Indigenous African Institutions 2nd Edition

George B. N. Ayittey pdf download

https://ebookname.com/product/indigenous-african-
institutions-2nd-edition-george-b-n-ayittey/

Get the full ebook with Bonus Features for a Better Reading Experience on ebookname.com
Instant digital products (PDF, ePub, MOBI) available
Download now and explore formats that suit you...

Essentials of the Mechanics of Materials 2nd Edition

George N. Frantziskonis

https://ebookname.com/product/essentials-of-the-mechanics-of-
materials-2nd-edition-george-n-frantziskonis/

The African Union Challenges of globalization security

and governance Global Institutions Samuel Makinda

https://ebookname.com/product/the-african-union-challenges-of-
globalization-security-and-governance-global-institutions-samuel-
makinda/

Relocating Agency Modernity and African Letters 1st

Edition Olakunle George

https://ebookname.com/product/relocating-agency-modernity-and-
african-letters-1st-edition-olakunle-george/

The Hound of the Baskervilles Webster s German

Thesaurus Edition Arthur Conan Doyle

https://ebookname.com/product/the-hound-of-the-baskervilles-
webster-s-german-thesaurus-edition-arthur-conan-doyle/
Vascular Medicine A Companion to Braunwald s Heart
Disease Expert Consult Online and Print 1e 1st Edition
Mark A. Creager

https://ebookname.com/product/vascular-medicine-a-companion-to-
braunwald-s-heart-disease-expert-consult-online-and-print-1e-1st-
edition-mark-a-creager/

Secret Fleets 1st Edition Cairns

https://ebookname.com/product/secret-fleets-1st-edition-cairns/

Burn for Me Hidden Legacy 01 Ilona Andrews

https://ebookname.com/product/burn-for-me-hidden-legacy-01-ilona-
andrews/

Racial Castration Managing Masculinity in Asian America

David L. Eng

https://ebookname.com/product/racial-castration-managing-
masculinity-in-asian-america-david-l-eng/

Marijuana Politics Uncovering the Troublesome History

and Social Costs of Criminalization Robert M Hardaway

https://ebookname.com/product/marijuana-politics-uncovering-the-
troublesome-history-and-social-costs-of-criminalization-robert-m-
hardaway/
Life Witness Evolution of the Psychotherapist 1st
Edition T. Byram Karasu

https://ebookname.com/product/life-witness-evolution-of-the-
psychotherapist-1st-edition-t-byram-karasu/
 INDIGENOUS
AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS
Second Edition

George B.N. Ayittey

T r a n s n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s
Published and distributed by Transnational Publishers, Inc.
Ardsley Park Science and Technology Center
410 Saw Mill River Road
Ardsley, NY 10502
___________________

Phone: 914–693–5100
Fax: 914–693–4430
E-mail: [email protected]
Web: www.transnationalpubs.com

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ayittey, George B. N., 1945-

Indigenous African institutions / George B. N. Ayittey. 2nd ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-57105-337-9
1. Indigenous peoples—Africa. 2. Africa—Politics and government. 3.
Africa— History. 4. Customary law—Africa—History. 5. Chiefdoms—Africa—
History. 6. Africa—Social life and customs. I. Title.

GN645.A88 2006
960—dc22
2006041784

Copyright © 2006 by Transnational Publishers, Inc.

All rights reserved. This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any
form (beyond that copying permitted by U.S. Copyright Law in Section 107, “fair
use” in teaching and research, Section 108, certain library copying, and except in
published media by reviewers in limited excerpts), without written permission
from the publisher.

Manufactured in the United States of America

Dedicated to African Leaders and Elites—For Their Re-education
Books by the same author:
Africa Betrayed
The Blueprint for Ghana’s Economic Recovery
Africa In Chaos
Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Development

Forthcoming books:
The African Conundrum
Africa’s Leadership Crisis
The Rape of Africa
 CONTENTS

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

INTRODUCTION: A CENTURY LOST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

A. Africa’s Economic Collapse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. Who Ruined Africa? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
C. Western Culpability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
D. The Fundamental Cause of Postcolonial Africa’s Ruin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
E. Myths and Misconceptions About Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
F. The Common Sense Approach to Africa’s Ills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
G. Aim and Purpose of Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

CHAPTER 1: THE INDIGENOUS SOCIAL SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

A. The Peasants’ Social Structure and Organization: A Comparative
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
B. African Beliefs, Religion, and Customs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1. Philosophical Tenets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2. The Individual Versus the Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3. The Fundamental Rights of the African People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4. The Concept of Wealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5. Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
C. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

CHAPTER 2: THE INDIGENOUS LEGAL INSTITUTIONS . . . . . . . . . 67

A. Natural Law, Customary Law, and Statutory Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
B. Native Courts—Courts and Customary Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
1. Jurisprudence in Stateless Societies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2. Jurisprudence in States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
C. Contracts and Property Rights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
1. Property Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
2. Settlement of Disputes and Court Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
D. Interethnic Conflicts and Disputes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
E. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

CHAPTER 3: INDIGENOUS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS . . . . . . . . 105

A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
B. Stateless Societies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
1. Organizational Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
a. The Igbo Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
b. The Fulani of Northern Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
c. The Somali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

v
vi INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

d. The Gikuyu of Kenya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

e. The !Kung of the Kalahari . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
2. Selection and Role of the Headman in Stateless Societies . . . . . . . 130
C. Government in Chiefdoms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
1. Day-to-Day Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

CHAPTER 4: THE AFRICAN CHIEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

A. The Selection of the Chief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
B. The Functions of the Chief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
C. “Corruption as a Cultural Trait”—A Digression. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
D. Checks Against Abuse of Power by the Chief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
1. Religious or Supernatural Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
2. Institutionalized Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
a. Private and Public Admonitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
b. Prohibitions Against Office of Chieftaincy or Kingship . . . . . 164
c. Political Pressure from Various Groups and Associations . . . . 166
E. The Destoolment of the Chief (Removal from Office) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
F. Spontaneous (Peasant) Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
G. Lemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

CHAPTER 5: AFRICAN KINGDOMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

A. Organizational Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
1. The Serer State/Kingdom (Senegal). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
2. The Kingdoms of Sierra Leone (Temne and Mende) . . . . . . . . . . . 189
3. The Mossi States/Kingdoms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
4. The Ga-Dangme Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
5. The Kingdom of Ife . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
6. The Kingdom of Kongo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
7. The Basoga Kingdom of Uganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
8. The Swazi Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
9. The Zulu Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
B. Exceptional Kingdoms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
1. The Kingdom of Dahomey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
2. The Dyola Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
C. The Traditional Role of African Kings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
1. The African Concept of the Universe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
2. The King’s Link to the Universe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
D. The Selection and Removal of African Kings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
1. The King of Cayor (Former Province of Ghana) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
2. The Bur (Serer King) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
3. The Ga King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
4. The Asante King. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
5. The Oni or Oba (Yoruba King) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
6. The Kongo King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
CONTENTS vii

7. The Luba King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

8. The Zibondo of Basoga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
9. The Kabaka of Buganda. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

CHAPTER 6: GOVERNMENT IN NATIVE AFRICAN EMPIRES . . . . 233

A. By Assimilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
1. The Mandinka (Islamic) Empire, 1870–98 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
2. The Eighteenth Century Zande Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
3. The Zulu Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
B. By Indirect Rule. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
1. The Ancient Empire of Ghana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
2. The Wolof Empire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
3. The Mali Empire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
4. Nineteenth Century Asante Empire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
5. The Oyo Empire (Yoruba) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
6. The Kingdom of Benin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
7. The Kanuri Empire (Northern Nigeria) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
8. The Lunda Empire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
9. The Kingdom of Kuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
10. The Empire of Mwene Mutapa (Great Zimbabwe) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

CHAPTER 7: THE NATIVE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT:

