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Actualizing Human Rights

This book argues that ultimately human rights can be actualized, in two senses.
By answering important challenges to them, the real-world relevance of human
rights can be brought out; and people worldwide can be motivated as needed for
realizing human rights.
Taking a perspective from moral and political philosophy, the book focuses
on two challenges to human rights that have until now received little attention,
but that need to be addressed if human rights are to remain plausible as a global
ideal. First, the challenge of global inequality: how, if at all, can one be sincerely
committed to human rights in a structurally greatly unequal world that produces
widespread inequalities of human rights protection? Second, the challenge of
future people: how to adequately include future people in human rights and how
to set adequate priorities between the present and the future, especially in times
of climate change? The book also asks whether people worldwide can be motiv-
ated to do what it takes to realize human rights. Furthermore, it considers the
common and prominent challenges of relativism and of the political abuse of
human rights.
This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of human rights,
political philosophy and, more broadly, political theory, philosophy and the
wider social sciences.

Jos Philips is Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Utrecht University, the Netherlands.

Routledge Studies in Human Rights
Series Editors:
Mark Gibney
UNC Asheville, USA
Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen
University of Copenhagen, Denmark
and
Bonny Ibhawoh
McMaster University, Canada

The Routledge Studies in Human Rights series publishes high quality and cross-
disciplinary scholarship on topics of key importance in human rights today. In a
world where human rights are both celebrated and contested, this series is com-
mitted to creating stronger links between disciplines and exploring new meth-
odological and theoretical approaches in human rights research. Aimed towards
both scholars and human rights professionals, the series strives to provide both
critical analysis and policy-oriented research in an accessible form. The series
welcomes work on specific human rights issues as well as on cross-cutting
themes and institutional perspectives.

Human Rights and US Foreign Policy

Prevarications and Evasions
Clair Apodaca

Politics of International Human Rights Law Promotion in

Western Europe
Order versus Justice
Koldo Casla

Extending International Human Rights Protections to

Vulnerable Populations
Raymond A. Smith

Fundamental Rights Challenges in Border Controls and

Expulsion of Irregular Immigrants in the European Union
Complaint Mechanisms and Access to Justice
Edited by Sergio Carrera and Marco Stefan

Why Human Rights Still Matter in Contemporary World Affairs

Edited by Mahmood Monshipouri
Actualizing Human Rights
Global Inequality, Future People, and Motivation
Jos Philips
Actualizing Human Rights
Global Inequality, Future People,
and Motivation

Jos Philips
First published 2020
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2020 Jos Philips
The right of Jos Philips to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by
him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act 1988.
The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com, has
been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No
Derivatives 4.0 license.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered
trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to
infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record has been requested for this book

ISBN: 978-0-367-82038-1 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-003-01156-9 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman
by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear
To the musicians
Contents

Acknowledgements ix

1 Introduction: two new challenges to human rights

and the question of motivation 1

PART I
Preparing the ground 9

2 Human rights: a conception 11

2.1 The book’s conception of human rights: human rights
and global justice 11
2.2 What are the minimum requirements of global justice? 13

3 Common challenges to human rights: the relativist

and the political pawns challenge 23
3.1 The relativist challenge 24
3.2 The political pawns challenge 30
3.3 To conclude 34

PART II
Novel challenges to human rights 41

4 The challenge of global inequality 43

4.1 A largely state-based world order and equal human
rights protection: a tension? 45
4.2 A largely state-based world order and human rights:
reconsidering our commitments 47
viii Contents
4.3 Some objections 53
4.4 To conclude 56

5 The challenge of future people 63

5.1 Which claims can qualify as human rights claims? 65
5.2 How to prioritize among human rights claims –
including between the present and the future 67
5.3 Priority-setting among human rights: uncertainties,
and assumptions, concerning future people 76
5.4 To conclude 85

PART III
Getting to realization 95

6 The question of motivation: can people be

motivated as needed for realizing human rights? 97
6.1 How best to approach the motivational question 99
6.2 What motivates individuals to act in accordance with
human rights? 101
6.3 Some objections 105
6.4 To conclude 112

7 Conclusion 119

Bibliography 123
Index 129
Acknowledgements

This book has been a long time in the making. It is impossible to thank everyone
who helped me over the years and stimulated my thoughts, but some people I
want expressly to mention: Mary Biezeman-Roest, Marcus Düwell, Joel Anderson,
Koen Bavelaar, Monika Bobbert, Frans Brom, Rutger Claassen, Marie Göbel,
Carla Kessler, Peter Lawrence, Titia Loenen, Sem de Maagt, Henry Shue, Dick
Timmer and, at Routledge, Sophie Iddamalgoda, Andrew Taylor and the series
editors and anonymous reviewers, as well as Ashleigh Phillips, Amit Prasad and
Paul Martin. Thank you! (Of course, the shortcomings of the present book
remain entirely my own.) I am also grateful to audiences at various places in the
Netherlands and at Heidelberg and Graz, and I want to thank all my colleagues
at Utrecht University, who make the Ethics Institute such a friendly environment
and fertile place to work. Last but not least, I thank my students. Working with
you is always very enriching and enjoyable!
Hopefully, this book can to some extent offer, in the words of Seamus
Heaney, a ‘glimpsed alternative’ – one that, thankfully, at times already has a
foothold in reality.
JP
The Hague, Spring 2020
1 Introduction
Two new challenges to human
rights and the question of motivation

