Elections in Zambia

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Elections in Zambia take place within the framework of a multi-party democracy and a
presidential system. The President and National Assembly are simultaneously elected for five-
year terms.

Contents
 1 Electoral history
o 1.1 Pre-independence
o 1.2 Post-independence
 2 Electoral system
o 2.1 President
o 2.2 National Assembly
 3 Referendums
 4 References
 5 External links

Electoral history
Pre-independence

Elections for five members of the Advisory Council were held for the first time in 1918, at which
time suffrage was limited to British subjects over the age of 21 who had lived in the territory for
at least six months and owned at least £150 of property.[1] Elections under the same system were
held in 1920 and 1922. In 1924 a Legislative Council with five elected member was created, with
the first elections held in 1926.

Prior to the 1929 elections the number of elected members was increased to seven. Subsequent
elections were held in 1932, 1935 and 1938. The 1941 elections saw eight members elected, with
the new Northern Rhodesian Labour Party winning five seats. However, after its defeat in the
1944 elections, the party was disbanded. Prior to the 1948 elections the number of elected
members was increased to ten, with two Africans appointed to the Council.

In 1953 the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was formed, with all territories electing
members to the federal Legislative Assembly. The first federal elections were held in the same
year. Northern Rhodesia had eight ordinary seats, and three members representing African
interests, two of which were Africans chosen by an electoral college and one European appointed
by the governor. Only three Africans qualified to vote. The Federal Party won seven of the eight
ordinary seats.
Constitutional reforms saw the number of elected seats in the Northern Rhodesian Legislative
Council increase to twelve in 1954, with four African members selected by the Northern
Rhodesian African Representative Council. The 1954 elections resulted in a victory for the
Federal Party, which won ten seats. The next federal elections in 1958 saw a landslide victory for
the United Federal Party (UFP), the successor the Federal Party, which won 46 of the 59 seats.

The promulgation of the "Lennox-Boyd constitution" led to the expansion of the Legislative
Council to 22 elected members for the 1959 elections. It provided for 12 "ordinary" seats with
mostly Europeans, six "special" seats mainly reserved for Africans, two reserved for Africans
and two reserved for Europeans. The UFP retained their majority, winning 13 seats. Further
constitutional reforms led to another electoral system being implemented for the 1962 elections,
with 15 members elected by an upper roll, 15 elected by a lower roll and 15 by both rolls
together. Although the UFP won the most seats, the United National Independence Party (UNIP)
and the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress (NRANC) were able to form a coalition
government.

The next elections in 1964 were held under another new system, with 65 seats elected by an
African "main roll" and ten seats by a "reserved roll" primarily for Europeans. The result was a
victory for UNIP, which won 55 of the 75 seats, allowing Kenneth Kaunda to become Prime
Minister, and subsequently President when Zambia became independent on 24 October 1964.

Post-independence

General elections in 1968 included the first vote for president, with Kaunda defeating Zambian
African National Congress (a renamed NRANC) leader Harry Nkumbula with 82% of the vote.
The ten reserved seats in the National Assembly were abolished and the number of elected seats
increased to 105, with an additional five members appointed by the President. UNIP won 81 of
the elected seats.

In 1973 the country became a one-party state; general elections in the same year saw Kaunda run
unopposed for the presidency, with voters voting yes or no to his candidacy (89% voted in
favour). The National Assembly now had 125 elected seats, ten presidential appointees and a
Speaker elected from outside the chamber. Although UNIP was the only legal party, up to three
UNIP candidates could contest each seat. The same system was used for elections in 1978, 1983
and 1988, with Kaunda re-elected each time.

Multi-party democracy was restored in 1991, with general elections held in October that year.
Kaunda was defeated by Frederick Chiluba of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy
(MMD) in the presidential elections, with Chiluba receiving 76% of the vote. The MMD won
125 of the 150 elected seats in an expanded National Assembly, whilst the number of
presidential appointees was reduced to eight. Chiluba was re-elected in the 1996 elections, with
the MMD winning 131 seats and UNIP losing all 25 seats it had won in 1991.

In 2001 MMD candidate Levy Mwanawasa won the presidential elections with just 29% of the
vote in a field of eleven candidates. The MMD was reduced to 69 seats in the National
Assembly, with opposition parties gaining a majority. Mwanawasa was re-elected in 2006 with
43% of the vote, although the MMD again failed to win a majority of seats in the National
Assembly. After Mwanawasa's death in 2008, presidential elections were held for a candidate to
serve the remainder of his five year term. The elections were won by the MMD's Rupiah Banda.

