Chapter 3

Climate Change and the

Politics of the Global
Environment
NEIL CARTER

The environment is commonly regarded as a matter of 'low politics'. a

second-order problem compared to the substantive concerns of 'high politics'
(Mearsheimer 2001). The environment has steadily risen up the international
political agenda since it burst on the scene at the 1972 Stockholm United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment. There have been numerous cycles of
interest in the environment when various issues. including acid rain, deforesta-
tion, ozone depletion and biodiversity loss, have experienced brief moments in
the limelight. However, over the last decade one issue - climate change - has
risen far above all the others to become the dominant concern of global envi-
ronmental politics. Climate change diplomacy has become increasingly intense,
with the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol resulting in major political ructions
that caused a genuine rift between the U S A and the European Union (EU). The
international effort to agree a post-Kyoto deal has made climate change a major
Ítem at the G8 summits at Gleneagles in 2005. Hokkaido in 2008 and L'Aquila in
2009. It would appear therefore that climate change has ascended to the realm of
high politics.
This chapter will examine climate change as an issue in global politics. It w ill
focus on the efforts to negotiate an effective climate change regime, focusing
on the role of the USA and the E U . tensions between developed and develop-
ing countries and the ongoing challenges of overcoming territorial conceptions
of sovereignty (see Mansbach. this volunte). This discussion will demónstrate the
extraordinary complexity that characterises climate change: it is a transboundary
issue that needs international solutions but is beset by major collective action
problems. It requires governments (and businesses and citizens) to set aside
national interests and short-term political horizons to support policies that may
have high short-term costs but deliver indefinable long-term benefits.

Climate change: what is the issue and w h y is it

increasingly salient?

There is overwhelming agreement among the world's leading scientists that

human-induced climate change is happening and that a lack of urgent action to

52
 Climate Change and the Politics of the Global Environment 53

reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions will have catastrophic consequences for
the planet and life as we know it (IPCC 2007). Global warming will result in
rising sea-levels. melting glaciers. increased desertification. the destructions of
coral reefs and the extinction of hundreds of species. Hundreds of millions of
people will face food shortages. flooding and reduced access to drinking water;
many will become environmental refugees.
There is a natural "greenhouse effect' whereby various atmospheric gases keep
the Earth's temperature high enough to sustain life. These gases allow radia-
tion from the Sun to pass through but then absorb radiation reflected back from
the Earth's surface. trapping heat in the atmosphere. Without the natural green-
house effect it is estimated that the average global temperature would be about
33°C lower. However. there is now consensus among the world's leading scien-
tists that human activities have strengthened the greenhouse effect by increasing
the concentration of these GHGs in the atmosphere. notably by burning fossil
fuels. deforestation. raising livestock and growing rice. Since the industrial revo-
lution. carbón dioxide (CO;) concentrations have increased by over a third, from
285 parts per million (ppm) to around 430 ppm CO:e in 2005. (Total GHGs are
measured in CO2 equivalent. or CO;e. which is the aggregation of non-COi GHGs
with CO;. weighted to reflect their respective contributions to the change in net
radiation at the upper troposphere.) The concentration of GHGs is now rising
rapidly by 2.5 ppm annually. On current trends. a doubling of pre-industrial GHG
concentrations to at least 580 ppm is expected by the middle of this century, rising
to 800-900 ppm by 2100 (Stern 2009: 25).
The Earth's a\ erage temperature has risen by 0.7=C since 1900 and is predicted
torise by anything between l . E C and 6 . 4 X by 2100 (IPCC 2007: 13). It is widely
agreed that any temperature increase in excess of 2.0°C is potentially very danger-
ous, yet even at 500 ppm CO:e there is a 95 per cent chance of exceeding 2.0°C.
Consequently. many scientists and environmentalists cali for a target of 400 ppm
C02e máximum or. at worst, 450 ppm COje (Stern 2009: 27). As we are already
at 430 ppm, with emissions still rising steadily. such a target will require global
emissions to be stabilised first and then reduced. Clearly. this is a huge global
challenge.
Climate change has become an increasingly salient issue in international pol-
itics for several reasons. First, the dramatic scientific message has finally been
accepted by the ruling élites in most countries. strengthened by growing evidence
that the effects of climate change are already observable. Second, the publication
of the Stern Review (Stern 2007) demonstrated that climate change will have seri-
ous economic consequences: if the world does not act, the overall costs and risks
of climate change will be equivalent to losing at least 5 per cent of global gross
domestic production (GDP) each year, forever (Stern 2007: xv). Thus Stern pro-
vided a powerful economic case in terms immediately understandable to political
and business élites. In particular, he communicated the need for radical measures
in the short term - the next 10 to 15 years - by identifying how the economic
costs of inaction will increase rapidly the longer the mitigation efforts are delayed.
Third, public concern about climate change has escalated, with growing pressure
54 Neil Cárter

on governments to act. Lastly, efforts are currently underway to negotiate a treaty

to replace the Kyoto Protocol, which runs its course in 2012. The election of
President Obama has also raised expectations that the USA, after a decade as an
international pariah on this issue, will push climate change high up the US foreign
policy agenda.

