VERDICTUM.

IN

2025 INSC 843 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7707 OF 2025

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017)

ESTATE OFFICER, HARYANA URBAN

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ORS. …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

NIRMALA DEVI …RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7708 OF 2025

(@SLP CIVIL NO. 25549 OF 2017)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7709 OF 2025

(@SLP(C) No. 20604 OF 2017)
Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
CHANDRESH
Date: 2025.07.14
19:29:15 IST

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7710 OF 2025

Reason:

(@SLP(C) No. 20614 OF 2017)

 VERDICTUM.IN

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7711 OF 2025

(@SLP(C) No. 20608 OF 2017)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7712 OF 2025

(@SLP(C) No. 20640 OF 2017)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7713 OF 2025

(@SLP CIVIL NO. 18218 OF 2025)
(@Diary No. 9756 OF 2017)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7714 OF 2025

(@SLP(C) No. 15152 OF 2017)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7715 OF 2025

(@SLP(C) No. 15306 OF 2017)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7716 OF 2025

(@SLP(C) No. 15273 OF 2017)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7717 OF 2025

(@SLP(C) No. 15146 OF 2017)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7718 OF 2025

(@SLP(C) No. 25553 OF 2017)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7719 OF 2025

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 1 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

(@SLP(C) No. 20617 OF 2017)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7720 OF 2025

(@SLP(C) No. 20642 OF 2017)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7721 OF 2025
(@SLP(C) No. 15274 OF 2017)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7722 OF 2025

(@SLP(C) No. 25547 OF 2017)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7723 OF 2025

(@SLP(C) No. 25555 OF 2017)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7724 OF 2025

(@SLP(C) No. 20616 OF 2017)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7725 OF 2025

(@SLP(C) No. 20607 OF 2017)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7726 OF 2025

(@SLP(C) No. 15147 OF 2017)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7727 OF 2025

(@SLP(C) No. 949 OF 2018)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7728 OF 2025

(@SLP(C) No. 4787 OF 2018)

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 2 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7729 OF 2025

(@SLP(C) No. 30437 OF 2018)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7730 OF 2025

(@SLP(C) No. 30436 OF 2018)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7731 OF 2025

(@SLP(C) No. 30438 OF 2018)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7732 OF 2025

(@SLP(C) No. 30439 OF 2018)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7733 OF 2025

(@SLP(C) No. 12014 OF 2021)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7734 OF 2025

(@SLP(C) No. 12015 OF 2021)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7735 OF 2025

(@SLP(C) No. 12016 OF 2021)

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 3 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

J. B. PARDIWALA, J.:
For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided in the following
parts: -

INDEX
A. HISTORY OF THE LITIGATION ..................................................................... 5

i. Few Salient Features of the Policy of 1992 .................................................... 15

ii. Institution of the Suits under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 for
seeking Mandatory Injunction for Enforcement of The Policy.................. 25

iii. Impugned Judgment of the High Court ........................................................ 32

iv. Filing of the Special Leave Petitions before this Court ................................ 36

B. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES .................................................................. 37

i. Submissions on behalf of the Appellants ....................................................... 37

ii. Submissions on behalf of the Respondents ................................................... 46

C. ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................... 49

i. Dictum as laid by this Court in Brij Mohan (Supra) and the Ratio
Decidendi. ......................................................................................................... 53

a. Wambaugh’s Test / Inversion Test ................................................................. 57

b. Halsbury’s Test............................................................................................... 58

c. Goodhart’s Test .............................................................................................. 60

ii. Maintainability of the Suit filed under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act,
1963 for seeking Mandatory Injunction for Enforcement of the Obligations
in terms of the Scheme of 1992. ...................................................................... 63

a. Conditions for granting a Mandatory Injunction. .......................................... 66

D. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 84

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 4 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

1. Delay condoned in Diary No. 9756 of 2017. Leave granted in all the
Special Leave Petitions.

2. Since the issues involved in all the captioned appeals are same and the

challenge is also to the self-same judgment and order passed by the High Court,

those were taken up for hearing analogously and are being disposed of by this

common judgment and order.

3. This batch of appeals arises from a common judgment and order passed

by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dated 12.08.2016 by which the

Second Appeals filed by the appellant herein came to be dismissed, affirming

the judgment and order passed by the First Appellate Court affirming the

decrees passed by the trial court in favour of the respondents herein.

A. HISTORY OF THE LITIGATION

4. Our order dated 05.03.2025 by itself would give more than a fair idea

as regards the history of this litigation and the issues involved in the matter.

Our order dated 5.03.2025 reads thus:

“ ORDER
1. We heard Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, the learned Additional
Solicitor General appearing for the Haryana Urban
Development Authority i.e. the petitioners – herein and the
learned counsel appearing for the respective respondents
in each of the petitions before us.
2. Having heard the matter for quite some time, we have
been able to understand the controversy involved in this
litigation. What we have been able to understand prima
facie is that in the State of Haryana, there is a very unusual
policy with respect to land acquisition. If the Government

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 5 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

wants to acquire land for public purpose, it proceeds in

accordance with the provisions of Land Acquisition Act.
However, it has its own policy of even providing alternate
plots of land to the oustees. It all started in the year 1989
with the issue of Notification under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act. In 1990, the Section 6 Notification came
to be issued. In the year 1992, the awards were passed.
3. We were taken through the relevant features of the policy
relating to allotment of residential plots/commercial sites
to the oustees. The same is at Annexure `P1’ in the first
matter before us.
4. Thereafter, we were taken through the various pleadings
in the plaint which is at Annexure `P6’.
5. Prima facie, it appears that the suits filed by the
individuals/oustees are one invoking Section 39 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963.
6. We also take notice of the fact that in some of the cases,
the Trial Court dismissed the Suits whereas few came to be
allowed.
7. However, the fact is that all these petitions arise from a
common Judgment and order passed by the High Court
dismissing in all 27 Second Appeals.
8. Today, Ms. Bhati, the learned Additional Solicitor
General invited our attention to the order passed by this
Court dated 8-5-2017, the same reads thus:-
“Delay condoned Shri Shyam Divan, learned senior
counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits
that the petitioner will abide by the policy framed on
11.08.2016 and every eligible oustee will be
accommodated according to the said Policy. Issue notice
restricted to the question of correctness of the general
direction made by the High Court in granting allotments
to all claimants who may not be similarly situated. In the
meantime, there shall be stay of execution.”
9. The plain reading of the aforesaid order would indicate
that at the relevant point of time, a statement was made on
behalf of the Authority that they were ready and willing to
consider the claims of the oustees in accordance with the
policy of 2016.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 6 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

10. Therefore, this Court thought fit to issue notice limited

to the general direction which has been issued by the High
Court in its impugned judgment and order, referred to
above. To the aforesaid, there is a strong objection at the
end of the learned counsel appearing for the individual
oustees. Their claim is that they are entitled to the benefit
of the Policy of 1992 and not 2016.
11. To a very specific question put to them as to why they
are objecting to the Policy of 2016, the reply was that the
rates have been increased over a period of years. They
want allotment at the rate which were prevalent in
accordance with 1992 policy and not in accordance with
2016 policy. This aspect will have to be looked into.
12. Ms. Bhati put forward three contentions. First, all those
oustees who had actually not applied in accordance with
the policy prevalent at the relevant point of time, could not
have instituted the suits invoking Section 39 of the Specific
Relief Act. According to Ms. Bhati, such suits by itself were
not maintainable.
13. Her second contention is that each co-sharer is not
entitled to individual plots and the third contention is with
regard to limitation.
14. Before we proceed to hear these matters finally, we
want the following information to be placed on record for
better and effective determination of the issues falling for
our consideration:-
(i) in how many cases before us, the concerned outstee(s)
had not applied at all;
(ii) How many had actually applied;
(iii) the fine distinguishing features between the policy of
1992 and 2016 respectively;
(iv) how many suits were allowed, whereas how many
were dismissed by the Trial Court.
15. We would also request Ms. Bhati, the learned ASG to
make us understand the purport of the judgment delivered
by this Court in “Brij Mohan and Others vs. Haryana
Urban Development Authority & Anr. (2011) 2 SCC 29
(Civil Appeal No.1 of 2011), decided on 3-1-2011.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 7 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

16. In the last paragraph of the impugned order passed by

the High Court, we find reference of Udai Singh’s case. It
appears that the entire impugned judgment is based on the
ratio of Udai Singh’s case.
17. We are informed that Udai Singh’s Judgment was
carried to this Court by way of Special Leave to Appeal
(Civil) Nos.8766-8767/2023 which came to be dismissed
by this Court vide order dated 24-11- 2025.
18. We would also like to know from Ms. Bhati whether the
High Court was justified in relying on the dictum as laid in
the Udai Singh’s case.
19. Let the aforesaid information come on record by way
of an affidavit. 20. Post these matters on 25-3-2025 as Item
No.1 to be treated as Part-heard.”

5. In pursuance of our order dated 5.03.2025 referred to above, the

appellant through its Estate Officer has filed an additional affidavit answering

the four specific questions put by us.

6. To the first two questions put by us, the reply of the appellant is as

under:

“(i & ii) In reply to the information as sought for in para

14(i)(ii) of the order dated 05.03.2025, it is submitted that
from the subsequent paras it is evident that any of the
respondent did not submit application as per the specific
format provided in brochure issued seeking allotment of
plot under Oustees quota and further failed to pay 10% of
the earnest money as mentioned over there. Therefore, it
cannot be said any of the concerned oustees had applied
seeking allotment of plot under Oustees quota as per the
brochure issued by the petitioner authority inviting
applications for an allotment of plot. It is submitted that as
per condition of the brochure issued by the petitioner
authority the application shall be deemed to be valid only

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 8 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

in those cases where the application so submitted are

accompanied by earnest money. In present case any of the
respondent has not submitted the earnest money with the
application if any so submitted.
iv.) In respect to para 14(iv) of the order it is submitted that
in total 30 civil suit instituted (26 in respect to impugned
order dated 12.08.2016), (3 in respect to impugned order
dated 30.07.2019) & (1 in respect to impugned order dated
07.01.2016) by the respondents and out of 30 civil suits, 12
civil suits were dismissed and 18 civil suits decreed by the
Ld. Civil Judge. A chart in respect to each suit
dismissed/decreed has been annexed with this additional
affidavit.
xxx xxx xxx
28. I say and submit that under all the policies framed
by petitioner HDUA from time to time and amended the
requirement of the public notice/advertisement to be issued
inviting applications from the interested persons including
the oustees and the applications are to be submitted in the
prescribed format along with earnest money and terms and
conditions of the brochure so issued the application shall
be deemed to be valid application if the same has been
submitted with earnest money.
xxx xxx xxx
29. I say and submit that when the applications have
not been submitted in the prescribed format that to without
the earnest money therefore the respondents are not
entitled for any relief and it will amount to wind full gain
if the respondent to have been fully compensated in
accordance with statutory scheme for the land acquired for
public purpose by the state if despite have not paid a single
penny if they are giving their plot as per the 1992 rates.”

7. As regards the distinguishing features between the Policy of 1992 and

the revised Policy of 2016 respectively, the appellant has explained the same in

the following manner:

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 9 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

“DISTINGUISHING FEATURES BETWEEN THE POLICY OF 1992 AND

POLICY OF 2016
Terms and conditions of Terms and conditions Modifications done in
Policy dated of Policy dated policy dated 01.08.2016
18.03.1992 11.08.2018 as modified on
08.05.2018
VI) Claims of the
oustees for allotment of
plots under this policy
shall be invited by the
Estate Officer, Haryana
Urban Development
Authority concerned
before the sector is
floated for sale.

2. An oustee shall be entitled to seek 2. An oustee shall be entitled to

allotment of plot in the same sector seek allotment of plot in the
for which land has been acquired for same sector for which land has
residential/commercial purpose. been acquired for
However, where the land has only residential/commercial
been acquired for any non-residential purpose and in case the plots
purpose such as industrial are not available in the same
institutional group housing sites, sector for which land has been
completely commercial sector etc. acquired for
then such an oustee shall be entitled residential/commercial
to seek allotment of plot in the purpose, then such an oustee
adjoining sector. Adjoining sector for may also be considered for
this purpose shall mean the sector allotment in an adjoining
with boundaries abutting to the said sector except where the land
sector. Where there are more than one was acquired prior to
sector adjoining to the sector for 10.09.1987. Where the land has
which land has been acquired in that only been acquired for any non-
case an oustee shall be entitled to residential purpose such as
make an application in any one sector industrial, institutional, Group
of his choice. However, where any Housing sites and completely
such application is made in more than commercial sector etc. then
one sector then only his one such an oustee shall be entitled
application in any such sector at the to seek allotment of plot in an
discretion of the HUDA Authority adjoining sector. Adjoining
shall be considered and earnest sector for this purpose shall
money in respect of other mean any sector where
applications shall automatically boundary abuts that of the said
stand forfeited and no claim for such sector. However, if no plot is
forfeiture shall lie in future. available for one or more
oustees in any of the adjoining
sectors, then a sector adjoining
to any of the original and
adjoining sectors, may be
considered for purpose of
allotment of plots. An oustee
shall be free to apply for
allotment of an ouste quota plot

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 10 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

in one, more or all the

adjoining sectors. It is clarified
that once any of these
applications is successful all
remaining applications shall be
automatically assumed to have
been cancelled.

3. The application of an oustee shall 3. The application of an oustee

be considered against the plots shall be considered against the
determined under oustees quota as plots determine under oustee
per the instruction issued vide memo quota as per the instruction
no. UB-A-62016/2213 dated issued vide Memo No. UB-A-6-
04.121.2015. The number of plots 2016/2213 dated 04.12.2015.
shall be determined on basis of total The percentage of plots shall be
available plots advertised. determined on the basis of plots
in a sector and it shall be
ensured that number of plots
allotted under all the reserved
categories shall not exceed
maximum limit of 50% of the
plots in a sector. The charge in
number of plots in a sector
subsequently should be taken
into account for determining
the reservation of oustees quota
plots.

