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A Conspiracy Against Obamacare The Volokh
Conspiracy and the Health Care Case 1st Edition Randy
E. Barnett Digital Instant Download
Author(s): Randy E. Barnett, Jonathan H. Adler, David E. Bernstein, Orin S.
Kerr, David B. Kopel, Ilya Somin (auth.), Trevor Burrus (eds.)
ISBN(s): 9781137363749, 1137363746
Edition: 1
File Details: PDF, 1.52 MB
Year: 2013
Language: english
A Conspiracy
Against Obamacare
This page intentionally left blank.
A Conspiracy
Against Obamacare
Randy E. Barnett
Jonathan H. Adler
David E. Bernstein
Orin S. Kerr
David B. Kopel
Ilya Somin
Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is
by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in
England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21
6XS.
Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has
companies and representatives throughout the world.
Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United
Kingdom, Europe and other countries.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
The challenge to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was a constitutional case like no
other. That was true in many respects, but for purposes of this remarkable volume,
four are particularly relevant.
First, the arc of the health care case that took it to the Supreme Court was
quite unusual. Many great constitutional disputes involving congressional stat-
utes present themselves as such from the very beginning. Take, for example, the
constitutional challenge to the McCain-Feingold campaign finance statute, which
culminated in the Supreme Court’s decision in McConnell v. FEC.1 In that case, the
congressional debates were constitutional debates about the meaning, scope, and
contemporary relevance of the First Amendment. First Amendment objections—
and related policy and political arguments framed in First Amendment terms—
had prevented earlier campaign finance proposals from becoming law. And when
McCain-Feingold finally passed, First Amendment arguments before Congress
transitioned almost seamlessly into First Amendment litigation before the courts.
Indeed, the statute itself recognized the reality of imminent First Amendment liti-
gation by including a provision for expedited Supreme Court review. Perhaps as a
result, the First Amendment litigation over McCain-Feingold was taken very seri-
ously from the outset.
Not so when it came to the constitutional challenge to the Affordable Care Act.
The trajectory of the health care cases was entirely different. While the health care
legislation was actively debated in Congress, it was a political and policy debate,
not a constitutional one. Legislators hotly contested the wisdom of the individual
mandate, but constitutional concerns about the mandate were not raised until the
very end of deliberations and were neither central to the debate nor taken particu-
larly seriously.
Thus, when a number of challengers—most prominently a number of states
with Republican attorneys general—filed suit and attacked the law as unconstitu-
tional, the challenges were near universally dismissed as frivolous. The suits were
seen more as a continuation of the policy debate and derided as political stunts
with little realistic prospects of success. Two things changed that: the decisions of
two federal district courts and the contributions collected in this volume.
The official game changers were the decisions issued in rapid succession by
Judges Henry Hudson of Virginia and Roger Vinson of Florida. Judge Hudson
first issued an opinion striking down the individual mandate as unconstitutional.2
Then in relatively short order, Judge Vinson did Judge Hudson one better and
viii FOREWORD
struck down the health care law in its entirety.3 Once these Article III judges
accepted the arguments against the health care statute, and in one case invalidated
it in toto, the challenges could no longer simply be dismissed as frivolous.
But there was an important caveat. While Judges Hudson and Vinson had
embraced constitutional challenges to the law, other district court judges rejected
similar challenges.4 And commentators could not help but notice that the judges
striking down the statute as unconstitutional were appointed by Republican presi-
dents, while those upholding the law were appointed by Democratic presidents.
This disparity received considerable media attention and fueled the perception
that the constitutional challenge against the Affordable Care Act was more a mat-
ter of politics than a serious constitutional theory.
Enter the Volokh Conspiracy (VC). Founded by my friend Eugene Volokh,
who clerked for Justice Sandra Day O’Connor the same year I clerked for Justice
Antonin Scalia, the Volokh Conspiracy had long (at least in Internet terms) been
a clearinghouse for serious constitutional analysis of contemporary issues with a
particular focus on libertarian and conservative views. But if ever a legal blog and
a constitutional moment were meant for each other, it was the Volokh Conspiracy
and the challenge to the Affordable Care Act. Precisely because the constitutional
challenge to the law came in like a lamb and not a lion and precisely because many
were eager to dismiss the challenge as a political device rather than the manifesta-
tion of a serious constitutional theory, there was a need for pointed constitutional
analysis and for voices ready to counter the cacophony of skepticism. And this
need arose over and again.