A SUMMARY AND AN ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
A. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
1. Chiefdoms and Kingdoms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
a. Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
b. Indigenous Curbs Against Despotism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
c. Native Freedom of Expression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
d. Peasants’ Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
2. The Empires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
a. Checks Against African Imperialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
b. Absence of Strong Centralized Rule. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
B. Features of the Indigenous Political System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
1. Beliefs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
2. Native Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
3. The Political System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
C. The Indigenous African Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
D. The Indigenous African Political System: An Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . 297
E. Kritarchy and Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305

CHAPTER 8: THE INDIGENOUS ECONOMIC SYSTEM:

CAPITAL AND PRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
A. The “Economic Problem” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
B. Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
viii INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

1. Organization and Occupations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317

2. The Factors of Production: Supplies and Ownership. . . . . . . . . . . . 322
a. Land Tenure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
b. Land and Chief in the Tribal Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
c. Land Acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
d. Land Grab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
e. Land Sale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335
f. Land Reform—A Digression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
g. Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342
h. Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344
i. Entrepreneurship and the Profit Motive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346

CHAPTER 9: THE INDIGENOUS ECONOMIC SYSTEM:

DISTRIBUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
A. Free Market and Free Trade Tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
1. Markets Types and Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
a. Market Regulations and Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360
b. Market Tolls and Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
c. The Importance of Markets in Indigenous Africa. . . . . . . . . . . 363
d. Media of Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
e. Market Prices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
f. Role of Women in the Distribution System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381
2. Means of Transportation/Roads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
B. The Role of Government in the Indigenous Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
1. Government Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
2. Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
C. Summary of the Features of the Indigenous Economic System . . . . . . . 401
1. Land Tenure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
2. European Enterprise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
D. The Indigenous Economic System: An Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404
E. Appendix: Gold Is Black and a Curse. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410

CHAPTER 10: THE INDIGENOUS INSTITUTIONS UNDER

COLONIALISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415
A. Colonialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415
1. Early Contacts and Scramble for Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415
2. Resistance Against Colonialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418
B. The Colonial State and Traditional Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421
1. Colonial Atrocities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421
2. African Chiefs Under Colonialism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
3. Colonial Policies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426
4. The Native Institutions Under Colonialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432
C. Colonialism: An Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442
1. European Imperialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442
2. Arab Imperialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449
CONTENTS ix

CHAPTER 11: THE POSTCOLONIAL DESTRUCTION AND

BETRAYAL OF AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459
A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
B. Monumental Leadership Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 462
C. The Ten-Count Indictment Against the Postcolonial Leadership . . . . . . 467
1. Charge Number 1: The Betrayal of the Cause for Freedom. . . . . . . 467
2. Charge Number 2: The Institution of Brutal Political Tyranny . . . . 468
3. Charge Number 3: Intellectual Repression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 472
4. Charge Number 4: Refusal to Take Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477
5. Charge Number 5: Functional Illiteracy—
“Development by Imitation” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 478
6. Charge Number 6: The Imposition of Alien Ideologies and
Systems on Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 479
a. Socialism—An Alien Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480
b. “Swiss-Bank” Socialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482
7. Charge Number 7: The Economic Ruination of Africa . . . . . . . . . . 483
a. The Golden Age of Peasant Prosperity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484
8. Charge Number 8: Butchers, Bombers, and Bandits (The 3-Bs). . . 488
a. The Butchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488
b. The Bombers/Destroyers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489
c. The Bandits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489
9. Charge Number 9: Denigration of the Indigenous. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 491
a. The Indigenous Versus Western Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 491
10. Charge Number 10: The Persecution of the African Chief . . . . . . . 494
D. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 506

CHAPTER 12: EPILOGUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 507

A. Africa Beyond the New Millennium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 507
B. Botswana: Indigenous Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 511
1. The Keys to Botswana’s Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514
C. Somalia’s Collapse: Elite Folly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517
D. African Solutions for African Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 523
E. Selected African Solutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525
1. Resolving Political Crises: The African Way . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525
2. Conflict Resolution: The African Way . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 528
a. Benin City (Nigeria)—A Haven of Tranquility . . . . . . . . . . . . 533
3. Rural Development Under a Traditional Chief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 535
a. KwaDumisa: A Successful Village Development Model . . . . . 538
4. Traditional Medicine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540
5. Integrating the Traditional and Modern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 551
a. Conservation: Lesson Under a Mango Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 551
b. How a Modern African Country Should Be Governed. . . . . . . 552
x INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

Maps
Map 1: Principal Peoples and Languages of Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 559
Map 2: Trans-Saharan Trade Routes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 560
Map 3: Precolonial African States and Kingdoms,
Tenth-Sixteenth Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 561
Map 4: Precolonial African States and Kingdoms,
Sixteen-Nineteenth Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 562
Map 5: Colonial Africa—1913 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 563
Map 6: Political Map of Africa—1990. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 565
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 575
 ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Ayittey, a native of Ghana, is a Distinguished Economist at American

University and President of the Free Africa Foundation, both in Washington, D.C.
He obtained his B.Sc. (Economics) at the University of Ghana, M.A. (Economics)
at the University of Western Ontario, London (Canada), and his Ph.D. from the
University of Manitoba, Winnipeg (Canada) in 1981 with an overall GPA of 4.00.
Dr. Ayittey was nominated in 1987 for The Africa Prize for Leadership by
The Times of London, became a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution,
Stanford University (Stanford, California) in 1988, and a Bradley Scholar at the
Heritage Foundation (Washington, D.C.) in 1989. He has received numerous
awards and grants, including “The President’s Visiting Scholar,” California State
University, Chico (2000), Faculty Award for Outstanding Teaching, American
University (1996), and grants from the Earhart Foundation, J.M. Kaplan Fund,
and American University. In 1993, he started The Free Africa Foundation in
Washington, D.C., to serve as a catalyst for reform in Africa.
An internationally renowned authority on Africa, Dr. Ayittey has written sev-
eral books on Africa, including Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Its Future
(Jan. 2005), Africa in Chaos (Jan. 1998), The Blueprint for Ghana’s Economic
Recovery (1997), and Africa Betrayed (1992), which won the H.L. Mencken
Award: “Best Book for 1992.” (The award is named after the American journal-
ist who championed personal freedom.)
A frequent contributor to The Wall Street Journal and The Los Angeles Times,
he has written numerous book chapters and articles on Africa and the Third World,
which have appeared in such other publications as Globe and Mail (Canada), The
Times of London, USA TODAY, The New York Times, The CATO Journal, World
Development, Humane Studies Review, Journal of Defense and Diplomacy,
Journal of Economic Affairs, Journal of Economic Growth, and Foreign Trade
Review. His articles have been syndicated for worldwide distribution and some
have been reprinted in Reader’s Digest, International Herald and Tribune, Jeune
Afrique Economie, and numerous papers in Africa.
Dr. Ayittey has also appeared on several radio talk shows and TV programs,
including NBC Nightly News, Canada AM, CBS “Nightwatch,” ABC “Nightline,”
Christian Science Monitor TV, Jim Lehrer NewsHour, C-SPAN, FOX News, CNN
International, and CNN “Crossfire” with Rev. Jesse Jackson. He makes frequent
commentaries on NPR, Voice of America (Straight Talk Africa), BBC World
Service. He has been featured in TV documentaries (Border Jumpers, PBS Wide,
2005; “Burden On The Land,” Roger Pyke Productions, Toronto, Canada, 1990),

xi
xii INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

and interviews with Bill Moyers, Bill O’Reilly, Robert Novak, and Charlie Rose.
Dr. Ayittey has testified before the Standing Committee on Foreign Relations
at the Senate of Canada and many U.S. congressional committees. He has served
as a consultant to several organizations, including the World Bank, U.S. AID, and
the Instituto Libertad y Democracia (ILD), Lima, Peru, headed by Hernando de
Soto. He has given numerous lectures to various organizations, institutions and
universities, including the National Bar Association, the IMF, the U.S. State
Department, U.S. Foreign Service, and the U.N. Development Program (UNDP).
He has been cited in many publications, including the American Economic
Review, The New York Times, Scientific American, The Economist, Associated
Press, The Kiplinger Report, TIME EUROPE, The Boston Globe: The Ottawa
Citizen, Newsweek, The Chicago Tribune, Investment Business Daily, The
Washington Times, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Oakland Tribune, The Asian
Wall Street Journal, and The Miami Herald.
In December 1990, Dr. Ayittey was invited by the White House to com-
memorate the signing of a Human Rights Proclamation by President Bush. In
2003, he was invited to make a presentation before the Presidential Advisory
Council on HIV/AIDS, regarding President Bush’s $15 billion Emergency
AIDS Relief Plan. And in 2004, he was invited again to the White House for the
signing ceremony of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) by
President Bush.
On February 18, 2006, Dr. Ayittey was made “Nkosuohene” (Chief) of Teacher
Mante, a village in Ghana, with the official title: Nana Obenfo Nkosuohene
Professor Ayittey Mante II.
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My debt of gratitude, on a project such as this, is enormous. Several indi-

