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Taiwan’s Security and Air Power

Recent concern about Mainland China’s intentions toward Taiwan, and more
general concern about the risk of instability in the region, has led to growing inter-
est in Taiwan’s military strategy. This book brings together a range of experts from
the West and from Taiwan itself, who examine the key issues connected with
Taiwan’s air power, which is a key aspect of the China–Taiwan military balance.
During the 1990s, Taiwan invested considerable resources in thoroughly re-
equipping its air force with modern US and French air defense and strike aircraft
equipped with modern guided missiles and American surface-to-air guided mis-
siles, thereby denying China command of the air in any conflict in the short to
medium term. These weapons were supplemented with indigenously designed and
developed combat aircraft and air defense missiles. In the longer term, air power
will remain a crucial influence on the overall balance as China’s efforts to upgrade
its own Air Force’s capabilities begin to undermine Taiwan’s current advantages.

Martin Edmonds is Professorial Fellow and Director of the Centre for Defence
and International Security Studies at Lancaster University. He is also (founding)
Editor-in-Chief of the international journal, Defence and Security Analysis
(Taylor & Francis) and Co-Director (with Professor Keith Hartley) of the
Lancaster and York Universities’ Defence Research Institute.

Michael M. Tsai is currently the Deputy Taipei Representative in Washington DC

with specific responsibility for Taiwan’s relations with the US Department of
Defense and the US Armed Forces. A member of the DPP, he served as a
Legislator in the Legislative Yuan and also served as adviser to the Organizational
Planning Committee of the Ministry of National Defense. He is the founder
of Taiwan Defense Affairs, and the Institute for Taiwan Defense and Strategic
Studies (ITDSS).
RoutledgeCurzon Security in Asia Series

1 Taiwan’s Security and Air Power

Taiwan’s defense against the air threat from Mainland China
Edited by Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai
Taiwan’s Security and
Air Power
Taiwan’s defense against the air
threat from Mainland China

Edited by Martin Edmonds and

Michael M. Tsai
 First published 2004
by RoutledgeCurzon
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by RoutledgeCurzon
29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.
“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s
collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”
RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group
© 2004 editorial matter and selection, Martin Edmonds and
Michael M. Tsai; individual chapters, the contributors

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or

reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic,
mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter
invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available
from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN 0-203-31643-6 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0–415–32317–7 (Print edition)

Contents

List of contributors vii

Foreword by Shiah Yng Jou x
Preface by Peter Brookes xiii
Acknowledgments xix
Abbreviations xx

1 Introduction: Taiwan and air power 1

MARTIN EDMONDS AND MICHAEL M. TSAI

PART I
Air power and Taiwan’s security 7
2 Air power and Taiwan’s security 9
MARTIN EDMONDS

3 Ten pointers for Taiwan on contemporary air power 29

GREG MILLS

PART II
The balance of air power over the Taiwan Straits 35
4 The shifting balance of air superiority at the Taiwan Strait
and its implications on Taiwan’s defense planning 37
YORK W. CHEN

5 Command of the air over Taiwan 55

CHIH-HENG YANG AND TZU-YUN SU

PART III
The air threat from Mainland China 71
6 PLA Air Force mobile offensive operations 73
KENNETH W. ALLEN
vi Contents
7 Why a Chinese preemptive strike against Taiwan would fail 89
ROBERT A. PAPE

PART IV
The air defense of Taiwan 103
8 The air battle strategy in Taiwan’s defensive operations 105
CHIH-KUNG YU

9 Joint air and missile defense for Taiwan: implications

for deterrence and defense 116
ERIC A. M C VADON

10 Air base defense: Taiwan’s defensive responses

to China’s missile threat 140
MING-YEN TSAI

PART V
Taiwan’s Air Force and future requirements 153
11 Military culture and air force restructuring 155
CHIEN CHUNG

12 The ROC Air Force after next: a race to embrace the future 163
RICHARD D. FISHER

Index 187
Contributors

Kenneth W. Allen is a Senior Analyst at the CNA Corporation where he is

responsible for analyzing China’s national security issues. Prior to this, he was
a Senior Associate at the Henry L Stimson Center, and Executive Vice
President of the US–Taiwan Business Council. While serving for 21 years in
the USAF, he served for 2 years as an Assistant Air Force Attache at the US
Embassy in Beijing. He holds Bachelors Degrees from the University of
California, Davis, and the University of Maryland, and a Masters Degree from
Boston University in International Relations.
Peter Brookes was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific
Affairs in the Office of Secretary for Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. From 1997 to
2001, he was a professional staff member at the US House of Representatives
International Relations Committee. From 1992–1994 he served with the
Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Operations after which he joined a
Washington private technology firm, SAIC. His early career was in the United
States Navy where he served as a naval aviator flying intelligence and recon-
naissance missions. He is a Commander in the US Naval Reserves assigned to
the US Defense Intelligence Agency and is currently Director of the Asian
Studies Center, the Heritage Foundation, in Washington DC.
York W. Chen is the Executive Editor of Taiwan Defense Affairs. He holds a
Master’s Degree from the Graduate Institute of International Affairs, Tam
Kang University, and served as Congressional Assistant to Michael M. Tsai
from 1996 to 1999. He is now a doctoral candidate at the Department of Politics
and International Relations at Lancaster University, UK, studying Taiwan’s mili-
tary strategy and doctrine. He is Research Associate in the Lancaster Centre for
Defence and International Security Studies. His recent publications include (with
Michael Tsai) “Submarines and Taiwan’s Defense,” (2001), Warfare in the
Information Age (2000) and (with Martin Edmonds) “An Assessment of the
ROCN’s Modernization Program: Strategic and Operational Considerations,” in
Taiwan’s Maritime Security (2003).
Chien Chung received his PhD degree in nuclear chemistry from McGill
University, Canada. He is currently a full Professor at the National Tsing Hua
viii Contributors
University, Taiwan. He is also a Professor Emeritus at both the Military
College and the Medical College of the National Defense University, Taiwan.
His recent publication includes “A Review of the ROC’s Military Reform:
A Case Study of the Taiwanese Navy,” in Defending Taiwan (2002).
Martin Edmonds is Professorial Fellow and Director of the Centre for Defence
and International Security Studies at Lancaster University, UK. He is also the
founding Editor-in-Chief of Defence and Security Analysis and a member of
the Editorial Board of Taiwan Defense Affairs. He has published over 150 jour-
nal articles, book chapters and memoranda on a wide variety of defense and
security issues. His most recent books relevant to Taiwan’s security include:
(edited with Greg Mills and Chyungly Lee) New Security Paradigms (2001);
(edited with Greg Mills and Chyungly Lee) Preventing Insecurity: Lessons for
and from East Asia (2003); (edited with Michael M. Tsai) Defending Taiwan:
The Future Vision of Taiwan’s Defence Policy and Military Strategy (2003),
and (edited with Michael M. Tsai) Taiwan’s Maritime Security (2003).
Richard D. Fisher is Adjunct Fellow in Asian Studies at the Center for Security
Policy, Washington DC, before which he was Senior Fellow at the Jamestown
Foundation and before that as Director of the Asian Studies Center at the
Heritage Foundation. His research interests are in China’s military moderniza-
tion and its implications for the United States, Russia, and Taiwan. He holds a
Bachelor’s degree from Eisenhower College, New York City.
Eric A. McVadon retired from the United States Navy with the rank of Rear
Admiral. Until July 1992 he served as Defense and Naval Attache at the US
Embassy in Beijing. Since then he has served as Director of Asia-Pacific
Studies at the Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis in Washington DC. He holds
a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from George Washington
University, and is a graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, the
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, and the National War College.
Greg Mills is the National Director of the South African Institute of International
Affairs based at Wits University in Johannesburg. He holds a BA degree from
the University of Cape Town, and an MA and PhD from the University of
Lancaster, UK. In addition to being the founding Editor of the South African
Yearbook of International Affairs and Editor of the South African Journal of
International Affairs, he has published over twenty books, the latest of which
have been: The Wired Model: South Africa, Foreign Policy and Globalization
(2001); Poverty to Prosperity: Globalization, Good Governance and African
Recovery (2003); and, with respect to Taiwan, New Security Paradigms (2001)
and Preventing Insecurity in East Asia (2003) (both edited with Martin
Edmonds and Chyungly Lee) (2001).
Robert A. Pape is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of
Chicago, specializing in international security affairs. Before going to
Chicago, he was on the Faculty of Dartmouth College and also taught at the
 Contributors ix
USAF’s School of advanced air power studies. He holds a PhD from the
University of Chicago and a Masters degree from the University of Pittsburgh.
His publications include Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War
(1996) and “The Determinants of International Moral Action,” in International
Organization (1999). He contributes regularly to the New York Times,
Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and the Boston Globe on international
security issues.
Tzu-Yun Su is the Assistant Editor of Taiwan Defense Affairs. He holds a
Master’s Degree from the Graduate Institute of International Affairs, Tam
Kang University. He is currently Associate Researcher of the Policy Research
and Coordinating Committee of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
Michael M. Tsai is currently the Deputy Taipei Representative in Washington DC
and publisher of the journal, Taiwan Defense Affairs. He received his MBA
from the University of Wisconsin and JD from the University of California
Western School of Law. Prior to his appointment in Washington, he served as
a Legislator in the Legislative Yuan and was adviser to the Organizational
Research and Planning Committee of the Ministry of National Defense in
Taipei. He was also the Convenor of the Defense Affairs and Policy Research
Committee of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the Legislative Yuan.
His recent book publications include Defending Taiwan (edited with Martin
Edmonds) (2001) and Taiwan’s Maritime Security (edited with Martin
Edmonds) (2003), and, with York Chen an article on “Submarines and
Taiwan’s Defense,” in Taiwan Defense Affairs (2001).
Ming-Yen Tsai received his PhD degree from Department of War Studies, King’s
College, London, UK. He is now Assistant Professor at the Graduate Institute
of International Politics, National Chung Hsin University, Taiwan. His recent
publication includes “PRC–Russia Military Ties: Background, Development,
and the Impact on Taiwan’s Security,” in Taiwan Defense Affairs, 2(3) (2002).
Chih-Heng Yang was Deputy Director of the Strategic and International Studies
Division, Taiwan Research Institute in Taipei. He received his PhD degree
from the National Taiwan University. His recent publication includes “The
Evolution and Adaptation of Taiwan’s Military Strategy,” in Defending Taiwan
(2002).
Shiah Yng Jou is an Air Force General and the President of the National Defense
University of Taiwan. He was one-time President of the Air Force Academy
and Vice Chief of the General Staff.
Chih-Kung Yu is a Colonel in the ROC Air Force. He is now the Deputy Director
of the Air Force Department, the National Defense University, Taiwan.
Foreword