Climate change: a distinctive issue in

world politics?

Climate change, like other global environmental issues, has several distinctive
features that make it a very complex and challenging problem. In particular, it is
an example of Hardin's (1968) parable of the 'tragedy of the commons', whereby
individuáis and communities over-exploit common environmental resources and
continué to do so even when they know it is damaging their long-term interests.
The global atmospheric commons is a 'sink' into which the waste pollutants gen-
erated by the consumption of fossil fuels are dumped. Individual actors have an
interest in exploiting the commons to the máximum, because they gain the full
benefits from their actions (e.g., someone driving to work or an electricity sup-
plier burning coal to genérate electricity), while the costs - climate change - are
shared by everyone else on the planet. That is the Tragedy': rational individual
actions produce collectively irrational outcomes. The challenge is to intervene to
stop that seemingly inexorable process. Yet there is no incentive for individuáis to
change their behaviour because they lose the benefits of exploiting the common
sink while others simply free-ride on their altruistic efforts.
Climate change is a global problem both because every country has con-
tributed to it and because everyone will suffer the consequences. Crucially,
however, some countries have contributed more than others, and some will suffer
more. In particular, the rich developed countries have generated far more G H G
emissions - both historically and currently - than the developing world (with
some exceptions). But it is quite clear that the worst effects of climate change
will fall on the latter, partiy because most are located in tropical and sub-tropical
zones where the impact will be greatest, but also because their weak infrastruc-
tures limit their capability to adapt to these changes. Climate change also brings
new divisions: for example, countries with extensive low-lying coastal áreas and
small island states will be particularly threatened by rising sea-levels and storm
damage, although again some richer countries (e.g., The Netherlands) are better
equipped to deal with these threats than poorer countries (e.g., Bangladesh).
Climate change poses some serious threats to traditional territorial notions of
State sovereignty and to the state-centric focus of academic international relations.
Climate change is a transboundary problem that does not respect national borders;
it can only be effectively addressed through concerted action by national govern-
ments, businesses and citizens across the world to reduce their GHG emissions.
If one country takes action to reduce its carbón emissions, it cannot exelude oth-
ers from benefiting, so how can it persuade other countries to make reductions
when they could just free-ride on the efforts of others? The doctrine of national
 Climate Change and the Politics of the Global Environment 55

sovereignty means that there is no international authority equivalent to a national

government - no global govemment - with the power to forcé every country to
conform. Moreover. the growth in GHGs is not the result of individual states
pursuing particular policies or delibérate aggressive acts; rather it is an unin-
tended by-product of the everyday social and economic activities of organisations
and individuáis. One implication is that solutions cannot be delivered by state
actors alone: they also require a host of non-state actors - non-govemmental
organisations (NGOs), businesses, individual citizens - to change their everyday
behaviour.
Yet, in other respects, climate change has reinforced the importance of the state
because international efforts to mitígate it have involved cooperation between
states. It is states that sign up to international treaties and national governments
that have the responsibility to ensure that their emission reduction targets are
met. While those targets cannot be delivered without the active involvement of
non-state actors, ironically. the extent of the emission reductions required will
increasingly forcé national governments to intervene extensively and creatively in
the activities of businesses and the lifestyles of citizens (Giddens 2009).
Another important feature of climate change is the centrality of scientific
knowledge and the uncertainty that surrounds it. Without science we would not
know about climate change and we obviously depend on scientists to tell us about
the nature of the threat. the need for action. the viability of alternative solutions
and the kind of adaptation measures required. One of the distinctive contributions
characterising global environmental politics has been the emergence of transna-
tional networks of scientists who are sufficiently moved about the urgency of a
problem to act as an 'epistemic community' promoting international action to
address climate change (Haas 1990). Their capacity to influence the political pro-
cess rests on their ability to persuade others that their knowledge is valid and
sufficiently important to require a policy responso. However, science is contested
and the development of climate change science has been characterised by many
uncertainties. Despite the strong scientific consensus that temperatures are rising
and that global warming is largely due to human activities, the persistence of a
handful of dissenting voices - albeit rarely the leading scientific experts in the
field - is still exploited by political sceptics to impede the progress of climate
change policy. This sceptical discourse has been much more influential in the
USA, where it was actively mobilised in support of President George W. Bush's
repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol. than in Europe.
Lastly, traditional realist accounts usually dismiss climate change as a secu-
rity threat. However, there is a serious possibility of conflict between states
over access to water sources, especially in the Middle East, or from the mass
migration of environmental refugees in search of food across an international bor-
der (Homer-Dixon 1999). Moreover, an alternative critical approach to security
argües that climate change poses a different kind of security threat. The con-
ventional militaristic language that defines security threats nationalistically as
coming from other states must be replaced by a recognition that climate change
is transboundary and requires international cooperativo solutions that address its
root causes, rather than the symptoms (Dalby 2009; Deudney 2006; Lacy 2005).
56 Neil Cárter