The 2011 general elections saw the Patriotic Front (PF) candidate Michael Sata elected president
with 42% of the vote, whilst the PF became the largest party in the National Assembly, winning
60 seats. After Sata's death in 2014, another presidential by-election was held in 2015 and won
by the PF's Edgar Lungu, who received 48% of the vote.

Electoral system
The voting age in Zambia is 18.

President

Since 1991 the President had been elected in a single round of voting by the first-past-the-post
system. However, the 2016 elections are likely to see the two-round system used. The
constitutional changes have been approved by the National Assembly and did receive
presidential assent.[2]

If a president dies in office, a by-election is held to elect a president to serve the remainder of the
five-year term. However, the 2015 constitutional amendments provide for a running mate, who
would serve the remainder of the five-year term without the need for a by-election in the instance
of the death of an incumbent.

National Assembly

Of the 159 members of the National Assembly, 150 are elected by the first-past-the-post system
in single-member constituencies, with a further eight appointed by the President and a Speaker
elected from outside the National Assembly.[3] National Assembly candidates must be at least 21.
[4]

Presidential system
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 Systems of government
Republican forms of government:
Presidential republics with an executive presidency separate
from the legislature
Parliamentary republics with an executive presidency
dependent on the legislature
Semi-presidential republics with both an executive
presidency and a separate head of government that leads the
legislature, who is appointed by the president
Parliamentary republics with a ceremonial/non-executive
president, where a separate head of government leads the
executive

Monarchical forms of government:

Constitutional monarchies with a ceremonial/non-executive
monarch, where a separate head of government leads the
executive
Constitutional monarchies with a ceremonial monarch, but
where royalty still hold significant executive and/or legislative
power
Absolute monarchies where the monarch leads the executive

One-party states where the dominant role of a political party

is codified in the constitution
Countries in which constitutional provisions for government
have been suspended (e.g. military dictatorship)
Countries which do not fit any of the above systems (e.g.
transitional government or unclear political situations)

A presidential system is a democratic and republican system of government where a head of

government leads an executive branch that is separate from the legislative branch. This head of
government is in most cases also the head of state, which is called president.

In presidential countries, the executive is elected and is not responsible to the legislature, which
cannot in normal circumstances dismiss it. Such dismissal is possible, however, in uncommon
cases, often through impeachment.
The title "president" has persisted from a time when such person personally presided over the
governing body, as with the President of the Continental Congress in the early United States,
prior to the executive function being split into a separate branch of government.

A presidential system contrasts with a parliamentary system, where the head of government is
elected to power through the legislative. There is also a hybrid system called semi-
presidentialism.

Countries that feature a presidential or semi-presidential system of government are not the
exclusive users of the title of president. Heads of state of parliamentary republics, largely
ceremonial in most cases, are called presidents. Dictators or leaders of one-party states, popularly
elected or not, are also often called presidents.

Presidentialism is the dominant form of government in the continental Americas, with 19 of its
23 sovereign states being presidential republics. It is also prevalent in Central and southern West
Africa and in Central Asia.

Contents
 1 Characteristics
 2 Subnational governments of the world
 3 Advantages
o 3.1 Direct elections
o 3.2 Separation of powers
o 3.3 Speed and decisiveness
o 3.4 Stability
 4 Criticism and disadvantages
o 4.1 Tendency towards authoritarianism
o 4.2 Political gridlock
 4.2.1 Lack of accountability
o 4.3 Impediments to leadership change
 5 Differences from a parliamentary system
o 5.1 Overlapping elements
 6 Republics with a presidential system of government
o 6.1 Presidential systems with a prime minister
o 6.2 Presidential systems with a theocratic supreme leader
 7 See also
 8 Notes and references
 9 External links

Characteristics
In a full-fledged presidential system, a politician is chosen directly by the public or indirectly by
the winning party to be the head of government. Except for Belarus and Kazakhstan, this head of
government is also the head of state, and is therefore called president. The post of prime minister
(also called premier) may also exist in a presidential system, but unlike in semi-presidential or
parliamentary systems, the prime minister answers to the president and not to the legislature.