Many people regard human rights as the minimum requirements of global

justice. Human rights are meant, for now, in the colloquial sense that everyone
should be guaranteed freedom from torture, freedom to express themselves, as
well as being guaranteed enough food and a decent minimum standard of living,
etc. In such an everyday understanding, human rights will frequently first of all
be a moral notion rather than a juridical one. They would, more precisely, be a
minimum ideal (if I may use this somewhat strange expression, which combines
the elementary and the elevated) for the world. Moreover, this ideal would at
least implicitly include future people, inasmuch as it would usually sketch a
vision for both the present and the future.
Of course human rights, so understood,1 have faced outspoken criticisms. The
criticisms may, for example, be of a relativist nature and deny that human rights
are universally valid. Or they may be criticisms – which could be called ‘realist’2 –
saying that human rights are only pawns in games of political power. Such
fundamental criticisms are both important and prominent, and I will return to
them soon.
Many people, however, are in principle quite willing to embrace human
rights as an ideal for the world. This is true for many policymakers, lawyers,
academics, activists, and citizens in general. At the same time, many of them
are, although relatively favourably disposed towards human rights, by no means
uncritical about them. These people are the intended audience of this book. The
core of this book discusses two 21st-century challenges to human rights – as
they might be called – as well as, third, the arguably more practical question of
how to motivate people and institutions actually to realize human rights. None
of these three issues have received much discussion, while they are bound par-
ticularly to trouble the readers of this book. I will refer to the first challenge as
the challenge of global inequality: How, if at all, can there be a sincere commit-
ment to human rights, with their outspoken idea of the equality of all human
beings, in a world of great inequalities that are not coincidental, but structural?
The second challenge, which I will call the challenge of future people, is espe-
cially urgent in the current times of climate change: How adequately to include
future people in human rights, and how to set adequate priorities between the
present and the future? And how, in relation to these questions, to deal with key
2 Introduction
uncertainties concerning the future – such as how many people will live in the
future, what their interests will be, and what exactly may threaten those interests?
And third, there is the question of motivation: How actually to motivate people
and institutions to do what it takes to realize human rights in societies
worldwide?
The two challenges and the motivational question will be the subject of the
central chapters of the book (Chapters 4–6) and will be discussed in greater
detail in a moment. But let me first say something about two more all-out chal-
lenges to human rights that are very prominent in the current debates about
human rights and which will be the subject of Chapter 3 – a chapter that (along
with Chapter 2, which details the book’s conception of human rights) prepares
the ground for the central chapters.
These more all-out challenges are the relativist challenge and (what I will
call) the political pawns challenge. The former states that human rights lack uni-
versal validity, while the latter says that they are merely pawns in political
power games. These common and influential challenges need to be discussed,
among other things because they are linked to currently prominent debates about
the end/future of human rights.3 My argument will be that the relativist and
political pawns challenges, in the versions of them that matter most, can be
answered:4 relativism about human rights is implausible at a general level; and
where the political pawns challenge asserts, as it usually does, that more than
‘local’ repairs (my term) to human rights are needed, it is unconvincing. Thus,
as far as these challenges are concerned, there will in the end turn out to be no
reason to fear for the future of human rights. The next chapters will then ask
whether there is bad news for human rights (1) based on large global inequal-
ities or (2) based on difficulties arising from the justified claims of future people,
especially in the light of climate change; or, more practically, whether human
rights run into problems (3) because of what it takes actually to motivate people
and institutions to act in accordance with them. I will now elaborate on these
three issues.
First, the challenge of global inequality. Can one, in a world of vast inequal-
ities such as ours, be sincerely committed to human rights and to the ideal of
equality that they embody? More particularly, many of the inequalities in our
world are not accidental, but arise on account of key structural features of that
world. I am thinking above all of the important role that largely sovereign states
play in realizing human rights. Among other things, some states are much richer
than others and function much more smoothly and, as a result, large inequalities
are bound to arise between states in the realization of human rights.5 Can one,
then, accept and perhaps also (as is often the case) in certain ways promote and
help to maintain a world order where largely sovereign states are very prominent
and at the same time be seriously committed to human rights, that is, to the idea
that all human beings equally should have certain freedoms and rights? (For the
moment, the notion of human rights employed is still the rather colloquial notion
presented above.) Or is this hypocritical? I will call the commitment to human rights
hypocritical if it turns out to be mere talk, while one’s actual actions – which
 Introduction 3
help, perhaps, to maintain certain core structural features of the world – serve to
undermine the realization of human rights.
There is, on the face of it, no easy way out of this challenge. It is not as if one
can easily embrace alternatives for a largely state-centred world order, or even
clearly conceive what such alternatives might be. Nor can we easily give up the
idea that a sincere commitment to human rights entails a sincere commitment to
some robust form of equality and of equal treatment of all human beings – to
more equality, it may seem, than can be delivered by a largely state-centred
world order, with its inevitable differences in wealth and in quality of institutional
functioning. Thus, it is a real and large question whether a sincere commitment
to human rights can go together with being committed to and supporting a
largely state-centred world order.
The second challenge on which I want to elaborate, and which is particu-
larly urgent in an age of climate change, is the challenge of future people. If
one understands human rights in a colloquial sense, future people will, I have
said, be included (as subjects of concern, rights bearers, etc.), although
perhaps in an implicit way. But when one develops a more elaborate concep-
tion of human rights as an ideal for the world, many questions remain with
regard to the inclusion of future people6 – while including them is clearly vital
for a global ideal in an age of climate change. I mainly want to focus on the
urgent question of when to give priority to the future over the present, and
when the other way around.7 This is not to suggest that future and present are
always in conflict; thankfully that is not so. But sometimes there will be con-
flicts and, in such cases, determining which of the two should get priority is
often both fraught and difficult. Fraught, because if the future gets precedence,
those presently alive frequently stand to lose something real – not only super-
fluous luxuries, but also important freedoms and real opportunities for an
improved life. And this unlikely to be only a theoretical concern: considering
how much the interests of future people are in jeopardy because of climate
change, and considering how many people may potentially live in the future, it
seems that the future should sometimes win out.
Furthermore, the matter is not only fraught but also difficult. This is partly
because it seems to require clarity about a number of more general issues, which
are relatively unexplored, concerning how to set priorities among human rights
(how to take the numbers into account, how to treat particularly vulnerable
people, etc.). And it is also difficult because the future, often even more than the
present, is full of uncertainties. These are of various kinds – different sorts of
unknowns – and some of them seem rather intractable. The uncertainties pertain,
among other things, to what the numbers of future people will be and what their
interests will be, and also to what could threaten their interests and provide pro-
tection against these threats. All this contributes greatly to making the inclusion
of future people in human rights a hard problem. For, the urgency of climate
change does not mean that the future is necessarily always to get precedence.
There are also, for example, the needs etc. of people in the present and various
uncertainties concerning the future. Hence the challenge of future people.
4 Introduction
I will argue that we can, in the end, often deal satisfactorily with both the
challenge of global inequality and with that of future people. Frequently, a non-
hypocritical commitment to human rights is ultimately possible, even in a world
of great inequalities – although this cannot come easily. And human rights can
take future people into account in a justifiable way, even if, in times of climate
change, hard choices can by no means always be avoided.
Human rights will of course have to deal with other challenges as well.
Regarding these, this book will particularly focus on one more question, which
is arguably more practical and which I will call the question of motivation (or
the motivational question).8 Motivation is understood here in the sense of indi-
vidual people and institutions actually being brought to act and function in
accordance with human rights. More specifically, the point is that, for human
rights to be plausible as a global ideal, it must be possible for societies actually
to function in accordance with human rights. Moreover, they should be capable
of so functioning from generation to generation,9 and achieve this by acceptable
means, for example without using manipulation or certain kinds of coercion. At
the minimum, all this should be the case for societies that are as good as human
societies can be: if even such societies cannot function in accordance with
human rights, human rights certainly forfeit their plausibility as a global ideal.10
Whether societies worldwide can function in accordance with human rights is
a large question, and I will argue that historical evidence does in any case not
suffice to answer it affirmatively. I will start my own exploration with Richard
Rorty’s remark that, to establish and maintain a human rights culture, it is
enough to have generations of ‘nice … well-off, secure … students’.11 This sug-
gestion is promising but it also has, I will argue, a number of problems.
Improvements and alternatives will be considered. The chapter devoted to the
motivational question will be the most explorative one of the book. This ques-
tion has not, for all I can see, been much discussed. I will try to get a first sense
of the robust empirical evidence while also taking the relevant non-empirical
aspects (such as considerations of acceptability) into account.
The chapter will, in order to keep things manageable, be confined to motiva-
tion of individuals. But indirectly, institutions will be addressed in some ways as
well. For of course, a society’s functioning in accordance with human rights is
not least an institutional matter. Institutions such as the government, and various
organizations in civil society, should be moved actually to respect and realize
human rights. Yet individual support for human rights is, I will argue, both a
necessary condition and ultimately also a sufficient one for maintaining institu-
tional motivations.
What binds together the challenge of global inequality, the challenge of
future people and the (arguably more practical) question of motivation is that,
for all three, meeting them is very urgent if human rights are to be actualized. I
mean this in a double sense of ‘actualized’ (the two senses are, to be sure,
related): in the sense of not losing their relevance (and thus becoming somehow
‘un-real’) and also in the sense of actually getting individuals – and institutions –
into movement (‘action’). To elaborate, meeting these challenges is vital in
 Introduction 5
order to make sure, first, that human rights do not lose their plausibility as a
global ideal and, thus, in a way become irrelevant and closer to mere talk.
Human rights will lose their plausibility if certain pressing issues are not
addressed, among others those which are at the centre of this book: how (if at
all) can a genuine commitment to human rights be upheld in a world of vast and
structural inequalities? How (if at all) can future people and their claims find an
adequate place in human rights? And how (if at all) can societies actually function
in accordance with human rights?
Second, as for actualization in the other sense, of actually getting individuals
and institutions to act and function in accordance with human rights, this is what
the motivational challenge is expressly concerned with. And, in a somewhat
more complex way, the challenges of inequality and of future people are con-
cerned with it, too. For these two challenges must be met in order for it to be
reasonably expectable from people worldwide and from future people that they
will be motivated to act in accordance with human rights. After all, how can one
expect them to be motivated to act in accordance with human rights unless there
is at least a plausible account of how people from all places and times can
defensibly be included in human rights? It must be clear, then, how future
people could be included in human rights in a plausible way, and it must like-
wise be clear what a commitment to human rights entails in the face of vast
global inequalities.
The very broad thrust of this book will be as follows. Concerning the chal-
lenge of global inequality, I will argue that it is often incompatible with human
rights to endorse inequalities between persons in the protection of important
interests. But this is not always so and even structurally engendered inequalities
(engendered, for example, by a largely state-centred world order) are sometimes,
but only sometimes, compatible with human rights. Or so I will argue. One
should work towards better institutional arrangements whenever possible; and
only where this is not possible, a less demanding interpretation (to the extent
necessary) of the equality of all humans may be embraced.
Concerning the challenge of future people, a first outline will be defended of
a model for how to set priorities among human rights – a model that (among
other things) offers a tool to start thinking about priority-setting between the
present and the future. Many factors have a place in this model – not only the
importance of people’s interests, the number of people concerned as well as
various constraints to do with equal treatment, but also various uncertainties and
(in the background) certain assumptions about future people.
With regard to the motivational question, a hypothesis about the motivation
of individuals will be defended (starting from Rorty’s suggestion, mentioned
above). This hypothesis concentrates on people being safe in the fulfilment of
their important interests and being able to develop and exercise their key capa-
cities. This hypothesis also makes clear when a society can be effectively
ordered in accordance with human rights – while keeping in mind that this soci-
etal ordering should take place in acceptable ways, and that the claims of future
people need to be taken into account as well. The chapter will, in addition,
6 Introduction
briefly discuss some important and prominent suggestions about individual
motivation (such as ideas to do with nudging and self-interest-based motivation)
and their (in)compatibility with the chapter’s main hypothesis. The chapter’s
conclusion will be (although cautiously) that it is possible for individuals and
societies actually to realize human rights.
In the end, then, I will argue that human rights can meet various challenges,
most importantly those central to the book, the challenges of global inequality
and of future people, addressed in Chapters 4 and 5; and that important ques-
tions about human rights’ motivational capacity, to which Chapter 6 is devoted,
can be answered. Human rights can, in short, be actualized. Chapter 7, the
book’s conclusion, points the way to some things that remain to be further inves-
tigated in future research.
Chapters 2 and 3 are preparatory chapters. As I have already mentioned,
Chapter 3 tries to answer two common (indeed, arguably the most common) and
quite radical challenges to human rights, the relativist challenge and the political
pawns challenge. Chapter 2, for its part, will propose the conception of human
rights that I will use. To elaborate: this conception will in some ways develop
the colloquial understanding of human rights that has been proposed above –
that everyone should be able to count on having enough to eat, be guaranteed
freedom from torture and to express themselves, etc. In some ways, however,
the conception developed in Chapter 2 will take distance from this colloquial
understanding.
This book’s envisaged audience is, as remarked, broad: all those, be they
policymakers, lawyers, academics, activists or citizens in general, who are inter-
ested in and broadly sympathetic towards human rights, but certainly also crit-
ical towards them.12 At the same time, the book speaks more particularly to the
philosophical human rights literature. This is in line with regarding human rights
first of all as a moral category, specifically as an ideal for the world. Such an
understanding is, as indicated, often a central feature of a colloquial notion of
human rights. But the more complex and detailed conception of human rights
developed in the next chapter will also hold on to this understanding.
In addition to the philosophical human rights literature, I will also speak,
more broadly, to the philosophical literature in global and intergenerational
justice. For each of the three issues central to the book there is, I believe, a gap
in this literature. I will come back to this in the chapters concerned, and will
only give a brief indication now. As for the challenge of global inequality, it is
fairly common ground in the literature that human rights protection should be
equal everywhere on earth. The literature frequently regards human rights as
global minimum standards of justice; and only when equal human rights protec-
tions have been secured does the literature tend to regard differences between
individuals in the protection of their interests as potentially compatible with
justice. That the requirement of globally equal human rights protection has to
reckon with certain structural features of the world that may be in tension with it
is not much discussed.13 Nor, consequently, is the question addressed of how – if
at all – this tension could or should be resolved.
 Introduction 7
The challenge of future people is confronted, first, with the fact that the philoso
phical literature has not been much concerned with questions of priority-setting
among human rights. To be sure, all questions of justice are, one may say, about
priority-setting, but priority-setting and human rights have not often been
brought together. Moreover, if certain problems with regard to future people
have, for instance in the context of climate change, received discussion – such as
various uncertainties and assumptions about future people’s needs and
numbers – the discussion has not usually been in the context of human rights.14
The motivational challenge, finally, is vast and in very important respects
interdisciplinary. It has received some attention in the philosophical literature,
but hardly, as far as I can see, specifically with regard to human rights (apart
from passing remarks such as Rorty’s, mentioned above); and there is even
less discussion striving to consider both robust empirical evidence and requirements
of acceptability.15
Thus, the book strives to open new ground both with regard to the challenges
of global inequality and future people and with regard to the motivational ques-
tion.16 Before turning to the challenges, I will now, in Chapter 2, develop the
book’s conception of human rights. This is necessary preparatory work. But it is
relatively technical, and some readers may prefer to skip this chapter and turn to
Chapter 3 directly.