4. An oustee shall have the right to

make such application only till the
plots are available for oustees in the
sector as per condition no. 2 and 3
above.

i) Plots to the 6. An oustee should have been the

oustees would be offered owner of the land as on the date when
if the land proposed to be the notification under Sec. 4 of the
acquired is under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is issued.
ownership of oustees Any subsequent purchaser of land
prior to the publication after said notification has been issued
of the notification under will not be entitled to make such
section 4 of the Land application. Any application made by
Acquisition Act and if such purchaser shall entail automatic
75% of more of the total rejection of application and forfeiture
land owned by the land of earnest money. However, the
owners in that sector is forfeiture of earnest money will be
acquired. done only after giving opportunity of
hearing to the defaulting applicant. 7.
An oustee shall be eligible to make
such application only if 75% or more

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 11 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

of his total land in the concerned

revenue estate is acquired. For this
purpose, the total land to be
considered for such determination
will mean the land comprised in the
same revenue
Estate(s) where the concerned sector
is situated.

iii) The above policy 8. The eligibility of each co-sharer for

shall also apply in case allotment of plot under oustees quota
there are a number of co- shall be determined on the basis of his
sharers of the land which individual holding i.e. each co-sharer
has been acquired. If the will be entitled to seek allotment of
acquired land measures plot on basis of his own individual
more than one acre. holding.
Then for the purpose of
granting benefits under
this policy, the
determining factor
should be the area
owned by each co sharer
respectively as per his
her share in the joint
holding. In case the
acquired land of the co
sharer is less than one
acre, only one plot of
250 sqd would be
allotted in the joint name
of the co sharers.
(Amended vide Memo
No.A-11P-93/7996-8013
dated 12.03.1993 as
under:
2. Benefit under oustees
policy shall be restricted
to one plot according to
the size of the holding
irrespective of the
number of co-sharers.
vii) The commercial 10. No commercial site will be
sites/building are sold by allotted to the oustees
auction. The
sites/buildings be also
allotted to oustees on
reserve price as and
when the auction of the
same is held. While
putting such
sites/buildings to public
auction, the oustees who
want to purchase the
sites /buildings could
represent before hand

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 12 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

for them. However, if the

area acquired of the
commercial site is
equivalent or less to the
area of booth shop cum
flat being auctioned by
HUDA they may be
given a booth /SCO sites
keeping in view the size
of acquisition under this
policy. (Amended vide
Memo No.A-11P-
98/24402-22 Dated:
28.08.1998.)
13. A co-sharer in the land will not
be eligible to claim allotment of plot
if he had given a no objection
certificate in favour of his co-sharer
and on account of submission of
such no objection certificate a plot
was allotted to such co-sharer in
any previous floatation of plots for
oustees.
v) As per the policy the 14. An o ustee who has already been
oustees shall be entitled to allotted a plot under the oustees
a developed plot/plots, the policy on any previous occasion as
size of which would a co-sharer shall not be entitled to
depend upon the area of stake claim for allotment of plot
his acquired land subject under oustees quota.
to a maximum of 500 syd.
The oustee shall be
entitled to this benefit
under this policy only
once in the same town
where the land of a person
situated / located.
However, in cases where
the land of a person
situated in the same town
is acquired in pockets at
different times. The owner
shall be entitled to claim
the benefit on account of
the entire area acquired at
different times for
purposes of claiming the
benefit under this policy.
15. An oustee who has made an In Clause 15 of the guidelines,
application for allotment of plot following clause may be added
under oustees policy on any 15(a). Where an application is
previous occasion and said made by an oustee in an
application either is pending for advertisement issued afresh,
decision or was rejected on any the price of plot that may be
ground and said rejection order was charged from him if he is

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 13 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

impugned before any Court of law successful in draw of lots out of

or authority or forum of any nature plots reserved for oustees shall
and matter has been remanded back be the rate as advertised in a
to the authority for fresh decision new advertisement in cases
shall be informed of the decision in where the allotment of plot
Bhagwan Singh's case and could not be effected despite
Sandeep's case and may also be determination of his eligibility,
advised to apply for allotment of the prevalent price at the time
plot in fresh advertisement which of application by the oustee in
will be issued after determination of pursuance to an advertisement
reservation and their earnest money may be charged alongwith
may be refunded along with interest simple interest @ 11% per
@ 55% per annum from date of annum till date. It is clarified
deposit till date of payment. that eligibility for the purpose
However, where litigation is as aforesaid shall be treated as
pending then the court of law determine only when Sachin
authority or forum where it is completed and satisfied all the
pending may be informed of the formalities/conditions as per
aforesaid decision and efforts may the applicable policy.
be made to get the litigation
disposed of in terms specified
herein.
16. The applications of the oustees
as received shall be put in draw of
lots and eligibility of only those
oustees who are successful in draw
of lots shall be determined. Mere
submission of such application or
success in draw of lots shall not
create any vested right for such
allotment as eligibility will be
determined only after oustee is
declared successful in draw of lots.
17. The list of applicants shall be
compiled within a period of 15 days
of closing of the scheme and draw
shall be held within a period of 30
days of closing of scheme for
advertised plots. The eligibility of
the oustees who are successful in
draw of lots shall be determined
within a further of if any outstay
who is declared as successful in
draw of Lords is found in eligible as
per policy then his draw shall be
cancelled the plot which will
become available on account of
such cancellation of draw me again
be put to draw of lots out of
remaining out these who were
earlier and unsuccessful in the same
bro the earnest money of successful
applicants may be refunded their
after no inter shell be payable on the
said amount if it is a refunded within

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 14 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

a. of from closing of 1226 - HSVP

policies and structures the scheme
otherwise interest @ 55% per
annum may be paid on earnest
money after expiry of 6 months till
date of payment.

8. So far as the fourth question is concerned as to how many suits were

allowed and how many came to be dismissed, the information provided by the

appellant is as under:

“iv.) In respect to para 14(iv) of the order it is submitted that

in total 30 civil suit instituted (26 in respect to impugned
order dated 12.08.2016), (3 in respect to impugned order
dated 30.07.2019) & (1 in respect to impugned order dated
07.01.2016) by the respondents and out of 30 civil suits, 12
civil suits were dismissed and 18 civil suits decreed by the Ld.
Civil Judge. A chart in respect to each suit dismissed/decreed
has been annexed with this additional affidavit.”
(emphasis supplied)

i. Few Salient Features of the Policy of 1992

9. Although we have given a fair idea as regards the distinguishing

features of the Policy of 1992 and the Policy of 2016 as modified in 2018

referred to above, we are of the view that for better and effective adjudication

of the issue in question we must highlight few salient features of the Policy of

1992. The salient features of the Policy of 1992 and in what manner the oustees

were expected to apply for the plot in accordance with the policy, has been

highlighted by the appellant in its written submissions as under:

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 15 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

“ISSUANCE OF BROCHURE/ADVERTISEMENT FOR

INVITING APPLICATIONS FOR ALLOTMENT OF
PLOT UNDER OUSTEES QUOTA

(i) BROCHURE/ADVERTISEMENT DATED 01.10.1992

The Petitioner Authority issued a brochure on 01.10.1992 for
a free hold residential plot in Sector 19 Part – II and Sector
20 in Kaithal. The salient features are:
(i) The application is to be addressed to the Estate Officer,
HUDA as:
“To
The Estate Officer,
Haryana Urban Development Authority,
Kurukshetra
Dear Sir,
I/we request that I/WE may be allotted a residential site
as stated on reverse side in Sector 19(Part ii) & Sector 20.
I/We agree to conform to abide by the terms and conditions
as contained in the Haryana Urban Development Authority
Act, 1977 and in the rules and Regulations applications
thereunder. I/we own no residential plot/house in my / our
name(s) or in the name(s) of my/our dependent
family/member(s)/spouse in Kaithal Urban Estate if applying
under General Category or any Urban Estate of Haryana if
applying under any Gender Category or any Urban Estate of
Haryana if applying under any Reserve Category.
Yours faithfully,
Signature of Applicant(s)”
(ii) Terms and conditions for the allotment of Residential
Plot:
“1(i) Only such applications shall be deemed to be valid as
are accompanied by specified earnest money equivalent to
10% of the tentative sale price in the form of cash
receipt/demand draft in favour of the Estate Officer,
Kurukshetra drawn at the place at which the application is
deposited. However, Earnest Money shall not be accepted in
cash by the Estate Officer, Kurukshetra, Bank branches will
accept cash also.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 16 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

(iii) The application form to be submitted was serial no. ed

and the price of
PRICE RS. 5/- AT THE COUNTER
Rs. 15/- by Registered Post.
Indian Postal Orders are not accepted.
No responsibility of postal delay.
(iv) The last date for receipt of application is 01.10.1992.

(ii) BROCHURE/ADVERTISEMENT DATED 22.12.1999

The salient features are:

(i) there is prescribed application with serial no.
seeking allotment of residential plot.
(ii) The application is to be addressed in the
prescribed format to the Estate Officer, HUDA.
(iii) Terms and Conditions:

“1(i) Only such applications shall be deemed to be valid

as are accompanied by specified earnest money
equivalent to 10% of the tentative sale price in the form
of a cash receipt/demand draft in favour of the concerned
Estate Officer, HUDA drawn at the place at which the
application is deposited. However, earnest money shall
not be accepted in cash by the concerned Estate Officer,
HUDA Bank branches will accept cash also.
3. The price is tentative to the extent that any enhancement
in the cost of land awarded by the Competent authority under
the Land Acquisition Act shall also be payable
proportionately, as determined by the Authority, within 30
days or in such specified period of its demand.

OTHER NOTES:
1. No interest shall be payable on the money for the
applicant for the period for which the same remains lying
with the authority.
3. An application without the prescribed earnest money
shall not be entertained and is liable to be rejected outright.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 17 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

4. The applicants under the reserved categories shall not be

eligible without the requisite certificates/documents.
xxx xxx xxx
6. Affidavit, wherever required, shall be furnished on
judicial stamp paper worth Rs. 3/- duly attested by a
Magistrate 1st Class/Executive Magistrate.
7. Allotment of plots and all matters connected therewith
shall be governed by the provisions contained in the HUDA
Act and Rules /Regulations framed thereunder as amended
from time to time.
8. Dispute if any regarding allotment related matters should
be settled within the jurisdiction of the concerned Estate
Officer, HUDA.”
The price of the brochure mentioned as Rs. 20.00
(iii) PUBLIC NOTICE / ADVERTISEMENT DATED
13.03.2025
(i) Oustees to apply alongwith application money Rs.
50,000/- for the concerned sector.
(ii) the claims of the oustees will be decided in terms of the
policy dated 11.08.2016 and 08.05.2018.
(iii) The terms and conditions available on HSVP website.

1. Any land owner whose land is acquired prior to

10.09.1987 by Urban Estate Department are not eligible
against the advertisement at hand for which separate
advertisement has been issued.
3. As held by Hon’ble High Court in Rajiv
Manchanda’s case (supra), the policy applicable to an
oustee is the one which is in force when an application is
made pursuant to an advertisement issued by HUDA and
in pursuance of which the plot is allotted. Therefore, for
deciding the claims of oustees the applicable policy
would be policy dated 04.12.2015, 11.08.2016 and
08.05.2018 as per which only the entitlement and
eligibility shall be decided.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 18 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

4. the allotment shall be made on the current reserve

price mentioned in the table attached and in case
finalization of allotment takes time, for any reason in that
eventuality bank rate of interest be charged till the date
of allotment on the rate mentioned in the advertisement.
(v) It is pertinent to mention here that in regard to
advertisement dated 13.03.2025 number of oustees have
already applied online paying Rs. 50,000.00.
(vi) That earlier as per advertisement, the closing date was
31.03.2025 and now the same has been extended to
31.05.2025.
(vii) It is submitted that from the above, it is evident that
there is a prescribed form of application with serial no. and
the same is to be submitted with earnest money.
(True copies of the advertisement dated 01.10.1992,
22.12.1999 and public notice dated 13.03.2025 are being
annexed marked as ANNEXURE A-7, Pg. 68-82.)
(viii) At the outset it is submitted that in regard to
advertisement/brochure dated 01.10.1992 and 22.12.1999
any of the respondents did not submit any application as per
prescribed format and even did not deposit the earnest
money. Therefore, any application submitted by any of the
respondents not in the prescribed form with earnest money
cannot said to be submission of application and once they
failed to comply with the mandatory condition of the
policy/advertisement cannot claim entitlement of a plot under
oustee policy.”

10. In addition to the aforesaid, the appellant has narrated the following

facts as regards the applicability of the policy etc. The same reads thus:

“The Petitioner Authority introduced a scheme whereby a

plot is offered to the oustees whose land has been acquired.
Size of the plot is decided as per criteria and the area of land
acquired. The person whose land has been acquired may
apply to the Estate Officer, concerned as and when oustees
claim for sector are invited along with copy of Award,

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 19 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

Nakaljamabi or registry as the case may be alongwith 10 %

earnest money.
(i) It is submitted that the petitioner Authority from time to
time issued policies for the allotment of residential plots/
commercial sites to the land owners those have become
oustees due to acquisition of their respective land. The relevant
oustees policies in regard to the present batch of SLP’s are as
under:
Petitioner-HUDA vide Memo No. A-2-92/2076 dated
18.03.1992 (policy) decided to offer a plot to the Oustees in
case where the land has been acquired (P-1 Pg. 31-33 with
SLP No. 15148 of 2017 Paper Book). The relevant terms and
conditions as mentioned in the said policy are as under:

(i) Plots to the oustees would be offered if the land proposed

to be acquired is under the ownership of oustees prior to the
publication of the notification under section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act and if 75 % or more of the total land owned by
the Landowners in that sector is acquired.
(ii) Oustees whose land acquired is:
(a) Less than 500 sq. yards would be offered a plot of 50 sq.
yards.
(b) Between 500 sq. yds. And one acre would be offered a plot
of 250 sq. yds.
(c) From 1 acre and above would be offered a plot of 500 sq.
yds where 500 or where 500 sq. yds. Plots are not provided in
the layout plan two plots of 250 sq. yds. Each may be given.
(iii) The above policy shall also apply in case there are no. of
co-sharers of the land which has been acquired. If the acquired
land measures more than one acre. Then for the purpose of
granting benefits under this policy, the determining factor
should be the area owned by each co-sharer respectively as
per his/her share in the joint holding. In case the acquired land
of the co-sharer is less than one acre, only one plot of 250 yds.
Would be allotted in the joint name of the co-sharers.
(vi) Allotment of plots to the oustees will be made at the
allotment rate advertised by the Haryana Urban Development

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 20 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

Authority for that sector, Land owners will be given

compensation for their land which is acquired.
(vii) Claim of the oustees for allotment of plots under this
Policy shall be invited by the Estate Officer, Haryana Urban
Development Authority concerned before the Sector is floated
for sale.
(viii) …
(A true copy of Memo dated 18.03.1992 is annexed herewith
marked as ANNEXURE A-1, PG. 46-48)

(ii) It is submitted that the Petitioner Authority in its 55 th

meeting held on 29.01.1993 approved the procedure for
inviting, scrutinizing and finally accepting the claims of
oustees and further modified the earlier policy dated
18.03.1992 on 12.03.1993 (P-3 Pg. 40-41) to the effect that

(i) Benefit under the policy is not to be allowed to those

oustees who have got residential/commercial plot from HUDA
in the urban estate.
(ii) Benefit shall be restricted to one plot according to the size
of the holding irrespective of the no. of co-sharers.
(A true copy of memo dated 12.03.1993 is annexed herewith
marked as ANNEXURE A-2, pg. 49-50.)

(iii) It is submitted that after passing of the judgment by the

Hon’ble High Court in the case of HUDA v. Sandeep Kumar,
during the pendency of the SLP’s issued a Memo dated
11.08.2016, i.e., another policy called as Policy of 2016.

(iv) In the said memo it was specifically mentioned that the

judgment dated 25.04.2012 passed by the Hon’ble High Court
in LPA No. 2096 of 2011 titled as HUDA v. Sandeep has been
upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated
06.03.2014 passed in SLP © No. 27256 of 2012 titled as
HUDA v. Sandeep whereby the special leave petition has been

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 21 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

dismissed and as such the order passed by the Hon’ble High

Court has been affirmed.
(v) It is submitted that in order to ensure the implementation
of the directions as issued in the case of Sandeep Kumar
(supra) by the Hon’ble High Court and to ensure settlement of
the oustees claim the Memo dated 11.08.2016 was issued. The
relevant salient features of the said memo dated
11.08.2016(Policy of 2016) are as follows:
1. An oustee shall have to submit an application for allotment
of plot under the oustees quota alongwith earnest money in
pursuance of advertisement inviting claim for such allotment.
2. … (amended subsequently vide memo dated
08.05.2018)
3. …(amended subsequently vide memo dated 08.05.2018)
4. ….
5. The allotment of plot to the oustees will be made
through draw of lots.
6. And oustee should have been the owner of the land
as on the date when the notification under Section 4 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is issued. Any subsequent purchase
of land after said notification has been issued will not be
entitled to make such application. Any application made by
such purchaser shall entail automatic rejection of application
and for feature of earnest money. However, the forfeiture of
earnest money will be done only after giving opportunity of
hearing to the defaulting applicant.
7. …

8. The eligibility of each co-sharer for allotment of

plot under oustee quota shall be determined on the basis of
his individual holding each co-sharer will be entitled to seek
allotment of plot on basis of his own individual holding.
9. ….
10. ….
11. ….