This volume on Taiwan’s air power is the third in a series that explores Taiwan’s
defense and security issues, the first two having looked respectively at Taiwan’s
defense, overall, and Taiwan’s Maritime security. It addresses the ROC Air
Force’s future development in the light of perceived threats from the People’s
Republic of China consequent upon that country’s extensive military modernization
program.
It is to be hoped that the book will not only prompt and stimulate the interac-
tion between military and civilian personnel in the government, but also encour-
age the exchange of ideas on the more pressing issue of Taiwan’s defense,
security, and air power. The international conference upon which it is based will
give leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and those from Asian-Pacific coun-
tries a useful point of reference. With its clear message, serious consequences for
the security and stability of the East Asian region due to mistake or misjudgment
might be avoided.
The book has been divided into five parts: the theory and practice of air power;
the balance of air power over the Taiwan Straits; the expansion of the PLA Air
Force and its effects; the air defense of Taiwan; a review of the ROCAF’s force
structure; and Taiwan’s future air power prospects. With regard to the expansion
of the PLA Air Force and its effects, many specialists have pointed out again and
again that in recent years the PRC, supported by a strong economic development,
has increased its defense budget by over 10 percent. This expansion constitutes a
serious threat to Taiwan, of which PRC air power is a major element.
Today, the PLA has deployed more than 400 missiles directed at Taiwan along
its Southeast coast. In respect of current and future combat aircraft developments,
the PLA has purchased Su-30s from Russia and has been granted a license by
Russia to manufacture the Su-27, domestically. Other than that, the PLA is work-
ing on the research and development of the J-10 MG by itself. All these activities
are leading to the steady increase in the numbers of air power assets in the
PLAAF’s inventory. In addition, the PRC is also actively developing aerospace
technologies with the purpose of integrating its overall C4ISR capability,
something that has already posed a serious threat to Taiwan’s security.
The acceleration in the PLA’s modernization program and the expansion of its
military strength has had a huge impact on the military balance between the PRC
 Foreword xi
and the ROC over the Taiwan Strait. More seriously, it has not only threatened the
stability of the Asian-Pacific region but has also threatened to compromise US
interests in the region.
The ROC Air Force has excellent, well-trained pilots, the quality of whom is
far better than that of PLAAF pilots. Also, within the limited air space over the
Taiwan Strait, the ROCAF still maintains its air superiority. The threats generated
by the continuous increase in the numbers and quality of PLA fighters and their
updated guided missiles cannot, however, be ignored. If the ROC’s fighter aircraft
can be equipped with the advanced US AIM120 air-to-air missiles then they
should be able to maintain its air superiority over the Taiwan Strait.
A legacy of the past, Taiwan’s major military airbases are well within the range
of the PLA’s 400 plus short-range D-11 and D-15 missiles. This is a potentially
dangerous factor governing the future development of Taiwan’s air power and
must also not be overlooked. It also has to be accepted that no country can guar-
antee protection against a missile attack, and the missile threat facing Taiwan is
also a security issue that faces the rest of the world.
The issues of air power and the security of the Taiwan Strait are concerned not
only with Taiwan’s security, but also with the stability of the Asian-Pacific area.
That stability is important to the prosperity of the entire Asian-Pacific region.
Even though Taiwan is confronted with the threat of the PRC’s military strength,
the ROC government has repeatedly declared that it will never be provocative or
take the offensive. It is a matter of fact that the strategic objective of the ROC’s
military is to establish a basic force capable of “effective deterrence and resolute
defense.” On this premise, the goal of the ROC Air Force’s future strategic
development is defensive air power.
The Taiwanese government welcomes all those who offer assistance in
furthering Taiwan’s national security and regional stability. It also looks for
opportunities to cooperate with other countries in the region and to join a regional
collective security mechanism. This policy is in accordance with Taiwan’s
interest in national security but also with the US commitment to maintaining the
region’s peace and stability.
In order to maintain the dynamic balance of the military strength across the
Taiwan Strait, the ROC’s armed forces have to improve the quality of their per-
sonnel in order to offset their lack of numbers in both personnel and equipment.
To achieve that goal, they must adopt a complete package measure and, to this
end, have introduced various initiatives to promote civilian control of the armed
forces and expand civilians’ participation in defense affairs. What is more, the
Taiwanese government and armed forces must ensure the transparency of the
defense policy and help the population get a better understanding of defense
affairs so as to enlist their support. With popular support, the survival and devel-
opment of the nation and the standard of living of its people can be better estab-
lished; the concept of defense by people can be made reality; Taiwan’s national
security can be better assured; and regional stability can be maintained.
As it is well known, a state’s national security alters over time with changes in
the environment and with the impact of new technologies. Air power
xii Foreword
developments across the Taiwan Strait are deeply influenced by the Strait’s
security environment. It is important to continue to research future Taiwan secu-
rity issues and to come up with effective suggestions as to how best to contribute
to regional stability through collective efforts. This book on air power and Taiwan’s
security is a valuable contribution toward that goal.

Shiah Yng Jou

Preface
The challenges and imperatives in
Taiwan’s defense

Introduction
Taiwan decision-makers, public opinion leaders, and defense experts on national
security affairs face a complex set of variables, influences, and political pressures
when considering Taiwan’s security. Among them, air power considerations are
critical to the future of Taiwan and for democracy in the Western Pacific.
The Taiwan Strait is certainly one of the most dangerous flashpoints in the
world, and perhaps – in its complexity – the most challenging in the Asia-Pacific
region. It is arguably more complex than the current situation with North Korea.
The prospects for stability over the next several years are uncertain. The United
States maintains a strong interest in assisting the democratically elected govern-
ment of Taiwan to deter the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) use of force; and
in ensuring that Taiwan has a sufficient self-defense capability to defeat PRC
efforts, should deterrence fail.
Beijing can have no illusions with regard to the United States’ commitments to
Taiwan’s security since they are embedded in US law in the form of the 1979
Taiwan Relations Act. To this end, the United States also has an interest in ensur-
ing that Taiwan develops a rational, civilian-controlled defense establishment and
a highly capable military that is able to function effectively in deterring and
defending against aggression.

The challenges
It is difficult to overstate the incredible array of challenges that Taiwan faces in
the years ahead. There are five in particular: (1) an ambitious PRC force mod-
ernization program; (2) Taiwan’s continued international isolation; (3) elements
resistant to reform within Taiwan’s defense establishment; (4) a stove-piped
bureaucracy; and (5) a restrictive economic environment.

PRC military modernization

The first and foremost challenge that Taiwan faces is a concerted PRC program to
gain the ability to use force decisively sooner rather than later. China is working
xiv Preface
toward multiple options for coercion or physical occupation of the island.
The United States stands by the fact that Taiwan’s future must be settled in a peace-
ful and mutually agreeable manner.
The PRC’s force modernization appears to be outpacing Taiwan’s. The dynamic
equilibrium in the military balance of power is shifting toward the PRC.
Moreover, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is striving to be able to
press home their attack before American forces can intervene. This places a new
series of requirements upon Taiwan’s military.
China’s modernization is focused on exploiting vulnerabilities in Taiwan’s
national and operational level command and control system, its integrated air
defense system, and its reliance on sea lines of communication as an island
nation. It is to be expected that if Beijing does choose a military option, the PRC
will make every effort to deter, delay, and deny US intervention and military oper-
ations.

International isolation
Taiwan is challenged by its isolated status in the international community. The
United States stands alone among major countries in its declared willingness to
assist and help defend Taiwan’s democracy. But while its commitment is strong,
Taiwan should nevertheless seek avenues in defense diplomacy with other coun-
tries. Despite US efforts and support, Taiwan’s isolation from the rest of the inter-
national community impedes its ability to benefit from the knowledge and
experience that are derived from interaction with foreign military establishments.
Its isolation also limits choices on procurement and force modernization, and lim-
its its ability to exploit technological, organizational, and doctrinal aspects of the
on-going revolution in military affairs.
Uncertainties with regard to procurement of foreign weapon systems compli-
cate development of a long-term coherent force modernization strategy.

Military conservatism
Taiwan’s isolation may be related to a third challenge – elements within Taiwan’s
defense establishment that appear reluctant to make the requisite changes in order to
improve Taiwan’s fighting efficiency and effectiveness and ensure its ability to deter
and counter PRC coercion and other forms of aggression. This must be overcome.
While “transformation” appears to be the buzzword of the moment in military
circles, almost every organization, including many in the United States, resists
change – yet change is necessary. Initiative, innovation, and evolution are critical.

Stove-piped bureaucracy
Another challenge is a defense establishment, including the military, which
operates in relative isolation from the rest of Taiwan’s governmental bureaucracy.
A greater degree of cooperation between military and other departments within
 Preface xv
the government would enhance Taiwan’s ability to react rapidly and efficiently to
crisis situations and other natural disasters. A unity of purpose and synergy of
effort is needed and, indeed, required.

Economic pressures
The Administration of President Chen Shui-bian also faces challenges stemming
from the island’s economic downturn. Taiwan’s economic challenges have created
a constrained budget environment that requires Taiwan to think more innovatively
about its defense needs and develop a more efficient, rational acquisition process
that marries strategy and defense system development and procurement.
Furthermore, Taiwan’s leadership, both civilian and military, must weigh seri-
ously the dramatic growth in China’s offensive capabilities. Taiwan’s indecision
on key defense needs such as increasing the defense budget, C4ISR (command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance), naval power and maritime surveillance, an integrated air defense and per-
sonnel, equipment, and logistics readiness, is giving some the impression that
Taiwan does not take its self-defense seriously. Taiwan’s defense budget must
reflect its commitment to its own security.

The imperatives
These challenges are serious, but fortunately they are not insurmountable. To
overcome these challenges, Taiwan must be committed to fundamental reform
and willing to commit the necessary financial resources to maintain a rough par-
ity in the cross–Strait balance of power. The ability to withstand any PRC attempt
at military coercion, at least until friendly forces can intervene, is the key to
Taiwan’s national security.
There are at least four imperatives that should guide Taiwan’s approach to
self-defense. Many of these imperatives already are being addressed through
the implementation of Taiwan’s National and Defense Reorganization Laws. If
faithfully executed, these Laws may hold the key to Taiwan’s ability to ensure
stability in the Taiwan Strait. Already much progress has been achieved in this
respect.
Among the most important imperatives are: (1) greater focus on coercive sce-
narios; (2) prioritization and rationality in Taiwan’s defense planning; (3) force
modernization; and (4) the enhancement of civil–military relations.