Developing a climate change regime to bind most of

usual levéis. Thi
The scientific consensus on climate change emerged slowly during the 1980s and of 'common bul
1990s. A key role was played by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change tion by developi
(IPCC) formed in 1988. Its first report, published in 1990, confirming the scientific historical and ci
consensus that human activities were contributing to climate change and calling ing countries w<
for immediate policy action to reduce carbón emissions, contributed significantly continué to gro\»
to the political momentum that resulted in the United Nations Framework Con- This principli
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) agreed at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. the 31 Annex 1 <
The main objective of the UNECCC was to stabilise GHG concentrations at lev- countries to mak
éis that should mitígate climate change. It identified a set of operating principies; the USA. 6 per c
precaution, co-operation. sustainability and equity. In particular, it established the emissions could
principie of "common but differentiated responsibilities' as the basis of equitable as a 'bubble' wi
burden sharing. Thus developed countries were expected to take the lead in com- tions of 21 per c
bating climate change and to transfer financial and technological resources to O per cent for F
developing countries to help them address the problem. However. the UNFCCC To secure the ^uj
set no firm targets; developed countries were simply given the "voluntary goal' sion targets coul
of returning G H G emissions to 1990 levéis. Nevertheless, the Rio treaty repre- projects, against;
sented an important achievement. especially given the opposition of the USA to vures - the so-cal
any binding commitments, but it was clear that its worthy principies needed to be Kv oto targets:
turned into something concrete as soon as possible.
A new institutional framework was established to continué negotiations aimed 1.An intematio
at strengthening the nascent climate change regime. The first Conference of the to buy and se
Parties to the U N F C C C (COP-1) in Berlin in 1995 agreed the "Berlín mándate' 2. .-AJointImpk
which recognised the need to work towards a protocol that set targets and strength- ment projecu
ened commitments to reduce G H G emissions. Eventually. the Kyoto Protocol, country in exi
hammered out over 10 days of intense negotiations in December 1997 (COP-3), A "Clean D
agreed legally binding targets for developed countries (Annex 1). Together these finance emisi
targets aimed at an overall reduction in the basket of the six main GHGs of credit for doü
5.2 per cent of 1990 levéis for the 5-year period 2008-12. However. subsequent
efforts to firm up the details agreed at Kyoto floundered at The Hague (COP-6) F:nally. importan
in 2000. and the following year the newly elected President Bush repudiated the r_:ure negotiation
Kyoto Protocol. As the USA was then responsible for over 20 per cent of global Cntics point «
GHG emissions, this decisión prompted a major crisis because the Protocol could n will do no moi
not enter forcé until it had been ratified by 55 countries and by countries which shon. the inexora
together were responsible for at least 55 per cent of the G H G emissions of the The compromises
developed Annex I countries. Frenzied diplomatic activity to bring other pre- •»ere too timid. an
varicating developed countries on board resulted in the Bonn agreement in July fardier. The Prole
2001, where Japan and Russia were persuaded to sign up to a binding agreement. iae US.A to ratifv-
But it was not until November 2004 that Russia, after winning additional conces- ~ r - raniculariy I
sions through hard bargaining, finally ratified the agreement, allowing the Kyoto • ^ reduce thei
Protocol to enter into forcé in 2005. The USA and Australia were the only major « e OI the regime-
developed countries not to ratify it, although Australia subsequently did in 2008. árveloped countri
By 2009. 184 countries had ratified the Kyoto Protocol. pie^ However. bod
Proponents of the Kyoto Protocol regarded it as a major breakthrough in inter- áoKged the Kyoio
national climate change politics. The primary achievement of the Protocol was ffciTswe chanee rea
 Climate Change and the Politics of the Global Environment 57

to bind most of the developed countries to emissions reductions on business-as-

usual levéis. This agreement represented the practical application of the principie
of 'common but differentiated responsibilities', which underpinned the recogni-
tion by developed nations that (1) they were responsible for the largest share of
historical and current GHG emissions; (2) the per capita emissions of develop-
ing countries were far smaller; (3) emissions in developing countries needed to
continué to grow to meet essential social and development needs.
This principie informed the decisión to set emission reduction targets for
the 31 Annex 1 countries that differed in recognition of the capacity of different
countries to make cuts. Key targets included 8 per cent for the E U , 7 per cent for
the USA, 6 per cent for Ganada and Japan, O per cent for Russia, while Australian
emissions could increase by 8 per cent. The overall E U 8 per cent target acted
as a 'bubble' within which member states had targets that ranged from reduc-
tions of 21 per cent for Denmark and Germany, and 12.5 per cent for the U K ,
O per cent for France and Finland, to an increase of 27 per cent for Portugal.
To secure the support of Russia and other East European states, these net emis-
sion targets could be achieved by offsetting carbón sinks, such as afforestation
projects, against actual GHG emissions. The Protocol also introduced three mea-
sures - the so-called Kyoto mechanisms - to enable countries to implement their
Kyoto targets:

1. An international emissions trading regime allowing industrialised countries

to buy and sell emission credits among themselves.
2. A Joint Implementation procedure enabling industrialised countries to imple-
ment projects that reduce emissions or remove carbón in another Annex 1
country in exchange for emission reduction credits.
3. A 'Clean Development Mechanism' permitting developed countries to
finance emissions reduction projects in developing countries and receive
credit for doing so.

Finally, importantly, the Protocol established the institutional mechanisms for

future negotiations and regime strengthening.
Critics point out that even if the overall Kyoto abatement target is achieved,
it will do no more than scratch the surface of the problem (Víctor 2004). In
short, the inexorable rise of global G H G emissions will continué unchecked.
The compromises needed to secure agreement at Kyoto meant that the targets
were too timid, and option of sequestering CO: into carbón sinks weakened them
further. The Protocol is also characterised by two key tensions: the refusal of
the U S A to ratify it and the absence of any requirement that developing coun-
tries, particularly large rapidly industrialising countries such as China and India,
should reduce their emissions. While the absence of the U S A was a clear fall-
are of the regime-building process, the latter was a positive demonstration by
developed countries of the 'common but differentiated responsibilities' princi-
pie. However, both issues represent unresolved - and interlinked - tensions that
dogged the Kyoto negotiations and continué to hamper efforts to strengthen the
climate change regime.
58 Neil Cárter

The reluctance of the U S A to embrace the Kyoto process reflects wider

divisions among developed countries regarding their willingness to make firm
commitments. Resistance has coalesced around the USA, in coalition with others
in the JUSCANZ (Japan, USA. Canadá, Australia and New Zealand) 'Umbrella
Group". Clearly, as the world's largest producer of GHG emissions (until China
recently overtook it), the inclusión of the U S A in any regime is vital to its
success. Yet, while the E U and some other industrialised nations pressed for
quantified targets throughout the climate change negotiations, the US govern-
ment has always dragged its feet. President George H . W. Bush was reluctant to
sign the Framework Convention at Rio and the Clinton-Gore administration then
blocked agreement on targets or timetables at Berlin. Before eventually accept-
ing a 7 per cent reduction target at Kyoto, Gore won significant concessions,
including the introduction of an emissions trading system. while the main sticking
point at the unsuccessful Hague Conference in 2000 was the insistence of the US
government that it be allowed to offset its emissions against its forest sinks.
The intransigence of the U S A demonstrates the importance of the political
economy of climate change politics. Disagreements between developed countries
can be attributed in large part to differences in energy resources and the struc-
ture of the energy industry (Paterson 1996). Countries that rely on fossil fuels for
export income, such as Middle Eastern oil-producing states, and those with large
energy resources, including the USA, have been most resistant to cuts. The latter
has an abundance of fossil fuel energy: it is a major oil, gas and coal producer.
The American 'gas-guzzler' culture of cheap, available energy generares strong
domestic resistance to any interference with oil prices. The economic and politi-
cal costs of implementing emission cuts are therefore seen as higher in the USA
than elsewhere, and because climate change has lower salience in America than
across the Atlantic, the US government believes the costs of adapting to climate
change (rather than mitigating it) are affordable. Furthermore, American politi-
cians have been subjected to strong pressure from a powerful dome.stic industrial
lobby. particularly motor and energy (which bankrolled President Bush's presi-
dential campaigns) interests. to obstruct the regime-building process (Lisowski
2002). Consequently. the Bush administration played the role of veto state with
some aplomb. doing its best to reframe the climate change debate on its terms.
For example. in the face of growing scientific consensus about climate change,
under Bush the US govemment exploited remaining uncertainties, and it tried to
persuade Russian President Putin not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Later, as it
became harder even for Bush to continué denying climate change was a problem,
he shifted tack by launching the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development
and Climate. a 2005 initiative with Australia. China. India. Japan and South Korea
to find voluntary ways of reducing emissions by accelerating 'the development
and deployment of clean energy technologies'. It was. transparently, an attempt to
undermine the Kyoto Protocol.
However, there has been a shift in climate change politics within the USA in
recent years as the public mood. which identified events such as Hurricane Katrina
with climate change. became more sympathetic to environmental issues. Initially,
 Climate Change and the Politics of the Global Environment 59