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 22 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

12. An oustee who has already got the benefit of

allotment of plot from Haryana Urban Development Authority
in any reserved category including under oustee policy shall
not be eligible to seek allotment of plot under oustee quota.
13. A co-sharer in the land will not be eligible to claim
allotment of plot if he had given a no objection certificate in
favour of his co-sharer and on account of submission of such
no objection certificate, a plot was allotted to such co-sharer
in any previous flotation of plots for oustees
14. An oustee who has already been allotted a plot under the
oustees policy on any previous occasion as a co-sharer and
shall not be entitled to stake claim for allotment of plot under
oustees quota.
15. … (amended subsequently vide memo dated 08.05.2018)
16. The applications of the oustees as received shall be put in
draw of lots and eligibility of only those oustees who are
successful in draw of lots shall be determined. Mere
submission of such application or success in draw of lots shall
not create any vested right for such allotment as eligibility will
be determined only after oustee is declared successful in draw
of lots.
17. …
18. …
(A true copy of memo dated 11.08.2016 is annexed herewith
marked as ANNEXURE A-3, PG. 51-57)
(vi) It is submitted that the policy dated 11.08.2016 was
clarified vide Memo dated 08.11.2016. (A true copy of memo
dated 08.11.2016 is annexed herewith marked as ANNEXURE
A-4 PG. 58-59.
(vii) It is submitted that the said policy dated 11.08.2016 was
amended vide Memo dated 08.05.2018 where clause 2, 3, 11
and 15 of the guidelines dated 11.08.2016 amended and clause
19 was added. A true copy of memo dated 08.05.2018 is
annexed herewith marked as ANNEXURE A-5 PG. 60-64.
(viii)It is submitted that the petitioner authority has already
filed a comparative chart distinguishing the policies of 1992
and 2016 as asked for by this Hon’ble Court in Para 14(iii) of

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 23 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

its order dated 05.03.2025 with the additional affidavit filed

on 25.03.2018 (A-2, pg 29-31 with the additional affidavit),
however, another copy of being annexed herewith marked as
Annexure A-6 pg. 65-67.
(ix) It is submitted that a bunch of special leave petition listed
for hearing on 08.05.2017 and the Hon’ble court pleased to
pass the order as:
“Delay condoned.
Shri Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of the petitioner submits that the petitioner will abide by the
Policy framed on 11.08.2016 and every eligible oustee will be
accommodated according to the said policy.
Issue notice restricted to the question of correctness of the
general direction made by the High Court in granting
allotments to all claimants who may not be similarly situated.
In the meantime, there shall be stay of execution.”
(x) It is submitted that the said policy dated 11.08.2016 was
formulated in view of the directions issued by the Hon’ble
Court in the case of Sandeep Kumar and even the
advertisement of public notice issued in 2025 inviting the
applications for allotment of plots is also based on the policy
dated 11.08.2016.

(xi) It is submitted that even in the judgment dated 22.11.2017

passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh Manchanda vs. HUDA 2018 (2) PLR 422 there
was issue in regard to the policy dated 11.08.2016. The said
question NO. 14 is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:
“Whether the policy dated 11.08.2016 or any part of the
thereof is illegal?
(xii) It is submitted that the Hon’ble High court while
passing the judgment dated 21.11.2017 dealt with all the
clauses of the policy dated 11.08.2016 and upheld the same.
(xiii) It is submitted that in the case of HUDA vs. Sandeep
Kumar & Ors. the Hon’ble High court while answering
question No. 3 arrived at the finding that the condition for
allotment of a plot for the reason that 75% of the land has been

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 24 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

acquired cannot be said to be unjustified and the landowner is

the owner of the remaining land, the policy makers has found
as a part of rehabilitation process and it to the object of
rehabilitate.
(xiv) It is submitted that in regard to applicability of the
oustees policy, the Hon’ble High court in the case of Rajiv
Manchanda vs. HUDA passed in Writ Petition No. 22252 of
2016 in Para 72 held that the policy applicable to an oustee is
1 which is in force when an application is made pursuant to an
advertisement issued by HUDA and in pursuance to which the
plot is allotted.
In present case, the respondents have not submitted the
applications seeking allotment of plot and the latest
advertisement in 2025 has been issued where it has been
mentioned that the policy dated 11.08.2016 will be applicable,
therefore, in the case of respondents also the said policy will
be applicable.”

ii. Institution of the Suits under Section 39 of the Specific Relief

Act, 1963 for seeking Mandatory Injunction for Enforcement of
The Policy.

11. It appears from the materials on record that suits were instituted with

almost stereotyped plaints. One such plaint of Suit No. 538 of 2007 instituted

by one Smt. Nirmala Devi w/o Shishpal Verma r/o Kaithal reads thus:

“Suit For Mandatory Injunction

It is submitted as under:
1. The plaintiff was the absolute owner in possession of the
land measuring 225 sq. yards being 15/1518 share out of the
total land mesuring 37 kanal 19 Marla comprised in Khewat
no. 416 mn, khatoni No. 549 min, Rect. No. 117, Killa No. 6/2,

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 25 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

11, 12, 13/1, 13/2, 14/1, 14/2/1, 15/1 situated within the
revenue estate of Patti Kaiseth seth Kaithal vide regd sale deed
no. 2629/1 dated 21/9/89.
2. Hereinafter the land fully detailed and described in para
no. 1 of the plaint shall be called the suit land for the aske of
the brevity.
3. That the suit land is situate within the Municipla limits of
Kaithal Distt kaithal.
4. That total land of plaintiff i.e. suit land fully mentioned in
para no. 1 of the plaint has been acquired by defendants for
the purose of devleopment of sector 19 & 20 of HUDA Kaithal
as residential sector and plaitiff is not having any other land
in sector 19 & 20 HUDA Kaithal.
5. That the plaintiff has been totally ousted from the suit land.
6. That the suit land has been acquired in the year 1992 by
defendants for the purpose of developmnet of sector 19 & 20
of HUDA, Kaithal as residential sector.
7. That there is policy of the defendant vide memo no.
2/92/2082 dated 18.03.1992 and vide advertisement of
defendants for the allotment of freehold residential house at
Kaithal.
8. That the policy dated 18.03.1992 vide memo no. 2/92/2082
is reproduced as under:
i. The plots to the oustees would be offered in the land
proposed to be acquired is under the ownership of oustees
prior of the publication of the notification under section 4
of the Land Acquisition Act, and if 75% of the total land
owned by the land owner in that sector is acquired.
ii. Oustees whose land acquired is:
a. Less than 500 sq. yards should be offered a plot
of 250 yards.
b. Between 500 and one acre should be offered
a plot of 250sq. yards.
c. From one acre and above should be allotted
a plot of 500 sq. yards or where 500 sq. yards plots
are not provided to the layout plan, two plots of 250
sq. yards each may be given.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 26 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

iii. That the above said policy shgall be applied in case

there area no. of cosharers of the land which has been
acuired, if the acquired land measures more than one care
then for the purose of granting benefit under the policy, the
determing factor should be the area owned by the each
cosharers respectively, as per his/her share in the joint
holding. In case the acquired land of the cosharers is less
than one acre only one plot of 250 sq. yards would be
allotted in the joint name of cosharers.
iv. That if the land of any landowner is released from
acquisition, he would not be eligible to avail of any benefit
under this policy (in respect of the area of land released).
v. That as per the policy, the oustee shall be entitled to
develop a plot/plots the size of which would depend upon
area of his acquired land subject to a maximum of 500 sq.
yards. The oustee shall be entitled to this benefit under this
policy only one the same town where the land of a person
is situated located. However, in case where the land of a
person sitauted in the same town is acquired in pockets at
different times, the owner shall be entitled to claim the
beneift on account of the entire land acquired at differne
times, for the purposes of claiming the benfits under this
policy.
vi. The claim of the oustees of allotment of plot under
this policy shall be invited by the Estate Oficer, HUDA
concerned before the sector is floated for sale
vii. The commercial sites/buildings are sold by the
auctions. The sites/buildings be also allotted to the oustees
on reserved price, as and when the auction of the said is
held. While puttingh such sites/buildings to public auction
to the oustees who wants to purchase the sites/building
would represent before hand for them. However, if the area
acquried of the commercial site is equivalent or less to the
area of booth/shop cum flat being auctioned by HUDA,
they may be given a booth/SCO site keeping in view the
size of acqusition under this policy.
9. That the defendants have reserved the plot no. 175 to 200,
of 500 sq. yards for the oustees in sector 20 HUDA Kaithal and
plot nos. 930, 936, to 948, 778, 772 in sector 19(2) U/E Kaithal
of 500 sq. yards for the oustees, and the plots, of 250 sq. yards

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 27 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

bearing no. 10, 20, 30, 40 , 120 ,130, 150, 160, 170, 263, 273
, 283, 300, 344, 354, 364, 369, 406, 434, 438, 516 has been
reserved for the oustees in sector 20.
10. That in the year 1992, the application were invited from
the plaintiff for release of free holder presidential develop plots
HUDA Kaithal. And the plainitff in accordance with the policy
full detailed in para no. 7 of the plaint duly applied for the
release of freehold residential develop plot vide regd. Notice
dated 19.12.2006 and vide reg. dated 19.12.2006 which have
been duly received by the defendants.
11. That the defendants have already allotted the plot to one
Ravinder Parkash and one Kavinder Parkash sons of Manohar
Lal Jain under the similar circumstances as that of the plaintiff
and which Act of the defendants is totally discriminatory.
12. That the defendants in spite of submissions as stated
above, failed to take any action for rerlease of ree hold
residential develop plot.
13. That the defendants again invited the application from the
plaintiff for release of free hold residential develop plot in Jan,
2000 and the plaintiff duly applied with all the formalities.
14. That the plaintiff in accordance with the policy and
advertisement fully detailed and described above, applied to
the defendants for release of ree hold residential develpo plots
vide red. Notices stated above which was duly received by the
defendants.
15. That the total land of the plaintiff is 225 sq. yds. has been
acquired and the plaintiff is entitled to the plot of 50 sq. yard
as per the policy dated 18.03.1992 on the reserved price of
1992.
16. The plaintiff is not goverened by the policy dated
12.03.1993.
17. That the defendants are under legal obligations to allot the
freehold residential plot of 50 sq. yard to the plaintiff as per
the policy dated 18.03.1992 and for which the plaintiff
represented the defendants many time as stated above, but
defendants have failed to take any action and have finally
refused and hence this suit.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 28 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

18. That the cause of action has accrued to the plaintiff and
against the defendants within the territorial jurisdiction on this
learned court as therefore got the jurisdiction to entertain and
try this suit.
19. That the value of the suit for the purposes of court fee and
jurisdiction is Rs. 200/- and accordingly court fee is affixed.
20. That the plaintiff prays a decree for mandatory injection
directing the defendants to deliver the free hold residential
develop plot of 50 sq. yards as mentioned in Para no. 7 of the
plaint be passed with costs in favour the plaintiff and against
the defendants.
Any other relief to which plaintiff is found entitled to may also
be granted to him.”
12. By and large identical written statements were filed by the appellant

herein as defendants. One such written statement filed in the above referred suit

reads thus:

“ Written Statement on behalf of defendants.

The defendants submit as under:

Preliminary objections:
1. That the suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable in
the eye of law. The plaintiff is not entitled to any plot as per
oustees policies of HUDA.
2. That the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the present
suit in the Hon’ble court because he has not deposited 10 %
earnest money along with his application which was
mandatory to be deposited as per brochure issued by HUDA
for inviting applications for allotment of residential plots to
the landowners whose land was acquired for floating the
HUDA sector. In one Writ Petition No. 13548 of 2001 the
Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana Chandigarh has
held that such oustees who did not deposit the earnest money
alongwith their application they have no legal right to claim
allotment of plots and the rule of estoppels stands against
them as they had waived the relinquished their right.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 29 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

3. That the suit of the plaintiff is time barred.

Reply on Merits:

1. That para no.1 of the plaint relates to description of land

which is a matter of record. The plaintiff be directed to prove
the alleged facts by cogent evidence.
2. That para no.2 of the plaint needs no reply.
3. That para no.3 of the plaint is wrong and denied. The
plaintiff be directed to prove the alleged facts by cogent
evidence.
4. That para no.4 of the plaint is wrong hence denied.
5. That para no.5 of the plaint is wrong and denied and not
admitted to be correct.
6. That para no.6 of the plaint is a matter of record.
7. That para no.7 of the plaint is also a matter of record.
8. That para no.8 of plaint along with its sub clauses (i) to
(vii) are matter of record, needs no reply.
9. That para no.9 of the plaint is also matter of record and
needs no reply.
10. That para no.10 of the plaint is wrong and denied. The
plaintiff did not deposit the earnest money along with his
application, so he has no legal right to claim the allotment of
plot and he had waived and relinquished his right.
11. That para no.11 of the plaint is wrong and denied. The
case of the plaint is not similar as that of Ravinder Parkash
mentioned in this para.
12. That para no.12 of the plant is wrong and denied. The
complete and detailed reply has already been given in above
in pre objection same may kindly be read as part of reply of
this para.
13. Para no.13 of the plant is wrong and denied.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 30 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

14. That para no.14 of the plaint is wrong and denied. The
plaintive has not deposited the 10% money with his
application, so he has waived his right if any.
15. The para no.15 of the plaint is a matter of record. The
plaintiff be directed to prove the alleged facts by cogent
evidence.
16. Para no.16 of the plant is wrong and denied.
17. Para no.17 of the plant is wrong and denied. The plaintiff
is not entitled to any free hold residential plot as he had
waived and relinquished his right as he had no deposited the
10 % earnest money with the application form.
18. Para no.18 of the plant is wrong and denied. The plaintiff
has got no cause of action against the defendants.
19. That para no.19 of the plaint is legal needs no reply.
20. That para no.20 of the plaint is wrong and denied. The
suit of the plaintiff is against law and facts, false and
frivolous the same may kindly be dismissed with special
costs.”
(emphasis supplied)

13. Thus, what is discernible from the averments made in the written

statement is that the plaintiffs failed to deposit 10 per cent of the earnest

money along with an appropriate application addressed to the authority

concerned in accordance with the Policy of 1992. In the absence of any

application with deposit of 10 per cent earnest money the benefits of the

Policy of 1992 could not have been extended. Such was the stance of the

appellant herein as defendants before the trial court.

14. On the other hand, the case of the plaintiffs before the trial court was

that it was not mandatory to deposit 10 per cent of the earnest money.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 31 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

However, the fact remains that the suits came to be instituted almost after a

period of fifteen years from the date of the Policy of 1992.

iii. Impugned Judgment of the High Court

15. The High Court in its impugned judgment took the view that the

entire controversy could be said to be covered by the decision of this Court

rendered in the case of Brij Mohan (supra) and the Full Bench decision of

the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Jarnail Singh (supra). Saying so, the

High Court though fit to dismiss all the Second Appeals thereby affirming

the original decree passed by the trial court in favour of the plaintiffs

(oustees) & some cases the judgment and order passed by the First Appellate

Court allowing the appeals filed by the original plaintiffs.