Greater focus on coercive scenarios

Taiwan should place greater emphasis on preparing for coercive uses of force,
short of a full-scale amphibious invasion by the PRC. In the coercive uses of
force, the strategic center of gravity is Taiwan’s political and military authorities.
PRC coercion or compellance would seek to undermine the ROC’s national will,
morale, and resolve.
xvi Preface
The PRC may seek to affect Taiwan’s national resolve in a number of ways,
including targeting its international support, undercutting or denying its military
capabilities, attempting to provoke a severe downturn in the economy, sowing
dissent within the domestic polity, or “decapitating” Taiwan’s political leadership.
Coercive uses of force could take many forms, including information warfare
attacks, air and missile strikes, or a naval blockade.
In fact, there is a school of thought that says that the PRC’s ability to success-
fully coerce Taiwan is dependent upon its ability to mount a credible threat of
invasion. But while holding this threat over Taiwan, other coercive scenarios,
short of a full-scale invasion, can be just as dangerous and even more likely.
Greater focus on limited uses of force in a coercive context does not mean Taiwan
should not be prepared for a worst-case scenario – the amphibious invasion. But
Taiwan must be ready for a wide range of military scenarios and pursue a com-
prehensive defense posture able to deal with the full spectrum of military threats
presented by Beijing.

Prioritization and rationalization in defense planning

The ROC Ministry of National Defense must prioritize efficient defense plan-
ning, acquisition, programming, and budgeting. The establishment of offices,
subordinate to the Minister of Defense, responsible for strategic planning, inte-
grated analysis, and the acquisition function is a positive step in this direction.
A top-down approach to strategy and force planning normally involves develop-
ment of a coherent national security strategy and, by extension, should facilitate
the drafting of a viable national military strategy. These national strategies in turn
will be supported by the necessary acquisition programs that will allow national
command authorities to execute defense plans.

Force modernization
National strategies should guide Taiwan’s force modernization. In the light of
PRC military modernization, certain requirements should be readily apparent.
Among these are:

● The imperative that Taiwan must have a survivable national command and
control system with sufficient strategic and tactical warning of hostile action,
and survivable national and defense information infrastructures. The island
must be able to withstand initial strikes and regain an operational capability
quickly and efficiently.
● Taiwan’s three Services must be interoperable and able to function as a team.
Joint operations are vital.
● Taiwan must be able to protect its critical civil infrastructure and ensure con-
tinuity of services to the government, military, and general populace. The
island must be able to maintain access to sea and air lines of communication.
The military must also be able to defend against an amphibious invasion.
 Preface xvii
● Taiwan must be able to defend against a PRC air and missile campaign.
Taiwan must understand that an integrated approach to air defense is critical
and Taiwan should begin now to develop an autonomous missile defense to
defend against the growing PRC missile threat.
● While active missile defenses are important, there should be no misconcep-
tion, however, that it is the perfect solution. Missile defenses are most effec-
tive if they are part of an integrated, layered approach to defending against
air and missile threats.
● A number of trends should encourage Taiwan toward a defensive strategy that
contains a limited offensive element to deter the PRC use of force and, if nec-
essary, deny or at least complicate execution of a PRC campaign against the
island.
● In the years ahead, effective self-defense, particularly against the growing
PRC threat, may require strikes against PRC offensive forces offshore. Such
actions would be intended to disrupt the pace and scope of military opera-
tions. To be effective, considerable training and practice are essential.
● In order to effectively operate its weapon systems and execute its defense
plans, Taiwan must foster a highly competent, professional officer and non-
commissioned officer corps and enlisted forces. Taiwan also requires a
progressive military education system that ensures professionalism and
encourages innovation. It must begin to develop future leaders today.

Enhancement of civil–military relations

Finally, Taiwan should enhance civil–military relations. Taiwan’s military no
longer can operate in isolation. Political considerations will define the nature of
conflict in the Taiwan Strait, to include its scope, intensity, and duration. Taiwan
needs a transparent and accountable military that is responsive to its democrati-
cally elected political leadership. Unity of purpose, maintenance of discipline
within the leadership, and the seamless interplay between the political and mili-
tary leadership is critical for resisting PRC coercion or aggression.
There is reason to be confident that the Taiwan military would obey the direc-
tion of its democratically elected leadership. Problems in civil–military relations,
thus, are not only questions over civilian control of the military, but also civilian
participation in the defense policy process. Taiwan must invest in a cadre of qual-
ified civilians experienced in the management of defense affairs. The argument
often heard in Taiwan that civilian defense specialists are not qualified to com-
ment on defense matters does not hold much water in the United States, Japan,
and other countries, all of which rely heavily on the expertise of civilian defense
experts.
In addition, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense must be capable of execut-
ing combined operations with civil agencies and law enforcement authorities. It
also must be responsive to media scrutiny and legislative oversight.
Finally, it is essential that Taiwan also develop laws that will establish a common
means of protecting classified information. Frequent leaks of sensitive defense
xviii Preface
information can undermine national security as well as any relationship with
current or future defense partners.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the United States has a strong interest in Taiwan’s overcoming the
challenges to its national security. The United States should continue to provide
necessary defense articles and services, and to help Taiwan along in reforming its
defense establishment.
The main responsibility for this task, however, lies with Taiwan. The United
States will continue to assist Taiwan in deterring the PRC’s use of force and main-
tain a robust defense capability. Washington does so because it is in the US inter-
est, Taiwan’s interest, and in the best interest of the entire region. But in any actual
wartime scenario, the initial combat burden necessarily must be borne by
Taiwan’s fighting forces. Taiwan’s armed forces must be ready. There is much
work to be done but the people, the armed forces and the political leadership of
Taiwan have the wherewithal to get it done and get it done right.

Peter Brookes
Acknowledgments

Most of the contents of this volume is made up of revised papers presented at a

Conference on “Taiwan’s Security and Air Power” held in Taipei on January 9, 2003.
The Conference was organized by the Institute for Taiwan’s Defense and Strategic
Studies, with the cooperation of the Graduate Institute for International Affairs and
Strategic Studies, Tamkang University, the National Defense University, and the
Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Lancaster University, UK.
A number of discussants helped ensure the Conference was informed and
authoritative as well as giving useful and constructive feedback to the paper-
givers. This volume acknowledges, therefore, the helpful comments and com-
mentary of Dr Jacqueline K. Davis, Dr Grant T. Hammond, Dr Bernard Loo,
Lt Gen Tomohiro Okamoto, Lt Gen Mamoru Sato, Dr June Teufel Dreyer, Maj
Gen Peter J. Tzeng, and Dr Ming-Hsien Wong.
The Conference would not have been possible but for the very generous spon-
sorship of The Republic of China National Security Council, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, the Mainland Affairs Council,
the National Security Bureau, the Straits Exchange Foundation, and China
Airlines. Many people were involved in the organization of the Conference and,
therefore, as precursors, also to the origins of this volume. The assistance of
Ms Ju-Yu Chung, Mr Henry S. Liao, Mr Fransisco C. Lin, Mr Brian C. Liu,
Mr David C. Wu, and Ms Novia Y. Huang needs to be recorded.
In particular, the tireless efforts of Mr York W. Chen, the Executive Editor
of Taiwan Defense Affairs, both in respect of the preparation and execution of the
Conference and in the preparation of this volume is gratefully acknowledged.
Without his contribution in multitudinous ways neither would have been brought
to a successful completion.
Drawing together articles originally written in different languages and trans-
lated literally is no easy task while at the same time honoring the sense of what
the authors wished to put across. Finally, the editors would wish to recognize the
reassuring contribution of Mrs Pauline Elliott of the Centre for Defence and
International Security Studies at Lancaster University and Editorial Assistant of
Defence and Security Analysis in the preparation of the contributions to this
volume and for her assistance with the copy-editing and proof reading.

Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai

Abbreviations

AA Anti-aircraft
AAA Anti-aircraft artillery
AAMs Air-to-air missiles
ABL Airborne Laser
ABM Anti-ballistic missile
ACC Air combat center
ADR Airbase damage repair
AEW Airborne early warning
AFB Air Force Base
AIDC Airborne Interceptor Command Channel
ALCM Air launched cruise missile
AMD Anti-missile defense system
AMRAAM Advanced medium range air-to-air missile
AOC Air Office Commanding
AOC Air operation centers
ARM Anti-radiation missile
ASRAAM Advanced short range air-to-air missile
ASW Anti-submarine warfare
ATACMS Advanced tactical missile system
ATO Air tasking order
ATT Advanced theater transport
AWACS Air warning and control system
BM Battle management
BMD Ballistic missile defense
BPI Boost-phase intercept
BVR Beyond visual range
BVRAAM Beyond visual range air-to-air missiles
C2 Command and control
C4I Command, control, communications, computer,
and intelligence
C4ISR Command, control, communication, computers, intelligence,
surveilance, and reconnaissance
CAP Combat air patrols
 Abbreviations xxi
CBW Chemical and biological warfare
CC&D Camouflage, concealment, and deception
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CEP Circular error probable
CMC Central Military Commission
CNN Cable Network News
CRCs Control and Reporting Center
CRPs Control and Reporting Post
DCA Defensive counter-attacks
DMT Distributive mission training
DoD Department of Defense (USA)
ECCM Electronic Counter Counter Measures
EID Electronic identification
ELINT Electronic intelligence
EW Early warning
EW Electronic warfare
FEL Free electron laser
FOFA Follow-on Forces Attack
GCI Ground control intercepts
GEM Guidance enhanced missiles
GHz Gigahertz
GLONASS Global navigation satellite system
GPS Global positioning system
GSH General Staff Headquarters
HUMINT Human intelligence
IADS Integrated air defense system
IAF Israeli Air Force
IDF Indigenous Defense Fighter
IFF Identification friend or foe
IRBMs Intermediate range ballistic missiles
IW Information warfare
JASSM Joint air-to-surface stand-off missile
JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munitions
JSF Joint Strike Fighter
LACM Land attack cruise missile
LIDAR Laser radar
MEZ Missile engagement zones
MLRS Multiple launch rocket system
MND Ministry of National Defense (Taiwan)
MOB Mobile offshore base
MR Military Region
MRAAM Medium-range anti-aircraft missile
MRAF Military region air force
MRBM Medium-range ballistic missile
NAD Naval area defense
xxii Abbreviations
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCO Non-Commissioned Officer
NMD National Missile Defense
NOP Normal Operating Procedure
NTI Nuclear threat initiative
NTW Navy Theater Wide
OCA Offensive counter-attack
ONI Office of Naval Intelligence (USA)
OTH Over-the-horizon
PGM Precision guided munitions
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF People’s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
POL Petroleum, oil, and lubricant
PRC People’s Republic of China
RADINT Radar intelligence
RAF Royal Air Force
RMA Revolution in Military Affairs
ROC Republic of China
ROCA Republic of China Army
ROCAF Republic of China Air Force
ROCN Republic of China Navy
ROE Rules of engagement
RP Reporting Post
RPV Remotely piloted vehicles
RRR Rapid runway repair
SAM Surface-to-air missile
SATCOM Satellite Communications
SBL Space-based laser
SEAD Suppression of enemy air defenses
SIGINT Signals intelligence
SLAM Stand-off land attack missiles
SLOC Sea lines of communication
SLV Space Launch Vehicle
SOF Special operations forces
SRBM Short-range ballistic missiles
SSK Conventional submarine
SSN Nuclear powered submarine
STUFT Ships Taken up from Trade
TACAN Ultra high frequency tactical air navigation
TBM Theater-anti-ballistic missile
TEL Transport-erector-launchers
TERCON Terrain-contour
TFS Tactical fighter squadron
 Abbreviations xxiii
THAAD Theater high altitude area defense
THEL Tactical high energy laser
TMD Theater missile defense
TRS Tactical reconnaissance squadron
UAVs Unmanned aerial vehicles
UCAR Unmanned combat armed rotorcraft
UCAVs Unmanned combat aircraft or aerial vehicles
USAF United States Air Force
USN United States Navy
V/STOL Vertical / short take-off and land
WMD Weapons of mass destruction
1 Introduction
Taiwan and air power
Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai

The defense and future security of Taiwan are closely and inextricably linked to
its air power capability. Air power has proved over the past eighty years to be the
sine qua non of military success on the battlefields of the world and, ultimately,
the determinant of victory in war. Such has been the impact of air power – the
third dimension of war – on the conduct of military conflict that it has persuaded
some to believe that it alone can be the decider of success. The general consen-
sus, however, is that while air power is the dominant factor in modern war, it alone
cannot ensure victory. Ultimately, as Martin Edmonds points out in Chapter 2
of this volume, victory is only secured when armies capture and hold ground
permanently.
Air power is, arguably, the twentieth century’s most significant military
phenomenon. From the time, one hundred years ago in 1903, that the Wright
brothers first flew a heavier than air vehicle, the ability to operate in the third
dimension has given to military commanders a force multiplier that adversaries
found difficult to withstand. Their only option was to develop air power capabil-
ities themselves and bring their confrontations on the ground and at sea also into
the air. Thus, the contest for air supremacy was born, a competition that has been
one of the major driving forces among industrial and technologically advanced
states for almost a century. Once one or other side has gained air supremacy, it is
in a position to exploit the numerous operational benefits that the third dimension
brings. Among these are the ability to target and destroy any enemy military
assets or units on the ground or his vessels at sea, providing they are within range,
and to provide air support to ground forces. This is a strategy advocated by
Chih-Heng Yang and Tzu-Yun Su in Chapter 5 on Command of the Air over Taiwan.
States with air and naval forces that enjoy air supremacy, however, do not
necessarily have it all their own way. The adversary has other means than aircraft
of defending its military forces against attack from the air. For example, today it
can deploy active defense methods through the use of surface-to-air anti-aircraft
guided missiles (SAMs) as well as rapid-fire anti-aircraft guns (AA). One effec-
tive form of defense is, of course, the ability to destroy the enemy’s aircraft and
missile sites on the ground before they are able to take off or alternatively
destroy his airfields and launch sites. Alternatively, it can fall back on passive
defensive measures to limit the damage that might otherwise be inflicted. Such
2 Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai
methods include the hardening of airfields, use of camouflage, and the building
of underground shelters.
The competition for command of the air and the exploitation of air supremacy,
however, is not confined any longer merely to manned, or unmanned, aircraft. As
the world moves into the twenty-first century, so the precision-guided ballistic
missile has become increasingly the preferred weapon of choice. There are a
number of reasons why this is so: first, economically, it is relatively cost-effective;
politically, it is less sensitive to public criticism since no pilots or crew are
involved, should they be shot down; and socially, it is preferred since with the use
of the means of global positioning and modern guidance systems, the missile hits
its target with unerring accuracy and reduces the effects of collateral damage.
Additionally, the missile becomes more economical, since where one missile can
reach and destroy its target, it might well take six or more times that number for
manned aircraft to have the same effect.
Manned aircraft, for all their high performance and offensive and defensive
sophisticated sub-systems, are prodigiously costly and potentially highly vulner-
able. They are expensive to procure, whether produced indigenously or purchased
from abroad, expensive to maintain, and costly to operate. The pilots who operate
them are highly trained but only reach the high levels of skill required in modern
air combat after a very lengthy period of instruction. Such are the physical, intel-
lectual, and psychological demands on those who fly modern fast jet combat
aircraft that only the very brightest and best are recruited. The cost, however, does
not end there. Pilots need to be kept at a high level of air readiness; their essen-
tial aeronautical and combat skills are only retained with constant practice both
on the ground in simulators and in the air.
These considerations, again, add to the huge total cost of having an effective
air force. The costs are so high that some air forces around the world are now look-
ing to train younger pilots than ever, specifically in order to get as long a return on
their investment as possible. The pilot is a, if not the, crucial asset in the competi-
tion for air power. As Chien Chung notes in Chapter 11 in his discussion of mili-
tary culture and the restructuring of the Republic of China (ROC) Air Force
(ROCAF), there is much that still needs to be done by way of training the young
Taiwanese combat pilot in the future. Much the same also goes for the mechanics,
engineers, and maintenance ground crew who work to keep him and his aircraft in
the air and of the ground control personnel who guide him safely and effectively
to his target.
Manned aircraft are vulnerable to attack from air-to-air guided missiles, or
canon fire, from other aircraft; today they may even be hit by a missile fired
beyond visual range. Alternatively, they may be targeted from surface-to-air
guided missiles launched from the ground or from ships at sea, or shot down by
gunfire. Ballistic missiles, in contrast, are a much more difficult target to destroy.
They are smaller, fly higher and faster, and are more difficult to identify and inter-
cept. This lesson was learned very quickly during the Second World War, when
fighter aircraft were able to intercept and destroy the slow-flying, jet engine pro-
pelled V-1 cruise missile, but unable to do anything about the V-2 rocket. At the
 Introduction 3
time, the V1 rocket did not leave the earth’s atmosphere and was therefore not,
stricto sensu, a ballistic missile, unlike those in service today.
This irrefutable fact presents Taiwan’s security with, arguably, its most pressing
problem. For almost a decade, as Eric McVadon details in his chapter (Chapter 9)
on the joint air and missile defense of Taiwan, the People’s Liberation Army PLA
have been amassing a formidable inventory of short-, medium-, and longer-range
ballistic missiles. All categories have the range to include Taiwan, making short-
range ballistic missiles (SRBM), from Taiwan’s point of view, a strategic threat.
China has been concentrating on two SRBM systems, the DF-15 and the DF-11,
of which there are now 400 in operational service, and which are projected to
reach 1,000 by 2010. Both missiles have solid propellants, can be launched with
little preparation from mobile launchers, and are able to deliver their warhead on
Taiwan within 6 to 8 minutes of firing. Improved accuracy with global position-
ing systems and larger 500 kg warheads would mean that relatively few would be
needed to inflict heavy damage on the capability of the ROCAF to respond.
Indeed, from an active counter-air defense perspective, there is little that can be
done to intercept and destroy a Mainland China missile attack on Taiwan. At
present, Taiwan’s only defense response is to limit the damage caused as much as
possible through prudent preparations as discussed in Ming-Yen Tsai’s chapter
(Chapter 10) on air base defense.
But it is not only the missile threat that gives the ROC cause for concern. There
is also the threat from manned combat aircraft, and the steady change in the bal-
ance of air superiority over the Taiwan Straits. The ROCAF’s weakest moment
vis à vis the PLAAF was in 1995 when all that was available were obsolete F-15s,
F-104s, and a handful of Taiwan’s own Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDFs).
The balance of air superiority between the ROCAF and the PLAAF was restored
when the former took delivery of the US F-16, French Mirage 2000, and more IDF
fighters; indeed it could be argued that until recently the air advantage lay with
Taiwan. As York Chen points out in detail in his chapter (Chapter 4) on the bal-
ance of air superiority over the Taiwan Strait, the ROCAF is now falling seriously
behind as the PLAAF expands in the number and capability of its combat aircraft.
The implications for ROCAF counter-air operations and the defense of Taiwan
are complex and substantial.
Since the turn of the century, however, the air superiority “edge” in Taiwan’s
favor has proved to be only temporary. It has steadily been eroded as PLA’s mili-
tary modernization program has begun to take effect in the field of command of
the air with the procurement of Russian designed and Chinese indigenously man-
ufactured Sukhoi Su-27 and Su-30 advanced aircraft. The estimate is that by
2010, the PLAAF would have amassed some 500 of these aircraft types. The
potency of these aircraft has also been considerably enhanced with the addition
of an array of beyond visual range (BVRAAM) and medium-range air-to-air
guided (AMRAAM) missiles.
The air threat to Taiwan, however, does not simply end there. Kenneth Allen
points out that it is not merely in land, sea, and weapons systems that the PLA is
moving significantly forward, but also in its development of theory and military
4 Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai
doctrine. In the past, air power was seen only as an adjunct of ground and sea
campaigns and essentially defensive in emphasis. The PLA took seriously the
lessons learned from their analysis of the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War, however,
reassessed the importance of air power, and its air campaign theory. In so doing,
they differentiated between offensive, defensive, and air blockade campaigns, and
set these within the context of the PLAAF’s ability to conduct these campaigns
either independently or jointly with other branches of the PLA. More significantly,
in recent years, the PLAAF and the PLA have been exercising air campaign
theory in respect of three modes of operation, mobile, positional, and guerrilla,
with the emphasis increasingly on the first.
What this means for Taiwan is that the PLA are acquiring the weapons and
equipment, the air power theory, and the military doctrine, to conduct offensive
air operations not just in the Taiwan Strait but further afield. To give credibility
to these new developments, the PLA and PLAAF are training extensively to be
able to implement these theories and doctrines, mostly within the region opposite
Taiwan. In the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, it is certain from these exer-
cises that the PLAAF would play a central role, as Chih-Kung Yu notes in his
chapter (Chapter 8) on air combat in the defense of Taiwan. To keep up the pres-
sure on Taiwan, and to hone the PLAAF pilots’ skills, these exercises have been
conducted regularly, with units rotating in and out of front line airfields, and prac-
tising across provinces and regions within China. For example, a recent exercise
held on Dong Shan Island in 2001 was the PLA’s first large-scale joint exercise
of China’s new integrated military force. “The PLA is working to develop the
necessary theory and train its forces to be able to reach its goal of conducting
simultaneous offensive and defensive campaigns. It is not there yet.” But there is
no doubt that it will not be too long before it is, an estimate of which the ROC is
fully aware.
In the dialectic of air power, Taiwan has to find ways of matching, or countering,
both the air threat and the joint forces threat that the PLA poses. In place, it
already has an integrated three-tier air defense system of SAM guided missiles in
addition to its air defense aircraft deployed in airfields around the island. Such is
the air power available to the PLA and the array of weaponry at the disposal
of the PLAAF, that the feeling in Taiwan is to draw back from its policy of “not
firing the first shot.” Chih-Heng Yang and Tzu-Yun Su argue that this would
mean abandoning Taiwan’s Maginot Line mentality and be prepared to adopt an
offensive–defensive strategy. This would lead to two options: the first would be to
develop a second-strike capability, but this would entail being able to withstand a
PLA first strike on Taiwan. The second would be to be prepared to build up an
offensive capability to strike, preemptively if necessary, at China’s Air Force
capabilities, even at the risk, as Rear Admiral Eric McVadon observes, of losing
US support.
An analysis of the PLA’s air threat to Taiwan, as conceded by the
US Department of Defense in 2002, concluded that it is real today and, in a relatively
short period of time, will become overwhelming. Unless something radical and
effective is done to counter it soon, the future of Taiwan must be uncertain, if not
 Introduction 5
bleak. As China’s air power lies at the heart of its capability to inflict harm on
Taiwan and its capacity to invade, so, for Taiwan, it forms the basis of its ability
to withstand attack and defend its sovereignty. Eric McVadon concludes that there
is an urgent need in Taiwan for a joint, combined, and comprehensive defense.
The components of these defenses differ according to whether the object against
which one is trying to defend oneself is an aircraft or a missile, cruise or other-
wise. Whether the former or the latter, there is much to be done by Taiwan to
strengthen its defense, some of which can be achieved through changes in tactics
and more efficient procedures. In particular, Taiwan should develop a joint air and
missile defense, and prepare, in the event that the United States would come to
the island’s aid if attacked by China, to be able to engage in combined operations
with US armed forces.
In addressing the air threat to Taiwan, Robert Pape takes a close look at the
likelihood of an attack by the PRC against the Taiwan. He concludes that in the
light of historical experience and no matter which of the three options – denial
(blockade), decapitation (bombardment), and punishment (invasion) – the PLA
might choose to coerce the island, the evidence would suggest that it would be
unlikely to succeed. The solution to Taiwan’s problem of how to respond to
the threats from the PRC is to work closely with the ROC’s main security asset –
the United States.
Nevertheless, Taiwan has to consider the best strategy in the short term to counter
the threat from the air from China. Of one thing the Taiwanese are certain: the threat
posed by China’s air power will neither go away nor diminish in size. Taiwan has
therefore also to look to the longer term. Here, Richard D. Fisher offers some
innovative and practical propositions. His chapter (Chapter 12) recognizes the
new threat from the PLA and identifies the directions where China, and its
military strategy, are going. For certain, the evidence is that China has extrava-
gant ambitions for its armed forces particularly in respect of capitalizing on the
“revolution in military affairs.” The PLA has embraced the concept of informa-
tion warfare, for which reason Taiwan must do likewise. This is not, however, to
discount the need to upgrade Taiwan’s current force and look to adopting weapons
systems currently serving in the front line of the USAF and other Service
branches. All of this will impose a significant financial burden on the island’s
economy. But it might well be that this is the cost that has to be paid to avoid
becoming absorbed into Mainland China.
As General Bernard Montgomery noted in 1943, “If we lose the war in the air,
we lose the war, and we lose it quickly.” That sentiment is as applicable to Taiwan
as it was to the Allied Forces in the North African desert. The only difference is
that air power in Montgomery’s day was relatively simple compared with today.
As Greg Mills points out in his overview (Chapter 3) of where air power is going
today and the ten factors that states should bear in mind if it is to be effective, air
power is not a unilateral phenomenon. Air power is almost all encompassing in its
demands and in its effects. This book addresses the question why air power is so
important to Taiwan’s national security and, through the expert contributions of
its eleven authors, offers some potential solutions.
Part I
Air power and Taiwan’s
security
2 Air power and Taiwan’s security
Martin Edmonds