:his shift was a bottom-up process that gathered momentum in the face of fed-
eral intransigence from the Bush White House. Several regions have developed
their own cap-and-trade systems, including California and the Regional Green-
nouse Gas Initiative launched by several north-eastern states. The election of
President Obama brought the possibility of a transformation in the US role in
climate change diplomacy. with potentially significant implications for the nego-
tiation of an effective post-Kyoto treaty. Obama made bis difference from Bush on
climate change a key feature of his election campaign and entered office declaring
that 'We will make it clear to the world that America is ready to lead. To pro-
lect our climate and our collective security, we must cali together a truly global
coalition' (Obama 2009). He made some remarkably 'green' appointments to key
environmental positions. including Stephen Chu. Nobel prize-winning physicist.
as Energy Secretary. Obama quickiy launched a tranche of initiatives including a
green economic stimulus package, investment in renewable technologies and an
Energy Bill that. for the first time, would introduce federal targets to reduce GHG
emissions and a cap-and-trade scheme. Yet, significantly, the familiar oil and gas
lobby mobilised its considerable resources in opposition to the Bill with the aim
of defeating or watering down the Bill as it passed through Congress during 2009.
By contrast, the USA's abrogation of leadership on climate change has left a
vacuum that the E U has been increasingly willing to fill. Throughout the 1990s,
the E U pushed for stringent international emission reduction commitments. At
Kyoto, although it failed to win the kind of tough cuts it wanted, the E U still
accepted the highest reduction target. which may have helped persuade other
countries to accept more ambitious cuts than initially intended. By playing hard-
ball, the U S A had a more profound impact than the E U on the architecture of
the Protocol because it was able to win concessions on the flexibility mecha-
nisms such as carbón sinks and the use of emission trading (Oberthur and Kelly
2008: 36). However, when subsequent negotiations at The Hague (COP-6) failed
and Bush repudiated the treaty, the E U stepped up to the mark in impressive style.
The E U ' s decisión to 'go it alone" by pressing ahead without the USA, illus-
trated by its telling diplomatic interventions at the reconvened Bonn C0P-6bis
and Marrakech COP-7, and later its success in delivering Russian ratification,
effectively saved the Protocol and demonstrated the EU's resolve as an actor in
international politics (Vogler and Bretherton 2006: 3, 13-14).
Subsequently, the E U has sustained this leadership role. It set up the world"s
first international carbón emissions trading system (ETS) in 2005. In March
2007, the European Council reasserted the E U ' s long-standing commitment to
hold mean global temperature increases to 2.0°C above pre-industrial levéis and
declared that the E U would cut its CO2 emissions by 20 per cent of 1990 levéis
by 2020, increasing this to 30 per cent if other developed countries agree to a new
post-Kyoto treaty. To give substance to its 20 per cent reduction commitment, the
E U agreed a Climate Change package in 2008 consisting of six pieces of leg-
islation aimed at delivering the required emission reductions across the energy,
business and transport sectors in the 27 member states. Thus the E U has exer-
cised a 'soft leadership' strategy in climate change politics (Oberthur and Kelly
60 Neil Cárter

2008). The E U has limited political and economic power to forcé other countries
to cut emissions, so it adopted an approach that combines 'leadership by example',
diplomacy, persuasión and argument.
Why has the E U accepted. with some alacrity. this leadership role, when it
might have just let Kyoto wither and die. thereby avoiding the considerable com-
pliance costs of reducing emissions? Several factors. relating both to the specific
challenge of climate change and to the wider role of the E U as an international
actor, explain this decisión. Most European governments - at least those in the oíd
EU15 - regard climate change as a grave threat. E U member states are heavily
dependent on imported energy and there is no gas-guzzling culture as in the USA;
so governments have a stronger balance-of-payments incentive to cut carbón
emissions and reduce imports of fossil fuels. Growing concerns about the secu-
rity of energy supplies. particularly after massive increases in oil and gas prices
around 2005 and the increasing dependency on Russian gas. have brought a new
focus on policies aimed at improving energy efficiency and developing renew-
able energy sources (Oberthur and Kelly 2008). In addition. Bush's repudiation
of Kyoto gave European leaders an opportunity to enhance the nascent reputation
of the E U as a serious. unified player in global politics. and to strengthen its posi-
tion vis-a-vis the USA. A combination of environmental pioneer states (Austria,
Denmark, Finland. Germany. Sweden and The Netherlands) plus the U K have
consistently played a leading role (Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007). Ideology and
personality have played their part. Between 1998 and 2005 Germany was gov-
erned by a red-green coalition in which Joschka Eischer was an influential Green
Foreign Secretary, backed for some time by the presence of Green ministers in
Belgium, Einland, France and Italy. Tony Blair embraced the cause of climate
change mitigation with enthusiasm. personally convinced by the arguments but
he also saw it as a way of distancing himself from Bush at a time when he was
the subject of strong domestic criticism over the Iraq war. The European Com-
mission, backed by the European Parliament. has played a crucial role because
it has recognised the need for the new policy measures. such as the E T S and the
2008 Climate Change package. both to ensure that member states met their Kyoto
commitments and to enable the E U to lead by example in the negotiation of a
post-Kyoto treaty (Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007). The E U institutions saw that
following the failure to establish a constitution in 2005. climate change offered a
popular means of reinvigorating and legitimising European integration because it
required genuinely 'European' solutions.
The eontinued willingness of the E U to assume a leadership role is crucial
if the second major tensión - the North-South divide - is to be resolved. The
Kyoto Protocol demonstrated that most developed countries at least accepted the
responsibility to take the initiative in making cuts. Clearly. at least in the médium
term. they must continué to make the lion's share of reductions because they
have been responsible for around 70 per cent of GHG emissions since 1950, even
though developed countries contain only about I billion of the global population
of 6.7 billion people alive today (Stern 2009: 23). Developed countries also have
far higher per capita emissions. Moreover, they have the resources to invest in the
necessary shift to a low-carbon economy.
 Climate Change and the Politics ofthe Global Environment 61

