Public Archaeology

ISSN: 1465-5187 (Print) 1753-5530 (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/ypua20

Great Zimbabwe in the Shadow of Robert Mugabe

and the ZANU-PF: An Analysis of the Political On-
site Use of Great Zimbabwe during the Period
2000–2025

Adam Andersson

To cite this article: Adam Andersson (22 Apr 2025): Great Zimbabwe in the Shadow of Robert
Mugabe and the ZANU-PF: An Analysis of the Political On-site Use of Great Zimbabwe during
the Period 2000–2025, Public Archaeology, DOI: 10.1080/14655187.2025.2475622

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public archaeology, 2025, 1–20

BACK MATTER

Great Zimbabwe in the Shadow of

Robert Mugabe and the ZANU-PF: An
Analysis of the Political On-site Use of
Great Zimbabwe during the Period
2000–2025
Adam Andersson
Department of Historical Studies, Gothenburg University, Gothenburg,
Sweden

This paper presents an analysis of how the national monument of Great

Zimbabwe has been politically used during the period 2000–2025, and it
examines how archaeology and the cultural heritage of Great Zimbabwe
have been used by political organizations for different purposes within the
framework of nationalism, during the period studied. Thus, the paper
focuses on the use of Great Zimbabwe during the economic downturn in
Zimbabwe. The article applies a theoretical perspective based in Critical Heri­
tage Studies, and it is stressed that during the period examined the national
monument was used in the creation of a Zimbabwean identity, an identity
built on the ideals of the governing ZANU-PF party, its leader President
Robert Mugabe, and his successor President Emmerson Mnangagwa. The
paper presents a detailed analysis of the on-site use of the monument by
ZANU-PF, Mugabe, and Mnangagwa during this period in the form of case
studies presenting and examining four political and public events that took
place at the monument. It is argued that the monument was actively used
for strengthening the party through nationalism, as well as promoting the
hegemony of the party and its leader during a period of economic problems.

keywords Great Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, ZANU-PF, nationalism, colonial­

ism, Critical Heritage Studies

© 2025 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the
Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent. DOI 10.1080/14655187.2025.2475622
2 A. ANDERSSON

Introduction
The disciplines of archaeology, culture studies and history have been used for several
purposes and by different political actors and institutions. Politics is deeply implicated
in these fields and people in power use them for their own purposes. There are a
several examples which stand out such as Nazi Germany’s usage of the archaeological
discipline during the 1930s and 1940s (Trigger, 1989: 164–65; Arnold, 1990, 2006;
Cornell & Andersson, 2025). The same argument could be said about other contexts,
such as both Mussolini’s and Ceausescu’s attempts to link their states to the former
Roman Empire (e.g. Henighan, 2002; Kallis, 2014; Ludomir, 2017), or the role
which Teotihuacán played in the creation of a common historical Mexican identity
(Bueno, 2016). There is no denying that history and heritage can be unifying forces,
and the notion of a common national identity rests at the very essence of nationalism
(e.g. Anderson, 1983). Thus, the political usage of Great Zimbabwe is by no means
unique, and there are many other examples where culture and monuments have
been used to create a national identity. It is with such context in mind that this
paper focuses on how the World Heritage site and national monument of Great Zim­
babwe has been politically used to a similar end by the incumbent ZANU-PF govern­
ment under both President Robert Mugabe, and his successor President Emmerson
Mnangagwa. The study will focus on highlighting the shift in ZANU-PF’s political
use of the site from 2000 onward, compared to its usage between 1980 and 2000.
The terms Government and ZANU-PF will be used interchangeably, because since
1980 the party has been in government in Zimbabwe. There was a government of
National Unity that lasted between 2009 and 2013, but Mugabe remained head of
state during this period. Therefore, it is difficult to deny the influence they have had
on the events which are being discussed within this paper.
Great Zimbabwe is a national monument which has been discussed in different
ways, as well as from different standpoints, since it is a monument which has
attracted the interest of people since it was constructed in the eleventh century
(Chirikure, 2020), and later when the first Portuguese explorers heard of it back
in the sixteenth century. However, the first documented encounter of the monument
by Europeans was given by the German explorer Karl Mauch in the nineteenth
century (Manyanga & Chirikure, 2019: 75–77). Great Zimbabwe is believed to
have been the regional capital of the former Empire of Zimbabwe between the
eleventh and the fifteenth centuries, and archaeological evidence suggests that it
was a centre for commerce and religious practices, with trade links as far as
Persia and China (Randell-McIver, 1906: 83; Caton-Thompson, 1931; Chirikure
& Pikirayi, 2008; Chirikure, et al., 2012). However, both the site and the Empire
would later fall into decline. The decline of Great Zimbabwe is debated, one
hypothesis attributed it to a decrease in the region’s gold output and to a changing
climate. These changes brought about food shortages and changes in the inter­
national trade networks, devaluing Great Zimbabwe’s importance as a trade hub
(Sinclair, 1987; Pikirayi, 1993, 2001; Ndoro, 2001). Another more recent theory
has been suggested by Shadreck Chirikure. He contends that, contrary to the
abrupt collapse attributed to environmental degradation, the decline of Great Zim­
babwe was a protracted phenomenon shaped by evolving political, economic, and
social processes (e.g. Chirikure, 2020).
 GREAT ZIMBABWE IN THE SHADOW OF ROBERT MUGABE AND THE ZANU-PF 3