The peculiarities of air power

Air power, it has been said, ‘is the twentieth century’s peculiar contribution to
warfare (and) continues to defy our attempts at analysis.’1 The explanation for
this somewhat enigmatic statement is that the vocabulary of air power is never
constant. Even apparently straightforward concepts, such as air power itself,
‘strategic bombing’, ‘command of the air’, or ‘air supremacy’ mean different
things to different people. Adding to the potential for confusion is the extent to
which scientific research and advanced technology have tended to concentrate on
the air element of modern strategy and tactics. Much of that technology is highly
esoteric and spans not merely the branch of the armed forces that traditionally
operates in the air and outer space, that is to say, Air Forces, but also encompasses
forces at sea and on land. Such is the degree of overlap of the ‘third dimension’
of warfare that the air element of modern strategy has often been a battleground
between all branches of the armed services. Each has claimed the residual ‘right’
to own and operate heavier-than-air flying vehicles – generally known as aircraft,
helicopters and missiles – independently of the other two.
Looking back to the early days of aviation and the idea of flight, the first
proponents were not those who saw it as a new dimension of warfare that required
a new and separate specialist branch of the armed forces. These were the two
existing branches, the Navy and the Army. They saw the application of aircraft as
adjuncts to their traditional strategic and operational roles: in the case of the
Navy, this was to give capital ships at sea the capability to search, find and locate
enemy ships at long distance, and ultimately engage them. Aircraft could also
improve communications at sea and allow ship commanders the option of being
able to bring concentrated firepower to bear on their adversaries. Aircraft elimi-
nated the limitations imposed by the horizon and the curvature of the earth and
widened communications, giving those fleets that had aircraft the tactical and
operational advantage.
Tactical and operational advantage – very much akin to the notion of the
‘knowledge edge’ that is driving the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) today –
was also the asset that aircraft brought to armies during the early days of military
aviation. The earliest use of the air was the ability of observers to survey the
10 Martin Edmonds
battlefield and locate enemy positions from gas-filled balloons some few hundred
feet in the air. From this height advantage, observers could direct artillery fire on
targets that otherwise would have been out of sight or give intelligence to com-
manders where enemy units could be found. However, these balloons were static
and had limited range. Aircraft overcame these limitations and widened the area
that could be surveyed. In both the early naval and military use of aircraft, the
heavy emphasis was on reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and target acquisi-
tion that ultimately led to naval and military engagements between fleets and
armies.
Only towards the end of the First World War was the potential for the use of
flying vehicles – and this meant airships as well as aircraft – as the means of
bringing firepower, and that meant the war, to the enemy, recognised. If aircraft
and airships could observe targets, then they could also be the means by which
munitions could be delivered on them. Such bombing raids, however, were not
confined to military targets. German Zeppelin raids on coastal towns in the
United Kingdom were frequent and thereby added a further dimension to warfare –
attacks on civilian populations. Air power effectively made war not only a three-
dimensional affair but also one that was no longer confined to military forces.
Civilians came under the purview of air power, making whole societies, their eco-
nomic and industrial capacity as well as their cities and towns vulnerable to attack.
And with this opening up of the third dimension of warfare and its scope for
offence came a new raft of strategic concepts and military operational doctrine.