16. However, what is important for us to take notice of something in the

impugned judgment are the submissions canvassed by the learned Advocate

General, State of Haryana. The High Court in its impugned judgment has

recorded the submissions canvassed by the learned Advocate General as

under:

“Mr. B.R. Mahajan, learned Advocate General, Haryana,

assisted by Mr. Deepak Balyan, Advocate, in support of
grounds of appeal has raised the multifold arguments which
reads thus:
i) the pre-requisites of the policy dated 18.03.1992 had
not been fulfilled by the plaintiff for allotment of a plot
under the oustee policy as the court below has not gone

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 32 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

into that question and without any reason ordered for

allotment of plot to the plaintiff.
ii) the court below has filed to take into consideration the
fact that the case of the plaintiff was not considered due
to non-compliance of Rule 5 of Haryana Development
(Disposal of Land and Buildings) Regulations 1978
(hereinafter referred to as 1978 Regulations) which deals
with the procedure in case of sale or lease of land or
building by allotment, in essence, the purchaser is
required to make an application to the Estate Officer
concerned and it should be accompanied by 10% of the
price/premium in the form of a demand draft table to the
Estate officer.
iii) The intended allottees under the oustee policy had not
fulfilled the essential terms and conditions of the
advertisement, brochure and 1978 Regulations. In the
instant case, there was no advertisement against which
the plaintiff had sought allotment of the plot.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. Thus, the main plank of the submission canvassed on behalf of the State

was that the oustees had failed to abide by the essential terms and conditions of

the advertisement, brochure of the 1978 Regulations etc. In short, the argument

before the High Court was that the oustees had failed to duly apply in a prescribed

format with the Estate Officer in accordance with the Scheme with deposit of 10

per cent price/premium in the form of a demand draft payable to the Estate Officer.

18. In the aforesaid context, we may only observe that none of the

submissions canvassed by the State have been dealt with by the High Court in its

impugned judgment. When it was the specific case of the State that no applications

in the prescribed format were preferred by the oustees with 10 per cent deposit of

the requisite amount then it was expected of the High Court even while

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 33 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

considering Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC to look into this aspect

of the matter. Even the trial court does not seem to have considered this aspect of

the matter including the First Appellate Court.

19. It was also brought to our notice by the learned counsel appearing for

the respondents (oustees) that allotment letters were issued at the rate

prescribed in accordance with the 1992 Policy subject to the outcome of the

Special Leave Petitions and once such allotment letters are issued then there is

no question in saying that the oustees had failed to apply in accordance with

the terms and conditions of the scheme. In what circumstances such allotment

letters were issued by the Estate Officer has been explained by the appellant in

its written submissions. The same reads thus:

“16. It is submitted that after passing of the order by Ld.

District Judge and Ld. Civil Judge, some of the respondents
filed Execution Petition before the Executing court for the
execution of the order passed by the Trial court.
17. It is submitted that the Ld. Civil Judge issued warrant of
arrest of the Estate Officer of the Petitioner Authority. The
said letter is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:
“To
Director General of Police
Panchkula (Haryana)
Whereas the Judgment Debtor Lajpat Rai S/o Shiv Dayal
R/o Kaithal, Tehsil and Distt. Kaithal was adjudged by a
decree of the Court in Suit No. RBT382/2007 on
11.11.2011 to order that the suits of plaintiffs are decreed
with costs to the effect that the plaintiffs of CS -I and C-
II are held entitled for separate freehold residential plots

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 34 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

measuring 250 sq. yards each and the plaintiffs or CS-I

to CS-III are liable to deposit the prices of the respective
plots as were applicable at the time of floating of Sec 19,
Urban Estate, Kaithal formalities for allotment of plots
be completed by defendants within two months from the
even date under initiation to plaintiffs in writing. But
defendants fail to comply all the condition which were
imposed on them, executing this process to bring the said
defendant before the court with all convenient speed.
You are hereby directed to arrest the said Estate Officer
HUDA and produce before me. Here fail not. If the Estate
Officer HUDA fulfil the above said condition, he shall not
be arrested. Youa re further commanded to return this
warrant on or before the 31.05.2019 with an
endorsement certifying the day on which and manner in
which it has been executed or the reason why it has not
been executed.
Given under my hand and the seal of the court, this
28.05.2019.
Amit Sharma
Civil Judge (Senior Div) Kaithal”
It is submitted that the application have not submitted in the
prescribed format and even the earnest money was not paid
but due to the order passed by the Civil Judge in regard to the
arrest of the Estate Officer, the petitioner authority under
compulsion issued allotment letter at the current rate subject
to outcome of The special leave petitions pending before this
Hon’ble Court. (A true copy of the one of such applications
arrest warrant and allotment letter is annexed herewith
marked as Annexure A-12 pg. 126-132.
18. It is submitted that similarly in some other cases also,
where the application has not been submitted in the
prescribed format, the earnest money has not been paid but
since, the suit has been decreed therefore, the Execution
petition filed and in Execution petition since the Ld. Civil
judge issued the warrant of arrest, therefore the Petitioner
Authority under compulsion issued allotment letter at the

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 35 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

current price subject to outcome of the special leave

petition.”

iv. Filing of the Special Leave Petitions before this Court

20. What is now important for us to note is the order passed by a coordinate

bench dated 08.05.2017 at the time of issuing notice. The order reads thus:

“Delay condoned. Shri Shyam Divan, learned senior

counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the
petitioner will abide by the Policy framed on 11.08.2016 and
every eligible oustee will be accommodated according to the
said Policy. Issue notice restricted to the question of
correctness of the general direction made by the High Court
in granting allotments to all claimants who may not be
similarly situated. In the meantime, there shall be stay of
execution.”
(emphasis supplied)

21. Thus, the appellant made itself explicitly clear before this Court that it

would abide by the policy framed on 11.08.2016 and every eligible oustee

would be accommodated according to the said policy. On such statement being

made, this Court issued notice restricted to the question of correctness of the

general directions issued by the High Court in its impugned judgment as

regards granting allotments to all claimants who may not be similarly situated.

This Court also stayed the execution of the decree.

22. The controversy before us as on date is in a limited compass, i.e.,

whether the respondents as oustees are entitled to the benefit of the scheme of

1992 or the scheme of 2016 as further modified in 2018 referred to above.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 36 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

B. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

i. Submissions on behalf of the Appellants

23. Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, the learned A.S.G., appearing for the appellants

vehemently submitted that only those oustees are entitled to seek allotment of

a plot under the policy who had filed appropriate application in a prescribed

format, seeking allotment of plot with the deposit of the requisite earnest

money. As regards this submission of Ms. Bhati, the following has been

highlighted in the written submissions filed by the appellant:

“(i) The Petitioner Authority issued advertisement

inviting applications for allotment of plot under oustees
quota in 1992 and 2000 whereas it has been mentioned in the
preceding paras and as is evident from the documents placed
on record that the application was to be submitted in the
prescribed format alongwith the earnest money.
(ii) It is submitted that from the perusal of the brochure
so issued in 1992 and in 2000, it is evident that the
application form is to be purchased upon payment as the
same is serial no. ed also. Not only this, even in the brochure
itself, the letter is to be addressed to the Estate Officer for the
submission of the
(ix) It is submitted that even in the procedure so
prescribed by the Petitioner Authority in respect to allotment
of plot under oustees quota, there is a condition of the inviting
applications to be submitted in the prescribed format.”

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 37 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

24. The second submission canvassed by Ms. Bhati is as regards the price

of the plot under the policy. This argument has been elaborated in the following

manner:

“(i) It is submitted that as far as price of plot so allotted under

oustees quota is concerned, the Hon'ble High Court in the
case of Rajiv Manchanda vs HUDA in question no. 8 and that
in a case where the land was acquired in 1992 the oustees is
liable to pay the price fixed in the advertisement by which the
applications are invited and pursuant to which advertisement
the plot is actually allotted to the oustees.
(ii) It is submitted as far as the present specially petitions are
concerned the respondents as mentioned here in above failed
to submit the application in the prescribed format and even
failed to deposit the earnest money therefore in fact the
application submitted if any cannot be set to be submission of
application as per advertisement/policy
(iii) It is submitted that in the case of HUDA and ors. v.
Sandeep and Ors. decided on 25.04.2012, the Hon'ble Court
while deciding the issue in regard to the price to be charged
under Question No. 8 held that the price that can be charged
is the price prevailing at the time of allotment. The extract
from the judgement reads as under:

“17. Where there is a scheme but it does not regulate

the allotment price it may be possible for the court to
direct the State Government/Development Authority to
allot plots to land-losers at a reasonable cost, in special
and extraordinary circumstances, it may also indicate the
manner of determining the allotment price. But where the
scheme applicable specifies the price to be charged for
allotment its terms cannot be ignored. If any land loser
has any grievance in regard to such scheme, he may
either challenge it or give a representation for a better or
more beneficial scheme. But he cannot as the code to
ignore the terms of an existing or prevailing scheme and
demand allotment at cost price.”

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 38 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

(iv) It is submitted that the judgment passed by this Hon’ble

court in Brij Mohan vs. HUDFA 2011(2) SCC 29 is of no help
to the oustees. Two questions arose for consideration in that
case before this Hon’ble Court.

In respect of first question i.e. whether HUDA should charge

only the actual land cost plus development charges for the
plots allotted to an oustee and not the market price/normal
allotment price; the court returned a finding that the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 contemplates only benefits like
solatium, additional amount and higher rate of interest to
the oustees and not allotment of plots at cost p rice. HUDA
or the State Government does not have any scheme
providing for allotment of plots at actual cost of oustees.
Therefore, it is not possible for the Court to direct the State
Government or the Development Authority to allot plots to
the oustees at a reasonable cost.
In respect of second question i.e. what is the meaning of the
words ‘normal allotment rate’, the court found that as a
matter of fact the land-loser has made an application in the
year 1990 for allotment of plot. A direction was issued by
the Court in the year 1992 but the HUDA delayed allotment
to the appellants. Therefore, the rate for which plots were
initially offered was ordered to be charged. The said
Question has been answered keeping in view the facts of the
aforesaid case, wherein application was submitted by an
oustee but still plot was not allotted to him. The said
judgment does not lay down that the ‘normal allotment rate’
in all circumstances shall be the rate when the sector is first
floated for sale. As a matter of fact, the norma allotment rate
would be the rate advertised by the HUDA in pursuance of
which applications are invited from the general public and
the oustees, in pursuance of which the plots are allotted.
(v) It is submitted that even otherwise in the case of Brij
Mohan the applications submitted by the applicants but in
present case no application in the prescribe format with
earnest money has been submitted therefore it cannot be said
that the respondents submitted any application in view of this
the case of Bridge Mohan is distribution from the facts and
circumstances of the present case.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 39 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

(vi) It is submitted that admittedly none of the respondent have

deposited the earnest money as per the advertisement of 1992
and/or 2004 cannot claim the price as per 1992.
(vii) it is submitted that in view the above and as per the policy
in existence the respondents cannot claim the price of 1992.
(viii) It is submitted that the Hon’ble court in the case of Rajiv
Manchanda v. HUDA while passing the judgment dated
22.11.2017 in Civil writ petition no. 22252 of 2016 while
answering the question no. 8 in regard to fixation of price in
para 57 held that an oustee including 1 whose land was
acquired prior to 1987 is liable to pay the price fixed in the
advertisement by which the applications are invited from the
oustee and pursuant to which advertisement of the plot is
actually allotted to the oustee.
(ix) It is submitted that since, no application in the prescribed
format has been submitted by any of the respondents and even
otherwise the earnest money has not been paid therefore, the
respondents cannot ask for any price of 1992 especially when
the no application has been submitted or if any application has
been submitted, the same is not in the prescribed format with
the earnest money which was the precondition for entitlement
of allotment of plot.
(x) It is submitted that when the respondents have not
submitted the applications in the prescribed format that too
without the earnest money therefore, the respondents are not
entitled for any relief and it will amount to wind full gain if the
respondent to have been fully compensated in accordance with
statutory scheme for the land acquired for public purpose by
the state if despite have not paid a single penny if they are
giving their plot as per the 1992 rates.
(xi) It is submitted that as it has been mentioned hereinabove
the petitioner authority has already issued public notice
inviting the applications from the oustees and the application
is to be submitted online with Rs.50,000.00. It is submitted that
any of the respondent can submit the application if so desired
to avail the benefit of oustees policy dated 11.08.2016.”

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 40 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

25. The third submission of Ms. Bhati is that the respondents could not

have instituted a civil suit after a period of almost 14 to 20 years of passing of

the final award. She would submit that the suits filed by the individual

respondents under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 were not

maintainable, more particularly, when none of the respondents had applied for

the plot in a prescribed format with deposit of earnest money. This argument

has been further elaborated as under:

“(i) It is submitted that admittedly the acquisition

proceedings concluded in 1992 upon passing of the award
and the State Government issued and advertisement inviting
the application for allotment of plot under the oustees quota
in 1992 itself but the respondents instituted Civil suit after 14-
20 years which is barred by Article 113 of the Limitation Act
where the limitation of 3 years for the institution of the suit
has been provided
(ii) It is submitted that the respondents field to comply with
the terms and conditions as a numerated in the advertisement
issued from time to time inviting the applications for
allotment of plot under out these Kota their food the suit
instituted under section 39 of Specific Relief Act for
mandatory injunction not maintainable and the Ld. Civil
Court dismissed one civil suits on the ground of
maintainability and limitation.
(iii) It is further submitted that even the Appellate court in
some of the cases dismissed the appeals affirmming the order
pass by the Civil judged dismissing the Civil suit.
(iv) It is submitted that there is bar under section 50(2) of
Haryana Development Authority Act, 1977 to the jurisdiction
of the Civil Court to entertain any suit or proceeding in any
matter
(v) It is submitted that the Hon’ble High Court in Regular
Second Appeal being RSA No. 3833 of 2010 titled as HUDA
vs. Kashmiri Lal vide its judgment dated 06.08.2012 arrived

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 41 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

at the conlusion that the suit is barred by limitaion because

the plaintiff applied for the allotment of plot in the year 1992
and the suit was filed after 15 years.
(vi) It is submitted that the Special leave petitoins preferred
against he said order dated 06.08.2012 being SLP C NO.
8766-8767 of 2013 titled as Kashmiri lal vs. EO HUDA
dismissed by this Hon’ble court vide order dated
15.07.2016.0
(vii) It is submitted that suit for mandatory injunction under
Section 39 was not maintainable as there was no breach of
an obligation. Ld. Civil judge ought not to have directed to
allot a plot especially when the terms and conditions in
regard to submission of application in the prescribed format
with earnest money has not been complied with and further
there is a bar of jurisdiction in the Act itself.
(viii) It is submitted that this Hon’ble court in the caose State
of Kerala vs. UOI 2024 (7) SCC 183, has discucsed about
section 39 of the Specific Relief Act and held that there should
be test in regard to (i) Prima facie case (ii) balance of
convenience (iii) irreparable injury.
In the present case, although there was no prima facie
case, yet the Ld. Civil Judge erroneously decreed the Civil
Suit in some of the cases, whereas in other similar cases the
Civil Suit so instituted were dismissed.”

