PLDT Co. v. City of Davao, G.R. No. L-23080, 30 Oct.

1965/15 SCRA 244

Facts:
 Before the Court is a suit for prohibition and mandamus, seeking to enjoin
respondent Davao City from fulfilling its contract with ITT Philippines Inc.
Furthermore, it seeks to compel the respondent Public Service Commission
(PSC) to require Davao City to obtain a certificate of public convenience and
necessity.
 Davao City entered into a contract with ITT to install and deliver the telephone
system.
 Petitioner argued that the projected installation would be unlawful expenditure of
public funds and prejudicial to the rights of the petitioner being the prior owner
and operator of the city-wide telephone system in Davao.
 Respondent in turn posited that the project will pave the way for better control of
peace and order and emergencies arising from the occurrence of fire and
epidemics based on its Resolution No. 664, in accordance with the general
welfare clause. However, petitioner likewise argued that Davao City's telephone
system cannot be justified under general welfare clause provisions because said
telephone system is commercial in nature and, therefore, not the proper subject
of the exercise of police power.
Issue:
 Whether Davao City has no power to establish and operate a telephone system;
Ruling:
 Yes. The Court ruled that Davao City was responding to a pressing necessity in
adopting the resolutions to establish a telephone system that can fully serve and
benefit the people in its territory. Such resolutions, in the light of the foregoing
set- up, constitute a lawful exercise of Davao City's power under Section 14 (ee)
of its Charter to legislate for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants.
 SEC. 14. General powers and duties of the Council. — Except as otherwise
provided by law, and subject to the conditions and limitations thereof, the City
Council shall have the following legislative powers:
 xxx xxx xxx
 (ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation
and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality,
peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred by this charter; and to fix penalties for
the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed a two hundred-peso fine or six
months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense.
 Suffice it to state as to this that, firstly, Section 14 (ee) of Davao City's Charter
speaks of "the furtherance of the prosperity" and "the promotion of the comfort,
 convenience, and the general welfare of the City and its inhabitants." If, as stated
in Resolution No. 664, the City Government stands to profit from the telephone
system, the same is in accordance with, rather than opposed to, the
aforementioned general welfare clause.
 2.Yes. The Court ruled that Davao City as a government entity is exempted from
securing a certificate of public convenience and necessity in accordance with the
Public Service Act.

Tablarin vs. Judge Gutierrez, G.R. No. 78164, 31 July 1987 Facts:
Facts:
  Medical Act of 1959 (RA 2382) defines its basic objectives as stated in Section
 1.Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization
and regulation of medical education (b) the examination for registration of
physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of
medicine in the Philippines.
 As laid down on section 5, the function of the Board of Medical Education:
 To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college
of medicine;
 (f)To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and
keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants
the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of
the Board of Medical Education;
 (h)To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and regulations
for the proper implementation of the foregoing functions.
 The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the
selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated
to improve the quality of medical education in the country. (MECS Order No. 52,
s. 1985)
Issue:
 Whether there is undue delegation of legislative power to the Board of Medical
Education without a sufficient statutory standard, thus contradicting the non-
delegation doctrine.
Ruling:
 No. The Court ruled that the legislative and administrative provisions impugned
by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police power
of the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and
non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote the
important interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the general
community. An important component of that public order is the health and
physical safety and wellbeing of the population, the securing of which no one can
deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.
 That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the
power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice
medicine, is also well recognized. thus, legislation and administrative regulations
requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical
board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of
governmental power.
 Moreover, the Court believed that the government is entitled to prescribe an
admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of
"upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of
"improving the quality of medical education in the country."
 Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.

Balacuit v. CFI, G.R. No. L-38429, June 30, 1988 Facts:

 Petitioners, managers of a theater house, filed a complaint seeking for Ordinance
640 be declared unconstitutional, and therefore void and unenforceable.
 The respondent court declared the Ordinance constitutional and valid, provided
that the fine shall not exceed Two Hundred Pesos.
 Hence, this filing of petition where petitioners contended that the Ordinance is an
invalid exercise of police power, which was opposed by the respondent City of
Butuan by interposing the general welfare clause which provides to enact all
 ordinances it may deem necessary and proper or the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good
order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants,
… xxx
Facts:
 Municipal Board of City of Butuan passed an ORDINANCE 640, penalizing any
person, entity or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets
to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances
to require children between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full
payment for tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the
said ticket.
Issue:
 Whether the City’s power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing
of prices of admission to these places of exhibition and amusement whether
under its general grant of power or under the general welfare clause.
Ruling:
 No. The Court ruled that there must be public necessity which demands the
adoption of proper measures to secure the ends sought to be attained by the
enactment of the ordinance, and the large discretion is necessarily vested in the
legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the public require,
but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. The
methods or means used to protect the public health, morals, safety or welfare,
must have some relation to the end in view, for under the guise of the police
power, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded by the legislative department.
 While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such
regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance
must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an
arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful
business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably
interfered with even by the exercise of police power.
 Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners
for even if We could assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable,
from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an
unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of
citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under
the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
 Wherefore, the trial court’s decision is reversed and set aside. Ordinance No.
640 is thus declared unconstitutional.

Del Rosario vs. Bengzon, G.R. No. 88265, 21 December 1989 Facts:
 Petitioners are officers of the Philippine Medical Association seeking to declare
RA 6675 or the Generics Act of 1988 unconstitutional.
 They argued that (a) and (b) is unequal treatment of government physicians,
dentists, and veterinarians, on one hand, and those in private practice on the
other hand, in the manner of prescribing generic drugs, for, while the former are
allegedly required to use only generic terminology in their prescriptions, the latter
may write the brand name of the drug in parenthesis below the generic name.
  In response, public respondent points out that the institution of generics in the
Philippines will compel physicians to prescribe drugs based on their therapeutic
or "active ingredient," instead of their well-known brand names.
Background of the Case
 RA 6675 or the Generics Act of 1988:
 Section 6, pars. (a) and (b)
 a) All government health agencies and their personnel as well as other
government agencies shall use generic terminology or generic names in all
transactions related to purchasing, prescribing, dispensing and administering of
drugs and medicines.
 b) All medical, dental and veterinary practitioners, including private practitioners,
shall write prescriptions using the generic name. The brand name may be
included if so desired.
Issue:
 Whether Generics Act is constitutional as to the exercise of police power of the
government.
Ruling:
 No. The Court ruled that the Act implements the constitutional mandate for the
State to protect and promote the right to health of the people and to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost.
 The prohibition against the use by doctors of "no substitution" and/or words of
similar import in their prescription, is a valid regulation to prevent the
circumvention of the law. It secures to the patient the right to choose between the
brand name and its generic
 Equivalent since his doctor is allowed to write both the generic and the brand
name in his prescription form.
 Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.

JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 120095, 5 Aug.1996/SCRA 260
319 (1996)
Facts:
 Following the much-publicized death of Maricris Sioson in 1991, deployment of
performing artists to Japan and other foreign destinations was banned but later
on rescinded.
 Department Order No. 3-A, providing for additional guidelines on the training,
testing, certification and deployment of performing artists.
 Department Order No. 3-B, pertaining to the Artist Record Book (ARB)
requirement, which could be processed only after the artist could show proof of
academic and skills training and has passed the required tests.
 Department Order No. 3-E, providing the minimum salary a performing artist
ought to receive (not less than US$600.00 for those bound for Japan) and the
authorized deductions therefrom.
 Department Order No. 3-F, providing for the guidelines on the issuance and use
of the ARB by returning performing artists who, unlike new artists, shall only
undergo a Special Orientation Program (shorter than the basic program)
although they must pass the academic test.
Issue:
 Whether the issued Orders are a valid exercise of police power.
Ruling:
 Yes. The Court ruled that the Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned
Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor
pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power.
 Pursuant to the alarming number of reports that a significant number of Filipina
performing artists ended up as prostitutes abroad (many of whom were beaten,
drugged and forced into prostitution), and following the deaths of number of
these women, the government began instituting measures aimed at deploying
only those individuals who met set standards which would qualify them as
legitimate performing artists.
 Moreover, the requirement for a venue certificate or other documents evidencing
the place and nature or work allows the government closer monitoring of foreign
employers and helps keep our entertainers away from prostitution fronts and
other worksites associated with unsavory, immoral, illegal or exploitative
practices.
 Finally, the Court stressed that these orders further the Constitutional mandate
requiring government to protect our workforce, particularly those who may be
prone to abuse and exploitation as they are beyond the physical reach of
government regulatory agencies. The tragic incidents must somehow stop, but
short of absolutely curtailing the right of these performers and entertainers to
work abroad, the assailed measures enable our government to assume a
measure of control.
 Wherefore, the petition is denied.

Ynot v. IAC, G.R No. 74457, March 20, 1987

Facts:
 President Marcos issued EO 626-A which prohibits the interprovincial movement
of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the
requirements particularly with respect to age.
 Petitioner transported 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo, thus were confiscated
by the police, which prompts him to sue for recovery but the trial court sustained
the confiscation and declined to rule on the petitioner’s argument that EO 626-A
is unconstitutional, for lack of authority and presumed validity.
 The Intermediate Appellate Court upheld the decision.
Issue:
 Whether EO 626-A is constitutional and valid exercise of police power.
Ruling:
 No. The Court ruled that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the
police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of
the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment
on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.
There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
 mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken.
 The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his
rights as he saw them, this case would never have reached us and the taking of
his property under the challenged measure would have become a fait accompli
despite its invalidity.
 Wherefore, EO 626-A is declared unconstitutional.

Gerochi v. DOE, G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007

Facts:
 Before the Court is a petition seeking to declare Section 34 of RA 9136 or the
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) unconstitutional, thus a
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order be issued to refrain the
respondents to implement, charge, and collect the Universal Charge.
 NPC-SPUG filed before the ERC a petition for the availment from the Universal
Charge of its share for Missionary Electrification, then another petition was filed
seeking the proposed share for the Environmental charge of ₱0.0025 per
kilowatt- hour, which was granted by the ERC.
 Pursuant thereto, respondent PECO charged petitioners and all other end-users
with the Universal Charge as reflected on their electric bills. They alleged that the
said charge is a disguise for tax.
 Petitioners contended that the power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as
such, the delegation of said power to any executive or administrative agency like
the ERC is unconstitutional; ERC is also empowered to approve and determine
where the funds collected should be used; and the Universal Charge is
oppressive and confiscatory.
 However, respondent PSALM argued that the charge is levied for a specific
regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the country's electric power
industry. Hence, there is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC
since ERC exercises a limited authority or discretion on the execution and
implementation of the EPIRA. The same was raised by the DOE.
 On the other hand, PECO argued that duty-bound to collect and remit the
amount. Failure to do so, would made them liable for the imposed fines and
penalties.
 Background of the Case
 SECTION 34. Universal Charge. — Within one (1) year from the effectivity of this
Act, a universal charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall
be imposed on all electricity end-users for the following purposes:
 Payment for the stranded debts in excess of the amount assumed by the
National Government and stranded contract costs of NPC and as well as
qualified stranded contract costs of distribution utilities resulting from the
restructuring of the industry;
 Missionary electrification;
 The equalization of the taxes and royalties applied to indigenous or renewable
sources of energy vis-à-vis imported energy fuels;
 (d)An environmental charge equivalent to one-fourth of one centavo per kilowatt-
hour (₱0.0025/kWh), which shall accrue to an environmental fund to be used
solely for
 Watershed rehabilitation and management. Said fund shall be managed by NPC
under existing arrangements; and
 A charge to account for all forms of cross-subsidies for a period not exceeding
three (3) years.
Issue:
 1.Whether the Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax;
 2.Whether there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the
ERC.
Ruling:
 1.No. The Court ruled that the conservative and pivotal distinction between these
two powers rests in the purpose for which the charge is made. If generation of
revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition
is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is
incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax.
 The creation of the Special Trust Fund (STF) is well within the pervasive and
non- waivable power and responsibility of the government to secure the physical
and economic survival and well-being of the community, that comprehensive
sovereign authority we designate as the police power of the State. Particularly
that the Universal Charge is imposed to ensure the viability of the country's
electric power industry.
 2.No. The Court ruled that in the face of the increasing complexity of modern life,
delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies is
allowed as an exception to the principle of separation of powers. All that is
required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the
regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the
regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
 Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.

Rubi v. Provincial Board, G.R. No. L-14078, 7 March 1919

Facts:
 Rubi and other Manguianes as a petitioner who filed for habeas corpus, claiming
illegal detention by provincial officials in Mindoro.
 Manguianes were ordered to relocate to a reservation at Tigbao, Mindoro,
established by the provincial government.
 On February 1, 1917, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted Resolution No.
25, and proposed a permanent settlement for the indigenous group of
Manguianes.
 The provincial governor, Juan Morente Jr., recommended Tigbao as the
settlement site due to previous failures to advance the Manguianes' condition.
 Secretary of the Interior approved Resolution No. 25 on February 21, 1917
 On December 4, 1917, the provincial governor issued Executive Order
 The provincial board and governor claimed the measures were necessary for the
protection of the Manguianes and public forests.
 Rubi and his group did not establish their dwellings within the designated
reservation, making them subject to penalties.
 The Solicitor-General indicated that any detention of Dabalos was lawful under
the Administrative Code.
 The petitioners contested the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code,
which allowed the governor to direct non-Christians to designated sites.
 The court ultimately ruled that the actions taken under Section 2145 were
constitutional and did not constitute unlawful imprisonment.
 Issue:
 Whether the order ordinance issued by the Provincial Board of Mindoro executive
order and the provincial governor through exercise of police power
constitutional?
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled against the petitioners, affirming the constitutionality of
the actions taken by the Provincial Board of Mindoro and the provincial governor.
The
 Court held that the provisions of the Administrative Code, specifically Section
2145, were valid and did not violate the petitioners' rights to liberty or due
process.
 Police power was upheld by the court as a legitimate action

NTC v. PVB, 192 SCRA 257, 10 Dec. 1990

Facts:
 National Development Co as the petitioner and respondent Philippine
Veterans Bank
 The case questioning the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1717,
issued during Marcos's regime.
 The decree aimed to rehabilitate the Agrix Group of Companies by extinguishing
all mortgages and liens on its assets.
 Philippine Veterans Bank, which held a mortgage on properties of Agrix
Marketing Inc. (AGRIX), filed a claim with the AGRIX Claims Committee
created by the decree.
 The Regional Trial Court annulled the decree, citing violations of separation of
powers, impairment of contracts, and the equal protection clause.
 The Supreme Court found that the decree was an invalid exercise of police
power, violating constitutional protections against arbitrary taking and
discrimination.
 The Court emphasized that the decree favored a specific group of investors over
legitimate creditors, undermining creditors' rights.
 The Court declared Presidential Decree No. 1717 unconstitutional and dismissed
the petition filed by the petitioners.
Issue:
 Whether Presidential Decree No. 1717 unconstitutional? RULING:
Ruling:
 Yes, the Is Presidential Decree No. 1717 unconstitutional,
 The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and declared PD 1717
unconstitutional. The Court found that the decree did not satisfy the police
power’s requirements of a lawful subject and method, as the public interest was
not sufficiently defined or related to the general welfare. The decree was deemed
in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses, as it took away
vested property rights arbitrarily and discriminated against different types of
creditors.
White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, G.R No. 122846, 20 Jan. 2009
Facts:
 The case involves the petitioner White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation,
and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation challenging the petitioner
Manila City for the Ordinance No. 7774.
 The ordinance prohibits short-time admissions and wash-up rates in hotels,
motels, and similar establishments in Manila.
 Petitioners argue that the ordinance violates their rights to liberty, due process,
and equal protection.
 The RTC initially issued a temporary restraining order and later declared the
ordinance null and void, citing infringement on personal liberties.
 The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC's ruling, upholding the ordinance's
constitutionality.
 The Supreme Court ultimately granted the petition, reversing the Court of
Appeals' decision and reinstating the RTC's ruling, declaring the ordinance
unconstitutional.
 The Court emphasized that the ordinance was an arbitrary intrusion into
individual rights and failed to effectively address the issues it aimed to resolve.
Issue:
 Whether the Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 unconstitutional
Ruling:
 Yes, Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 was declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court. The Court found that the ordinance infringed on individual
liberties, including the rights to liberty, due process, and equal protection under
the law, and lacked sufficient justification for its restrictions on legitimate business
activities and personal freedoms.

White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, G.R No. 122846, 20 Jan. 2009
Facts:
 The case involves the petitioner White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation,
and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation challenging the petitioner
Manila City for the Ordinance No. 7774.
 The ordinance prohibits short-time admissions and wash-up rates in hotels,
motels, and similar establishments in Manila.
 Petitioners argue that the ordinance violates their rights to liberty, due process,
and equal protection.
 The RTC initially issued a temporary restraining order and later declared the
ordinance null and void, citing infringement onpersonal liberties.
 The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC's ruling, upholding the ordinance's
constitutionality.
 The Supreme Court ultimately granted the petition, reversing the Court of
Appeals' decision and reinstating the RTC's ruling, declaring the ordinance
unconstitutional.
 The Court emphasized that the ordinance was an arbitrary intrusion into
individual rights and failed to effectively address the issues it aimed to resolve.
Issue:
 Whether the Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 unconstitutional RULING:
Ruling:
  Yes, Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 was declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court. The Court found that the ordinance infringed on individual
liberties, including the rights to liberty, due process, and equal protection under
the law, and lacked sufficient justification for its restrictions on legitimate business
activities and personal freedoms.that income tax should not be included in the
computation of operating expenses, as it is not an expense incurred in providing
utility services and should be borne solely by the stockholders. The Supreme
Court upheld this position, emphasizing that including income tax in operating
expenses could unjustly shift the tax burden to consumers.

MMDA v. Track works G.R No. 179554 16 Dec. 2009

Facts:
 The petitioner Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and
respondent Trac kworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc.
 Track works had a contract with Metro Rail Transit Corporation (MRTC) for
advertising services based on a Build-Lease-Transfer (BLT) agreement.
 In 2001, MMDA requested Track works to dismantle the advertising installations
citing safety concerns.
 Track works refused the request, leading MMDA to proceed with the dismantling.
 Track works filed an injunction suit against MMDA in 2002, resulting in a
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction from the
 Regional Trial Court (RTC).
 The RTC issued a permanent injunction against MMDA, ruling in favor of Track
works.
 The Court of Appeals upheld the RTC's decision, affirming Trackworks' rights
under its contract with MRTC.
 The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that MMDA lacked the authority to dismantle
the advertising installations, reinforcing Track works' contractual rights.
Issue:
 Whether the MMDA can dismantle the advertising material provided by Track
works?
Ruling:
 No, the MMDA did not have the authority to unilaterally dismantle the billboards,
signages, and other advertising media insta lled by Trackworks in the MRT3
structures. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Trackworks, affirming that MMDA
lacked the power to dismantle these installations, as Trackworks' rights were
derived from its contract with MRTC under the Build-Lease-Transfer agreement.

OSG v. Ayala Land, Inc. 600 SCRA 617, 18 Sept. 2009

Facts:
 The petitioner Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari against several mall operators, including the respondent Ayala Land,
Robinsons Land, Shangri-La Plaza, and SM Prime Holdings.
 The case started from the legality of charging parking fees in shopping malls and
whether the National Building Code mandated free parking spaces.
 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled that the National Building Code and its
Implementing Rules did not require mall operators to provide free parking.
  The RTC concluded that compelling mall operators to provide free parking would
constitute an unlawful taking of property without just compensation.
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's decision, stating that the issue involved
a pure question of law.
 The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the decisions of the lower courts, affirming
that the mall operators were not obligated to provide free parking.
Issue:
 Whether the Ayala is obligated to provide free parking space in their malls for the
benefit of the public in general is valid?
Ruling:
 No, the respondents are not obligated to provide or give free parking spaces in
their malls for the use of their patrons or the public in general. The RTC
concluded that the National Building Code and its Implementing Rules do not
mandate free parking, and compelling the mall operators to provide free parking
would constitute an unlawful taking of property without just compensation. This
ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.

Bautista vs. Junio

G.R. No. L-50908, 31 January 1984
FERNANDO, C. J.
Facts:
 The case began when the Philippine government issued Letter of Instruction No.
869 on May 31, 1979, as a response to the 1974 oil crisis. The directive aimed to
save energy by banning private vehicles with H (Heavy) and EH (Extra Heavy)
plates from being used on weekends and holidays. Specifically, the ban applied
from midnight on Saturday (or 1:00 a.m., as stated in the petition) to 5:00 a.m. on
Monday, or from 1:00 a.m. on a holiday to 5:00 a.m. the next day. Certain
vehicles, like those classified as Service (S), Truck (T), Diplomatic (DPL),
Consular Corps (CC), and Tourist Cars (TC), were exempted.
 Later, on June 11, 1979, Memorandum Circular No. 39 was issued, which
outlined penalties for violations, including fines, vehicle impounding, and
cancellation of registration. Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista,
vehicle owners affected by the ban, questioned the constitutionality of the Letter
and the Memorandum. They argued it violated their rights to due process and
equal protection and involved an unlawful delegation of legislative power. The
issue eventually reached the Supreme Court after initial hearings and legal
procedures in the lower courts, setting the stage for an important constitutional
debate.
Issue:
 Whether Letter of Instruction No. 869 and its implementing Memorandum
Circular No. 39 violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court dismissed the petition upholding the validity of LOI No. 869
and its implementing Memorandum Circular No. 39. The Court acknowledged the
government's authority to create rules for the public's benefit, especially during
 the energy crisis. The restriction on heavy vehicles was seen as a sensible
solution to address a serious problem affecting the public.
 The Court ruled that issuance of LOI is part of the President executive power to
issue decrees and did not involve an improper delegation of the Legislative
Authority. The Land Transportation and Traffic Code had a legal ground in giving
 penalty for the offenders even the Court noted that impounding vehicle lacked
statutory support.

Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila vs. BOT

G. R. No. L-59234, September 30, 1982
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
Facts:
 The Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI), along with Felicisimo
Cabigao and Ace Transportation Corporation, all taxi operators, sought to nullify
two directives: Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 issued by the Board of
Transportation (BOT) on October 10, 1977, and Memorandum Circular No. 52
issued by the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) on August 15, 1980. These
directives required taxis older than six years in Metro Manila to be phased out,
based on the policy that only safe and comfortable vehicles should serve as
public transportation.
 The phase-out began in 1978 with 1971 model taxis and continued yearly for
older models. The petitioners initially asked the BOT to reconsider the rule, but
after no decision was made by the end of 1981, they brought their case to the
Supreme Court on December 29, 1981. They argued that the directives violated
their rights to due process and equal protection under the law.
Issue:
 Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord
with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding
the petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process?
Ruling:
 The Court dismissed the petition, ruling that BOT and BLT did not violate the
petitioners right. The Court found out that BOT and BLT complied with the
procedural due process required by Presidential Decree No. 101 as they had not
obligated to hold public hearings or solicit position papers.
 The Court held that the six-year age limit is reasonable and fair which aimed to
ensure the public safety and comfort. The Court recognized that the concrete
evidence on the condition of older taxis and need consistent regulations to avoid
corruption and maintain safety.

Mirasol vs. DPWH

G.R. No. 158793, June 8, 2006
CARPIO, J.
Facts:
 On January 10, 2001, petitioners James Mirasol, Richard Santiago, and the
Luzon Motorcyclists Federation, Inc. filed a petition against the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB),
 challenging certain administrative orders. They argued that these orders, which
imposed a total ban on motorcycles on certain expressways, were not supported
by Republic Act No. 2000, the Limited Access Highway Act. The petitioners
asked for a temporary restraining order to block the enforcement of the ban,
particularly on the Manila- Cavite Toll Expressway.
 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially granted an injunction in 2001, allowing
motorcycles with engine displacements over 400 cubic centimeters to use certain
expressways. However, in 2003, the RTC dismissed the petition but ruled that a
specific order, which imposed a minimum engine size requirement for
motorcycles, was unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause.

Issue:
 Whether Administrative Order No. 1 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
 No. The Court held the validity of Administrative Order No. 1, stating that it was
issued under the Department of Public Works and Communications and aligned
with the state’s police power to regulate public highways for safety purposes. The
Court held that the prohibition of motorcycles was a justified measure under
police power to maintain safety on controlled-access roads.

Anglo-Fil Trading vs. Lazaro

G.R. No. L-54958, September 2, 1983
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
Facts:
 The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) was established to oversee and manage all
ports across the country, consolidating functions like planning, development, and
operations. Through Presidential Decree No. 857, the PPA assumed authority
over arrastre and stevedoring services previously managed by the Bureau of
Customs. In 1980, President Marcos issued directives to integrate stevedoring
operations in major ports, leading to the selection of Ocean Terminal Services,
Inc. (OTSI) as the sole operator at the Manila South Harbor after an extensive
evaluation process by the PPA.
 Following the awarding of an exclusive five-year contract to OTSI, petitioner
PIPSI challenged its validity, along with the 10% revenue collection by the PPA.
The case, filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila, sought to nullify the
contract and stop its implementation. A restraining order was issued on July 29,
1980, temporarily halting the execution of the exclusive arrangement between
the PPA and OTSI.
Issue:
 Whether the PPA have the power and authority to award an exclusive
stevedoring contract in favor of respondent OTSI?
Ruling:
 Yes. The Court held that the Manila South Harbor is public property owned by the
State wherein the operations of the port including stevedoring work are under the
regulation and control for the public good and in the interest of general welfare.
  The Court emphasize that PPA as an agency of the state enjoys the presumption
of validity in favor of its official act implementing its constitutional mandate and
enjoying its police power in enacting public regulations intended for the general
welfare.

PPA vs. Cipres Stevedoring

G.R. No. 145742 July 14, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Facts:
 The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), established by Presidential Decree No.
857, manages the planning and operations of ports in the Philippines. Cipres
Stevedoring & Arrastre, Inc. (CISAI) operated cargo handling services in
Dumaguete City under various permits, including an eight-year contract that
ended on December 31, 1998. After the contract expired, CISAI continued its
operations through temporary permits until April 2000, when the PPA issued
Administrative Order No. 03-2000, requiring all long-term contracts to be
awarded via public bidding, replacing the prior policy of renewal for satisfactory
operators.
 CISAI argued it was entitled to a contract renewal under the earlier policy due to
its "very satisfactory" performance in 1998. When the PPA announced a public
bidding for Dumaguete's cargo operations, CISAI sought legal relief, resulting in
a temporary restraining order (TRO) from the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
However, the PPA challenged the RTC's jurisdiction and claimed public bidding
served the public interest. The Court of Appeals ultimately sided with CISAI,
nullifying the RTC's decision and ordering a preliminary injunction against the
PPA's bidding process.
Issue:
 Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the RTC to issue the writ of
preliminary injunction to CISAI.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the PPA, overturning the Court of Appeals'
decision. It clarified that P.D. No. 1818 and R.A. 8975 explicitly prohibit issuing
injunctions in cases involving government contracts, including stevedoring and
arrastre services. The Court rejected CISAI's claim of vested rights, noting that its
hold-over permit was temporary and could be revoked at any time.
 The Court highlighted those stevedoring services, being tied to public interest,
are subject to regulation under the state's police power. It affirmed that the PPA
acted within its authority to require public bidding for cargo handling services and
emphasized that granting a preliminary injunction would conflict with public
interest by allowing CISAI to continue operations without a valid contract. The
Court also pointed out that CISAI's operations were based solely on an expired
and revocable permit, making the Court of Appeals' injunction improper and
legally unfounded.

Chavez v. Romulo
G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004
Facts:
  In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo highlighted the urgent need
for a nationwide firearms ban in public areas to address increasing crime rates,
including high-profile incidents like the killing of a former rebel leader. She
instructed PNP Chief Hermogenes E. Ebdane to suspend the issuance of
Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR) indefinitely, aiming to
improve public safety. Following this, Ebdane issued the "Guidelines in the
Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence" on
January 31, 2003, which revoked all existing PTCFORs and limited firearm
carrying privileges to specific authorized individuals.
 Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed firearm holder impacted by these new
regulations, sought reconsideration from the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG), but his request was denied. Left with no other recourse,
Chavez filed a petition for prohibition and injunction, challenging the legality of
the Guidelines and naming PNP Chief Ebdane and Executive Secretary Alberto
G. Romulo as respondents in his case.
Issue:
 Whether the PNP Chief has the proper authority to issue guidelines on firearms
ban
 Whether the guidelines’ issuance constitute a valid exercise of police power
Ruling:
 The Court DISMISSED the petitio, affirming the proper authority of PNP Chief to
issue guidelines. It clarified that the President's directive was a policy
pronouncement rather than a legislative act. The Court noted that the authority to
regulate firearms and issue permits had long been entrusted to the PNP Chief,
as the successor to the Chief of the Constabulary.
 The Court also ruled that bearing arms in the Philippines is not a constitutional
right but a statutory privilege subject to government regulation. The revocation of
Chavez's PTCFOR was deemed a legitimate exercise of police power,
addressing public safety concerns due to rising crime rates. Furthermore, the
Court stressed that the Guidelines did not outright ban firearm possession but
instead controlled the carrying of firearms outside one’s residence.

MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Assn. Inc.

G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000
PUNO, J.
Facts:
 The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) oversees essential
services in Metro Manila, including road management. In 1995, the MMDA
requested the Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), a homeowners' group in Makati
City, to open Neptune Street—a private road in their subdivision—to public traffic,
citing public safety and convenience under Republic Act No. 7924. The MMDA
also planned to demolish a perimeter wall connecting the private road to
Kalayaan Avenue, a public road.
 In response, BAVA filed a case for injunction in the Makati Regional Trial Court to
prevent the road's opening and the wall's demolition. Although the trial court
initially issued a temporary restraining order, it later denied BAVA's request for a
preliminary injunction. On appeal, the Court of Appeals inspected the site and
ruled that the MMDA lacked authority to open Neptune Street without a Makati
City Council ordinance. The appellate court issued an injunction against the
 MMDA, a decision upheld when the MMDA's motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Issue:
 Whether MMDA have the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic under
its regulatory and police powers?
Ruling:
 The Court of Appeals sided with BAVA, concluding that the MMDA lacked the
authority to open Neptune Street for public use. It explained that police power is
primarily exercised by the National Legislature and may only be delegated to
local government units, which have the authority to pass ordinances. As a
development agency, the MMDA’s role is limited to coordinating and delivering
basic services, without any legislative power to enact ordinances or regulations.
 The court clarified that Republic Act No. 7924, which governs the MMDA, does
not grant it police power or legislative authority. The MMDA’s functions are strictly
administrative and coordinative, preventing it from independently opening private
roads without a local ordinance. Additionally, the court pointed out that the
MMDA's justification based on its mandate to rationalize road use does not give it
the power to legislate or infringe on private property rights.

MMDA vs. Trackworks

G.R No. 179554, December 16, 2009 BERSAMIN, J.:
Facts:
 In 1997, the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) signed
a Build-Lease-Transfer (BLT) agreement with Metro Rail Transit Corporation
(MRTC) for the construction of the MRT3. This agreement granted MRTC the
right to develop commercial spaces and earn advertising revenue from MRT3
structures for 25 years, after which ownership would revert to the government. In
1998, MRTC entered a contract with Track works to manage advertising services
within MRT3, but in 2001, the MMDA ordered the removal of Track works'
billboards, citing a regulation banning such advertisements in public spaces.
 Track works refused to comply, prompting the MMDA to dismantle the billboards.
Track works then sought legal action, securing a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and later a preliminary injunction from the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The
Court of Appeals upheld the RTC's decision after MMDA filed a petition for
certiorari.
 Eventually, the RTC issued a permanent injunction, prohibiting the MMDA from
dismantling Track works' advertising installations, with the Supreme Court later
denying MMDA's appeal.
Issue:
 Whether the MMDA have the authority to unilaterally dismantle the billboards and
advertising media installed by Track works
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Track works, upholding the lower courts'
decisions. The Court stated that Track works had the right to install advertising
media based on MRTC's authority under the BLT agreement. It emphasized that
MMDA did not have the power to remove the installations on its own, as its role
was limited to administrative and regulatory functions, not legislative authority.
  The Court also clarified that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 did not apply to MRT3
since it was considered private property, and the regulation was meant for public
spaces. Additionally, the Court pointed out that the responsibility to enforce the
Building Code lay with the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH),
not the MMDA.