Notes
1 In Ch. 2 below this colloquial notion of human rights will be developed and revised,
and its relationship to the post-WWII practice of human rights will be discussed.
2 See e.g. Caney (2005), pp. 7ff.
3 Cf. authors such as Bob (2019); Douzinas (2007); Hopgood (2013); Kennedy (2004).
4 While my discussion of these challenges aims, of course, to be adequate in the light of
the literature, it is above all in Chs. 4, 5 and 6 that the discussion strives to be novel.
5 These remarks may seem to commit me to a particular view on the causes of poverty,
etc. But I do not think that they do; see Ch. 4.
6 It may be noted that the inclusion of future people is often doubtful in the post-WWII
practice of human rights. For the relation of this book’s conception of human rights to
that practice, see Ch. 2.
7 Philosophers, and also lawyers, have often concentrated on other questions about
future people, such as the question of whether they can have entitlements if they do
not yet exist and if it is not yet clear concretely what person could be harmed, bene-
fited or (dis)respected. Cf. Ch. 5.
8 To be sure, the motivational ‘question’ is a challenge for human rights. I call it a ‘question’
to indicate that it may be of a different kind – more practical, less fundamental – than
the other two challenges. But that itself is a moot point and not much may in the end
depend on whether it is so.
9 ‘Generation’ is meant colloquially here, not in any technical sense.
10 It may be thought it should also be possible for (at least certain) less ideal societies.
Cf. Section 6.4.
11 Rorty (1994), p. 127.
12 I take it that most readers of this book will not to such an extent be critical towards
human rights as to be drawn to the relativist and political pawns challenges. But these
challenges are still so prominent and important that they warrant discussion.
8 Introduction
13 It should be noted that the challenge of global inequality, as I articulate it here, is
different from the question of whether human rights are ‘enough’ (cf. Moyn 2018).
Concerning the question whether they are ‘enough’, Chapter 2 will make it clear that I
regard human rights as articulating only the minimum requirements of global justice.
14 Henry Shue, one of the pioneers of philosophical debates about human/basic rights,
also has one of the best discussions of what may be called precaution in the context of
climate change (Shue 2010). But even he does not specifically discuss this in the
context of (human) rights. Many other discussions, such as Caney (2009), are very
brief, some exceptions being Bos and Düwell (2016) and Düwell, Bos and Van
Steenbergen (2018).
15 One example of an outstanding contribution is Judith Lichtenberg’s (2014) book on
poverty (Ch. 10). Some other examples can be found in Birnbacher and Thorseth (2015).
16 By contrast, Ch. 3 (on the relativist and political pawns challenges) does not aim to
break new ground, but only strives to argue in a way that is adequate in light of the
existing philosophical literature.
This book will typically engage in ideal theory, which thinks about possibilities
and ideals taking as a given how human beings are (with the best possible upbringing
and education, etc., and more generally living under the best possible institutions),
but not taking changeable features of humans and of the world as given (cf.
Sections 4.2 and 6.1 below). As will become clear below, human rights will often
have particularly severe problems if certain issues cannot even be solved in ideal
theory. I will concentrate on ideal theory when thinking about the (in)compatibility of
human rights and a largely state-based world order; about how to set priorities among
human rights, including human rights of future people; and about the question of
whether societies worldwide can function in accordance with human rights. Yet these
problems evidently, and very importantly, also have relevance for the world in the
21st century, with its vast inequalities, rapid climate change and widespread non-
observance of human rights.
Part I

Preparing the ground

2 Human rights
A conception

So far, a rather colloquial conception of human rights has been used. According
to this conception, human rights are about ensuring that everyone is free from
torture, can freely express their views, has enough to eat, etc.1 This is too thin,
however, to serve as a basis for the rest of the book. Therefore, the present
chapter will develop in detail what this book’s conception of human rights will
look like, and also justify the conceptual choices made. I will proceed in two
steps. First, the book’s general conception of human rights will be proposed, that
is, its broad answer to the question of what human rights are. In one sentence:
human rights will be regarded as the minimum requirements of global justice,
and the content of these requirements as having to do with (reliably) protecting
the very important interests of all human beings (Section 2.1). I will explain why
human rights are understood in this way and also how, in this understanding,
they relate to the post-World War II practice of human rights. Second, I will go
into the contents of human rights, further than that they have to do, as said, with
protecting the very important interests of all human beings (Section 2.2): What,
more precisely, is a human right and what, approximately, could a plausible list
of human rights look like? Who bears duties with regard to human rights? And
how weighty are human rights? The discussion will be confined to those ele-
ments of the book’s human rights conception that urgently need clarification as a
basis for the discussions in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.2