During the latter half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century the monu­
ment of Great Zimbabwe was used to justify the British colonization of the
region. The British made claims that the monument was too advanced to have
been built by the indigenous Africans, and that it must have been built by a
foreign people. Theories ranged from the monument being of Phoenician origin
to that it was the biblical palace of the Queen of Sheba (e.g. Bent, 1893; Hall &
Neal, 1902). These theories were written with the purpose of giving British colonia­
lization more legitimacy, by removing Great Zimbabwe’s historical connection with
the indigenous population (Manyanga & Chirikure, 2019: 76). This colonialist and
imperialist perspective has been thoroughly discussed, debunked, and criticized
during the latter part of the twentieth century, and the beginning of the twenty-
first century (e.g. Caton-Thompson, 1931; Garlake, 1973, 1982; Ndoro, 2001;
Pikirayi, 2006; Matenga, 2011; Willems, 2013; Manyanga & Chirikure, 2019;
Andersson, 2020; Chirikure, 2020).
This paper will, however, take a step away from the history of the monument, and
its early political usage, and it will instead focus and discuss how it has been used for
political purposes during the period 2000–2025. The fact that Great Zimbabwe has
been used to unify the new nation of Zimbabwe is not a new topic, and a lot of
research has been carried out on the theme (e.g. Garlake, 1982; Kuklick, 1991;
Ndoro, 1994, 2001; Ndoro & Pwiti, 1997; Ranger, 2004, 2005, 2009; Fontein,
2006; Pikirayi, 2006; Matenga, 2011; Andersson, 2020; Chirikure, 2020; Thondh­
lana, et al., 2021). Today it is clear that Great Zimbabwe played an important role
in the creation of the nation, and that the monument has been used to construct a
unifying cultural and historical Zimbabwean identity. However, it is up for debate
whether this identity represents all of Zimbabwe, or if it is just representing the
ideals of the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)
(Willems, 2013). After being granted independence as the new nation of Zimbabwe
in 1980, it became abundantly clear that unity was important, since it was not just
divided by ethnicity, but also by culture, language, and traditions, where the two
largest ethnic groups consisted of the Shona and the Ndebele (Moyo, 2014: 3).
This made it even more important to unify these different groups, and local commu­
nities, through the creation of a new common national identity (Sinamai, 1998;
Ranger, 2004; Pikirayi, 2006; Muchemwa, 2010; Willems, 2013). This attempt to
unify a nation through such methods is by no means unique to Zimbabwe, but is
the foundation on which nationalism is built; another African example is how
post-apartheid South Africa attempted to create a common identity for all their
various communities, and ethnic groups (Bornman, 2006)
Great Zimbabwe was considered an ideal heritage site for the purpose of unifica­
tion, because of its history. It represented the former Empire of Zimbabwe. Concur­
rently, Great Zimbabwe was and still is evidence of a highly advanced African
civilization that existed long before European colonization. Therefore, by empha­
sizing its historical importance, ZANU-PF rejected colonial narratives that Africans
were incapable of building advanced civilizations. This reinforced the party’s ideol­
ogy of African empowerment and self-rule. Simultaneously, it was a chance to
reclaim a monument that had been culturally appropriated by the colonizers.
Therefore, the monument has been used by ZANU-PF as a pillar for the construc­
tion of Zimbabwe’s identity since 1980, not at least since the government claims to
4 A. ANDERSSON

be the successor of it is legacy (e.g. Garlake, 1982; Ndoro, 2001; Ranger, 2004,
2005, 2009; Pikirayi, 2006; Matenga, 2011). This subject is an interesting and
important one, and it has been thoroughly discussed; however, it will not be the
primary focus of this paper. Instead, this paper will approach a topic which, so
far, has not been so profoundly discussed as the above subject, namely how the
ZANU-PF government used Great Zimbabwe not for the purpose of unification,
but rather to promote and secure ZANU-PF’s political hegemony, and how its
leader Mugabe sought to use the monument for stabilizing the party’s internal
struggles, and when the government was facing criticism. This paper will therefore
rest on a few points of discussion.

Aims and objectives

This study is to analyse the strategic use of Great Zimbabwe by the ZANU-PF leader­
ship, specifically under Mugabe and his successor Mnangagwa, from 2000 to 2025.
It examines how the heritage site was utilized as a political and ideological instrument
to bolster the ruling party’s supremacy, sustain authority, and consolidate within
party factions during times of political strife. Simultaneously, the research examines
the active integration of Great Zimbabwe into political and public activities aimed at
stabilizing the nation and the ZANU-PF party, especially during economic crises from
2000 to 2020. This article examines the utilization of national legacy, illustrating the
merging of history, politics, and government in modern Zimbabwe.
On a general level the paper will therefore also exemplify how culture heritage can
be used by governments not only when they are going through political and financial
hardships, but also when political leaders endure internal pressure from political
opponents, both inside and outside their own government. In this context it ought
to be recognized that this usage of the past and its monuments is not unique to
Mugabe’s government (e.g. Ludomir, 2017; Symond & Vareka, 2020) The author
of this paper also wishes to state that this is in no shape or form a criticism of
how the Zimbabwe government under Mugabe or his successor Mnangagwa
made/make use of Great Zimbabwe, but rather it is an attempt to add to the discourse
on how such heritage sites can be used for various ends. Naturally, it should also be
mentioned that ZANU-PF were and are not the only ones who sought/seek to make
use of Great Zimbabwe and its symbolic value, but rather, due to its historical impor­
tance, there were/are several groups from all over the political spectrum that have
attempted to link themselves to the heritage site (e.g. Matenga, 2011).

Theory, method, and material

As the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how Great Zimbabwe has been uti­
lized politically, this study employs Critical Heritage Studies as its theoretical frame­
work, an interdisciplinary approach that scrutinizes the construction, mobilization,
and politicization of history and heritage. This viewpoint contests conventional,
static interpretations of legacy by highlighting its function as a dynamic and conten­
tious process, influenced by power dynamics and ideological objectives (e.g. Smith,
2004, 2006; Harrison, 2010, 2013). By taking a step back and considering the pol­
itical, demographic, and economic effects of Zimbabwe’s policies, it is possible to
view Great Zimbabwe in a new light. Thus, this theoretical framework lets one
 GREAT ZIMBABWE IN THE SHADOW OF ROBERT MUGABE AND THE ZANU-PF 5

observe the use of objects and monuments with a more critical approach. It is with
these advantages in mind that this approach can be applied to the case study of
Great Zimbabwe. By observing Great Zimbabwe with a Critical Heritage lens, it
is possible to understand why the monument has been of such great importance
for different groups, but primarily for ZANU-PF under Robert Mugabe. It is also
possible to understand how heritage sites can be wielded by political organizations.
This is clearly exemplified when one observes Great Zimbabwe. The paper also
draws inspiration from studies focusing the use of cultural heritage in totalitarian
contexts (Ludomir, 2017; Symond & Vareka, 2020).
Concerning the method, the paper focuses on several events that were organized
at Great Zimbabwe by the incumbent ZANU-PF government during the period
2000–2025, and it is based on in-depth studies and examinations of literature,
newspapers, and the speeches presented at the events. The paper focuses on three
separate events where ZANU-PF arranged official events at the monument, how
these were conducted, in what context they were organized, and what has been
written in conjunction with these events.