The dialectic of air power

Clearly, air power brought significant operational advantage to those armed
forces that had access to the new technology. But, as with the dialectic of war
itself, one technological advantage tends to prompt an opposite response that sub-
sequently leads to the development of an equal and opposite military technologi-
cal developments. In the case of early developments in air power – that of manned
aircraft – this meant the development of specialist aircraft and munitions that
could intercept and destroy enemy aircraft used for battlefield reconnaissance and
aerial bombardment.
Such were the advantages of air power to the side that had it, and could thereby
enjoy both command of the air and exercise air supremacy, that it soon became,
within the relatively short time span of two decades the sine qua non of military
success. For this reason, the history of air power has been one of technological
competition between states seeking to have command of the air and deny it to
their enemies. In the course of this development, the dialectic of air power and the
struggle to gain air supremacy has assumed many dimensions and become
highly complex. Some of these developments have occurred in space, some in
the air – the world’s atmosphere – some on, and even under, the sea, and some on
the ground. Furthermore, they have involved, inter alia, scientific and technolog-
ical developments in aerodynamics, ballistics, radar, stealth, sensors, information
technologies, satellite imagery and electronics.
 Air power and Taiwan’s security 11
Whilst air power alone cannot win wars – this in the final analysis is a matter
of capturing and holding ground – or be able to exercise total control of the seas
and sea lanes of communication, armies and navies cannot – or are extremely
unlikely to – prevail in battle or in war without having either command of the air
or air supremacy in that it is denied to the enemy. Air power – by which is meant
‘the total ability of a nation to operate throughout the air and in space’2 –
presupposes therefore both command of the air and the ability to exercise air
supremacy. To have air power and to be able to exploit it means that armies and
navies effectively have an added dimension – the third dimension – to their oper-
ations. Not to have command of the air, or the ability to exercise air supremacy,
means that they are left at a distinct disadvantage vis à vis their adversary.
Not to have command of the air or air supremacy points to a likely defeat,
except under certain or exceptional circumstances. The air war in Vietnam during
the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated that even with overwhelming air superiority,
the United States with all its air power could not prevail over its adversary. The
North Vietnamese, fighting a guerrilla campaign, in what today would be classed
as asymmetrical warfare, totally lacked air power but nonetheless were able ulti-
mately to emerge victorious. Air power, therefore, has to be seen in the context of
the particular conflict in which states are engaged. It is manifestly the case that
against modern forms of international terrorism, air power, whilst useful under
certain circumstances, and in particular situations, nevertheless has limitations.
Correspondingly, the air dimension of warfare is one over which adversaries
also have to compete in order to gain control of the airspace or to acquire air
supremacy. In a manner of speaking, states have no alternative. It is for this
primary reason that much scientific, intellectual, engineering and technological
effort, not to mention scarce national resources, is appropriated for the research,
development and manufacture of manned and unmanned aircraft, missiles, satel-
lites, sensors, surveillance equipment, communications and guidance systems –
all the artefacts of air power – compared with other military equipment and
weapons of war.
The vocabulary of air power that causes such confusion as mentioned can be
seen in terms of the importance the concept has for all three branches of the
armed services. As air power was seen as an essential war-winning asset, all three
clearly wanted to exercise control over the means by which it was acquired. This
in turn has sometimes proved to be the cause of bitter inter-service rivalry, even
to the extent of armies and navies opposing the formation of a separate air force
branch of the armed services. This wrangling was much in evidence in the United
States during the 1950s, both before and after the formation of the United States
Air Force (USAF), replicating an experience that occurred in the United
Kingdom some thirty years before.
During the period after the Second World War, the theory of strategic bom-
bardment was very much in vogue. It was a legacy of the massive strategic air
raids and aerial bombardment against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan during
the Second World War. It was a strategy that had many advocates, in particular the
Italian Army Colonel, Giulio Douhet3 and the American, William ‘Billy’ Mitchell
12 Martin Edmonds
after the First World War,4 Basil Liddell Hart in 19255 and the Russo-American
strategic theorist, Alexander de Seversky during the Second World War and after.6
From what they had observed, principally, in the First World War, each foresaw
aerial bombardment as a war-winning strategy. None envisaged any practical
means by which attacks from the air against both military and civilian targets
could either be prevented or intercepted. Air power, they argued, had introduced
into modern warfare an offensive capability for which there was no effective or
guaranteed defence. Bomber aircraft, they concluded, would always be able to
penetrate air defences. In 1942, even Hollywood in the form of Walt Disney pro-
ductions, joined forces with de Seversky to promote his argument for strategic
bombing, even to the extent of reducing Japan, and its people, to little more than
a pile of rubble.7 The subsequent experience of Britain’s fighter aircraft and early
warning radar screen during the Battle of Britain was not sufficient to persuade
de Seversky otherwise after the Second World War had ended.
After the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the concept of strate-
gic bombardment took on a new dimension, as Bernard Brodie pointed out in his
Strategy in the Missile Age.8 It was little wonder, therefore, that all three Services
in the United States and, subsequently, Britain and France, wanted to harness the
Second World War air power developments in Germany with jet-propelled aircraft
and, more importantly, the V2 ballistic rocket. By developing the means – ballistic
missiles – strategic and tactical offensive capabilities would be further enhanced.
These in turn would help deter the perceived Soviet military threat. The Soviet
Union was no different in its embracing strategic rocketry. It also devoted con-
siderable effort in those early postwar years to developing the V2 technology
acquired from a defeated Germany. In the process, they even formed a fifth
branch of their armed forces, the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces.
Although ballistic missile technology was in its infancy after 1945, strategic
bombing was very much the dominant strategic concept; it was one that was
actively promoted by the American, Soviet, British and French Air Forces. Only
later were the claims for strategic bombing challenged and proved wanting. At the
time and before missile technology fully matured into effective weapons systems,
manned strategic bombers (the B-29, Lancaster and, subsequently, the American
B-49 and B-52s, Britain’s ‘V’ bomber force and the French Mirage IV), operated
by Western Air Forces, were initially the only effective means of delivery.
Research and development into missiles, however, stimulated inter-Service
competition. This was especially prevalent in the United States. There, all three
Services claimed the right to own and exercise strategic air power. The USAF
argued that this was their responsibility because missiles were viewed effectively
as rocket-powered aircraft. The US Army felt that rockets were merely another
form of artillery and therefore missile acquisition was a natural development for
them. The US Navy (USN) even saw missiles launched from naval platforms were
simply a progression in naval gunnery.9 Only when the vulnerability of strategic
missile launch sites became an issue in the 1960s did the submarine-launched
solid fuelled strategic missile come into its own (Polaris) and the USN assume
the role of delivering the principal US strategic nuclear deterrent.
 Air power and Taiwan’s security 13
The essential characteristics of air power
To escape the vicissitudes of air power vocabulary and interpretations of differing
technologies, Tony Mason has helped clarify what air power is in his book Air
Power in the Nuclear Age, Theory and Practice.10 In it, he defines air power as,

The ability to project military force by, or from, a platform in the third
dimension above the surface of the earth … (and) is exploited to advantage by
the platform or vehicle; rather than simply traversed as by a bullet, a shell or
a ballistic projectile.11

The important point in this definition is to recognise the human element in

the application of force in the third dimension. Whether or not the platform is
manned or unmanned is immaterial; it is man’s exploitation of the third dimen-
sion for military advantage that is essential. This is the distinctive feature of the
concept of air power. Part of that exploitation is to deny the enemy the ability to
do likewise.12 Indeed, air power is concerned with the dialectic of warfare con-
ducted primarily in the third dimension. Once ‘air supremacy’ has been achieved,
and providing all conditions are met, a state can be considered to have achieved
command of the air. The strategic, operational and tactical advantages that air
power can offer can then be applied to combat on land and at sea.
Air power is exercised through the deployment and use of platforms, or vehicles,
in the third dimension. In plain English, these platforms are heavier-than-air flying
vehicles generally operated or flown by trained human beings to perform a range
of specific tasks. These platforms can also include, in addition to aircraft, air bal-
loons, unmanned vehicles controlled from ground stations, satellites and space
vehicles. Their roles and tasks are either to deny or assist in denying, the use of
the third dimension – which includes space – to the enemy, and to exploit it to the
advantage of one’s own naval and ground forces.