Thus, the second distinguishing aspect of the health care case was the intensity
and duration of the media focus. Unlike some of the contributors to the Volokh
Conspiracy, I was not present at the creation of the case. I did not become involved
until Judge Vinson’s decision reached the court of appeals. By then, the challenge
had grown to include over half the states in the Union. In the interview with mem-
bers of the steering committee, I mentioned that I had experience with earlier
high-profile cases involving everything from campaign finance to the war on ter-
ror to issues of race. Little did I know that the coverage of the health care case
would eclipse all those other high-profile matters.
In many ways, the health care case was the perfect storm for media coverage.
The impact on the economy in general and the health care sector in particular
were undeniable. As a consequence, the press corps covering medicine, health care,
and business issues were fully engaged in the case. In addition, for the talented
corps of reporters who cover the Supreme Court, the health care case was a tem-
porary reversal of fortune. In most outlets, Supreme Court reporters generally
seem to have to fight for a few column inches to cover momentous cases. With the
health care case, by contrast, editors seemed to have an almost insatiable appetite
for stories exploring any angle. And, finally, there were the political reporters fas-
cinated by the dynamic of the president’s signature legislative accomplishment
being evaluated by the Supreme Court in the midst of a reelection campaign.
This continual attention on the case from a still mostly skeptical media corps
created an unprecedented need for continuing constitutional commentary. In
most cases, the constitutional debate is confined to the briefs and perhaps a few
FOREWORD ix
blog entries. And generally speaking, even a substantial constitutional case engen-
ders coverage at the time of argument and the time of decision, and that is it. But
with the health care case, every decision by multiple courts as the issue made its
way to the Supreme Court, and every filing in the Supreme Court, engendered
substantial commentary, criticism, and rebuttal. And the most penetrating of that
continuing commentary is collected in this volume.
Third and relatedly, the health care case captured the public imagination like
no other case in recent memory. Whether because of the saturation coverage, the
political dynamic, the practical impact, or something else, many people who had
never paid significant attention to a constitutional case were riveted by this one. As
a result, the stakes could not have been higher. The case went beyond the precise
issues before the Court to implicate the general public’s confidence in the legal
system as a whole.
Thus, the attention placed on the party of the president appointing the district
court judges deciding the health care cases created the real prospect of the public
viewing constitutional adjudication as nothing more than politics by other means.
The seriousness and timeliness of the constitutional analysis collected here helped
provide an antidote to that, as did the courts of appeals, where the results neces-
sitated a more nuanced narrative. A number of prominent appellate court judges
appointed by Republican presidents, such as Laurence Silberman of the D.C. Cir-
cuit and Jeffrey Sutton of the Sixth Circuit, voted to uphold the statute. But at
roughly the same time, Judge Frank Hull, an appointee of President Clinton, was
one of two Eleventh Circuit judges to strike down the law in the challenge brought
by Florida and a growing number of states. The Volokh Conspiracy was there to
discuss all of these developments in virtually real time and to emphasize that this
more complicated pattern of judicial decisions both underscored the seriousness
of the challenge and demanded a more nuanced discussion of the relationship
between judicial philosophy and the political party of an appointing president.
Finally, the constitutional stakes in the health care case were and remain criti-
cally important. Much of the focus in the immediate aftermath of the decision
understandably emphasized the chief justice’s analysis of the taxing power and the
practical reality that, although there were four votes to do so, the Court’s majority
did not invalidate the law in toto. But that should not obscure the reality that there
are five votes to invalidate the mandate as exceeding Congress’s power under the
Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, and a remarkable seven votes hold-
ing that the Medicaid expansion exceeded Congress’s spending power.
When the case began, there were confident predictions that there would be
seven or eight votes against the Commerce Clause challenge. Even on the eve of
argument, seasoned commentators were still insisting that the constitutional chal-
lenge was frivolous. And these predictions were not merely wishful thinking. It was
far from obvious that the new appointees of President George W. Bush would have
the same enthusiasm for federalism as the justices they replaced. While former
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and especially Justice O’Connor cut their teeth in
the state courts and in state politics, both Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice
Samuel Alito had their formative experiences in the executive branch of the federal
government. There was a palpable sense in some circles that the health care case
x FOREWORD
could be the swan song for the federalism revival—marking the end of one of the
signal doctrinal achievements of the Rehnquist Court.