But it is also clear that any effective climate change regime must, sooner rather
man later, bring the rapid growth of emissions in developing countries under con-
"rol. The developing world will soon be the source of most emissions. Global
3HG emissions are currently split roughly 50/50 between developed (and tran-
-ition) countries (Annex 1) and the rest of the world. Several of the largest
ceveloping countries - China, Indonesia, Brazil, India - now rank in the top
:en for the absolute level of emissions in terms of COie (Garnaut 2008: ch. 3),
although they remain far below the developed world in terms of per capita emis-
sions. China, for example, has seen its GHG emissions grow by around 70 per cent
since 1990, due to its rapid economic growth and heavy dependency on coal for
Its energy supply, to become the largest emitting country in the world, with over
20 per cent of global G H G emissions. It is projected that China will contribute
33 per cent of global emissions by 2030 assuming it continúes its development
path of energy-intensive rapid economic expansión (Garnaut 2008: ch. 3). With
population growth concentrated in the developing world and the per capita growth
of emissions rapidly escalating as poorer countries industrialise, then on business-
as-usual projections the developing world might be responsible for as much as
80 per cent of global emissions by 2050.
Clearly, the principies of 'common but differentiated responsibilities', equity
and sustainability are open to many different interpretations. Thus a major stum-
bling block for the U S A throughout the Kyoto negotiations was the absence of
any firm commitment by developing countries to reduce their emissions. The
US Govemment was mindful of the 1997 Byrd-Hagel resolution to the US Sen-
ate that opposed the Kyoto Protocol on the grounds that it excluded developing
countries and would harm the competitiveness of US industry. That concern has
been exacerbated by the eontinued, rapid growth of China, which is now a major
competitor.
However, the major developing countries, such as China and India, demand that
they should not have any targets imposed on them while they remain so far behind
the developed world. In particular, they point out that their per capita emissions
are much lower than in developed countries: for example, per capita emissions in
the USA are around five times higher than in China. As long as this gross inequal-
ity within the international system remains. it will be very difficult to persuade
developing countries to take significant action to control their emissions. As the
Indian climate change envoy to COP-15 observed, 'Western countries are hypo-
critical and must sacrifice some luxuries before asking developing countries to cut
greenhouse gas emissions" (The Age, 1 August 2009). It is important to recognise
that China and India are not - as some in the North have suggested - irre.sponsibly
ignoring the problem of climate change. China, for example, is very conscious of
its dependency on coal-fired electricity generation, and has introduced several ini-
tiatives to improve energy efficiency and to develop renewable sources of energy.
There is an increasingly strong lobby within the Chínese political élite pushing
for China to move towards a low-carbon economy by setting emissions reduction
targets and introduce E T S (Reuters 2009). India, too, has ambitious plans for a
massive expansión of solar energy. But any serious efforts to reduce emissions will
depend heavily upon the transfer of financial and technological resources from
 '*!«• ííSifl