The following characteristics apply generally for the numerous presidential governments across
the world:

 The executive can veto legislative acts and, in turn, a supermajority of lawmakers may
override the veto. The veto is generally derived from the British tradition of royal assent
in which an act of parliament can only be enacted with the assent of the monarch.
 The president has a fixed term of office. Elections are held at regular times and cannot be
triggered by a vote of confidence or other parliamentary procedures, although in some
countries there is an exception which provides for the removal of a president who is
found to have broken a law.
 The executive branch is unipersonal. Members of the cabinet serve at the pleasure of the
president and must carry out the policies of the executive and legislative branches.
Cabinet ministers or executive departmental chiefs are not members of the legislature.
[citation needed]
However, presidential systems often need legislative approval of executive
nominations to the cabinet, judiciary, and various lower governmental posts. A president
generally can direct members of the cabinet, military, or any officer or employee of the
executive branch, but cannot direct or dismiss judges.
 The president can often pardon or commute sentences of convicted criminals.

Subnational governments of the world

See also: State governments of the United States

Subnational governments, usually states, may be structured as presidential systems. All of the
state governments in the United States use the presidential system, even though this is not
constitutionally required. On a local level, many cities use Council-manager government, which
is equivalent to a parliamentary system, although the post of a city manager is normally a non-
political position. Some countries without a presidential system at the national level use a form
of this system at a subnational or local level. One example is Japan, where the national
government uses the parliamentary system, but the prefectural and municipal governments have
governors and mayors elected independently from local assemblies and councils.

Advantages
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Supporters generally claim four basic advantages for presidential systems:

  Direct elections — in a presidential system, the president is often elected directly by the
people. This makes the president's power more legitimate than that of a leader appointed
indirectly. However, this is not a necessary feature of a presidential system. Some
presidential states have an indirectly elected head of state.
 Separation of powers — a presidential system establishes the presidency and the
legislature as two parallel structures. This allows each structure to monitor and check the
other, preventing abuses of power.
 Speed and decisiveness — A president with strong powers can usually enact changes
quickly. However, the separation of powers can also slow the system down.
 Stability — a president, by virtue of a fixed term, may provide more stability than a
prime minister, who can be dismissed at any time.

Direct elections

In most presidential systems, the president is elected by popular vote, although some such as the
United States use an electoral college (which is itself directly elected) or some other method.[1]
By this method, the president receives a personal mandate to lead the country, whereas in a
parliamentary system a candidate might only receive a personal mandate to represent a
constituency. That means a president can only be elected independently of the legislative branch.

Separation of powers

A presidential system's separation of the executive from the legislature is sometimes held up as
an advantage, in that each branch may scrutinize the actions of the other. In a parliamentary
system, the executive is drawn from the legislature, making criticism of one by the other
considerably less likely. A formal condemnation of the executive by the legislature is often
considered a vote of no confidence. According to supporters of the presidential system, the lack
of checks and balances means that misconduct by a prime minister may never be discovered.
Writing about Watergate, Woodrow Wyatt, a former MP in the UK, said "don't think a
Watergate couldn't happen here, you just wouldn't hear about it." (ibid)

Critics respond that if a presidential system's legislature is controlled by the president's party, the
same situation exists. Proponents[who?] note that even in such a situation a legislator from the
president's party is in a better position to criticize the president or his policies should he deem it
necessary, since the immediate security of the president's position is less dependent on legislative
support. In parliamentary systems, party discipline is much more strictly enforced. If a
parliamentary backbencher publicly criticizes the executive or its policies to any significant
extent then he/she faces a much higher prospect of losing his/her party's nomination, or even
outright expulsion from the party. Even mild criticism from a backbencher could carry
consequences serious enough (in particular, removal from consideration for a cabinet post) to
effectively muzzle a legislator with any serious political ambitions.

Despite the existence of the no confidence vote, in practice it is extremely difficult to stop a
prime minister or cabinet that has made its decision. In a parliamentary system, if important
legislation proposed by the incumbent prime minister and his cabinet is "voted down" by a
majority of the members of parliament then it is considered a vote of no confidence. To
emphasize that particular point, a prime minister will often declare a particular legislative vote to
be a matter of confidence at the first sign of reluctance on the part of legislators from his or her
own party. If a government loses a parliamentary vote of confidence, then the incumbent
government must then either resign or call elections to be held, a consequence few backbenchers
are willing to endure. Hence, a no confidence vote in some parliamentary countries, like Britain,
only occurs a few times in a century. In 1931, David Lloyd George told a select committee:
"Parliament has really no control over the executive; it is a pure fiction." (Schlesinger 1982)

By contrast, if a presidential legislative initiative fails to pass a legislature controlled by the

president's party (e.g. the Clinton health care plan of 1993 in the United States), it may damage
the president's political standing and that of his party, but generally has no immediate effect on
whether or not the president completes his term.