A brief contextualization of Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF, and Great

Zimbabwe
To fully understand the development of the political use of Great Zimbabwe one
must first study the historical and contextual background. The reason for this is
that it is possible to perceive a shift in how ZANU-PF used Great Zimbabwe
from the start of the twenty-first century, compared to their first two decades in
power. It can be concluded that between 1980–2000 Great Zimbabwe was used pri­
marily as a symbol for the newly emancipated Zimbabwe, and that the ruins
became important for the creation of a common national identity (e.g. Garlake,
1973, 1982; Ndoro, 2001; Ranger, 2004, 2005, 2009; Matenga, 2011; Andersson,
2019, 2020). This is clear when observing everything from the name of the nation,
the currency notes and coins, and the national flag (e.g. Kuklick, 1991) — all of
which carry associations with the monument. Therefore, it is possible to understand
that the history of Great Zimbabwe was promoted by the ZANU-PF government,
and that the monument became one of the cornerstones in the newly created
national identity. ZANU-PF did not, however, make use of the site itself but
rather used it symbolically and ichnographically. A change in the use of the site
can be noted after 2000. This shift coincides with Zimbabwe’s economic problems,
and when the new opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) rose
in popularity (Alao, 2012: 102–03; Willems, 2013). MDC did make use of imagery
connected to Great Zimbabwe, but they did not have the same access to the site
itself. One of the party’s emblems showed a Great Zimbabwe bird sitting within
a massive cogwheel (e.g. Gwekwerere & Mpondi, 2018; Thondhlana, et al.,
2021). This usage of iconography connected to Great Zimbabwe highlights that
the national monument is important to several political factions; however, political
parties other than ZANU-PF appear to have limited access to utilize the site itself. It
is therefore possible to draw the conclusion that the government (ZANU-PF)
sought to use Great Zimbabwe for its advantage.
6 A. ANDERSSON

There is no denying that the land reforms of 1992–2002 were a major catalyst for
the economic and political problems which Zimbabwe have endured at the start of
the twenty-first century (Muchemwa, 2010; Mkodzongi & Lawrence, 2019). The
Land Reforms saw the successfully run large-scale farms/plantations being nationa­
lized and broken up into family-owned farmsteads (Bourne, 2011: 165). The
immediate effect of this was a decrease in all aspects of production, which caused
an economic recession (e.g. Bourne, 2011; Alao, 2012). In the immediate aftermath
of the land reforms a ‘brain-drain’ also occurred — this since most of the previous
farm-owners had been of British descent and their know-how was lost when they
were replaced (Bourne, 2011: 167). Zimbabwe’s economy was, and still is,
heavily reliant on the production of tobacco, and some estimate it to constitute
one third of the nation’s overall exports (Bourne, 2011: 165), and therefore the
decrease in production led to a loss in the state’s export revenue. Naturally, it
should be mentioned that it was not only the agricultural sector which suffered
from this loss in population, but other areas such as medical and educational
sectors. Whilst this economic recession occurred the government did not lower
their expenditures, rather they printed more money (Economist, 2020). This is
what later caused Zimbabwe’s inflation and later the economy to fail; it was also
one of the primary reasons for Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Commonwealth
of nations in 2002, an organization which Zimbabwe later would leave in 2003.
Taking all these factors into account, it can be concluded that ZANU-PF was as
the incumbent government under a lot of pressure. This fact is made ever clearer
when observing the 2000 parliamentary election and the 2002 presidential election,
as both became the first ones in the history of the post-independent Zimbabwe
where an opposition party seriously challenged the ZANU-PF government
(Bourne, 2011: 168–69).

The use of Great Zimbabwe by the ZANU-PF, Robert Mugabe, and

Emmerson Mnangagwa
So how did the ZANU-PF use of Great Zimbabwe change from the late twen­
tieth century compared with the early twenty-first century? This paper suggests
that the earlier usage of Great Zimbabwe during the late twentieth century
focuses primarily on national unification, whilst the later usage during the
twenty-first century was intended to provide political support for the incumbent
government. What this entails is that Mugabe’s government at the beginning of
the new century began to arrange social, ceremonial, and public on-site events
at the monument (Andersson, 2020). The content of these events varied, but
what they all had in common was that they were firmly connected to the gov­
ernment and to the ruling ZANU-PF party. This trend is then later continued
by Mugabe’s successor Mnangagwa. The paper will focus on the following
four case studies:
• The Repatriation of a Zimbabwe Bird, 2003
• Unity Day Anniversaries, 2001, 2003
• The celebration of Robert Mugabe’s 92nd birthday, 2016
• Munhumutapa Day 2024
 GREAT ZIMBABWE IN THE SHADOW OF ROBERT MUGABE AND THE ZANU-PF 7

These four events were all carried out on-site at the Great Zimbabwe national
monument, and all of them could be considered major public events. What also
united them was the fact that they were organized by the ZANU-PF-led govern­
ment. All these events had different themes, and by examining and placing them
within their economic and political context, it is possible to create an understanding
of why they were arranged at Great Zimbabwe. With hindsight and knowledge of
escalating problems within Zimbabwe, and the pressure put on ZANU-PF, it is
possible to see that the government and Mugabe needed to project progress and
strength. Thus, each of these events was arranged to benefit ZANU-PF and help
stabilize their political power. Nevertheless, it should also be mentioned that
there were other locations which were also used by ZANU-PF for similar purposes,
such as the World Heritage site Matobo Hills which acted as the venue for Robert
Mugabe’s 93rd birthday in 2017. Furthermore, it should be stated that the govern­
ment sought to repatriate several objects, and this is not something that should be
condemned, but rather supported; there are many former colonies which are still
attempting to bring their treasures home from European nations that looted
them and sought to appropriate African heritage (e.g. Pomian, 2005; Greenfield,
2007; Chiwaura & Naidoo, 2021). The repatriation of a Zimbabwe Bird is an
excellent example of this (Munjeri, 2009: 12–14).