Thus, the Court’s decision was an important constitutional moment because
it underscored the Court’s continued willingness to pursue its ongoing project of
identifying judicially enforceable limits on Congress’s power. The comments col-
lected in this volume are critically important to understanding that constitutional
moment—in terms of both why it happened and what it means. The Constitution
had its Federalist Papers, and the challenge to the Affordable Care Act had the
Volokh Conspiracy.
Paul D. Clement
Partner, Bancroft PLLC,
43rd Solicitor General of the United States,
Counsel to 26 states in the challenge to the Affordable Care Act
Notes
1. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
2. Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010).
3. Florida v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011).
4. See, e.g., Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010); Thomas More
Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
Acknowledgments
The contributors to this volume give special thanks to Eugene Volokh, creator of
the Volokh Conspiracy, for inviting them to join that special community. We’d also
like to thank the readers and commenters at the Volokh Conspiracy, without whom
we would have little incentive to keep blogging.
Additionally, we’d like to thank Paul Clement for both contributing to this vol-
ume and for masterfully bringing the case to the Supreme Court. Paul and his
team, as well as Mike Carvin and those at Jones Day, could not have done a better
job in bringing NFIB v. Sebelius to the Court.
We’d also like to thank Brian O’Connor and Scarlet Neath at Palgrave Macmil-
lan for believing in this project and effectively seeing it through.
Ilya Somin would like to thank the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) for
giving him the opportunity to write amicus briefs in several of the health care
cases on their behalf and that of a group of well-known constitutional law schol-
ars and members of Congress. He also thanks Cory Andrews of the WLF for his
invaluable assistance with the briefs. In addition to VC bloggers, several scholars
gave helpful advice about the briefs or other writings he did on these cases, includ-
ing Steve Calabresi, Brad Joondeph, Gary Lawson, and Neil Siegel.
Trevor Burrus thanks Matt Gilliam for help gathering material, and Ilya Shap-
iro and Roger Pilon for giving him time to work on the project. Additional thanks
go to Roger for offering him a job at the Cato Institute right as the Obamacare
litigation was gaining momentum.
Introduction
***
After months of intense debate, President Barack Obama signed the Affordable
Care Act into law on March 23, 2010, radically transforming American health care
for the worse.
Some argue that the inefficiencies of America’s pre-ACA system demonstrated
that free-market mechanisms do not work for health care. This is an odd thing to
say about a system that essentially lacked two of the most important qualities of a
market: meaningful prices and fluid consumer choice. Call your doctor and ask for
the price of a basic procedure. At best, you’ll wait a few hours, if not days, and then
only get a vague and probably inaccurate answer. More likely, however, is that the
receptionist will ask if you’re serious. The predominance of the insurance model
of health care, as well as the growth of Medicare and Medicaid, helped create a
literally “priceless” system.4
The ACA took the dysfunctional parts of our former system—particularly the
persistent, incorrect, and damaging belief that health insurance is the same as
health care—and made them worse. The act tries to create the functional equiva-
lent of a single-payer system—mandatory coverage for the sick at no extra cost
to them with the extra funding coming from healthier citizens—and wrap it in
the patina of a market. By using the trappings of a market, lawmakers got many
bonuses. Not only were they able to sidestep the criticism of a “government take-
over of health care,” but they were able to hide the true cost of the ACA, an enor-
mous political win.
The ACA rests on three pillars: (1) “community rating” price controls that force
insurers to sell coverage to those with preexisting medical conditions at the same
premiums they charge healthy people of the same age, (2) an “individual man-
date” requiring essentially everyone purchase a qualifying health insurance plan,
and (3) subsidies to keep people of modest means from walking away from the
overpriced insurance the individual mandate forces them to buy. The second and
third pillars are necessary to prop up the market under the weight of the first.
Many people outside of the insurance market are younger, healthier, and do not
consume much health care. To offset the cost increases from the first pillar, the
individual mandate forces healthy people to buy coverage at much higher premi-
ums than they would pay in a competitive market. By mandating that individuals
make those payments to private insurance companies, and again by subsidizing
insurers directly, Congress hoped to get insurers the needed funds to cover people
with preexisting conditions.
The law’s passage brought immediate lawsuits. Two cases were the most promi-
nent. One was spearheaded by Virginia’s Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli II. The
other was led by the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB); Pam
Bondi, the attorney general of Florida; and 25 other states. The Florida/NFIB case
eventually reached the Supreme Court.