Meralco v Sps. Ramos

GR 195145, February 10, 2016 BRION, J,
Facts:
 The Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) provides electricity in Metro Manila,
and the respondents, the Ramos couple, had a contract with MERALCO for their
home. During an inspection in 1999, MERALCO discovered an illegal connection
on their electric meter, which was traced to a residence of their relative. The
meter was disconnected without the Ramos couple's knowledge, and MERALCO
later demanded a large payment for the alleged illegal usage.
 The Ramos couple denied the charge and asked for their service to be
reconnected. They filed a complaint against MERALCO, seeking damages and
reconnection. The Regional Trial Court ruled in their favor, ordering MERALCO to
restore the electric service and pay damages, which was later upheld by the
Court of Appeals.
Issue:
 Did MERALCO have the right to immediately disconnect the respondents' electric
service upon discovering the illegal connection?
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court rejected MERALCO's petition for review, upholding the
decision of the Court of Appeals. It ruled that MERALCO lacked the authority to
disconnect the respondents' electric service without following the procedures
outlined in R.A. 7832, which requires the presence of an officer or Energy
Regulatory Board representative during inspection and prior notice to the
customer before disconnection.
 The Court highlighted the importance of ensuring due process during the
inspection and found that MERALCO failed to prove it met the legal
requirements. It also stated that MERALCO could not charge the respondents for
the illegal connection without evidence showing they benefited from it. In terms of
damages, the Court modified the original amounts, increasing actual damages,
adjusting moral damages, and raising exemplary damages to deter future
violations.

National Power Corporation vs. Posada

LEONEN, J.
GR No.191945 Mar 11, 2015

Facts:
 The case at bar is a MOTION TO WITHDRAW APPEAL in the Supreme Court.
 The case started when NPC commenced expropriation proceedings to secure a
right-of-way easement over land parcels in Barangay Marinawa, Bato,
 Catanduanes, which are owned by the respondents. This initiative was a
component of NPC's Substation Island Grid Project. NPC proposed a price of
P500.00 per square meter for the properties, a valuation that the respondents
challenged, asserting that the true worth was P2,000.00 per square meter.
 RTC confirmed NPC's right to expropriate the properties and ordered a
commission to determine just compensation. The court-appointed commissioners
later recommended a fair market value of P1,500.00 per square meter. NPC
opposed this recommendation, arguing that the value should be based on the
land's assessed value and not its potential.
 NPC amended its complaint to acquire portions of the properties instead of just
an easement, depositing P580,769.93 with the Land Bank of the Philippines as
the value for the expropriated land. The trial court issued a Writ of Possession
but this was later recalled due to NPC's failure to comply with the court's order
regarding just compensation.
 The trial court fixed the just compensation at P2,000.00 per square meter and
stated that NPC could not take possession until it paid the determined value of
the land. NPC's appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied, leading to the case
at bar.
Issue:
 Whether the trial court was correct in recalling the Writ of Possession issued in
favor of the National Power Corporation?
Held:
 The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision to recall the Writ of
Possession, affirming that NPC failed to comply with the requirements of
Republic Act No. 8974 regarding just compensation.
 Expropriation proceedings for national infrastructure projects are governed by
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and Republic Act No. 8974. The power of eminent
domain is an inherent competence of the state. It is essential to a sovereign.
Thus, the Constitution does not explicitly define this power but subjects it to a
limitation: that it be exercised only for public use and with payment of just
compensation. Whether the use is public or whether the compensation is
constitutionally just will be determined finally by the courts.
 Expropriation, the procedure by which the government takes possession of
private property, is outlined primarily in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. It
undergoes two phases. The first phase determines the propriety of the action.
The second phase determines the compensation to be paid to the landowner.
 In expropriation cases involving national infrastructure projects, the trial court
issues a Writ of Possession upon compliance by the implementing agency of the
guidelines stated in Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974. If it is later found that the
guidelines were not complied with, the trial court recalls the Writ of Possession
for being improperly issued. When a trial court recalls a Writ of Possession in an
expropriation proceeding, the parties do not revert to status quo, i.e., the status
of the parties before the expropriation complaint was filed. The trial court’s order
of condemnation stands regardless of whether a Writ of Possession was already
issued.

City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila

JOHNSON, J.
GR No.14355 Oct 31, 1919
Facts:
 The case at bar is an APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Del Rosario, J.
 The case started when the City of Manila submitted a petition to the Court of First
Instance, aiming to expropriate specific parcels of land in the Binondo district to
facilitate the expansion of Rizal Avenue. The city asserted that the expropriation
was essential for the advancement of public welfare.
 The defendants, notably the Chinese Community of Manila, opposed the petition,
arguing that the land in question serves as a cemetery where numerous Chinese
individuals have been laid to rest. They asserted that the proposed expropriation
would disrupt this sacred ground and disturb the final resting places of the
deceased. They contended that the current roads adequately meet the public's
needs and that alternative routes could be employed without jeopardizing the
integrity of the cemetery.
 The lower court, presided over by Judge Simplicio del Rosario, ruled in favor of
the defendants, stating that there was no necessity for the expropriation. The City
of Manila subsequently appealed the decision, leading to the present case at bar.
Issue:
 Whether the courts can inquire into and hear proof regarding the necessity of the
expropriation proceedings by the City of Manila?
 Whether the land in question, being a cemetery, was subject to expropriation for
public use?
Held:
 The Supreme Court ruled that the City of Manila could not expropriate the
cemetery land as there was no proven necessity for the expropriation.
 The court held that it had the authority to inquire into the necessity of the
expropriation and that the cemetery, being a public property, could not be taken
for public use without specific legislative authority.
 When a municipal corporation attempts to expropriate private property and an
objection is made thereto by the owner, the courts have ample authority, in this
jurisdiction, to make inquiry, and to hear proof upon an -issue properly presented,
concerning the question whether or not the purpose of the appropriation is, in
fact, for some public use. The right of expropriation is not inherent power in a
municipal corporation and before it can exercise the right some law must exist
conferring the power upon it. A municipal corporation in this jurisdiction cannot
expropriate public property. The land to be expropriated must be private, and the
purpose of the expropriation must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that
neither of said condition exists, or that either one of them fails, the right to
expropriate does not exist. If the property is taken in' the ostensible behalf of a
public improvement which it can never by any possibility serve, it is being taken
for a use not public, and the owner's constitutional rights call for protection by the
courts.

Moday vs. Court of Appeals

ROMERO, J. GR No.107916 Feb 20, 1997
Facts:

 The case at bar is a PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
  The case's origins started when the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan approved
Resolution No. 43-89. This resolution empowered the Municipal Mayor to
commence expropriation proceedings for a one- hectare segment of Lot No.
6138, property of Percival Moday. This land was designated for the development
of the Bunawan Farmers Center, along with various government sports facilities.
 The resolution received the endorsement of former Municipal Mayor Anuncio C.
Bustillo before being forwarded to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for their
approval. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan rejected the resolution, asserting that
expropriation was unwarranted since alternate lots were available in Bunawan. In
spite of the opposition, the Municipality of Bunawan initiated a Petition for
Eminent Domain against Percival Moday, later adding his parents as defendants
in the case.
 The municipality filed a motion to take possession of the property, claiming to
have deposited the necessary amount as required by law.
 RTC approved the motion, asserting that the Sangguniang
 Panlalawigan's lack of action in declaring the resolution invalid rendered it
effective. The petitioners' request for reconsideration was denied, prompting
them to escalate the case to the Court of Appeals, where the lower court's ruling
was upheld. The petitioners argued that the expropriation was driven by political
motives and claimed that the resolution was invalid as it lacked the approval of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The case was brought to the Supreme Court
seeking to reverse the Court of Appeals' decision and declare Resolution No. 43-
89 null and void.
Issue:
 Whether a municipality can expropriate private property based solely on a
municipal resolution that has been disapproved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan?
Held:
 The Supreme Court ruled that the Municipality of Bunawan had the authority to
expropriate the property despite the disapproval of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
 Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the
instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s disapproval of Municipal Resolution No.
 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The
 law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole
ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to
issue. Although pertaining to a similar provision of law but different factual milieu
then obtaining, the Court’s pronouncements in Velazco v. Blas, where we cited
significant early jurisprudence, are applicable to the case at bar. “The only
ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution,
ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is
‘beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same.’
Absolutely no other ground is recognized by the law. A strictly legal question is
before the provincial board in its consideration of a municipal resolution,
ordinance, or order. The provincial (board’s) disapproval of any resolution,
ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such
resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred
by law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative functions
of the municipal council or president. Such has been the consistent course of
executive authority.”
Republic vs. Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co.
REYES, J.B.L., J.
GR No.L-18841 Jan 27, 1969
Facts:
 The case at bar is an APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
 The case originated from the formation of the Bureau of Telecommunications on
July 1, 1947, pursuant to Executive Order No. 94. This newly established bureau
was entrusted with the responsibility of managing and maintaining
telecommunication services across the Philippines. The Bureau was authorized
to negotiate and oversee wire-telephone communication services, promptly
renting trunk lines from PLDT to enhance call connectivity for government offices
and the general public.
 In 1933, PLDT and RCA Communications, Inc. entered into an agreement for the
transfer of telephone messages between the United States and the Philippines,
which included a revenue-sharing arrangement. This contract was amended
several times, with the last amendment in 1947 establishing a 50-50 revenue
split. However, on February 2, 1956, PLDT notified RCA of its intention to
terminate the contract by February 2, 1958.
 The Bureau of Telecommunications, after setting up its own Government
Telephone System, started offering its services to the public. This expansion
sparked complaints from PLDT about the Bureau's utilization of its trunk lines for
commercial activities.
 PLDT issued a warning to cut off the trunk lines if the Bureau did not halt its
operations by midnight on April 12, 1958. When there was no response, PLDT
severed the connections, effectively cutting off the Philippines from international
telephone services—leaving only calls from the United States as an exception.
 The trial court granted a preliminary injunction to restore the lines but ultimately
dismissed both the complaint and PLDT's counterclaims following the trial,
prompting appeals from both sides.
Issue:
 Whether the Bureau of Telecommunications is entitled to use PLDT's facilities
without compensation?
Held:
 The court ruled that the Bureau is entitled to use PLDT's facilities, subject to just
compensation.
 Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no
cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only
a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be
subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and
services to allow interservice connection between both telephone systems is not
much different.
 In-either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit.
If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may; in the interest
of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just
compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to
render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid
therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the
 users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public
use.

Barangay San Roque, Talisay, Cebu vs. Heirs of Francisco Pastor

PANGANIBAN, J.
GR No. 138896 Jun 20, 2000

Facts:
 The case at bar is a PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court
of Appeals.
 The events leading to the case began when the petitioner filed a complaint for
expropriation against the respondents before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Talisay, Cebu (Branch 1).
 In 1933, PLDT and RCA Communications, Inc. entered into an agreement for the
transfer of telephone messages between the United States and the Philippines,
which included a revenue-sharing arrangement. This contract was amended
several times, with the last amendment in 1947 establishing a 50-50 revenue
split. However, on February 2, 1956, PLDT notified RCA of its intention to
terminate the contract by February 2, 1958.
 MTC resolved to dismiss the complaint, citing insufficient jurisdiction. The MTC
concluded that eminent domain represents the authority to seize private property
for public benefit, a process that is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), rather than the MTC.
 The petitioner then escalated the matter to the Regional Trial Court, which
ultimately rejected the complaint as well. The RTC determined that eminent
domain actions have an impact on real property titles; therefore, the assessed
value of the property will dictate the appropriate court for the case.
 The RTC concluded that since the assessed value of the property was only
P1,740.00, the case should have been filed in the MTC, as per Section 3,
paragraph (3) of Republic Act No. 7691, which grants MTCs exclusive original
jurisdiction over civil actions involving real property with an assessed value of
less than P20,000.00.
 The petitioner subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court, presenting a
fundamental legal question concerning which court held jurisdiction over the
eminent domain case.
Issue:
 Whether which of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) or the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or expropriation where the
assessed value of the subject property is below Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00)?
Held:
 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, Barangay San Roque, and
granted the petition. The Court set aside the orders of the RTC and directed it to
hear the case.
 We agree with the petitioner that an expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
 In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum
of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority
and right to take private property for public use.
  It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is
whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the
requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the
authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the
observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the
government’s exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.

Republic vs. Tagle

PANGANIBAN, J.GR No. 129079 Dec 02, 1998
Facts:
 The case at bar is a SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
 The origins of this case trace back to September 1982, when the Philippine
Government, represented by the Philippine Human Resources Development
Center (PHRDC), entered into negotiations with the Japanese International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) to launch the ASEAN Human Resources
Development Project in the Philippines. This project encompasses the
Construction Manpower Development Center (CMDC), which is currently
operated by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).
 Memorandum of Agreement was executed between PHRDC and Benitez, in
which she consented to lease or sell a section of her property in Barangay
Salawag, Dasmariñas, Cavite. This property, governed by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 14701, spans approximately 483,331 square meters.
 Benitez granted PHRDC the authority to occupy and develop the land. In
December 1983, a lease contract was executed; however, it was later discovered
that the deed of donation from Benitez to the Philippine Women’s University
(PWU), a party to the lease, was not finalized until December 1984, a full year
after the lease agreement was signed.
 Following the expiration of the lease on January 1, 1988, discussions
commenced regarding the property's sale. However, Benitez did not sign the
Deed of Absolute Sale, despite previous agreements in place. In August 1995,
Benitez sought payment for unpaid rentals and filed an unlawful detainer suit
against PHRDC. In response, the DTI submitted a complaint for eminent domain
under Executive Order No. 1035, which allows the government to acquire private
property for various development projects.
 The DTI deposited P708,490.00 as just compensation and subsequently filed a
motion for a writ of possession, which the RTC initially granted on May 24, 1996.
Benitez submitted a motion for reconsideration, resulting in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) quashing the writ of possession on July 26, 1996. The court then
denied the Department of Trade and Industry's (DTI) motion for reconsideration
on February 20, 1997. The DTI subsequently escalated the issue to the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
 Whether a writ of possession can be quashed on the grounds that the
expropriating government agency is already in possession of the property sought
to be expropriated?
Ruling:
 The Court ruled that the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial duty of
the court once the government has made the required deposit for just
compensation.
  It is undisputed that the expropriation proceeding in the case at bar involves a
development project covered by EO 1035
 The expropriation of real property does not include mere physical entry or
occupation of land. Although eminent domain usually involves a taking of title,
there may also be compensable taking of only some, not all, of the property
interests in the bundle of rights that constitute ownership.
 In the instant case, it is manifest that the petitioner, in pursuit of an objective
beneficial to public interest, seeks to realize the same through its power of
eminent domain. In exercising this power, petitioner intended to acquire not only
physical possession but also the legal right to possess and ultimately to own the
subject property. Hence, its mere physical entry and occupation of the property
fall short of the taking of title, which includes all the rights that may be exercised
by an owner over the subject property. Its actual occupation, which renders
academic the need for it to enter, does not by itself include its acquisition of all
the rights of ownership. Its right to possess did not attend its initial physical
possession of the property because the lease, which had authorized said
possession, lapsed. In short, petitioner wanted not merely possession de facto
but possession de jure as well.

Manosca vs. Court of Appeals

VITUG, J.GR No. 106440 Jan 29, 1996
Facts:
 The case at bar is a PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court
of Appeals.
 The events leading to this case began when the petitioners inherited a 492-
square-meter parcel of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro
Manila. This land was identified by the National Historical Institute (NHI) as the
birthplace of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of the Iglesia Ni Cristo.
 NHI adopted Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, designating the land as a national
historical landmark. This resolution received the official endorsement of the
Minister of Education, Culture and Sports. The Secretary of Justice later
confirmed the legality of the declaration, emphasizing that the site held
substantial historical significance and could be appropriated for public use.
 Office of the Solicitor General, filed a complaint for expropriation in the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, asserting that the land was needed for public purposes as a
national historical landmark. The Republic also sought an urgent motion to take
immediate possession of the property.
 The petitioners vehemently opposed the motion, contending that the
expropriation lacked a genuine public purpose and would ultimately serve to
benefit a religious entity. They argued that this violates Section 29(2) of Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court granted the Republic permission to take
possession of the property after establishing its provisional market value.
 The appellate court ruled that the ordinary remedy of appeal was adequate and
that the petitioners had not demonstrated any grave abuse of discretion by the
trial court. The petitioners then sought a review from the Supreme Court.
Issue:
 Whether the "public use" requirement of eminent domain is satisfied in the
attempted expropriation of the land declared as a national historical landmark?
Ruling:
  The Supreme Court ruled that the "public use" requirement of eminent domain
was satisfied in the attempted expropriation of the land.
 The term “public use,” not having been otherwise defined by the constitution,
must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public
exigency. Black summarizes the characterization given by various courts to the
term; thus: “Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis
for taking property by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, ‘public use’
is one which confers some benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to
actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed
facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of
use, whether exercised by one or many members of public, a ‘public advantage’
or ‘public benefit’ accrues sufficient to constitute a public use.

Filstream International Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals

FRANCISCO, J. GR No. 125218 & 128077 Jan 23, 1998
Facts:
 The case at bar are PETITIONS for review of the decisions of the Court of
Appeals.
 The contention revolves around the expropriation of properties held by Filstream,
situated on Antonio Rivera Street in Tondo II, Manila, encompassing an area of
3,571.10 square meters and documented under multiple Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCTs). On January 7, 1993, Filstream initiated an ejectment suit against the
occupants of its properties. This legal action culminated in a ruling from the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila on September 14, 1993, which ordered
the occupants to vacate the premises and remit overdue rental payments.
 The decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and later by the
Court of Appeals, making it final and executory.
 During the ejectment proceedings, the occupants filed a complaint for Annulment
of Deed of Exchange against Filstream. Meanwhile, the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing the expropriation of certain parcels of land,
including those owned by Filstream. Subsequently, the City filed a complaint for
eminent domain seeking to expropriate Filstream's properties.
 The RTC granted a Writ of Possession to the City, which led Filstream to submit
motions aimed at dismissing the complaint and quashing the writ. RTC rejected
Filstream's motions and announced the condemnation of the properties for public
use. Filstream's subsequent motions for reconsideration were denied, prompting
the filing of a certiorari petition with the Court of Appeals. However, this petition
was ultimately dismissed due to procedural shortcomings.
 Filstream subsequently submitted a petition for review to the Supreme Court,
contesting the dismissal of its appeal and the Court of Appeals' decision to grant
a restraining order and preliminary injunction in favor of the private respondents.
Issue:
 Whether the issuance of the restraining order and preliminary injunction by the
Court of Appeals was justified despite the existence of a final and executory
judgment in favor of Filstream?
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court also reversed and set aside the resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated January 28, 1997, and February 18, 1997, which granted the
restraining order and preliminary injunction.
  A strict adherence to the technical and procedural rules in this case would defeat
rather than meet the ends of justice as it would result in the violation of the
substantial rights of petitioner. At stake in the appeal filed by petitioner before the
CA is the exercise of their property rights over the disputed premises which have
been expropriated and have in fact been ordered condemned in favor of the City
of Manila. In effect, the dismissal of their appeal in the expropriation proceedings
based on the aforementioned grounds is tantamount to a deprivation of property
without due process of law as it would automatically validate the expropriation
proceedings which the petitioner is still disputing. It must be emphasized that
where substantial rights are affected, as in this case, the stringent application of
procedural rules may be relaxed if only to meet the ends of substantial justice.
 We take judicial notice of the fact that urban land reform has become a
paramount task in view of the acute shortage of decent housing in urban areas
particularly in Metro Manila. Nevertheless, despite the existence of a serious
dilemma, local government units are not given an unbridled authority when
exercising their power of eminent domain in pursuit of solutions to these
problems.

Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga vs. Court of Appeals

VELASCO, JR., J. GR No. 150640 Mar 22, 2007
Facts:
 The case at bar is a PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
 The petitioner sought to expropriate a portion of the respondents' land to convert
it into a barangay feeder road, claiming that this would serve public purposes as
outlined in Barangay Resolution No. 6. The resolution stated that the land would
facilitate access for agricultural products and basic needs of residents, who
currently faced difficulties using a long, circuitous dirt road to reach the provincial
road.
 The respondents confidently claimed ownership of the 27,000- square meter
property, contending that the expropriation was aimed at private use, primarily to
advantage the homeowners of the nearby Davsan II Subdivision. They argued
that the barangay council intentionally misrepresented the purpose of the
expropriation to disguise its actual intentions.
 The respondents emphasized that, according to Presidential Decree No. 957, it is
the responsibility of the subdivision owner to ensure the provision of a feeder
road for the residents. In the course of the trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
sided with the petitioner, affirming that the expropriation was both legal and
intended for public benefit. Additionally, the court mandated the appointment of
commissioners to assess just compensation.
 The Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), determining that the expropriation served the interests of a private
subdivision rather than serving a public purpose. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the complaint due to insufficient merit, which has now prompted a petition for
certiorari to be filed with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
 Whether there was a violation of the power of eminent domain by the petitioner?
 Whether there was a failure to pay just compensation to the respondents?
Ruling:
  The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, ruling that the
proposed exercise of the power of eminent domain was not for a public purpose.
The petition was dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.
 Another vital requisite for a valid condemnation is the payment of just
compensation to the property owner. In the recent case of APO Fruits
Corporation
 v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, 514 SCRA 000 (2007), just compensation
has been defined as “the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator,” and that the gauge for computation is not the taker’s
gain but the owner’s loss. In order for the payment to be “just,” it must be real,
substantial, full, and ample. Not only must the payment be fair and correctly
determined, but also, the Court in Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export
Processing Zone, 349 SCRA 240 (2001), stressed that the payment should be
made within a “reasonable time” from the taking of the property. It succinctly
explained that without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
“just” inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences
of being immediately deprived of the land while being made to wait for a decade
or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with the loss.
Thus, once just compensation is finally determined, the expropriator must
immediately pay the amount to the lot owner. In Reyes v. National Housing
Authority, 462 SCRA 265 (2005), it was ruled that 12% interest per annum shall
be imposed on the final compensation until paid. Thus, any further delay in the
payment will result in the imposition of 12% interest per annum. However, in the
recent case of Republic v. Lim, 462 SCRA 265 (2005), the Court enunciated the
rule that “where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5)
years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the
owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property.”
Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Dulay
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
GR No.L-59603 Apr 29, 1987
Facts:
 The case at bar is a PETITION for certiorari and mandamus to review the order
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Br. XVI, Dulay, J.
 The journey leading to this case commenced on January 15, 1979, when the
President of the Philippines signed Proclamation No. 1811, designating a tract of
land in Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, for the development of an export processing zone.
This reservation comprised four parcels of land, encompassing a total of 22,328
square meters, all of which were privately owned by the San Antonio
Development Corporation.
 The EPZA sought to acquire these parcels according to the valuation established
by Presidential Decree No. 464; however, the parties were unable to come to an
agreement. As a result, the EPZA pursued a legal complaint for expropriation in
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, requesting a writ of possession to acquire the
land necessary for the development of the Mactan Export Processing Zone. On
October 21, 1980, the court issued a writ of possession.
 During the pre-trial conference on February 13, 1981, the court determined that
the only issue to resolve was the just compensation for the properties.
Subsequently, the court appointed commissioners to ascertain the just
compensation. On June 19, 1981, the commissioners recommended a
compensation of P15.00 per square meter.
 The EPZA submitted a motion for reconsideration, contending that Presidential
Decree No. 1533 has effectively repealed the relevant provisions of Rule 67 in
 the Revised Rules of Court, which have historically regulated the assessment of
just compensation. The trial court rejected this motion, prompting the EPZA to
submit a petition for certiorari and mandamus that challenges both the
constitutionality of the decrees and the court's authority to appoint
commissioners.
Issue:
 Whether the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation
under P.D. No. 1533 is valid and constitutional?
Ruling:
 The court affirmed that the determination of just compensation is a judicial
function and that the decrees unduly restricted the court's authority in this regard.
 The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees
constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to
render this Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it
for final determination. Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court
technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the
property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply
stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the
assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to
appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need
to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private property is seemingly
fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not had before the
actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees during the
proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court
has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor,
and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise
its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair.
 The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial
determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of
Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.

Ansaldo vs. Tantuico, Jr.

NARVASA, J.GR No. 50147 Aug 03, 1990
Facts:
 The case at bar is a PETITION to review the decision of the Commission on
Audit.
 The case centers around the petitioners, Jose Ma. Ansaldo and Maria Angela
Ansaldo are the proud owners of two adjoining lots, boasting a combined area of
1,041 square meters, situated in the vibrant district of San Juan, Metro Manila. In
1947, the government acquired these lots to facilitate the widening of what is
currently known as Ramon Magsaysay Avenue.
 The property was seized without any formal declaration of eminent domain or
consent from the owners, and remarkably, the Ansaldo family remained silent for
more than twenty-six years without protesting or challenging the seizure. On
January 22, 1973, they formally submitted their request for compensation for
their property. The matter was later submitted to the Secretary of Justice, who
 advised that just compensation should be established in accordance with
Presidential Decree No. 76.
 This decree mandated that just compensation must be determined based on the
property's current and fair market value at the time it is taken. Subsequently, the
Commissioner of Public Highways initiated a reassessment of the property's
market value. This evaluation was finalized, and a payment recommendation was
submitted to the Auditor General.
 The Commission on Audit, under the leadership of Acting Chairman Francisco S.
Tantuico, Jr., determined that compensation ought to be assessed based on the
conditions at the time of acquisition in 1947, a ruling that has been reaffirmed in
later decisions. The Ansaldo family sought recourse by appealing these decisions
to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
 Whether the just compensation for the expropriated property be determined as of
the time of taking in 1947 or at the time of the filing of the expropriation suit?
 Whether the government have the authority to expropriate the property without a
formal action or agreement with the owners?
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled that the just compensation for the Ansaldos' property
should be determined as of the time of taking in 1947. The Court affirmed the
decision of the Commission on Audit and directed the Department of Public
Works and Highways to institute the appropriate expropriation action to
determine the just compensation due to the owners, with interest at the legal rate
from the time of taking until full payment is made.
 In the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, there is a "taking"
when the owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there
is a practical destruction or a material material impairment of the value of his
property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof, There is a "taking" in
this sense when the expropriator enters private property not only for a
momentary period but for a more permanent duration, for the purpose of devoting
the property to a public use in such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
 lt is as of the time of such a taking, to repeat, that the just compensation for the
property is to be established. As stated in Republic v. Philippine National Bank, "x
x (W)hen plaintiff takes possession before the institution of the condemnation
proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said
possession, not of filing of the complaint and the latter should be the basis for the
determination of the value, when the taking of the property involved coincides
with or is subsequent to, the commencement of the proceedings. Indeed,
otherwise, the provision of Rule 69, Section 3, directing that compensation 'be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint' would never be operative.
As intimated in Republic v. Lara (supra), said provision contemplates 'normal
circumstances/ under which 'the complaint coincides or even precedes the taking
of the property by the plaintiff/ " The reason for the rule, as pointed out in
Republic v. Lara, is that— "x x (W)here property is taken ahead of the filing of the
condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the public
purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may
have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in
the value of the property from the time the complaint is filed, due to general
economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only
for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend
beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his
 property at the time it is taken. This the only way that compensation to be paid
can be truly just; i.e., 'just not only to the individual whose property is taken,' 'but
to the public, which is to pay for it.'"

National Power Corporation vs Tiangco

G.R. No. 170846, February 6, 2007
Facts:
 The respondents, Aurellano, Lourdes, and Nestor, owned a 152,187 square
meters parcel of land in Tanay, Rizal. The National Power Corporation (NPC), a
government-owned corporation, sought to acquire 19,423 square meters of this
land for its 500Kv Kalayaan-San Jose Transmission Line Project. NPC's plan
indicated that the right-of-way would divide the respondents' land, leaving
separate portions of 33,392 square meters and 99,372 square meters.
 After repeated unsuccessful negotiations with the Tiangcos, NPC filed a
complaint for expropriation. The RTC granted NPC the right to take possession of
the area sought to be expropriated and directed establishing a board of
commissioners to determine just compensation to be paid to the Tiangcos. Then,
the RTC ordered NPC to pay and deposit
 ₱81,204.00 as provisional compensation, to which they complied enabling it to
take possession.
 The board conducted inspections and hearings, during which the Municipal
Assessor of Tanay provided the value of the land at ₱21,000.00 per hectare. On
the other hand, the commissioner valued the land at ₱30.00 per square meter,
with improvements valued at ₱2,093,950. NPC sought only an easement of right-
of-way, not ownership, and argued for compensation of 10% of the property’s
market value under Republic Act No. 6395. The court-appointed commissioner
noted that the project deprived the respondents of land use and recommended
expert appraisal.
 The RTC determined the market value at ₱2.09 per square meter, totaling
 ₱40,594.07 for the 19,423 square meters needed by NPC. Upon appeal, the CA
disregarded this, which was based on a 1984 tax declaration. Instead, the CA
relied on a 1993 tax declaration. Thus, the compensation awarded for the 19,423
square meters of land affected is increased to ₱116,538.00.
Issue:
 Whether the property should be valued based on the 1984 or the 1993 valuation.
Ruling:
 In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing of the complaint, if there
was no actual taking prior thereto. Hence, in this case, the value of the property
at the time of the filing of the complaint on November 20, 1990 should be
considered in determining the just compensation due the respondents.
 The trial court fixed the value of the property at its 1984 value, while the CA, at its
1993 worth. Neither of the two determinations is correct. For purposes of just
compensation, the respondents should be paid the value of the property as of the
time of the filing of the complaint which is deemed to be the time of taking the
property.
 The expropriation proceedings in this case having been initiated by NPC on
November 20, 1990, property values on such month and year should lay the
basis for the proper determination of just compensation.
 In the determination of such value, the court is not limited to the assessed value
of the property or to the schedule of market values determined by the provincial
 or city appraisal committee; these values consist but one factor in the judicial
valuation of the property. The nature and character of the land at the time of its
taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation
should be given to the landowner. All the facts as to the condition of the property
and its surroundings, as well as its improvements and capabilities, should be
considered.
 Neither of the two determinations made by the courts below is therefore correct.
A new one must be arrived at, taking into consideration the foregoing
pronouncements.
 The Supreme Court remanded to the court of origin for the proper determination
of the amount of just compensation

Republic vs Castellvi
G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974
Facts:
 The Castellvi property had been occupied by the Philippine Air Force since 1947
under a renewable lease agreement from year to year. In 1956, Castellvi refused
to renew the lease and demanded the property be vacated and restored to its
original condition. Despite demands, the military refused to vacate, citing the
value of permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00.
Castellvi initiated an ejectment case but withdrew it after the Republic filed
expropriation proceedings, agreeing to receive unpaid rent for 1956-1959.
 The Republic filed a complaint for eminent domain against Carmen M. Vda. de
Castellvi and Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun in 1959, seeking to expropriate their
land for public use. The Republic proposed a provisional value of P259,669.10
based on the market value assessed by the Committee on Appraisal for the
Province of Pampanga. Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun, however, contended that
the fair market value of their land was significantly higher being residential lands,
with Castellvi valuing hers at P15 per square meter or P11,389,485.00, and
Toledo-Gozun at P15 per square meter for hers or P8,085,675.00.
 The RTC authorized that the Republic be placed in possession of the lands upon
payment of the provisional values of P151,859.80 for Castellvi and P107,609.00
for Toledo-Gozun. The RTC appointed three commissioners to determine the just
compensation. The commissioners recommended a compensation of P10 per
square meter for both properties, plus additional compensation for improvements
on Toledo- Gozun’s land. The court upheld this recommendation and also
ordered that interest at 6% per annum be paid on the compensation from the
date of the provisional deposit.
 The Republic urges that the "taking " of Castellvi's property should be deemed as
of the year 1947 by virtue of the lease agreement.
Issue:
 Whether the lower court erred in holding that the "taking" of the properties under
expropriation commenced with the filing of the action.
Ruling:
 No, the lower court did not err in holding that the "taking" of the properties under
expropriation commenced with the filing of the action.
 A number of circumstances must be present in the "taking" of property for
purposes of eminent domain.
  First, the expropriator must enter a private property. This circumstance is present
in the instant case, when by virtue of the lease agreement the Republic, through
the AFP, took possession of the property of Castellvi.
 Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary
period. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable
from year to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and
considered transitory.
 Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal
authority. This circumstance in the "taking" may be considered as present in the
instant case, because the Republic entered the Castellvi property as lessee.
 Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be conceded that the circumstance of
the property being devoted to public use is present because the property was
used by the air force of the AFP.
 Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In the
instant case, the entry of the Republic into the property and its utilization of the
same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously
recognized as owner by the Republic
 The Supreme Court hold, therefore, that the "taking" of the Castellvi property
should not be reckoned as of the year 1947 when the Republic first occupied the
same pursuant to the contract of lease, and that the just compensation to be paid
for the Castellvi property should not be determined on the basis of the value of
the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error when it held
that the "taking" of the property under expropriation commenced with the filing of
the complaint in this case.