The major attributes of air power

The first thing that has to be recognised is that, whereas 70 per cent of the world’s
surface is covered by water, 100 per cent is surrounded by air, or the atmosphere.
It is this environment in which air power is exercised. This distinguishes the third
dimension from the sea and land power inasmuch as the atmosphere presents no
physical barriers or hindrances. Encumbrances such as the weather, clouds,
winds, storms, rain, fog and declining oxygen levels with altitude can present
constraints and problems, though developments in modern aircraft, unmanned
aerial vehicles and missiles have mitigated most, if not all, of them to a signifi-
cant degree. This means that, in effect, heavier-than-air air-breathing vehicles,
that is to say aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, have the ability to move easily
anywhere above the surface of the globe and do so from sea level to operational
heights in the order of 60,000 feet and above. The only limitations on this degree
of ubiquity is the range of the aircraft, the endurance of its pilot and crew, and the
14 Martin Edmonds
fact that ultimately it has to find a suitable place from which to take off and
to land.
These limitations, through the application of modern technology, have been
reduced significantly. This has given aircraft, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs),
satellites and missiles and, therefore, the countries that use them a degree of
ubiquity not found either on land or at sea. On land, the nature of the terrain and the
requirement to operate only on a two-dimensional plane, presents commanders
with major operational problems. Armies cannot always go where they would
like. Aircraft do not face such operational barriers; they are not constrained by
geography to the same degree. Likewise, navies are limited to water, both on the
surface and beneath, and are restricted to navigable channels. Though they can
operate in a third dimension, beneath the waves, even then they are still con-
strained as to where they can operate. From their perspective, when operated from
ships at sea or from coastal land bases, aircraft and UAVs, equipped with modern
sensors and surveillance technology, can cover most areas where navies are likely
to operate, but without the same restrictions.
Ubiquity is, therefore, one of the major attributes of air power. It is a capabil-
ity that states and their air forces are quick to exploit. However, there is one spe-
cific consideration that air forces have to bear in mind that presents a significant
barrier to unencumbered air operations. Because states see, in international law,
the air space above their territories as belonging to them, they resist others over-
flying what they perceive to be exclusively theirs.13 Aircraft entering the air space
of another state therefore require permission to do so. When entering the air space
of another state, all aircraft, civil and military, have to conform to both national
and international rules and procedures and are under the control of the host state
whilst they are there. This includes a unique identification signal to each and
every aircraft or UAV. Failure to comply would be construed as a violation of
another’s air space. Such an incursion potentially would invite interception by air
defence aircraft, or in extremis attack from surface-to-air missiles or ground gun-
fire and to be shot down. The fate of the Korean Airliner 007 when it strayed into
Soviet air space in August 1983,14 or that of the American maritime patrol aircraft
off Southern China in March 2001,15 or even the protests from the Greek author-
ities when Turkish aircraft flew into parts of the Aegean inadvertently, are graphic
examples of this principle.
A more dramatic case of the principle of no over-flying without permission was
when the USAF was ordered to dispatch bombers to attack Tripoli on 16 April
1986. Other than the United Kingdom, no European state was prepared to grant
the USAF permission to over-fly its territory on that mission. France, in particu-
lar, refused over-flight permission to the US F-111 aircraft detailed to execute the
mission, code named El Dorado Canyon. Consequently, the US aircraft had to fly
along the Eastern Atlantic Ocean around France and Spain over international
waters (and therefore in international air space). From there they entered the
Mediterranean, taking advantage of the fact that Gibraltar was a British colony.
This lengthy over-sea route was only made possible through the use of in-flight
refuelling in both directions, thereby extending the range of each aircraft. The
 Air power and Taiwan’s security 15
task was not impossible, merely inconvenient and involved not only additional
flight time, but also, in total, 100 aircraft instead of two-thirds that number.16
A further disadvantage that can limit the ubiquity of air power is the need for
aircraft and UAVs to have somewhere to take off and land. Missiles only require
one location from where to be launched; their mission is strictly a one-way affair.
Depending on their range, this can also prove a logistic problem. Modern aircraft
and UAVs also need constant and frequent maintenance to keep operating. They
demand extensive logistic support and, in some cases, highly sophisticated
ground-based equipment and facilities. In turn, this requires suitably located and
equipped airfields. When operating away from one’s own territory, these facilities
have to be provided by what is termed ‘host nation support’. Those countries
providing such assistance, however, can place operational restrictions on the uses
to which the air power of other states aircraft and missiles might be put. This hap-
pened when USAF who wanted to launch an air attack from the Italian military
airfield of Aviano against Serb forces in Banja Luka. The Italians refused
permission, using their prerogative to do so ostensibly in order to gain political
leverage to be present at the later peace talks.17
These support facilities are not always available, as has recently (Fall, 2003)
become evident in the US build-up for a possible invasion of Iraq. The ability to
operate against enemy targets some distance from an aircraft’s or a UAV’s home
base necessitates friendly countries or Allies making their airfields and other
facilities available. Unlike the 1990–1991 Gulf war when the USAF had unre-
stricted use of Saudi Arabian airfields to attack Iraq, in 2002 a restriction was
imposed that they could only be used for logistic support purposes.
Alternatively, air power can be based on large sea-going platforms. These are
principally aircraft carriers that can operate independently offshore in interna-
tional waters. Nuclear powered carriers have the capability to operate for long
periods without refuelling which makes them such a potent element of projected
air power. Such vessels can also carry their own aircraft logistic and maintenance
support, but are inevitably restricted in the number and variety of aircraft and UAVs
that it can operate and support.18 Aircraft carriers, however, are not the only vessels
to carry heavier-than-air combat vehicles: most naval ships carry one or two heli-
copters, and assault ships likewise carry a range of heavier-than-air vehicles.
Modern technology has even made it possible for aircraft and helicopters to
operate independently of home bases. The development of the vertical take-off
and land aircraft, such as the British Harrier has enabled land forces to have air
support from aircraft located within the theatre of battle. With the development of
the attack helicopter, a form or airborne cavalry, land forces again can operate
with their own air support without depending on that of their air forces operating
from bases some distance away. Even so, these new forms of military support
aircraft and helicopters require mobile logistic support systems to sustain their
operations.
Despite these physical, legal and political limitations, air power remains for the
most part ubiquitous within the particular constraints faced by all states with air
forces. Military force can be deployed from the air against sea and land targets
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
and learned Judge (on a Masonic question) to grant the desire of the
applicants, deeming it no encroachment whatever in ranking with
those who may have assumed the exclusive privilege in granting of
charters. And it is by the St John's expected that all Brethren and
Masonic Bodies will have the consideration of supporting the dignity
and respect of antiquity which' may add to the lustre of a city,
though not the metropolis, yet admitted by all parties, for population
and industry, to be the first in the kingdom.— Yours, J. C." St John's
efforts to widen the circle of disaffection to the Grand Lodge of
Scotland,
 ANTIQUITY OF GLASGOW ST JOHN. 281 then to a limited
extent prevalent in Edinburgh, and to secure for itself the position of
a Grand Lodge, were neutrahsed by the return of the Seceding
Lodges to their former allegiance. The clause in the Schaw Statutes
of I S99 confirming the right of the Warden of the Lodge of
Kilwinning to be present at the election of wardens of all Lodges in a
district embracing Glasgow, and to be convener of and president at
all conventions of the Craft in the west of Scotland, shows that the
Malcolm Canmore Charter and the pretensions founded upon it by
the Lodge of Glasgow were alike unknown to the highest Scottish
Masonic authority of the period. The document in question was, in
1868, submitted to the inspection of Mr Cosmo Innes, and that
eminent archaeologist gave it as his opinion that it had been written
within the last two hundred years. We think he might safely have
limited the period by a good deal more than one-half But apart
altogether from this apocryphal charter, the proof of the Lodge St
John's existence in 161 3, contained in the records of the Masons'
Incorporation, and the fact of its identification as a party in 1628 to
the Craft's deed in favour of St Clair of Roslin, entitle it to a high
position on the roll of old Scotch Lodges. Frederick Augustus Barrow,
of View Park Villa, Partick, whose portrait heads the present chapter,
is Junior Grand Deacon of the Grand Lodge of Scotland, and Depute
Provincial Grand Master of Glasgow. He is a Past Master of St Mark,
Glasgow, to which Lodge he was affiliated in 1857, and has for many
years borne a prominent part in the administration of Masonic affairs
in the western metropolis. He was the acting head of the province
when the Earl of Dalhousie laid the foundation-stone of the Albert
Bridge in 1870, and presided at the Masonic banquet held in honour
of that event. Mr Barrow is Provincial Grand Superintendent of
Lanarkshire, under the Supreme Grand Royal Arch Chapter of
Scotland ; Provincial Grand Master of Glasgow and the west country,
under the Royal Order of Scotland ; and holds other appointments in
the so-called higher degrees. He is a Prince of the Chapter of Rose
Croix, a Knight Commander of the Religious and Military Order of the
Temple, and has attained to the 30th degree of the Ancient and
Accepted Scottish Rite.
 CHAPTER XXVIII. OTWITHSTANDING its readmission to
Grand Lodge, a feeling of dissatisfaction and lukewarmness
continued to pre vail in Mary's Chapel on account of its treatment in
connection with the union with Kilwinning. Its unsuccessful attempt
in 1S15 to regain its position at the head of the roll was at no great
interval followed by a charge of irregularity in connection with its
recognition of Knight Templars. It was afterwards involved in a series
of troubles through the negligence or malversation of some of its
officers, and in 1824,
 VICISSITUDES OF MARY'S CHAPEL. 283 by a vote of Grand
Lodge, was suspended from all Masonic privileges. It protested
against this sentence as being " inconsistent with the principles of
Masonry, and contrary to the express decision of the Supreme Court
of this country, pronounced in November 181 1, upon a former
attempt of the Grand Lodge to deprive Freemasons of their just
rights." But the more pacific of the brethren, dissatisfied with the
isolation to which the Lodge was subjected through the irascibility of
its leading officials, adopted measures of a conciliatory character,
which were accepted by Grand Lodge. An examination of the
Lodge's books revealed the names of nearly two hundred intrants
whose registration had been neglected. These, which included Brs.
George Dundas (the late Lord Manor), and Benjamin Bell, advocate
(the present Sheriff of Elgin and Banffshire), were forthwith recorded
by Grand Lodge. Such irregularities were unfavourable to the
prosperity of Mary's Chapel. No minutes of its transactions were kept
for the two years ending December 1833 ; and at the St John'sday
communication of that year, at which only five brethren attended,
Alexander Deuchar accepted the mastership, in order "to prevent the
Lodge from becoming dormant." James Graham of Leitchtown
became Master in 1835. Under this brother's reign, which extended
overtwo years, a new generation of members had sprung up, who,
being no parties to former disputes, worked harmoniously with
Grand Lodge. After eight years of comparative prosperity, Mary's
Chapel was involved in fresh troubles through the culpability of its
then Master, who was afterwards expelled. Exertions corresponding
to the gravity of the situation were now put forth by the brethren, —
Mr Graham was recalled to the chair, and ere his retirement in 1849,
the Lodge had regained both strength and influence. Mr Graham's
portrait will be found at the head of this chapter. Stirling Royal Arch
is his mother Lodge, but he affiliated into Mary's Chapel in 1834. He
was Senior Grand Deacon from 1838 to 1841, and took an active
part in organising the Fund of Scottish Masonic Benevolence, and
was one of its first trustees. He is a Knight Grand Commander of the
Temple, and a member of the 32d degree of the Ancient and
Accepted Scottish Rite. He went to Canada in 1854, and has held the
office of Master of an English Lodge in Montreal. He is now a citizen
of Toronto, and continues to take an active interest in the Fraternity.
Mr Graham's family is descended from the noble house of Graham,
Eai'l of Monteith, through the Garteer family, being the oldest cadets
of the Grahams of Garteer, by direct descent from George Graham
the second Laird of Garteer. Alexander Deuchar played a prominent
part in the Masonic events of the early part of the present century.
He was the eldest son of David
 2 84 HISTORY OF FREEMASONRY. Deuchar of Morningside,
the head of the old Scotch family of Deuchar. David Deuchar had a