The legal challenges mostly focused on the individual mandate, particularly
whether Congress has the power, pursuant to the Commerce Clause and the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause, to compel people to enter into commerce. A few aca-
demics argued that the taxing power justified the mandate, but that was a sideshow
INTRODUCTION 3
to the commerce power argument. This, of course, would come back to haunt the
challengers when Chief Justice John Roberts unexpectedly upheld the mandate’s
penalty as a “tax.” The provision that induced states to drastically expand their
Medicaid programs or risk losing federal funding for all Medicaid programs was
also challenged.
Volokh Conspiracy bloggers were involved in the challenge to the Affordable
Care Act from the beginning. Before he joined the NFIB’s legal team, Randy Bar-
nett joined the Cato Institute on amicus briefs filed in lower federal courts. Ilya
Somin authored briefs on behalf of the Washington Legal Foundation, as did
David B. Kopel on behalf of the Independence Institute. Very few people engaged
with the challenge to the Affordable Care Act more than the bloggers featured in
this book.
***
For many of the public, and for most legal academics, the case against the indi-
vidual mandate seemed too clever by half. The arguments often focused on subtle
distinctions and minute differences in wording in order to distinguish the indi-
vidual mandate from the broad scope of Congress’s commerce power.
But the case against the mandate was always more clear to me than those
nuanced discussions. Effective lawyering requires careful language and subtle dis-
tinctions, but only because lawyers must play the hand the Court dealt us.
For me, the argument was, and is, simple: A pure “effects-based” theory of
the commerce power has no limits. Congress’s power must be limited by kind,
not degree.
The Court accepted that argument in United States v. Lopez5 and United States v.
Morrison.6 In those landmark cases, Chief Justice William Rehnquist decided that
enough was enough. Since the New Deal, the government had won every chal-
lenge to the scope of Congress’s commerce power, mostly with the argument that
“everything affects everything else.” Such limitless expansion of federal power had
to stop. Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that if a limited national government is
more than a forgotten lesson from civics class, that if the federal government is to
be actually rather than theoretically limited, then the commerce power must not
be a blank check based on Rube Goldberg–like connections to commerce. Thus,
he ruled that having a gun in a school zone (Lopez) or committing violence against
women (Morrison) were not the kind of quintessentially economic activities that
fall under scope of the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause,
regardless of their effects on interstate commerce. With the individual mandate,
the government believed they could avoid running afoul of Lopez and Morrison by
arguing that decisions not to purchase a product were economic in a way guns in
school zones and violence against women are not.
But all purchases and nonpurchases, as well as all actions and nonactions, obvi-
ously affect commerce, and this would have been obvious to any Framer. If you
walked into the Pennsylvania State House during the convention (or, better yet,
joined the equally important after-hours discussions at the Indian Queen Tavern
or at Benjamin Franklin’s house), and argued that the inchoate Commerce Clause
4 A CONSPIRACY AGAINST OBAMACARE
For us, the individual mandate was the last mile in a marathon we’ve been run-
ning since the New Deal.
Although I’m not here to remind you of lessons from high school civics, it
might be worthwhile to keep these abstract concepts in mind as you read the pages
that follow. The discussions between contributors to this volume may seem eso-
teric, but at the core they are talking about drawing lines—even if they’re argu-
ably arbitrary lines that only partially map onto our interconnected world. The
Supreme Court once asked whether there is a meaningful line between “manufac-
turing” and “commerce” and decided that there wasn’t. With the Affordable Care
Act, we looked for a meaningful line between “action” and “inaction.” Sure, these
distinctions are nuanced, but should the lack of easily discernible lines make us
throw up our hands and abandon our federal system altogether?
Even national borders are powerless against a pure, effects-based jurisdictional
test. Yet if the United Nations began asserting jurisdiction over U.S. manufactur-
ing laws based on the theory that the effects of our laws are not contained within
our borders, we would boldly and confidently assert that our laws are none of their
business. Our manufacturing laws certainly have extraterritorial effects, but they
are not the type of thing the UN has power over.
Obviously the UN is a poor analog to our integrated federal system. Yet many
of the reasons we don’t want the UN running our health care also apply to repos-
ing those personal choices in Washington, D.C.