City Government of Quezon City vs Ericta

G.R. No. L-34915, June 24, 1983
Facts:
 The Quezon City Council, the petitioners, enacted Section 9 of Ordinance No.
6118, S-64. The ordinance regulated private memorial cemeteries in Quezon
City, requiring at least 6% of the total area to be allocated for the burial of
paupers who were city residents for at least five years before death.
 Although initially not enforced, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution to
implement the provision to stop the sale of lots by cemetery owners who failed to
comply. Himlayang Pilipino, Inc., the respondent, filed a petition questioning the
ordinance's constitutionality, claiming it violated the Constitution, the Quezon City
Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.
 The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Himlayang Pilipino, declaring the
provision null and void, prompting the city to appeal.
 The petitioners argued that the requirement to allocate land for paupers' burial
was a valid exercise of local police power and served a public use.
 The respondent countered that the provision constituted a confiscation of
property, as it permanently restricted its use, that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.
Issue:
 Whether Section 9 of the ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power.
Ruling:
  No, Section 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power.
 The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose,
the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
 When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in
Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the
dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it
simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or
expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the
law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however,
requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different
from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain
areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land
they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health,
and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to
insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome
environments.

DPWH Secretary vs Tecson

G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013
Facts:
 Spouses Heracleo and Ramona Tecson, the respondents, co-owned a 7,268-
square-meter parcel of land in Malolos, Bulacan, which was taken by the
government in 1940 without their consent or expropriation proceedings for the
construction of the MacArthur Highway.
 In 1994, the respondents demanded payment of the land's fair market value. The
District Engineer of the DPWH offered ₱0.70 per square meter based on
Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of Bulacan, which the
respondents found unsatisfactory. They demanded either the return of the
property or payment at the current market value, assessed at ₱2,543,800.00.
 As such, the respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages. The DPWH argued for dismissal, citing state immunity, prescription,
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and a claim that compensation should
be based on 1940 or 1941 values.
 The RTC dismissed the case due to state immunity, but the CA reversed this
decision, ruling that state immunity does not apply where recovery of
compensation is the sole remedy. The CA remanded the case to the RTC to
determine just compensation.
 The RTC initially appointed the Branch Clerk of Court as Commissioner to
determine just compensation but later referred the matter to the Provincial
Appraisal Committee. The PAC recommended ₱1,500.00 per square meter as
just compensation for the property.
 The RTC directed the Department of Public Works and Highways to pay the
amount of One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱1,500.00) per square meter.
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed this decision with the modification that the just
compensation stated above should earn interest of six percent (6%) per annum.
Issue:
 Whether the respondents are entitled to just compensation after more than fifty
years.
Ruling:
 Yes, the respondents are entitled to just compensation after more than fifty years.
 There is taking when the expropriator enters private property not only for a
momentary period but for a permanent duration, or for the purpose of devoting
the property to public use in such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive him
of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
 It is undisputed that the subject property was taken by petitioners without the
benefit of expropriation proceedings for the construction of the MacArthur
Highway. After the lapse of more than fifty years, the property owners sought
recovery of the possession of their property.
 When a property is taken by the government for public use, jurisprudence clearly
provides for the remedies available to a landowner. The owner may recover his
property if its return is feasible or, if it is not, the aggrieved owner may demand
payment of just compensation for the land taken. For failure of respondents to
question the lack of expropriation proceedings for a long period of time, they are
deemed to have waived and are estopped from assailing the power of the
government to expropriate or the public use for which the power was exercised.
What is left to respondents is the right of compensation. The trial and appellate
courts found that respondents are entitled to compensation. The only issue left
for determination is the propriety of the amount awarded to respondents.
 The Supreme Court held that the valuation of the subject property owned by
respondents shall be ₱0.70 instead of ₱1,500.00 per square meter, with interest
at six percent (6%) per annum from the date of taking in 1940 instead of March
17, 1995, until full payment.

Manapat v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 110478, October 15, 2007
Facts:
 In the 1960s, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM) allowed
individuals to occupy the Grace Park property under the condition that they would
vacate if RCAM pursued plans to construct a school. The plan did not proceed,
the occupants offered to purchase the portions they occupied. However, unable
to afford RCAM's proposed price for the land, they petitioned the Government to
acquire and subdivide the property into home lots for resale at low prices. The
Land Tenure Administration (later succeeded by the PHHC) negotiated with
RCAM, but due to RCAM's high asking price and government budget constraints,
the effort was discontinued. RCAM decided to subdivide and sell the lots directly
to the public, and several individuals, including petitioners and respondents in
this case, purchased lots from RCAM.
 However, in 1977, President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
1072, appropriating funds for the expropriation of Grace Park. The National
Housing Authority (NHA), PHHC's successor, initiated expropriation proceedings
to develop the property under the Zonal Improvement Program and resell
subdivided lots at low cost to residents. Then, multiple expropriation cases were
filed by the NHA with the RTC of Caloocan City.
 The RTC initially dismissed most cases but later ordered the condemnation of
several lots and fixed just compensation at ₱180.00 per square meter in some
cases. The NHA appealed to the CA on two issues: the necessity of taking in
dismissed cases and the adequacy of just compensation in others. Likewise, the
CA reversed the dismissed cases and affirmed the decision in cases that granted
the expropriation.
Issue:
 Whether the NHA may validly expropriate the subject parcels of land.
Ruling:
 Yes, the NHA may validly expropriate the subject parcels of land.
 Just like its two companion fundamental powers of the State,51 the power of
eminent domain is exercised by the Legislature. However, it may be delegated by
Congress to the President, administrative bodies, local government units, and
even to private enterprises performing public services.
 The Court has recognized the following requisites for the valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain: (1) the property taken must be private property; (2)
there must be genuine necessity to take the private property; (3) the taking must
be for public use;
 (4) there must be payment of just compensation; and (5) the taking must comply
with due process of law.
 It is incontrovertible that the parcels of land subject of these consolidated
petitions are private property. Thus, the first requisite is satisfied.
 The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain,
may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a
particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the
improvement.
 In the instant cases, the authority to expropriate came from Presidential Decree
No. 1072, issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1977. At that time,
and as explicitly recognized under the 1973 Constitution, President Marcos had
legislative powers. Perforce, the expropriation of the subject properties –
identified with specificity in the P.D. --- was directed by legislation. The issue of
necessity then assumed the nature of a political question.
 The Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" falls within the confines of "public
use".
 To satisfy the fourth requisite, the Court affirm the appellate court’s disposition
 that the subject cases be remanded to the trial court for the determination of the
amount of just compensation. Under case law, the said determination is a judicial
prerogative.
 As to the observance of the fifth requisite, the due process clause, in the
expropriation proceedings, all the parties have been given their day in court. That
they are now before this Court is attestation enough that they were not denied
due process of law.
 From the foregoing disquisitions, it is unmistakable that all the requirements for
the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain have been complied with.
Thus, our answer to the singular and fundamental issue in these consolidated
cases is: YES, the NHA may validly expropriate the subject parcels of land.
 Public use refers to any use directly available to the general public as a matter of
right and not merely as a forbearance or accommodation. Examples would be
parks which are res communes; property devoted to public services administered
by privately-owned public utilities, like telephone or light companies (demandable
as a matter of right by anyone prepared to pay for said services); and a pilot
development center.

Heirs of Juancho Ardona, et al. vs Reyes, et al

G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555, October 26, 1983
Facts:
  The Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA), the respondent, filed four complaints for
expropriation with the Court of First Instance of Cebu City, aiming to acquire
approximately 282 hectares of land for the development of tourism projects under
its Revised Charter (PD 564). The proposed development included a sports
complex, golf course, clubhouse, recreational facilities, and infrastructure such as
power grids, water systems, and sewerage, intended to promote tourism and
benefit the community. PTA deposited an amount equivalent to 10% of the
property value as required under PD 1533, and the court issued writs of
possession allowing PTA to take immediate possession of the land.
 On the other hand, the petitioners argued that no constitutional provision
authorized expropriation for tourism purposes, and that the intended use cannot
be paramount to the determination of the land as a land reform area. They also
claimed that the jurisdiction belonged to the Court of Agrarian Relations, not the
Court of First Instance.
Issue:
 Whether the purposes of the taking, in this case, constitute "public use".
Ruling:
 Yes, the purposes of the taking, in this case, constitute "public use".
 In the Philippines, Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando has aptly summarized the
statutory and judicial trend as follows:
 The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt
that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever
project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or
parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not any more. As long as
the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into
play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt,
determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided
into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer, through
the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the
government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public
use.
 The petitioners' contention that the promotion of tourism is not "public use"
because private concessioners would be allowed to maintain various facilities
such as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc. inside the tourist complex is impressed
with even less merit. Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and
other private businesses using public streets end highways do not diminish in the
least bit the public character of expropriations for roads and streets. The lease of
store spaces in underpasses of streets built on expropriated land does not make
the taking for a private purpose. Airports and piers catering exclusively to private
airlines and shipping companies are still for public use. The expropriation of
private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose
even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms,
entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns.

Province of Camarines Sur vs CA

G.R. No. 103125, May 17, 1993
Facts:
 The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129,
authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property
 contiguous to the provincial capitol. The purpose was to establish a pilot farm for
non-food and non- traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for
provincial government employees.
 Under the resolution, Governor Luis R. Villafuerte filed two expropriation cases
against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin. Forthwith, the
Province filed a motion for a writ of possession, which the San Joaquins failed to
appear at the hearing. They later moved to dismiss the complaints, arguing that
the offered price for their property was inadequate.
 The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province to take
possession of the property upon depositing ₱5,714.00 as provisionally fixed for
damages that private respondents may suffer. A writ of possession was issued on
January 18, 1990. The San Joaquins moved for relief from this order and sought
to amend their motion to dismiss, but the RTC denied these motions.
 The San Joaquins petitioned the CA to: (a) declare Resolution No. 129 null and
void, (b) dismiss the expropriation complaints, and (c) set aside the RTC's
orders. They also sought to restrain enforcement of the writ of possession. The
Province argued that it had authority under the Local Government Code (B.P.
Blg. 337) and that the expropriations were for a public purpose. The Solicitor
General noted that while presidential approval was unnecessary for the
Province's exercise of eminent domain, approval from the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) was required to convert the land classification from
agricultural to non-agricultural.
 The CA set aside the RTC's orders granting possession and denying the
amended motion to dismiss. It also directed the RTC to suspend expropriation
proceedings until the Province secured DAR approval for land reclassification.
Issue:
 Whether the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose
or public use.
Ruling:
 Yes, the resolution is valid and the expropriation is for a public purpose or public
use.
 Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of
"public
 purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be
exercised. The old concept was that the condemned property must actually be
used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the
taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use". Under
the new concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience or benefit,
which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole
community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project.
 The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a
public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to
the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur.
Once operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable
information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry.
Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be
enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of
the Constitution.
 Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the
property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or
public use and, second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for the
 taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more
than three commissioners.
 Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the
expropriated land to the landowner. However, when possession of the land
cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is neither convenient nor
feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner
is to demand payment of just compensation.

NHA v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo

G.R. No. 154411, June 19, 2003
Facts:
 The National Housing Authority (NHA) filed an amended complaint for eminent
domain against various claimants, including the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, to
expropriate properties in Cebu City for a socialized housing project. The RTC
declared NHA's right to expropriate the properties of the Heirs of Isidro
Guivelondo and appointed commissioners to determine just compensation. The
commissioners recommended compensation of
 ₱11,200.00 per square meter, which the court adopted in its Partial Judgment.
The NHA and the heirs filed motions for reconsideration, resulting in an Omnibus
Order on October 11, 2000, hereby set aside insofar as it has fixed just
compensations for Lots 12, 13, and 19 because the fixing of said just
compensations appears to lack adequate basis.
 NHA's petition for certiorari before the CA was dismissed, as the Partial
Judgment and Omnibus Order had become final. A subsequent petition for
review to the Supreme Court was also denied. In July 2001, NHA filed a motion
to dismiss the case, rendered impossible by the unconscionable value of the land
sought to be expropriated, which the intended beneficiaries can not afford. The
trial court denied the motion, and this denial was upheld on appeal by the CA.
Following the finality of the judgment, the RTC issued a writ of execution. The CA
ultimately dismissed NHA's petition for certiorari upholding the trial court's orders
and enforcing the judgment.
Issue:
 Whether the NHA can dismiss the petition where the case had been decided and
the judgment had already become final and executory.
Ruling:
 No, the NHA cannot dismiss the petition where the case had been decided and
the judgment had already become final and executory.
 Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the
property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or
public use and, second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for the
taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more
than three commissioners. Thus:
 The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of
the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take
the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in
the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint." An order of dismissal, if this be ordained,
would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves
 nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of
condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the
proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the right of
condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard."
 The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to
be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three
(3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the
evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would
finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done
by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may
believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of
fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek a reversal of
the order by taking an appeal therefrom.
 In the case at bar, petitioner did not appeal the Order of the trial court dated
December 10, 1999, which declared that it has a lawful right to expropriate the
properties of respondent Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo. Hence, the Order became
final and may no longer be subject to review or reversal in any court.

NPC & Pobre v. CA

G.R. No. 106804, August 12, 2004
Facts:
 The National Power Corporation (NPC) filed two expropriation cases involving
property owned by Antonino Pobre in Tiwi, Albay, which was being developed as
the Tiwi Hot Springs Resort Subdivision. In the first expropriation case, NPC
acquired 8,311.60 square meters of Pobre’s property in 1977 at ₱25 per square
meter or a total amount of P207,790. During this time, NPC dumped waste
materials beyond the agreed site, causing significant damage to other portions of
Pobre’s property. In the second expropriation case, NPC sought an additional
5,554 square meters of Pobre’s property for the construction and maintenance of
Naglagbong Well Site. After depositing ₱5,546.36 (10% of the lot's market value)
and obtaining a writ of possession, NPC entered the property. However, NPC
later abandoned the project in 1981 due to opposition from Pobre and moved to
dismiss the case in 1985, citing the discovery of an alternative site.
 The trial court granted NPC’s motion to dismiss but allowed Pobre to present
evidence on his claim for damages caused by NPC's actions, including the
dumping of waste materials. NPC failed to object to Pobre’s exhibits, leading the
court to admit them into evidence. After NPC repeatedly failed to present its own
evidence, the trial court considered the case submitted for decision.
 NPC filed a petition for certiorari with the Intermediate Appellate Court, which
dismissed the petition but instructed the trial court to rule on NPC’s objections to
Pobre’s exhibits. The RTC ruled in favor of Pobre, ordering NPC to pay
₱3,448,450 as the fair market value of the 68,969 square meters property, with
legal interest. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court's decision but deleted
the award of attorney’s fees.
Issue:
 Whether the NPC must pay just compensation for the entire property of Pobre.
Ruling:
 Yes, the NPC must pay just compensation for the entire property of Pobre.
  If the propriety of the taking of private property through eminent domain is subject
to judicial scrutiny, the dismissal of the complaint must also pass judicial inquiry
because private rights may have suffered in the meantime. The dismissal,
withdrawal or abandonment of the expropriation case cannot be made arbitrarily.
x x x However, when the defendant claims that his land suffered damage
because of the expropriation, the dismissal of the action should not foreclose the
defendant's right to have his damages ascertained either in the same case or in a
separate action.
 Thus, NPC's theory that the dismissal of its complaint carried with it the dismissal
of Pobre's claim for damages is baseless. x x x Case law holds that in the event
of dismissal of the expropriation case, the claim for damages may be made either
in a separate or in the same action, for all damages occasioned by the institution
of the expropriation case. x x x The trial court in this case reserved Pobre's right
to prove his claim in the same case, a reservation that has become final due to
NPC's own fault.
 Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the
expropriated land to the landowner. However, when possession of the land
cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is neither convenient nor
feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner
is to demand payment of just compensation.
 In this case, the Supreme Court agree with the trial and appellate courts that it is
no longer possible and practical to restore possession of the Property to Pobre.
The Property is no longer habitable as a resort-subdivision. The Property is
worthless to Pobre and is now useful only to NPC. Pobre has completely lost the
Property as if NPC had physically taken over the entire 68,969 square-meter
Property.

ATO vs Gopuco
G.R. No. 158563, June 30, 2005
Facts:
 Apolonio Gopuco, Jr. owned Cadastral Lot No. 72, a 995-square-meter property
near Lahug Airport in Cebu City. In 1947, the Lahug Airport had been turned over
by the United States Army to the Republic of the Philippines.
 In 1949, the NAC notified surrounding landowners, including Gopuco, of the
government’s intention to acquire their properties for airport expansion. Some
landowners sold their lots after assurances of repurchase rights if the airport
ceased using the land, but Gopuco refused to sell.
 The CAA filed an expropriation complaint with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Cebu seeking to acquire Lot No. 72 and other nearby properties for the
expansion project. The CFI declared the expropriation justified and in lawful
exercise of the right of eminent domain. No appeal was taken and the judgment
of condemnation became final and executory.
 Subsequently, when the Mactan International Airport commenced operations, the
Lahug Airport was ordered closed by then President Corazon C. Aquino. Gopuco
wrote to the Bureau of Air Transportation seeking the return of his lot, citing the
abandonment of the original purpose for its expropriation. Later, ownership of Lot
No. 72 was transferred to the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA) in 1992 under Republic Act No. 6958. Gopuco filed a complaint
asserting that the original purpose for which the property was expropriated had
ceased or otherwise been abandoned, and title to the property had therefore
reverted to him. The RTC dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal, the CA
overturned the decision.
Issue:
 When private land is expropriated for a particular public use, and that particular
public use is abandoned, does its former owner acquire a cause of action for
recovery of the property?
Ruling:
 The fact of abandonment or closure of the Lahug Airport admitted by the
defendant did not by itself, result in the reversion of the subject property back to
the plaintiff. Nor did it vest in the plaintiff the right to demand reconveyance of
said property.
 When real property has been acquired for public use unconditionally, either by
eminent domain or by purchase, the abandonment or non-use of the real
property, does not ipso facto give to the previous owner of said property any right
to recover the same.
 The answer to that question depends upon the character of the title acquired by
the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, a municipality, or a
corporation which has the right to acquire property under the power of eminent
domain.
 If, for example, land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition
that when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its
former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the
former owner reacquires the property so expropriated.
 When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either
by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no
rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned or the land may be
devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired,
or any reversion to the former owner.
 In this case, the judgment on the propriety of the taking and the adequacy of the
compensation received have long become final. The Court have also already
held that the terms of that judgment granted title in fee simple to the Republic of
the Philippines. Therefore, pursuant to the Court ruling in Fery, no rights to Lot
No. 72, either express or implied, have been retained by the herein respondent.

Republic v. Lim
G.R. 161656, June 29, 2005
Facts:
 The Republic of the Philippines initiated expropriation proceedings in 1938 over
Lots 932 and 939 in Lahug, Cebu City, owned by Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon,
to establish a military reservation for the Philippine Army. After depositing ₱9,500
under the order of the CFI, the Republic took possession of the lots. Then, the
Republic was ordered by CFI in 1940 to pay ₱4,062.10 as just compensation.
The Denzons appealed, but it was dismissed.
 In 1961, the heirs of the Denzons, Valdehueza and Panerio, filed an action to
recover possession, arguing that the Republic failed to pay the compensation.
The court ruled in 1962 that while the lots were still under their ownership due to
non-payment, however, in view of the annotation on their land titles, they were
ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic.
 Valdehueza and Panerio appealed the CFI Decision to the Supreme Court, which
affirmed the decision. It held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered
owners, there has been no payment of just compensation by the Republic, and
 ruled that Valdehueza and Panerio are not entitled to recover possession of the
lots but may only demand the payment of their fair market value.
 In 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, the
respondent. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, Lim foreclosed on the
mortgage in 1976, leading to the cancellation of their title (TCT No. 23934) and
the issuance of a new title (TCT No. 63894) in Lim's name. This further
complicated the unresolved compensation issue between the heirs and the
Republic. Lim later filed a complaint for quieting of title against the petitioners.
 The RTC ruled in favor of Lim and declared Lim the absolute and exclusive
owner of Lot No. 932. Upon appeal, the CA upheld and affirmed this decision.
Issue:
 Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to
the judgment of the CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940.
Ruling:
 No, the Republic has not retained ownership.
 The Supreme Court ruled that the expropriation of lands consists of two stages:
 The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts involved in the suit. The second phase of the eminent domain
action is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just compensation
for the property sought to be taken."
 It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to
have been completed. In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, the Court
ruled that, "the process is not completed until payment of just compensation."
Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-
in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process
incomplete.
 The Court cannot but construe the Republic’s failure to pay just compensation as
a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such circumstance, recovery of possession
is in order. In several jurisdictions, the courts held that recovery of possession
may be had when property has been wrongfully taken or is wrongfully retained by
one claiming to act under the power of eminent domain or where a rightful entry
is made and the party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has
been assessed or agreed upon; or fails or refuses to have the compensation
assessed and paid.

Mun. of Meycayauan vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 640 (1988)

Facts:
 In 1975, Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed an application for
a permit to fence a parcel of land which would allow the storage of heavy
equipment and various finished products.
 Mayor Celso R. Legaspi including other Municipal Council of Meycauayan
passed a Resolution to expropriate the parcel of land.
 On 1976, the Special Committee recommended that the resolution be
disapproved due to no genuine necessity. This recommendation was approved.
 In 1983, Mayor Adriano D. Daezalong with the Municipal Council of Meycauayan
passed Resolution for the purpose of expropriating anew the respondent’s land.
The Regional Trial Court issued an order the taking of the property and ascertain
the just compensation for the property.
Issue:
 Whether the expropriation of the Respondents Lot is of Public Necessity.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court held that there is no genuine necessity for the Municipality of
Meycauayan to expropriate the aforesaid property of the Philippine Pipes and
 Merchandising Corporation for use as a public road.
 The Court ruled that the Municipality of Meycauayan would be better acquired by
acquiring the other available roads in the vicinity maybe at lesser costs without
causing harm to an establishment doing legitimate business therein.

De Knecht vs. Bautista, 100 SCRA 660 (1980)

Facts:
 The petition stemmed from the government, through the Department of Public
Works and Communications planning to extend the EDSA to Roxas Boulevard.
 The original plan was to extend EDSA through Cuneta Avenue which was
changed to pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets that would affect
multiple homeowners.
 Said homeowners, including Cristina de Knecht, filed a petition to former
President Ferdinand Marcos to revert to the original plan.
 The former president referred to DPH for the explanation whom reiterated the
new plan.
 The matter was referred to the Human Settlements Commission whom
recommended to revert back to the original plan.
 The government filed a complaint for expropriation against property owners
which was counter filed by Cristina for a motion to dismiss.
 The government filed a motion for a writ of possession, which was granted. Thus,
the petitioner challenged the writ of possession due to constitutional violations.
Issue:
 Whether the expropriator can choose any property it preferred.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court held that the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets
were arbitrary and shall not receive judicial approval.
 The Court clarified that the progress and development should be carried out and
remembered for the benefit of the people.

Republic vs. De Knecht, G.R. 87351, February 12, 1990

Facts:
 In 20 February 1979, the Republic of the Philippines filed an expropriation
proceeding against Cristina De Knecht and other property owners from Fernando
Rein and Del Pan streets.
 In 19 March 1979, De Knecht filed a motion to dismiss the case due to lack of
jurisdiction, arbitrary valuation of the properties, and prematureness of the
complaint.
 In June 1979, the Republic filed a motion for a writ of possession which was
granted due to the Republic being able to deposit a 10% compensation to PNB.
  De Knecht then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme
Court challenging the lower court’s order. Where the Supreme Court ruled in her
favor.
 In 17 February 1983, Batas Pambansa Blg. 340 was enacted which the Republic
took advantage of to dismiss the case based on the new law. This was granted
by the lower court.
 De Knecht filed a dismissal to the Court of Appeals which set aside the lower
court’s order and dismissed the expropriation proceedings, affirming the
Supreme Court's earlier ruling.
 The Republic filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court questioning the
validity of the “law of case” doctrine.
Issue:
 Whether the Batas Pambansa Blg. 340s can override the final judgment by the
Supreme Court in an expropriation case.
 Whether the law of the case theory applies, preventing legislative action from
affecting the final judgment.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court granted the petition seeing that Batas Pambansa Blg. 340
justified proceeding with the expropriation thus rendered the Court’s earlier
decision inapplicable.
 The Court reversed the court’s earlier decision and reinstated the order of the
trial court dismissing the original expropriation proceeding following the newly
enacted law.

De la Paz Masikip v. Judge Legaspi, G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006
Facts:
 In 6 January 1994, Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip was notified by the Municipality of
Pasig of the intention of expropriating 1,500 square meters of the property.
 Dela Paz Masikip is the owner of a 4,521 square meter parcel of land located in
Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City which was to be used forsports development and
recreational activities of the Barangay Caniogan residents.
 In 2 May 1994, Dela Paz Masikip argued that the expropriation was
unconstitutional as her property was not sufficient or suitable to be used on the
request.
 In 21 February 1995, the Municipality of Pasig filed a complaint for expropriation
to the Regional Trial Court seeking condemnation of the property and just
compensation.
 In 12 April 1995, Dela Paz Masikip filed a motion to dismiss the complaint due to
lack of genuine necessity, arbitrary selection of property, and procedural defects.
 In 7 May 1996, the Regional Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss stating that
there is genuine necessity on the expropriation. This was also affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
Issue:
 Whether there is a genuine necessity for the expropriation.
 Whether the procedural handling of the expropriation case by the lower courts
was in accordance with law.

Ruling:
  The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and Court of Appeals’ decision thus
granting the petition of Dela Paz Masikip thus dismissing the expropriation
complaint due to the City of Pasig fail ng to establish a genuine necessity for the
expropriation.
 The Court discussed the procedural errors, noting that the petitioner’s motion to
dismiss was the proper responsive pleading and that the trial court should have
focused on evidentiary hearings for necessity rather than appointing
commissioners for just compensation.

Eslaban v. De Onorio, G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001

Facts:
 In 6 October 1981, Santiago Eslaban, Jr., the Project Manager of the National
Irrigation Administration, approved a irrigation canal construction on a property’s
24,660 square meter portion.
 Clarita Vda. de Onorio’s husband agreed to this construction provided with
P4,180.00 as compensation for the Right-of-Way damages.
 Clarita Vda. de Onorio, the property owner, executed an Affidavit of Waiver of
Rights and Fees for the waiver of the damages on the crops and improvements
but not for the land.
 The petitioner offered P35,000.00 as financial assistance under Executive Order
No. 1035 however the respondent demanded full compensation.
 In 10 December 1990, the respondent filed a complaint seeking P111,299.55 as
just compensation which the petitioner previously refused.
 The Regional Trial Court ordered the petitioner to pay P107,517.60 as just
compensation which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
 Whether land granted via a homestead patent and registered ceases to be public
domain.
 Whether just compensation can be determined with the timing.
 Whether the waiver signed by Onorio has impact on the compensation
requirement.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court clarified that once land under a homestead patent is
registered, it ceases to be part of the public domain and is protected against
encumbrances.
 The Court concluded that just compensation should be provided/determined at
the date of taking and not on the date of the complaint’s filing.
 The Court found that the waiver signed by Onorio did not exempt NIA from
paying compensation for the land itself, only for the crops and improvements.

RP vs. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 71176, May 21, 1990 FACTS:
 The Solicitor General for the Department of Education and Culture filed a
complaint
 against Amerex for the expropriation of four parcels of land at Dr. Manuel L.
Carreon Street, Manila.
 The complaint was due to the property being needed as a permanent site for a
High School Building.
  The then Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. Invoked the Presidential
Decree No. 42, informing the court that the P1,303,470 which was the assessed
value for the property’s taxation has been deposited to the PNB.
 The court issued an order directing the sheriff to place the plaintiff in possession
of the property.
 The Amerex filed a motion to dismiss the complaint due to failing to categorically
state the amount of just compensation thus requested it to be fixed at
P2,432,042.
 The lower court issued an order vesting the plaintiff with the lawful light to take
the property upon payment of just compensation as provided by law.
 Thus, the lower court ordered Amerex to submit an audited financial statement
for the acquisition cost including its improvement fees. To which the amount of
P2,258,018.48 as the total value of the property.
 The lower court also allowed Amerex to withdraw the P1,303,470 deposit with the
PNB.
Issue:
 Whether the respondent Court erred in determining the petitioner’s just
compensation.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court made an erroneous determination of the just compensation
in this case where the prescribed just compensation was based on the
commissioners’ recommendation worth P2,258,018.57.
 The Court emphasized that it is duty-bound to determine whether the
commissioners had discharged the trust reposed in them according to well-
established rules and formed their judgment upon correct legal principles for they
are not supposed to act ad libitum.

EPZA vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 (1987)

Facts:
 In 15 January 1979, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No.
1811, which is to reserve a part of the land in Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, for the
establishment of an export processing zone.
 The reserved land included 22,328 square meters worth of land owned by San
Antonio Development Corporation (SADC).
 The Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) offered to purchase the land
based on
 Section 92 of Presidential Decree No. 464. However, both parties did not reach
mutual agreement.
 EPZA filed a complaint for expropriation in the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
 In 21 October 1980, the court issued a writ of possession which allowed EPZA to
take possession of the land.
 The court appointed commissioners to assess the just compensation whom
recommended P15.00 per square meter as the fair value.
 EPZA filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that under P.D. No. 1533
superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court the just
compensation should be lower of the owner's declared value or the assessor's
valuation.
 The trial court denied the motion and affirmed the commissioners' report.
Issue:
  Whether the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in
P.D. No. 1533 is valid and constitutional.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court clarified that the method of ascertaining just compensation
constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. Where during
the expropriation proceeding the court would still have the power to determine
the just compensation for the property.

