December
10, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/saudi-arabia-gathers-
chinas-xi-with-arab-leaders-new-era-ties-2022-12-09/
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103
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https://english.news.cn/20230517/c9a9f264be0c4d7cbc0382a2c530aa
fc/c.html
fc/c.html; and Kinling Lo, “China, Saudi Arabia Enter ‘New Stage’ of
Financial Cooperation as State-Owned Bank Opens Riyadh Branch,” South
China Morning Post, September 6, 2023,
https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-
economy/article/3233565/china-saudi-arabia-enter-new-stage-
financial-cooperation-state-owned-bank-opens-riyadh-branch
financial-cooperation-state-owned-bank-opens-riyadh-branch.

104
Xinhua, “第三届 ‘⼀带⼀路’ 国际合作⾼峰论坛务实合作项⽬清单
（附件⼆全⽂),” State Council of the People’s Republic of China, October
18, 2023,
https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202310/content_6910130.htm
https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202310/content_6910130.htm.

105
Xinhua, “第三届 ‘⼀带⼀路’ 国际合作⾼峰论坛务实合作项⽬清单
（附件⼆全⽂).”

106
“How MBridge Cross Border CBDC Encourages Foreign Digital Yuan
Use,” Ledger Insights, November 1, 2022,
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yuan
yuan.

107
“Project mBridge: Connecting Economies Through CBDC,” BIS,
October 2022, https://www.bis.org/publ/othp59.pdf
https://www.bis.org/publ/othp59.pdf.

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108
Henry Sender, “Iran Accepts Renminbi for Crude Oil,” Financial Times,
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00144feab49a
00144feab49a.

109
“GT Voice: China’s Yuan Set to Play a Larger Role in Trade Settlement,”
Global Times, January 16, 2022,
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202201/1246080.shtml
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202201/1246080.shtml.

110
“Iran, China Discuss Boosting Trade in National Currencies,” Financial
Tribune, February 21, 2023,
https://financialtribune.com/articles/business-and-
markets/117207/iran-china-discuss-boosting-trade-in-national-
currencies
currencies.

111
“Russia and Iran Conducting Around 80% of Settlements in National
Currencies, Considered Yuan,” Interfax, May 17, 2023,
https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/90588/
https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/90588/.

112
“RMB Tracker Monthly Reporting and Statistics on Renminbi (RMB)
Progress Towards Becoming an International Currency,” SWIFT, October
2023; and “RMB Tracker Monthly Reporting and Statistics on Renminbi
(RMB) Progress Towards Becoming an International Currency,” October
2021.

113
“GDP Based on PPP, Share of World,” International Monetary Fund,
accessed October 24, 2023.

114
See table 4 in “Triennial Central Bank Survey,” Bank for International
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115
“GDP Based on PPP, Share of World,” International Monetary Fund,
accessed October 24, 2023.

116
“RMB Tracker Monthly Reporting and Statistics on Renminbi (RMB)
https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/the-difficult-realities-of-the-brics-dedollarization-effortsand-the-renminbis-role?lang=en Page 45 of 51
The Difficult Realities of the BRICS’ Dedollarization Efforts—and the Renminbi’s Role | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 7/16/25, 03:47

Progress Towards Becoming an International Currency,” SWIFT, February

2022.

117
“Share of Rubles in Russian Exports Totals 41% in July — Minister,”
TASS, September 8, 2023, https://tass.com/economy/1681807
https://tass.com/economy/1681807; and Den
Besten, Di Casola, and Habib, “Geopolitical Fragmentation Risks and
International Currencies.”

118
Chupilkin Beata Javorcik, Peeva, and Plekhanov, “Exorbitant Privilege
and Economic Sanctions,” 8 and figure 2.

119
Chupilkin Beata Javorcik, Peeva, and Plekhanov, “Exorbitant Privilege
and Economic Sanctions,” 3.

120
Habiba Hamdy, “Russia Central Bank Adds EGP to Exchange Rate
List,” Ahram Online, January 19, 2023,
https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/484545/Business/
Economy/Russia-central-bank-adds-EGP-to-exchange-rate-list.aspx
Economy/Russia-central-bank-adds-EGP-to-exchange-rate-list.aspx.

121
Bloomberg News, “Why Putin Is Worried About Russia’s Volatile
Ruble,” Bloomberg, September 1, 2023,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-09-01/why-putin-
is-worried-about-russia-s-volatile-ruble-usd-rub#xj4y7vzkg
is-worried-about-russia-s-volatile-ruble-usd-rub#xj4y7vzkg.

122
Nidhi Verma and Aftab Ahmed, “Exclusive: As India Frowns on
Paying for Russian Oil With Yuan, Some Payments Held Up,” Reuters,
October 16, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/india-frowns-
paying-russian-oil-with-yuan-some-payments-held-up-sources-say-
2023-10-16/
2023-10-16/.

123
“UAE Central Banks Sign Currency Swap Agreement,” Egypt State
Information Service, September 28, 2023,

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https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/187026/Egypt%2C-UAE-central-
banks-sign-currency-swap-agreement?lang=en-us
banks-sign-currency-swap-agreement?lang=en-us.