62 Neil Cárter

North to South to fund the introduction of clean technologies. renewable sources

of energy and so on. But, in practice. developed countries have been unwilling to
put their hands in their pockets, and big prívate corporations are reluctant to relin-
quish control of technologies without economic or financial compensation (e.g.,
access to markets).
One widely touted solution to the equity problem is the notion of 'contraction
and convergence'. which aims for per capita parity at a "safe level' of 2.0 tonnes
of CO2 by 2050. Most developing countries are currently well below that figure
while high-income countries are far above it. So developed countries must cut
rapidly and substantially to 2.0 tonnes CO2 per capita. while the former should
be allowed to expand until, say. 2030 or 2040, but then be required to cut back to
reach parity by 2050 (Schreuder 2009: 60). But even this radical proposal ignores
another feature of the globalised economy. which is that a large proportion of
the goods manufactured in industrialising countries such as China. México and
South Korea are exported to and consumed in the developed world - yet these
'embedded emissions' are not accounted for in official UNFCCC data.
Other commentators see market-based mechanisms as the key both to the over-
all problem of emissions reductions and to the North-South divide (Stern 2009;
Tickell 2008). One of the significant developments since the implementation
of the Kyoto Protocol has been the development of 'carbón commodification'.
whereby carbón reductions have been turned into commodities that can be traded
in the market. Global carbón markets were worth € 4 7 billion in 2007. up from
$31 billion in 2006. The market saw transactions for 2.9 billion tonnes of C02e.
with the E U E T S accounted for 70 per cent of the volume and over 78 per cent
of the valué (World Bank 2008a: 1). By any measure, carbón trading has grown
impressively to establish itself as a new commodity.
The E U was initially unenthusiastic about the American insistence on the inclu-
sión of emissions trading in the Kyoto Protocol, but when it adopted the mantle of
climate change leader at the turn of the century. the E U turned to emissions trad-
ing as a means ensuring that member states would be able to meet existing and
future emission reduction targets. The E T S . launched in 2005, is a carbon-trading
scheme based upon the principies of cap-and-trade that allocates energy-intensive
installations a number of carbón permits that can then be traded. The scheme helps
overeóme the free rider problem by requiring all large European organisations -
currently around 12,000 sites are included - to join the E T S . By guaranteeing
the scheme will remain in place businesses have the long-term security to justitX
investing in cleaner technologies plus the financial incentive to cut emissions so
that they can sell surplus emissions permits for a profit in the new carbón mar-
ket. The E T S has had its teething problems. Phase 1 (2005-07) was criticised
because most permits were issued free, which enabled some businesses to make
a significant profit from them. Most member states also oversupplied permits.
which resulted in the price of carbón falling to a level so low that it was an inef-
fective incentive to reduce emissions. Overall, Phase 1 had little, if any, impac:
on GHG emissions. Phase 2 (2008-12) saw the European Commission exercis-
ing tougher control over the volume of permits allocated. a small number o:
 Climate Change and the Politics ofthe Global Environment 63

which were auctioned, so it is predicted that the E T S will now deliver signifi-
cant emission reductions. Phase 3 (2013-20) has been approved as part of the
EU's Climate Change package. It will centralise the allocation of permits, with a
iarger proportion to be auctioned, and it will be extended to include aviation.
Another important Kyoto innovation was the Clean Development Mechanism
• CDM), which is the only part of the Protocol that provides an active role for
developing countries to reduce their emissions. The C D M permits developed
countries to finance emissions-reduction projects in developing countries and
receive credits for doing so that count towards their Kyoto targets. An additional
incentive for Annex 1 countries is that it may be cheaper to achieve emission
reductions in developing countries than domestically. The attraction for devel-
oping countries is that CDM may facilitate technology transfer and attract new
foreign investment to projects that deliver sustainable development.
The C D M took off at a rapid rate after the Protocol entered into forcé in 2005,
boosted by the EU's decisión to allow credits earned under C D M to be traded
within the E T S . By August 2009, there were 1751 registered CDM projects, which
were estimated to deliver over 2.7 billion tonnes of emissions reductions by 2012
(IGES 2009). The assumption underpinning C D M is that all reductions in GHGs
are equally good for climate change mitigation, whether they occur in the U S A
or Mali. However, there are political costs if developed countries are perceived as
using CDM as an easy option to avoid having to rein in the consumerist lifestyles
of their own citizens. In short, it will fuel the familiar refrain from the South that
developing countries cannot be expected to take actions that might harm them if
the rich North is unwilling to accept some pain too.
The C D M has had its problems (Tickell 2008). For example, there is a concern
about the extent to which a CDM investment generates 'additionality', or sim-
ply finances a project that would have happened anyway. Many C D M schemes
are intended to produce short-term, low-cost GHG reductions, such as an end-of-
pipe luethane gas capture scheme, rather than a more capital-intensive renewable
energy scheme that might have a longer lead-in time before it generates emission
reduction benefits. Nevertheless, by most accounts C D M has been a success, but it
needs to be reformed if it is to genérate the volume of transfers of technology and
financial investment from rich to poor countries that will be essential to resolve
North-South tensions (Stern 2009).

The future of climate change politics

The international politics of climate change has seen the negotiation of a post-
Kyoto treaty secure a place - at least temporarily - on the table of high politics,
with efforts focused on achieving a deal at the Copenhagen COP-15 in December
2009. It seems that climate change is now established on the agenda of inter-
national politics. Moreover, while the literature on international environmental
politics has focused on the factors that enable or inhibit regime formation, it is
likely that several more traditional realist concerns will bolster the importance of
64 Neil Cárter