viduals, both Africans and non-Africans, foundations, and institutes have actively
or indirectly supported my research into indigenous African institutions. This sup-
port has been indispensable, especially when my spirits were faltering.
As most researchers of African issues would testify, the obstacles that stand
in the way of scholarly inquiries can be daunting. They range from the dearth of
reliable data, difficulties in conducting field work in Africa, and the attendant
problems with transportation, communications, logistics to downright uncooper-
ative attitude of suspicious African government officials, and even personal safety.
In the course of my research in Africa, Kenyan security agents raided my room at
the Intercontinental Hotel (November 1989) and seized documents and articles I
was carrying in my suitcase. I was tossed into jail in Dakar, Senegal (January
1994), as well as trailed by security agents whenever I traveled to Ghana and
Zimbabwe. Even Washington, D.C., in the United States was no sanctuary. My
office at American University was fire-bombed in February 1999, causing the loss
of nearly 80 percent of the contents of my office, including book manuscripts
saved on diskettes. Back-ups in the office were also incinerated. Support at such
times was invaluable.
Deserving of foremost mention for producing the first edition of this book is
Earhart Foundation, Ann Arbor, Michigan, which provided me with funding
grants for two summers (1987 and 1988) to help cover the cost of research and
field trips to Africa. The Hoover Institution, Stanford University, where I spent a
year (1988–1989) as a National Fellow, equally deserves my gratitude. Hoover
provided me with such facilities—archives, office space, outstanding computer
facilities and excellent secretarial support—that I was able to complete three book
manuscripts: Indigenous African Institutions, Africa Betrayed and The African
Economic Crisis: The Indigenous Solution. Other organizations and institutions
are equally deserving of mention: The Cato Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the
Center of Study of Public Choice and Institute of Humane Studies at George
Mason University. For this second edition, the J.M. Kaplan Fund has been gener-
ous in providing financial support.
I have been fortunate to receive critical reviews from my colleagues at
American University and encouragement from Mary Kaplan, Koshin Mohammed,
and Ablorh Odjidja in particular. There are many others that I still owe a debt of
gratitude—numerous Africans who have shown unflinching support for my work
and writings.

xiii
xiv INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

Although my debt of gratitude is enormous, the views expressed in this book

are solely my own. Any errors, omissions, and misstatements are entirely my
responsibility.
George B.N. Ayittey, Ph.D.
American University,
Washington, D.C.
January 2006
 INTRODUCTION

A CENTURY LOST

One hundred years ago, our trading was limited to the supply of raw
materials, mainly gold, timber and cocoa. One hundred years later, our
trading consists of raw materials, mainly gold, timber and cocoa. I must
admit that Ghana’s path towards self-reliance has not been smooth. I am
painfully aware that our past can be characterized by one step forward
and two steps backward.
—President John A Kufuor of Ghana (The Financial Gazette, May
3, 2002).

The lack of real economic development in many African countries is due

to poor, and sometimes outright irresponsible leadership.
—President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria in an address to the
African Ministerial Forum on Integrated Transport in Africa (AMFIT)
(This Day, Mar. 11, 2003, web posted).

A. AFRICA’S ECONOMIC COLLAPSE

The twentieth century has been described as a “Lost Century” for Africa.
Once a region with rich natural resources, as well as bountiful stores of optimism
and hope, the African continent now teeters perilously on the brink of economic
disintegration and collapse. Africa’s paradox is stupefying. Its untapped mineral
wealth is immense. As an old continent, it is the source of strategic minerals, such
as tantalite, vanadium, palladium, uranium, and chromium. It has the bulk of the
world’s gold, cobalt, diamonds, and manganese. Compared to the Asian continent,
Africa is not overpopulated. Therefore, it “has enormous un-exploited potential in
resource-based sectors and in processing and manufacturing. It also has hidden
growth reserves in its people—including the potential of its women, who now pro-
vide more than half of the region’s labor force” (World Bank 2000, 12).
Yet, paradoxically, a continent with such abundance and potential is inex-
orably mired in steaming squalor, misery, deprivation, and chaos. The Congo
Basin is extremely rich in minerals, but its people are yet to derive any substan-
tial benefit from that wealth. Instead, they have slipped with indecent haste back

1
2 INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

to near stone-age existence. Provision of basic social services—such as educa-

tion, health care, sanitation, clean water, and roads—is nonexistent. In the east-
ern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), particularly in Goma, there
is no government. Freelance banditry and pillage are the daily fare. No one is in
control of anything—not even rebel groups of their own people. Lancet, Britain’s
leading medical journal, reported in a study that, “War-ravaged Congo is suffer-
ing the world’s deadliest medical crisis, with 38,000 people dying each month,
mostly from easily treatable conditions like diarrhea and respiratory infections.
Nearly 4 million people died between 1998 and 2004 alone, an indirect result of
years of fighting that has brought on a collapse of public health services” (The
New York Times, Jan. 7, 2006, A3).
When Ghana gained its independence on March 6, 1957, it stood at the same
level of development as South Korea. Both countries had income per capita of
$200. At independence, there was much hope for Ghana. The country’s economic
potential was enormous: rich endowments of minerals (gold, diamonds, bauxite,
manganese); cash crops (cocoa, coffee, kola nuts); and timber. In addition, Ghana
had a well-educated population, a relatively larger professional and educated class
than many other African countries. But fifty years later, South Korea’s income per
capita was about thirty times that of Ghana: $12,200 versus $420. Nigeria also
stood at the same stage of development with South Korea in 1960, but forty years
later, Africa’s most populous nation, seems uncharitably mired in convulsive vio-
lence and grinding poverty with nearly the same per capita income as in 1960—
as if the economy hibernated.
Independence and freedom from colonial rule did not bring the prosperity
promised by the nationalist leaders. Poverty levels instead increased sharply in the
postcolonial period. By the early 1990s, the dreams of many Africans had been
shattered: they were economically worse off than they were at independence
(World Bank 1989, 4). Economic collapse of Africa could have ramifications for
the rest of the world. British Prime Minister Tony Blair cautioned that “the West
could face new terrorist threats unless measures were taken to relieve African
poverty. More [African] states would collapse into anarchy and mayhem,” he
added (BBC World Service, Feb. 6, 2002).
On July 8, 2003, the United Nations issued a stern warning about worsening
economic and social conditions in black Africa, just as U.S. President George W.
Bush, began a five-day tour of the continent. In its Human Development Report
(2003), the UN Development Program (UNDP) warned that at the prevailing
rates, black Africa would take another 150 years to reach some of the develop-
ment targets agreed by UN members for 2015.

Unless things improve it will take sub-Saharan Africa until 2129 to

achieve universal primary education, until 2147 to halve extreme poverty
and until 2165 to cut child mortality by two thirds. For hunger no date
can be set because the region’s situation continues to worsen” (Financial
Times, July 9, 2003, 1).
INTRODUCTION 3

The exceptions to the general economic atrophy in Africa have been few. The
World Bank periodically trots out a phantom list of “economic success stories” in
Africa—only to vanish a few years later. Back in 1994, the World Bank, after
spending $25 billion to reform the economies of twenty-nine African countries,
identified the following six as “economic success stories”—The Gambia, Burkina
Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Six years later, these six coun-
tries had vanished from the World Bank’s list. Worse, Ghana and Tanzania were
on HIPC (highly indebted poor country) life support system, while Zimbabwe’s
economy had utterly collapsed. As if to admit its own failure, the World Bank
“forecasts that in Africa and the Middle East, the number of ‘absolute poor” will
increase between 2005 and 2015” (OECD Observer, May 2005, 32).