The repatriation of a Zimbabwe Bird, 2003

If we begin by looking at the event organized in 2003, it is possible to draw a con­
nection to what was occurring within Zimbabwe. At the time when this event was
carried out the nation was going through the economic effects of the government’s
various land reforms (Alao, 2012: 100–02; Mkodzongi & Lawrence, 2019). What
we also know is that during the 2002 presidential-election ZANU-PF was for the
first time not the guaranteed winner, something which had been indicated following
the 2000 parliamentary election. There are therefore several reasons for why the
government would make use of nationalistic pride and rally a divided nation
behind the symbolic notion of Great Zimbabwe and associate it with ZANU-PF.
The monument had since 1980 been profiled as a symbol for all ethnic groups,
and it symbolized an independent and united Zimbabwe. Edward Matenga suggests
that the soapstone bird returned in 2003 was located on the balcony overlooking
the enclosure at the national monument (Matenga, 1998: 38). The soapstone
birds are connected to Great Zimbabwe, and were taken from the monument by
European explorers and looters. The birds hold a deep a spiritual significance,
especially for those of Shona origin. Thus, the return of these soapstone birds
can be viewed as the return of Zimbabwe’s cultural and spiritual heritage, symbo­
lizing the reclamation of the nation’s history (Dewey, 2006; Hubbard, 2009).
Mugabe stressed this himself in 2003 during his speech regarding Great Zimbabwe,
and the repatriation of one of the halves of the Zimbabwe Birds.
On behalf of the Government and the people of Zimbabwe, I feel privileged and hon­
oured to receive the lower half of one of the soapstone birds from the Great Zimbabwe
era which we heartily welcome back home after years of exile which began with illegal
movement from our country between 1889 and 1903. The Great Zimbabwe birds are
our nation’s prized culture treasures, a symbol of our nation whose meaning defies time
8 A. ANDERSSON

and location. The return of the pedestal of this national symbol is, therefore, cause for
celebration because it fits into our on-going programme of national identity and restor­
ation. Like our Land Reform Programme, today’s ceremony allows us to assert owner­
ship over our national resources and treasures. (Mugabe Speech A)

Mugabe made several things clear in his speech. He stressed the value of Great Zim­
babwe and the soapstone bird, in particular their cultural and national significance.
With this connection he also raised by association the value of the party/person who
brought them home. He amplified their importance by emphasizing that this repa­
triation was a cause for celebration, once again stressing the point that this was a
great victory for the entire nation. In the final sentence he drew a connection to
the ongoing land reform, using both Great Zimbabwe and its artefacts as a justifi­
cation. Further, he stressed the connection between the repatriation and ZANU-PF’s
economic policies. Even if this citation is just a part of the speech it is possible to
understand the purpose, and how the leader for the ZANU-PF sought to make
use of the repatriation. This is also why this repatriation became such an important
event, since it was possible for ZANU-PF to put the return of this artefact into a
larger historical and contemporary socio-political context, which was something
the party and Mugabe made full use of (e.g. Matenga, 2011; Andersson, 2020).
The repatriation and the speech gave the impression that, under Mugabe and
ZANU-PF, Zimbabwe was making progress, both internationally and in the
national decolonization process. It is possible to assume that the government
wished to project the image that the ZANU-PF was giving back Zimbabwe its
pride and that the party was restoring the nation to its former glory. With this cer­
emony ZANU-PF managed to interweave the cultural and political sphere and turn
Great Zimbabwe into a political tool. It is possible to make these arguments by
studying Mugabe’s rhetoric, but also from the timing of the event. The ZANU-PF
government had the opportunity to hold the event simultaneously as their land
reforms were being put into effect. This period is today known as the Third Chimur­
enga and this choice of name further enforced the belief that Zimbabwe was still in
conflict, and that the nation was still oppressed (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems,
2009). The First Chimurenga (1896–1897) was an armed resistance by the Shona
and Ndebele populations against British colonial authority in Southern Rhodesia.
The Second Chimurenga (1960s–1979) was the guerrilla conflict waged by nation­
alist factions, chiefly ZANU and ZAPU, against white-minority governance in Rho­
desia, culminating in Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980. The Third Chimurenga
refers to the era of land reform in Zimbabwe, commencing in 2000, during
which the government, under Mugabe and ZANU-PF, executed extensive land
expropriations from white commercial farmers to allocate land to black Zimbab­
weans. This movement was seen as the last stage of Zimbabwe’s liberation war,
thereby bolstering nationalist narratives and ZANU-PF’s political legitimacy
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems, 2009; Mlambo & Gwekwerere, 2019: 130–35).
The repatriation and the land reforms were presented to be a part of a continued
struggle against the colonizers and the imperialists. The party knew that the nation
was going through a complicated period, and it was easier to turn attention away
from those issues, and towards a common enemy, in this case Zimbabwe’s white
 GREAT ZIMBABWE IN THE SHADOW OF ROBERT MUGABE AND THE ZANU-PF 9

minority. Mugabe deflected the nation’s attention away from current struggles and
problems, whilst simultaneously appealing to its nationalistic pride.

Indeed, as some scholars have written, the aim of the colonizer was to foist an image of
inferiority into the colonized and, to a large extent this was achieved by teaching our
people a history which was not theirs and consequently alienating them from their
own … To justify these acquisitions, the colonial collectors employed all sorts of
hypotheses to clothe the cultural material in question in borrowed Semitic, Egyptian
or western robes. The most classic example of these attempts to deny Africans their
heritage is the Great Zimbabwe monument whose origins were attributed variously
to Semites, Egyptians and Arabs … Once the colonizers convinced themselves that
the civilizations they were discovering in African were foreign to the indigenous Afri­
cans, they freely collected even those objects which were sacred to communities.
(Mugabe Speech A)

In the above citation of the speech Mugabe made it clear that it is not just a simple
repatriation, since this return should be considered as something more, a restor­
ation of Zimbabwe’s African pride. What should also be noted in this part of the
speech is how Mugabe chose to discuss colonialism and the colonizers. When he
emphasized this, he indirectly discussed the British presence, a nation that he at
the time of the repatriation was at odds with due to the ongoing suspension of Zim­
babwe from the Commonwealth. That he chose, once again, to address this issue
could also be a way to give further justification for ZANU-PF’s land reforms. In
this section of the speech Mugabe continued to encourage Africans to take back
their heritage, and it is possible to make the argument that he wished to infuse
them with further hostile feelings towards Zimbabwe’s white minorities.
In both parts of the speech, he aimed to increase nationalistic fervour, while sim­
ultaneously presenting the colonizers and their ancestors as the enemy. ZANU-PF
and Mugabe made full use of Great Zimbabwe and its historical/nationalistic
value, and the party did this by appealing to the bulk of the population’s patriotic
pride.
Firstly, ZANU-PF, under Mugabe’s leadership, projected strength and progress
by spearheading the repatriation of the soapstone bird. Throughout his speeches,
Mugabe emphasized the cultural significance of the bird, further enhancing the
importance of its return. This act was framed as a sign that Zimbabwe was on
the path to recovery, sending a message to the public that under ZANU-PF’s leader­
ship, the country would continue to be restored. Secondly, ZANU-PF and Mugabe
justified their land reforms by comparing them to the repatriation of the soapstone
bird, positioning both as parts of a broader national restoration process (Hubbard,
2009). This parallel helped to amplify nationalistic fervour while fuelling ethnic
tensions between black and white Zimbabweans, tensions that had been
intensifying in 2003. Thirdly, through the ceremonial return of the soapstone
bird, ZANU-PF and Mugabe sought to present themselves as defenders of
African values and traditional beliefs. By orchestrating this event, ZANU-PF posi­
tioned themselves as the sole political party committed to preserving Zimbabwe’s
cultural heritage, contrasting themselves with the opposition, which was accused
of being ‘too Western’ and disconnected from Zimbabwe’s traditional roots.
10 A. ANDERSSON