2.1 The book’s conception of human rights:

human rights and global justice
This section presents the main thrust of this book’s conception of human rights.3
Human rights will be understood as the minimum requirements of global justice,
and the content of these requirements concerns the protection of very important
interests of all human beings.4
I start off with a more methodological point. There are two requirements that
any plausible conception of human rights will, I believe, have to meet. I will first
briefly state them and then explain and discuss them further. First, a conception
of human rights will in some way have to be continuous with everyday usage
(even though it may at the same time be considerably revisionist towards it, as
12 Preparing the ground
will become clear). Second, there has to be clarity about the role(s) that a con-
ception of human rights is supposed to fulfil, as different roles will ask for
different contents of a conception.
To further clarify these requirements and why they are sensible, it may be
helpful to take a look at another complex concept, autonomy.5 (I might also have
taken, say, democracy.6) I start with the first requirement, that of a conception
being to some extent continuous with daily usage; in discussing it, my stance on
the second requirement will become clear as well.
‘Autonomy’ as a term in daily life – I mean in policy making, education,
medical practice, etc. – is used to refer to very many different ideas (which are
often, to be sure, not very clearly articulated). Yet if someone were to say: I am
now going to call by the name of autonomy what everyone else calls, say,
privacy, then this would completely ‘change the subject’7 and only cause confu-
sion. Worse even than the confusion, the subject would also be changed away
from what got people interested in a discussion allegedly about autonomy in the
first place – they were presumably interested in some of the ideas that are often
referred to by that term.8 Similarly, most activists, policymakers, lawyers, etc. are
interested in human rights because of the ideas, etc. connected to the term in
daily usage or, more specifically, in the post-World War II practice of human
rights.9 A conception of human rights had better not change the subject entirely
away from that.10
Yet what exactly that means – not entirely to change the subject – is by no
means crystal-clear. Taking the example of autonomy again, I think that one
could sensibly say: I am going to discuss autonomy in one of the roles with
which the term is often connected, for example in the role where a lack of auto-
nomy is a necessary condition for forced admission to a psychiatric clinic – and
autonomy then refers to something like the ability to make one’s own choices.
Here, a host of possible meanings of autonomy are left aside and, furthermore,
the analysis might (by drawing, for example, on philosophical debates about
autonomy) go on in a way that is considerably revisionist vis-à-vis certain prac-
tical usages. For example, the analysis might go on to say that, in the role of its
lack being necessary for forced admission to a mental health institution, auto-
nomy should be understood very differently than it usually is when people con-
sider this role; or one might even doubt that a lack of autonomy could, in any
understanding of autonomy (which preserved some kind of connection with ‘the
ability to make choices of one’s own’), be a suitable necessary condition for
forced admission to a psychiatric clinic.
I propose something quite similar for human rights. I want to understand
human rights as the minimum requirements of global justice, where I conceive
of justice in the Rawlsian sense of being the main virtue of social institutions (in
this case of the global institutional framework, whether it be a world order con-
stituted by largely sovereign states or some other kind of world order);11 and
minimum requirements of justice refer to the requirements of justice that have to
be fulfilled in order for the world to be just in broad outline, albeit not entirely.12
Content-wise, I understand human rights as, very broadly, having to do with the
 Human rights: a conception 13
protection of the important interests of all human beings – an understanding that
is, being put in this general way, a recognizable and probably quite central part
of the post-World War II practice. Furthermore, seeing human rights as the
minimum requirements of global justice is a recognizable part of the practice as
well. Indeed, I would say that it is a recognizable part of the practice that (1) an
important role of human rights is to want to offer a minimum moral ideal for the
world (indeed, the main criterion that a global institutional order would have to
meet); and also that (2) nothing else that human rights possibly also want to offer,
no other role, should undercut this role. It is this role, and this understanding of
human rights as being about the protection of everyone’s very important interests,
that the present book takes up. This means that this book’s conception of human
rights is, in the way discussed above, continuous with the post-World War II prac-
tice and that, as such, it may be said not to change the subject. At the same time,
this conception of human rights is not being offered as the best interpretation – or
even an interpretation – of the practice or of a part thereof.13
The further development of this conception of human rights – human rights
understood first of all as offering the minimum requirements of global justice and
as having something to do with the protection of all people’s important interests –
will be undertaken in Section 2.2. It will take its main lead from existing
philosophical debates about justice.14 I will discuss how, more particularly, to
understand what a (moral) right is, and what a human right morally understood is
(our conception, taking its lead from debates on justice, may be called moral); what
a plausible list of human rights might look like; how one may think of the relation
between rights and duties, and who are plausibly duty bearers; and I will again
consider the weight of human rights. This will prepare the ground for discussing (in
Chapter 4) how the book’s conception of human rights is to deal with equality of
protection among human beings, for discussing (in Chapter 5) how it is to deal with
the inclusion of future people and for investigating (in Chapter 6) whether this con-
ception in addition fulfils certain plausible motivational constraints.15
It bears emphasizing that nothing in these discussions and investigations is
meant, as it stands, as a policy proposal, as direct guidance for activists or as a
proposal for revising the law. Rather, what I envisage is to make a contribution
to debates in what John Rawls calls the ‘background culture’ of a society – in
universities, the media, schools, as well as in reflective discussions among
diverse kinds of practitioners; it is in this sense that this book may be said to
want to offer orientation for the practice.16 It is hoped that its contribution will
be worthwhile for people from a wide variety of walks of life and backgrounds.

2.2 What are the minimum requirements of global justice?

Many questions arise if one regards human rights as the minimum requirements
of global justice. This section will deal with three that are central: first, with
what, more precisely, are the contents of these requirements (that is, on the
‘recipient side’; I will deal both with what a moral right is and with what a
plausible list of human rights would, approximately, look like); second, with
14 Preparing the ground
how human rights relate to duties and with who are plausibly duty bearers
regarding human rights; third, with how weighty human rights are. This sec-
tion’s aim is primarily to clarify (rather than defend) the conception proposed on
the points where clarity is needed for Chapters 4, 5 and 6.17 I will always strive,
to the extent possible, to take positions that are not highly dependent on contro-
versial theoretical commitments and that could thus be endorsed by people from
a wide variety of backgrounds.

Content (i): What is a human right?

What, content-wise, are the minimum requirements of global justice about (on
the ‘recipient side’)? I will begin by asking what a human right is, and take my
lead from Henry Shue. Shue states that what he calls a moral right18 ‘provides
the rational basis for a justified demand that the actual enjoyment of a substance
be socially guaranteed against standard threats’ (italics mine).19 What I want to
take from this, rather freely, is that moral rights are, at the core, about reliably
protecting people’s interests.20 (These interests are the ‘substances’; I will come
back to the notion of reliability in a moment.) Human rights, more particularly,
are about reliably protecting very important interests. It is their concern with
very important interests and, one may add, very important protections of them,
that makes human rights so morally weighty and central.21
I want to add that, with human rights, the very important interests in question
should concern broad categories of people,22 everywhere and possibly also
always.23 If this were not so, and if they concerned interests that were only applic-
able to a small part of humanity, we would stray so far from the everyday usage of
‘human rights’ that we would make the notion unrecognizable. At the same time,
however, interests of smaller categories of people can always also qualify as
subject matters of human rights by being brought under more general headings.
For example, the interest of the highly musically gifted in developing their musical
capacities to some minimally adequate extent can be subsumed under the interest
of people to develop their creative abilities to some minimally adequate extent.
This latter interest is evidently applicable to very broad categories of people, and
attending to it will, in the case of the highly musically gifted, inevitably imply that
their musical abilities should be developed to some minimally adequate extent.
Shue says that a moral right is about ‘guarantees’. Having a right means it
shouldn’t be possible that one’s ‘enjoyment of a substance’ is taken away at will
or overnight: there ought to be (well-enforced) laws or other suitable institutions
(such as, in certain cases, customs) to protect the interest in question against
threats.24 In my words, we are talking about reliable protection of very important
interests. This is plausibly an essential part of what a right is. Equally important,
meanwhile, is that the guarantee/reliable protection cannot be provided in the
face of everything. According to Shue, it is against ‘standard threats’, which
means something like predictable and prevalent threats.25 To be sure, this
remains rather vague and Chapter 5 will explicitly raise the question of protec-
tion against just which threats is required as a matter of human rights.
 Human rights: a conception 15
In sum: human rights, understood as the minimum requirements of global
justice, state that certain reliable protections of very important interests ought to
be provided. The interests in question concern broad categories of people every-
where and (possibly) also always. (Whether the protection of these interests
should also be equal everywhere and always will be the explicit subject of the
next chapter.)
But are there human rights so conceived? The answer will be affirmative, I
will assume, if (1) there are very important interests, which are consequently
worthy of reliable protection, and if (2) there are suitable duty bearers for pro-
tecting them. I will ask below whether (1) and (2) are indeed the case, and will
conclude by revisiting the weight of human rights, in order to see as clearly as
possible what is at stake in the (non-)realization of human rights.

Content (ii): What human rights (if any) are there?