B. WHO RUINED AFRICA?

A diagnosis of Africa’s ills always generates heated and emotional debates,
because there is plenty of blame to spread around. But the blame-game, as we
shall see, detracts from the fundamental issues. Generally, however, there have
been two passionate and equally virulent schools of thought on the causes of
Africa’s crises. The predominant school—the externalist—believes that Africa’s
woes are due to such external factors as Western colonialism and imperialism, the
pernicious effects of the slave trade, racist conspiracy plots, exploitation by avari-
cious multinational corporations, an unjust international economic system, inad-
equate flows of foreign aid, and deteriorating terms of trade, among others.
Disciples of this school include most African leaders, scholars, and intellectual
radicals. For decades, this externalist position held sway in academic and politi-
cal circles and always portrayed Africa as a “victim” of some hostile external
forces—real or chimerical.
The New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), for
example, claims that Africa’s impoverishment has been accentuated by the legacy
of colonialism and other historical legacies, such as the Cold War and the unjust
international economic system. Colonialism subverted the “traditional structures,
institutions and values,” creating an economy “subservient to the economic and
political needs of the imperial powers” (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/home.
php, para. 21). Colonialism, according to NEPAD, retarded the development of
an entrepreneurial and middle class with managerial capability. At independence,
Africa inherited a “weak capitalist class,” which explains the “weak accumulation
process, weak states and dysfunctional economies” (para. 22). More recent rea-
sons for Africa’s dire condition include “its continued marginalization from glob-
alization process” (para. 2).
Naturally, this stance reflects that of African leaders, who blame everybody
else but themselves for Africa’s woes. According to Issifu Ali, the Chairman of
Ghana’s former National Democratic Congress, whatever economic crisis the
nation was going through had been caused by external factors. “He said the NDC
has since 1982 adopted pragmatic policies for the progress of Ghana, adding that
4 INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

the macro-economic environment of 1999 has been undermined by global eco-

nomic developments” (The Independent, Nov. 18, 1999, 3). For his part, former
president Daniel arap Moi of Kenya accused the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and other development partners of denying Kenya development funds, thus
triggering mass poverty (Washington Times, June 3, 1999, A12). In an address to
commemorate independence from Britain, President Robert Mugabe blamed
Britain and the United States for the crisis in his country and told a rally in Harare
in April 2003 that they were trying to “re-colonize” Zimbabwe by leading a cam-
paign against him. “Never again will Zimbabwe be a colony,” he said (Reuters)
(The New York Times, Apr. 19, 2003, A4).
By the mid-1980s, a new and angry generation of Africans had emerged,
totally fed up with African leaders who refused to take responsibility for their
own failures and instead used colonialism and other external factors as conve-
nient alibis to conceal their own mismanagement and incompetence. This group
may be called “the internalists,” who believe that, while external factors have
played a role, internal factors are far more significant in causing Africa’s crisis.
This group maintains that, while it is true that Western colonialism and imperi-
alism did not leave Africa in good shape, Africa’s condition has been made
immeasurably worse by internal factors: misguided leadership, misgovernance,
systemic corruption, capital flight, economic mismanagement, declining invest-
ment, collapsed infrastructure, decayed institutions, senseless civil wars, politi-
cal tyranny, flagrant violations of human rights, and military vandalism. Even
Africa’s children form part of this group of internalists who no longer buy the
colonialism-imperialism claptrap.
Chernoh Bah, President of the Children’s Forum asserted that Africa’s socio-
economic problems are a direct repercussion of incompetent and corrupt politi-
cal leaders who usurped political office via the gun. “Some blame colonialism for
Africa’ plight while others blame the continent’s harsh climatic conditions. I think
the reason is the kind of political systems we have had over the past decades,” he
said. (Standard Times [Freetown], Apr. 2, 2003, web posted). At the UN Children’s
Summit held in May 2002 in New York, youngsters from Africa ripped into their
leaders for failing to improve their education and health. “You get loans that will
be paid in 20 to 30 years and we have nothing to pay them with, because when
you get the money, you embezzle it, you eat it,” said twelve-year-old Joseph
Tamale from Uganda (BBC News, May 10, 2002).
Back in 1981, some Ghanaian peasants were openly calling upon Britain to
recolonize the country. In Nigeria, a former governor in the Second Republic Sam
Mbakwe, publicly “advocated for the return of the colonists who, he stressed,
would lead the country back to political sanity” (West Africa, Mar. 18–24, 1991,
409). Not that colonialism was preferable, but that call represented an unequivo-
cal indictment of African heads of state and kleptocrats who had failed their peo-
ple. Said Akobeng Eric, a Ghanaian, in a letter to the Free Press (Mar. 29–Apr.
11, 1996): “A big obstacle to economic growth in Africa is the tendency to put all
INTRODUCTION 5

blame, failures and shortcomings on outside forces. Progress might have been
achieved if we had always tried first to remove the mote in our own eyes” (2).
In Zimbabwe, the people did not buy President Mugabe’s claim that “Britain,
greedy Western powers, the IMF, the Asian financial crisis and the drought” were
responsible for the country’s economic mess. They rejected his request for con-
stitutional revisions to give him more draconian powers in a February 15, 2000,
referendum, handing him his first political defeat in twenty years of virtually
unchallenged rule.
Even UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, himself an African, lashed out at
African leaders at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit in Lome,
Togo, in July 2000. He pointedly told them that they were to blame for most of
the continent’s problems. “Instead of being exploited for the benefit of the peo-
ple, Africa’s mineral resources have been so mismanaged and plundered that they
are now the source of our misery” (Daily Graphic, July 12, 2000, 5). Earlier in
the year at a press conference in London in April, 2000, Kofi Annan, “lambasted
African leaders who he said had subverted democracy and lined their pockets
with public funds, although he stopped short of naming names” (The African-
American Observer, Apr. 25–May 1, 2000, 10). During a brief stop-over in Accra,
he disclosed in a Joy FM radio station interview that “Africa is the region giving
him the biggest headache as the Security Council spends 60 to 70% of its time on
Africa. He admitted sadly and that the conflicts on the continent embarrasses and
pains him as an African” (The Guide, July 18–24, 2000, 8).

C. WESTERN CULPABILITY
To be sure, in ruining Africa, African leaders and governments were “aided,”
intellectually and financially, by various international aid agencies, financial insti-
tutions, and all sorts of people, even including African Americans. Indeed, the
World Bank (1989) itself admitted:

Responsibility for Africa’s economic crisis is shared. Donor agencies and

foreign advisers have been heavily involved in past development efforts
along with African governments themselves. Governments and donors
must be prepared to change their thinking fundamentally in order to
revive Africa’s fortunes. However, Africa’s future can only be decided by
Africans. External agencies can play at most a supportive role (2).