Nevertheless, some regard these attitudes as philistine. For many, the course of
human progress requires centralization, and those who stand in the way of Con-
gress’s attempts to solve problems of a national scale are reactionaries holding on
to unenlightened theories no longer relevant to modern nations.
To this I say that it is hardly enlightened to require every group with deep con-
victions about health care—from Catholics to Jehovah’s Witnesses to those who
simply don’t believe in Western medicine—to create lobbying organizations in
Washington so they can defend their convictions in a tribal, yet dapper, Hobbesian
war over what our “national health care plan” looks like.
Because of the synergistic effects of constitutional interpretation, the only
way to resist such centralizing force is to stand against an illegitimate proposal
even if you think it is a good idea. If you believe that the Constitution autho-
rizes all good ideas, then you do not really believe in the Constitution—you just
believe in good ideas.
With the legalization of marijuana in Colorado and Washington and the legal
quagmires that have emerged due to the quirky fact that marijuana is simultane-
ously legal and illegal in those states, perhaps some champions of centralization
are realizing the costs of an expansive federal government. The untenable situa-
tion in Washington and Colorado is a good indicator that the federal government
has overstepped its constitutional boundaries. After all, whereas Congress once
believed it lacked the power to prohibit alcohol without a constitutional amend-
ment, they now prohibit drugs by statute. They do this based on the same Supreme
Court cases—for example Wickard v. Filburn,7 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.,8 United States v. Darby9—that were the basis for the argument that Congress
can force inactive people to purchase health insurance.
6 A CONSPIRACY AGAINST OBAMACARE
Much of this kvetching about ships that have long sailed and discussions of
rudimentary constitutional analysis may seem simplistic and mostly irrelevant.
Yet the purpose, structure, and principles of our Constitution have been forgotten
by many. Most disturbingly, many people have forgotten the most important rule
about power: every time you consider granting a new power to government you
must first imagine that power in the hands of your most feared political opponents.
Due to the chief justice’s unpredictable opinion, we are now likely stuck with
a law that I fear will seriously damage the health of Americans. What’s more,
attempts to further centralize power will not stop at the individual mandate. When
the law fails, as I predict it will, it will be said that the federal government lacked
enough power to make it work. The chief justice’s opinion gives people a real
choice whether to comply with the requirement to purchase insurance or pay a
“tax.” Many people will not, and as the price of insurance goes up, more and more
people will choose to remain uninsured. This will certainly be called a “loophole.”
Similarly, the Court also gave states a choice about whether to comply with the
Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion. Another “loophole.” Finally, the states
that don’t create health care exchanges will also throw wrenches in the law’s over-
all scheme. “Loopholes” all around. Having freedom of choice in deeply personal
health care decisions, however, is not a loophole.
When the time comes to revisit the Affordable Care Act, those choices by free,
sovereign entities (citizens and states) will be blamed for the law’s dysfunctions.
To paraphrase philosopher Robert Nozick, liberty disrupts patterns. Free choice
inevitably upsets the carefully crafted plans of Washington.
As a solution to the law’s problems, more power will be proposed. A few voices,
such as many who write for the Volokh Conspiracy and those of us at the Cato
Institute, will strenuously argue that the problem is not a lack of power but a lack
of freedom. I am not optimistic, however, that very many entrenched bureaucrats
and politicians will locate the problem in the mirror rather than in the freedoms
of the American people.
***
I am deeply grateful that Randy, Ilya, Dave K., Dave B., Orin, and Jonathan asked
me to be a part of this exciting project. The conversations recorded here are truly
historic, and I hope that this volume will be a valuable and novel contribution to
Supreme Court history.
Trevor Burrus
Research Fellow
Cato Institute Center for Constitutional Studies
Notes
1. John H. Langbein, “Scholarly and Professional Objectives in Legal Education: Ameri-
can Trends and English Comparisons,” in Pressing Problems in the Law, Volume 2: What
Are Law Schools For?, ed. Peter Birks (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 3.
INTRODUCTION 7
2. Id. at 5.
3. “Annual Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Conference,” CSPAN, http://www.c-span
.org/Events/Annual-Fourth-Circuit-Court-of-Appeals-Conference/10737422476–1.
4. For more on this theory, see John C. Goodman, Priceless: Curing the Health Care Crisis
(Oakland, CA: Independent Institute, 2012), and David Goldhilll, Catastrophic Care:
How American Health Care Killed My Father—and How We Can Fix It (New York:
Knopf, 2013).
5. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
6. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
7. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
8. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
9. United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
1
In the Beginning
F rom the moment he took office, President Barack Obama saw health care
reform as one of his administration’s top priorities. In February 2009, Presi-
dent Obama announced to a joint session of Congress that discussions on reform-
ing American health care would move forward as a priority. Meetings were held
with industry leaders, lobbyists, and influential senators and members of Congress
over the next many months.
The discussions in this chapter occurred prior to the signing of the final version
of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). As Congress, pundits, and average Americans
debated health care reform, so too did the Volokh Conspiracy (VC) bloggers.
On November 7, 2009, the House of Representatives passed the “Affordable
Health Care for America Act” by a 220–215 vote, with 39 Democrat votes against
and 1 Republican vote in favor.
In the Senate, the road was more difficult. Senate Republicans vowed to filibus-
ter, so any bill needed a filibuster-proof 60 votes. Having only 58 votes at the time
(before Senator Al Franken (D-MN) won his recount and before Arlen Spector
switched parties), Senate Democrats had to appease their more centrist colleagues.
The Democrats were further stymied when, in late August, before the bill could
come up for a vote, Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) succumbed to brain cancer.
Senate Democrats focused on getting the votes of their moderate colleagues, par-
ticularly Connecticut’s Joe Lieberman and Nebraska’s Ben Nelson. Lieberman would
not support any bill that had a “public option”—that is, a government-run insur-
ance program that competes with private insurers. In exchange for Lieberman agree-
ing to support the bill, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid permanently shelved the
public option provision, much to the anger of many Democrats and liberal pundits.
That left Nelson. During late-night negotiations, Reid approved several of
Nelson’s “concerns,” the most famous being higher federal Medicaid payments to
Nebraska, which would become known as the “Cornhusker Kickback.” Whatever
name people wanted to call it, Reid got Nelson’s vote.
Early in the morning on December 24, 2009, Reid called the vote and the bill
passed 60–39. All Democrats and two independents voted for; all Republicans
voted against, with one abstention (Jim Bunning of Kentucky).
In January 2010, Republican Scott Brown was surprisingly elected to Ted Ken-
nedy’s seat. Senate Democrats had lost their filibuster-proof voting bloc, but they
Other documents randomly have
different content
On the issuing of the eleventh edition of the "Encyclopædia
Britannica," I was asked by the editor to write two articles on
Bookselling and Publishing, with biographical notices of British and
American publishers' houses. I did this with much pleasure, and
afterwards received an invitation to a dinner at the Hotel Cecil to
celebrate the Encyclopædia's completion and publication. Among
some 600 guests who were present, there were representatives of
great distinction from every department of learning, such as the
Speaker of the House of Commons, Mr. Balfour, Sir W. Harcourt, Lord
Brassey, Lord Bryce and Viscount Wolseley. These names are
sufficiently representative of the guests, although it would be
difficult to give a complete list of them. Altogether, it was a
wonderful gathering, and my association with it was most gratifying
to me.
CHAPTER VI
The Bookselling Trade and Underselling
THE published price of a book being publicly advertised, there is
probably no other trade which gives the same opportunity of
attracting the public by underselling as that of Bookselling, and evils
of a greater or less degree in this direction have been practised since
the days of Caxton. In the early days of the nineteenth century
serious attention was directed to underselling, and an association
formed entitled "The Associated Booksellers." This was formed in
1812, but the notorious Lackington carried underselling, and what
he termed "remainders," to such an extreme that the very existence
of the Bookselling trade was seriously threatened. This Association,
however, lacked sufficient strength to take the necessary steps to
stop the underselling mania, and it was not until 1850 that another
Booksellers' Association was formed which nobly fought a most
difficult and trying battle. The Association failed, owing to the
decision in 1852 by Lord Campbell, Mr. Grote, and Dean Milman that
the question of a bookseller having "paid the purchase money shall
not resell it under a certain price, derogated from the rights of
ownership which, as purchaser, he had acquired." This decision had
the effect of dissolving the Association.