Are there any interests so important that they are worth reliably protecting (and
for which very important protections can be provided, otherwise it is all no use;
there is, to take an extreme example, no human right to immortality)? To show
that some interest, for example freedom of speech, is a very important interest,
one can point to its instrumental importance for, for example, a well-functioning
society – in the light of governance-related and economic considerations, etc.26
But one will also, and possibly above all, point to its intrinsic importance, which
is perhaps best demonstrated by considering what happens to a human being
when they have or, conversely, do not have freedom of speech (to remain with
the same example): what this means for their ability to flourish, to be agents, to
reach their ends, etc. In addition, one needs to consider certain objections, for
example that (instrumentally) a prosperous society could be obtained without
freedom of speech; or that (intrinsically), on some conceptions of the person,
flourishing of the individual does not require freedom of speech; or that some
forms of flourishing are not all that important in the first place.
In short, my suggestion is that the main way to establish the importance of an
interest is by examining human experiences (broadly understood): by showing –
which will usually be through narrating, cf. also Chapter 3 below – what
happens to people if these interests (to be able freely to express one’s opinion, to
have enough food, etc.) are, positively, reliably protected or, negatively, not reli-
ably protected.27 If the account does not convince, the main response must be to
try to show again, and now in a more compelling way, how important it is reli-
ably to protect a certain interest.28 Thus, the same approach can be used to estab-
lish the importance of a given interest and that of a given protection.29 It will
involve empirical elements (concerning what happens if certain protections are
or are not in place, etc.), but also normative judgement (for example, concerning
what is important enough).
Let us now ask what an adequate list of human rights would look like.30
Usually, very important interests such as the following are among the subject
matters of human rights: being alive, being free from torture, being free to
Another Random Scribd Document
with Unrelated Content
On the eigth day of December one thousand seven hundred and
Eleven the Sovereign and Burgesses then assembled ffor choosenig
a free Burgess in place of Mr Richard Willson Burgess who departed
this life on Sunday the second day of December Instant they did
elect and unanimously choose Hans Hamilton Esq' a free Burgess in
his place and room And at the same time the said Mr Hamilton took
the oath of a Burgess as Usuall Roger Haddock Sover" Rob Leathes
Geo Macartney John Halridge Nicholas Thettford George: Portis
James Gurner Geo: Macartney
 The Town Book of Belfast. 2 1 1 To the Soveraigne &
Burgesses of the Corporation of Belfast Whereas I Roger Haddock of
Carranbane in the County of Downe one of the Burgesses of the s''
Corporation am by my own private affairs and by other business in
which I am engaged prevented from giveing due attendance or
doing such service to the s'' Corporation as I am inchned to doe Now
I the said Roger Haddock doe for the reasons afores' by these
presents Surrender & give up to the s'' Soveraigne & Burgesses my
Burgesship which I desire they will be pleased to accept of & dispose
of the same to such person as they shall think most capable to serve
the s'' Coiporation In witness whereof I have hereunto putt my hand
& seale the 14th day of Novembr 1713 Roger Haddock Ja: Wallace
Ter: Dogherty John Murray Copia vera We the Sovereig^n and
Burijesses havinsf been assembled to Elect and choose a free
Burgess to serve in the room of Mr Roger Haddock of Carranbane
who resigned his place of Burgess which resignation did first come
to our hands the seventh of December one thousand seven hundred
and thirteen We did unanimously choose Mr. Robert Le Byrtt of
Belfast a free Burgess of this Corporation in his room the same day
And whereas the said Robert Le Byrtt hath been hitherto hindered
from taking the oath of a Burgess by reason of his being detained in
Dublin he haveingbeen sent thither to the Parliam' with the Records
of this Corporation by the Sovereign of this Burrouofh we do
therefore now confirm the said Election and he hath this day
accordingly taken the oath of a Burgess before us As witness our
hands this twenty eigth day of December one thousand seven
hundred and thirteen Robert Leathes Soveraigne Nath: Byrtt Henry
Ellis George Portis James Gurner Nicholas Thettford Thos: Banks
This day at an Assembly of the Sovereign and Burgesses of the
Burrough of Belfast M' Thomas Banks was sworn [Burgess] as being
Constable of the Castle of Belfast before us as witness our hands the
twenty eigth day of December one thousand seven hundred &
thirteen Rob' Leathes Soveraigne Nath: Byrtt Henry Ellis George
Portis James Gurner Nicholas Thettford 29'^ day of January 1714 Att
a Court then holden wee the Soveraign and Burgesses by the
experience and good opinion wee have had & do
 212 The Town Book of Belfast. still have unto Robert
Lebyrtt a Burgess of this Burrough have elected & chosen him to be
our Town Clerk during his honest carrying and upright behaviour in
the said place and have given him a pattent for the same under our
hands & the Comon Seal of Town James Gurner Sovereign Rob'
Leathes Nath: Byrtt George Portis Henry Ellis Nicholas Thettford
Tho': Banks Constable of the Castle We the Sovereign and Burgesses
having been assembled to Elect and chose a free Burgess to serve in
ye Room of James Macartney Esqrone of the Judges of his Maj"."
Court of Common Pleas in Ireland who resigned his place of Burgess
(which resignation came to our hands the sixteenth day of August
17 15 and dated the said day) we did unanimously choose Edward
Clements Esq^a free Burgess of this Corporation in his room same
day and the said Edward Clements hath this day accordingly taken
the oath of a Burgess Wherefore we do confirm the said Election
undr our hands this said 1 6 day of August 1 7 1 5 James Gurner
Sovereign Robt Leathes Jn° Ech: Chichester Geo: Macartney John
Hallridge Nath: Byrtt Henry Ellis George: Portis Nicholas Thettford
Geo: Macartney Robt: Lebyrtt At an assembly held in the Burrough
of Belfast by the Sover" and Burgesses of the said Burrough the
twenty fifth day of June 1716 James Gurner Esql: then Sovereign
Whereas there was a By Law made the twenty fourth day of June
1660 prohibiting any Burgesse after being Elected and sworn
Soveraign of the Burrough of Belfast to sell by Retail in his house
any wine, beer, ale aqua vit^e or other strong waters or keep
entertainment in his house dureing the time of his being Sovereign
of the said Burrough on forfeiture of one hundred pounds And
whereas it is the opinion of the Sovereign and all the Burgesses now
present that whoever is admitted a Burgess of the said Corporation
ought to be qualified to serve as
 The Town Book of Belfast. 2 1 3 Sovereign when Elected
and also that the said By Law is useless and inconvenient It is
therefore ordered by the said Sovereign and Burgesses that the said
By Law be and is hereby Repealed annulled and made void to all
intents and purposes whatsoever and the same is accordingly hereby
declared to be from the date hereof annulled Repealed and made
void to all intents and purposes whatsoever T Z-' c • James Gurner
Sovereign Robt Leathes Henry Ellis George: Portis Hans Hamilton
Robt Lebyrtt Thos: Banks This day at an assembly of the Sovereign
& Burgesses of the Burrough of Belfast the Rev'' Doct' William Tisdall
was sworn as being Constable of the Castle of Belfast before us As
witness our hands this fifth day of Aprill 1 7 1 7 Henry Ellis
Sovereign This day at an assembly of the Sovereign and Burgesses
Capt Robert Leathes was sworn as being Constable of the Castle of
Belfast before us As witness our hands this 29 J" ' ' Henry Ellis
Sovereign Nicholas Thettford Rob' Lebyrtt Nath: Byrtt George Portis
James Gurner We the Soveraign & Burgesses haveing been
assembled to Ellect and choose a Free Burgess to serve in the Room
and place of Edward Clements Deceased we have unanimously
chosen Thomas Hewetson a fifree Burgess of this Corporation in his
Room this 27th day of May and the said Thomas Hewetson hath this
day accordingly taken the oaths of a Burgess whereof we do confirm
the said Ellection under our hands this said 27th day of May 17 18
Jo: Carpenter Sovereign Henry Ellis James Gurner Rob': Lebyrtt Rob'
Leathes The Io'^ Day of November 1720 At a Generall Assembly of
the Sovereign and Burgesses and free Commonalty of the Towne
and Corporation Edward Hall was duly elected and chosen to serve
the
 214 The Town Book of Belfast. Corporation in the office of
Serjeant at Mace in the room and place of John Brooks Deceased
Rob': Byrtt Sov"? Isaac M'^Cartney Rob' Hamilton Mich' Wood Lewes
Smith Tho^ Miller Rober' M'Calpin Tho: Warnock Geo: Macartney
Nath Byrtt James Gurner Nicholas Thettford J a' Macartney Belfast
September the 28'^ A? Dni 1721 At a Court then held we the
Soveraigne & Burgesses have administred the oath of a ffree
Burgess to Rob' Green Esq! Constable of the Castle of Belfast and do
hereby allow he hath a Right to all the priviledges and Libertys w':''
any Constable of the Castle heretofore has enjoyed & which by the
Charter of the said Town are allowed Rob': Byrtt Sov" John Hallridge
Henry Ellis George: Portis James Gurner Nicholas Thettford Ja'
Macartney Belfast the 24"" day of October An?. Domini 1723 At an
[court] Assembly then held Wee the Burgesses have administred the
oath of A free Burgess to Thomas Banks Gent Constable of the
Castle of Belfast and doe hereby allow he hath a Right to all the
priviledges and Liberties which any Constable of the Castle
heretofore has Enjoyed & which by the Charter of the said Town are
allowed Burrough of Belfast 20"" Sepf 1725 At an Assembly of the
Sovereign & Burgesses then mett together the underneath bonds
and papers were Delivered over by Arthur Byrtt son to the late Nathl.
Byrtt Esq' Sov'" of the s'' Burrough to James Macartney Esq^ the
p'sent Sov'" thereof The Right Honble The Earl of Donnegalls bond
for 200' dated the 26"' March 1702 & payable to Jno Chalmers Esq'
then Sov'" for the use of the poor Sampson Theakers Bond for 10'
dated the 25'!' Deer 1676 & payable to George Macartney Esq' then
Sov'" John Carpenter Esqf his Bond 150' dated i" Dec' 1720 &
payable to Rob' Byrtt Esq' then Sov" Mr Isaac Macartneys promisary
note for 242" ster Dated the 8"' day of Septf 17 18 & payable to
George Macartney Esq' then Sovr'" The Lady Longfords Letter dated
29'" Deer 1692 owing the rec' of 100! for the use of the poor Rob'
Leathes Esq' his rec' to Clotworthy Upton Esq' for 32" dated 4"" June
17 14 A Rec! from Rob' Leathes Esq' to Geo McCartney Esqf Sov'? for
sevl' bonds & papers therein mencioned to be Delive? to him Dated
28'? May 1 7 14 Clothworthy Upton Esq! his acco' for Interest Due to
the
 The Town Book of Belfast. 215 poore Roger Haddocks Rec'
to Clotworthy Upton Esq' for 96' dated Jany 3"' 17 10 Ditt'" Rec' to
Ditto for 32" Dated 10'!' June 17 12 James Gurner Sov™ his Rec' to
Ditto for 32" Dated 19"' November 17 14 Dittos Rec^ to Ditto for 32"