This repatriation is also one of the occasions where we can see the main differ­
ence between the earlier symbolic and the later more active usage of Great
Zimbabwe. The repatriation in 2003 was not the first time that a soapstone bird
had been returned to the monument. In 1981 five similar soapstone birds were repa­
triated by the South African government (Dewey, 2006). This event, however, did
not get the same national and political attention as the return of the single soap­
stone bird received in 2003. This begs the question, why was the repatriation in
2003 given so much more recognition? If comparing the sheer number of returned
artefacts, the five birds in 1981 should be considered a greater political victory. This
is where the different political context in 1981 and in 2003 must be taken into con­
sideration. Naturally, it is possible that it had something to do with what lengths it
had taken to return the single artefact in 2003. It had taken a lot of effort simply to
track down the other half, and once it was located it took a lot of effort to solve the
diplomatic discussions.
In 1981 when the first five soapstone birds were repatriated, Mugabe’s party was
in a far more secure position politically. The party had just won a landslide victory
in the nation’s first free election. The party had been a dominant force in the war for
independence. With a clear majority the party was the largest in Zimbabwe
(Willems, 2013). There was different economic reality. In 1981 Zimbabwe was
one of Africa’s wealthiest nations (e.g. Mlambo, 2014). When the first five Zimbab­
wean birds were repatriated, it was still a great victory, and it was a part the process
of creating a united national identity (e.g. Sinamai, 2006). This is demonstrated by
the fact that the government sought to use the Zimbabwe bird on several national
emblems such as coins, flags, and so on (Kuklick, 1991). However, there existed no
need for the party to project the same amount of progress or strength.
In 2003 the economic and political reality was different, since the nation was suf­
fering from an economic recession, and ZANU-PF had barely held onto power in
the 2002 presidential election. It is therefore possible to draw the conclusion that
ZANU-PF decided to take advantage of the repatriation to legitimize their right
to govern. This assumption can also be justified by the fact that the Land
Reforms were to a certain extent considered as the Third Chimurenga. With this
example it is therefore possible to see how Great Zimbabwe took on a more
active political role at the start of the twenty-first century.

The Unity Day Anniversaries, 2001, 2003

Another example of when ZANU-PF took advantage of the symbolic value of Great
Zimbabwe, was when, on two occasions in 2001 and 2003, the government
arranged festivities at the monument, and these galas were held to celebrate
Unity Day (Matenga, 2011: 102). In Zimbabwe, Unity Day is a holiday created
to commemorate the unification of the two largest political parties, ZANU and
ZAPU (Bourne, 2011: 139). Both parties played vital roles in the liberation of
the nation, and during the war of independence (e.g. Mungazi, 1992; Bourne,
2011; Alao, 2012). Both parties had their own political and ethnical backgrounds,
and it was only at the end of the war that they stood together. The fact that they
were never fully united led to conflicts during the liberation struggle, and these dis­
agreements continued after the war was over. The years preceding the Unity Accord
 GREAT ZIMBABWE IN THE SHADOW OF ROBERT MUGABE AND THE ZANU-PF 11

were characterized by the Gukurahundi, a brutal battle between the government

and alleged rebels in Matabeleland. Between 1982 and 1987, Mugabe’s government
executed mass killings, torture, and repression, predominantly aimed at Ndebele
civilians linked to ZAPU (Phimister, 2009; Bourne, 2011; Alao, 2012). The ratifica­
tion of the Unity Accord in 1987 not only concluded the conflicts but also necessi­
tated the compulsory amalgamation of ZANU and ZAPU into ZANU-PF, hence
influencing Zimbabwe’s political framework (Muchemwa, 2010; Bourne, 2011;
Alao, 2012). The open hostilities ended with the signing of the Unity Accord in
1987 (Alao, 2012: 102), and Unity Day commemorates the signing of this agree­
ment. It is therefore a day that also commemorates the formation of ZANU-PF
that was the outcome of the merging of ZANU and ZAPU (Alao, 2012: 84). It
could also be argued that, after the signing of the Unity Accord, Zimbabwe
became a one-party state in all but name, as there was now no other opposition
party that came close to challenging ZANU-PF’s majority rule. As previously
mentioned, it was only in the 2002 election that MDC would challenge ZANU-
PF’s political hegemony (Willems, 2013: 2).
This brings us back to the arranged festivities at Great Zimbabwe in 2001 and
2003 that were music galas directed at young people (Muchemwa, 2010: 504–
06). It is here possible to make the justification that ZANU-PF wished to use this
as an opportunity to appeal to Zimbabwe’s younger voters. It was a chance for
the traditional ZANU-PF to appear a bit more modern and potentially win back
some of the support that the newcomers in MDC were attracting. Once again,
the political context at the beginning of the twenty-first century ought to be remem­
bered. ZANU-PF was at the time in a diplomatic conflict with the United Kingdom
over the disputed land reforms, and the nation’s suspension from the Common­
wealth (Bourne, 2011). These land reforms had also caused the financial situation
to worsen, and this had brought with it an increased support for the opposition
(Alao, 2012: 103–04).
It is not too far-fetched to draw the conclusion that celebrating Unity Day at
Great Zimbabwe was a symbolic gesture and a propaganda show, meant to gain
new support. On one hand you have the festivities themselves which appeal to
the young generation. The young generation would remember the celebration,
and the party which organized them, while the older generation would perhaps
instead focus on how far the nation had come from the days of Rhodesia. It was
an opportunity for ZANU-PF to once more connect itself with the liberation and
use the heritage as a reminder that it had been this party who had spearheaded
the nation to freedom. It has already been concluded that Great Zimbabwe in
many ways represents decolonization and the emancipated Zimbabwe, and by
arranging these events ZANU-PF continued to lay claim to this legacy. Additionally,
Unity Day is a holiday meant to celebrate the creation of the ZANU-PF and the
signing of the Unity Accord, and they decided to organize this celebration at the
nation’s most renowned historical monument (Matenga, 2011: 102; Sinamai,
2017). This fact alone could be an effort to interweave the party with Zimbabwe’s
history. It was potentially an attempt to further legitimize their right to govern by
associating them to the historic monument.
These events were arranged by ZANU-PF and the Mugabe-led government, when
the party was under pressure. In the end, the event in 2003 was the last time that the
12 A. ANDERSSON