family of six sons, who were all members of the Craft. Alexander
was initiated in the Lodge St David in May 1801, and was passed
and raised in the Lodge of Edinburgh in November 1802. After filling
several minor offices in Mary's Chapel, he was elected to the
(^^'4^'A:d e^U-c^ cc^ Mastership, which he held till 1 8 14, when
he retired. The prosperity of the Lodge having been affected by
adverse circumstances, he was recalled to the chair in 1823. Shortly
after his resumption of office, a demand by Grand Lodge for the
production of its books was resisted by Mary's Chapel. Subsequently,
however, on the Lodge being threatened with suspension for its
contumacy, a majority of the brethren succeeded in passing
 ALEXANDER DEUCHAR. 285 resolutions of submission to
Grand Lodge. Regarding these resolutions as having been improperly
arrived at, and as compromising the dignity of the Lodge, Mr
Deuchar returned to St David's, and for three years took an active
part in its affairs. He afterwards resumed his connection with Mary's
Chapel, and filled its chair for a short period, under circumstances
which have been already adverted to. He died in 1844. While it can
truly be said that in matters connected with the rituals, ceremonies,
laws, and usages of Freemasonry, Mr Deuchar was one of the best-
informed men of the day ; it is equally true, that having derived his
historical knowledge of the Craft chiefly through the oral and written
traditions that were current in the previous- century, his sympathies
and teachings were deeply tinged with the fabulous. It was to his
association with the " High Degrees" that he owed his widespread
fame. He became a Knight Templar in 1803, and was in 1806 elected
Commander of the Edinburgh Encampment. He was chiefly
instrumental in instituting the Grand Conclave of Knight Templars,
and of the Supreme Grand Royal Arch Chapter of Scotland — events
which are more particularly referred to in the next chapter, — and in
1825 he inaugurated a movement for the resuscitation of the Royal
Order of Scotland. It was in the course of his correspondence with
Continental Masons on the antiquity of the Mut £-rades that he
obtained a copy of the Charter of Cologne, a translation of which he
presented to the Lodge of Edinburgh. This document will be found at
length in another chapter. Mr Deuchar, who followed the business of
seal-engraver, was an eminent genealogist, and had a thorough
knowledge of Heraldry, upon which subject he published a work in
three volumes, entitled, 'The British Herald,' which was by
permission dedicated to Sir Walter Scott. The annexed portrait of Mr
Deuchar is copied from a medallion by Heniiing.
 (l/}'^Xyi.^^A~u.-t,ty\^ CHAPTER XXIX. N their ardent
desire to associate ideas of antiquity with the " High Degrees," some
writers have not hesitated to identify the Masonic Templars now
existing as the I'ightful representatives of the Knight Templars of the
middle ages. In this they are altogether mistaken. Masonic
Templarism does not in any respect bear relationship to the Templars
of the Crusades, but is a branch of the system of Masonic
Knighthood which had its origin on the Continent some hundred and
thirty years ago. It was to their intercourse with brethren belonging
to regiments serving in Ireland towards the end of the last century
that Scotch Lodges owed their acquaintance with Knight Templarism.
And it is a curious fact that this Order, then
 KNIGHT TEMPLARISM. 287 known as "Black Masonry," was
propagated to a large. extent through charters issued by the " High
Knight Templars of Ireland Kilwinning Lodge," — a body of
Freemasons in Dublin, who were constituted by Mother Kilwinning in
1779, for the practice of the Craft Degrees. This encouraged the
belief in Kilwinning being a centre of the haut grades ; — and in 18
13 application was made to the mother Lodge to authorise the
transference of one of these Black warrants from Knights of the
Temple and of Malta, in the Westmeath Militia, to brethren of the
same degree serving in the Shropshire Militia. Mother Kilwinning had
previously been solicited to constitute a Provincial Grand High Knight
Templar Encampment for Ireland— and so recently as 1827 had
been interrogated by the Grand Conclave of Scotland as to the date
at which it began to practise Knight Templary, and the number of
Lodges " holding of her she had empowered to make Templars." An
extensive importation into Scotland of Irish Knight Templar warrants,
under which the Royal Arch was also conferred, followed upon an
edict of the Grand Lodge in 1800, forbidding daughter Lodges to
work degrees other than those of St John's Masonry. Through the
incidental notice of a visit of Knight Templars to Mary's Chapel,
contained in the minute of a communication of the Lodge held in
January 1807, we become acquainted with the fact that the now
defunct Early Grand Encampment of Ireland had in the early part of
the present century succeeded in establishing an Assembly of that
Order in the Scottish metropolis, and that the chief promoter at a
subsequent period of the Grand Conclave of Knight Templars of
Scotland, was a Grand Master under the " Early Grand " Constitution
: " . . . The Lodge was this evening honoured by a deputation from
the Grand Assembly of High Knight Templars in Edinburgh, No. 31 of
the Early Grand Encampment of Ireland, headed by the Most
Worshipful Grand Master, Alex. Deuchar, — being the first time, it is
believed, a deputation of Knight Templars visited this Lodge — at
least it is the first time for some hundred years that any Lodge of
Freemasons in Edinburgh has been visited by an Assembly of Knight
Templars, headed by their Grand Master. ..." This minute is in the
handwriting of Mr Deuchar, to whose credulity in regard to the
alleged antiquity of the " High Grades " may be attributed the
assumption that a century before his own time the Mason Lodges in
Edinburgh were accustomed to receive the visits of Encampments of
Knight Templars. The Order was introduced into Edinburgh in 1798
by brethren serving in a regiment of English Militia, then quartered
in that city, under a warrant emanating from Dublin. In all probability
it was in virtue of a dispensation from this Military Encampment that
the first Grand Assembly of Knight Templars was set up in the
Scottish metropolis. It was constituted in i8c6 under an Irish charter,
and in 18 10 it originated a scheme for
 288 HISTORY OF FREEMASONRY. instituting a Supreme
Court of the Order in this country. This was accomplished in i8ii ;
and by the charter erecting the Templars of Scotland into a Conclave
of the "Knights of the Holy Temple and Sepulchre, and of St John of
Jerusalem, H. R, D. M. fK. D. S. H." under the hand of the
 GRAND PRIORY OF SCOTLAND. Duke of Kent, then head of
the Masonic Templars in England, Mr Alexander Deuchar was
appointed Grand Master for life. This circumstance led to the
warrants that were issued by the Grand Conclave being designated "
Deuchar Charters." His life appointment, which was somewhat
ostentatiously displayed on the seal that was attached to these
charters, ultimately occasioned jealousy and disunion, as it shut out
men of position and influence from aspiring to the highest office in
the Order. Mr Deuchar at last yielded to the feeling which had been
evoked on this subject, and in 1835 resigned the Grand Mastership
in favour of Admiral Sir David Milne, K.C.B. We present fac-similes of
the Deuchar Seal and of the one which was subsequently adopted
by the Grand Conclave. The Deuchar seal bears at least one emblem
with which Brethren who have been knighted under the modern
system are unacquainted. Indeed, so radical have been the changes
effected in the Scotch ritual, ceremonies, and dress, that those now
prevailing bear little or no resemblance to those in use forty years
ago. The Deuchar Charters authorised Encampments to " instal
Knights Templars and Knights of St John of Jerusalem," one
condition on which these warrants were held being " that no
communion or intercourse shall be maintained with any Chapter or
Encampment, or body assuming that name, holding meetings of
Knight Templars under a Master Mason T
 290 HISTORY OF FREEMASONRY. Charter." In 1837 the
most of these warrants were forfeited, and the Encampments erased
from the roll of the Grand Conclave, on account of not making the
required returns. In 1843 Priories were empowered to admit as
Chivalric Knights persons who were not Freemasons. This
arrangement was abandoned in 1856, when it was re-enacted that
"every one admitted into the Order must be previously a Royal Arch
Mason." By the Charters which, in 1856, replaced those held by the
few Scotch Encampments which were then reconstituted by the
Grand Priory of Scotland, Priories are empowered " to create
Esquires of the Order, and instal Knight Templars. To confer the
Masonic degrees, first, of Knight of St John of Jerusalem, now
usually called Knight of Malta, with the preceding step known by the
name of the Mediterranean Pass or Knight of St Paul ; secondly, of
Knight of the Red Cross of Constantine ; and thirdly, of the Priestly
Order of the Temple." Although neither of the degrees mentioned
have been eliminated from the work of Priories under the Scotch
Constitution, the Red Cross of Constantine is now being conferred in
Scotland under English auspices. The Chapter-General, sitting at
Edinburgh, and claiming to be the supreme power of the Order of
the Temple " for the whole world," grants the honorary titles of
Knight Grand Cross, Knight Commander, and Knight Companion,
with the right to sit and vote in Grand Priories. Some fifty or sixty
Encampments of Masonic Knight Templars were existing in Scotland
about the year 18 17. Now (1873) there are only four Encampments
working in this country under the Grand Priory, and about twelve or
fifteen " Early Grand " Encampments. This fact shows in how little
esteem Knight Templarism is held by the present generation of
Scottish Craftsmen. The Supreme Grand Royal Arch Chapter of
Scotland was instituted by the representatives of thirty-four
Chapters, at a General Convocation of the Order held in St John's
Chapel, Edinburgh, August 28, 18 17. The Charter of Constitution
which was then adopted proceeds upon the assumption that the "
Royal Arch " had existed in Scotland prior to the erection of the
Grand Lodge, — and that it was embraced in the " Degrees of
Freemasons," the jurisdiction of which had from time immemorial
been vested in the Barons of Roslin. This is an erroneous statement.
The Arch was fabricated on the Continent about the year 1735-40,
whence it was imported into Britain, and was first adopted in
England as a Masonic degree by brethren professing to be the
representatives of the Grand Lodge of York, in retaliation for the
alterations made in the ritual by the London Grand Lodge in order to
exclude from its communion brethren who refused to recognise its
authority. It was a boast of the York or " Ancient " Masons that they
worked degrees of which Lodges under the London Grand Lodge
were ignorant. The earliest allusion to the Royal Arch Degree
 WILLIAM JAMES HUGHAN. 29I extant is contained in a
work of Dr D'Assigney, printed at Dublin in 1744, of the existence of
which there were doubts until the recent discovery of a copy by
Brother William James Hughan, of Truro. The Arch obtained a
footing in Scotland about the middle of last century, through the
medium of Military Lodges which had themselves become
acquainted with the degree in their intercourse with Irish Masons ;
and though in some instances regarded by Lodges as the ne plus
ultra of Freemasonry, it was generally worked in connection with the
Order of the Temple. It is alleged that the Ancient Lodge of Stirling
was, in 1743, the first in this country to practise the degree, but of
this there is no authentic evidence. The portrait which heads this
chapter is that of WILLIAM jAMES HuGHAN, of Truro, Cornwall, who
is a member by honorary affiliation of the Lodge of Edinburgh. He
occupies a high place among the Masonic celebrities of the
nineteenth century. Ever since 1863, the year of his initiation in the
St Aubyn Lodge, Devonport, he has prosecuted his studies in
connection with the literature of the Order with a conscientiousness
and an energy rarely evinced. In his writings he has ever been
careful to mark the distinction between matters that are purely
historical and those that are merely legendary, and in this respect
has done much to dissipate the superstition which has so long
enveloped Masonic history. Free from the jealousies of rivalry, he
accords the fullest credit to the researches of other brethren. He is
the author of ' Constitutions of the Freemasons,' ' History of
Freemasonry at York,' ' Unpublished Records of the Craft,' and ' Old
Charges of British Freemasons,' is editor of a local Masonic Calendar,
and is a diligent and disinterested contributor to the leading Masonic
periodicals in this and other countries. In short, his fame as a
Masonic author extends to every place in which Freemasonry has a
footing and is practised by an intelligent brotherhood. He has an
honorary connection with many English and Scotch Lodges, and with
Royal Arch Chapters in this country and in America. The Lafayette
Chapter, City of Washington, elected him an honorary member at the
time they conferred a similar distinction on the Marquis of Ripon
(Grand Master of England), Lord Tenterden, and Sir John
Ma.cdonald, who were in that city respecting the Treaty of
Washington ; and he has since been appointed representative in
England of the Grand Chapter of Pennsylvania. Brother Hughan is
Past Master of the Lodge Fortitude, Truro, and ex-Provincial Grand
Secretary of Cornwall. He also holds an honourable position in the
High Degrees. Like ourselves, he recognises their excellence, but
considers them Masonic only by adoption, and all dating their
institution at periods subsequent to the erection of the Grand Lodge
of England in 1717.
 CHAPTER XXX. HE custom of Knight Templar Encampments
fraternising with Lodges prevailed to a considerable extent in
Scotland, particularly in the western provinces, at the end of last and
beginning of the present centuries, and the distinction of honorary
membership was frequently conferred on Knight Templars as an
expression of the Brethren's admiration of the High Degrees. The
Encampments, on their part, reciprocated the compliment by
initiating the office-bearers of Lodges in which they were received
into the several degrees worked by them. This exchange of
courtesies tended to a wider dissemination in Lodges of a taste for
the Arch and Templar degrees — so much so, that possession of
these was in some instances made
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