Dated 9'!' July 17 15 A Letter from Tiio' Banks to the Sov'" &
Burgesses dated 1 8"' August 1 7 1 8 giving an acco' of 32" by him
paid to Capf Leathes on acco' of Interest due by L'' Donnegall to the
s!*. poor A List of the poor & the money paid them to the year 1 7
19 Apaperofordersofanassembly dated the 2 2''Aprill 1725 in relacion
to the poors money Memo'" a Rec' given same day by the Sov'" for
the above P^P^"^^ James Macartney Sover? Burrough of Belfast At
an Assembly of the Sovereign Burgesses & Comonality of said
Burrough Arthur Byrtt Esqr Sovrn held the eight day ot November
1744 at the Market house of said Burrough and continued from time
to time by adjournment to the 15th of said month as appears by the
List of voters hereunto annexed to choose a Sergeant at Mace for
said Burrough in the Room & place of Edward Hall who for his
mismanagement in his office as also that he is at present confined in
Jeal at Carrickfergus for Debt and not Likely to be relieved by which
means he is rendered incaple of doing his duty as Town Serjeant
Clement Monepenny was elected Chosen & sworn same day Serjeant
at Mace for said Burrough by the majority of said assembly in the
Room & place of said Edward Hall so disqualified Dated this 15th day
of November 1744 Entered by Robt Byrtt Town Clerk Ar: Byrtt Sovem
CANDIDATES No Clements Monepenny No Arthur Hall I James
Archbald I Roger Haddock 7 2 Thomas Banks Esqr i 2 And" M'Comb
8 3 Hugh Donaldson 2 3 Alex' M'Kyle 9 4 John Sharp 3 4 James
Greerer 5 Thomas Beatton 5 W" Wallace 6 Alex' Young 4 6 Ja'
Holmes 10 7 John Stewart 7 Duncan Taylor 11 8 John Gordon 8 John
ffleming 12 9 Dan' Blow 9 Robt Stewart 13 10 John Brown 10 John
Beggs 14 II Alex' Stewart 5 II John Potts 15 1 2 Ben" Legg 6 12
Hugh Lynn 16 13 Henry Blair 17 13 John Ashmere 14 Margetson
Saunders 18 14 John Scott 15 John Johnston 19 15 John M'Munn 35
16 And" Gelaspie 16 Saml Moffett 17 Sm" Wilson 20 17 John
Ballentine Barber 36 18 Robt M'MulIan 18 Robt Gaskin »9 Robt
Caulfield 19 Charles Ramage 20 Robt Clark 20 Jas Adair Senr. 37 2 1
John Black 21 And" Hannah 38 22 Isaac Read 21 22 Sam" Brown 23
Edward Mitchell 22 23 John Cunningham 39 24 James Carmichael 24
Rich'' Coleman 40 25 Hugh Martin 23 25 W" Paterson 26 Thos Lowry
26 Geo Walls 27 Will" Miller 27 Saml Boyd 41 28 Hugh M'Kitrick 24
28 Thos ffife 42 29 John M'Nish 25 29 John Cowden 43
 2l6 The Town Book of Belfast. No Clements Monepenny No
Arthur Hall 30 Robt Wills 26 30 John ffife Barber 44 31 Sam" Smith
27 31 John Whitlock 45 32 John Gregg 32 Wm Cross 46 z-i Wm
Gregg 28 33 Geo Sharp 47 34 John Coheran 34 John Stevenson 48
35 Sam" Joy 35 Wm Sharpley 49 36 Wm Stott 29 36 Mathew
Douglass 50 37 Jam" Peacock 30 37 Michael M'ffall 51 38 Gilbert M
'Cully 31 38 Tho Whitnall 52 39 Walter Wilson 32 39 Tho Servise 53
40 Jam" Smith -^t, 40 Alex' Mugerlane 41 Geo Ashmere 34 41 Jam'
Boyd 54 42 Wm Archibald 42 Thos Johnston 43 Chas Hamilton 43
John M'[Cleary]Creery 44 ffra Kirkland 55 44 Robt M'Creery 45 Wm
Hannah 45 John Dorment 46 John Taylor 46 John Lowden 69 47
John M'Donald 56 47 Geo M'Creery 70 48 Jas Bell 48 David Jukes 49
Thos Anderson 49 Thos Wamock 71 SO John M'Murray 50 Wm
M'Cleary 72 51 Val Thetford 56 51 Thomas Smalshaw -]}, 52 Wm
Holmes 57 52 John Ratclife 53 John Millwright 53 John Peart 74 54
Jas Blow 58 54 Michl Ratclife 75 55 Henry Duncan 59 55 Geo
M'ffarson 56 Ed" M'Donald 60 56 John Miller 57 John Leech 61 57
John Smith 58 Hugh Boyd 58 John Brown 59 John Jemison 59 Alex'
Ward 76 60 John Knox 60 John M'ffadden 61 Chas Walsh 62 61 Jas
Ramsey 62 John Duff Burgess 63 63 Wm Nutt 63 Wm Simpson 64
63 Moses Hill 64 Jas Ross 65 64 Jas Anderson 65 Wm Boyd 66 65
Wm Worthington Junr 77 66 Henry Kelso 66 Wm MaGofolk 78 67
James Weir 67 67 Wm Mathews 68 Wm Dick 68 68 Robt Black 69
Thomas Gregory 79 Adjourned to Saturday 70 Richd Whitford 80 the
loth of Novr 1744 71 ffra Beaty 72 Wm Wha 81 69 Alexr Spawin 82
73 Saml Galloway 70 Tho Whiteside 83 74 John Jakson 71 Revd Geo
Robertson 84 75 Robt Corbitt 72 John Gibson 76 Alex' Mears 102 73
Neile Patten n Robt Gutry 74 Ralph Charley 85 78 Jas Lemon 75
John Leith 86 79 Tho Coulter 103 76 ' as Wilson 87 80 Hh" Haven 77
Tho Jones 88 81 David Stevenson 78 John Ross 89 82 Michl Ratcliffe
Senr 104 79 Wm Worthington Senr 90 83 Mathw King 105 80 Wm
Lawson 91 84 Pat Gibson 81 John Holmes 85 W" Cambell 82 Dav''
Lyons 86 W° Beck 83 Wm Biggar 87 W" Caruthers
 The Town Book of Belfast. 217 No Clements Monepenny No
Arthur Hall 84 Robt Aldiich 88 Saml Allen 106 85 John Jones 92 89
Robt Henderson 86 Hugh Beaty 90 Geo Magee 87 Ed" fforsyth 91
John Herd 107 88 John fibrsyth 93 92 Richd Coulter 108 89 Henry
Charley 94 93 Israel Bums 109 90 Martin VVorthington 95 94 John
M'ffarran 91 Henry Linn 95 Arth' Clark 92 Adam Addidle 96 George
Cork 1 10 93 James Chads 96 97 Hen Vernett 94 ffra Bowell 97 98
Tho Graham 1 1 1 95 Wm Kirkwood 98 99 Isaac Hall 112 96 Jas
Woods 99 100 John Hall 113 97 Wm Legg ICX3 98 John Stewart
Adjourned to Saturday 99 Thos M'Connell loi the loth of Novr 1744
ICX3 John Wilson lOI Cha M'Neily lOI Andw Sloan 127 102 Obed'
Grove 114 102 Cha Moor 128 103 Cha Young 115 103 John Brown
104 Jas Charley 116 104 Thos Heming los James 105 Neile Magee
129 106 Wm Brown 106 Hugh Holmes 130 107 John Dorment
Adjourned to thursday 108 John Riggs the 15th of Novr 1744 109
Andw Trimble no Dav' Mote 107 Geo Macartney Esqr III Robt M'ffall
131 108 Revd Barnard Ward 112 Wm Watt 132 109 Val Jones Junr
'13 Gawen Davison no Thos Gregg 114 Sam' Read 133 III Vincent
Mercy 115 Day" Logan 134 112 John M'Kedy 117 116 John Bole 113
Saml Stanton 118 117 Wm Pettycrewe 114 Robt Wallace "5 John
Hay Adjourned to thursday 116 Hen: East 15th Novr 1744 117 John
Rice 119 118 Jas Dixon 119 Wm Johnston Landw' 120 Saml M'Teer
121 John Armstrong 120 133 Wm Hamilton 122 John M'Cahee 134
John Clark 138 123 John Bennett 121 135 Wm Culbert 139 124 Hen
M'ffadden 136 Jas M'Donald 140 125 Saml Macartney 122 137 Phi:
Coats 141 126 Robt Hay 123 138 Robert ffoothey 142 127 Archd
Miller 124 139 Nathl Morrison 143 128 Gilbert M'Dowell 125 140
Michl Addidle 144 129 Jas Law 126 141 Jas Young 145 130 ffaithfuU
Wilson 135 142 Thos Sturgeon 146 131 Randall Petty crew 136 143
Michl Mears 147 132 Isaac Agnew 137 Att the adjournmt to this day
at the Close thereof the said Arthur Hall gave up having no more to
poll nor offering any more votes & the said Clements Monepenny
being 26 votes more than said Hall the Election was declared
publickly in Court in the favour of the said Monepenny who was then
& there
 2l8 The Town Book of Belfast. sworn into the office of
Serjeant at Mace for the Burrough of Belfast aforesaid in the Room &
place of the aforesaid Edwd Hall Entd this 15th day of Nov 1744
upon Ar: Byrtt Sovn Record by Robt Byrtt Town Clark For Clements
Monepenny For Arthur Hall 143 117 26 Majority for C Monepenny
260 Gross amount Bur: of Belfast At an Assembly of the Sovereign &
free Burgesses of this Corporation this day held in order to chuse a
burgess in Parliament in the room of David John Barry Esq' deceased
& in pursuance of a precept from the Sheriff of this County We doe
unanimously Chuse & Elect the Hon"" John Chichester to represent
us in Parliam' in the room of s"! Mr Barry Dated this I4'^ November
1745 Ar: Byrtt Sov"; Copy of the freedom presented to his Grace the
L'' Primate in a gold Box the 2°'' Sept' 1748 Be it Remembered that
an assembly held at y' Town Hall of the Burrough of Belfast the 2''
day of Sept' in the year of our Lord 1^48 Margetson Saunders Esq'
Sovereign of s? Burrough his Grace the most rev** father in God
George Lord ArchBpp of Ardmagh Primate & Metropolitan of all
Ireland & one of the L''.' Justices thereof was unanimously admitted
into the Liberties & franchises of y' said Burrough as a singular mark
of our Esteem & affection for him In Testimoney whereof we have
caused the Common Seal of y' s? Burrough to be hereunto affixed
the day & year afores* Margetson Saunders Sov° Constables for ye
Town 1^48 James Tough John Steele Hugh Marron Charles Walsh
James Baird Hugh Bamet high Const. Burrough of Belfast At an
Assembly of the Sovereign and free Burgesses of this Corporation
this day held in order to chuse a burgess in Parliament in the room
of the Hon''!" John Chichester dec? and in pursuance of a precept
from the Sherriff of this County We doe unanimously chuse and Elect
William Macartney of the Town of Belfast Esquire to represent us in
Parliament in the room of the said John Chichester Dated this 14'''
day of October 1747 forty seven Margetson Saunders Sov" Names of
the Sworn Measurers 1738 & 1754 I Rob' Huey 8/9 Jo" M^Clealan [2
Pat M'Bride] 9/10 Rich'' Campbell [3 Mich Wood] [11 Ja. Dickson] 4
Arch'' Whiteford 2 [12 Arch" Vickar] 5 Alex' Johnston 3 [13 Arch"
Taylor 6 Ivar M'Intosh 12-14 Jo° Brown 7 Dougall M'Gregor 5 13-15
Duncan Stewart 8 John Campbell 6 14 Henry Mullati Rob' Hamilton
 The Town Book of Belfast. 219 Constables for the year
1753 for the Town of Belfast W" Wilson high constable Wm Turner In
Ann Street Geo: Mitchell old Quay Jo? Har\'ey weaver Mill Street W"
Taylor N: Street Arch'' Scott do Constables for the year 1754 for the
Town of Belfast James M'Watters High Constable W" Brown in Bridge
Street W"° Stewart in North Street W° Henderson in New Key Edw*
Harrison in Mill Street Gaun Wallace in Bridge Street Belfast
Wednesday Oct 28 1767 At an Assembly of the Soveraign Free
Burgesses & Freemen of this Corporation this day held at the Market
House Nathaniel Boddle was unanimously chosen one of the
Sergeants at Mace of this Borough in the Room of George Murray
deceased At the same time the said Nath' Boddle took the oath of a
Sergeant at Mace before me Geo Macartney Enf^ Henry Joy D. T.
Clke The Oath of the Sovraigne You shall sweare that yo" shall well
and truly serve our Soveraigne Lord the Kinge by the space of one
whole yeare now next ensueing as Sovraigne of the Burrough of
Bellfast (If God grant you soe long life) is' uniill a successor be
siuonie w"' yo'. best endea"'"\ according to the power given unto
you by his Ma"" Lres Pattents and [that] you shall according to the
best of yo' knowledge discrecion doe equall justice as well to the
pooreas the rich and truly fairly indigently [litely] intreate the people
of this Burrough/w/ [and] shall use yo' best endeav'.' to uphold
maintayne the rights Libties jurisdiccions and [all] Lawfull ordinances
of this Towne and Burrough correccion of victualls (That is to saie)
breade wine beare Ale ffish and fleshe you shall truly and tenderly
see or cause to bee scene unto craftsmen Labourers and Artificers
you shall truly enquire of and those that shall be found guilty faulty
and trespassinge therein you shall justly correct and duly reforme,
widdows and orphans you shall succour and Defend And finally in all
other thinges that shall or may concerne yo' office you shall therein
faithfully and uprightly demeane yo' self for the most quiet benefitt
worshipp honesty [and] creditt &-* advancem'- of this yo' Burrough
and the Inhabitants thereof. Soe help yo" God in Jesus Christ, The
Oathe of Supremacy I doe hereby [utterly] testefie and declare in
my conscience that o' Soveraigne Lord King Charles his highnes is
the only supreme Governo' of this Realme and of all other his
highnes's Dominions and Realmes as well in all Spirituall &