Ansaldo vs. Tantuico, G.R. 50147, August 3, 1990

Facts:
 In 1947, the Department of Public Works, Transportation, and Communication
took possession of multiple lots without formal expropriation proceedings or
securing an agreement with the owners.
 These lots were used to widen what is now Ramon Magsaysay Avenue in San
Juan, Metro Manila.
 Jose Ma. Ansaldo and Maria Angela Ansaldo did not protest the taking of their
property and instead remained silent for 26 years.
 In 22 January 1973, Jose Ma. Ansaldo and Maria Angela Ansaldo formally
requested comensation for the two lots with area of 1,041 square meters.
 In 2 February 1973, the Secretary of Justice had that the just compensation
should be paid following Presidential Decree No. 76 which would be based on
current market value.
 The Commission on Audit (COA) recommended that the compensation should be
based on the value at the time of taking in 1947., reiterating this ruling in 1978
and 1979.
Issue:
 Whether the amount of compensation to be paid to the claimants is to be
determined as of the time of the taking of the subject land.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled that the compensation should be determined as of the
time of taking in 1947, not based on later valuations affirming the COA’s decision.
 The Court clarified that there was no evidence that the land was taken against
the Ansaldos' will, and with their prolonged silence suggests consent to the
taking.

NAPOCOR v. Tiangco, GR. No. 170846, February 6, 2007

Facts:
 The NPC was created for the purpose of undertaking the development and
generation of power from whatever source.
 NPC required the lands owned by Aurellano Tiangco, Lourdes Tiangco, and
Nestor Tiangco at Barangay Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal for the 500Kv Kalayaan-San
Jose Transmission Line Project.
 After repeated unsuccessful negotiations with the respondents, NPC filed a
complaint for expropriation with the Regional Trial Court.
  The RTC granted NPC the right to take possession of the area sought to be
expropriated and issued a Condemnation Order with the court tasked to
determine just compensation.
Issue:
 Whether the amount of just compensation for the expropriated portion is to be
based on the 1984 or 1993 valuation.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ordered that neither of the 1984 or 1993 valuation is correct
thus a new one must be arrived at, taking into consideration the foregoing
pronouncements.
 The Court ruled that the just compensation is not limited to the assessed value of
the property or to the schedule of market values determined by the committee as
his is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss.

City of Cebu v. Spouses Dedamo, G.R. No. 142 971, May 07, 2002
Facts:
 The City of Cebu needed to expropriate 1,624 square meters of the land owned
by the spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo for the construction of a public road.
 The petitioner deposited P51,156 to the PNB to take immediate possession of
the property.
 The respondents filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the expropriation was for
the benefit of Cebu Holdings, Inc. which is a private entity thus not for the use of
the public.
 The respondents also claimed that the expropriation undervalued their property
as the offered price was too low compared to the offered prices on the nearby
plots.
 The trial court approved the writ of possession by the City which was
acknowledged by the spouses. The Commissioner then submitted a valuation
higher than the City’s proposal, which the trial court approved.
 The City of Cebu filed a petition challenging the decision made by the Regional
Trial Court, upheld by the Court of Appeals about eminent domain.
 The petitioner argued that the just compensation should follow the date the
complaint was filed which was on 17 September 1993, and not when it was taken
in year 1994.
 The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision, prompting the City to
escalate the challenge to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
 Whether the precedence of statutory provisions in R.A. 7160 over procedural
rules regarding the determination of just compensation.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court clarified that while the general rule is to determine just
compensation as of the filing of the complaint, exceptions exist, such as when
the property is taken at a later date. Thus, following Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160,
just compensation in eminent domain cases is determined as of the time of
actual taking, not the filing of the complaint.

Assoc. of Small Landowners v. DAR, 175 SCRA 343 (1988) FACTS:

  Multiple petitions from various landowners, farmers, and planters were filed
questioning the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 27, Executive Order
Nos. 228 and 29, and Republic Act No. 6657.
 The petitions stemmed from the 1935 Constitution mandated a social justice
which was to ensure the well-being and economic security of all people,
especially the less privileged.
 The regulation was implemented for an agrarian reform program to distribute
agricultural lands to landless farmers and provide just compensation to
landowners.
 The petitioners challenged the coverage of their landholdings under P.D. No. 27;
the constitutionality of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, which pronounced emancipated
tenant farmers as owners; the sufficiency of P50 billion initial funding; and R.A.
No. 6657 regarding the basis of just compensation and the modes of payment.
Issue:
 Whether the P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No. 6657 are
constitutional.
 Whether the laws violated due process, equal protection, and the constitutional
requirement of just compensation.
 Whether the transfer of land ownership before full payment of just compensation
was constitutional.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the agrarian reform measures,
affirming the inherent power of the state to enforce agrarian reform.
 The Court clarified that these laws were consistent with the constitutional
mandate for agrarian reform and did not violate the constitutional rights of
landowners.
 The Court ruled that landowners who were unable to exercise their retention
rights under P.D. No. 27 were entitled to the retention rights provided by R.A. No.
6657.

DAR v. CA, 249 SCRA 149 (1995) FACTS:

Facts:
 The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) filed two consolidated petitions against the Court of Appeals' decision in
favor of Pedro L. Yap, Heirs of Emiliano F. Santiago, and Agricultural
Management & Development Corp. (AMADCOR).
 The petition stemmed from the private respondents claiming there were lapses
by DAR and LBP in the valuation and payment of compensation.
 Pedro Yap claimed that his titles were canceled without notice, and
compensation was not deposited; the heirs of Emiliano Santiago claimed similar
issues regarding the compensation; and AMADCOR raising concerns about lack
of notice in administrative proceedings and delayed compensation.
 DAR argued that the Administrative Order No. 9 as a valid exercise of its rule-
making
 power. They also claimed that the Certificates of Deposit by LBP complied with
the law and previous court rulings.
 The Court of Appeals granted the private respondents’ petition, declaring DAR
Administrative Order No. 9 is null and void regarding trust account.
 The CA ordered LBP to deposit specific amounts in cash and government
financial instruments for the private respondents.
Issue:
 Whether the deposited compensation in trust accounts should be immediately
released to the rejecting landowners despite pending final valuation.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court determined that withholding the compensation while
proceedings are ongoing would unfairly penalize the landowners for exercising
their right to seek just compensation.
 The Court clarified that the immediacy of payment is integral to rendering the just
compensation in the constitutional sense.
 The Court mandated the immediate release of the amounts deposited in trust
without restriction to ensure fair play.

DAR v. CA, 249 SCRA 149 (1995)

Facts:
 The case involved a dispute over landholdings acquired by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified
beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
 The private respondents were landowners whose properties were acquired by
the DAR.
 The DAR issued Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, which allowed for
the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposits in cash or bonds for
compensation.
 The private respondents challenged the order, arguing they should be entitled to
withdraw the amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of cases
involving the final valuation of their properties.
 The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled in favor of the private respondents, declaring
DAR Administrative Order No. 9 null and void insofar as it provided for the
opening of trust accounts.
 The CA ordered the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to immediately deposit
the compensation amounts in cash and government financial instruments into
bank accounts designated by the DAR in the names of the private respondents.
 The CA held that withholding the right of landowners to appropriate the amounts
deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties, even if they
rejected the DAR's valuation, would be an oppressive exercise of eminent
domain
Issue:
 Whether the landowners were entitled to withdraw the compensation deposited in
trust accounts pending the final determination of just compensation.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the landowners.
 The Court held that the DAR's attempt to distinguish between the deposit of
compensation and the determination of just compensation was unacceptable.
 The Court stated that withholding the landowners' right to withdraw the deposited
amounts, despite their rejection of the DAR's valuation and their deprivation of
possession and use of their properties, was an oppressive exercise of eminent
domain.
 The Court ordered the LBP to immediately deposit the compensation amounts in
cash or government financial instruments in accessible bank accounts
 designated by the DAR, allowing the landowners to withdraw the funds without
prejudice to the final determination of just compensation.

Meralco v. Pineda, 206 SCRA 196 (1992)

Facts:
 In 1974, Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) filed a complaint for
eminent domain against 42 defendants to construct a 230 kV
transmission line.
 MERALCO offered to pay compensation, but the parties couldn't
agree on the amount.
 The respondent judge determined the amount of just compensation
without proper reception of evidence before the Board of
Commissioners.
 The respondent judge based the amount of just compensation on
"competent evidence" without allowing the Board of Commissioners
to hold hearings.
 MERALCO argued that this violated their right to due process
because the judge formulated an opinion on the land's value
without allowing the Board of Commissioners to hold hearings.

Issue:
 Whether the respondent court could dispense with the assistance of
a Board of Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding and
determine just compensation itself.

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent judge violated
MERALCO's right to due process by disregarding the Board of
Commissioners.
 A trial before the commissioners is indispensable in expropriation
cases to allow parties to present evidence on just compensation.
 The appointment of commissioners is a mandatory requirement.
 While the court can disregard the commissioners' findings, it can
only do so for valid reasons, such as illegal principles applied,
disregard of evidence, or grossly inadequate/excessive amounts.
 A trial with the aid of commissioners is a substantial right that
cannot be capriciously disregarded.

NPC v. Henson, G.R. No. 129998, December 29, 1998

Facts:
 The National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a complaint for eminent
domain to acquire five parcels of land owned by the respondents for
the expansion of the NPC Mexico substation.
 The land was classified as agricultural but had been reclassified as
residential.
 The trial court appointed commissioners to determine just
compensation, but did not conduct a hearing on their reports.
 The trial court fixed the fair market value of the land at P400.00 per
square meter, based on the selling price of lots in an adjacent fully
developed subdivision.
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Issue:
 What is the just compensation for the taking of the respondents'
property?

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court modified the decisions of the lower courts,
fixing the just compensation at P375.00 per square meter.
 The Court found that the trial court's valuation was not supported
by evidence and was higher than any of the commissioners'
recommendations.
 The Court agreed with Commissioner Atienza's recommendation of
P375.00 per square meter, as it was the closest valuation to the
market value of lots in the adjoining fully developed subdivision.
 The Court also excluded the communal irrigation canal from the
area to be expropriated, as it was excluded in the amended
complaint.
 The Court affirmed the lower courts' decision to require the NPC to
pay legal interest on the compensation awarded, but ruled that the
NPC is exempt from paying costs of the proceedings.

Napocor v. Sps. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 156093, February 2, 2007

Facts:
 National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) sought to expropriate an
easement of right-of-way over portions of land owned by
respondents for the construction of a transmission line project.
 NAPOCOR deposited the provisional value of the land and obtained
a writ of possession.
 The trial court appointed commissioners to determine just
compensation, but they did not conduct hearings or allow the
parties to present evidence.
 The commissioners recommended a valuation of PHP 10,000.00 per
square meter, which the trial court approved.
 NAPOCOR appealed, arguing that it was denied due process
because it was not allowed to present evidence before the
commissioners.
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Issue:
 Whether NAPOCOR was denied due process when it was not allowed
to present evidence on the reasonable value of the expropriated
property before the Board of Commissioners.

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of NAPOCOR, finding that it was
denied due process.
 The Court held that a trial before the commissioners is
indispensable in expropriation cases to allow parties to present
evidence on just compensation.
 The Court emphasized that the appointment of commissioners is a
mandatory requirement, and while the court can disregard their
findings, it can only do so for valid reasons.
 The Court remanded the case to the trial court for a new hearing
 before the Board of Commissioners, where NAPOCOR would be
given the opportunity to present evidence.
 The Court also noted that the trial court's valuation of PHP
10,000.00 per square meter was not supported by sufficient
evidence.
 The Court emphasized the importance of due process in
expropriation proceedings, particularly when public funds are
involved.

Leca Realty v. Republic, G.R. No. 155605, Sep

tember 27, 2006 Facts
 The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), filed a complaint for eminent
domain in 1996 to acquire portions of properties belonging to Leca
Realty Corporation, Lee Leng Realty Inc., Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Co., Bank of the Philippine Islands, and Cityland Inc.
 The City Appraisal Committee of Mandaluyong determined the fair
market values of the properties, ranging from P35,000 to P45,000
per square meter.
 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) appointed commissioners to
determine the just compensation, who recommended values
ranging from P50,000 to P137,500 per square meter.
 The RTC adopted the commissioners' report, and the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision.
 The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
a petition for certiorari after failing to appeal the CA decision within
the reglementary period.
Issue:
 Is the Republic estopped from challenging the CA decision due to its
agent's (OSG) failure to file a timely appeal?
 Did the CA err in affirming the amount of just compensation
determined by the commissioners, which varied significantly for
different properties in the same vicinity?
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled that the Republic was not estopped by the
OSG's failure to file a timely appeal. The Court emphasized that
while the government is generally not estopped by the mistakes of
its agents, this rule is not absolute and should not be used to
perpetuate injustice. The Court also noted that the Republic had
available remedies like a motion for reconsideration or an appeal,
which they failed to pursue.
 The Supreme Court upheld the CA decision regarding the just
compensation. The Court acknowledged that the zonal valuation
determined by the City Appraisal Committee was for taxation
purposes only and did not necessarily reflect the actual market
values of the properties. The Court found that the commissioners'
determination of just compensation was based on a thorough
investigation and consideration of various factors, including
location, existing facilities, desirability, neighborhood, and size.

NPC v. Angas, 208 SCRA 196 (1992)

Facts:
 In 1974, NPC, a government-owned and controlled corporation, filed
two complaints for eminent domain in Lanao del Sur to acquire land
for hydroelectric power development.
 The lower court, after hearings and a series of proceedings,
rendered a consolidated decision in 1979, ordering NPC to pay the
landowners just compensation "with legal interest thereon . . . until
fully paid."
 In 1981, one of the landowners filed an ex-parte motion seeking a
12% per annum legal interest rate based on Central Bank Circular
No. 416, issued pursuant to Presidential Decree 116.
 The lower court granted the motion, allowing the 12% interest rate.
 NPC filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the final
decision had already been rendered, and that Circular No. 416 only
applied to judgments involving loans or forbearance of money,
goods, or credits.
Issue:
 Whether or not Central Bank Circular No. 416 applies to the
computation of legal interest on just compensation for expropriated
lands, or if Article 2209 of the Civil Code, which prescribes a 6%
legal interest rate, should prevail.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled that Article 2209 of the Civil Code,
providing for a 6% legal interest rate, should apply in this case. The
Court applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which states that
where general terms follow the designation of particular things or
classes of persons or subjects, the general term will be construed to
comprehend those things or persons of the same class or of the
same nature as those specifically enumerated.
 The Court reasoned that the term "judgments" in Central Bank
Circular No. 416 refers to judgments in cases involving loans or
forbearance of any money, goods, or credits. The Court cited the
case of Reformina v. Terol, where it had previously ruled that the
judgments spoken of and referred to in Circular No. 416 are
judgments in litigations involving loans or forbearance of any
money, goods, or credits.
 The Court concluded that the legal interest for expropriated land is
an indemnification for damages for the delay in payment, and
therefore Article 2209 of the Civil Code, which applies to general
monetary obligations, should be applied.

Wycoco v. Judge Caspillo, G.R. No. 146733, January

13, 2004

Facts:
 Feliciano F. Wycoco owned a 94.1690-hectare rice land in Nueva Ecija.
 He voluntarily offered to sell the land to DAR for P14.9 million.
 DAR offered P2,280,159.82 for 84.5690 hectares, excluding idle
lands, rivers, and roads.
 Wycoco rejected the offer, leading DAR to refer the case to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for just
 compensation determination.
 Wycoco filed a separate case for just compensation with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City, acting as a Special
Agrarian Court.
 The RTC, without requiring evidence, determined just compensation
based on public knowledge of prevailing market value and awarded
Wycoco P13,428,082.00.
 The Court of Appeals (CA) modified the RTC decision, deducting the
compensation for a 3.3672-hectare portion previously sold to the
Republic.
 Wycoco filed a petition for mandamus to compel the RTC to issue a
writ of execution and for Judge Caspillo's inhibition.
Issue:
 Did the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, validly acquire
jurisdiction over the case for determination of just compensation?
 Assuming jurisdiction, was the compensation determined supported by
evidence?
 Were the awards of interest and damages for unrealized
profits valid?
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court held that the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction.
While DARAB has primary jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters,
the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over just compensation
determination.
 The Court found that the RTC erred in determining just
compensation without requiring evidence. The Court emphasized
that while judicial notice can be taken of matters of common
knowledge, it cannot be used to arbitrarily determine just
compensation without considering factors like acquisition cost,
current value of similar properties, size, location, and tax
declarations.
 The Court ruled that the award of actual damages for unrealized
profits should be deleted due to lack of evidence. The Court stated
that such claims must be supported by competent proof, such as
receipts or other documentary evidence.

City of Manila v. Oscar Serrano, G.R. No. 142304, June 20, 2001

Facts:
 The City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7833 in 1993, authorizing
the expropriation of certain properties in Tondo, including Lot 1-C,
covered by TCT No. 226048.
 Lot 1-C originally belonged to Feliza de Guia, and after her death, it
was transferred through a series of inheritances and sales to
Demetria de Guia, the mother of the respondents.
 The City of Manila filed an amended complaint for expropriation
against the Serrano family, the heirs of Demetria de Guia.
 The RTC ruled in favor of the City of Manila, but the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision, finding that the City failed to comply
with certain procedures before resorting to expropriation.

Issue:
 Whether or not the City of Manila properly complied with the
 procedures before resorting to expropriation.

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision and
reinstated the RTC ruling.
 The Court held that the City of Manila had complied with the
necessary procedures before filing the expropriation complaint.
 The Court emphasized that expropriation proceedings consist of two
stages: (1) condemnation of the property, and (2) determination of
just compensation.
 The Court found that the City had properly condemned the property
through the enactment of Ordinance No. 7833 and that the
determination of just compensation was a matter for the court to
decide.
 The Court remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings on
the determination of just compensation.

Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, December 19, 2005

Facts:
 The Philippine government (Republic) entered into a concession
agreement with Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.
(PIATCO) for the construction and operation of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Terminal III (NAIA 3).
 The Supreme Court in Agan v. Piatco declared the agreement void
due to PIATCO's lack of financial capacity and the agreement being
contrary to public policy.
 The Court in Agan v. Piatco ruled that the government must
compensate PIATCO for the construction of NAIA 3 before taking
possession.
 The Republic filed a complaint for expropriation with the Pasay City
Regional Trial Court (RTC) and deposited the assessed value of NAIA
3 with the Land Bank of the Philippines.
 The RTC issued a writ of possession to the Republic, but later
amended its order based on Republic Act No. 8974 (RA 8974), which
requires immediate payment to the property owner upon filing the
complaint.

Issue:
 Whether the Republic must comply with the immediate payment
requirement of RA 8974 before obtaining a writ of possession in the
expropriation of NAIA 3.

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled that the Republic must comply with the
immediate payment requirement of RA 8974.
 The Court held that RA 8974 supersedes Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, which allows for a deposit of the assessed value instead of
immediate payment.
 The Court emphasized that the government cannot unjustly
enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its investors.
 The Court also noted that the government's actions in this case
were inconsistent with the previous ruling in Agan v. Piatco.
Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga, 22 SCRA 1334 (1968)

Facts:
 The municipality of Zamboanga was the provincial capital of
Zamboanga province.
 Commonwealth Act 39 (1936) converted Zamboanga into a
chartered city, requiring the city to pay for properties abandoned
by the province.
 The properties included 50 lots and buildings used for government
purposes (e.g., capitol, schools, hospital).
 Zamboanga province's capital was transferred to Dipolog in 1945.
 Republic Act 711 (1952) divided Zamboanga into Zamboanga del
Norte and Zamboanga del Sur, dividing the province's assets.
 Zamboanga del Norte was entitled to 54.39% of the properties'
value, payable by Zamboanga City.
 Republic Act 3039 (1961) transferred the properties to Zamboanga
City free of charge.
 Zamboanga del Norte filed a complaint for declaratory relief,
arguing that Republic Act 3039 was unconstitutional.

Issue:
 Was Republic Act 3039 unconstitutional for depriving Zamboanga
del Norte of its property without due process and just
compensation?

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled that Republic Act 3039 was valid insofar
as it transferred public properties to Zamboanga City.
 The Court distinguished between public property (owned by the
municipality in its governmental capacity) and patrimonial property
(owned in its private capacity).
 The Court found that the properties in question were being used for
governmental purposes, making them public property.
 The Court held that the City of Zamboanga must pay just
compensation for any patrimonial properties that were not devoted
to public service.
 The Court also stated that registration of the lots did not convert
public property into private property.
 The Court upheld the validity of Republic Act 3039 but emphasized
the need to distinguish between public and patrimonial properties
and ensure just compensation for any patrimonial properties
transferred to the city.

YMCA vs. CIR, 33 Phil. 217 (1916)

Facts:
 Established in 1907, the YMCA claims exemption from taxation on
the ground that it is a religious, charitable and educational
institution combined.
 The city of Manila, contends that the property is taxable,that it has
an educational department is not denied. It is undisputed that the
aim of this department is to furnish, at much less than cost,
instruction in subjects that will greatly increase the mental
efficiency and wage-earning capacity of young men, prepare them
in special lines of business and offer them special lines of study.
Lower Court Ruling:
 The lower court ruled in favor of the city, classifying the property as
taxable

Issue:
 Whether the YMCA's building and grounds are subject to taxation
under the Manila city charter.

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision, finding the
YMCA qualifies for tax exemption due to its multifaceted purpose
combining religious, charitable, and educational activities.
Exemption from taxation can be granted to institutions that serve
dual or multiple relevant purposes as defined by law.

Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Segovia vs. Provincial Board of Ilocos

Norte

Facts:
 The Bishop owns a land with a church, convent, cemetery, and
adjacent lots in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. In 1925, the plaintiff paid
land tax under protest for two lots: one adjacent to the convent and
one where an old cemetery existed.

Lower Court Rulings:

 The lower court ruled the tax on the cemetery lot was illegal but
upheld the tax on the convent-adjacent lot.
Issue:
 Whether the lot is exempted from tax falling under the category of
: and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and
exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes

Ruling:
 The judgment appealed from is reversed in all it parts and it is held
that both lots are exempt from land tax and the defendants are
ordered to refund to plaintiff whatever was paid as such tax, without
any special pronouncement as to costs.
 The adjacent lot is not used for commercial purposes but is utilized
for lodging of visitors of the religious establishment for the religious
activities.

Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue & Court of
Tax Appeals**

Facts:
 In 1957, M.B. Estate, Inc. donated P10,000 to the parish priest for
church construction.
 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed a gift tax of P1,370
against the Catholic Parish of Victorias, which included surcharges
and interests for late filing.
 Petitioner protested the assessment, arguing he could not be liable
as he was not the parish priest at the time of donation and invoked
constitutional tax exemptions for religious entities.

Lower Court Rulings:

  The Court of Tax Appeals ruled that parish priests administer church
properties and can be held liable for taxes on gifts received for
church purposes, denying the claim of tax exemption based on
constitutional grounds.

Issue:
 Whether the gift tax imposed on the parish is constitutional and if
the related properties are exempt from taxation.

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court affirmed the tax liability but ruled that Rev. Fr.
Lladoc was not personally liable, instead stating the Head of the
Diocese should pay the assessed gift tax as the legal recipient.
 The Supreme Court clarified that the constitutional exemption
applies to property taxes, not excise taxes like gifts.
 The ruling emphasizes that the exemption from taxation in the
constitution does not cover gift taxes, as these are not property
taxes but excise taxes assessed on the transfer of property by way
of gift. It also noted that exemptions must be explicitly granted by
law, underscoring the strict interpretation against exemptions in
taxation.
 This case establishes clarity on the tax treatment of donations to
religious entities, especially concerning who holds liability for taxes
assessed.
 SPECIFIC LAWS ON TAX EXEMPTION
 SEC. 101. Exemption of Certain Gifts. - The following gifts or
donations shall be exempt from the tax provided for in this Chapter:
 (2) Gifts in favor of an educational and/or charitable, religious,
cultural or social welfare corporation, institution, accredited
nongovernment organization, trust or philanthropic organization or
research institution or organization: Provided, however, That not
more than thirty percent (30%) of said gifts shall be used by such
donee for administration purposes. For the purpose of this
exemption, a 'non-profit educational and/or charitable corporation,
institution, accredited nongovernment organization, trust or
philanthropic organization and/or research institution or
organization' is a school, college or university and/or charitable
corporation, accredited nongovernment organization, trust or
philanthropic organization and/or research institution or
organization, incorporated as a non-stock entity, paying no
dividends, governed by trustees who receive no compensation, and
devoting all its income, whether students' fees or gifts, donation,
subsidies or other forms of philanthropy, to the accomplishment and
promotion of the purposes enumerated in its Articles of
Incorporation.

Abra Valley College vs. Aquino, 162 SCRA 106 (1988)

Facts:
 The case involves Abra Valley College, Inc., a educational
institution, seeking to annul the seizure and sale of its lot and
building for non-payment of real estate taxes.
 Abra Valley College, Inc. is an educational corporation and
institution of higher learning duly incorporated with the Securities
and Exchange Commission in 1948. The college lot and building
were seized and sold at public auction for non-payment of real
estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31.The college
 building is used for educational purposes, but the second floor is
also used as the residence of the Director and his family.The ground
floor of the college building is being used and rented by a
commercial establishment, the Northern Marketing Corporation.

Lower court rulings:

 The Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch I, declared the distraint,
seizure, and sale of the college lot and building as valid.

Issue:
 Whether the college lot and building are exempt from real property
taxes due to their use for educational purposes.

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court has ruled in previous cases that the primary use
of the property for educational purposes determines tax
exemption, not the incidental use thereof
 The Court has also ruled that exemption extends to facilities which
are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of educational purposes.

 Section 54, paragraph c, Commonwealth Act No. 470, as amended

by Republic Act No. 409, provides that all lands, buildings, and
improvements used exclusively for educational purposes are
exempt from real property tax.
 The Assessment Law provides that the exemption from real
property tax includes not only the land actually occupied by the
building but also adjacent lands devoted to incidental use.

American Bible Society vs. City of Manila 101 Phil. 386 (1957)

Facts:
 American Bible Society distributes and sells bibles and gospel
portions, and translates them into local dialects. City of Manila
claimed that it was operating as a general merchandise business
without necessary permits and licenses since 1945 and asked them
to obtain permits and pay fees within 3 days, which the Petitioner
objected to.
 The petitioner paid the fees under protest to avoid closure and
seeks that the Municipal Ordinances No. 3000, be declared illegal
and unconstitutional and to refund of fees paid under protest with
interest and court costs

 The Court of First Instance dismissed the petition. The Court of

Appealelevated the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:

 Whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila, Nos. 3000, as

amended, and 2529, 3028 and 3364, are constitutional and valid;
and
 Whether the provisions of said ordinances are applicable or not to
the case at bar.

Ruling:
 The Court ruled that “the Municipal Ordinance 3000, although not
unconstitutional is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and
 defendant-appellee is powerless to license or tax the business of
plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair
plaintiff’s right to the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious
profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of
religious beliefs.
 The Court finds that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, is also
inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.
 The Court was able to determine that the American Bible Society
was involved in business of selling.

CIR v DLSU, G.R No. 196596, 9 Nov 2016

Facts:
 The case revolves around the tax exemption status of De La Salle
University, Inc. (DLSU) regarding income derived from rental
contracts with concessionaires. The Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) issued Letter of Authority No. 2794 to audit DLSU’s accounts,
which was later deemed void due to its broad and indefinite
coverage that contravened Revenue Memorandum Order No. 43-90.
 Lower courts ruled that there was deficiency income tax against
DLSU, based on claims that not all rental income was used for
educational purposes.

Issue:
 Whether or not DLSU was liable for deficiency income tax ?
 Whether the Letter of Authority No. 2794 was valid, given its
coverage across multiple unverified years?
 3). Whether or not DLSU did sufficiently prove that all rental income
was actually, directly, and exclusively used for educational
purposes?
 Whether or not DLSU’s assessments of deficiency income tax lawful
considering its claimed tax-exempt status under the Constitution?

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled that:
 Letter of Authority No. 2794 was void due to its broad and indefinite
nature, failing to comply with the requirements set by Revenue
Memorandum Order No. 43-90.(Revenue Memorandum Order No.
43-90, both the taxable period and the kind of tax must be
specifically stated)
 DLSU was not liable for deficiency income tax as it sufficiently
demonstrated that its rental income was actually, directly, and
exclusively used for educational purposes.
 The Court set aside the deficiency assessments against DLSU,
affirming its tax-exempt status regarding the income in question.

Ormoc Sugar v. Treasurer of Ormoc, G.R. No. L-23794, 17 Feb. 1968

Facts:
 In January 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City enacted
Ordinance No. 4 imposing a 1% tax on centrifugal sugar exported
by Ormoc Sugar Company.
 Ormoc Sugar Company paid taxes totaling P12,087.50 under protes
but filed a complaint, claiming the ordinance was unconstitutional
 for violating the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity in
taxation.
 The Court of First Instance upheld the ordinance’s constitutionality
in August 1964, under the validity of Local Autonomy Act

Issue:
 Whether or not the ordinance violates the equal protection clause of
the Constitution by singling out Ormoc Sugar Company for taxation?
 Whether or not the ordinance conform to the rule of uniformity of
taxation as required by the Constitution?

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court declared the ordinance unconstitutional for
violating the equal protection clause by creating a classification that
was not reasonable and not applicable to future conditions, only
targeting Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. –
 Section 22(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution (Uniformity of
Taxation).

 The Court ordered the refund of the P12,087.50 paid in taxes under
protest, stating there was no entitlement to interest as the taxes
were not collected arbitrarily.
 The Court further states that the classification created by the
ordinance failed to meet the constitutional standards necessary for
tax legislation

Punzalan vs. municipal Board of Manila, 95 Phil. 46 (1954

Facts:
 This lawsuit was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Manila by a group of
professionals, including two lawyers, a medical practitioner, a public accountant,
a dental surgeon, and a pharmacist, acting on their own and on behalf of other
professionals in Manila. They seek to annul Ordinance No. 3398 of the City of
Manila, challenge the corresponding provision in the Manila charter that
authorizes it, and obtain a refund for taxes collected under the ordinance that
were paid under protest.
 Ordinance No. 3398, approved by the municipal board on July 25, 1950, imposes
a municipal occupation tax on various professions operating in the city. Non
payment would mean a fine of Php 200 and prison sentence of up to six months,
or both, as determined by the court.
 Lower Court Ruling: Validated the Manila charter's authority to impose the tax but
deemed the ordinance illegal due to purportedly unauthorized penalties.
Issue:
 Whether or not the ordinance constitute double taxation
Ruling:
 The Cour reversed the lower court's ruling declaring the ordinance illegal,
affirmed the charter's validity, and rejected claims of class legislation and double
taxation.
 Ordinance No. 3398 remains valid; plaintiffs' claims dismissed, with costs against
them.
  The argument against double taxation may not be invoked where one tax is
imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city, it being widely
recognized that there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the requirement that
license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation, calling or
activity by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof.