Unity Day was organized at Great Zimbabwe. The reason for this was because the
party received a lot of negative feedback from religious groups, who saw this use as
a desecration of their sacred grounds (Matenga, 2011: 102).

The celebration of Robert Mugabe’s 92nd birthday, 2016

This brings us to the last occasion and the most recent event which will be examined
in this paper, namely Mugabe’s 92nd birthday. This is an interesting example of
ZANU-PF’s latest usage of Great Zimbabwe, and after this example it is increas­
ingly difficult to deny how ZANU-PF politically use the symbolic value of the
monument. However, it should be mentioned that the widespread national celebra­
tion of Robert Mugabe’s birthday was nothing new at the time, and something
which had occurred annually for decades. The celebrations were a result of the
21 February movement which was heralded by the ZANU-PF Youth League
since 1986. In 2017, 21 February become a new national holiday known as
Robert Gabriel Mugabe National Youth Day.
When President Mugabe celebrated his 92nd birthday on 27 February 2016, the
entire event was held at Great Zimbabwe. This can be interpreted as an attempt to
further interweave the ZANU-PF with Zimbabwe’s history. It could also be under­
stood as a step away from interlinking Great Zimbabwe with Zimbabwe, and
instead connecting solely the party with the monument. This interpretation is
strengthened by the fact that no other political group can organize events at the
site. If we study Great Zimbabwe from a historical point of view, the archaeological
sources indicate that there existed a ruling elite which inhabited the monument
(Chirikure, 2020). It was from Great Zimbabwe that the former kings of the
region ruled, and it was the seat of their power (Caton-Thompson, 1931; Beach,
1980; Sinclair, 1987; Pikirayi, 2001). It is possible to draw the connection that
this birthday celebration was an attempt to further cement Mugabe’s place in Zim­
babwe’s history, to highlight the direct lineage between the ZANU-PF and the
former Kingdom of Zimbabwe. There are several parallels to be made when an
incumbent president such as Mugabe celebrates his personal birthday at a site
where historical kings reigned. This could be interpreted in several ways, one of
which is that Mugabe was not an ordinary president, he was something more.
There is also a case to be made that ZANU-PF further takes on the role of the
gentry, assuming the role of the ruling class of Zimbabwe. Once again, an argument
could be made that there exists some symbolic value here, since by organizing this
event, ZANU-PF also lays claim to fulfilling the role of a being a direct descendant
of the ruling class in the former Zimbabwe Empire (Andersson, 2020). This wish to
be seen as the ruling elite could both be intentional and unintentional, and it could
play both in favour and against ZANU-PF. It was reported in the Guardian that the
cost of the lavish birthday party was around US$800,000, and its extravagance
caused a lot of headlines. This was because, at the time of the celebration, Masvingo
Province was suffering from drought and famine (Guardian, 2020). This further
distanced ZANU-PF from parts of the population, establishing them as the aristoc­
racy of Zimbabwe.
It is highly likely that a purpose from ZANU-PF’s side was that the party should
be noted as the rightful descendant of the leading elite of the Kingdom of
 GREAT ZIMBABWE IN THE SHADOW OF ROBERT MUGABE AND THE ZANU-PF 13

Zimbabwe, whilst also cementing President Mugabe’s position in history. It can also
be stressed that Mugabe perhaps had ulterior motives in organizing the event at the
monument. The choice of location could have been an attempt to unite ZANU-PF,
which at the time was plagued by internal strife (Andersson, 2020). In 2016 Robert
Mugabe had shown no clear signs of resigning, neither as Zimbabwe’s president,
nor as leader of ZANU-PF. This, together with his advanced age, meant that his
position was weaker than it had been previously. What we know in hindsight is
that there were those within the party who wished him to resign and name a suc­
cessor. This was, however, something that he had no immediate plans to do, but
rather he consolidated his position by getting rid of potential political threats.
The dismissal of anyone seen as a threat is also what led to the increased internal
issues within the party. Signs of this could be seen in late 2014 when Mugabe
fired Vice President Joice Mujuru with the excuse that she had conspired against
him (Independent, 2020). This was likewise immediately followed by the dismissal
of several ministers who had been closely associated with her (BBC1, 2020). It is
therefore possible to draw the conclusion that ZANU-PF, at the time of
Mugabe’s birthday in 2016, was still trying to stabilize these issues. These internal
struggles would later culminate in the autumn of 2017 when Mugabe chose to get
rid of Joice Mujuru’s successor, Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa. Only weeks
after Mnangagwa was dismissed he orchestrated a coup, together with the Zim­
babwe Defence Force, and assumed control of the nation. This coup took place
only a little over a year after the event at Great Zimbabwe and it is possible to
draw some conclusion of what Mugabe and his allies sought to achieve by organiz­
ing the event at the monument. The argument could be made that the choice of
venue was an attempt to unify a divided party by making use of Zimbabwe’s
national and revolutionary history. This conclusion is partly justified by the
speech which Mugabe held during the celebration. If one reads between the lines,
it is feasible to argue that he is not only talking about the monument, but also
about ZANU-PF, and the history of the party. There are signs that Mugabe seeks
to use Great Zimbabwe to draw focus away from personal ambitions and once
more focus on something greater. Great Zimbabwe here represents unity, and not
just for Zimbabwe, but also for the ruling party.
The venue selected for the celebrations, our majestic Great Zimbabwe Monument
whose African origins the imperialists wished to denigrate so much, is itself iconic
for the African people as a whole. (Mugabe Speech B)