26. The fourth submission of Ms. Bhati is as regards the status of a co-

sharer in respect to allotment of plot under the scheme. This submission has

been elaborated in the following manner:

“(i) It is submitted that in regard to the allotment of plot under

oustees quota to the co-sharer it is submitted that initially in
the policy dated 18.03.1992 wherein clause (iii) of the said
policy it is mentioned that in case there are no. of co-sharer of
the land which has been acquired and if the acquired land
measures more than 1 acre than for the purpose of granting
benefit under this policy the determining factor would be the
area of co-sharer respectively as per his/her shareholding and

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 42 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

in case the acquired land of the co-sharer less than only one
plot of 200 sq. yards in the joint name of co-sharers.
(ii) It is submitted that subsequently the said policy dated
18.03.92 was amended and the same was modified to the effect
that “benefit under oustees policy shall be restricted to 1 plot
according to the holding irrespective of co-sharers”.
(iii) It is submitted that in the policy dated 18.03.1992 in
regard to offering of the plot to the land owners it was
mentioned that:
(a) Less than 500 sq. yards would be offered a plot of 50
sq. yards.
(b) Between 500 sq. yds. And one acre would be offered
a plot of 250 sq. yds.
(c) From 1 acre and above would be offered a plot of
500 sq. yds. Where 500. Where 500 or where 500 sq. yds.
Plots are not provided in the layout plan, two plots of 250
sq. yds. Each may be given.
(iv) It is submitted that in the policy dated 11.08.2016 in
clause 8 about the eligibility of co-sharer it is mentioned that
the eligibility of each co-sharer for allotment of plot under
oustees quota shall be determined on the basis of individual
holding i.e. each co-sharers will be entitlement to seeking
allotment of plot on the basis of his owned individual holding.
Further in Clause 13 of the said policy in regard to the
eligibility of co-sharer who has given no objection certificate
in his co-sharer it has been mentioned that a co-sharer in the
land will not be eligible to claim allotment of plot if had given
a no objection certificate in favour of the co-sharer and on
account of submission of such no objection certificate a plot
was allotted such co-sharer in prevailing flotation of plot for
the oustees. It has also been made in case of any previous
occasion a plot under the oustees policy has been allotted in
that a co-sharer will not be entitled for allotment of plot
under oustees quota.”

27. In the last, Ms. Bhati invited our attention to few relevant provisions of

law. The same read thus:

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 43 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

“(i) The Specific Relief Act, 1963

“Section 39. Mandatory injunction – When, to prevent

the breach of an obligation, it is necessary to compel the
performance of certain acts which the Court is capable of
enforcing, the Court may in its discretion grant an
injunction to prevent the breach complained of, and also to
compel performance of the requisite acts.”
(ii) Limitation Act
Article Any suit for which no period of Three When the
113 limitation is provided elsewhere in years right to
this Schedule sue
accrues

Section 3: Bar of limitation – (1) Subject to the provisions

contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit
instituted appeal preferred, and application made after the
prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation
has been set up as a defence.
(2) For the purposes of this Act-
(a) A suit is instituted:
(i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is
presented to the proper officer;
(ii) in the case of a pauper, when his application
for leave to sue as a pauper is made; and
(iii) in the case of a claim against a company
which is being wind up by the court, when the
claimant first sends in his claim to the official
liquidator;
(b) any claim by way of a set off or a counter claim, shall
be treated as a separate suit and shall be deemed to have
been instituted:
(i) in the case of a set off, on the same date as
the suit in which the set off is pleaded;
(ii) in the case of a counter claim, on the date on
which the counter claim is made in court;

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 44 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

(c) an application by notice of motion in a High Court

is made when the application is presented to the proper
officer of that court.

(iii) HUDA Act and Rules.

“Section 50 of HUDA Act, 1977.
(i) Save as of otherwise expressly provided in the Act,
every order passed or direction issued by the State
government or order passed or notice issued by the
Authority or its officer under this Act shall be final and
shall not be questioned in any suit or legal proceeding.

(ii) No Civil Court shall have the jurisdiction to entertain

any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter the
cognizance of which can be taken and disposed of by the
authority empowered by this Act or the rules or
regulations made thereunder.
Regulation 5 of Haryana Urban Development (disposal of
Land and Buildings) Regulations 1978, which lays:
“5. Procedure in case of sale or lease of land or building
by allotment:
(i) In the case of sale or lease of residential and
industrial land or building by allotment the intending
purchaser shall make an application to the State Officer
concerned in the prescribed form (annexed to these
regulations) as given in Forms A and B respectively.
(ii) No application under sub-regulation (1) shall be
valid unless it is accompanied by such amount may be
determined by the Authority, which shall not be less than
ten per cent of the price/premium in the form of a demand
draft payable to the Estate Officer, and drawn on any
scheduled bank situated at the local place of the Estate
Officer concerned or any other such place as the Estate
Officer may specify”
(iii) xxxx”

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 45 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

28. In such circumstances referred to above, Ms. Bhati very fairly

submitted that although the suits were liable to be dismissed yet the appellant

is ready and willing to allot the plots to the respondents if eligible otherwise,

in accordance with the scheme of 2016.

29. She would submit that the appellant has already issued a public notice

inviting appropriate applications from the oustees and such applications are to

be submitted online with payment of Rs. 50,000/- towards earnest money.

30. What we have been able to gather from the aforesaid is that allotment

letters were issued to the oustees but at the revised rate of Rs. 1122 per sq. yd.

in accordance with the 2016 policy.

31. In such circumstances referred to above, Ms. Bhati submitted that this

Court may pass an appropriate order, directing the appellant to consider the

applications that may be filed online in accordance with the policy of 2016.

ii. Submissions on behalf of the Respondents

32. Dr. Surender Singh Hooda, the learned senior counsel appearing for the

respondents in SLP No. 4787 of 2018 vehemently submitted that this Court

may not interfere or rather disturb the concurrent findings recorded by three

courts below. So far as the entitlement of the oustees to claim plots in

accordance with the scheme of 1992 is concerned, the entire controversy is

squarely covered by a decision of this Court in the case of Brij Mohan and

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 46 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

Others v. Haryana Urban Development Authority reported in (2011) 2 SCC

29.

33. He further submitted that the issue as regards restricting the allotment

of one plot to the oustees who have a joint holding came to be concluded by a

Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the case of Jarnail

Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab reported in (2010) 10 P&H CK 0212.

34. Dr. Hooda submitted that so far as his matter is concerned, the same is

distinguishable on facts with the other connected matters. He pointed out that

his client had submitted an application with the appellant authority for

allotment of plot under 1992 scheme. Even a draw was held where the

application of his client’s father was cleared successfully and a plot in Sector

20 was earmarked.

35. He further pointed out that the suit filed by his client came to be

decreed. The decree came to be affirmed right up to the High Court. The

principal argument of Dr. Hooda is that if the policy of 2016 is applied it would

impose a substantial financial burden on the oustees.

36. Relying on the decision of this Court rendered in Brij Mohan (supra)

referred to above, he would submit that the oustees are entitled to allotment of

plots in accordance with the policy that was floated and advertised at the time

of the land acquisition proceedings i.e. 1992 and not as per any subsequent

revised policy.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 47 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

37. Mr. Rajiv Raheja, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents in

SLP No. 20614 of 2017 and connected matters submitted that no error not to

speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the High

Court in passing the impugned judgment and order. His principal argument is

that the policy of 2016 cannot be applied with retrospective effect.

38. Mr. Sidharth Mittal, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in

SLP No. 20640 of 2017 would submit that so far as the price of allotment of

plots is concerned, the same has been settled by this Court in Brij Mohan

(supra).

39. The sum and substance of the submissions canvassed on behalf of the

respondents is that they are ready and willing to deposit the requisite amount

for the purpose of allotment of plots in accordance with the policy of 1992. In

short, their case is that they are ready and willing to deposit the amount of Rs.

863 per sq. yd. but the demand of the revised rate of Rs. 1122 per sq. yd. is not

tenable in law.

40. In such circumstances referred to above, learned counsel appearing for

the respondents prayed that there being no merit in these appeals those may be

dismissed and the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court may

be affirmed.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 48 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

C. ANALYSIS

41. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having

gone through the materials on record the only question that falls for our

consideration is whether the respondents herein are entitled to claim plots as

oustees at the rate prescribed by the 1992 policy or at the rate prescribed by the

revised policy of 2016?

42. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side, we

must look into the two judgments; one of this Cout in Brij Mohan (supra) and

the other of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case

of Jarnail Singh (supra).

43. In Brij Mohan (supra), this Court dealt with the following two

questions:

(i) Whether HUDA should charge only the actual land cost plus

development charges for the plots allotted to oustees/land-losers, and

not the market price/normal allotment price?

(ii) What meaning should be ascribed to the words 'normal allotment rate'

used in the scheme for allotment to oustees?

44. In Brij Mohan (supra), this Court elaborately interpreted the policy

dated 18.03.1992 and answered the aforesaid two questions as such:

“10. No doubt, the contention that allotment of plots to land

losers should be at actual cost (acquisition cost of land plus

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 49 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

development cost), appears to be reasonable and attractive.

That should be the ultimate goal in a changing scenario
favouring acquisitions which are land loser- friendly. The
arguments of the appellants do certainly make out a case for
such a scheme to create a better settlement and rehabilitation
policy in regard to land acquisitions. If there was any
statutory provision in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (`Act'
for short) or other scheme, providing for allotment at cost
price, a land loser could certainly claim allotment in terms of
the scheme. But the Statute contemplates only benefits like
solatium, additional amount and higher rate of interest to the
land losers and not allotment of plots at cost price. Nor does
the State Government or HUDA have any scheme providing
for allotment of plots at actual cost to land losers. We are
informed that State of Haryana is now proposing to introduce
a more attractive and land-loser friendly rehabilitation and
resettlement policy, which contemplates allotment of bigger
residential/commercial/industrial plots to land losers and
oustees. But that is for the future.
11. Where there is a scheme but it does not regulate the
allotment price, it may be possible for the court to direct the
State Government/Development Authority to allot plots to
land losers at a reasonable cost, and in special and
extraordinary circumstances, it may also indicate the manner
of determining the allotment price. But where the scheme
applicable specifies the price to be charged for allotment, its
terms cannot be ignored. If any land loser has any grievance
in regard to such scheme, he may either challenge it or give
a representation for a better or more beneficial scheme. But
he cannot ask the court to ignore the terms of an existing or
prevailing scheme and demand allotment at cost price. The
scheme of HUDA contemplates allotment of plots only in
terms of the scheme, that is at normal allotment rates. This
benefit is extended in addition to the benefits under sections
23(1A), 23(2) and 28 of the Act, and therefore the scheme
provides for allotment at normal allotment rate. Necessarily,
the allotment and the price to be charged, will have to be
strictly in accordance with such HUDA Scheme. In this case
the HUDA scheme requires the land loser-allottee to pay the
normal allotment rates for the plots to be allotted to them
under the scheme. Therefore, a land loser cannot claim
allotment of a plot at acquisition cost of land plus

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 50 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

development cost or at any other lesser price. The decision in

Hansraj H. Jain was a case where the scheme did not provide
for any allotment price, and the price demanded was
Rs.13,200/- per sq.m. as against the compensation of Rs.4 per
sq.m. which in effect was 3300 times the acquisition price. It
was on those peculiar facts and circumstances, this court
thought it fit to direct the respondents therein to adopt the
acquisition cost plus development cost as the allotment price.
That principle will not apply where there is a specific scheme
which provides the rate of allotment.
Re : Question (ii)
11. As noticed above, the scheme requires the allottees under
the scheme for land-losers/oustees, to pay the normal
allotment rates for the allotted plots. The question is what is
the meaning of the term `the normal allotment rate'. No
doubt, the term would ordinarily refer to the allotment rate
prevailing at the time of allotment. If an acquisition is made
in 1985 and the developed layout in the acquired lands is
ready for allotment of plots in 1990, and allotments are made
in the years 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 at
annually increasing rates, a land-loser who is allotted a plot
in 1990 will naturally be charged a lesser price. But if his
application is kept pending by the Development Authority for
whatsoever reason and if the allotment is made in 1992, he
may have to pay a higher price; and if the allotment is made
in 1995 he may have to pay a much higher price. The question
is whether any discrimination should be permitted depending
upon the whims, fancies and delays on the part of the
authority in making allotments. To take this case itself, the
application for allotment was made in 1990. On 9.9.1991,
HUDA advertised the residential plots in the sectors
developed from the acquired lands for allotment, wherein the
allotment rate was shown as Rs.1032 per sq.m. (Rs.863/- per
sq.yd) for plots of 300 sq. m. In the year 1993, the allotment
price was increased to Rs.1342/- per sq.m. (Rs.1122/- per
sq.yd.) and the appellants are required to pay the 1993 price
instead of paying the rate in vogue when the layout was ready
for allotment. Should the land loser who promptly made the
application in 1990 be made to suffer, because of the inaction
on the part of HUDA in making the allotment? We get the
answer in the HUDA scheme itself.”

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 51 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

45. In Jarnail Singh (supra), the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High

Court held that every co-sharer is entitled to a plot as per his entitlement, although

his land is joint with others. The Full Bench held that every co-sharer has an

independent right to allotment to plot under the oustee quota. It is the share of the

co-sharers which is acquired, and the compensation is paid independently to all

co-sharers and the entire compensation is not paid to one co-sharer on behalf of

all. In such circumstances, a co-sharer is entitled to separate plot as per his share,

if eligible, in accordance with law. In Jarnail Singh (supra), the Full Bench struck

down Clause 6(V) of the Policy dated 26.09.1994 and held that it had no

reasonable nexus with the object to be achieved, as the basic purpose of the policy

of HUDA is to rehabilitate the oustees.

46. The Writ Petitions ultimately came to be disposed of with the following

orders and directions:

“1. The oustees, whose land is compulsorily acquired for

a public purpose, form a class in itself, having a rational
basis with the object of re-settlement;

2. Clause 6(v) of the Policy dated 26.9.1994 is struck

down as it has no reasonable nexus with the objective to
be achieved;

3. A co-owner, as per the eligibility criteria fixed by the

State Government, shall be entitled to be considered for
allotment of plot irrespective of the fact that his holding of
land is joint with other co-owner;

4. However, the oustees, as a class in themselves, would

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 52 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

be entitled to reservation of plots to such an extent as the

State Government may deem appropriate;

5. That the State Government shall be at liberty to reframe

policy for reservation of plots to constitutionally
permissible classes and within limit of 50% of plots; and

6. That till such time an appropriate policy is framed,

the State Government or its instrumentalities shall not
allot plots under the oustees quota.”

i. Dictum as laid by this Court in Brij Mohan (Supra) and the

Ratio Decidendi.

47. This Court has rendered plethora of decisions explaining how to cull out

the ratio decidendi of a judgment and identify the principles which have

precedential value. It is now well settled that

not every observation in a judgment of this Court is binding as precedent. Only

the ratio decidendi or the propositions of law that were necessary to decide on the

issues between the parties are binding. Observations by the judge, even

determinative statements of law, which are not part of her reasoning on a question

or issue before the court, are termed obiter dicta. Such observations do not bind

the Court. More simply, a case is only an authority for what it actually decides.

48. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Islamic Academy of

Education v. State of Karnataka reported in 2003 INSC 391 pithily observed:

“2. …The ratio decidendi of a judgment has to be found out

only on reading the entire judgment. In fact, the ratio of the
judgment is what is set out in the judgment itself. The answer

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 53 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

to the question would necessarily have to be read in the

context of what is set out in the judgment and not in isolation.
In case of any doubt as regards any observations, reasons and
principles, the other part of the judgment has to be looked
into. By reading a line here and there from the judgment, one
cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment. …”
(emphasis supplied)

49. In Secunderabad Club v. CIT reported in 2023 INSC 736 this Court, had

the occasion to delineate how to cull out the ratio decidendi of a judgment and

identify the principles which have precedential value. This Court observed:

“14….According to the well-settled theory of precedents,

every decision contains three basic ingredients:
(i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An
inferential finding of fact is the inference which the judge
draws from the direct or perceptible facts ;
(ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal
problems disclosed by the facts; and
(iii) judgment based on the combined effect of (i) and (ii)
above.
For the purposes of the parties themselves and their privies,
ingredient (iii) is the material element in the decision, for, it
determines finally their rights and liabilities in relation to the
subject-matter of the action. It is the judgment that estops the
parties from reopening the dispute. However, for the purpose
of the doctrine of precedent, ingredient (ii) is the vital
element in the decision. This is the ratio decidendi. It is not
everything said by a judge when giving a judgment that
constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a judge's decision
binding a party is the principle upon which the case is
decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a
decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi.”
(emphasis supplied)

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 54 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

50. Further, a simple test that has been invoked by this Court to determine

whether a particular proposition of law is to be treated as the ratio decidendi of a

case is the “inversion test” formulated by Professor Eugene Wambaugh. The test

mandates that to determine whether a particular proposition of law is part of

the ratio decidendi of the case, the proposition is to be inversed. This means that

either that proposition is hypothetically removed from the judgment, or it is

assumed that the proposition was decided in reverse. After such removal or

reversal, if the decision of the Court on that issue before it would remain the same

then the observations cannot be regarded as the ratio decidendi of the case.

51. In State of Gujarat v. Utility Users’ Welfare Assn. reported in (2018) 6

SCC 21, the test was explained thus:

“113. In order to determine this aspect, one of the well-

established tests is “the Inversion Test” propounded inter
alia by Eugene Wambaugh, a Professor at The Harvard Law
School, who published a classic text book called The Study of
Cases [ Eugene Wambaugh, The Study of Cases (Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., 1892).] in the year 1892. This textbook
propounded inter alia what is known as the “Wambaugh
Test” or “the Inversion Test” as the means of judicial
interpretation. “the Inversion Test” is used to identify
the ratio decidendi in any judgment. The central idea, in the
words of Professor Wambaugh, is as under:
“In order to make the test, let him first frame carefully the
supposed proposition of law. Let him then insert in the
proposition a word reversing its meaning. Let him then
inquire whether, if the court had conceived this new
proposition to be good, and had it in mind, the decision could
have been the same. If the answer be affirmative, then,
however excellent the original proposition may be, the case
is not a precedent for that proposition, but if the answer be

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 55 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

negative the case is a precedent for the original proposition

and possibly for other propositions also. [ Eugene
Wambaugh, The Study of Cases (Boston: Little, Brown & Co.,
1892) at p. 17.] ”

114. In order to test whether a particular proposition of law

is to be treated as the ratio decidendi of the case, the
proposition is to be inversed i.e. to remove from the text of the
judgment as if it did not exist. If the conclusion of the case
would still have been the same even without examining the
proposition, then it cannot be regarded as the ratio
decidendi of the case. This test has been followed to imply
that the ratio decidendi is what is absolutely necessary for
the decision of the case. “In order that an opinion may have
the weight of a precedent”, according to John Chipman Grey
[ Another distinguished jurist who served as a Professor of
Law at Harvard Law School.], “it must be an opinion, the
formation of which, is necessary for the decision of a
particular case”.
(emphasis supplied)

52. The test was affirmed by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Nevada

Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2019) 20 SCC 119

wherein it was held thus:

“13. It follows from the aforesaid discussion that the decision

in Tapas D. Neogy [State of Maharashtra v. Tapas D. Neogy,
(1999) 7 SCC 685 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1352] did not go into
and decide the issue: whether immovable property would fall
under the expression “any property” under Section 102 of the
Code. We say so by applying the inversion test as referred to
in State of Gujarat v. Utility Users' Welfare Assn. [State of
Gujarat v. Utility Users' Welfare Assn., (2018) 6 SCC 21] ,
which states that the Court must first carefully frame the
supposed proposition of law and then insert in the proposition
a word reversing its meaning to get the answer whether or
not a decision is a precedent for that proposition. If the
answer is in the affirmative, the case is not a precedent for

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 56 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

that proposition. If the answer is in the negative, the case is

a precedent for the original proposition and possibly for
other propositions also. This is one of the tests applied to
decide what can be regarded and treated as ratio decidendi
of a decision. Reference in this regard can also be made to
the decisions of this Court in U.P. SEB v. Pooran Chandra
Pandey [U.P. SEB v. Pooran Chandra Pandey, (2007) 11
SCC 92 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 736], CIT v. Sun Engg. Works
(P) Ltd. [CIT v. Sun Engg. Works (P) Ltd., (1992) 4 SCC 363]
and other cases which hold that a decision is only an
authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence
in a decision is its ratio. Not every observation found therein
nor what logically flows from those observations is the ratio
decidendi. Judgment in question has to be read as a whole
and the observations have to be considered in light of the
instances which were before the Court. This is the way to
ascertain the true principles laid down by a decision. Ratio
decidendi cannot be decided by picking out words or
sentences averse to the context under question from the
judgment.”
(emphasis supplied)

a. Wambaugh’s Test / Inversion Test

53. The Inversion Test propounded by Wambaugh is based on the assumption

that the ratio decidendi is a general rule without which a case must have been

decided otherwise. Inversion Test is in the form of a dialogue between him and

his student. He gave following instructions for this:

1. Frame carefully the supposed proposition of law.

2. Insert in the proposition a word reversing its meaning.

3. Inquire whether, if the court had conceived this new proposition to be good

and had had it in mind, the decision could have been the same.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 57 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

4. If the answer is affirmative, then, however, good the Original

Proposition may be, the case is not a precedent for that proposition.

5. But if the answer be negative, the case is a precedent for the Original

Proposition and possibly for other propositions also.

54. Thus, when a case turns only on one point the proposition or doctrine of

the case, the reason for the decision, the ratio decidendi, must be a general rule

without which the case must have been decided otherwise. A proposition of law

which is not ratio decidendi under the above test must, according to Wambaugh,

constitute a mere dictum.

55. However, Rupert Cross criticized the Inversion Test on the ground

that "the exhortation to frame carefully the supposed proposition of law and the

restriction of the test to cases turning on only one point rob it of most of its value

as a means of determining what was the ratio decidendi of a case, although it has

its uses as a means of ascertaining what was not ratio".

56. Thus, the merit of Wambaugh’s test is that it provides what may be an

infallible means of ascertaining what is not ratio decidendi. It accords with the

generally accepted view that a ruling can only be treated as ratio if it supports the

ultimate order of the court.

b. Halsbury’s Test
57. The concept of precedent has attained important role in administration of

justice in the modern times. The case before the Court should be decided in

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 58 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

accordance with law and the doctrines. The mind of the Court should be clearly

reflecting on the material in issue with regard to the facts of the case. The reason

and spirit of case make law and not the letter of a particular precedent.

58. Lord Halsbury explained the word “ratio decidendi” as “it may be laid

down as a general rule that that part alone of a decision by a Court of Law is

binding upon Courts of coordinate jurisdiction and inferior Courts which consists

of the enunciation of the reason or principle upon which the question before the

Court has really been determined. This underlying principle which forms the only

authoritative element of a precedent is often termed the ratio decidendi”.

59. In the famous case of Quinn v. Leathem, Lord Halsbury said that:

“Now, before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood and what

was decided therein, there are two observations of a general
character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I
have very often said before, that every judgment must be read
as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be
proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be
found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole
law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the
case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is
that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I
entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may
seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning
assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas
every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always
logical at all.”
(emphasis supplied)
60. Thus, according to Lord Halsbury, it is by the choice of material facts that

the Court create law.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 59 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

c. Goodhart’s Test
61. In 1929, Goodhart had argued that the ratio of a case must be found in the

reasons for the decision and that there is no necessary connection between the

ratio and the reasons. He laid down following guidelines for discovering the ratio

decidendi of a case:

1. Ratio decidendi must not be sought in the reasons on which the judge has

based his decision.

2. The reasons given by the judge in his opinion are of peculiar importance,

for they may furnish us with a guide for determining which facts he

considered material and which immaterial.

3. A decision for which no reasons are given does not necessarily lack a ratio;

furthermore, the reasons offered by a court in reaching a decision might be

considered inadequate or incorrect, yet the court’s ruling might be endorsed

in later cases – a ‘bad reason may often make good law’.

4. Thus, ratio decidendi is whatever facts the judge has determined to be the

material facts of the case, plus the judge’s decision as based on those facts.

It is by his choice of the material facts that the judge creates law.

62. If we accept Goodhart’s conception of ratio decidendi, we could explain

why hypothetical instances are unlikely to be accorded the same weight as judicial

precedents as hypothetical instances are by definition obiter dicta. Also, this

conception of ratio decidendi links the doctrine of precedent with the principle

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 60 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

that like cases be treated alike. Any court which considers itself bound by

precedent would come to the same conclusion as was reached in a prior case

unless there is in the case some further fact which it is prepared to treat as material,

or unless fact considered material in the previous case is absent.

63. Applying the three tests referred to above, so as to understand the ratio of

the decision of the Court rendered in Brij Mohan (supra) and its binding effect

we have no hesitation in taking the view that the case on hand is not covered by

the dictum as laid in Brij Mohan (supra). We find it difficult to accept the

vociferous submission canvased on behalf of the respondents that so far as the

rate at which the allotment is to be made is squarely covered by the dictum as laid

in Brij Mohan (supra).

64. Ms. Bhati the learned ASG is right in her submission that so far as the first

question answered by this Court in Brij Mohan (supra) is concerned i.e. whether

HUDA should charge only the actual land cost plus development charges for the

plots allotted to an oustee and not at the market price/normal allotment price; this

Court returned a finding that the land acquisition Act, 1894 contemplates only

benefits like solatium, additional amount and higher rate of interest to the oustees

and not allotment of plots at cost price. HUDA or the State Government does not

have any scheme providing for allotment of plots at actual cost of oustees. In such

circumstances, it is not permissible for the Court to direct the State Government

or the development authority to allot plots to the oustees at the reasonable price.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 61 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

65. In so far as the second question answered by this Court in Brij Mohan

(supra) is concerned i.e. what is the meaning of the expression “normal allotment

rate”, this Court found that as a matter of fact the land-loser had made an

application in the year 1990 for allotment of plot. A direction was issued by this

Court in the year 1992 but HUDA delayed the allotment to the appellants therein.

In such circumstances, the rate for which the plots were initially offered was to be

charged.

66. The second question answered in Brij Mohan (supra) is keeping in mind

the facts of the case wherein the application was submitted by an oustee but still

the plot was not allotted to him.

67. Ms. Bhati is right in her submission that the dictum as laid in Brij Mohan

(supra) should not be read as laying down an absolute proposition of law that the

“normal allotment rate” in all circumstances shall be paid when the sector is first

floated for sale. As a matter of fact, the normal allotment rate would be the rate

advertised by HUDA in pursuance of which the plots are allotted. In the case on

hand the picture is hazy in so far as the fact whether appropriate applications in

the prescribed format were preferred in accordance with the Policy of 1992 with

deposit of the earnest money as stipulated in the scheme itself.

68. However, with all that has been said by us as aforesaid we are still inclined

to direct the appellant to allot the plots to the eligible oustees in accordance with

the Policy of 2016. It shall be open for the eligible oustees i.e., the respondent

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 62 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

herein to apply online in accordance with the Policy of 2016 with the requisite

deposit of the amount. If such application is filed online with the deposit of the

requisite amount, the appellant shall consider the same and process the online

application accordingly.

ii. Maintainability of the Suit filed under Section 39 of the Specific

Relief Act, 1963 for seeking Mandatory Injunction for Enforcement
of the Obligations in terms of the Scheme of 1992.

69. Although it is not necessary for us to look into Section 39 of the Specific

Relief Act, 1963 (for short, the Act, 1963) or consider whether the suits instituted

by the respondents herein invoking Section 39 of the Act were maintainable in

law, yet for the benefit of the courts below we would like to explain the scope and

purport of Section 39 of the Act, 1963. We say so because irrespective of the

question whether suits were maintainable in law or not we have decided to give

the respondents herein the benefit of the 2016 Scheme.

70. Section 39 of the Act 1963 reads thus:

“39. Mandatory injunctions.—When, to prevent the breach of
an obligation, it is necessary to compel the performance of
certain acts which the court is capable of enforcing, the court
may in its discretion grant an injunction to prevent the breach
complained of, and also to compel performance of the
requisite acts.”

71. The term “obligation” in Section 39 referred to above has been defined

under Section 2(a) of the Act 1963. The same reads thus:-

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 63 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

“obligation” includes every duty enforceable by law;”

72. Obligation is a tie or bond which obliges one to do or suffer something.

The term as defined in the Act 1963, means any duty enforceable by law and,

therefore, excludes all imperfect obligations, such as moral, social and religious

duties, as the performance of those duties cannot be enforced by law. As the

present definition includes any duty enforceable by law, it includes:-

(a) Obligations arising out of law of torts as well as of contract.

(b) Obligations arising out of trust.

(c) Obligations arising out of a statute.

73. In the case on hand, the suits were instituted by the respondents herein for

mandatory injunction seeking allotment of plots in accordance with the scheme

of 1992 floated by the State of Haryana.

74. This Section requires that the defendant or the party concerned must be

prevented from breach of an obligation under the contract. It further requires that

certain special acts, which flow from such obligation, must be specifically proved.

The acts must have reference to an enforceable obligation. The breach of

obligation and performance and compulsion to perform certain acts in relation to

such obligation must be specifically established before a mandatory injunction

can be granted. The plaintiff in a suit instituted by him under Section 39 of the

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 64 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

Act 1963 is obliged to satisfy the court with appropriate pleadings and cogent

evidence that the defendant is committing breach of a particular obligation which

is binding on him and there are certain acts which are capable of being enforced

by the court in view of the terms of the policy of allotment of plot so far as the

case on hand is concerned.

75. Mandatory injunction by its nature embodied under Section 39 of the

1963 Act is discretionary. The granting of mandatory injunction is a matter of

judicial discretion of the court and it can be granted only in a case which falls

strictly within the four corners of the provision - Section 39 of the Act 1963. The

two elements which govern Section 39 of the Act 1963 for the grant of mandatory

injunction are (i) the necessity to prevent breach of an obligation by the

intervention of the court and (ii) that such acts should be of that nature capable of

enforcement by the court. Yet another ingredient is also available which is crucial

in the matter of grant of mandatory injunction that it should be ‘amenable for

exercise of judicial discretion’. A relief which is not amenable for exercising

judicial discretion of the Court cannot be granted by way of a mandatory

injunction. It should satisfy not only breach of an obligation and the necessity of

its prevention, but also the availability of judicial discretion to be exercised. A

mere breach of an obligation or necessity to prevent the same alone cannot be

brought under the purview of mandatory injunction unless the same is amenable

for exercising discretion by the Court.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 65 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

a. Conditions for granting a Mandatory Injunction.