City of Manila vs. Cosmos Bottling Company Corp. G.R No. 196681, 27 Jun 2018
Facts:
 The City of Manila assessed Cosmos for local business taxes in the amount of
P1,226,781.05.Cosmos protested the assessment, arguing that Tax Ordinance
Nos. 7988 and 8011 are null and void and tendered payment of only
P131,994.23, which was refused by the City Treasurer.
 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of Cosmos, but denied the claim for
refund.
 CTA Division's Decision: Held that the collection by the City Treasurer of Manila
of local business tax under both Section 21 and Section 14 of the Revenue Code
of Manila constituted double taxation. The court also ruled that the City Treasurer
cannot validly assess local business tax based on the increased rates under Tax
Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011 after the same have been declared null and void.
CTA En Banc's Resolution: Dismissed the petition for review for failing to file a
motion for reconsideration or new trial with the CTA Division.
Issue:
 Whether there was Double taxation involved in this case ( the privilege of doing
business in the City of Manila; a local business tax imposed on gross sales or
receipts of the business.)
Ruling:
 The Court ruled in favor of Cosmos Bottling Corporation (Cosmos) in the case
against the City of Manila and Office of the City Treasurer of Manila. The court
held that the mandatory filing of a motion for reconsideration or new trial before
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) Division is essential for filing a petition for review
with the CTA En Banc. The petitioners' failure to comply with this requirement led
to the dismissal of their petition.

Physical Therapy Org. vs. Municipal Board, G.R. 10448, August 30, 1957
Facts:
 The case involves a petition for declaratory judgment by the Physical Therapy
Organization of the Philippines, Inc. against the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila and the Mayor regarding the validity of Municipal Ordinance No. 3659,
which regulates the operation of massage clinics in the city.
 The ordinance defines massage clinics, hygienic and aesthetic massage,
massagists, attendants, and operators. It requires permit fees, building
requirements, and regulations for the operation of massage clinics. The
ordinance aims to prevent immorality and prostitution in massage clinics.
 The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petition and dissolved the writ
of injunction.

Issue:
  The permit fee of P100.00 for operators of massage clinics is considered
reasonable for regulation purposes.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding the ordinance
valid as it intends to regulate massage clinics for hygienic and aesthetic
purposes and prevent immorality. The court relied on Section 18 of the New
Charter of the City of Manila (Republic Act 409), which grants legislative powers
to the Municipal Board to enact ordinances for the promotion of morality, peace,
and general welfare.

CIR vs. Algue, Inc., 158 SCRA 9 (1988

Facts:
 Algue, Inc., a domestic corporation, was assessed delinquency income taxes
amounting to P83,183.85 for the years 1958 and 1959 by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.
 Algue filed a protest against the assessment, which suspended the running of the
reglementary period for filing an appeal.
 The protest was not immediately acted upon by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR), and a warrant of distraint and levy was issued but not served until the
protest was resolved.
 Algue claimed a deduction of P75,000.00 as promotional fees paid for services
rendered in forming the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation and facilitating its
purchase of properties from the Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company.
 The BIR disallowed the deduction, leading Algue to appeal to the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA).
Issues:
 Whether the appeal of Algue to the CTA was filed within the reglementary period.
 Whether the P75,000.00 claimed as promotional fees was a legitimate and
reasonable business expense deductible from gross income.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court held that the appeal was timely filed. The protest filed by
Algue suspended the running of the reglementary period, which resumed only
after the protest was resolved and the warrant was served.
 The Court found that the P75,000.00 promotional fees were necessary and
reasonable business expenses. The fees were paid for substantial services that
resulted in the successful formation of a new corporation and the acquisition of
properties, which benefited Algue.
 The decision of the CTA to allow the deduction was affirmed, emphasizing that
taxes must be collected in accordance with the law and that legitimate business
expenses should be acknowledged as deductions.

Commissioner vs. Makasiar, 177 SCRA 27 (1989)

Facts:
  Search and seizure warrants were issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila
(CFI-MANILA) in Criminal Cases Nos. 8602 and 8603 for violations of Republic
Act No. 3720 and the Revised Penal Code, involving counterfeiting of Johnnie
Walker Scotch Whisky.
 A composite team enforced the warrants, seizing items from Hercules Bottling
Co., Inc., including tanks of Scotch Whisky and bottles labeled as Johnnie
Walker.
 The Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila issued a warrant of seizure and
detention for the goods, initiating seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation
of the Tariff and Customs Code.
 The CFI-MANILA authorized the transfer of the seized goods to the Bureau of
Customs warehouse.
 The Bureau of Customs continued the seizure proceedings despite objections
from The Distillers Co. Ltd. of England, leading to the filing of a petition for
prohibition and a temporary restraining order by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 35, Manila.
Issues:
 Whether the RTC had jurisdiction to enjoin the Bureau of Customs from
continuing with seizure and forfeiture proceedings over goods seized under a
search warrant issued by the CFI-MANILA.
 Whether the seizure and forfeiture proceedings by the Bureau of Customs could
proceed simultaneously with criminal prosecutions in other courts.

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court held that the RTC had no jurisdiction to interfere with the
Bureau of Customs' exclusive authority over seizure and forfeiture proceedings.
 The Collector of Customs had secured jurisdiction over the goods by having
actual possession and control, allowing the proceedings to determine the legality
of the importation.
 The preservation and safekeeping of the seized goods must be ensured for
evidentiary purposes in the criminal cases, with a representative quantity set
aside as evidence.
 Both seizure and forfeiture proceedings and criminal prosecutions may proceed
simultaneously and independently, as they address different aspects: the former
focuses on the legality of the goods' importation, while the latter addresses the
penal liability of individuals involved.
 The decision of the respondent judge to declare the seizure and forfeiture
proceedings null and void was reversed, allowing the Bureau of Customs to
continue its proceedings.

City of Pasig vs Meralco, GR 181710, 7 Mar 2018

Facts:
 The City of Pasig enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 25 in 1992, imposing a
franchise tax on businesses within Pasig when it was still a municipality.
 In 1995, Pasig was converted into a city through Republic Act No. 7829.
 In 2001, Pasig City's Treasurer demanded that MERALCO pay franchise taxes
for the years 1996 to 1999 under the said ordinance.
 MERALCO protested, claiming the ordinance was void ab initio, supported by
prior decisions of the Department of Justice, the Regional Trial Court, and the
Court of Appeals.
  The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision, declaring the tax demand invalid, and the
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was dismissed.
Issues:
 Whether the conversion of Pasig from a municipality into a city conferred it the
authority to levy the franchise tax under the void ordinance.
 Whether the CA erred in ruling that Pasig City had no legal basis for demanding
franchise taxes from MERALCO from 1996 to 1999.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's decision, ruling that the conversion of
Pasig into a city did not validate the void ordinance.
 As a municipality, Pasig did not have the authority to levy a franchise tax, and
this lack of authority was not rectified by its conversion into a city.
 The franchise tax demand on MERALCO was null and void since the ordinance
was void ab initio and did not become valid upon city conversion.

YMCA vs. CIR, 33 Phil. 217 (1916)

Facts:
 The Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) of Manila was assessed and
taxed by the city of Manila.
 YMCA paid the tax under protest and filed an action to recover it, claiming
exemption under section 48 of the Manila city charter.
 The association was established in the Philippines in 1898, with its building
formally dedicated in 1909.
 The building includes various facilities such as a reception hall, game rooms,
lecture rooms, a library, reading rooms, rooming apartments, and an athletic
building.
 The association offers educational courses, religious activities, and charitable
services, making no profit from its activities.
Issues:
 Whether the YMCA of Manila is exempt from taxation under the statute that
exempts lands or buildings used exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or
educational purposes, and not for profit.
Ruling:
 The court ruled that the YMCA of Manila is exempt from taxation.
 The court held that the YMCA is a combination of religious, charitable, and
educational institutions and is not conducted for profit.
 The judgment appealed from was reversed, and the cause was remanded with
instructions to enter judgment in favor of the YMCA of Manila for the sum of
P6,221.35

Bishop of Nueva Segovia vs. Provincial Board, 51 Phil. 352 (1927)

Facts:
 The Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Segovia, representing the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church, owns a parcel of land in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.
  The land includes a churchyard, a convent with an adjacent vegetable garden,
and an old cemetery.
 The plaintiff paid the land tax on the lot adjoining the convent and the old
cemetery under protest.
 The plaintiff filed an action to recover the land tax paid, alleging the tax collection
was illegal.
 The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff regarding the cemetery lot but
absolved the defendants concerning the lot adjoining the convent.
Issues:
 Whether the lot adjoining the convent, including the vegetable garden, is exempt
from land tax.
 Whether the lot formerly used as a cemetery, now used for lodging during
religious festivities, is exempt from land tax.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled that the exemption from land tax for the convent
includes the adjacent vegetable garden as it serves the incidental needs of the
priest.
 The lot formerly used as a cemetery, now used as a lodging place for religious
festivities, is also exempt from land tax as it constitutes an incidental use in
religious functions.
 The judgment of the lower court was reversed, and both lots were declared
exempt from land tax. The defendants were ordered to refund the tax paid by the
plaintiff.

Lladoc vs. CIR, 14 SCRA 292 (1965)

Facts:
 M.B. Estate, Inc. donated P10,000 to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz for a new Catholic
Church in Victorias, Negros Occidental.
 The donation was made in 1957 and was fully utilized for its intended purpose.
 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed a donee's gift tax of P1,370
against the Catholic Parish of Victorias in 1960.
 Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc, the parish priest at the time of assessment, protested
the tax assessment and claimed he was not liable since he was not the priest
during the donation.
Issues:
 Whether gift tax can be imposed on property used exclusively for religious
purposes given the constitutional exemption for such properties.
 Determining the real party in interest for the payment of the gift tax.
Ruling:
 The constitutional exemption applies only to property taxes, not excise taxes like
the gift tax.
 A gift tax is an excise tax on the privilege of receiving property rather than on the
property itself.
 The head of the diocese, not the parish priest, is the real party in interest and
liable for the payment of the gift tax.
 The court affirmed the tax liability but modified the ruling so that the head of the
diocese, rather than Rev. Fr. Lladoc, should pay the tax.
Province of Abra vs. Hernando, 107 SCRA 104 (1981)
Facts:
 The Provincial Assessor of Abra levied a tax assessment on properties owned by
the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued.
 The Bishop filed a petition for declaratory relief, claiming exemption from real
estate taxes as the properties were used for religious or charitable purposes.
 The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied by the respondent
judge.
 A summary judgment was granted by the respondent judge without hearing the
side of the petitioner.
Issues:
 Whether the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued are exempt
from real estate taxes.
 Whether the respondent judge violated procedural due process by granting a
summary judgment without a hearing.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court held that there must be proof of the actual and direct use of
the properties for religious or charitable purposes to be exempt from taxation.
 The Constitution requires that properties must be "exclusively," "actually," and
"directly" used for such purposes to qualify for tax exemption.
 Tax exemptions are not favored and must be strictly construed against the
taxpayer.
 The failure of the respondent judge to conduct a hearing and immediately grant
the exemption violated the constitutional command of procedural due process.
 The petition was granted, and the resolution of June 19, 1978, was set aside.
The case was ordered to be heard on the merits by the trial court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
Facts:
 On August 14, 1987, Andre Marti, herein accused-appellant, will send 4
packages to a friend abroad with details as "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052
Zurich, Switzerland".
 When accused arrived at the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders, located in
Ermita, Manila, he was asked by Anita Reyes, proprietor’s wife, as to what was
inside the parcel. Reyes wanted to inspect the contents but he told her it was just
some books, cigars, and gloves as gift to his friend.
 Reyes then sealed the carton, incorporated Styrofoam at the top and bottom of
the box then with masking tape and prepared for shipment.
 Before sending the box to the Bureau of Customs, the proprietor, Job Reyes
(husband of Anita Reyes), following the standard procedure, opened and
examined the box of herein accused.
 There he saw cellophane wrapper with dried leaves inside.
 On that same day, Mr. Reyes reported the shipment to the NBI and requested a
laboratory examination of the samples in which Reyes extracted from cellophane
wrapper.
  Reyes brought the report and a sample from shipment to the Narcotics Sectio of
NBI. NBI Agents had joined Reyes back to his store to get all the contents of the
said shipment and were brought to the Forensic Chemistry Section of NBI for
laboratory examination.
 An Information was filed against the accused-appellant for violation of RA 6425,
or the Dangerous Drugs Act.
 Trial court decision: Accused-appellant was convicted for violating Section 21(b),
Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e (i), Article 1 of RA
6425, as amended, the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Issues:
 Whether the lower court erred in admitting the evidence that was illegally
searched and seized objects contained in the shipment.
 Whether the lower court erred in convicting the appellant despite the undisputed
fact that his rights under the Constitution while under custodial proceedings were
not observed.
 Whether the lower court erred in not giving credence to the explanation of the
appellant on how the parcels came to his possession.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court answered on the negative. Accused-appellant cannot invoke
his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures since there is
absence of governmental interference. Here, Job Reyes and Anita Reyes are
both private individuals, who conducted the search and seizure of the contents of
the packages. Thus, the evidence is admissible.
 No. There was no violation of his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court did not
find any undisputed fact during the custodial proceedings. The accused was well
informed of his rights and duly assisted by his counsel. No testimonies were
found of record while under investigation as testified by the NBI, which was used
against him during the trial.
 The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court have considered his explanation as
to how did he get the parcels. But they found his alibi as self-serving, easily
fabricated, and weak. Alibi of denial must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence and there must be testimony from credible witness to be given greater
evidentiary weight by the court.

Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)

Facts:
 Joseph Hurtado with his wife, Susie are living in Sacramento, California, where
they met and became friends with Jose Antonio Estuardo, an immigrant from
Chile.
 However, their relationship disintegrated when Hurtado learned of Estuardo’s
affair with Susie.
 He sent Susie to live with her parents when Estuardo continued to court his wife.
Since this arrangement is only temporary, Susie returned and Estuardo again
pursued her.
 Faced with this continuing threat, Hurtado confronted Estuardo in a bar, and
 the police arrested him on battery charges. While his trial on the battery charge
was pending, Hurtado shot and killed Estuary. The state charged him with
murder, an offense punishable by death.
 At the time, many states provided for grand jury hearings before a defendant
went to trial. Typically, a grand jury comprising some two dozens of people listens
 to the prosecutor’s side of a case and decided whether enough evidence exists
to bring a defendant to trial. The California Constitution of 1879, however,
specified that prosecutors could initiate a trial from an information, a document
filed by the prosecutor charging a person with a crime after evidence is
presented to a judge, rather than a grand jury. Using such a document, the state
brought Hurtado to trial for murder.
 He was found guilty and sentenced to death. The California Supreme Court
affirmed the sentence, and a date was set for his execution. Hurtado asked the
U.
 S. Supreme Court to reverse the conviction on the grounds that the state had
denied him his right to a grand jury hearing.
Issue:
 Is an indictment by grand jury necessary to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in state felony prosecutions?
Ruling:
 No.
 It is said by the court that the constitution of the United States was made for an
undefined and expanding future, and that its requirement of due process of law,
in proceedings involving life, liberty, and property, must be so interpreted as not
to deny to the law the capacity of progress and improvement; that the greatest
security for the fundamental principles of justice resides in the right of the people
to make their own laws and alter them at pleasure. It is difficult, however, to
perceive anything in the system of prosecuting human beings for their lives, by
information, which suggests that the state which adopts it has entered upon an
era of progress and improvement in the law of criminal procedure.

MAYOR WILLIAM N. MAMBA, ATTY. FRANCISCO N. MAMBA, JR., ARIEL MALANA,

NARDING AGGANGAN, JOMARI SAGALON, JUN CINABRE, FREDERICK BALIGOD,
ROMMEL ENCOLLADO, JOSEPH TUMALIUAN, and RANDY DAYAG, Petitioners
vs.
LEOMAR BUENO, Respondent
Facts:
 On June 13, 2009, in Tuao, Cagayan, a canteen owned by Emelita Mamba,
mother of their town Mayor William Mamba, was robbed and Leomar Buena was
allegedly involved in such incident. Bueno, a minor, was invited to the police
station for investigation. He was accompanied by his mother, Maritess.
 On June 14, 2009, members of the Task Force Lingkod Bayan, established by
the Sangguniang Bayan of Tuao, together with several barangay officials,
escorted Bueno and his mother to the police station.
 Questioning and story narration showed different versions of it.
 Petitioners contended that there were no police investigators present in the
station when they arrived. It was alleged that a certain Raymund Rodriguez
pointed Bueno as one of the robbers. On the other hand, Bueno claimed that
Rodriguez is also participant to the crime.
 The respondent contended that he was forcibly taken from the police station to
the mayor’s residence where he was tortured to confess for the robbery incident
along with another minor, Lorenzo Haber.
  Maritess was not allowed to accompany her son and was advised to seek judicial
recourse. She then sought the assistance of the Regional Office of the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in Cagayan with regard to case of Bueno.
 On August 25, 2009, Bueno, together with CHR filed a Petition for the Issuance
of Writ of Amparo with the CA. It was given due course; summary hearing was
made to hear testimonies and to present evidence from both the respondent and
petitioner.
Issue:
 Whether the CA erred in the issuance of the writ of amparo favoring the
respondent.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court upheld the CA’s decision. They reasoned that the writ serves
as a protective remedy for violations of the rights to life, liberty, and security. The
Court upheld the CA's findings that Bueno's rights were violated. It was found out
that he was illegally detained and tortured by the members of the Task Force.
Testimonies were corroborated by valid and credible evidence which the court
appreciated stating also that those of the petitioners were characterized as mere
denials lacking substantial evidence.
 The Court reiterated that even if Bueno had committed a crime, their acts of
illegally detaining and torturing Buena did not justify that his constitutional rights
be violated. It was noted that government officials are bound to protect and
ensure that everyone’s right to life, liberty, and property be respected and valued.

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES,
Facts:
 Juan Ponce Enrile and several others were charged of plunder in the Office of
the Sandiganbayan.
 In which they were purportedly involved in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).
 Prior to his surrender and before he was placed under the custody of the law, he
filed for a petition that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found
against him. The Sandiganbayan denied his petition primarily on the basis of the
prematurity since he has not yet surrendered nor put to custody.
 On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied his motion. On that same day, he
voluntarily surrendered and was confined due to some medical examination.
 On July 7, 2014, Enrile filed for Motion for detention and to post bail in
consideration of several grounds as enumerated that: (a) the Prosecution had not
yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was
charged with plunder, the penalty
 as to him would only be reclusion temporal , not reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he
was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be seriously
considered.
 He was consistently denied by the Sandiganbayan to post bail. He contended
that he is entitled to bail as a matter of his right.
 Aggrieved, he filed for a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court claiming that
his right to bail was violated.
Issue:
  Whether the Sandiganbayan’s denial of Enrile’s motion for bail, without a hearing
to determine the strength of evidence against him, violated his constitutional
rights.
 Whether Enrile’s frail health condition constituted an exceptional circumstance
warranting his provisional release on bail despite the charge of a non-bailable
offense.
 Whether the Supreme Court can grant bail on humanitarian grounds for an
accused charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua.
Ruling:
 The Court ruled that Enrile be granted the right to post bail. It was decided on the
grounds of humanitarian reasons, considering the fact of Enrile’s advanced age
and frail health. This is in addition to the some other factual findings thoroughly
discussed and considered which the Court noted and was substantiated with
evidence.
 It was also noted that bail is a matter of right or discretion that depends on the
nature of the offense and the stage of the criminal proceeding.
 With matter discussed on the considerations noted in the proceedings, the
Supreme Court decided to grant Enrile the right to post bail.

SIEGFRED D. DEDURO VS. MAJ. GEN. ERIC C. VINOYA, in his capacity as

COMMANDING OFFICER of the 3rd INFANTRY DEIVISION, PHILIPPINE ARMY
Facts:
 Petitioner Deduro was an activist from Iloilo and affiliated with several
organizations and movement groups, was alleged and red-tagged as being a
ranking member of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army
(CPP-NPA) by military officers under the respondent’s command.
 Petitioner cited several incidents whereby military officials publicly identified him
as part of the rebel group. It circulated throughout the national and local media.
 He alleged that there were other instances that his name was dragged in some
posters beside other activists, and other members of non-government
organizations (NGOs) as criminal and terrorists.
 He even recalled being followed by some unidentified men and those other
persons red-tagged together with his name were killed.
 Due to these incidents, and to protect his life, liberty and security, he sought
Petition for Writ of Amparo.
 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied the petition having found that the
allegations were baseless and unsupported by evidence.
Issue:
 Whether or not the Court a quo seriously erred in the outright dismissal of the
petition without filing a return or conduct of hearing.

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court held that Deduro should be issued of the writ of amparo.
This remedy is designed to provide rapid judicial relief for any person whose life,
liberty and security is threatened. As viewed by the Court, pieces of evidence
were sufficient to merit the issuance. Red-tagging is a serious threat that can
justify the issuance of the writ of amparo. It was also highlighted that the trial
court requires petitioner to file for a verified return as it is important to allow the
 petitioner to present his cases fully especially in situations where there is danger
to the life, liberty and security of a person.

REYNALDO VALENCIA Y VIBAR VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:
 An accident happened on November 25, 2011 whereby Valencia is the driver of
the passenger jeepney traversing Sagumayon bridge in Legazpi City. He
suddenly hit a man who was identified as Celedonio Jaquilmo who died from that
accident. Witnesses to the incident included the passengers Añonuevo and
Nicerio, and Macinas who was near the area where it happened.
 Valencia purportedly did not stop to assist the victim. Valencia denied the
charges.
 The lower courts were moved by the testimonies of the witnesses. Valencia was
found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide by both the trial courts.
 Valencia appealed to the Supreme Court, raising questions about the sufficiency
of evidence proving his direct involvement in the victim’s death.
Issue:
 Whether or not the Court of Appeals (CA) erred in upholding petitioner's guilt for
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court reviewed the case appealed by Valencia and the petition
was granted, acquitting him of the charges.
 Here, the Court held that conviction in a criminal case must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution was able to establish that Jaquilmo had died
on the bridge but they failed to prove that Valencia’s imprudence in driving the
jeepney was the proximate cause of his death. It was noted that the prosecution
has the responsibility of establishing the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt but then again, they failed to prove that petitioner’s inexcusable lack of
precaution in driving the jeepney was the victim’s proximate cause of his
unfortunate death.
 Also, as noted in the case of People v. Ganguso, the Bill of Rights guarantees
that an accused should be favored of the presumption of innocence. Unless his
guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt and corroborated of valid evidence, he
must be acquitted.
 Therefore, unable to prove the presence of all elements of reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide beyond reasonable doubt, the Decision of the CA was
reversed and set aside, and petitioner Valencia was acquitted.

MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS vs. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE
FRANCISCO ARCA
Facts:
 On March 27, 1968, Ordinance No. 6537 was enacted by the Municipal Board of
Manila and was signed by herein petitioner Mayor Villegas. This ordinance
prohibited non-Filipino citizens from being employed or engaged in any business,
trade or occupation, whether permanent or temporary, in Manila without securing
an employment permit from the Mayor and pay the fee of P50.00.
 Respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila, was affected
by this ordinance. He filed a petition with the Court of First Instance in Manila
 contending that such ordinance be declared as null and void for being
discriminatory and violative of his alien’s rights and for being arbitrary, oppressive
and unreasonable.
 Judge Arca issued the writ of preliminary injunction and rendered decision
declaring the Ordinance No. 6537 null and void.
Issue:
 Whether Judge Arca committed a serious error of law in ruling that the ordinance
violated the undue process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled that the said ordinance violated the due process of law
and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
 The Court reasoned that it unduly restricts the petitioner of his rights to
employment. The mere fact that he is required to secure for the permit before he
can gain employment is tantamount to denying him of his basic right of the
people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. The Court justified
that Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens in our territory but once
an alien is permitted to reside in the Philippines, he cannot be deprived of life
without due process of law. The Bill of Rights guarantees that due process of law
includes the means of livelihood and it was given to any person, whether resident
or alien individuals.
 Thereby, the Court decided that the raised issue lacks merit and the decision of
the Appellate Court was affirmed.

RUBI, ET AL. (Manguianes) vs.THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO

 Facts:
 In 1917, the Manguians, including Rubi, were ordered by the Governor to thrive
in an established reservation situated in Tigbao, Mindoro. They were ordered to
stay and if they were to escape, they will be imprisoned. A person named
Dabalos who said to escaped from the reservation were held captive by the
provincial sheriff and brought to prison in Calapan.
 They were directed to take up their habitation in that reservation in Tigbao by
virtue of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and which was duly
approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.
 Rubi challenged the legality of this section contending that they were deprived of
their liberty, being forced to remain in a certain place, and was without due
process of law.
Issue:
 Whether the challenged Section 2145 violated the due process of law.
Ruling:

 No. The Supreme Court held that the relocation of the Manguians to the
reservation in Tigbao, Mindoro did not constitute deprivation of their right to
liberty without due process of law. It was found that it was a valid exercise of the
state’s police power which is aimed at the advancement and welfare of the
Manguians and not an arbitrary infringement on their liberties. It was noted that
the enactment of the Administrative Code was conferred upon the Provincial
Governor, with the approval of the Provincial Board and the Department Head
has been given discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. As public
 officials, they are at a better position to determine and select sites which have the
conditions most favorable for the improvement and development of the people.
 Hence, the Court ruled that Section 2145 of the Administrative Code is not
violative of the due process of law and thus, constitutional.

CITY OF MANILA, et al Vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge,
RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Facts:
 On March 30, 1993, Mayor Lim of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7783, which
prohibited the establishment or operation of businesses providing certain forms
of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities in the Ermita-Malate area
and prescribed penalties for violation thereof.
 In other words, it basically prohibited the establishment of bars, karaoke bars,
motels, and hotels in the Malate area which people go to for thrill and
entertainment.
 The Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a petition challenging
the validity of the ordinance. It was contended that it contravenes the PD No.499,
which declared parts of the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone, and
violated the Local Government Code of 1991 granting the City Council regulatory,
but not prohibitory power.
 Judge Laguio declared the ordinance as void and unconstitutional. Aggrieved,
petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
 Whether Ordinance 7783 is valid.
Ruling:
 It was held that Ordinance 7783 is null and void.
 According to the Supreme Court, it violated the due process of law. It was
arbitrary, discriminatory and imposed an infringement upon the liberty of
individuals to use their property, as they were restricted to establish certain
business on their properties. It was also noted that an ordinance can only be
valid when it was within the powers of the local government units to enact and
must be passed according to procedures as prescribed by law.
 Therefore, the Ordinance cannot be declared as valid. It was unconstitutional
which clearly violates the liberties of people and of their property.

GMA NETWORK, INC. vs. MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION
BOARD
Facts:
GMA Network manages and operates the UHF television station, EMC channel 27
which aired the “Muro Ami: The Making” without first securing a permit from the MTRCB
as provided in Section 7 of PD 1986.
On January 7, 2000, the MTRCB issued a suspension order against GMA Network.
There was a penalty for the suspension as based on Memorandum Circular 98-17 dated
December 15, 1998 provided for the penalties for exhibiting a program without a valid
permit from the MTRCB.
The respondent denied the petition filed by the petitioner for the motion for
reconsideration and letter-protest.
Petitioner’s appeal to the Court of Appeals was likewise denied.
Issue:
 Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the show "Muro Ami:
The Making" prior to its broadcast by television.
 Whether Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and binding on
petitioner.
Ruling:
 Yes.
 MTRCB is tasked to screen, review, and examine all motion pictures, television
program, including publicity materials. Although, there are certain exemptions to
this function, the publicity for the movie, “Muro Ami: The Making” fall under its
enumerations subject to the review of the MTRCB Board.
 However, Memorandum 98-17 as the basis of the suspension order is not binding
on the petitioner. The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereof,
expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the National
Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law Center
three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which
are not published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced.
In this instance, it is unenforceable.
 Thus, the petitioner was not bound by said circular and should not have been
charged of the sanction as provided.

Knights of Rizal (KOR) vs. DMCI Homes, Inc.

Facts:
 DMCI Project Developers, Inc. (DMCI-PDI) acquired a lot in Manila, near Taft
Avenue, Ermita, intending to construct the Torre de Manila condominium.
Necessary permits were obtained, including a Barangay Clearance, Zoning
Permit, and Building Permit, for a 49-story building.
 Concerns arose when the Manila City Council temporarily suspended the
building. Permit through Resolution No. 121, claiming that the structure would
obstruct the sightline of the Rizal Monument.
 The City Legal Officer and the National Historical Commission of the Philippines
(NHCP) opined that the project was outside the heritage zone and did not
obstruct the Rizal Monument’s frontal view.

 Despite further suspensions by the Manila City Council, the Manila Zoning Board
of Adjustments and Appeals (MZBAA) recommended approval, and previously
issued permits were ratified.
 Knights of Rizal (KOR) sought to stop the project through a Supreme Court
petition, citing concerns over the monument's view.
Issues:
 Should the Court issue a writ of mandamus to stop the construction of Torre de
Manila?
 Did the construction violate constitutional protections or heritage conservation
laws?
Ruling:
  The Supreme Court ruled that there was no existing law expressly or impliedly
forbidding the construction of the building. DMCI-PDI complied with all required
permits, and the project was located outside the boundaries of Rizal Park. The
Court emphasized that mandamus only applies when there is a clear legal duty.
KOR's claims about the aesthetic impact of the building did not constitute a legal
basis to stop the construction.
 The Court noted that zoning standards applied only to heritage sites. Torre de
Manila was outside the designated heritage area and DMCI-PDI has complied
with legal requirements.
 Claims regarding the visual impact on the Rizal Monument’s sightline were not
supported by any law. The Court stated that the law does not specifically protect
aesthetic views of historical monuments.
 The Court also emphasized that alleged violations of zoning laws should be
addressed through administrative procedures, not through a writ of mandamus.
The City of Manila acted within its discretion in granting permits and variances for
the project.

Evasco, Jr. vs. Montañez

Facts
 The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City passed Ordinance No. 092-2000 to
regulate outdoor advertising materials, including billboards. The ordinance
outlined specific rules, such as a 10-meter setback for billboards along highways,
a prohibition on billboards in residential zones, and the designation of regulated
areas near scenic spots such as the Davao River, Mt. Apo, Samal Island, and the
city skyline. It also required fees for permits and authorized the City Engineer to
remove illegal billboards after giving a 60-day compliance notice.
 Notices and demolition orders were issued to several advertising businesses,
including Alex Montañez's Ad & Promo Management (APM) business for violating
the ordinance. Montañez and the Davao Billboards and Sign makers Association,
Inc. (DABASA) challenged the ordinance and the demolition orders in court.
 RTC declared several provisions of the ordinance invalid as they are inconsistent
with the National Building Code, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, leading the
City Engineer to file a petition with the Supreme Court.
Issue
 Whether or not Ordinance No. 092-2000 is valid.
Ruling
 The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 092-2000, and reversed
the decision of the lower courts.
 The Court emphasized the 10-meter setback requirement is a proper exercise of
the city's police power as local government units can impose stricter regulations
than the National Building Code under their charter. It also stated that
designating "regulated areas" for aesthetic preservation is a legitimate exercise
of police power, as long as they serve public interests and are not oppressive.
 Fees for sign permits were found reasonable, necessary, and not excessive as
they support the city's regulatory efforts. Additionally, the City Engineer's authority
to remove illegal billboards is valid, provided a 60-day compliance notice is given.
 The Court stated that ordinances are presumed valid unless proven
unreasonable or unconstitutional, and that local government units have broad
discretion under their charters to regulate for the general welfare, including
adopting aesthetic standards.
David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo
Facts
 Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation
No. 1017 (PP 1017), declaring a state of national emergency, citing her authority
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution (Calling Out Power).
 The proclamation was based on alleged conspiracies involving
political opposition, leftist groups, and military factions to overthrow the
government, posing a clear and present danger to national security. Along with
this, General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5) directed the military and police to
suppress lawless violence, rebellion, and acts of terrorism.
 Later, Proclamation No. 1021 lifted PP 1017 after the government declared
that awless violence and rebellion had been quelled. Several petitioners
challenged PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, arguing that they violated constitutional
rights such as freedom of expression, press, and peaceful assembly. They
contended that these issuances constituted a de facto declaration of martial law
and that the ctions taken under them led to illegal warrantless arrests and
searches.
Issue
 Were PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional?
Ruling
 The Supreme Court found PP 1017 valid as an exercise of the President's
power to call out. However, it stated that its provisions that command the
enforcement of laws not related to lawless violence and the issuance of decrees
are unconstitutional. While G.O. No. 5 was declared unconstitutional as
the issuances could not authorize the President to assume legislative powers
or issue decrees with the force of law.
 The Court also emphasized that the undefined "acts of terrorism" in G.O. No.
5 lacked a clear legal definition. The Court found that this ambiguity could lead
to arbitrary enforcement and violations of constitutional rights, as it did not
provide a specific standard for law enforcement to follow, potentially infringing on
freedoms such as speech and assembly.
 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of PP 1017 in its general
intent but invalidated specific provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 that
exceeded the President's constitutional authority. It emphasized that any
government action affecting constitutional rights must be carefully scrutinized and
remain within the bounds of the Constitution.

Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, 5th Division

Facts
 Alfredo Romualdez filed a Petition for Certiorari to overturn two Sandiganbayan
resolutions. He was charged with violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (RA 3019). The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
alleged that Romualdez, as the brother-in-law of then-President Ferdinand
Marcos, unlawfully intervened in a contract between the National Shipyard and
Steel Corporation (NASSCO) and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering
Company (BASECO) in 1975.
 Romualdez filed several motions to dismiss the case, claiming that Section 5 of
the Anti-Graft Law was vague. He argued that it did not specify the acts of
 intervention he allegedly committed. He also believed that this lack of specificity
violated his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
 The Sandiganbayan denied his motions, stating that issues not raised in the
initial motion were waived.
Issues
 Is Section 5 of RA 3019 unconstitutional?
 Is the Information filed against Romualdez vague?
Ruling
 The Court stated that Section 5 of RA 3019 is constitutional. It emphasized that it
is clear and does not violate due process rights. Additionally, it emphasized that
he doctrines of "overbreadth" and "void-for-vagueness" do not apply to penal
statutes and only apply to free speech cases.
 The Supreme Court’s decision highlights that the provisions can be easily
understood through simple statutory construction. The Court found that it
sufficiently described the offense, allowing Romualdez to prepare an adequate
defense.

Ong vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts
 Former Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Commissioner Jose Ong and his wife,
Nelly Ong, challenged the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Ombudsman
regarding the forfeiture of their properties.
 The case started when Congressman Bonifacio Gillego filed a complaint alleging
that Ong acquired assets far exceeding his lawful income. Ong’s declared net
worth was P750,000.00, but he allegedly purchased prime real estate properties
worth P21.4 million.
 After a fact-finding investigation, the Ombudsman found sufficient grounds to
pursue forfeiture proceedings, as Ong's explanation of the sources of his wealth
was deemed inadequate. A petition for forfeiture was filed, claiming the Ongs'
questioned assets.
 The Sandiganbayan then issued a writ of preliminary attachment over these
properties. But the Ongs claimed that Nelly Ong was denied a preliminary
investigation and questioned the constitutionality of the forfeiture law. The
spouses argued that RA 1379 is vague because it allegedly does not sufficiently
define "ill-gotten wealth" and how it can be determined, which they claimed
violates the non-delegation of legislative power provision. They contended that
this lack of clarity could lead to arbitrary enforcement of the law.
 Their motions to dismiss were denied, leading them to file a Petition for Certiorari
to nullify the Sandiganbayan's resolutions.
Issue
 Is Republic Act No. 1379 unconstitutional for being vague or violating the
presumption of innocence?
Ruling
 The Supreme Court stated that Republic Act No. 1379 is constitutional. It clearly
defines unlawfully acquired property as assets grossly disproportionate to lawful
income.
  The presumption of illegality in the law does not violate the presumption of
innocence. It shifts the burden of proof to the accused to justify their acquisitions,
which is consistent with due process.
 The Court emphasized that the law is not vague and provides clear guidelines on
legal responsibilities, prohibited conduct, and unexplained wealth among public
officials.

Tañada vs. Tuvera

Facts
 Lorenzo Tañada, Abraham Sarmiento, and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood, Integrity, and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI) sought the publication of
various presidential decrees, arguing that these decrees were unpublished and
therefore invalid. They claimed that the absence of publication violated their
constitutional right to due process and the public's right to information. Petitioners
contended that all laws, regardless of their nature, must be published to be
binding and enforceable.
 The respondents, including then-Exec. Sec. Juan Tuvera, countered that
publication was not always required. They argued that under Article 2 of the Civil
Code, laws could become effective without publication if they explicitly provided
otherwise, and that some presidential decrees had provisions declaring them
effective immediately upon approval. The respondents also asserted that internal
administrative rules and regulations intended solely for internal operations did not
require publication.
 Petitioners sought clarity from the Supreme Court, asking what constitutes a "law
of public nature" or "general applicability," whether laws of general and specific
application should be distinguished, the definition of "publication," and where and
when such publication must take place.
 The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, maintained that publication
was necessary only for laws of general applicability and could be conducted
outside the Official Gazette if it sufficiently informed the public.
 The Supreme Court revisited the case to address the constitutional implications
of publication, focusing on its necessity for due process and the public's right to
access information about the laws governing them.

Issues
 Is publication always required for laws to take effect?
 What constitutes "laws of public nature" or "general applicability," and is
publication necessary for them?
Ruling
 The Supreme Court ruled that publication is mandatory for all laws to take effect.
The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code refers to
the date a law takes effect, not to the requirement of publication.
 All laws, including those of local application and private laws, as well as
presidential decrees and executive orders, must be published, as they relate to
the public interest and ensure transparency in governance. Internal
administrative rules and interpretative regulations are exempt from publication.
 The Court also emphasized that laws must be published promptly after approval.
They take effect 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
explicitly stated by the legislature. The decision ensures that people are informed
 of the laws that govern them and without publication, laws are effectively "secret"
and cannot bind individuals, as this would violate their right to due process.

Philippine International Trading Corp. vs. Angeles

Facts
 Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) issued Administrative Order
No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, requiring that applications for importing goods from the
People's Republic of China (PROC) be supported by a matching export program
from the Philippines.
 Remington Industrial Sales Corporation (Remington) and Firestone Ceramic, Inc.
(Firestone) were affected by this order as they failed to comply with the export
requirement.
 As a result, PITC withheld their importation applications, leading Remington and
Firestone to file a petition for prohibition and mandamus before the RTC of
Makati. The court ruled that PITC's order was unconstitutional for several
reasons, including the failure to publish it, making it legally ineffective.
Issue
 Was Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 legally valid considering it was
not published in the Official Gazette?
Ruling
 The Supreme Court held that the Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01
was unconstitutional. Laws, including administrative orders, must be published to
be effective, according to Article 2 of the Civil Code, which requires publication
for the law to take effect. The Administrative Order in question was not published
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, thus, it was invalid
until publication.
 The Court stated that Amendments filed in the UP Law Center and published in
the National Administrative Register did not cure the defect of non-publication in
the Official Gazette, making the order ineffective.
 As a result, Remington and Firestone were not subject to its requirements, and
PITC's actions based on the Court order were invalid.

Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R No. 113911, 23 Jan. 1998
FACTS
 Leonides C. Basconcillo, a licensed Marine Engineer, was employed as the Chief
Engineer of the M/V Boracay by Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. and Elkano Ship
Management, Inc. on February 13, 1987, under a one-year fixed-term contract
with a monthly salary of $1,787.50.
 Basconcillo was dismissed on April 2, 1987, based on allegations of gross
negligence and incompetence, which the petitioners claimed were evidenced by
several incidents during his employment.
 Basconcillo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) on April 20, 1987, contending that petitioner
did not provide a formal notice/ investigation on the alleged incompetence.
 The POEA affirmed respondent’s contention declaring his dismissal illegal and
ordering the petitioners to pay him the salaries corresponding to the unexpired
portion of his contract, which was also affirmed by the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), elevating the case to the SC.
  ISSUE
 Whether the respondent’s dismissal is valid.
 RULING
 The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the decisions of the POEA
and NLRC.
 The Court held that the petitioners failed to prove the existence of just cause for
Basconcillo's dismissal and that due process was not observed.
 For an employee's dismissal to be valid,
 the dismissal must be for a valid cause; and
 the employee must be afforded due process.
 The alleged incidents of incompetence were unsupported by relevant and
convincing evidence. The affidavits of Robinson and Capt. Jose B. Orquinaza,
who caused private respondent's dismissal and recommendation, are highly
suspicious and do not in any way prove that the alleged incidents showing the
private respondent's incompetence were ever investigated and proven, as they
were sufficiently rebutted by the entries in the seaman's book. Mere allegations
are not synonymous with proof.
 Article 282, the Code requires the service of a written notice containing a
statement of the cause(s) of termination and giving said employee ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. A notice of termination in writing is
further required if the employee's dismissal is decided upon.
 The Court also held that private respondent was illegally dismissed. No notice
was ever given to him prior to his dismissal. This fact alone disproves petitioners'
allegation that "private respondent was given fair warning and enough
opportunity to explain his side [regarding] the incidents that led to his dismissal."
These requisites cannot be replaced as they are not mere technicalities, but
requirements of due process to which every employee is entitled to ensure that
the employer's prerogative to dismiss is not exercised arbitrarily.

Tanada vs. PAEC, 141 SCRA 307 (1986)

FACTS
 Two cases were involved concerning the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1
(PNPP-1) and the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC).
 In the first case ( G.R. No. 70632), petitioners challenged the competence of the
PAEC Commissioners to assess the safety of PNPP-1 during the licensing
proceedings.
 They argue that the Commissioners lack the "proven competence" required by
law, and that the National Power Corporation's (NPC) application to convert its
construction permit into an operating license was invalid due to insufficient
information regarding financial qualifications, nuclear fuel sources, and insurance
coverage for nuclear damage, and PAEC Commissioners with bias and
prejudgment regarding the nuclear plant’s safety.
 In the second case ( G.R. No. 68474), Petitioners are seeking a court order to
require the PAEC to reconsider previous orders and hold public hearings about
the safety of PNPP-1, stressing the importance of public health and safety.
ISSUE
 Whether the PAEC Commissioners exhibited bias and prejudgment in the
determination of PNPP-1's safety.
RULING
 G.R. No. 70632
  Yes. Having thus prejudged the safety of the PNPP-1 respondent PAEC
Commissioners would be acting with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction were they to sit in judgment upon the safety of the plant, absent the
requisite objectivity that must characterize such an important inquiry.
 G.R. No. 68474
 The Court resolved to order respondent PAEC (once reconstituted) to re-open
the hearing on PNPP-1 so as to give petitioners sufficient time to complete their
cross-examination of the expert witnesses on quality assurance, to cross-
examine the witnesses that petitioners have failed to cross-examine on and after
August 9, 1985, and to complete the presentation of their evidence, for which
purpose, respondent PAEC shall issue the necessary subpoena and subpoena
duces tecum to compel the attendance of relevant witnesses and/or the
production of relevant documents. For the said purposes, the PAEC may
prescribe a time schedule which shall reasonably assure the parties sufficient
latitude to adequately present their case consistently with the requirements of
dispatch. lt is understood that the PAEC may give NPC the opportunity to correct
or supply deficiencies in this application or evidence in support thereof.

Anzaldo vs. Clave, 119 SCRA 353 (1982)

FACTS
 This case involves around the position of Science Research Supervisor II at the
Medical Research Department of the National Institute of Science and
Technology (NIST) between Doctor Felicidad Estores-Anzaldo and Doctor Eulalia
L. Venzon.
 When Doctor Quintin Kintanar, promoted to Director of the Biological Research
Center in 1974, the position was became vacant.
 Doctor Venzon contested Anzaldo's appointment, leading to administrative
actions.
 The NIST Reorganization Committee accepted Venzon's protest to be valid,
however the position remains unfilled. Eventually, Doctor Pedro G. Afable, the
Officer-in-Charge of NIST, appointed Anzaldo, which the Civil Service
Commission approved
 Venzon appealed with the Office of the President, which was forwarded to the
NIST.
 The Civil Service Commission, led by Chairman Jacobo C. Clave and
Commissioner Jose A. R. Melo, later recommended Venzon for the position,
contradicting the earlier appointment of Anzaldo.
 On March 20, 1980, Clave, acting as Presidential Executive Assistant, revoked
Anzaldo's appointment and directed that Venzon be appointed instead, while
stating that Anzaldo's appointment would remain valid during the pendency of
Venzon's protest.
 The petitioner filed a motion for a motion but was denied, elevating the case to
the Supreme Court (SC).
ISSUE
 Whether Anzaldo was denied due process in the administrative proceedings
leading to the revocation of her appointment.
RULING
 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Anzaldo.
  It is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process of law when
Presidential Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of
Chairman Clave ( himself) of the Civil Service Commission.
 The case is analogous to Zambales Chromite Mining Co. vs. Court of Appeals, L-
49711, November 7, 1979, 94 SCRA 261, where it was held that the decision of
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon, affirming his
own decision in a mining case as Director of Mines was void because it was
rendered with grave abuse of discretion and was a mockery of administrative
justice.
 Due process of law means fundamental fairness.
 It is not fair to Doctor Anzaldo that Presidential Executive Assistant Clave should
decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission, as to who between Doctor Anzaldo and Doctor Venzon should be
appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President
of the Philippines.

Tejano v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 159190, June 30, 2005

FACTS
 The Philippine National Bank's auditor discovered an alleged unfunded
withdrawal of P2.2 million by V&G Better Homes Subdivision on July 17, 1992,
initiated by a note from a bank executive.
 On July 20, 1992, PNB Cebu's Vice President, Cayetano A. Tejano Jr.,
authorized a withdrawal despite the account only having P33,436.78. The
transaction increased the bank's cash-on-hand and reduced V&G's loan account.
 An investigation linked Tejano and other bank officials to irregular withdrawals. In
response, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas ordered those
involved to submit counter-affidavits.
 A resolution was issued with the filing of charges against Tejano and others for
violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, while charges against other
bank officials were dismissed due to insufficient evidence.
 The case at the Sandiganbayan was recommended for dismissal by Special
Prosecutor Jesus A. Micael due to lack of probable cause, but this
recommendation was rejected by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who had
previously been involved as a Special Prosecutor.
 Tejano filed a motion for reconsideration, which was not resolved on the merits,
leading to further complications and a subsequent recommendation for denial by
another prosecutor.
 Tejano then filed a petition for certiorari to challenge the Ombudsman's rejection
of the dismissal recommendation and the denial of his request for
reconsideration.
ISSUE
 Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in disapproving
the recommendation for dismissal of the case against Tejano and others.
RULING
 The Court found that Ombudsman Desierto committed grave abuse of discretion
by disapproving the recommendation for dismissal.
 The Court ruled that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the
same person whose decision is under review.
 In this case, petitioner attributes partiality on the part of Ombudsman Desierto for
having participated in the reinvestigation of the instant case despite the fact that
 he earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same when he
was a Special Prosecutor by concurring in the recommendation for the filing of
the information before the Sandiganbayan.
 The Court also cited that having participated in the initial preliminary investigation
of the instant case and having recommended the filing of an appropriate
information, it behooved Ombudsman Desierto to recuse himself from
participating in the review of the same during the reinvestigation.

Tumey vs. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1997)

FACTS
 Tumey was arrested in White Oak and was brought before Mayor Pugh of North
College Hill for illegal possession of intoxicating liquor.
 The defendant sought dismissal of charges due to the mayor's disqualification
under the 14th Amendment, but the mayor denied the request. The trial
continued, resulting in Tumey's conviction for unlawfully possessing intoxicating
liquor, leading to a fine and mandated imprisonment until payment was made.
 Tumey appealed to the Hamilton County court, which reversed the decision and
disqualified the mayor.
 The State requested a review from the Ohio Court of Appeals, which overturned
the common pleas court decision and upheld the mayor's judgment.
 On May 4, 1926, the State Supreme Court rejected Tumey's request for the Court
of Appeals to certify the case record. Tumey subsequently filed a petition arguing
that the case should be dismissed as it did not raise any significant constitutional
questions.
 The case was escalated to the US Supreme Court after the Chief Justice of the
State Supreme Court authorized a writ of error.
ISSUE
 Whether a trial conducted by a judge with a direct financial interest in the
outcome violates the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
RULING
 The Supreme Court reversed the decision and set aside Tumey's conviction,
ruling that the mayor’s dual role as judge and recipient of fines violated due
process.
 A law provided that in case of conviction, the judge could deduct from the fine
imposed by him the sum of $12 in addition to his salary, another portion of the
fine going to the treasury of the village, of which he was also the mayor. It was
held that such a law could insure his impartiality since he stood to benefit,
personally and officially, with every judgment of conviction he rendered.
 The US Supreme Court concluded that a system by which an inferior judge is
paid for his service only when he convicts the defendant has not become so
embedded by custom in the general practice either at common law or in this
country that it can be regarded as due process of law unless the costs usually
imposed are so small that they may be properly ignored as within the maxim de
minimis non curat lex.

People v. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 452 (1996)

FACTS
  The People of the Philippines filed a petition against CA and several respondents
seeking to annul the latter’s decision from the request to inhibit Judge Pedro S.
Espina from hearing two criminal cases.
 The petition was filed with an urgent prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order to prevent Judge Espina from conducting further
proceedings in the aforementioned criminal cases.
 The Supreme Court (SC) initially required the respondents to comment on the
petition but noted that several respondents failed to do so within the specified
time frame. However, due to the delay in filing the same, it appeared to benefit
the respondents, particularly since many were in detention.
ISSUE
 Whether Judge Espina should be disqualified from hearing the criminal cases
due to a potential lack of impartiality.
RULING
 The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the decision of the Court
of Appeals.
 One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a judicial
proceeding is that there must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the matter before it. Thus, every litigant, including
the State, is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
 The Court found that Judge Pedro S. Espina could not be considered to possess
the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge" necessary for fair adjudication ( due
process).
 It was held in the case of Javier vs.Commission on Elections that the judge must
not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance
to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less
than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a
judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will
not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will
not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in
invoking his action for the justice they expect.
 Judge Espina's decision in favor of respondent Jane Go serves as sufficient and
reasonable basis for the prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality in handling
the criminal cases. Verily, it would have been more prudent for Judge Espina to
have voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the criminal cases.

Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 (1997)

FACTS
 Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta were public officers at the Manila
International Airport Authority (MIAA), with Tabuena serving as General Manager
and Peralta as Acting Finance Services Manager, charged with malversation of
public funds amounting to P55 million, which was allegedly misappropriated
during their tenure.
 The case arose when then-President Ferdinand Marcos verbally instructed
Tabuena to pay the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) what
MIAA owed, a directive which was later formalized through a memorandum dated
January 8, 1986.
 Funds were withdrawn using manager's checks, which were cashed and
delivered in cash to Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, the private secretary to then-
President Ferdinand Marcos.
  The transactions lacked the usual documentation and did not follow the standard
operational procedures for disbursements.
 The defense claimed that Tabuena and Peralta acted in good faith, believing they
followed President Marcos' directive to pay PNCC directly, as outlined in a
memorandum.
 The Sandiganbayan convicted Tabuena and Peralta of malversation, resulting in
imprisonment, fines, and perpetual disqualification from holding public office.
ISSUE
 Whether the Sandiganbayan’s conviction of malversation with the petitioner
violated his constitutional right to due process.
RULING
 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Tabuena and Peralta’s acquittal, holding that
they acted in obeying the President’s lawful order, thus negating the crime of
malversation.
 The Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense witness
and the accused themselves is a violation of their constitutional right to due
process. It had allied itself with, or to be more precise, had taken the cudgels for
the prosecution in proving the case against Tabuena and Peralta when the
Justices cross-examined the witnesses, their cross-examinations supplementing
those made by Prosecutor Viernes and far exceeding the latter’s questions in
length.
 The “cold neutrality of an impartial judge” requirement of due process was
certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the Court, with its overzealousness,
assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate.
 “A trial judge should not participate in the examination of witnesses as to create
the impression that he is allied with the prosecution.”
 "We doubt not that the sole motive of the learned judge was to ascertain the truth
of the transaction, but it is never proper for a judge to discharge the duties of a
prosecuting attorney. However anxious a judge may be for the enforcement of
the law, he should always remember that he is as much judge in behalf of the
defendant accused of crime, and whose liberty is in jeopardy, as he is judge in
behalf of the state, for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of society.”
The Court has declared that due process requires no less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. Bolstering this requirement, it added that the judge must not only be
impartial but must also appear to be impartial, to give added assurance to the parties
that his decision will be just.

Nelson B. Lai v. People, G.R. No. 175999, 1 July 2015

FACTS
 On December 16, 1995, around 9:00 PM, Enrico Villanueva, Jr. was with friends
in a jeepney in Bacolod City when the owner, Nelson Lai y Bilbao, ordered them
to leave the vehicle while searching for a female companion.
 After they complied, Lai accused Villanueva of stealing the antenna from his
vehicle but denied the accusation, managed to escape, and ran to the house of a
friend, Christopher Padigos. There, he informed Padigos about the incident,
stating that Lai had grabbed him and struck him at the neck, but he had retaliated
by kicking Lai.
 When a sudden power outage occurred, Villanueva was shot in the neck by Lai
at the dancehall party.
  He was rushed to the hospital, where he identified Lai as his assailant to
witnesses and police officers present.
 Lai denied the allegation contending that he had no involvement in the shooting,
and even requested a paraffin test, which returned negative results.
 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Lai guilty of homicide, sentencing him to
an indeterminate prison term and ordering him to indemnify Villanueva's heirs.
ISSUE
 Whether the accused was denied due process due to the judge's non-
disqualification.
RULING
 The Supreme Court annulled the decisions of both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals, primarily on the grounds of due process violations stemming from
Judge Elumba's failure to disqualify himself.
 The Court emphasized that a judge must not only be impartial but must also
appear to be impartial to ensure public confidence in the judicial system. It noted
that Elumba's prior role as a public prosecutor in the same case created a conflict
of interest, which warranted his disqualification.
 Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court embodies the rule on self-
disqualification by a sitting judge, viz.:
 Section 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any
case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided
in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without
the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record.
 A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
 Reprising Section 1 of Rule 137 is Section 5, Canon 3 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,21 which pertinently demands the
disqualification of a judge who has previously served as a lawyer of any of the
parties, to wit:
 Section 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any
proceedings in which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which
it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter
impartially.

 Further, the SC reiterates, ‘the cold neutrality of an impartial judge‘ is an

indispensable imperative of due process.
 Judge Elumba's prior participation as the public prosecutor was passive, or that
he entered his appearance as the public prosecutor long after the Prosecution
had rested its case against the petitioner did not really matter. The evil sought to
be prevented by the rules on disqualification had no relation whatsoever with the
judge's degree of participation in the case before becoming the judge. He must
be reminded that the same compulsory disqualification that applied to him could
similarly be demanded of the private prosecutor or the defense lawyer, if either of
them should be appointed as the trial judge hearing the case. The purpose of this
stricture is to ensure that the proceedings in court that would affect the life,
liberty, and property of the petitioner as the accused should be conducted and
 determined by a judge who was wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent.

Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)

FACTS:
 Petitioner's wife was killed on July 4, 1954. Suspicion immediately focused on the
petitioner, who was arrested on July 30, indicted on August 17, and convicted on
December 21, 1954.
 The case attracted widespread, prejudicial publicity before and during the trial.
The petitioner was interrogated for over five hours without counsel during a
televised inquest before a large audience.
 Newspapers published the names of potential jurors weeks before the trial,
exposing them to public influence. The trial occurred during a heated election,
with the prosecutor and judge as candidates.
 Media heavily disrupted the trial, with reporters in close proximity to jurors and
counsel, and a broadcasting station near the jury room.
 Jurors were not sequestered before deliberations and had access to news
media, while supervision during deliberations was inadequate.
 The trial judge took no effective measures to address the prejudicial publicity or
disruptions.
 The petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing he was denied a fair trial.
The District Court granted the writ, but the Court of Appeals reversed.
ISSUE:
 Whether the trial judge failed to protect the petitioner from prejudicial publicity.
RULING:
 YES. The SC ruled that the state trial judge did not fulfill his duty to protect
Sheppard from the inherently prejudicial publicity which saturated the community
and to control disruptive influences in the courtroom.
 The majority recognized that “[l]egal trials are not like elections, to be won
through the use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper.” Also, “the
[Supreme] Court has insisted that no one be punished for a crime without ‘a
charge fairly made and fairly tried in a public tribunal free of prejudice, passion,
excitement, and tyrannical power.’ Moreover, “[f]reedom of discussion should be
given the widest range compatible with the essential requirement of the fair and
orderly administration of justice.” However, “it must not be allowed to divert the
trial from the ‘very purpose of a court system . . . to adjudicate controversies,
both criminal and civil, in the calmness and solemnity of the courtroom according
to legal procedures.’ ” One of the requirements is that “the jury’s verdict be based
on evidence received in open court, not from outside sources.”
 The Court reversed the denial of the habeas petition and the case was remanded
to the District Court with instructions to issue the writ and order that Sheppard be
released from custody unless the State puts him to its charges again within a
reasonable time.

Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652 (1995)

FACTS:
  The NBI charged Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio Lejano, and others
with rape with homicide for the rape and murder of Carmela Vizconde, her
mother Estrellita, and sister Anne Marie.
 The DOJ's preliminary investigation relied on Jessica Alfaro’s sworn statement
and other evidence, while Webb claimed he was in the U.S. at the time.
 The DOJ found probable cause, leading to the filing of an Information and the
issuance of arrest warrants.
 Petitioners alleged violations of due process, abuse of discretion, improper
issuance of warrants, prejudicial publicity, suppression of evidence, and Alfaro’s
exclusion as an accused.
 Respondents argued probable cause was properly established, due process was
upheld, Alfaro’s exclusion was lawful, and publicity did not impair the case.
ISSUE:
 Whether the DOJ Panel lost its impartiality due to the prejudicial publicity waged
in the press and broadcast media by the NBI.
RULING:
 NO. The SC held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that
they might be, by the barrage of publicity.
 In the case at bar, the SC find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone
and content, of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally
infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. The SC held that
petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of
fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond
knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal
investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be
blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. That the DOJ Panel’s 26-page Resolution
carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they considered
any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The
length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and
the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of
petitioners speak well of their fairness.
 The SC also upheld that the Vizconde case will move to a more critical stage as
petitioners will undergo trial on the merits. The Court stressed that probable
cause is not synonymous with guilt and while the light of publicity may be a good
disinfectant of unfairness, too much of its heat can bring to flame an accused's
right to fair trial. Without imposing on the tria judge the difficult task of supervising
every specie of speech relating to the case at bar, it behooves her to be
reminded of the duty of a trial judge in high profile criminal cases to control
publicity prejudicial to the fair administration of justice. The Court reminds judges
that our ability to dispense impartial justice is an issue in every trial and in every
criminal prosecution, the judiciary always stands as a silent accused. More than
convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, the business of the judiciary is to
assure fulfillment of the promise that justice shall be done and is done — and
that is the only way for the judiciary to get an acquittal from the bar of public
opinion.

People v. Sanchez, G.R. Nos. 121039-45, January 25, 1999

FACTS:
  On June 28, 1993, Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez were abducted by a group
led by Mayor Antonio Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna.
 Witnesses Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan testified they, along with
George Medialdea, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion, and Luis Corcolon, forcibly took
the victims from UP.Los Baños.
 The victims were brought to Erais Farm, owned by Mayor Sanchez, where
Gomez was beaten, and Sarmenta was raped by Sanchez.
 Sarmenta and Gomez were then taken to a sugarcane field.
 Gomez was killed along the way, while Sarmenta was gang-raped by the other
accused before being murdered.
 Their bodies were discovered the next day.
 Mayor Sanchez and his co-accused were charged with seven counts of rape with
homicide. • The Pasig City Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, presided by Judge
Harriet Demetriou, found them guilty and sentenced them to seven terms of
reclusion perpetua. The accused appealed to the Supreme Court, citing issues of
credibility, alibi, conspiracy, media prejudice, and medical findings.
 The prosecution maintained that evidence and witness testimonies were
consistent, credible, and sufficient to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
 Whether the accused was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial
publicity. RULING:
 NO. The SC ruled that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to
a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a
fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded
as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal
field x x x. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards
against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and
judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism
 This failure to present proof of actual bias continues to hound accused-appellant
Sanchez, having failed, in his motion for reconsideration, to substantiate his
claims of actual bias on the part of the trial judge. Not only that, accused-
appellant’s case has been exhaustively and painstakingly reviewed by the Court
itself. Accused-appellant Sanchez has not shown by an iota of proof that the
Court, in the examination of his appeal, was unduly swayed by publicity in
affirming the sentence of conviction imposed by the trial court. The charge of
conviction by publicity leveled by accused-appellant has thus no ground to stand
on.

SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD v. TORCITA, G.R. No. 130442, April 6, 2000

FACTS:
 C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita was driving along with four passengers when he was
overtaken by a pick-up truck owned by Congressman Manuel Puey where a
vehicular collision almost took place.
 After such incident, the pick-up truck accelerated speed in an attempt to escape
the other car but C/Insp Torcita was able to pursue them. They reached Hacienda
Aimee where Torcita alighted from the vehicle and the confrontation occurred.
 C/Insp. Torcita was charged with 12 administrative complaints which were
consolidated into one major complaint, which is, conduct unbecoming of a police
officer.
  The Summary Dismissal Board, however, did not find sufficient evidence to
establish that Torcita was guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer so the
board dismissed the complaint.
 Nevertheless, the board found that since Torcita was in the performance of his
duty when the incident happened, he allegedly committed a simple irregularity in
the
 performance of his duty for being in the influence of alcohol and was suspended
for 20 days and salary suspended for the same period of time.
 Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City
questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for which he was not
charged. RTC granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive
position of the questioned decision.
 The board appealed from the RTC decision, by petition of review to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the same for the reason that the respondent could not
have been guilty of irregularity considering that the 12 cases were eventually
dismissed.
ISSUE:
 Whether C/Insp. Torcita may be penalized for an offense he was not originally
charged with.
RULING:
 NO. The SC upheld that it is glaringly apparent from a reading of the titles of the
twelve administrative cases filed against C/Insp. Torcita, that none of the charges
or offenses mentioned or made reference to the specific act of being drunk while
in the performance of official duty. The records do not bear out the specific acts
or conduct constituting the charge/offense in the twelve cases which were
consolidated at the pre-hearing conference into a single case of "Conduct
Unbecoming of a Police Officer." Notably, there is no indication or warning at all
in the summary dismissal proceedings that C/Insp. Torcita was also being
charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic drinks
while in the performance of his duties.
 The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of the
offense for which he was not notified nor charged. Summary dismissal
proceedings are governed by specific requirements of notification of the charges
together with copies of affidavits and other attachments supporting the
complaints, and the filing of an answer, together with supporting documents.
Notification of the charges contemplates that respondent be informed of the
specific charges against him. Torcita was entitled to know that he was being
charged with being drunk while in the performance of duty, so that he could
traverse the accusation squarely and adduce evidence in his defense. Although
he was given an opportunity to be heard on the multiple and broad charges
initially filed against him, the absence of specification of the offense for which he
was eventually found guilty is not a proper observance of due process. There can
be no short-cut to the legal process.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION, G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000 FACTS:
 The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a
Note Verbale from the U.S. containing a request for the extradition of private
respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. Attached to the Note Verbale were the
Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court,
Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition.
  Jimenez appears to be charged in the U.S. with conspiracy to commit offense or
to defraud the U.S., attempt to evade or defeat tax, fraud by wire, radio, or
television, false statements, and election contributions in name of another.
 A panel of attorneys were designated to handle the case. Pending the evaluation
of the extradition documents, Jimenez requested copies of the official extradition
request from the U.S. Government, the documents and papers submitted
therewith, and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after
receiving said copies.
 Thereafter, Jimenez requested that he be given at least a copy of, or access to,
the request of the US Government and a period of time to amplify on his request.
• However, the Secretary of Justice responded negatively saying that it is
premature to furnish Jimenez with the copies of the extradition request and other
supporting documents pending the evaluation of the DOJ, that such evaluation is
not a preliminary investigation of criminal cases, and that said documents contain
information covered by strict secrecy rules under the US law.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing.
RULING:
 YES. True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice
and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in
administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate
the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case
affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear
therein and present their side and to refute the position of the opposing parties
(Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).
 In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding,
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the respondent’s basic due
process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the
affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-
affidavits and other supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof.
Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence
submitted by the complainant.
 These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances,
such as:
• In proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like
the summary abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the
preventive suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges
(Section 63, Local Government Code, B. P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of
filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like
establishments which are immediate threats to public health and decency,
and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal
prosecution;
• Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the
respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing
at a later time without prejudice to the person affected, such as the
summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and
the replacement of a temporary appointee; and
• Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to
exercise them had not been claimed.