climate change. Growing concerns about energy security, encouraged by global

fluctuations in oil prices and the growing dependence of Europe on Russian gas,
make the case for any country to shift to a low-carbon economy increasingly per-
suasive. The inclusión of significant climate change measures within the fiscal
stimulus packages introduced during 2008-09 in China, France, South Korea,
the USA and elsewhere indicares that this kind of thinking is slowly percolating
through international policy élites. Indeed, Todd Stern, State Department Special
Envoy for Climate Change Issues, has observed that under the Obama adminis-
tration, climate change has 'risen up to the top of the U.S. national security set
of priorities' (America.gov 2009). There are also a range of trade and economic
issues associated that are likely to genérate conflict among developed countries
(such as the EU's decisión - opposed by the USA - to include aviation emissions
within the E T S ) and between developed and developing countries (such as the
expansión of biofuels), which seem likely to ensure that climate politics remains
on the top table.
Whatever deal is thrashed out to supersede Kyoto, the challenge of persuading
the major developing countries to embrace a development trajectory based on the
low-carbon economy will remain paramount. At a time of global recession, when
many developed countries will have to make public expenditure cuts for years
ahead, it is difficult to persuade governments to come up with the kinds of income
and technology transfers necessary to meet even the mínimum targets. Moreover,
as the damage we have already done becomes increasingly evident, humankind
will have to deal with the impact of climate change. Consequently, the interna-
tional agenda is tuming to the challenge of adaptation. which raises both new and
similar challenges. On the one hand. there is a fear in some circles that focus-
ing on adaptation shifts the emphasis away from mitigation. On the other hand,
the costs of adaptation will be unavoidable. high and, again. unevenly distributed
with developing countries suffering first and being less able to deal with the chal-
lenges. Henee the ongoing tensions between the developed and developing nations
are here to stay and are likely to intensify - possibly at the cost of a meaningful
international regime.
The only way out of this quagmire is if the developed world shows effective
and sustained leadership: but the prospects look bleak. Serious doubts remain
about the capacity of the USA to assume a leadership role. The USA is playing
'catch-up' (Paterson 2009). While the E U is on schedule to meet its overall Kyoto
reduction target, the USA has seen its emissions increase by around 15 per cent
since 1990, a far cry from its 7 per cent Kyoto reduction target. Moreover, the
underlying obstacles to US leadership on climate change have not disappeared,
as illustrated by the difficulties Obama faced in getting his Energy Bill through
Congress in 2009. The sentiment underpinning the Byrd-Hagel resolution persists
in the energy bilí clause imposing protectionist measures on those (developing)
countries not implementing GHG cuts. Yet it is questionable how far the USA can
act as a genuine leader that can persuade developing countries to make cuts when
the USA has such a sorry record of emissions reductions to date.
 Climate Change and the Politics ofthe Global Environment 65

The E U has established itself as the international climate change leader,

nuilding new institutions and making emissions trading and C D M work. It has
benefited economically from the important links it has established with China and
India through the implementation of CDM. Yet the E U too faces serious chal-
lenges if it is to maintain its leadership role. Although the E U will meet its overall
Kyoto target, most member states will require the help of the E T S and C D M cred-
its to meet their targets. The E U has eontinued to act by example with its 2020
reduction targets. but its Climate Change package is significantly less ambitious
than originally intended. partly because it was thrashed out in the depths of global
recession. Its capacity for progressive leadership has also been weakened by its
enlargement to 27 states, which has brought in a bloc of East European states,
such as Poland with its heavy dependence on coal, that are opposed to measures
that might damage economic growth.
Whatever deal eventually replaces Kyoto. it is important not to assume that
regime formation and implementation represent everything there is to say about
global climate change politics. There are numerous multilateral and bilateral
agreements that exist alongside - albeit often inspired by - the Kyoto process.
Transnational climate change governance has taken off rapidly in recent years.
The carbón market has grown exponentially. with the E U E T S likely to be supple-
mented (and linked) to planned emissions trading systems in the USA, Australia
and New Zealand. Beyond that, a myriad of public-private partnerships, prívate,
\oluntary and individual initiatives are flourishing (Paterson 2009: 150-1). In
short, climate change governance has a momentum of its own that might be ham-
pered, but not undermined by a failure in the overarching international regime
process.

Guide to further reading

Several books offer lively introductions to international climate change politics

(Giddens 2009: Schreuder 2009: Stern 2009: Tickell 2008). It is important to
grasp the stark reality of climate change science (IPCC 2007) and the com-
plexity of the relationship between science and policy (Hulme 2009). The Stern
Report is essential reading to grasp the economic case for global action on climate
change (Stern 2007). The academic journals Climate Policy, Environmental Poli-
tics and Global Environmental Politics are a rich source of reading on all aspects
of climate change politics and policy. Political philosophers have also engaged
constructively with the ethical issues raised by North-South issues and equitable
burden-sharing (Environmental Politics 2008; Garvey 2008). There is a growing
literature on climate change and environmental security (Dalby 2009; Homer-
Dixon 1999; Lacy 2005). It is also useful to lócate climate change in the wider
literature on international environmental politics and policy (Cárter 2007; Clapp
and Dauvergne 2005).