Mugabe tried to unite a divided party by using the symbolic value of Great
Zimbabwe. What we have previously seen is that ZANU-PF made active political
usage of the monument, both in connection with the repatriation of the soapstone
bird and the Unity Day celebrations. It is therefore not an improbable assumption
that the President wanted to use this symbolic value to rally support from within the
party itself. Since Great Zimbabwe represents a pre-colonial heritage, organizing
the event at the site could be an attempt to remind Zimbabweans of their historical
struggles, and who saw them through these struggles. In this part of Mugabe’s
speech, he calls for unity within the party, and he uses the same rhetoric as
during the occasion in 2003, where he sought to deflect focus away from the
nation’s internal issues, and focus on the ‘real’ threat, the imperialists. In the
14 A. ANDERSSON

speech, Great Zimbabwe is invoked to symbolize the struggle they were forced to
wage against the very nature of imperialism and colonialism, and this connection
is further emphasized in another part of Mugabe’s speech.
I am happy to share with you that I treat this event with seriousness it deserves rightly
and as a patron of the Movement, I remain highly committed to ensuring that it
maintains its importance and aims and objectives for which it was founded. (Mugabe
Speech B)

By organizing the event at Great Zimbabwe, Mugabe wanted to make the political
guests at the party realize how far ZANU-PF and the nation had come since the
Second Chimurenga, while at the same time possibly also wanting them to under­
stand that there was much left to be done. In many ways this is the double
nature of Great Zimbabwe, it represents their continued struggle, while also repre­
senting their independence (Andersson, 2020). The monument represents ZANU-
PF and the indigenous population’s struggle, since Great Zimbabwe is a monument
that the Europeans had sought to not only deprive them of, but even appropriate.
Simultaneously, Great Zimbabwe likewise represents a tremendous victory, the
victory of having removed colonial authority, and restored Zimbabwean culture
and history. This double meaning might have been the core message that Mugabe
sought to instil in his guests; they had come far, but there was still work left to
be done. By gathering the upper echelon of the party at the same event it gave
the appearance of a united front.
The choice of venue was not just a sign of the nation’s victories, it was also a rep­
resentation of how far ZANU-PF had come under Mugabe’s leadership. In 1960,
before the struggle reached its height, it had been impossible for a black Zimbab­
wean to organize any kind of event at the site, but now sixty-six years later it
was possible. Mugabe had led the party during their war for independence and
emancipation, and together with his allies he had guided the party to victory. He
had restored the native African legacy and reclaimed African history. Great Zim­
babwe might in Mugabe’s eyes represent all these things. Great Zimbabwe had,
as previously mentioned, been a monument which the Europeans sough to appro­
priate as their own (e.g. Bent, 1893; Hall & Neal, 1902). However, in the same
manner as the nation itself, Mugabe had restored the monument to its rightful
owners. If one looks at the history of the party and its organization, since the
1960s they had developed from a guerrilla force to become the established ruling
government of the nation. Thus, this speech and history lesson is a call for unity,
but unity on his terms, with himself still as their leader.
The Great Zimbabwe Monument from which derives the name of our great country is
rock solid as you can see, and unshakable, typifying the ideals of pan-Africanism upon
which our finding fathers have inexorably anchored our shared conception of African
identity and heritage. (Mugabe Speech B)

This part of the speech can also be used to justify the interpretation that Mugabe
wished to use Great Zimbabwe to unite a ZANU-PF plagued by internal issues.
The usage of the word pan-Africanism, the talk of heritage, and shared concept
of identity are all indicators of a call for unity. Mugabe also makes it clear that
to him Great Zimbabwe represents all these things. It is therefore possible to
 GREAT ZIMBABWE IN THE SHADOW OF ROBERT MUGABE AND THE ZANU-PF 15

assume that Mugabe wished to make use of this representation to bring back unity
to the ranks of the party.
In addition, the fact that Mugabe celebrated his birthday at the iconic site was not
just for the sake of the ZANU-PF, but was also a way to connect himself with the
former rulers of the Empire of Zimbabwe. Mugabe had ruled Zimbabwe for almost
four decades, and he had in many ways been the nation’s de facto king since 1987.
It seems likely that the monument had a deeper symbolic meaning for him, and to
host the celebration at the site emphasized his position as the leader of the nation.
Thus, it is possible that there was an underlying desire from Mugabe’s side to be
further written into the annals of history and to connect himself with the legacy of
Great Zimbabwe. Robert Mugabe was an important figure in Zimbabwe’s liberation,
and some might argue that he was the most important one. This was something that
both he and the ZANU-PF tried to emphasize by arranging the celebration at Great
Zimbabwe and further entwining the party with the monument.

Munhumutapa Day celebrations

More recently, in 2024, Mugabe’s successor Mnangagwa has likewise sought to
make use of the monument. Mnangagwa’s government has created a new national
holiday — Munhumutapa Day — that is connected to Great Zimbabwe, but also to
himself. Munhumutapa Day is intended to honour the Munhumutapa Empire who
are associated with the construction of the Great Zimbabwe. Thus, the celebration
further links the Munhumutapa Empire and its accomplishments with that of con­
temporary Zimbabwe. However, the celebration likewise glorifies Mnangagwa per­
sonally, since the holiday coincides with his birthday on 15 September (The Herald,
2024). Munhumutapa Day can be viewed as a continuation of using Great Zim­
babwe for political purposes, a strategy noticeable throughout Mugabe’s adminis­
tration. Both Mugabe and Mnangagwa have used the monument’s symbolic
importance to strengthen their political narratives and solidify their authority.
During Mugabe’s tenure, Great Zimbabwe functioned as a setting for nationalistic
events, such the ones previously mentioned in this paper. Similarly, Mnangagwa
and his government uses the monument to foster unity and validate its authority,
comparing historical significance with contemporary political aims (e.g. Chronicle;
Manica Post; The Herald). The inaugural Munhumutapa Day demonstrates this
strategy of combining of history with political messaging to reinforce national iden­
tity and bolster support for the ruling party, since it was hosted at Great Zimbabwe
(Manica Post; Chronicle). Cde John Paradza, who is a member of ZANU-PF and
Deputy Minister of Environment, Climate, and Wildlife, explained the choice of
using Great Zimbabwe prior to the launch by stating:
The choice of the venue for the Munhumutapa Day launch is inspired by the fact that
the Great Zimbabwe monument is an enduring symbol of the resilience and sophisti­
cation of the Zimbabwean people who used locally available resources to construct a
towering city that has been inspirational generation after generation and that is also
exactly what our president is doing. (The Herald, 2024)