PEOPLE v. ESTRADA, G.R. No. 130487, June 19, 2000

FACTS:
 During a mass at St. John’s Cathedral in Dagupan City, Roberto Estradasuddenly
walke towards the altar and sat on the Bishop’s chair, screaming that he will not
move out no matter what happens.
 This prompted the churchgoers to summon Rogelio Mararac, the security guard
of the Cathedral. After attempts of stopping Estrada using his nightstick, Estrada
drew a knife from his back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed him hitting his left
throat. Estrada went over the fallen victim and tried to stab him again but was
able to ward him off. Meanwhile, SPO1 Conrado Francisco received a report of
the commotion inside the cathedral, where he ran to the accused-appellant to
advise him to the drop the knife which the latter obeyed. Mararac expired a few
minutes upon arrival at the hospital
 Estrada filed for a “Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and
Psychiatric Examination” because he has been exhibiting abnormal behavior for
the past weeks but was denied. Instead of taking a stand, his counsel presented
a testimony of Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan, a resident physician in the
Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio general Hospital. She verified that the
appellant has been confined at the BGH where he was diagnosed with
“Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid Type—schizophrenia, paranoid, chronic,
paranoid type.”
 The Court found Estrada guilty of murder and sentenced him to death.
ISSUE:
 Whether Estrada’s arraignment should have been suspended.
RULING:
 YES. The SC ruled that the arraignment of an accused shall be suspended if at
the time thereof he appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition of
such nature as to render him unable to fully understand the charge against him
and to plead intelligently
 thereto. Under these circumstances, the court must suspend the proceedings
and order the mental examination of the accused, and if confinement be
necessary for examination, order such confinement and examination. If the
accused is not in full possession of his mental faculties at the time he is informed
at the arraignment of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, the
process is itself a felo de se, for he can neither comprehend the full import of the
charge nor can he give an intelligent plea thereto.
 Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. His counsel manifested that
accused appellant was waiving the right to testify in his own behalf because he
was "suffering from mental illness." This manifestation was made in open court
more than two (2) years after the crime, and still, the claim of mental illness was
ignored by the trial court. And despite all the overwhelming indications of
accused-appellant's state of mind, the judge persisted in his personal
assessment and never even considered subjecting accused-appellant to a
medical examination. To top it all, the judge found appellant guilty and sentenced
him to death! By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court
effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial. The trial court's negligence was a
violation of the basic requirements of due process; and for this reason, the
proceedings before the said court must be nullified.

LIM v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 111397, August 12, 2002 FACTS:
  New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant owned by respondent
Bistro Pigalle Inc. filed before the trial court a petition for mandamus and
prohibition, with prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction, against Alfredo Lim, in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila
because policemen under Lim's instructions inspected and investigated Bistro's
license as well as the work permits and health certificates of its staff.
 This caused the stoppage of work in Bistro's night club and restaurant
operations. Lim also refused to accept Bistro's application for a business license,
as well as the work permit applications of Bistro's staff, for the year 1993.
 Acting on Bistro's application for injunctive relief, the trial court issued the first
assailed temporary restraining order.
 On January 20, 1993, the trial court granted Bistro's application for a writ of
prohibitory preliminary injunction.
 However, despite the trial court's order, Lim still issued a closure order on Bistro's
operations effective January 23, 1993, even sending policemen to carry out his
closure order.
ISSUE:
 Whether Lim’s issuance of the closure order is proper.
RULING:
 NO. The authority of mayors to issue business licenses and permits is beyond
question. The law expressly provides for such authority under Section 11 (l),
Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and Section 455 (3) (iv) of
the Local Government Code. From the language of the two laws, it is clear that
the power of the mayor to issue business licenses and permits necessarily
includes the corollary power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue the
same. However, the power to suspend or revoke these licenses and permits is
expressly premised on the violation of the conditions of these permits and
licenses. The laws specifically refer to the "violation of the condition(s)" on which
the licenses and permits were issued. Similarly, the power to refuse to issue such
licenses and permits is premised on non-compliance with the prerequisites for
the issuance of such licenses and permits. The mayor must observe due process
in exercising these powers, which means that the mayor must give the applicant
or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard.
 Lim has no authority to close down Bistro’s business or any business
establishment in Manila without due process of law. Lim cannot take refuge
under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and the Local Government Code.
There is no provision in these laws expressly or impliedly granting the mayor
authority to close down private commercial establishments without notice and
hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be void. The due process
clause of the Constitution requires that Lim should have given Bistro an
opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses
and permits.

VIVO v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013

FACTS:
 Ray Peter Vivo was PAGCOR’s Managing Head of PAGCOR’s gaming
department. • On February 21, 2002, he received a letter from the senior
managing head of PAGCOR’s HR department, advising that he was being
administratively charged with gross misconduct, rumor-mongering, conduct
prejudicial to the interest of the company, and loss of trust and confidence; that
 he should submit a written explanation of the charges; and that he was at the
same time being placed under preventive suspension.
 On March 14, 2002: Vivo received the summons for him to attend an
administrative inquiry, instructing him to appear before PAGCOR’s Corporate
Investigation Unit (CIU) on March 15, 2002. At petitioner’s request however, the
inquiry was conducted at his residence on said date. He was furnished the
memorandum of charges that recited the accusations against him and indicated
the acts and omissions constituting his alleged offenses.
 However, when his counsel requested to be furnished copies of the statements,
PAGCOR rejected on the ground that he had already been afforded sufficient
opportunity to confront, hear and answer the charges against him during the
administrative inquiry.
 The CIU tendered its investigation report to PAGCOR’s Adjudication Committee.
The latter summoned the petitioner to appear before it in order to address
questions
 regarding his case. His counsel moved for the rescheduling of the meeting
because he would not be available on said date, but the Adjudication Committee
denied the request upon the reason that the presence of counsel was not
necessary in the proceedings.
 The petitioner received the letter informing him of the resolution of the PAGCOR
Board of Directors in its May 14, 2002 meeting to the effect that he was being
dismissed from the service.
ISSUE:
 Whether PAGCOR violated Vivo’s right to due process
RULING
 NO. The petitioner could not dispute the observance of his right to due process
by PAGCOR as set forth herein. He made no credible showing of the supposed
violation of his right to due process. He was heard through the written statement
he submitted in response to the memorandum of the charges against him. He
actively participated in the administrative inquiry conducted by the CIU at his own
residence. He was afforded the opportunity to clarify his position in the
proceedings before the Adjudication Committee. He was also able to appeal the
adverse decision to dismiss him from the service to the CSC. There is also no
question that PAGCOR complied with the twin-notice requirement prior to the
termination of his employment, the first notice being made through Ela’s letter
dated February 21, 2002 informing him on his being administratively charged for
the offenses mentioned, and the second being through the letter dated May 15,
2002 advising him that PAGCOR’s Board of Directors had resolved to dismiss
him from the service. It is settled that there is no denial of procedural due
process where the opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or
through pleadings is accorded.

Budiongan v. De la Cruz
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. • G.R. NO. 170288
September 22, 2006
Facts:
 Private respondents Arlene P. Palgan and Valeriano U. Nadala filed a Complaint
against the petitioners, Pedro E. Budiongan, Jr. (Municipal Mayor) and other local
officials of Carmen, Bohol before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman Visayas
 for the alleged illegality in the conduct of the bidding, award and notice to
commence work since there was no fund appropriated for the purpose.
 By virtue of a Municipal ordinance the amount of P450,000.00 was appropriated
for the purchase of a road roller for the municipality. However, the same was
realigned and used for the asphalt laying of a portion of the Tan Modesto
Bernaldez Street.
 Bidding was conducted and the project was awarded in favor of Herbert Malmis
General Merchandise and Contractor, Inc. (Malmis) who emerged as the lowest
complying bidder. With such authority, Malmis commenced with the project.
 1ISAGANI A. CRUZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2007 Edition).
 2 ANTONIO E.B. NACHURA, OUTLINE REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW (2016).
 Initially, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas found probable cause
and recommended the filing of an information for violation of Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code against the petitioners. However, the complaint against
Hermosila Logrono, Desiderio Gudia, Jr. and Herbert Malmis was dismissed for
lack of merit.
 Upon review of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, the charge was modified and
two informations for (1) violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and (2)
violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 301 were filed before the Sandiganbayan.
 Petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for Leave of Court to File
Motion for Reinvestigation arguing that the above Informations were filed without
affording them the opportunity to file counter-affidavits to answer/rebut the
modified charges.
 Said motion was denied with respect to the second information considering that
Budiongan had already been arraigned and the case was already set for pre-trial.
For the first information, the Sandiganbayan granted leave to the petitioner to file
a motion for reconsideration before the Office of the Special Prosecutor, not a
motion for reinvestigation.
 Hence, the present petition for certiorari.
Issue:
 Whether the modification of the charge from violation of Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code to violation of Sections 3(e) and 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019
denied petitioners’ rights to due process since they were not given the
opportunity to answer and present evidence on the new charge in a preliminary
investigation.
Ruling:
 No. The Supreme Court ruled that the right to a preliminary investigation is not a
constitutional right but is merely a statutory right. Its absence is not an
impairment to the validity of an information, neither does is affect the jurisdiction
of the court over the case, nor does it constitute as a ground for the quashing of
the information. In effect, the denial of a motion for reinvestigation cannot
likewise invalidate the Information or oust the court of its Jurisdiction over the
case.
 “Petitioners were not deprived of due process because they were afforded the
opportunity to refute the charges by filing their counter-affidavits. The
modification of the offense charged did not come as a surprise to the petitioners
because it was based on the same set of facts and the same alleged illegal acts.
Moreover, petitioners failed to aver newly discovered evidence nor impute
commission of grave errors or serious irregularities prejudicial to their interest to
warrant a reconsideration or reinvestigation of the case as required under
Section 8, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Thus, the modification of the offense charged, even without affording the
 petitioners a new preliminary investigation, did not amount to a violation of their
rights.”
 “Furthermore, the right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the
accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at Arraignment.
 “The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that
the person accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial. A finding of probable
 cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime
has been committed and was committed by the suspect. Probable cause need
not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt.”
 Hence, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Roxas v. Vasquez
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. • G.R. No. 114944
June 19, 2001
Facts:
 Petitioners Manuel C. Roxas and Ahmed S. Nacpil were Chairman and Member,
respectively, of the Bids and Awards Committee of the PC-INP.
 The PC-INP conducted a public bidding for the purchase of sixty-five (65) fire
trucks. Tahei Co., Ltd. was declared as the lowest bidder and was awarded the
contract.
 The Commission on Audit discovered the irregularities in the bidding, awarding
and purchase of the fire trucks, thus prompting then DILG Secretary Rafael
Alunan III to file a Complaint on for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No.
3019 before the Ombudsman, against several PNP officials including the
petitioners.
 The Deputy Ombudsman for the Military conducted a preliminary investigation
where respondents submitted their respective counter-affidavits. It recommended
the indictment of the petitioners.
 On review, the Office of the Special Prosecutor Review Committee
recommended the dismissal of the complaints against Manuel Roxas, Ahmed
Nacpil, and others.
 The information was filed before the Sandiganbayan but upon motion of other
respondents, Generals Flores and Tanchanco, a reinvestigation was conducted,
recommending the indictment of the petitioners. An Amended Information was
filed impleading the petitioners, hence this petition for certiorari.
 One of the petitioners’ contentions was that the indictment of the petitioners from
the reinvestigation was without notice or participation, which is violative of their
right to due process.
Issue:
 Whether the indictment of the petitioners from the reinvestigation, without notice
nor participation of the petitioners, is violative of their right to due process.
Ruling:
 No. In Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Supreme Court held as follows:
 “xxx. And even without such notice, we agree with the observations of the
Sandiganbayan that "under the Rules of Procedures of the Office of the
 Ombudsman [Administrative Order No. 07], particularly Sec. 7, in relation to Sec.
4, while complainants in preliminary investigation before
 the Ombudsman actively participated therein,their participation is no longer
accorded to them as a matter of right in the stage of the reinvestigation." In
administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense. (underscoring ours)”
 “The rule is well established that due process is satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy
or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.”
 Here, the petitioners were able to file their respective Counter-Affidavits during
the preliminary investigation. They were likewise able to file Motions for
Reconsideration of the Order of the Ombudsman impleading them.
 Hence, the petition was dismissed.

Marohombsar v. Judge Adiong

CORONA, J. • A.M. No. RTJ-02-1674
January 22, 2004
Facts:
 Judge Santos B. Adiong was the presiding judge, in a civil case for injunction with
prayer for preliminary Injunction entitled Ms. Yasmira N. Pangadapun vs. Ms.
Bailinang P. Marohombsar
 Pangadpuan was questioning the appointment of Marohombsar as as provincial
social welfare officer V of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (DSWD-ARMM) which Pangadpuan
previously held as an officer-in-charge
 Judge Adiong issued a TRO upon the filing of the complaint. Later on, Judge
Adiong issued an order stating that a preliminary conference had been held and
that both parties had waived the raffle of the case.
 During the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction on April 5, 1999, none of the lawyers appeared. Hence, respondent
judge considered it submitted for resolution and issued the preliminary injunction
the following day. Hence, the present complaint against Judge Adiong.
 Marohombsar asserted that she was denied due process when the TRO and
preliminary injunction were issued without hearing.
Issue:
 Whether the issuance of the TRO and preliminary injunction without hearing was
violative of Marohombsar’s right to due process.
Ruling:
 No. “A TRO is generally granted without notice to the opposite party and is
intended only as a restraint on him until the propriety of granting a temporary
injunction can be determined. It goes no further than to preserve the status quo
until that determination.”
 The provisions of Rule 58, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
justified the issuance of the TRO Ex-Parte due to Judge Adiong’s assessment of
the urgency of the relief sought.
 “In applications for preliminary Injunction, the dual requirement of prior notice and
hearing before injunction may issue has been relaxed to the point that not all
 petitions for preliminary injunction need undergo a trial-type hearing, it being
doctrinal that a formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances,
essential to due process. The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present any evidence he may have in
support of his defense. In the present case, complainant was able to move for a
reconsideration of the order in question, hence her right to due process was not
in anyway transgressed. We have ruled that a party cannot claim that he has
been denied due process when he has availed of the opportunity to present his
position.”
 “Even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent judge erred in ordering
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, we ruled in Equatorial Realty vs.
Anunciacion, Jr. that, as a matter of public policy, the acts of a judge in his official
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are
erroneous, provided he acts in good faith and without malice. Respondent judge,
or any other member of the bench for that matter, is presumed to have acted
regularly and in the manner that preserves the ideal of the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge implicit in the guarantee of due process.”

Inacay v. People
REYES, J. • G.R. No. 223506
November 28, 2016
Facts:
 Garry V. Inacay (Inacay) was a former sales agent of Mega Star Commercial
(MSC) who was charged with estafa for allegedly not remitting a certain payment
he collected. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted him and the conviction
was upheld by the Court of Appeals (CA).
 During the proceedings, Inacay was represented by a certain Eulogia B. Manila
(Manila), who represented herself as a lawyer. However, Inacay discovered that
she was not a member of the bar. He obtained a certification from the Office of
the Bar Confidant (OBC) showing that Manila is indeed not a member of the
Philippine Bar.
 In this petition for review on certiorari, Inacay contended that he was denied due
process since he was not represented by a lawyer.
Issue:
 Whether Inacay was denied due process considering that he was represented
by a sham lawyer during the proceedings of his case.
Ruling:
 Yes. “In criminal cases, the right of the accused to be assisted by counsel is
immutable. Otherwise, there will be a grave denial of due process. The right to
counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically
means that a person must be heard before being condemned. ‘Thus, even if the
judgment had become final
 and executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity
to be heard by himself and counsel.’”
 “‘The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in
the case of an on-going litigation, it is a right that must be exercised at every
step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client company.’ Unless the
accused is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense
presented in his behalf will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and
 skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due
process.”
 Here, all throughout the proceedings of the case, prior and after his conviction,
Inacay was being represented by Manila who was proven to be not a member of
the bar. Likewise, Inacay had no idea of such fact, hence, it can be considered
that he was not assisted by a counsel in the proceedings before the lower
courts, and was denied due process.
 The petition was granted, and the case was remanded to the RTC for a new trial.

SHARON FLORES-CONCEPCION, COMPLAINANT, V. JUDGE LIBERTY O.

CASTANEDA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 67, PANIQUI, TARLAC,
RESPONDENT
LEONEN, J • A.M. No. RTJ-15-2438
September 2, 2020
Facts:
 An Administrative Complaint was filed against Judge Liberty O. Castañeda
(Judge Castañeda), then the judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paniqui, Tarlac,
Branch 67 by Sharon Flores-Concepcion (Concepcion), whose marriage Judge
Castañeda had nullified without Concepcion even knowing about it.
 During the pendency of the case, Judge Castañeda was dismissed from service
in another case. Because of this, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
recommended that Concepcion's Complaint be dismissed. However, this Court
later resolved to return the same to the OCA for the reevaluation of the case on
its merits.
 In its memorandum, OCA recommended for Judge Castañeda to be dismissed
with forfeiture of her retirement benefits except leave credits, and disbarred.
However, while the Memorandum was pending, Judge Castañeda died.
Issue:
 Whether the death of Judge Castañeda warrants the dismissal of the
Administrative Complaint filed against her for being moot.
Ruling:
 Yes. “[W]hen the respondent in a pending administrativecase dies, the case must
be rendered moot. Proceeding any further would be to violate the respondent's
fundamentalright to due process. Should it be a guilty verdict, any monetary
penalty imposed on the dead respondent's estate only works to the detriment of
their heirs. To continue with such cases would not punish the perpetrator, but
only subject the grieving family to further suffering by passing on the punishment
to them.”
 “In administrative cases, however, the essence of procedural due process is
merely one's right to be given the opportunity to be heard.” In Casimiro v.
Tandog, the Court held:
 The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basis requirement of
notice and a real opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, such as
in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to
explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in
court; one may be heard also thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process.
  The sufficiency of pleadings in lieu of actual hearings does not imply that
administrative proceedings require a "lesser" standard of procedural due
process.
 “The opportunity to be heard is an intrinsic part of the constitutional right to due
process. Thus, in criminal cases, cases against the accused are immediately
dismissed upon death since the accused can no longer participate in all
aspectsof the proceedings.”
 “Administrative proceedings require that the respondent be informed of the
charges and be given an opportunity to refute them. Even after judgment is
rendered, due process requires that the respondent not only be informed of the
judgment but also be given the opportunity to seek reconsideration of that
judgment. This is the true definition of the opportunity to be heard.”
 “When [a] Public Officer or employee dies, there is no one left for the State to
dismiss from service.” According to the Supreme Court, “a respondent's death
during the pendency of an administrative proceeding was cause to dismiss the
case, due to the futility of the imposition of any penalty.”
 Hence, the complaint was dismissed.

Philcomsat vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218 (1989)

REGALADO, J. • G.R. No. 84818
December 18, 1989
Facts:
 Under RA 5514, Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT) was granted "a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and
operate in the Philippines, stations and associated equipment and facilities for
international
 3 CRUZ, supra note 1, at 114.
 satellite communications. It was likewise granted the authority to "construct and
operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services
from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals."
 Petitioner PHILCOMSAT filed with respondent NTC an application for authority to
continue operating and maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously
operating and maintaining since 1967, to continue providing the international
satellite communications services it has likewise been providing since 1967, and
to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services. Pending
hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to
operate and maintain the above-mentioned facilities, provide the services and
charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for.
 Petitioner was granted a provisional authority to continue operating its existing
facilities, to render the services it was then offering, and to charge the rates it
was then charging. This authority was valid for six (6) months.
 The assailed NTC order issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis A. Alcuaz
(Alcuaz) had further extended the provisional authority of the petitioner for
another six (6) months, however, it directed PHILCOMSAT to charge modified
educed rates through a reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on the present
authorized rates.
 PHILCOMSAT filed a petition seeking to annul and set aside the said order,
contending among others that the questioned order violates procedural due
process for having been issued without prior notice and hearing.
Issue:
  Whether the NTC order violated procedural due process because it was issued
motu proprio, without notice to petitioner and without the benefit of a hearing.
Ruling:
 Yes. The Supreme Court held that rate-fixing power of administrative bodies is
quasi judicial rather that quasi-legislative, hence a notice of hearing is imperative
and the absence of such is violative of due process.
 In The Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al., the Court held that:
 Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative
proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances
involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of
administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and
hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the
administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or
legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or
quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than
general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected
by the action is entitled to notice and hearing.
 Here, it can be said that the order in questioned contains all attributes of a quasi-
judicial adjudication considering that the order pertained only to PHILCOMSAT.
Likewise, “an immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect its
operations and the quality of its service to the public considering the
maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial
 outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to
cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC
based its questioned order.”
 “It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to
make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be
temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a
complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in
the present case.”
 Therefore, the writ prayed for was granted and the order of respondents was set
aside.

Suntay vs. People, 101 Phil. 833 (1957)

PADILLA, J. • G. R. No. L-9430
June 29, 1957
Facts:
 Emilio Suntay (Suntay) was criminally charged of seduction for allegedly having
carnal knowledge of one minor namely Alicia Nubia (Alicia.
 He obtained a passport and left the Philippines for San Francisco.
 On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed a Motion praying the Court to
issue an order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned,
particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign
Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so
that he may be dealt with in accordance with law." The same was granted by the
Court of First Instance (CFI).
 Hence, this petition for a writ of certiorari to annul the order of the CFI.
 Suntay contended that the order may be carried out only "through the
cancellation of his passport," and the said order is illegal because the court
cannot take the discretionary power away from the Secretary and itself order a
 passport to be cancelled." The petitioner further contends that while the
Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion in the cancellation of passports, "such
discretion cannot be exercised until after hearing," because the right to travel or
stay abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning and protection of the
Constitution and hence he cannot be deprived of such liberty without due
process of law.
Issue:
 Whether Suntay should be granted a "quasi-judicial hearing" by the respondent
Secretary of Foreign Affairs before withdrawing or cancelling the passport issued
to him.
Ruling:
 No. “Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason (or the
withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where
the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts and left the
country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the
exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to
have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such
passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When
discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such
as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing
may be dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his
passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of
the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be
deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of such hearing. If
hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of law
clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte
would be violative of the said clause.”
 Hence, the petition was denied.

De Bisshop vs. Galang, 8 SCRA 244 (1963)

REYES, J.B.L., J. • G.R. No. L-18365
May 31, 1963
Facts:
 Petitioner-appellee George de Bisschop, an American citizen, as a prearranged
employee of the Bissmag Production, Inc., of which he is president and general
manager. was allowed to stay in this country for three years, expiring 1 August
1959.
 He applied for an extension, however, herein respondent-appellant Bureau of
Immigration received confidential reports that the business was engaged in
gambling instead of being a legitimate business it purported to be.
 His application for extension of stay as a prearranged employee has been denied
by the Board of Commissioners. Thereafter, his requested for a copy of the
adverse decision of said Board, but the legal officer of the Bureau of Immigration
replied that pursuant to immigration practice and procedure and in such cases
where the result is a vote for denial, for reasons of practicability, no formal
decision, order or resolution is promulgated by the Board. And that the denial of
the petition for extension was expressed by the majority members of the Board.
 Pending resolution of the main case filed by the petitioner-appellee, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued ex-parte by the court a quo ordering the
 respondent-appellant to desist from arresting and detaining petitioner-appellee.
Hence, this present appeal by the respondent-appellant.
 Respondent-appellant contended that that the lower court erred (a) in holding
that the Commissioners of Immigration are required by law to conduct formal
hearing on all applications for extension of stay of aliens; and (b) in ruling that
said Commissioners are enjoined to promulgate written decisions in such cases.
Issue:
 Whether a formal hearing is required on all applications for extension of stay of
aliens.
Ruling:
 No. The Supreme Court held that formal hearings are not required. The
administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive responsibility of
the Executive branch. Extension of stay of aliens is purely discretionary on the
part of immigration authorities. Since Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise
known as the Philippines Immigration Act of 1940, is silent as to the procedure to
be followed in these cases. Hence, the Court have no jurisdiction to review the
purely administrative practice of immigration authorities of not granting formal
hearings in certain cases as the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of
practicability and expediency. This does not violate due process as the advice to
leave the country within 5 days is mere formality, a preliminary step, and, is not
final.
 “It is already a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a day in court is not a matter of
right in administrative proceedings.
 ‘The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an administrative
proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading
American writer on Constitutional Law, has well said, due process of law is not
necessarily judicial process; much of the process by means of which the
Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely
executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law as is judicial
process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in
administrative proceedings, it is otherwise since they rest upon different
principles. * * * in certain proceedings, therefore, of an administrative character, it
may be stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing
are not essential to due process of law.’ (Cornejo vs. Gabriel and Provincial
Board of Rizal, 41 Phil. 188, 193-194)”
 Hence, the order appealed from is reversed. The petition for prohibition is
dismissed, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the court a quo is
dissolved, with costs against petitioner-appellee George de Bisschop.
Var Orient Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Achacoso, 161 SCRA 232 (1988) GRIÑO-AQUINO. J. •
G.R. No. 81805
May 31, 1988
Facts:
 The petitioners filed a complaint with the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication
Office, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against the
private respondents for having allegedly violated their Contracts of Employment
with the petitioners.
 After joinder of the issues, the case was heard on March 4, 1987 where the
parties agreed to submit their respective position papers and thereafter the case
would be submitted for decision. Only the private respondents submitted a
position paper.
  On the basis of the Pleadings and memoranda the public respondent rendered a
decision on September 9, 1987. The Decision was sent via registered mail to
 petitioner’s counsel and was received by the receptionist of the building where
his office was.
 The decision became final and a writ of execution was issued. Petitioners
contended that they only became aware of the decision upon receipt of the writ
through their new counsel. Likewise, their previous counsel denied having
received a copy of said decision.
 Hence, the present petition. Petitioners contended that the decision had not been
received by the petitioners, hence, it was not yet final and executory and that (1)
they were denied due process of law because the respondent administrator
resolved the case without any formal hearing.
Issue:
 Whether petitioners were denied due process of law because the POEA resolved
the case without any formal hearing.
Ruling:
 No. “The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard (Bermejo
vs. Barrios, 31 SCRA 764), or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side (Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, 110 SCRA 438; Gas
Corporation of the Phil. vs. Hon. Inciong, 93 SCRA 653; Cebu Institute of
Technology vs. Minister of Labor, 113 SCRA 257), or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of (Dormitorio vs. Fernandez,
72 SCRA 388).”
 During the hearing of the case, the parties agreed to file their respective
memoranda and thereafter, the case would be submitted for decision. Such
procedure is allowed for the purpose of expediency in resolving labor disputes.
 “Furthermore, the petition for review does not allege that the petitioners are in
possession of evidence, other than those which they had attached to their
pleadings, which if produced would have altered the outcome of the case.”
 Hence, the petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

Saunar v. Exe. Sec. Ermita, et.al

MARTIRES, J • G.R. No. 186502
December 13, 2017
Facts:
 Petitioner Carlos R. Saunar (Saunar), while he was regional director for Western
Mindanao based in Zamboanga City, received a subpoena ad testificandum from
the Sandiganbayan requiring him to testify in the plunder case against President
Estrada. He appeared before the Sandiganbayan on several hearing dates, the
last being on 27 October 2004.
 On 29 October 2004, then NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco (Wycoco) issued
relieved Saunar from his duties and was ordered to report to the DDROS for
further instructions.
 Pursuant thereto, he reported to his immediate supervisor Filomeno Bautista
(Bautista) on the first week of November 2004. Saunar was told to be available at
any time whenever he would be needed.
 On 6 October 2006, Saunar received an order from the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) requiring him to answer the allegations against him for his
 failure to report for work since 24 March 2005, without approved leave of
absence for four (4) months.
 On 23 October 2006, Saunar was reassigned as regional director of the Bicol
Regional Office. On 29 January 2007, he received a copy of the OP decision
finding him guilty of gross neglect of duty and of violating Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 and dismissing him from service.
 He elevated the case to the Court of Appeals and the CA affirmed the OP
decision in toto. Hence, this present appeal.
 Saunar contended that his constitutional right to due process was violated
considering that no real hearing was ever conducted and that the clarificatory
conference conducted by the PAGC was a sham. Likewise he was not notified of
the charges against him because he was only made aware of the allegations
after the PAGC had formally charged him
Issue:
 Whether Saunar was denied due process for not being given the opportunity to
appear during the hearings of his case and not being notified of the said
hearings.
Ruling:
 Yes. The Court ruled that Saunar was treated unfairly during the PAGC
proceedings and that he was denied due process considering that he was not
given the opportunity to appear during the clarificatory hearings to propound
questions against opposing parties due to the fact that he was not notified of
such hearings. According to the Supreme Court, the absence of a formal hearing
does not necessarily constitute denial of due process as long as the party
involves waives the same.
 “[D]ue process is a malleable concept anchored on fairness and equity. The due
process requirement before administrative bodies are not as strict compared to
judicial tribunals in that it suffices that a party is given a reasonable opportunity
to be heard. Nevertheless, such "reasonable opportunity" should not be
confined to the mere submission of position papers and/or affidavits and the
parties must be given the opportunity to examine the witnesses against them.
The right to a hearing is a right which may be invoked by the parties to thresh
out substantial factual issues. It becomes even more imperative when the rules
itself of the administrative body provides for one. While the absence of a formal
hearing does not necessarily result in the deprivation of due process, it should
be acceptable only when the party does not invoke the said right or waives the
same.”
 In Arboleda v. National Labor Relations Commission the Court expounded that
administrative due process does not necessarily connote full adversarial
proceedings, to wit:
 The requirement of notice and hearing in termination cases does not connote full
adversarial proceedings as elucidated in numerous cases decided by this Court.
Actual adversarial proceedings become
 necessary only for clarification or when there is a need to propound searching
questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. This is a procedural right
which the employee must ask for since it is not an inherent right, and summary
proceedings may be conducted thereon. (emphasis supplied)
 The petition was granted and the court ruled that petitioner Carlos R. Saunar
was entitled to full back wages from the time of his illegal dismissal until his
retirement and to receive his retirement benefits.
Central Bank Employees Assoc. v. BSP, G.R. No. 148208, Dec. 15, 2004
Facts:
 Petitioner: Central Bank Employees Association, Inc.
 Respondent/s: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and the Executive Secretary
The petitioner filed a petition for prohibition seeking to prevent the respondents
from enforcing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653.
 The petitioner argued that the proviso, which exempts BSP officers (SG 20 and
above) from the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) while requiring rank-and-file
employees (SG 19 and below) to comply with it, is unconstitutional.
 According to the petitioner, this classification is arbitrary, capricious, and violates
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
 The petitioner claimed that the provision is discriminatory, pointing out that
subsequent amendments to the charters of other Government Financial
Institutions (GFIs) like GSIS, LBP, DBP, and SSS exempted all their employees
from the SSL, thereby disadvantaging BSP's rank-and-file workers.
 Initially, the lower court upheld the validity of the proviso, prompting the appeal to
the Supreme Court.
Issue/s:
 Does the classification of BSP employees into those exempts from the SSL and
those subject to it violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution? 2. Does
the ongoing enforcement of the proviso, considering the subsequent
amendments to the charters of other GFIs, amount to unjust discrimination
against BSP's rank-and-file employees?
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled that the classification of BSP employees into those
exempt from the SSL (SG 20 and above) and those subject to the SSL (SG 19
and below) is valid under the Rational Basis Test.
 However, the Court held that the continued application of the proviso, given the
subsequent amendments to the charters of other GFIs exempting all their
employees from the SSL, constitutes invidious discrimination against BSP rank
and-file employees. Therefore, the proviso was declared unconstitutional.
 rational basis test 2is a judicial review test used by courts to determine the
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance.It is also referred to as “ rational
review .” Under this test, the statute or ordinance must have a legitimate state
interest, and there must be a rational connection between the statute ’s/
ordinance ’s means and goals.