But the World Bank did not instruct Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi,
to order his police to open fire on demonstrators protesting the results of the May
28, 2005, elections, killing more than forty people. Neither did the World Bank
or the IMF persuade President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe to demolish shanty-
towns and squatter villages around Harare in June 2005. “The United Nations
estimates that the campaign, Operation Murambatsvina, using a Shona word
meaning “drive out the rubbish,” has so far left 200,000 people homeless and
6 INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

30,000 vendors jobless. Human rights and civic leaders say the numbers could be
several times that, a view that seemed plausible during a four-day visit to Harare
and Bulawayo, the nation’s second-largest city, and points between (The New York
Times, June 11, 2005, A3). Nor did Western neocolonialists order the late
Presidents Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the
Congo) and General Sani Abacha of Nigeria to loot their countries’ treasuries for
deposit in Swiss banks.
Instead of addressing personal and leadership failures, black intellectuals and
African government officials have overplayed the racism, slavery, Western colo-
nialism, and imperialism card to the point of absurdity. These external factors had
nothing—absolutely nothing—to do with the incompetent, irresponsible, and bru-
tal actions of “modern and educated” African leaders that have caused the
destruction of many African countries and the deaths of millions of people. If
General Siad Barre of Somalia, General Juvenal Habryimana of Rwanda,
General Pierre Buyoya of Burundi, General Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, General
Samuel Doe of Liberia, General Joseph Momoh of Sierra Leone, General Robert
Guie of Ivory Coast, and General Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo had been willing
to relinquish and share political power, each of their countries would have been
saved. And note the frequency of the title, General.
It is also true the West supported or propped up some of Africa’s despots but
so too did other blocs. The historical record shows that each foreign entity goes to
Africa to pursue its own interests: the Americans, Arabs, Europeans, and Russians.
Certainly, the Chinese do not go to Africa because they love black people so much.
It is African leaders who must defend and pursue Africa’s interests, but do they?
Of course not; they are more interested in pursuing their own selfish personal
interests. They care less about their people and squander scarce resources on
unnecessary luxury items and prestigious projects. Consider the following:

• President Robert Mugabe has bought a new presidential fleet which

consists of a state-of-the-art limousine for himself, a second limou-
sine for one of the vice-presidents, two Mercedes Benz sedans and
19 presidential escort trucks with total value of $250 million
(http://www.mweb.co.zw/standard/index.php?id=3880&pub-
date=2001-11-18).
• Nigeria has taken delivery of 9 Russian-made attack helicopters at
a reported cost of $100 million. The 6 Mi-35 and 3 Mi-34 heli-
copters are expected to consolidate Nigeria’s position as West
Africa’s unrivaled military leader. A respected daily newspaper, The
Vanguard, said the helicopters were ordered by the previous military
regime (The New York Times, Apr. 5, 2001, A6).
• LILONGWE,—Plans to purchase a US $545,000 limousine for
President Bingu wa Mutharika have sparked heated debate in
Malawi, which faces yet another year of acute food shortages.
Finance Minister Goodall Gondwe told parliament on Wednesday
INTRODUCTION 7

that the Maybach 62, made by Mercedes-Benz, was necessary, as

the president was without an official vehicle. The car used by for-
mer president Bakili Muluzi was involved in an accident last year,
and the government intended to pay for the new vehicle in install-
ments (Integrated Regional Information Network, IRIN, United
Nations June 16, 2005).

The intention here is not to exculpate Western or other foreign misdeeds in

Africa but to place at center stage the role and responsibility of modern post-
colonial leadership in Africa’s ruination. Too many excuses have been made for
them from both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, but these leaders must be held
accountable—just as traditional African leaders are, as we shall see in this book.
President Levy Mwanawasa of Zambia, where 75 percent of its 10 million peo-
ple live on less than $1 a day, said he was “tired” of his office as Zambia’s
President and apologized to his country for failing to tackle poverty, but insisted
he will stay in office until elections are due in 2006. “It has not been possible to
reduce poverty and I feel sad about it, as it is one of my failures. Unfortunately,
if Zambians made a mistake to elect me as president; they are stuck with me until
2006,” he said (BBC Africa, Jan. 12, 2005, at http://www.bbc.co.uk). Racism,
slavery, and colonialism have little to do with modern African leadership failure.
And making excuses for modern leadership failures does not help the African
people. According to Nigeria’s President Olusegun Obasanjo, “corrupt African
leaders have stolen at least $140 billion (£95 billion) from their people in the
decades since independence” (London Independent, June 14, 2002, at www.inde-
pendent.co.uk).
It is always crucial to maintain a distinction between African leaders and the
African people. It is the leadership that has been the problem, not the people. This
distinction is important for four reasons. First, Westerners often use the generic
term “Africans”—as in “Africans are reforming their economies.” Which
Africans: the leaders or the people? Second, there are many Westerners, who
naively think that the best way of helping the African people is by working with
or handing money over to their leaders. Third, other Westerners are reluctant to
criticize the misguided and inept policies of African leaders for fear of being
labeled “racist.” But such overt racial oversensitivity or political correctness hands
the leadership a free pass and compounds Africa’s woes. Finally, the primary and
ultimate responsibility of developing Africa and feeding its people rests with
African leaders or governments, not Western donors.

D. THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE OF POSTCOLONIAL AFRICA’S RUIN

The plight of Africa periodically attracts world attention, which cynics may
describe as “a ten-year attention deficit cycle.” Every decade or so, megaplans are
drawn up and rock concerts held to launch an international rescue mission for
Africa. Acrimonious wrangling over financing modalities ensues. Years slip by,
8 INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

and then a decade later, another grand Africa initiative is unveiled. Back in 1985,
there was Live Aid and a “Special Session on Africa” held by the United Nations
to boost aid to Africa. Then in March 1996, the United Nations launched a $25
billion Special Initiative for Africa. About ten years later in 2005, a cacophonous
galaxy of rock stars, antipoverty activists, and heads of state called upon the G-
8 countries to cancel Africa’s $350 billion crippling foreign debt and double aid
to the continent. British Prime Minister Tony Blair made aid to Africa the cen-
terpiece in Britain’s presidency of the G-8 meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland in
July, 2005. Live 8 rock concerts were held simultaneously in eight Western cities.
The G-8 countries canceled at least $40 billion in debt owed by twenty-seven of
the world’s poorest nations, mostly African, and provided additional aid. In
September 2005, the plight of Africa again took center stage at a UN conference
with clockwork precision. Much of this effort—admirable though it may be—may
come to naught, and expect another UN conference in 2015.
Helping Africa, of course, is noble but the fundamental problem is that the
raucous galaxy of rock stars, development experts, and African government offi-
cials set out to help people they do not understand. It has now become a theater
of the absurd—the blind leading the clueless. Western do-gooders may be
excused, but the treachery on the part of African leaders cannot be. In fact, as we
shall argue, the basic reason why things went so wrong in postcolonial Africa is
that the leadership, in most cases, imposed alien systems and institutions on their
people. In that sense, they can be classified as black neocolonialists, who were no
different from the white colonialists.
An African population may be divided into two groups: the peasant majority
and the elite minority. The leadership is drawn from the elite group, which is
“educated” and is composed of politicians, lawyers, soldiers, teachers, doctors,
journalists, and other professionals. Recall the exhortation to distinguish between
the African leaders and the African people. The vast majority of the people—gen-
erally 70 percent—are peasants. The object of development is to raise the eco-
nomic lot of the people (the masses), not develop the pockets of the ruling elites.
But most of the government officials and development experts—both African
elites and their “development partners” in the West—seldom understood the very
people (Africa’s peasants) they set out to help. Few, if any, of the “experts” under-
stood what motivates African peasants, how they conduct their economic activi-
ties, how they secure farmland to raise their crops, or even how they obtain funds
to purchase a dug-out canoe, for example. Ecology, culture, politics, law, and
development are inextricably intertwined. Development must be custom-tailored
to fit the recipient’s topography: culture, politics, and institutions. In practice,
however, it was often the other way round. Various “canned” and “ready-made”
development strategies were prescribed for Africa and it was rather the people
who were expected to “change” to fit them or make the imported models work.
Obviously, the development process should start from the bottom-up with a
study and understanding of the African peasants and their ways of life. Since most
INTRODUCTION 9

development experts and even African leaders tragically lacked this knowledge,
it was often a case of the blind leading the clueless. Nobody bothered to consult
with the people purported to being helped. As Wayne Ellwood complained:

Time and time again local communities are ignored. Misconceived,

harmful development projects are dropped in their laps without consul-
tation and the people of the industrialized countries, who bankroll most
of the Bank’s activities, are asked to pay the bill.
“The Bank needs its own glasnost so that informed public debate
can take place,” says Probe International’s Pat Adams. “Decision-mak-
ing,” she adds, “should be returned to the people who have to live with
the physical consequences of the decision; they’re the people with the
best judgment about what risks to take with their environment” (New
Internationalist, Dec. 1990, 6).