76. The Conditions for granting a mandatory injunction as developed over

time by a catena of decisions of this Court may be summarized as under:

i) Obligation: There must be a clear obligation on the part of the

defendant.
ii) Breach: A breach of that obligation must have occurred or be
reasonably apprehended
iii) Necessity: It must be necessary to compel the performance of
specific acts to prevent or rectify the breach.
iv) Enforceability: The court must be able to enforce the
performance of those acts.
v) Balance of Convenience: The balance of convenience must be
in favour of the party seeking the injunction.
vi) Irreparable Injury: The injury or damage caused by the breach
must be irreparable or not adequately compensable in monetary
terms.

77. Specific relief may, in brief be explained as relief in specie. It is the

remedy which aims at the exact fulfilment of the obligation. The term ‘obligation’

as used in the Specific Relief Act in its wider juristic sense covers duties arising

either ex-construction or ex-delicto. Every duty enforceable at law is obligation.

The definition clause of the Act of 1963 does not allow narrow interpretation of

the word ‘obligation’ to restrict it to a contractual duty alone. The definition of the

word ‘obligation’ as used in the Act of 1963 is wide enough and the definition

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 66 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

cannot be equated with the definition of the word ‘obligation’ used in the English

Law. ‘Obligation’ may be said to be a bond or tie, which constrains a person to do

or suffer something, it implies a right in another person to which it is co-related,

and it restricts the freedom of the obligee with reference to definite acts and

forbearance; but in order that it may be enforced by a Court, it must be a legal

obligation. The definition of ‘obligation’ in Section 2 of the Specific Relief Act is

so wide that any breach of legal obligation may give a cause to the affected party.

The definition of the word ‘obligation’ in Section 2 of the Act of 1963 should be

interpreted in a way which may serve the cause of the society.

78. Before we talk about the legal rights of the oustees and the legal

obligations on the part of the authorities, so far as the enforcement of the scheme

for allotment of plots is concerned, we must look into some law on this subject:

i. The question of allotment of the plots to the oustees, came up for

consideration before this Court in State of U.P. Vs. Smt. Pista Devi & Ors.

reported in AIR 1986 SC 2025, wherein the Court was called upon to consider

the acquisition of land by Meerut Development Authority. The Court directed

that where large tracts of land for the purposes of land development in urban

areas is acquired, the developing authority should provide a house or shop site

of reasonable size on reasonable terms to each of the expropriated persons, who

have no houses or shops/buildings in the urban area in question. The said

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 67 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

direction was issued in view of the provisions of Section 21(2) of the Delhi

Development Act, 1957, which contemplates settlement of those land-owners,

whose land has been acquired.

ii. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan & Anr. reported

in (2011) 7 SCC 639, this Court negated the argument that in case of land

acquisition, the plea of deprivation of right to livelihood under Article 21 is

sustainable. It was held to the following effect:

"26. It is desirable for the authority concerned to ensure that

as far as practicable persons who had been living and
carrying on business or other activity on the land acquired,
if they so desire, and are willing to purchase and comply with
any requirement of the authority or the local body, be given a
piece of land on the terms settled with due regard to the price
at which the land has been acquired from them. However, the
State Government cannot be compelled to provide alternate
accommodation to the oustees and it is for the authority
concerned to consider the desirability and feasibility of
providing alternative land considering the facts and
circumstances of each case.

27. In certain cases, the oustees are entitled to rehabilitation.

Rehabilitation is meant only for those persons who have been
rendered destitute because of a loss of residence or livelihood
as a consequence of land acquisition. The authorities must
explore the avenues of rehabilitation by way of employment,
housing, investment opportunities, and identification of
alternative lands.

"10.... A blinkered Vision of development, complete

apathy towards those who are highly adversely affected
by the development process and a cynical unconcern for
the enforcement of the laws. lead to a situation where the
rights and benefits promised and guaranteed under the
Constitution hardly ever reach the most marginalised

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 68 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

citizens." (Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. Vs. Mathias Oram

(2010) 11SCC 269)

For people whose lives and livelihoods are intrinsically

connected to the land, the economic and cultural shift to
a market economy can be traumatic. (Vide State. of UP.
v. Pista Devi AIR 1986 SC 2025, Narpat Singh v. Jaipur
Development Authority AIR 2002 SC 2036, Land
Acquisition Officer v. Mahaboob (2009) 14 SCC 54,
Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Mathias Dram (2010) 11see
269 and. Brij Mohan v. HUDA (2011)2 see 29.) The
fundamental right of the farmer to cultivation is a part of
right to livelihood. "Agricultural land is the foundation
for a sense of security and freedom from fear. Assured
possession is a lasting source for peace and prosperity."
India being a predominantly agricultural society, there is
a "strong linkage between the land and the person's
status in [the] social system".

28. However, in case of land acquisition, "the plea of

deprivation of right to livelihood under Article 21 is
unsustainable". (Vide Chameli Singh v. State of U'P. (1996) 2
sec 549 and Samatha v. Slate of A.P. (1997) 8 SCC191). This
Court has consistently held that Article 300-A is not only a
constitutional right but also a human right. (Vide Lachhman
Dassv, Jagat Ram (2007) 10 see 448 and Amarjit Singh v.
State of Punjab (2010) 10 see 43). However, in Jilubhai
Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat 1995 Supp. (1) scc 596,
this Court held: (SCC pp. 620 & 632, paras 30 & 58)

"30. Thus it is clear that right to property under Article

300- A is not a basic feature or structure of the
Constitution. It is only a constitutional right. ....

58. ...The principle of unfairness of the procedure

attracting Article 21 does not apply to the acquisition or
deprivation of property under Article 300-A giving effect
to the directive principles."
(Emphasis supplied)

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 69 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

iii. This Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs. Union of India

reported in (2000) 10 SCC 664 held as under: (SCC pp. 702-03,

para 62)

"62. The displacement of the tribals and other persons

would not per se result in the violation of their
fundamental or other rights. The effect is to see that on
their rehabilitation at new locations they are better off
than what they were. At the rehabilitation sites they will
have more and better amenities than those they enjoyed
in their tribal hamlets. The gradual assimilation in the
mainstream of the society will lead to betterment and
progress."
(Emphasis supplied)

iv. In State of Kerala v. Peoples Union for Civil Liberties reported

in (2009) 8 SCC 46, this Court held as under: (SCC p. 95, paras

102-03)

"102. Article 21 deals with right to life and liberty. Would it

bring within its umbrage a right of tribals to be rehabilitated
in their own habitat is the question?

103. If the answer is to be rendered in the affirmative, then,

for no reason whatsoever even an inch of land belonging to a
member of Scheduled Tribe can ever be acquired.
Furthermore,' a distinction must be borne between a right of
rehabilitation, required to be provided when the land of the
members of the Scheduled Tribes are acquired vis-a-vis a
prohibition imposed upon the State from doing so at all."
(emphasis supplied)

79. In the Narmada Bachao Andolan (supra), under the head 'land for land',

this Court observed that Constitution requires removal of economic inequalities

and provides for provision of facilities and opportunities for a decent standard of

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 70 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

living and protection of economic interests of the weaker segments of the society.

Every human has a right to improve his standard of living. The Court concluded

that allotment of land in lieu of land acquired in view of the Rehabilitation &

Resettlement Policy (for short 'R&R 'Policy'), the State Authorities are under

obligation to allot land to the allottees as far as possible. The expression 'as far as

possible' has been explained in para 38, which reads as under:

"38. The aforesaid phrase provides for flexibility, clothing the

authority concerned with powers to meet special situations
where the normal process of resolution cannot flow smoothly.
The aforesaid phrase can be interpreted as not being
prohibitory in nature. The said words rather connote a
discretion vested in the prescribed authority. It is thus
discretion and not compulsion. There is no hard-and-fast rule
in this regard as these words give a discretion to the authority
concerned. Once the authority exercises its discretion, the
court should not interfere with the said discretiori/decision
unless it is found to be palpably arbitrary. (Vide Iridium India
Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc. (2005) 2 see 145 and High
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Veena Verma (2009) 14
SCC 734). Thus, it is evident that this phrase simply means
that the principles are to be observed unless it is not possible
to follow the same in the particular circumstances of a case."

80. The Court further held that the Government has the power and

competence to change the policy on the basis of ground realities and that State

Government is competent to frame policy and a public policy can be challenged,

where it offends some constitutional or statutory provisions. It observed as under:

"35. In State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga (1998) 4 SCC

117, this Court while examining the State policy fixing the
rates for reimbursement of medical expenses to government
servants held: (SCC pp. 129-30, paras 25-26 & 29)

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 71 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

"25. ...When Government forms its policy, it is based on

a number of circumstances on facts, law including
constraints based on its resources. [t is also based on
expert opinion. It would be dangerous if court is asked to
test the utility, beneficial effect of the policy or its
appraisal based on facts set out on affidavits. The court
"would dissuade itself from entering into this realm
which belongs to the executive. It is within this matrix
that it is to be seen whether the new policy violates Article
21 when it restricts reimbursement on account of its
financial constraints.

26.... For every return there has to be investment.

Investment needs resources and finances. So even to
protect this sacrosanct right, finances are an inherent
requirement. Harnessing such resources needs toр
priority.

29. No State of any country can have unlimited resources

to spend on any of its projects. That is why it only
approves its projects to the extent it is feasible."

36. The Court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by

the Government merely because it feels that another decision
would have been fairer or more scientific or logical or wiser.
The wisdom and advisability of the policies are ordinarily not
amenable to judicial review unless the policies are contrary
to statutory or constitutional provisions or arbitrary or
irrational or an abuse of power. (See Ram Şingh Vijay Pal
Singh v. State of U.P. (2007) 6 SCC 44, Villianur 1yarkkai
Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India (2009) 7 sec 561 and
State of Kerala v. Peoples Union for Civil Liberties (2009) 8
see 46.)

37. Thus, it emerges to be a settled legal proposition that the

Government has the power and competence to change the
policy on the basis of ground realities. A public policy cannot
be challenged through PIL where the State Government is
competent to frame the policy and there is no need for anyone
to raise any grievance even if the policy is changed. The
public policy can only be challenged where it offends some
constitutional or statutory provisions."

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 72 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

(emphasis supplied)

81. This Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan (supra) has held that it is

impermissible in law to read a part of the document in isolation. The document is

to be read as a whole. (see para 44). In Jage Ram & others v. Union of India &

others reported in 1995 Supp (4) SCC 615, this Court considered the earlier

judgment in Pista Devi’s case and held that since the acquisition is only for

defence purposes, the allotment of alternative ‘site would create innumerable

complications and that allotment of alternative sites ‘depends upon the purpose of

acquisition as well. It was held to the following effect:

“1. The only question raised in these two writ petitions is

whether an observation is to be made by this Court to the
effect that the petitioners would be entitled to allotment of
alternative sites by the Delhi Development Authority; It is
true that the lands of the petitioners were acquired for a
defence purpose, viz., establishment of Radar. They were duly
paid the compensation demanded of. One of the reliefs sought
in the writ petitions is that since they have been displaced
from their holdings, they need some site for construction of
their houses and that, therefore the Government of India may
make an effort to provide them alternative Sites. We are
aware of the decision rendered by this Court in State of UP,
vs. Pista Devi AIR 1986 SC 2025 (See at p. 260). But it
depends upon the acquisition for which it was made. In that
case, acquisition related to planned development of housing
scheme by Meerut Development Authority. Therefore, though
no scheme was made providing alternative sites to those
displaced persons whose lands were acquired and who
themselves needed housing accommodations, a direction was
given to the Meerut Development Authority to provide
alternative sites for their housing purpose. Since the
acquisition is only for defence purpose and if the request is
acceded to, it would create innumerable complications, we

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 73 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

are constrained not to accede to forceful persuasive argument

addressed by Mr. RP. Gupta, learned counsel for the
petitioners.”

82. In S. Gurdial Singh & others v. Ludhiana Improvement Trust reported

in (1995) 5 SCC 138, considering Pista Devi’s case, this Court observed that the

benefit of providing alternative sites should not be uniformly and mechanically

extended to all the cases unless there is any express scheme framed by appropriate

authorities and the scheme is in operation. This Court was considering the

allotment of alternative sites for commercial purposes, as a local displaced

persons in terms of acquisition of land by the Improvement Trust. It was observed

as under:

“4. It is then contended, relying upon-the decision of this

Court in State of U.P. v. Pista Devi AIR 1986 SC 2025 that
the appellants are entitled to allotment of alternative sites for
commercial purpose. Therein, the land was acquired for
housing development and the persons whose properties were
sought to be displaced were directed to be provided housing
accommodation under the schemes formed thereunder. The
general ratio therein cannot be uniformly and mechanically
extended to all the cases unless there is any express scheme
framed by appropriate authorities and the scheme is in
operation. Under these circumstances, we cannot give any
express direction in this behalf. However, when the grievance
was made by the appellants, an admission was made in the
counter-affidavit filed in the High Court thus:“The
petitioners could get a plot of land as local displaced persons
in lieu of their acquired land according to rules on the
subject.”
(Emphasis supplied)

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 74 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

83. In Amarjit Singh & ors. v. State of Punjab & ors. reported in (2010) 10

SCC 43, it has been held that rehabilitation is not a recognized right either under

the Constitution or under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Any

beneficial measures taken by the Government are, therefore, guided only by

humanitarian considerations of fairness and equity towards the landowners. The

rehabilitation of the property owners is a part of the right to life guaranteed under

Article 21 of the Constitution and that acquisition made in exercise of power of

eminent domain for public purpose and that individual right of ownership over

land must yield place to the larger public good. It was held as under:

“16. As regards the question of rehabilitation of the

expropriated landowners, Mr. Subramanium, submitted that
rehabilitation was not a recognised right either under the
Constitution or under the provisions of the Land Acquisition
Act. Any, beneficial measures taken by the Government are,
therefore, guided only by humanitarian considerations of
fairness and equity towards the landowners. The benefit of
such measures is however subject to the satisfaction of all
such conditions as may be stipulated by the Government in
regard thereto. The policy relied upon by the appellants being
only prospective cannot be made retrospective by a judicial
order to cover acquisitions that have since long been
finalised.

xxx xxx xxx

49. We must, in fairness to Mr. Gupta mention that he did not

suggest that rehabilitation of the oustees was an essential
part of any process of compulsory acquisition so as to render
illegal any acquisition that is not accompanied by such
measure. He did not pitch his case that high and in our

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 75 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

opinion rightly so. The decisions of this Court in New

Reviera. Coop. Housing Society v. Land Acquisition Officer
(1996) 1 SCC 731 and Chameli Singh v. State of U.P. (1996)
2 SCC 549 have repelled the contention that rehabilitation of
the property owners is a part of the right to life guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution so as to render any
"compulsory acquisition for public purpose bad for want of
any such measures.

50. In New Reviera case (supra). this Court held that if the
State comes forward with a proposal to provide alternative
sites to the owners, the Court can give effect to any such
proposal by issuing appropriate directions in that behalf. But
a provision for alternative sites cannot be made a condition
precedent for every acquisition of land. In Chameli Singh
case (supra) also the Court held that acquisitions are made
in exercise of power of eminent domain for public purpose,
and that individual right of ownership over land must yield
place to the larger public good. That acquisition in
accordance with the procedure sanctioned by law is a valid
exercise of power vested in the State hence cannot be taken
to deprive the right to livelihood especially when
compensation is paid for the acquired land at the rates
prevailing on the date of publication of the preliminary
notification.