The rhetoric of Paradza heavily links Mnangagwa’s policies with the monument,
and it highlights how ZANU-PF still views Great Zimbabwe, and what it rep­
resents. The celebration itself can be viewed as an implied correlation to Great
16 A. ANDERSSON

Zimbabwe, since the Munhumutapa Empire built the monument. It is possible that
Mnangagwa wants Zimbabweans to make the connection that, as Munhumutapa
Empire built Great Zimbabwe, Mnangagwa is building Zimbabwe. The comments
made by Paradza certainly strengthen such argument. That the holiday coincides
with Mnangagwa’s birthday links it heavily with him on a personal level, and
this can be likened to Robert Gabriel Mugabe National Youth Day that celebrates
the former president.

Conclusion
It could be argued that the usage of Great Zimbabwe by ZANU-PF during the
period 2000–2025 was three-fold. First, there was a desire to continue to use
the site as a nationalistic symbol, a symbol which united the nation. Secondly,
the party wanted to continue spreading this image and simultaneously use the
monument to project its own strength, progress, and unity. Thirdly, under Mnan­
gagwa ZANU-PF used the monument to further root contemporary Zimbabwe
with the historical Munhumutapa Empire.
When examining the timeline of when the events discussed were organized, it
becomes clear that ZANU-PF made use of the monument when the party’s future
was uncertain and when ZANU-PF were facing economic and political pressure.
The Unity Day galas and the ceremonial repatriation of the soapstone bird were
both held during a time when Zimbabwe and ZANU-PF were facing political diffi­
culties. Concurrently, the party was still suffering from the financial and political
backlash of the controversial land reforms, and it looked likely that the newly
formed MDC might challenge their position of power. It is therefore possible that
the repatriation is the ideal example of how Great Zimbabwe was used by
ZANU-PF, and how it differed from the more symbolic usage of the site during
1980–2000. This argument can be built on the fact that the repatriation in 1981
differed significantly from the repatriation in 2003. In 1981 several Zimbabwe
birds were returned by the South African government, but this was not as widely
celebrated or recognized by ZANU-PF. When compared to the soapstone bird repa­
triated in 2003 it is possible to recognize how the latter occasion was used by the
party to project strength and progress, and through this legitimize and strengthen
their hold on the power. The fact that it is possible to see such differences
between the two repatriations is a sign of the political usage of the monument
during the period 2000–2025, and this conclusion is further strengthened by
Mugabe’s speech in conjunction with the repatriation. The latter repatriation can
likewise be viewed as a commemoration of why ZANU-PF valued the heritage
site of Great Zimbabwe as part of the national identity that ZANU-PF sought to
create. At the same time, ZANU-PF used Great Zimbabwe’s symbolic and nationa­
listic value to strengthen the party’s hold on power.
The same argument can be presented concerning Mugabe’s birthday celebration
at the site in 2016. This usage differs since it was not primarily focused on rallying
the support of the nation; instead, Mugabe sought to end the discontent within his
own party ranks. This fact was highlighted by the dismissal of Vice President
Mujuru and her associates. These internal issues are also evident in Mugabe’s
decision to later dismiss Mujuru’s successor Mnangagwa, and the fact that
 GREAT ZIMBABWE IN THE SHADOW OF ROBERT MUGABE AND THE ZANU-PF 17

Mugabe was later ousted in a military coup (BBC2, 2020). It can therefore be
stressed that ZANU-PF was dealing with internal issues, and at the time of his birth­
day Mugabe was losing his grip on power. Thus, Mugabe organized the celebra­
tions at the monument to remind them of their heritage, of their humble
beginnings, and not least that under his leadership ZNU-PF had gone from being
a small organization to becoming the nation’s dominant power. By analysing his
speech, it is possible to stress that he wished to unite the gathered guests and the
party by making them focus on something larger. This is where he made use of
the symbolic value of Great Zimbabwe, because in many ways the national monu­
ment does personify their struggle and their journey. It is also possible that another
reason for organizing the event at the site was to further cement Mugabe’s and
ZANU-PF’s place in the annals of Zimbabwe’s history. There is undeniably a
great deal of symbolism when the current ruling party gathers for such an event
at the site where former kings had their seat of power.
Lastly, Mnangagwa’s inaugural Munhumutapa Day celebration in 2024 that was
held at the monument can be viewed as the continuation of both Mugabe’s and
ZANU-PF’s usage of Great Zimbabwe. The parallels made between contemporary
Zimbabwe and the Munhumutapa Empire are made abundantly clear, thus further
making a connection between the historical empire and contemporary Zimbabwe.
Simultaneously the date of the holiday, 15 September, coincides with Mnangagwa’s
birthday and this further links the ruling party, as well as the sitting president, with
the national monument. This latter correlation can be likened to the birthday cele­
bration hosted for Mugabe, and Robert Gabriel Mugabe National Youth Day.
To conclude, it can be emphasized that ZANU-PF has taken advantage of Great
Zimbabwe for cementing its leading role in Zimbabwean politics. On four
occasions during 2000–2025 ZANU-PF have made varied use of the site’s cultural
and nationalistic value. What this paper has shown is the continued political impor­
tance of Great Zimbabwe. The paper has also demonstrated how ZANU-PF,
Mugabe, and Mnangagwa organized events at the site to further strengthen their
hold on power. From this, one can also draw general conclusions of how heritage
sites can be used by governments across the globe for various purposes.

Acknowledgements
I want to provide a thank you to the two anonymous reviewers who provided valu­
able feedback, and that helped make the manuscript better. I would likewise wish to
acknowledge my colleague Julie Shipp, who provided me with insightful discussions
on the topic.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Ethical statement
There may be some ethical questions raised in this paper.
18 A. ANDERSSON

Notes on contributor
Adam Andersson received MA in archaeology in 2020 at the Department of His­
torical Studies at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. His major focus of
research is the epistemology and ontology of archaeology, the contemporary politi­
cal dimensions of archaeology, the relationship between heritage management and
the public, and the archaeology of the contemporary past. Since 2022 employed as a
PhD. student at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
Correspondence to: Adam Andersson. Email: [email protected]

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