A similar cavalier attitude underscored the December 1992 UN-led human-

itarian mission to save Somalia. The Western media largely ignored the painstak-
ing grassroots reconciliation efforts and peace initiatives made by traditional local
structures to bring order and stability to Somalia. For example, in October 1991,
clan elders met in Sheikh to resolve the Isse Muse/Habr Yunis factional conflict.
In February 1993, a peace agreement was signed without any conditions attached
between the Dhulbahante and Habr Yunis clans to end fighting and resolve dis-
putes over grazing land, water resources, and property. Then in March 1993, in
the northern town of Borama, the Council of Elders (Guurti) met to set a politi-
cal framework for a return to constitutional rule. Said Martin Griffiths, director
of ACTIONAID, a British charity: “If the U.N. had paid more attention to tradi-
tional peacemaking mechanisms in Mogadishu, its troops would not have found
themselves in the quagmire the mission had sunk into. . . . The cooperation of tra-
ditional local elders is crucial to the success of any peace initiative” (West Africa,
Jan. 24–30, 1994, 115).
There are other countless examples of how international donors failed to pay
even elementary heed to what is on the ground:

• In Egypt, 5,000 U.S.-made stoves were useless because they were

designed for pipeline use rather than tanked gas used in Egypt. . . .
Twenty-six irrigation pumping stations established as part of a $19
million U.S. AID project were not working, in part due to lack of
electrical power at the sites; at the same time AID sponsored a sep-
arate $32 million renewable-energy project involving water pump-
ing without linking it to the irrigation project. . . . A $108 million
AID-financed grain-silo complex completed in 1987 was unable to
operate for several years due to insufficient power (The Wall Street
Journal, Jan. 23, 1989, A19).
10 INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

• In Senegal, the United States built 50 crop-storage depots but placed

them in locations the peasants never visited. The depots, which cost
about $2 million, now stand empty. . . . In Sudan, the Soviets built
a milk bottling plant at Babanusa. Babanusa’s Baggara ethnic
groups men drink their milk straight from the cow and there aren’t
any facilities to ship milk out of Babanusa. The 20-year old plant
hasn’t produced a single bottle of milk (The Wall Street Journal,
July 29, 1985, 18).
• In Sudan, a plant for making tomato paste was placed in an area
where the farmers cultivate date palms, not tomatoes. A milk dehy-
dration plant was built in an area where there are no dairy cows. . . .
In northern Kenya, Norwegian aid officials built a fish-freezing
plant near a lake for the Turkana ethnic groups men. But the
Turkana are pastoral people who survive by raising cattle, goats and
camels. Worse, after the plant was built, it was discovered that freez-
ing fish in the daily 100-degrees temperatures would take more
electricity than was available in the entire Turkana district (Whitaker
1988, 74).

It should come as no surprise why so many international aid-funded agricul-

tural projects withered in Africa. But the greatest censure must be reserved for
African leaders. In many cases, they themselves, in a fit of megalomania, drew
up the grandiose projects that emphasized prestige rather than economy. Donor
countries simply could not “unload” useless projects in Africa without the con-
sent, acquiescence, or connivance of African leaders—a perspective (the com-
plicity of African leaders) that is often neglected in scholarly discussions
—perhaps for the sake of “political correctness.” It stretches the bounds of
credulity to portray “educated” African leaders as hapless victims of crooked for-
eign merchants who sell them useless products. Why would anyone living on the
twentieth floor of an apartment complex buy a lawn mower and claim fraud?
Many African leaders and officials did exactly that because of the “commis-
sions” they were reaping on foreign loans and aid projects. According to Lamb
(1983), “Of every dollar coming into Zaire, whether in the form of a foreign aid
grant or a business contract, Zairian officials took twenty cents off the top for
their personal cut” (45). In March 1990, Le Monde, a Paris newspaper reported
that “Every franc we give impoverished Africa comes back to France, or is smug-
gled into Switzerland and even Japan.”
Not surprisingly, many of the international aid efforts, noble as some might
have been, floundered, resulting in scandalous waste of resources and a grievous
deterioration of living conditions. At the turn of the century, most African coun-
tries were worse off in terms of income per capita than they were at independence
in the 1960s.
INTRODUCTION 11

E. MYTHS AND MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT AFRICA

The main obstacle that has bedeviled efforts to lift the African people out of
poverty has been the difficulty of penetrating the layers of mythology, ignorance,
and prejudice enshrouding Africa and its people. For many centuries, Africa
remained a mystery or a foreboding enigma. It attracted the curiosity of explor-
ers while fascinating and captivating empire-builders by its vast wealth. The
length and breadth of Africa were explored, discovered, conquered, and colonized.
Its people were denigrated as “backward and inferior”:
Harris (1987) wrote:

The image of Africans as inferior was reinforced further by arguments

of several Christian missionaries, ministers, and others who explained
that an African was better off a slave in a Christian society than free in
“African savagery” . . . Hugh Murray, a popular geographer of the early
19th century, described the continent as an area of mystery with wild and
strange aspects of man and nature. Africa was a strange place, inhabited
by strange men, where monsters dwelt and strange things happened.

African or black inferiority as a concept reached its high point when it

became intellectualized by philosophers of the Enlightenment. In a footnote to his
essay entitled “Of National Character,” which appeared in his Essay and Treatises
(1768), the influential Scot philosopher, David Hume wrote:

I am apt to suspect the negroes . . . to be naturally inferior to the white.

There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white,
nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No inge-
nious manufacturers amongst them, no arts, no sciences.
Given that position, it was natural for Europeans to conclude that
Africans had no history and no written language, two other great myths.
But a society which justified its expansion overseas, and into Africa in
particular, in terms of the “civilizing mission to uplift the heathens and
savages of Africa,” could not regard the history or language of the lat-
ter group as being worthy of serious study (21).

The ignorance and mythology continue to dominate impressions of the con-

tinent even to present times, albeit for different reasons. When the Smithsonian
surveyed visitors to its new exhibition, “African Voices,” in Washington, D.C. in
1999, it found that “many people [Americans] didn’t know Africans lived in
cities. . . . Some didn’t believe Africans used paper money. . . . Another miscon-
ception was that everyone was stationary, living in villages, until the unfortunate
millions were sold into slavery, said Mary Jo Arnoldi, the curator of African
Ethnology and Art” (The Washington Post, Dec. 15, 1999, C16).
12 INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

Another widespread but erroneous belief is that Africans had no culture.

Their traditional cultural structures were destroyed by colonialism (Coquery-
Vidrovitch 1976; Gutkind and Waterman 1977). It was argued, for example, that
the structure of rural life was no longer respected, and this loss of respect accel-
erated the destruction by instigating a movement away from “exploitation of (for-
eign) neighbors to the exploitation of individuals within their own communities”
(Gutkind and Wallerstein 1976).
While it is true that the colonialists reordered African society to suit their
purposes with brutal force, it is inaccurate to assert that Africa lost its cultural
identity totally. Most of the indigenous cultures and institutions underwent some
transformations and adaptations to survive the onslaught of colonialism. This
view is also shared by Bell (1987), who argued: “the traditional structures were
profoundly altered by external influence, but they were hardly overthrown” (64).
The view that the traditional structures underwent processes of transforma-
tion and adapted themselves to the “invading” cultures in order to survive was
also advanced by Wrigley (1960):

The idea of Negro Africa as savagery modified by the influence of

European or quasi-European intruders is clearly no more than an extrap-
olation from the situation that has existed in recent times; and sufficient
knowledge has been accumulated to make it no longer legitimate to the-
orize in vacuo about “waves” of invasion. Although tropical Africa has
certainly received major cultural imports from time to time, the archae-
ological record suggests, on the whole, continuous indigenous develop-
ment rather than a succession of external impacts.