Some years after attention was again directed to the evil of
underselling, which it has taken nearly a century to bring to an end,
for it is hoped that by the adoption of publishing on the net book
system and the Publishers' and Booksellers' Associations, discounts
to the public will be entirely abolished. On looking through the
volume for 1864 of that consistently intelligent trade journal, "The
Bookseller," I find the editor saying that "The opening of the new
season appears to be a very appropriate time for a few remarks
upon the ruinous system of underselling, which seems to be the rule
rather than the exception, not only in London, but in most provincial
cities. How far it will proceed and what may be the extent of the
damage it may do, none can predict. We, however, believe
underselling to be wholly unnecessary and that it may be checked, if
not altogether stopped, if publishers and booksellers will come to an
understanding on the subject." The article goes on to point out how
by publishers, if necessary, reducing their selling prices, they might
do away with the discount allowed to the public, or, in other words,
encourage the adoption of a net system. It is pleasant to see a letter
on this point issued the same year, and signed by A. Macmillan.
When about to publish their celebrated Globe edition of
Shakespeare's works at 3s. 6d., after speaking of the number of
pages, the quality of the paper, the printing and the binding, Mr.
Macmillan goes on to say, "Why should the trade throw away their
profits on a book that needs no further cheapening to put it within
the reach of all. I have neither the will nor the power to dictate to
the trade what they shall sell the books for after they buy them from
us, but I would be glad and grateful if they would try the experiment
on this new book whether the underselling which has crept in of late
years, does good really to anybody." It is most gratifying that the
present head of that firm should have done so much to bring to an
end the unjust system of discounts. It was stated that nearly 80,000
copies of the Globe Shakespeare were sold within six months of its
publication.
In 1867, after many years of unrest, matters were again brought
under discussion through Mr. Thomas Bosworth, of Regent Street,
giving excessive discounts. I have before me a leaflet issued by this
bookseller entitled "Rattening in the Book Trade." In this leaflet he
complains of Messrs. Hamilton, Adams & Co. having closed his
account, owing to his continuing to sell to the public books at trade
prices and sometimes less than that. This did not continue very long,
as I find that in 1869 he had to make a composition with his
creditors. In 1890 the parent of the Associated Booksellers of Great
Britain and Ireland was formed, under the title of "The London
Booksellers' Society," and I am proud to record that I was one of the
early members of its Council. The main object of the Society was to
restrict discounts to 25 per cent., and it issued a price list from 6d.
to £2 2s. showing these discounts. Had it not been for the
introduction of the net system, this Booksellers' Association would in
all probability have followed the footsteps of its predecessors.
A correspondent in "The Bookseller" for 1877 gives a very
despondent account of the bookseller and the way the bookselling
trade was carried on. This despondency was caused mainly by the
iniquitous system of discounts which were then being given to the
public and the unfair methods of business, owing to the want of
harmony and business regulations. The correspondent says that "A
bookseller of to-day is very often a man who might just as well be a
cheese-monger or a pork-butcher for anything he knows or cares
about books; and as for him being capable of guiding or advising his
customers, they have sometimes no little trouble in making him
understand a requirement that lies just outside the current of
popular demands. The cause of this degeneracy is not far to seek: it
is the undignified and unneighbourly scramble for custom, in which
each man's object is to give away a larger discount in the shilling
than anyone else. Unless booksellers can be found who will have the
courage to stand out of this scramble and be content to serve such
customers who are willing to pay a fair price for their books, it is to
be feared that the race of booksellers will become extinct."
Fortunately, by the introduction of the net system, this downward
tendency has been stopped, and the bookselling trade is gradually
taking the place it deserves in the world of letters.
The Publishers' Association was established in 1896. Mainly through
the influence and the exertions of Sir Frederick Macmillan, the net
book scheme was officially recognized by the Publishers' Association.
It has grown ever since that time and has undoubtedly been the
salvation of the Bookselling trade in this country, and it is hoped that
it will lead to further and better conditions for every one connected
with the trade.
This question of underselling is so closely associated with the
general condition of the Bookselling trade that I have decided to
reprint in this chapter the following article which appeared in the
"Publishers' Circular" and was written by me in 1915. Though a
development in some of the particulars has been obtained, there is
still much to be done. As the article was reprinted and distributed by
the Associated Booksellers, and I also receive so many
congratulatory letters respecting it, I feel that it may probably be of
service when some of the details of the trade are again under
discussion. I have omitted from the article such portions of it as time
has shown to be unnecessary. What I have here reprinted I hope
may be found of interest.
SOME NOTES ON BOOK-SELLING
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