ecclesiasticall thinges or causes as in causes and matters temporall
and that noe forraigne Prince person prelate state or potentate hath
or ought to have any Jurisdiccion power superiority preheminence or
authorety ecclesiasticall or Temporall within this Realme and
therefore I doe utterly renounce and forsake all furraigne
Jurisdiccions powers superiorityes and authoretyes and doe promise
that from henceforth I shall beare faithe and such [truth] true
alleagiance to the Leige highnes his heires and Lawfull Successors
and to my power shall assist and defend all Jurisdiccions priviledges
power and authorety granted or belonging to the King's highnes his
heires & Successors & enrolled and annexed to the Imperiall Crowne
of this Realme Soe help me God &;c
 220 The Town Book of Belfast. The Oath of the Overseers
of the Markett You shall sweare that you will serve in the office of
overseer of the Markett in this Towne untill Easter next if you soe
long live dureing w".'' time you shall well and truely looke into y°
wholesomnesse of all sorts of flesh meate corne graine ineale Butter
and Bread that shall come into the Markett, and see that noe corrupt
victuall be brought and sold into the Markett, and if any you are to
take it away and from time to time to acquaint y° Soveraigne for the
time being of the same and that you shall observe such orders and
By Lawes of the Corporacon relateing to the Markett (agreeing w''
the statute in that case made and provided) as shall be given you in
charge from time to time by the Soveraigne aforesayd and all other
things relating to the office of an overseer of the Markett according
to your skill and knowledge you shall observe Soe helpe you God
[The Oath of a Market Juror per stat 27 Geo. 3. to be sworn one by
one in] open court [at Assizes] [You shall well, truly,] and Diligently
exercise the office of a Market juror in the Borough of Belfast
without favour or affection malice or ill will, to any person or persons
whatsoever So help you God The oath of a free Burgesse You shall
sweare that yo': will be ready as one of the Twelve Burgesses of this
Towne and Burrough of Belfast to doe yo' best endeav" for the
publique good thereof and that you come uppon due warning given
you by or from the Suffran of this Towne and Burrough for the tyme
being or any by him appointed to give your true advice and best
Counsell in any thing that you shall be required touching the
ffranchise weale and the good rule and government of this Towne as
oftentymes as cause and occasion shall require And that from
henceforth you shall attend & assistant to ye Suffran of this Towne
for ye tyme being And that you will keepe the Councell and
ordinances made by the Suffran and the major parte of the
Burgesses by and w'' the consent of the Lord of the Castle or in his
absence the Constable thereof These and all other things w".' belong
to a Burgesse of this Towne to doe or to be done you shall well and
truly keepe & performe So helpe you God in Christ Jesus, \RTHUR
lord CHICHESTER BARRON of BELLFAST in y" County of Antrim in y"
Province of Ulster in y° North of Ireland was a younger son of S'
John Chichester of Rawley near Barnstable in Devonshire where he
attained to Capacity for y= University he was sent to Oxford and was
of Exetter College he was only a Gramer Scholler and being very
active strong and ingenious took affection to a Millitary Course he
went first into Ireland takeing with him for Companion Bartholomew
Fortescue my fathers youngest Brother whom he jnuch loved he
being as I have often heard his Lord'? say very good Company a
valient strong man and one of y" best wrestlers in those times they
stay'd a while with S' George Bourchiers who was then Master of y°
Ordinance in
 The Town Book of Belfast. 221 Ireland and son of y'' Earl of
Bath and father of this Earl a Noble Gentleman they had been Actors
with other young gentlemen of a youthfull rash trick in England for
which they fled into Ireland and when their friends had obtained
their pardon of Queen Elizabeth they returned to England soon after
my Lord Chichester who was then but Master Chichester adventured
abroad for advancement and ffortescue turned sea Cap' and died in
that employment Chichester was afterwards made Cap' of one of y'
Queen's best ships under y° command of f Lord Sheffeild at y'^ Sea
fight with y^ Spanish Armado in 1588 He had y*^ comand of one of
y" Queen's ships with 500 men in S' ffrancis Drakes last voyage to
y'^ west Indies. S' francis Drake died there at that time He was a
volunteer in y" Earl of Essexes voyage to Spain and at Cales Captain
Paul Chichester who was an able darring man being slayn with a
bullett y° Earl of Essex gave him his Company. He was Sergeant
Major Generall of y'' Queen's Army in Pickardy under y' comand of S'
Thomas Buskervill and at y" seige of Ameans was shott in y'^
shoulder and for his couragious good service then and in those warrs
was there knighted by King Henry y° fourth. ^Vhen those civill warrs
were ended he went into y" Low Countries where he had a Company
of 200 men which then was his subsistance but S' Rob: Cicell
Secretary of State to y'^ Queen being very much his noble friend
telling her Maj".° what pitty it was so able a gentleman should bury
his time in that Country with a single Company she haveing
Imployment for him in Ireland where his Brother S' John Chichester
was slayn with a bullett ; got Leave of y" Queen to send for him, he
being then garrisoned at Ostend, and to employ him in y" service of
Ireland with a Regm' of 1200 men, with which command he was
sent thither and according to his commision landed them with
himself at Dublin S' Adam Loftus of Rathfernam Lord Chancellor and
S' Rob: Gardiner Lord Chief Justice being Lords Justices in y"
intervals Between y^ death of y° Lord Barrows Lord Deputy who
dyed at Newry and y'= coming of yf Earl of Essex Lord Lievtent from
Dublin he was sent with a Regm' to garrison at Tradath within a
short time after y'' Earl of Essex arived at Dublin with y= Gallantry of
England and hearing much in praise of S' Arthur Chichester and
perfection of his Regm! made a journey purposely with his Gallants
to see him and S' Arthur haveing drawn his Regm' up in a most fair
field and exenv'sed them perfectly at which he was excellent they
being in close order y' Earl thinking to put a sully on them by
breaking throw them charged at them with his Gallants Cavallry but
y' Collonell not being used to receve foyles had so ordered his Pikes
as they forced y" Earl to a Corry Coale and upon his wheele a saucie
fellow with his Pike prickt his Lord""'' saveing your reverence in y=
Rear and made him bleed ; so he haveing enough of that smarting
sport, he retreated giving y' Collenell and his Regm' high praise, his
Lord'" stayed but a short while in Ireland then came S' Charles Blunt
Lord Mountjoy Lord Deputty and was after Earl of Devonshire who
within few months made S' Arthur Chichester Serjeant Major
Generall of y"' Army he well knowing his strong Abillityes in ffrance
and y"-' Low Countries where they had been intimate friends S'
Harry Danvers who was afterwards made by King James Lord
Danvers and Earl of Danby was before Major Generall: about six
months after he was made Governor of Carrickfergus and those
parts which being so far off from y'= Lord Generall: as he could not
attend to receive and distribute his orders S' John Barkley was made
Major Generall: who about a year after was slayn with a bullett at y"
takeing of an Island in a logh called Maherlecoo
 222 The Town Book of Belfast. in y' County of Ardmagh
then was S' Arthur Chichester made Major Generall again and at
lenth had that office by patent dureing hfe and after his invading y"
County of Tyrone by boats over Logh Neagh from Maserine in y°
County of Antrim and raiseing a ffbrt at his landing place which was
after named Mountjoy he was made Governor thereof and y°
adjacent countries by Pattents and Admirall of Logh Neagh by y"
name of Logh Chichester y'' next year y"-' Queen dying King James
made y° Lord Deputy Mountjoy Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and S'
Arthur Chichester S! Harry Docwray and S' W"' Godolfin Privy
Councellors of Ireland which was when they were upon their March
with y^' army in Munster to reduce y'' Citty of Watterford Cork and
Limrick that rebelled and would not proclaime King James as their
King but they were forced to it and some of y" Chief actors hanged
at Cork y" next Spring y° Lord Lievten': went for England all being at
Peace in Ireland so did S' Arthur Chichester and S' George Carry of
Cockinton in Devonshire who was then Treasurer in Ireland was for
ye p'sent left Lord Deputy and about two years after or less it being
in 1604 S' Arthur Chichester was made Lord Deputy which he held
twelve years which was longer than Ever any did before or since and
towards his end of that Governm' he was made I5arron of Belfast his
own Town and after his rendering up of y" King's sword was made
Lord High Treasurer of Ireland then he retired to his Estate and
Governm' in Ulster and about three years after was by Lett' from
King James called into England and imployed Ambassador to y"
Princes of y= Union in Germany and in short time after his return
was made one of y" Councell of Warr and within few months one of
y" Lords of y" Privy Councell of England and in few years after dyed
in London much lamented by all that knew him he was buried at
Carrickfergus where he had built y"" noblest brave house in y°
Kingdom and had prepared a neate Tomb to receive him when when
{sic) God should please to send him to it. He was one so farr from
ambition and coveteousness that he nether by friends nor of himself
[would] moved for advancm' Millitary or Civill but still it was confered
on him unsought as all those commands and honours were w'.'' he
had by favour of S' Rob: Cicill Earl of Salisbury y= Earl of Devonshire
and Lastly from King James so likewise was his Knighthood by ye
King of ffrance all w".'' certainly would not have been lay'd on him
had he not been a very meriting man and of such deportm' as
gained a generall good opinion and Love. To my Knowledge y" Earl
of Devonshire in time of his being Lord Deputy said he wondered at
S' Arthur Chichester for others prest him for many things but he for
nothing but grumbled like a right western man and that he had
twice made him Major Generall and given him two Govermn'.' those
of Carrickfergus and Tyrone and knew not what more to do for him
at p'sent but make him Lievtenant Generall: of y' Army which he
would do if he found him grumbling still and thenunless he could
make him Generall: and Lord Deputy he had done as much as was in
him to do for him at lenth he made him both Loveing him very
much. He never sought y' honour of Barron nor knew it was comeing
to him untill y^ first Lord Caufield who was then S. Toby Caufield
brought him a Patent for it from y' King as a present from S'
Humphrey May who had in England y" mannage and disposall of all
Irish affairs and procured it for him Loveing him heartly they being
ancient acquaintances and friends. I well know that King James by
his Lett'? of favour and grace called my Lord Chichester into England
in 161 3 he being then Lord Deputy S' Humphrey May who had
strong power with ye King offered to get him
The text on this page is estimated to be only 11.12%
accurate