The persistence of these myths may be attributed to racism, “Tarzan movies,”

and the fact that much of what was known about Africa was compiled by foreign
researchers and writers. Africa saw itself through “foreign eyes.” There was lit-
tle written scripture about African heritage by native Africans—largely due to the
cultural practice of handing down historical information from one generation to
the next through the oral tradition. Most people therefore accepted what foreign
writers told them about Africa.
While some of these writers did credible and painstaking service to Africa,
the works of others were profusely tainted with various ethnocentric and scholas-
tic biases. In the heyday of colonialism, for example, there was a notable pro-
clivity on the part of European writers to deprecate African civilizations and
portray Africans as “savages.” Yelpaala (1983) observed that: “It might be said
that the anthropologist created the savage, the barbarian, and the primitive and his
state of statelessness, lawlessness, and self-help to provide a rational basis for
colonialist subjugation and exploitation of the savage. All these categories of
(anthropological) studies had various problems; derived from Eurocentric, eth-
nocentric, and possibly racist perspectives, they could hardly reflect the people
studied” (350).
INTRODUCTION 13

African chiefs and kings were routinely depicted as “despots.” Naturally,

Africans “yearned” to be freed from their own terrible “despotic” rulers. What
could be more godsend to the Africans themselves than the arrival and imposition
of colonial rule—to “civilize” and “liberate” them from tyrannical rule by their
own “horrible” leaders. Colonial archives and documents are full of references to
such “tyrannical” rulers.
History can be written from three perspectives: from the point of view of the
victor, the vanquished, and a neutral observer. Of course, the colonized Africans
did not see things exactly the same way as the European colonialists or writers.
The “terrible” African rulers must have been generally those who gave the colo-
nialists the most “trouble,” that is, offered the stiffest resistance to European dom-
ination and conquest. Of course, to their people, such chiefs were not “terrible”
or “despotic” at all but rather heroes who fought to resist the colonial subjuga-
tion. The Economist (Dec. 19, 1998) put it succinctly:

African kings [supposedly] have a cruel reputation. Shaka, the first Zulu
monarch, is reported to have had people clubbed to death for sneezing
in his presence. The kings of Buganda are said to have worn anklets of
dried human sinew. And when the Asantehenes, kings of what is now
central Ghana, died, children were slaughtered to accompany them to the
next world. But these were exceptions rather than the rule—and their
history was written by the conquerors who liked to make themselves out
to be noble killers of blood-thirsty tyrants.
In fact most of pre-colonial Africa was not ruled by tyrants at all but
by a variety of political systems including hereditary monarchies, most
of whom were subject to tradition and parliaments of elders. In these
kingdoms succession was not usually by primogeniture; monarchs were
frequently chosen from short-lists of available princes by established
chiefs or elders. Bad ones were sometimes asked to step down or over-
thrown (79).

Besides ethnocentrism and self-serving colonial propaganda, there were

unavoidable, or more appropriately, honest biases in the description and docu-
mentation of African culture. These arose primarily out of errors in translations
and difficulties in interpretations of African languages. Williams (1987, 169) put
it best:

Africans generally prefer to dwell on the constitutional theories and not

on the constitutional practices. They proudly speak of the freedom and
absolute powers of the chief or king. Some will even tell you that the
king “owned all the land” in the country. They are not trying to deceive.
Words of another language often fail to translate the people’s concepts
or meaning. When they say the king is supreme or has absolute power
they mean that he has absolute power to carry out the will of the people.
14 INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

It was so well understood that supreme power rested in the people that it
was never thought necessary to state such a fact. Likewise, they would
say, and say proudly, the king “owns all the land in the country” since
everybody but a fool knew that he didn’t, that nobody owned the land
(in the Western sense), and that the king’s role was that of custodian and
overseer, his principal duty being to see that the land was fairly distrib-
uted among all families.

Nevertheless, some anthropological studies were objective, and some Westerners

are now taking a second look at the so-called “primitive cultures.” We are also
now being told by Western scholars that the so-called primitive cultures of the
cave men may, after all, have attributes worth aping today. Consider the follow-
ing story that appeared in The Wall Street Journal (Oct. 21, 1986, 35), which is
paraphrased below.

Dr. S. Boyd Eaton is one of a group of scientists studying the diet and
lifestyle of early humans to determine what is ‘natural’ for the human
body. Our bodies haven’t evolved much since prehistoric times, they rea-
son, so the diet and activity patterns of that era may still suit us best.
Duplicating primitive diet and exertion, these scientists suggest,
may yield more energy, better health and greater chance of beating mod-
ern “diseases of civilization,” such as osteoporosis, obesity, cancer,
hypertension, hiatal hernias and heart disease. They cite skeletal evi-
dence that humans living 30,000 years ago were taller and more muscu-
lar than modern Americans and had better teeth—all indications, the
scientists say, of a healthier diet . . .
Humans in paleolithic times, before the development of agricul-
ture, had no dairy foods, for instance—yet osteoporosis was unknown,
Dr. Kratz notes. Apparently, milk wasn’t nature’s way of preventing
bone disease, he says. And pre-agricultural people didn’t eat wheat,
either, he says.

Archaeological work by Ralph and Susan McIntosh in Mali (1977–1998) are

reshaping views about Africa. As reported by Todd Ackerman in The Houston
Chronicle (May 5, 1999):

Their research has become a linchpin of academic discovery the last 20

years that is changing Africa’s historical image as one of half-naked sav-
ages destroyed by tribalism. The old thinking was summed up in 1961
by Hugh Trevor-Roper, a famous Oxford professor who wrote, “There is
no African history: there is only the history of the Europeans in Africa.
The rest is darkness.”
Now academics are trumpeting the continent’s precociousness: that
every major stone tool appeared in Africa first; that its ceramics are
INTRODUCTION 15

older than those of the Near East and Europe; that it used true steel
2,000 years before Europeans; and that Jenne-jeno was an urban civi-
lization without the despots and intercity wars that scholars have
believed were an essential early stage in the evolution of government.
The last surprised even the McIntoshes, who were trained with the
Marxist-influenced theory that governments contain roots of tyranny,
that leaders amassed wealth and gained the ability to extract goods from
the population. But look as they did, the McIntoshes never found the
palaces of government or the incised tablets praising kings or the big
houses with nicer belongings.
What they found instead—an even distribution of wealth, special-
ists working for their own profit and a complex economy including far-
reaching trade—suggested an alternative kind of government, perhaps
even the roots of democracy.
Other archaeologists took notice. And at a recent conference at New
York University, they named ancient civilizations in India and Pakistan,
northern China, Ireland and North Germany as likely fitting Jenne-jeno’s
model. Slowly, a school of thought is emerging that there were alterna-
tive government structures—that some governments evolved without
despotism as a stop along the way (6).

Ethiopians are also rediscovering their heritage. There is renewed interest in

Aksum, a powerful kingdom that ruled the Horn of Africa from the first to the
sixth century A.D. and was one of the four great civilizations at that time, along-
side Rome, China, and Persia. According to Emily Wax, a Washington Post for-
eign correspondent:

Ethiopia, one of the world’s poorest and least developed nations, is

believed to contain some of civilization’s oldest archaeological troves
under its rocky soil. Experts estimate that less than 7 percent of these
artifacts have been found, meaning that Ethiopia could be on the brink
of the same kind of major archaeological discoveries that began in late
19th-century Greece or 1920s Egypt.
“Aksum is one of the least known civilizations in the world,” said
Fasil Giorghis, an Ethiopian architect and leader of a team of archae-
ologists and historians who are working in Aksum. In 1980, Aksum
was proclaimed a world heritage site by UNESCO, which called it
“one of the last great civilizations of antiquity to be revealed to mod-
ern knowledge.”
Aksum’s wealth and architectural achievements were recorded in
Greek and Arab literature of that era. Aksum is also widely believed to
have been one of the first places in the world to adopt Christianity after
the Middle East and is an important site of pilgrimages in the Christian
world, according to Giorghis and other experts.
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
 REVOLUTIONART MEGAN Model: Megan Renee Age: 21
Occupation: Model Country: United States Website
www.modelmayhem.conn/MeganReneeL
www.meganreneel.tumblr.com ^Clayton Ad
 Photo by Ray Gutierrez, Make up by Morgan Pant Photo by
R Kontrol
f Photo b^Blichael Magers, swimsuit by Bonsoir Bella
 i i ■ ,! ! rt A V INTERVIEW WITH KAROL LIVER THROUGH
SHAPES AND COLORS ec INTERVIEW WITH KAROL LIVER Poland O
www.karol-liver.com i— September 2011 _ i § By Nelson Medina
[email protected] UJ CC Images by ©Karol Liver
 Can you tell us a little about yourself to help people who
aren't familiar with you, get to know you a little better? My name is
Karol Liver, I was born in Poland in 1981, I am a professional
photographer currently living in Dublin, Ireland. I am mainly
dedicated to studio work. My work can be described as a bridge
between portraiture, fine art nude and conceptual, even theatrical
photography and is mainly focused on a person. The emotional
aspect attached to each image is what matter most to me and it's
usually achieved on a mutual, conscious agreement of confidence
between a photographer and a person photographed. I have no
bigger interest in pure fashion, beauty of glamour work, although I
do that kind of photography from time to time on commission. I've
recently launched prism Photo Magazine which is strictly dedicated
to contemporary photography and is available online to view.
 How did you start shooting professionally? I've been keen
on photography since I was given my first camera as a gift from my
father when I was 15 and have always photographed since after, but
only recently, for the past five or six years, photography has become
my source of income and my yellow brick road I still follow. I've
decided to leave everything else behind, quit my Monday-Friday
jobs, never look back and give all my free time, enthusiasm,
commitment and devotion to photography I've also realised that
camera can be a tool of trade and a tool of expression at the same
time. I am currently actively focusing on three areas under the same
flagship: studio photography, prism magazine and photography
related event management. I don't think I would ever be able to
function without this trinity anymore. Girl, recycled © 201 1 Karol
Liver | model: Ciara
 How do you keep motivated and interested? I am
surrounded by inspirational arts, events and talented artists. I am
collaborating with photographic studios and galleries. I am currently
connected to a prosperous Dublin art gallery in which I do
photography workshops and organise photo exhibitions. I am
constantly in search of new inspirations, meeting artist of all kind
and doing a lot of research by myself - for both my photo shoots and
prism magazine. The word 'boredom' has been successfully erased
from my dictionary.
 The girl who desperately wanted to be on all the covers ©
2010 Karol Liver | model: Juchi What commission have you done you
would be most proud of? I never considered myself to fully be a
commercial photographer, more of an artist and I am not a big fan
of commissioned work in which you are usually being told what to
do and how the final 'product' should look like. The bigger the
commission is, the less freedom of choice and own interpretation is
being given to the craftsman, so I prefer smaller assignments. A
year ago I've been asked to contribute one image to a charity
calendar to raise money for animal shelter in Ireland and I was given
a free hand to do whatever I want. My image, a portrait of a lady
breastfeeding a small puppy, was instantly labelled as scandalous
and provocative by Irish press and soon raised an international
rumpus, but also raised some discussions about animal's rights,
exposed the calendar globally and helped publishers to achieve their
initial goal to help raise money for animal rescue centre. It was such
a noble cause and I'm particularly proud of this image.
 Could you reveal some of your favourite photograph
techniques? I've grown up with film cameras, my heart will always
be given to 35mm B&W and medium format, but I hardly ever do
film these days. I do mainly digital due to its instant nature and
accessible, wide field of post-processing techniques. I am an
advanced Photoshop user, but not a crazy photo-manipulator. I use
my own textures and tend to limit the palette down to few colours to
emphasise nuances of the whole picture. Most of my recent work
has been done in a studio space. I use artificial light. I sometimes do
a bit of digital art too if in a mood. First love © 201 1 Karol Liver |
model: Joanna
 Sisters © 201 1 Karol Liver models: Joanna and Anna What
can we find around your workplace and how is your bedroom? As
said, I do most of my work in a studio space. I am not a technical
freak, all I need in my studio workplace is a set of lights (I usually
use a set of two, a beauty dish and a soft box), a wall (the one you
can see on most pictures), a person to work with and a big dose of
understanding of what has to be achieved. I hail to simplicity and
tend to limit all factors down to one - so only pure expression is left.
As for the second part of the question - my bedroom is a big mess at
the moment, I've just moved into a new apartment, still trying to
unpack my stuff. There's a big chimney in here, so fingers crossed
for some nice Christmas gifts this year.
 What other artistic genres influence you? I am inspired a lot
by non-visual art, music in particular. Listening to music creates a
wave of subliminal images that can be transferred to a photographic
medium. This is truly an amazing experience to feel and transfer
music of your own, inner visual language to a defined visual form.
While editing I always listen to my favourite artists and seek out for
inspirations in between their lines and tones. As an emotional being
I like to be exposed to extremes and music can get you there in a
blink of an eye. Music can also influence the way you concentrate on
editing the final picture. I am a big fan of Nine Inch Nails, Tool, Chris
Vrenna's 'American McGee's Alice" and movie soundtracks in general.
I've recently discovered Soap'n'Skin- this girl is a gem in the sea of
commercial, plastic kitsch. I am also inspired by books a lot. One of
those untitled © 201 1 Karol Liver I model: Dani
 "3r Gaia © 201 1 Kami Liver model: Juchi Is there any
emotional connection between you and your work? Emotional factor
is a crucial part of my personal work. Emotion is to be engraved on
the surface of an image. It will last as a reproduction of someone's
feelings. No artist can say to be emotionally disconnected to his or
her own work - art is, after all, about expressing yourself through
various mediums and finding a way for that expression, sometimes
even exhibitionism to be seen and, if lucky, accepted by other. If any
particular part of oneself is to be seen on the picture it has to be
truly felt, shown, captured and explored. When depression is to be
shown a model has to feel depressed, her body has to be wrapped
in that state. When it comes to editing I will also do anything it takes
to experience that emotion further and feel that tension too. One girl
started to cry and was not able stop the teardrops for an hour. I
don't know what the pain was all about, but I know it was real.
 Which artists and what art movements inspired you most? I
am inspired by Jan Saudek's work. I feel heavily attracted to his
visions and admire his talent. I love H.R.Giger's sculptural fantasies,
the rawness of Francis Bacon's imagery, Salvador Dali's surrealistic
landscapes and emotionally disturbing aspects of Edvard Munch's
paintings. There is no particular art movement that inspired me most
and I feel like I'm discovering something new every day to keep
myself constantly inspired. It can be a theatre play, an old
daguerreotype photograph, a video on youtube, a quote from a
movie or a video game soundtrack - there are limitless inspirational
sources around us. I steal a little bit from here and there. ^33t>. -1
lip" IvroflTTTTg make up © 2010 Karol Liver | model: Rachel
 V* 1 Any advice for other artists, beginners and
experienced alike? Let your instincts guide your behaviour, keep
pursuing white rabbits, it's all about the chase after all, isn't it? j*8l 1
m. V. £ The penance (from the Sinner series) © 201 1 Karol Liver |
model: Juchi
 REVOLUTIONART \ 7 BE A REAL MODEL FOR A REAL
MAGAZINE This is the best place to expose your talent. A showcase
for photographers, models, make up artists and fashion designers.
Send your best shoots to Revolutionart Magazine until the deadline.
http://Www.revolutionartmasazine.com/how_to_participate.html
+ ♦ REVOLUTION ART MUSIC
Welcome to our website – the ideal destination for book lovers and
knowledge seekers. With a mission to inspire endlessly, we offer a
vast collection of books, ranging from classic literary works to
specialized publications, self-development books, and children's
literature. Each book is a new journey of discovery, expanding
knowledge and enriching the soul of the reade

Our website is not just a platform for buying books, but a bridge
connecting readers to the timeless values of culture and wisdom. With
an elegant, user-friendly interface and an intelligent search system,
we are committed to providing a quick and convenient shopping
experience. Additionally, our special promotions and home delivery
services ensure that you save time and fully enjoy the joy of reading.

Let us accompany you on the journey of exploring knowledge and

personal growth!

ebookname.com