124
“Report of the Inter-Departmental Group (IDG) on Internationalisation
of INR,” Reserve Bank of India.

125
“CBUAE and Reserve Bank of India Exchange of Two MoUs to
Strengthen Use of National Currencies for Bilateral Trade and Link
Payment and Financial Messaging Systems, Central Bank of the UAE, July
15, 2023, https://www.centralbank.ae/media/kvudu12x/cbuae-and-
reserve-bank-of-india-sign-two-mous-to-strengthen-use-of-national-
currencies-for-bilateral-trade-and-link-payment-and-financial-
messaging-systems-_eng.pdf
messaging-systems-_eng.pdf; Reuters, “Reserve Bank Nudges Banks to
Settle UAE Trades in Rupee, Dirham: Sources,” BFSI, August 22, 2023,
https://bfsi.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/financial-
services/reserve-bank-nudges-banks-to-settle-uae-trades-in-rupee-
dirham-sources/102922768
dirham-sources/102922768; and ETBFSI Research, “Dumping the Dollar:
India, UAE Begin Trade in Local Currencies,” Economic Times, August 19,
2023, https://bfsi.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/financial-
services/dumping-the-dollar-india-uae-begin-trade-in-local-
currencies/102853131
currencies/102853131.

126
Siddharth Upasani, “India, Saudi Arabia to Explore Trade in Local
Currencies,” Moneycontrol, September 11, 2023,
https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/economy/india-
saudi-arabia-to-explore-trade-in-local-currencies-11349051.html
saudi-arabia-to-explore-trade-in-local-currencies-11349051.html.

127
Adrija Chatterjee, “Exclusive: Brazil, South Africa May be Next in Line
for India’s Bilateral Currency Settlement Plan, Moneycontrol, August 8,
2023,
https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/economy/brazil-
south-africa-may-be-next-in-line-for-indias-bilateral-currency-

https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/the-difficult-realities-of-the-brics-dedollarization-effortsand-the-renminbis-role?lang=en Page 47 of 51
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settlement-plan-11123721.html
settlement-plan-11123721.html.

128
“India Broadens Access to ‘Vostro’ Accounts to Facilitate Rupee Trade,”
Reuters, August 8, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-
broadens-access-vostro-accounts-facilitate-rupee-trade-2023-08-08/
broadens-access-vostro-accounts-facilitate-rupee-trade-2023-08-08/.

129
Nikunj Rajesh Ohri and Shivangi Acharya, “India Rupee Settlement
Mechanism Draws Interest From More Nations,” Reuters, December 16,
2022, https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/india-rupee-
settlement-mechanism-draws-interest-more-nations-2022-12-16/
settlement-mechanism-draws-interest-more-nations-2022-12-16/.

130
“RBI Approves 34 Russian Vostro Accounts at Indian Banks,”
Regulation Asia, August 3, 2023, https://www.regulationasia.com/rbi-
approves-34-russian-vostro-accounts-at-indian-banks/
approves-34-russian-vostro-accounts-at-indian-banks/.

131
Kallol Bhattacherjee, “UAE’s Dirham Can be the Third Currency in
India-Russia Trade, Says Russian Economist,” The Hindu, July 6, 2023,
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/uaes-dirham-can-be-the-
third-currency-in-india-russia-trade-says-russian-
economist/article67045594.ece
economist/article67045594.ece.

132
Nidhi Verma, “Exclusive: Indian Refiners Pay Traders in Dirhams for
Russian Oil,” Reuters, February 3, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/indian-refiners-pay-
traders-dirhams-russian-oil-2023-02-03/
traders-dirhams-russian-oil-2023-02-03/.

133
Aftab Ahmet and Swati Bhat, “Exclusive: India, Russia Suspend
Negotiations to Settle Trade in Rupees,” Reuters, May 4, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/india-russia-suspend-
negotiations-settle-trade-rupees-sources-2023-05-04
negotiations-settle-trade-rupees-sources-2023-05-04.

134
“Exports From Iran to India Up 5% in H1 2023 Y/Y,” Tehran Times,
September 4, 2023,

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https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/488708/Exports-from-Iran-to-
India-up-5-in-H1-2023-y-y
India-up-5-in-H1-2023-y-y.

135
“At NSA Talks, Iran Raises Rial-Rupee Trade, India Says Deal With
Saudi Will Have ‘Profound’ Impact,” The Wire, May 2, 2023,
https://thewire.in/diplomacy/ali-shamkhani-ajit-doval-iran-india-
nsa-talk
nsa-talk.

136
Anup Roy and Khine Lin Kyaw, “India-Dominated Clearing Union
Moves Toward Rupee Settlement,” Bloomberg, July 6, 2023,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-06/clearing-
union-dominated-by-india-moves-toward-rupee-settlements
union-dominated-by-india-moves-toward-rupee-settlements.