THE CHICHESTER MONUMENT I.N ST. NICHOLAS'

CHURCH, CARKICKFERGUS.
 The Town Book of Belfast. 223 made an Earl and as I heard
Knight of y" Garter if he would but court a little y" then Favorite y"
Earl of Sumersett which he said he could not do and that he had
more honour by being a Barron then his Estate could becoming a
nobleman support. He moved not to be a Privy Councellor of
England King James knowing well his abillityes his well deservings
and his discreet and honorable manage of his negotiations in his
Embassage in Germany did it of himself. He was no very good Orator
but had a singular good expression with his pen sublime and
succinct according to y'' subject whereof he wrote and y^ Person to
whom his Lett" to King James were so acceptable as he gave him
encouragm' and command to write often to him and once when y"
King received a Lett' from him he gave it to his ffavorite Sumersett
biding him learn it without book saying he had not received such a
Lett' since he was King of England and y' secretary of State y° Earle
of Salisbury and Lords of y° Councell would give his lines high praise
he was a great statesman and good comon wealths man and as
knowing able a souldier as any of our nation in those times ; he was
a carefull performer of his mannagm'? and keeper of his word no
man knew his composition and disposition better than myself
Therefore I may with confidence and truth say this that he was a
man of great honour Piety prudence justice bounty and valour very
hospitable charitable affable and excellent good company within and
without doors being a Lover of all Civill becoming sports games and
recreations. His Estate was all of his own acquisition by fair purchase
only y" King gave him S' Cahier O'Doghertyes County it being by his
rebellion Escheat to y" Crown and he with his adherents being cutt
off by y" Industry and activity of my Lord Chichester that land was
then worth about 1000" per Ann: within those times of Largis and in
that Kingdom and at ^ furthest point north was no great gift or
reward from a King to a Subject that had been 12 years his Vice Roy
and so well a Ueserver His Estate being about 8000'' per Ann: he left
to his good Brother S' Edward Chichester who also inherited his
honour of Barron of Belfast and in short time after was made
Viscount of Carrickfergus and Governor of that Town and Country
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