PNB v. Palma, G.R. 157279, August 9, 2005

Facts:
 Petitioner: Philippine National Bank (PNB)
 Respondent/s: a group of employees of the Philippine National Bank (PNB) The
petitioner filed a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, challenging the decisions of the Court of Appeals regarding the entitlement
of the respondents (employees) to certain benefits under Republic Act No. 6758,
employees who claimed they were unjustly denied certain benefits that were
granted to employees hired before July 1, 1989, under Republic Act No. 6758.
The law states that additional compensation is only for those who were
incumbents (current holders of a position) as of that date. The respondents
 argued that this was unfair discrimination and violated their right to equal
protection under the law.
Issues:
 Whether the respondents are entitled to the differential in employee benefits that
accrued from July 1, 1989, to January 1, 1997.
 Whether the Philippine National Bank (PNB) is estopped from denying the claims
of the respondents after extending similar benefits effective January 1, 1997. 3.
Whether the non-integration of additional compensation into the standardized
salary rates, which is exclusive to incumbents as of July 1, 1989, violates the
equal protection clause.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court approved the petition, determining that the respondents
were not eligible for the benefits they claimed. The Court highlighted that,
according to Section 12 of RA 6758, only individuals who were incumbents as of
July 1, 1989, qualified for the additional compensation. It also concluded that the
Court of Appeals had incorrectly applied the law and that the doctrine of stare
decisis necessitated following prior rulings that clarified the law's interpretation.
The Court additionally determined that the constitutional issue concerning equal
protection was not appropriately presented, and that PNB was not barred from
disputing the respondents' claims.
 stare decisis 3- a Latin term that means “let the decision stand” or “to stand by
things decided”.

Unido vs. COMELEC, G.R. 56515, 104 SCRA 17 (1981)

Facts:
 Petitioner: United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO)
 Respondent: Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
 The UNIDO requested equal media coverage for their campaign against
proposed constitutional amendments, seeking the same prime time slots and
number of stations as President Marcos.
 The COMELEC denied this request, stating that the President's media
engagement was in his capacity as President, not as a political party leader.
Issues:
 Did COMELEC breach the principles of equality, good faith, and fair play by
rejecting UNIDO's request for equal media coverage during the plebiscite
campaign? Was COMELEC's decision to deny UNIDO's media coverage
request warranted considering the President's role and prerogatives?
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court dismissed the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO)'s
appeal, upholding the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)'s decision. The
Court ruled that the President's media appearances were constitutional and
conducted in his capacity as President, not as a political party leader. It
emphasized that the President has a unique role in informing the public about
government initiatives, and that the opposition cannot demand equal media
coverage simply because the President received it. The ruling highlighted the
importance of fair electoral processes but acknowledged the limitations of media
access for opposition groups.
PJA vs. Prado, G.R. 105371, 227 SCRA 703 (1993)
Facts:
 Petitioner: Philippine Judges Association, represented by its president Bernardo
P. Abesamis, along with other judges from various courts, including the National
Confederation of Judges Association of the Philippines
 Respondent: Hon. Pete Prado, Secretary of the Department of Transportation
and Communications, Jorge V. Sarmiento, Postmaster General, and the
Philippine Postal Corporation
 The case involves the challenge to Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354, which
removed the franking privilege from the Judiciary, including the Supreme Court
and lower courts. Petitioners, representing various judges, argued that this
withdrawal undermined the independence of the Judiciary and violated the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. They contended that the law discriminated
against the Judiciary while
 retaining the franking privilege for other government officials and entities. The
petitioners also raised concerns about the legislative process in enacting the law.
Issues:
 Does Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 breach the constitutional mandate that each
bill passed by Congress must focus on a single subject as stated in its title? Was
the passage of R.A. No. 7354 in accordance with the constitutional stipulation for
three readings on different days and the distribution of printed copies in its final
version? Does the removal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary infringe
upon the equal protection clause of the Constitution?
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled that Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354, which
withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary, is unconstitutional. The Court
found that this withdrawal violated the equal protection clause because it treated
the Judiciary differently from other government entities that retained the privilege.
As a result, the Court restored the franking privilege to the Judiciary and related
offices.

Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 118533 248 SCRA 700 (1995)

Facts:
 Petitioner: Mayor Pablo R. Olivarez.
 Respondents: Hon. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), the Hon. Ombudsman,
Special Prosecutor Aniano Desierto, and Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose de G.
Ferrer. Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI) accused Mayor Pablo R.
Olivarez of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for refusing to issue
a mayor's permit for a night fair, despite an approved resolution allowing it.
 Olivarez claimed BCCI did not apply for the necessary permits and justified his
refusal by stating it was to avoid liability under the law.
 A preliminary investigation recommended prosecution against Olivarez, initially
for a different section of the law, but later modified to Section 3(e).
 The Ombudsman reviewed the case multiple times, reversing earlier
recommendations to dismiss it, citing sufficient evidence of probable cause.
 Olivarez filed several motions for reconsideration and reinvestigation, which were
granted at times, but ultimately led to the Sandiganbayan finding probable cause
against him.
  The case involved disputes over whether BCCI had properly applied for the
permit and whether Olivarez's actions constituted bad faith or partiality.
Issues:
 Did the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan misuse their authority in deciding to
prosecute Mayor Olivarez?
 Was it valid for the Ombudsman to approve the charges against Olivarez without
a new preliminary investigation?
 Did the shift in the case's focus from "evident bad faith" to "manifest partiality"
show that the Ombudsman abused their discretion?
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court dismissed the petition due to lack of merit, upholding the
resolutions of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan. The Court determined
that the respondents did not commit grave abuse of discretion in their actions.

Tiu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127410, January 20, 1999

Facts:
 Petitioners: Conrado L. Tiu, Juan T. Montelibano Jr., and Isagani M. Jungco
OnMarch 13, 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7227, creating the Subic
Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and granting tax and duty-free incentives. On
June 10, 1993, President Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97, outlining these
incentives. EO 97-A, issued on June 19, 1993, limited the tax-free area to the
"secured area" of the former Subic Naval Base, excluding businesses and
residents outside it. The petitioners challenged EO 97-A for violating the equal
protection clause, arguing it discriminated against those outside the secured
area.
 The Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of EO 97-A, leading the
petitioners to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Issues:
 The main issue is whether EO 97-A violates the equal protection clause by
limiting tax and duty incentives to the secured area of the SSEZ and excluding
those outside it.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court upheld EO 97-A’s constitutionality, affirming the Court of
Appeals' decision. It ruled that the order does not violate the equal protection
clause, as the distinctions between the secured area and outside areas are valid
and reasonable. These distinctions are based on factors like investment impact,
management ease, and preventing fraud, aligning with RA 7227’s goals. The
Court also noted that EO 97-A treats all within the secured area equally.

Coconut Oil Refiners v. Torres, G.R. 132527, July 29, 2005

Facts:
 Petitioner/s: Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc., Philippine Association of
Meat Processors, Inc. (PAMPI), Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) and Bukluran
ng Manggagawang Pilipino (BMP)
 Respondents: Hon. Ruben Torres, the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority(BCDA), the Clark Development Corporation (CDC), the Subic Bay
 Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), and various private entities operating tax and
duty-free shops, including 88 Mart Duty Free, Freeport Traders, PX Club, and
others. The petitioners argue that certain executive orders and a BCDA Board
Resolution are unconstitutional, claiming they represent executive overreach and
violate Republic Act No. 7227, which established these economic zones to
promote development and attract investments. The petitioners contend that the
challenged issuances allow for tax-free importation of consumer goods, which
they argue is contrary to the law that limits such privileges to raw materials,
capital, and equipment. They also assert that these issuances violate the equal
protection clause and create unfair competition against businesses outside the
zones. The specific executive orders and resolutions being challenged include
Executive Order No. 80, Executive Order No. 97-A, and BCDA Board Resolution
No. 93-05-034. The petitioners claim that the continued implementation of these
issuances will cause them grave and irreparable injury. The respondents, on the
other hand, raise procedural defenses, including lack of legal standing and
unreasonable delay in filing the petition.
Issues:
 Do the challenged issuances amount to executive lawmaking, thereby breaching
the principle of separation of powers?
 Are the provisions of the challenged issuances unconstitutional due to a violation
of the equal protection clause?
 Do the challenged issuances infringe upon the prohibition against unfair
competition and practices that restrain trade?
 Do the challenged issuances violate the policy favoring the use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials, and locally produced goods?
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court partially granted the petition, declaring Section 5 of
Executive Order No. 80 and Section 4 of BCDA Board Resolution No. 93-05-034
as null and void.
 Nevertheless, it affirmed the validity of Executive Order No. 97-A, with the
exception of the second sentences in paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3, which were also
ruled invalid.

ISAE v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000

Facts:
 Petitioner: International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE).
 Respondents: Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Hon. Crescenciano B., Dr. Brian.
The case involves the International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE)
contesting the salary disparity between foreign-hires and local-hires at the
International School, Inc. Local-hires, primarily Filipinos, claimed discrimination
as they received lower salaries housing and transportation.
 The school justified this disparity based on the "dislocation factor" and the limited
tenure of foreign-hires.
 The ISAE argued that this classification was discriminatory and that both groups
performed equal work. A deadlock in collective bargaining negotiations led to a
notice of strike, prompting intervention from the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE). TheSchool maintained that the classification was valid due
to the different employment statuses of foreign and local hires.
Issues:
  Is the difference in salaries between foreign-hires and local-hires at the
International School discriminatory towards Filipino teachers?
 Is the classification based on where a teacher is hired a valid reason for the
salary difference between foreign-hires and local-hires?
 Should foreign-hires be part of the same bargaining group as local-hires for
collective bargaining?
Ruling:
 The Court ruled that the salary disparity between foreign-hires and local-hires at
the International School, Inc. was unjustified. It emphasized the principle of
"equal pay for equal work," stating that both groups performed similar functions
and should receive equal salaries. The justifications provided by the school, such
as the "dislocation factor" and limited tenure of foreign-hires, were deemed
insufficient. The Court reversed previous orders that upheld the salary
differences, reinforcing the need for equitable treatment of all employees.
However, it acknowledged that foreign-hires do not belong to the same
bargaining unit as local-hires due to differences in tenure and benefits. Therefore,
while foreign-hires may still receive certain benefits not granted to local hires,
their salaries should align with those of local-hires performing similar work.

PHILRECA vs. DILG, G.R. No. 143076, June 10, 2003

Facts:
 Petitioner: Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA),
Agusan del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ANECO), Iloilo I Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (ILECO I), and Isabela I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ISELCO I).
 Respondents: Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government and
the Secretary of the Department of Finance
 The case involves several electric cooperatives (petitioners) challenging the
constitutionality of certain provisions in the Local Government Code (Sections
193 6and 2347) that withdraw tax exemptions previously granted to them under
an older law (P.D. No. 2698). The petitioners argue that this change violates their
rights under the equal protection clause and the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution. The Supreme
 Court ruled against the petitioners, stating: 1. Equal Protection Clause: The Court
found no violation because the Local Government Code allows for reasonable
classification. The distinctions between cooperatives under the old law and
those under the new law (R.A. No. 6938) are substantial and justifiable. 2. Non-
Impairment Clause: The Court concluded that the changes in tax exemptions do
not substantially impair the obligations of the loan agreements the cooperatives
entered into, as the agreements do not grant tax exemptions.
Issues:
 Do Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code violate the equal
protection clause by treating electric cooperatives under P.D. No. 269 unfairly?
Do these sections affect the contract obligations between the Philippine
Government and the United States Government as outlined in the loan
agreements?
Ruling:
 The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case upheld the constitutionality of
Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code, which withdrew tax
exemptions previously granted to electric cooperatives under P.D. No. 269. The
 Court found no violation of the equal protection clause, stating that there is a
reasonable classification between cooperatives under P.D. No. 269 and those
under R.A. No. 6938. It also ruled that the non-impairment clause was not
violated, as the Local Government Code did not substantially impair the
obligations of existing loan agreements. The Court emphasized that the remedy
for the petitioners lies in legislative action, not judicial intervention, and denied
the petition.

Beltran v. Secretary of Health, G.R. No. 133640, November 25, 2005

Facts:
 Petitioner: Rodolfo S. Beltran, under the name Our Lady of Fatima Blood Bank,
Fely G. Mosale, under the name Mother Seaton Blood Bank, People's Blood
Bank, Inc., Maria Victoria T. Vito, M.D., under the name Avenue Blood Bank,
Jesus M. Garcia, M.D., under the name Holy Redeemer Blood Bank, Albert L.
Lapitan, under the name Blue Cross Blood Transfusion Services, and Edgardo R.
Rodas, M.D., under the name Record Blood Bank, in their individual capacities
and on behalf of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks. Respondents:
Secretary of Health and the Department of Health (DOH).
 The petitioners, primarily blood bank operators, challenging the constitutionality
of Section 7 9of Republic Act No. 7719, known as the National Blood Services
Act of 1994, and its implementing rules.
 9 Section 7. Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks. — All commercial blood
banks shall be phased-out over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of
this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary.
 The Act mandates the phase-out of commercial blood banks over a specified
period to promote voluntary blood donation and ensure a safe blood supply. The
petitioners argue that the law discriminates against commercial blood banks,
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, and infringes on their rights
to operate their businesses.
 They claim that the law's provisions violate the equal protection clause and the
non -impairment clause of the Constitution.
Issues:
 Is Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 an improper delegation of legislative
power? Do Section 7 and its implementing rules breach the equal protection
clause? Do these provisions violate the non-impairment clause?
 Do they infringe on personal liberty and property rights?
 Is Republic Act No. 7719 a legitimate use of police power?
 Do these provisions genuinely promote public welfare?
Ruling:
 The ruling upheld the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719,
known as the National Blood Services Act of 1994, which mandates the phase-
out of commercial blood banks to promote voluntary blood donation and ensure a
safe blood supply. The
 Court found that the law does not violate the equal protection clause, does not
constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, and is a valid exercise of
police power aimed at protecting public health. The petitions challenging the law
were dismissed, and the temporary restraining order against its implementation
was lifted.
DAR v. CA, 249 SCRA 149 (1995)
Facts:
 The case involved a dispute over landholdings acquired by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified
beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
 The private respondents were landowners whose properties were acquired by
the DAR.
 The DAR issued Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, which allowed for
the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposits in cash or bonds for
compensation.
 The private respondents challenged the order, arguing they should be entitled to
withdraw the amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of cases
involving the final valuation of their properties.
 The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled in favor of the private respondents, declaring
DAR Administrative Order No. 9 null and void insofar as it provided for the
opening of trust accounts.
 The CA ordered the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to immediately deposit
the compensation amounts in cash and government financial instruments into
bank accounts designated by the DAR in the names of the private respondents.
 The CA held that withholding the right of landowners to appropriate the amounts
deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties, even if they
rejected the DAR's valuation, would be an oppressive exercise of eminent
domain
Issue:
 Whether the landowners were entitled to withdraw the compensation deposited in
trust accounts pending the final determination of just compensation.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the landowners.
 The Court held that the DAR's attempt to distinguish between the deposit of
compensation and the determination of just compensation was unacceptable.
 The Court stated that withholding the landowners' right to withdraw the deposited
amounts, despite their rejection of the DAR's valuation and their deprivation of
possession and use of their properties, was an oppressive exercise of eminent
domain.
 The Court ordered the LBP to immediately deposit the compensation amounts in
cash or government financial instruments in accessible bank accounts
designated by the DAR, allowing the landowners to withdraw the funds without
prejudice to the final determination of just compensation.

Meralco v. Pineda, 206 SCRA 196 (1992)

Facts:
 In 1974, Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) filed a complaint for eminent
domain against 42 defendants to construct a 230 kV transmission line.
 MERALCO offered to pay compensation, but the parties couldn't agree on the
amount.
 The respondent judge determined the amount of just compensation without
proper reception of evidence before the Board of Commissioners.
 The respondent judge based the amount of just compensation on "competent
evidence" without allowing the Board of Commissioners to hold hearings.
 MERALCO argued that this violated their right to due process because the judge
formulated an opinion on the land's value without allowing the Board of
Commissioners to hold hearings.

Issue:
  Whether the respondent court could dispense with the assistance of a Board of
Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding and determine just compensation
itself.

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent judge violated MERALCO's right to
due process by disregarding the Board of Commissioners.
 A trial before the commissioners is indispensable in expropriation cases to allow
parties to present evidence on just compensation.
 The appointment of commissioners is a mandatory requirement.
 While the court can disregard the commissioners' findings, it can only do so for
valid reasons, such as illegal principles applied, disregard of evidence, or grossly
inadequate/excessive amounts.
 A trial with the aid of commissioners is a substantial right that cannot be
capriciously disregarded.

NPC v. Henson, G.R. No. 129998, December 29, 1998

Facts:
 The National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a complaint for eminent domain to
acquire five parcels of land owned by the respondents for the expansion of the
NPC Mexico substation.
 The land was classified as agricultural but had been reclassified as residential.
 The trial court appointed commissioners to determine just compensation, but did
not conduct a hearing on their reports.
 The trial court fixed the fair market value of the land at P400.00 per square
meter, based on the selling price of lots in an adjacent fully developed
subdivision.
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Issue:
 What is the just compensation for the taking of the respondents' property?

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court modified the decisions of the lower courts, fixing the just
compensation at P375.00 per square meter.
 The Court found that the trial court's valuation was not supported by evidence
and was higher than any of the commissioners' recommendations.
 The Court agreed with Commissioner Atienza's recommendation of P375.00 per
square meter, as it was the closest valuation to the market value of lots in the
adjoining fully developed subdivision.
 The Court also excluded the communal irrigation canal from the area to be
expropriated, as it was excluded in the amended complaint.
 The Court affirmed the lower courts' decision to require the NPC to pay legal
interest on the compensation awarded, but ruled that the NPC is exempt from
paying costs of the proceedings

Napocor v. Sps. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 156093, February 2, 2007

Facts:
 National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) sought to expropriate an easement of
right-of-way over portions of land owned by respondents for the construction of a
transmission line project.
  NAPOCOR deposited the provisional value of the land and obtained a writ of
possession.
 The trial court appointed commissioners to determine just compensation, but
they did not conduct hearings or allow the parties to present evidence.
 The commissioners recommended a valuation of PHP 10,000.00 per square
meter, which the trial court approved.
 NAPOCOR appealed, arguing that it was denied due process because it was not
allowed to present evidence before the commissioners.
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Issue:
 Whether NAPOCOR was denied due process when it was not allowed to present
evidence on the reasonable value of the expropriated property before the Board
of Commissioners.

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of NAPOCOR, finding that it was denied due
process.
 The Court held that a trial before the commissioners is indispensable in
expropriation cases to allow parties to present evidence on just compensation.
 The Court emphasized that the appointment of commissioners is a mandatory
requirement, and while the court can disregard their findings, it can only do so for
valid reasons.
 The Court remanded the case to the trial court for a new hearing before the
Board of Commissioners, where NAPOCOR would be given the opportunity to
present evidence.
 The Court also noted that the trial court's valuation of PHP 10,000.00 per square
meter was not supported by sufficient evidence.
 The Court emphasized the importance of due process in expropriation
proceedings, particularly when public funds are involved.

Leca Realty v. Republic, G.R. No. 155605, Sep tember 27, 2006
Facts
 The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH), filed a complaint for eminent domain in 1996 to acquire
portions of properties belonging to Leca Realty Corporation, Lee Leng Realty
Inc., Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., Bank of the Philippine Islands, and
Cityland Inc.
 The City Appraisal Committee of Mandaluyong determined the fair market values
of the properties, ranging from P35,000 to P45,000 per square meter.
 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) appointed commissioners to determine the just
compensation, who recommended values ranging from P50,000 to P137,500 per
square meter.
 The RTC adopted the commissioners' report, and the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the decision.
 The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition
for certiorari after failing to appeal the CA decision within the reglementary
period.
Issue:
 Is the Republic estopped from challenging the CA decision due to its agent's
(OSG) failure to file a timely appeal?
 Did the CA err in affirming the amount of just compensation determined by the
commissioners, which varied significantly for different properties in the same
vicinity?
Ruling:
  The Supreme Court ruled that the Republic was not estopped by the OSG's
failure to file a timely appeal. The Court emphasized that while the government is
generally not estopped by the mistakes of its agents, this rule is not absolute and
should not be used to perpetuate injustice. The Court also noted that the
Republic had available remedies like a motion for reconsideration or an appeal,
which they failed to pursue.
 The Supreme Court upheld the CA decision regarding the just compensation.
The Court acknowledged that the zonal valuation determined by the City
Appraisal Committee was for taxation purposes only and did not necessarily
reflect the actual market values of the properties. The Court found that the
commissioners' determination of just compensation was based on a thorough
investigation and consideration of various factors, including location, existing
facilities, desirability, neighborhood, and size.

NPC v. Angas, 208 SCRA 196 (1992)

Facts:
 In 1974, NPC, a government-owned and controlled corporation, filed two
complaints for eminent domain in Lanao del Sur to acquire land for hydroelectric
power development.
 The lower court, after hearings and a series of proceedings, rendered a
consolidated decision in 1979, ordering NPC to pay the landowners just
compensation "with legal interest thereon . . . until fully paid."
 In 1981, one of the landowners filed an ex-parte motion seeking a 12% per
annum legal interest rate based on Central Bank Circular No. 416, issued
pursuant to Presidential Decree 116.
 The lower court granted the motion, allowing the 12% interest rate.
 NPC filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the final decision had already
been rendered, and that Circular No. 416 only applied to judgments involving
loans or forbearance of money, goods, or credits.
Issue:
 Whether or not Central Bank Circular No. 416 applies to the computation of legal
interest on just compensation for expropriated lands, or if Article 2209 of the Civil
Code, which prescribes a 6% legal interest rate, should prevail.
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled that Article 2209 of the Civil Code, providing for a 6%
legal interest rate, should apply in this case. The Court applied the doctrine of
ejusdem generis, which states that where general terms follow the designation of
particular things or classes of persons or subjects, the general term will be
construed to comprehend those things or persons of the same class or of the
same nature as those specifically enumerated.
 The Court reasoned that the term "judgments" in Central Bank Circular No. 416
refers to judgments in cases involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods,
or credits. The Court cited the case of Reformina v. Terol, where it had previously
ruled that the judgments spoken of and referred to in Circular No. 416 are
judgments in litigations involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods, or
credits.
 The Court concluded that the legal interest for expropriated land is an
indemnification for damages for the delay in payment, and therefore Article 2209
of the Civil Code, which applies to general monetary obligations, should be
applied.

Wycoco v. Judge Caspillo, G.R. No. 146733, January 13, 2004

Facts:
 Feliciano F. Wycoco owned a 94.1690-hectare rice land in Nueva Ecija.
 He voluntarily offered to sell the land to DAR for P14.9 million.
  DAR offered P2,280,159.82 for 84.5690 hectares, excluding idle lands, rivers,
and roads.
 Wycoco rejected the offer, leading DAR to refer the case to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for just compensation
determination.
 Wycoco filed a separate case for just compensation with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cabanatuan City, acting as a Special Agrarian Court.
 The RTC, without requiring evidence, determined just compensation based on
public knowledge of prevailing market value and awarded Wycoco
P13,428,082.00.
 The Court of Appeals (CA) modified the RTC decision, deducting the
compensation for a 3.3672-hectare portion previously sold to the Republic.
 Wycoco filed a petition for mandamus to compel the RTC to issue a writ of
execution and for Judge Caspillo's inhibition.
Issue:
 Did the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, validly acquire jurisdiction over
the case for determination of just compensation?
 Assuming jurisdiction, was the compensation determined supported by
evidence?
 Were the awards of interest and damages for unrealized profits valid?
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court held that the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction. While
DARAB has primary jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters, the RTC has
exclusive jurisdiction over just compensation determination.
 The Court found that the RTC erred in determining just compensation without
requiring evidence. The Court emphasized that while judicial notice can be taken
of matters of common knowledge, it cannot be used to arbitrarily determine just
compensation without considering factors like acquisition cost, current value of
similar properties, size, location, and tax declarations.
 The Court ruled that the award of actual damages for unrealized profits should be
deleted due to lack of evidence. The Court stated that such claims must be
supported by competent proof, such as receipts or other documentary evidence.

City of Manila v. Oscar Serrano, G.R. No. 142304, June 20, 2001

Facts:
 The City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7833 in 1993, authorizing the
expropriation of certain properties in Tondo, including Lot 1-C, covered by TCT
No. 226048.
 Lot 1-C originally belonged to Feliza de Guia, and after her death, it was
transferred through a series of inheritances and sales to Demetria de Guia, the
mother of the respondents.
 The City of Manila filed an amended complaint for expropriation against the
Serrano family, the heirs of Demetria de Guia.
 The RTC ruled in favor of the City of Manila, but the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision, finding that the City failed to comply with certain procedures before
resorting to expropriation.

Issue:
 Whether or not the City of Manila properly complied with the procedures before
resorting to expropriation.

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision and reinstated the
RTC ruling.
  The Court held that the City of Manila had complied with the necessary
procedures before filing the expropriation complaint.
 The Court emphasized that expropriation proceedings consist of two stages: (1)
condemnation of the property, and (2) determination of just compensation.
 The Court found that the City had properly condemned the property through the
enactment of Ordinance No. 7833 and that the determination of just
compensation was a matter for the court to decide.
 The Court remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings on the
determination of just compensation.

Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, December 19, 2005

Facts:
 The Philippine government (Republic) entered into a concession agreement with
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction and
operation of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Terminal III (NAIA 3).
 The Supreme Court in Agan v. Piatco declared the agreement void due to
PIATCO's lack of financial capacity and the agreement being contrary to public
policy.
 The Court in Agan v. Piatco ruled that the government must compensate
PIATCO for the construction of NAIA 3 before taking possession.
 The Republic filed a complaint for expropriation with the Pasay City Regional
Trial Court (RTC) and deposited the assessed value of NAIA 3 with the Land
Bank of the Philippines.
 The RTC issued a writ of possession to the Republic, but later amended its order
based on Republic Act No. 8974 (RA 8974), which requires immediate payment
to the property owner upon filing the complaint.

Issue:
 Whether the Republic must comply with the immediate payment requirement of
RA 8974 before obtaining a writ of possession in the expropriation of NAIA 3.

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled that the Republic must comply with the immediate
payment requirement of RA 8974.
 The Court held that RA 8974 supersedes Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which
allows for a deposit of the assessed value instead of immediate payment.
 The Court emphasized that the government cannot unjustly enrich itself at the
expense of PIATCO and its investors.
 The Court also noted that the government's actions in this case were inconsistent
with the previous ruling in Agan v. Piatco.

City of Baguio vs. Nawasa, 106 Phil. 144 (1959)

Facts:
 The City of Baguio, a municipal corporation, filed a complaint for declaratory
relief against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), a
public corporation created by Republic Act No. 1383.
 The City of Baguio contended that RA 1383 did not include the Baguio
waterworks system within its purview.
 The City of Baguio argued that if RA 1383 did include the Baguio waterworks
system, it was unconstitutional because it deprived the City of ownership, control,
and operation of the system without compensation and due process of law.
  NAWASA argued that RA 1383 was a valid exercise of police power and eminent
domain, and that the Baguio waterworks system was not private property but a
"public works for public service" under the control of the legislature.

Issue:
 Whether or not Republic Act No. 1383 is a valid exercise of police power or the
power of eminent domain.

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled that RA 1383 was not a valid exercise of police power
or eminent domain.
 The Court found that RA 1383 did not confiscate, destroy, or appropriate the City
of Baguio's property.
 The Court held that RA 1383 merely directed the transfer of all waterworks
systems belonging to cities, municipalities, and municipal districts to NAWASA
for efficient management, but it did not confiscate them because it required
payment with an equal value of NAWASA's assets.
 The Court also held that the Baguio waterworks system was not a public road,
park, or street, but rather a property owned by the City in its proprietary
character.
 The Court stated that as patrimonial property, the waterworks system could not
be taken away except for public use and upon payment of just compensation.

Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga, 22 SCRA 1334 (1968)

Facts:
 The municipality of Zamboanga was the provincial capital of Zamboanga
province.
 Commonwealth Act 39 (1936) converted Zamboanga into a chartered city,
requiring the city to pay for properties abandoned by the province.
 The properties included 50 lots and buildings used for government purposes
(e.g., capitol, schools, hospital).
 Zamboanga province's capital was transferred to Dipolog in 1945.
 Republic Act 711 (1952) divided Zamboanga into Zamboanga del Norte and
Zamboanga del Sur, dividing the province's assets.
 Zamboanga del Norte was entitled to 54.39% of the properties' value, payable by
Zamboanga City.
 Republic Act 3039 (1961) transferred the properties to Zamboanga City free of
charge.
 Zamboanga del Norte filed a complaint for declaratory relief, arguing that
Republic Act 3039 was unconstitutional.

Issue:
 Was Republic Act 3039 unconstitutional for depriving Zamboanga del Norte of
its
property without due process and just compensation?

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court ruled that Republic Act 3039 was valid insofar as it
transferred public properties to Zamboanga City.
 The Court distinguished between public property (owned by the municipality in its
governmental capacity) and patrimonial property (owned in its private capacity).
 The Court found that the properties in question were being used for
governmental purposes, making them public property.
 The Court held that the City of Zamboanga must pay just compensation for any
patrimonial properties that were not devoted to public service.
 The Court also stated that registration of the lots did not convert public property
into private property.
 The Court upheld the validity of Republic Act 3039 but emphasized the need to
distinguish between public and patrimonial properties and ensure just
compensation for any patrimonial properties transferred to the city.