137
Dheeraj Tiwari, “Indian Banks Reach Out to RBI Over US Ban on ACU
Settlements,” Economic Times, September 22, 2023,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/ba
nking/indian-banks-reach-out-to-rbi-over-us-ban-on-acu-
settlements/articleshow/103846321.cms?from=mdr
settlements/articleshow/103846321.cms?from=mdr.

138
Marcela Ayres, “Weakening of Brazil’s Real Part of Global Movement,
Says Cenbank Director,” Nasdaq, August 22, 2023,
https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/weakening-of-brazils-real-part-of-
global-movement-says-cenbank-director
global-movement-says-cenbank-director; and “South African Rand
Finds Its Feet After Volatile Week,” Reuters, October 13, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-african-rand-stabilises-
after-volatile-week-2023-10-13/
after-volatile-week-2023-10-13/.

139
Barry Eichengreen, Camille Macaire, Arnaud Mehl, Eric Monnet, and
Alain Naef, “Is Capital Account Convertibility Required for the Renminbi
to Acquire Reserve Currency Status?,” Banque de France, Working Paper
no. 892, November 2022, https://publications.banque-
france.fr/en/capital-account-convertibility-required-renminbi-
acquire-reserve-currency-status
acquire-reserve-currency-status.
https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/the-difficult-realities-of-the-brics-dedollarization-effortsand-the-renminbis-role?lang=en Page 49 of 51
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140
“Report of the Inter-Departmental Group (IDG) on Internationalisation
of INR,” Reserve Bank of India; and 彭⽂⽣, “货币国际化新机遇与新挑
战，从逆全球化到去⾦融化， 新浪专栏,” Sina, June 4, 2022,
http://finance.sina.com.cn/zl/china/2022-06-04/zl-
imizirau6495120.shtml
imizirau6495120.shtml.

141
Eichengreen, Macaire, Mehl, Monnet, and Naef, “Is Capital Account
Convertibility Required for the Renminbi to Acquire Reserve Currency
Status?”

142
中央⾦融⼯作会议的“新提法”与“新信号”, 经济观察⽹, November 11,
2023, http://www.eeo.com.cn/2023/1101/611560.shtml
http://www.eeo.com.cn/2023/1101/611560.shtml; and为强国复
兴伟业提供有⼒⾦融⽀撑——中央⾦融⼯作会议指明前进⽅向、凝聚信
⼼⼒量，Xinhua, November 5, 2023
http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2023/1105/c1001-40110544.html
http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2023/1105/c1001-40110544.html.

143
Connie M. Friesen, “Re-Thinking U.S. Policy on Engagement With
Chinese Financial Institutions,” Harvard Kennedy School of Government,
Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government Associate,
Working Paper no. 183, 21-25, May 2022,
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/file
s/183_AWP_final.pdf
s/183_AWP_final.pdf. Most offshore direct CIPS participants are
Chinese state-owned bank affiliates. See “CIPS全球服务,” Cross-Border
Interbank Payment System. Almost all offshore renminbi clearing banks
are affiliates of large Chinese state-owned banks. See 中国⼈⺠银⾏, “2023
年⼈⺠币国际化报告.”

144
Evan A. Feigenbaum and Adam Szubin, “What China Has Learned
From the Ukraine War,” Foreign Affairs, February 14, 2023,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/what-china-has-learned-
ukraine-war
ukraine-war.

145
Maziar Motamedi, “What’s Behind Iran and Russia’s Efforts to Link
https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/the-difficult-realities-of-the-brics-dedollarization-effortsand-the-renminbis-role?lang=en Page 50 of 51
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Banking Systems?,” Al Jazeera, February 8, 2023,

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/8/whats-behind-iran-and-
russias-efforts-to-link-banking-systems
russias-efforts-to-link-banking-systems.

146
In addition to Argentina, Egypt, and Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Bolivia,
Pakistan, and several African countries, including Malawi and Nigeria, are
facing significant dollar shortages. See Colleen Goko-Petzer and Karl
Lester M Yap, “Dollar Scarcity Is Pushing More African Countries to
Crisis,” Bloomberg, November 19, 2023,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-19/dollar-
scarcity-is-pushing-more-african-countries-to-crisis
scarcity-is-pushing-more-african-countries-to-crisis; Arun Devnath
and Karl Lester M Yap, “Bangladesh Expects $1.1 Billion in IMF, ADB
Loans by December,” Bloomberg, November 23, 2023,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-24/bangladesh-
expects-1-1-billion-in-imf-adb-loans-by-december
expects-1-1-billion-in-imf-adb-loans-by-december; Carlos Valdez, “US
Dollar Scarcity Threatens Bolivia’s ‘Economic Miracle’, April 15, 2023,
Associated Press, https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-economy-us-
dollar-42f815800dd18eb0952590bb8b968cfd
dollar-42f815800dd18eb0952590bb8b968cfd; and Faseeh Mangi and
Betsy Joles, “Dollar Shortage Traps Multinationals’ Profits Inside Pakistan,”
Bloomberg, October 4, 2023,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-05/pkr-usd-us-
dollar-shortage-traps-global-firms-profits-inside-pakistan
dollar-shortage-traps-global-firms-profits-inside-pakistan.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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