51. There is, thus, no gainsaying that rehabilitation is not an

essential requirement of law for any compulsory acquisition
nor can acquisition made for a public purpose and in
accordance with the procedure established by law upon
payment of compensation that is fair and reasonable be
assailed on the ground that any such acquisition violates the
right to livelihood of the owners who may be dependent on
the land being acquired from them.”
(emphasis supplied)

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 76 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

84. Thus, from the above-referred judgments, it is evident that acquisition of

land does not violate any constitutional/ fundamental right of the displaced

persons. However, they are entitled to resettlement and rehabilitation as per the

policy framed for the oustees of the project concerned.

85. We looked into one of the judgments of the trial court rendered in Civil

Suit No. 538 of 2007 titled “Smt. Nirmala Devi, W/o Sh. Shishpal Varma, resident

of Kaithal vs. The Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority, Kaithal

& Ors.”. We take notice of the fact that the said suit came to be dismissed by the

trial court essentially on two grounds. First on the ground that the plaintiff had

failed to apply with the authorities concerned in a specified format with deposit

of the earnest money at the rate of 10% of the total price as mentioned in the

details provided in the brochure, and secondly on the ground that the suit was

hopelessly time-barred as the same came to be instituted after a period of 14 years

from the date of the advertisement/notice. The relevant findings recorded by the

trial court read thus:-

“12. However, as per the brochure issued by the defendants

in the year 1992, placed on record as Ex.P6, the prospective
applicants, including the outees, were required to apply in a
specified format with deposit of earnest money at the rate of
10% of the total cost as mentioned in the details provided in
the said brochure. However, the plaintiff never applied for the
said plot under the oustees quota in the year 1992 in
response to the said advertisement/brochure before the last
date of application. As per the averments of the plaintiff
herself, as contained in the plaint, the plaintiff had applied

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 77 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

for the said plot only on 19.12.2006, i.e. after about 14 years
of the said advertisement/notice. Although the plaintiff has
submitted in her plaint that she had applied for the release of
a free-hold residential developed plot in January 2000, no
documentary evidence in the form of a copy of application or
postal receipt etc., has been placed on record. In the case
titled as Smt. Bhagwanti vs. HUDA 2002 (4) RCR (Civil) 21
(P&H) a division Bench of the Hon’ble High Punjab and
Haryana High Court has held that where the petitioners
submitted their application for allotment of plots after the
prescribed date, the authority is not expected to wait for more
than four years to apply at his/her convenience and then
proceed to make allotment to others. In the present case too,
a fair opportunity was granted to all concerned to apply.
However, the plaintiff failed to avail of that opportunity. That
being the case, the plaintiff has to thank herself for failure to
get any plot.
13. Besides, as per a mandatory condition, as mentioned in
the brochure, the applicants were supposed to deposit earnest
money at the rate of 10% of the total cost of the plot. Rule 5
of the Haryana Urban Development (Disposal of Land and
Buildings) Regulations, 1978, requires that the intending
purchaser shall make an application to the Estate Officer
concerned in the prescribed form (annexed to the regulation)
and no application shall be valid unless it is accompanied by
such amount as may be determined by the authorities which
shall not be less than 10% of the price/premium. In the
present case, the plaintiff has neither pleaded the payment of
the earnest money nor placed on record any evidence
regarding the payment of earnest money at the rate of 10%.
x x x x
17. It is an admitted fact that the land of the plaintiff had been
acquired by the defendants in the year 1992 and the plaintiff
had applied for the release of a free-hold residential
developed plot under the oustees quota on 19.12.2006 and
the present suit was filed on 1.8.2007. In other words, the
plaintiff had applied for the plot after 14 years of the
acquisition of her land and has filed the present suit after 15
years of the said acquisition. As per article 113 of the
Limitation Act, 1993, the period of limitation for an
injunction suit is three years from the date when the right to

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 78 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

sue accrues to the plaintiff. I find merit in the contention of

Ld. Counsel for the defendants that the cause of action had
arisen in favour of the plaintiff in the year 1992 itself when
her land had been acquired by the defendants. It is pertinent
to mention here that throughout her plaint, the plaintiff has
not specified the date as to when the cause of action accrued
in her favour. Therefore, the suit of the plaintiff having been
filed after 15 years of the cause of action having arisen in her
favour, the same is not only hopelessly time-barred but the
plaintiff is also guilt of delay, laches and acquiescence on her
part and is therefore not entitled to the equitable and
discretionary relief of injunction. Therefore, issue No. 4 is
also decided in favour of the defendants and against the
plaintiff.”
(emphasis supplied)

86. The plaintiff Smt. Nirmala Devi preferred civil appeal in the court of the

Additional District Judge bearing Civil Appeal No. 47 of 2012. The First Appeal

came to be allowed. The matter of concern is that there is no discussion worth the

name by the first appellate court as regards the findings recorded by the trial court

referred to above. The reason for us to say that it is a matter of concern is because

right from the inception the appellant herein has been saying that none of the

oustees, at least the respondents before us, had applied in the requisite format for

allotment of plots with the deposit of the earnest money. If this part of the

obligation would have been performed or discharged by the oustees in accordance

with the scheme then perhaps HUDA could have been called upon to perform its

part of the obligation. It is only if the plaintiff would have performed its part of

the obligation according to the scheme, then Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act,

1963 could have been invoked to compel the HUDA as defendant to perform its

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 79 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

part of the obligation. This aspect unfortunately has not been looked into even by

the High Court.

87. We also looked into one of the judgments of the trial court allowing the

suit filed by one Dixit Lal s/o Sh. Sunder Lal resident of Kaithal. We are referring

to the judgment rendered by the trial court in Civil Suit No. 228/1 of 2009

decided on 21.11.2009.

88. In the said suit the entire line of reasoning is different. The trial court

while decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff held as under:

“10. Plaintiff has claimed that no plot was allotted to him

despite various requests made by him. Smt. Bimlesh mother of
the plaintiff examined as PW-1 has deposed that plaintiff had
applied for allotment of plot under the oustees quota, but the
copy of the application was not readily available with him. She
has further deposed that in the year 2007 as well she had
approached the defendants at the time of allotment of plots in
Sector-19 and 20 HUDA, Kaithal but her request was not
considered by the defendants; whereas similarly placed
persons had been allotted plots under the court orders. Shri
Lakhi Ram, Clerk from the office of Haryana Urban
development Authority. Kaithal examined as DW-1. Has
deposed that plaintiff had not applied for allotment of plot nor
had she deposited 10% of the earnest amount despite
advertisement Ex. D3.

11. Admittedly, there is no proof on record to show that the

plaintiff had applied for a plot under the oustees quota. A
perusal of Ex. D3 shows that the booking of the plots was open
for general category as well as the oustees from 02.09.1992
till 01.10.1992. No doubt the earnest money has been specified
against each category of land, but the said advertisement
cannot be said to be in consonance with the policy of 1992 of
Haryana Urban Development Authority which is applicable.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 80 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

According to the said policy, Haryana Urban Development

Authority was required to offer to the oustees in proportion to
their acquired land. Only after making an offer, the Haryana
Urban Development Authority could take the plea that the
offer has not been accepted by the oustees by not applying for
the plot within the given time. The oustees who make the
application pursuant to such advertisement can be asked by
Haryana Urban Development Authority to deposit 10% of the
earnest money. Any revision or modification in the policy of
1992 cannot bar the claim of the persons whose land had been
acquired two prior to the said modification. In the present suit
the land of the plaintiff was acquired in the year 1989 and
award was passed on 26.02.1992 and the modification in the
policy made by Haryana Urban Development Authority in the
year 1993 cannot have a retrospective effect.

12. In Civil Writ Petition No. 19927 of 2009 titled as Sandeep

Vs. State of Haryana and others decided on 16.05.2011 by
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Raniit Singh, Judge Hon'ble Punjab and
Haryana High Court, Chandigarh, it has been observed as
under:-

"Majority of the claim are being denied on the ground that

application is not sent with 10% of the price of the plot.
This is also not in conformity with the policy so
formulated. The HUDA concededly has not kept in register
to keep the claims of the allottees live. The requirement of
depositing 10% of the price would arise only if the claims
are first invited as per the policies and it has to be through
press a newspaper, the price, as per the policy instructions
dated 12.03.1993, is to be deposited once the claim is
finally accepted by the competent authority and when the
sector scheme is floated. It is on account of these
violations that majority of the oustees are being made
approach this court through various writ petitions. In
order to set the position right and as one time measure it
is appropriate to direct HUDA to invite claims of all the
oustees through an advertisement in the newspaper giving
them sufficient time to make applications. Those who make
applications pursuant to such an advertisement may be
asked to deposit 10% of the price, if the plots are still
available. Their claims be considered in the light of the
policies formulated by HUDA."

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 81 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

13. The Haryana Urban Development Authority has not

performed its obligation in inviting the claim of oustees as laid
down in the policy dated 19.03.1992 and subsequent policy.
The said policy required. Haryana Urban Development
Authority to invite the claim of the oustees separately before
floating any Sector. The land looser have option to buy first
before applications are invited from general public. In the
present case as well as the claim of the oustees were invited
while inviting the claim of the general public. It cannot be
denied that once the claim of the oustees is invited along with
general public, the possibility of first satisfying the claim of the
oustees would stand defeated. Merely because the plaintiff has
not produced any proof with regard to his application for
allotment of plot would not defeat her right as it was the duty
of the Haryana Urban Development Authority to first make a
clear offer with regard to allotment. The land of the plaintiff
was admittedly acquired by the defendants and no plot has
been allotted to the plaintiff till date in lieu of the said
acquisition. The plaintiff has a right to receive the preferential
plot under the oustees quota and in order to redress his
grievance plaintiff has filed the present suit. The plaintiff has
a locus standi to file the present suit and the suit is
maintainable.”

89. Thus, while allowing the suit the trial court in no uncertain terms

observed that there was no proof or any evidence worth the name on record to

indicate that the plaintiff had applied for a plot under the oustee quota yet it

proceeded to say that the advertisement issued by HUDA was not in any

conformity with the policy of 1992 and in such circumstances the oustees were

not obliged to prefer any application in the prescribed format with deposit of 10

per cent of the price.

90. Although we are not convinced with the line of reasoning adopted by the

trial court while allowing the suit as referred to above, as affirmed upto the High

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 82 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

Court yet even assuming for the moment that the advertisement was not in

conformity with the Scheme of 1992 there is no explanation worth the name at

the end any of the oustees why the suits were instituted after a lapse of almost

14 to 20 years, more particularly, when the land of respective oustees came to be

acquired in 1992.

91. Well, it may be argued and quite legitimately that the term “obligation” in

Section 39 of the Act, 1963 may not be always mutual. Section 39 deals with

mandatory injunctions, which can be used to prevent the breach of an obligation

and at times compel the performance of specific acts necessary to prevent that

breach. The obligation, in this context, refers to a duty enforceable by law, and

while it can be reciprocal in some cases (like a contract), it can also be a unilateral

duty such as a trustee’s obligation to a beneficiary. However, it would all depend

on the individual facts of each case. When the scheme in question specifically

provides that an oustee shall file an application in a specified format with deposit

of the requisite amount towards earnest money then it is a part of the obligation

on the part of the oustee to do so before he calls upon the State to allot the plot in

accordance with the terms of the scheme.

92. There is no explanation worth the name why it took 14-20 years for the

plaintiffs to institute their respective suits for mandatory injunction under Section

39 of the Act 1963. Whether Article 58 of the Limitation Act would apply or

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 83 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

Article 113 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation would be 3 years. By

no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the case on hand is one of recurring

cause of action so as to bring the suit within the period of limitation though

instituted almost after a period of 14-20 years.

93. In such circumstances referred to above, we could have taken the view

that the suits themselves were not maintainable as they should have been

dismissed only on the ground of limitation far from being not maintainable under

Section 39 of the Act 1963.

94. However, as observed earlier, since we are inclined to grant the benefit of

the scheme of 2016, we are not non-suiting the respondents (original plaintiffs)

completely.

D. CONCLUSION

95. We summarise our final conclusion and dispose of all the appeals with the

following directions:

(i) The respondents are not entitled to claim as a matter of legal right relying on

the decision of Brij Mohan (supra) that they should be allotted plots as

oustees only at the price as determined in the 1992 policy.

(ii) The respondents are entitled at the most to seek the benefit of the 2016 policy

for the purpose of allotment of plots as oustees.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 84 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

(iii) We grant four weeks time to all the respondents herein to prefer an appropriate

online application with deposit of the requisite amount in accordance with the

policy of 2016. If within a period of four weeks any of the respondents herein

prefer any online application in accordance with the scheme of 2016 then in

such circumstances the authority concerned shall look into the applications and

process the same in accordance with the scheme of 2016. We clarify that it will

be up to the authority to look into whether the respondents are otherwise

eligible for the allotment of plots or not.

(iv) We make it clear that there shall not be any further extension of time for the

purpose of applying online with deposit of the requisite amount.

(v) We understand that some of the respondents may be very rustic and illiterate

and may not be in a position to apply online, in such circumstances we permit

them to apply by preferring an appropriate application or otherwise addressed

to the competent authority with deposit of the requisite amount.

(vi) We make it clear that the entire exercise shall be completed within a period of

eight weeks from the date of the receipt of the online application that may be

filed by the respondents.

(vii) The State of Haryana as well as HUDA shall ensure that land grabbers or any

other miscreants may not form a cartel and try to take undue advantage of the

allotment of plots. At the end it should not happen that unscrupulous elements

ultimately derive any benefit or advantage from allotment of land to the

oustees. In this regard the State and HUDA will have to remain very vigilant.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 85 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

(viii) We believe that since the allotment of plot is with a laudable object and not

for any monetary gain, a condition should be imposed at the time of allotment

that the allotee shall not be entitled to transfer the plot to any third party

without the permission of the competent authority and in any case not within

five years from the date of the allotment.

(ix) This litigation is an eye opener for all States in this country. If land is required

for any public purpose law permits the Government or any instrumentality of

Government to acquire in accordance with the provisions of the Land

Acquisition Act or any other State Act enacted for the purpose of acquisition.

When land is acquired for any public purpose the person whose land is taken

away is entitled to appropriate compensation in accordance with the settled

principles of law. It is only in the rarest of the rare case that the Government

may consider floating any scheme for rehabilitation of the displaced persons

over and above paying them compensation in terms of money. At times the

State Government with a view to appease its subjects float unnecessary

schemes and ultimately land up in difficulties. It would unnecessarily give

rise to number of litigations. The classic example is the one at hand. What we

would like to convey is that it is not necessary that in all cases over and above

compensation in terms of money, rehabilitation of the property owners is a

must. Any beneficial measures taken by the Government should be guided

only by humanitarian considerations of fairness and equity towards the

landowners.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 86 of 87

 VERDICTUM.IN

(x) Ordinarily, rehabilitation should only be meant for those persons who have

been rendered destitute because of loss of residence or livelihood as a

consequence of land acquisition. In other words, for people whose lives and

livelihood are intrinsically connected to the land.

(xi) We have made ourselves very explicitly clear that in cases of land acquisition

the plea of deprivation of right to livelihood under Article 21 of the

Constitution is unsustainable.

96. All the appeals are disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

97. The Registry is directed to circulate one copy each of this judgment to all

the High Courts.

.................................. J.
(J.B. Pardiwala)

.................................. J.
(R. Mahadevan)

New Delhi;
14th July, 2025.

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15148 of 2017 Page 87 of 87