Speed and decisiveness

Some supporters of presidential systems claim[who?] that presidential systems can respond more
rapidly to emerging situations than parliamentary ones. A prime minister, when taking action,
needs to retain the support of the legislature, but a president is often less constrained. In Why
England Slept, future U.S. president John F. Kennedy argued that British prime ministers Stanley
Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain were constrained by the need to maintain the confidence of
the Commons.

Other supporters of presidential systems sometimes argue in the exact opposite direction,
however, saying that presidential systems can slow decision-making to beneficial ends. Divided
government, where the presidency and the legislature are controlled by different parties, is said
to restrain the excesses of both the coalition and opposition, and guarantee cross-partisan input
into legislation. In the United States, Republican Congressman Bill Frenzel wrote in 1995:

There are some of us who think gridlock is the best thing since indoor plumbing. Gridlock is the
natural gift the Framers of the Constitution gave us so that the country would not be subjected to
policy swings resulting from the whimsy of the public. And the competition—whether multi-
branch, multi-level, or multi-house—is important to those checks and balances and to our
ongoing kind of centrist government. Thank heaven we do not have a government that
nationalizes one year and privatizes next year, and so on ad infinitum. (Checks and Balances, 8)

Stability

Although most parliamentary governments go long periods of time without a no confidence vote,
Italy, Israel, and the French Fourth Republic have all experienced difficulties maintaining
stability. When parliamentary systems have multiple parties, and governments are forced to rely
on coalitions, as they often do in nations that use a system of proportional representation,
extremist parties can theoretically use the threat of leaving a coalition to further their agendas.

Many people consider presidential systems more able to survive emergencies. A country under
enormous stress may, supporters argue, be better off being led by a president with a fixed term
than rotating premierships. France during the Algerian controversy switched to a semi-
presidential system as did Sri Lanka during its civil war, while Israel experimented with a
directly elected prime minister in 1992. In France and Sri Lanka, the results are widely
considered to have been positive. However, in the case of Israel, an unprecedented proliferation
of smaller parties occurred, leading to the restoration of the previous system of selecting a prime
minister.

The fact that elections are fixed in a presidential system is considered by supporters a welcome
"check" on the powers of the executive, contrasting parliamentary systems, which may allow the
prime minister to call elections whenever they see fit or orchestrate their own vote of no
confidence to trigger an election when they cannot get a legislative item passed. The presidential
model is said to discourage this sort of opportunism, and instead forces the executive to operate
within the confines of a term they cannot alter to suit their own needs.

Proponents of the presidential system also argue that stability extends to the cabinets chosen
under the system, compared to a parliamentary system where cabinets must be drawn from
within the legislative branch. Under the presidential system, cabinet members can be selected
from a much larger pool of potential candidates. This allows presidents the ability to select
cabinet members based as much or more on their ability and competency to lead a particular
department as on their loyalty to the president, as opposed to parliamentary cabinets, which
might be filled by legislators chosen for no better reason than their perceived loyalty to the prime
minister. Supporters of the presidential system note that parliamentary systems are prone [citation
needed]
to disruptive "cabinet shuffles" where legislators are moved between portfolios, whereas in
presidential system cabinets (such as the United States Cabinet), cabinet shuffles are unusual.

Criticism and disadvantages

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Critics generally claim three basic disadvantages for presidential systems:

 Tendency towards authoritarianism – some political scientists say presidentialism

raises the stakes of elections, exacerbates their polarization and can lead to
authoritarianism (Linz).
 Political gridlock – the separation of powers of a presidential system establishes the
presidency and the legislature as two parallel structures. Critics argue that this can create
an undesirable and long-term political gridlock whenever the president and the legislative
majority are from different parties, which is common because the electorate usually
expects more rapid results from new policies than are possible (Linz, Mainwaring and
Shugart). In addition, this reduces accountability by allowing the president and the
legislature to shift blame to each other.[2]
 Impediments to leadership change – presidential systems often make it difficult to
remove a president from office early, for example after taking actions that become
unpopular.
A fourth criticism applies specifically to nations with a proportionally elected legislature and a
presidency. Where the voters are virtually all represented by their votes in the proportional
outcome, the presidency is elected on a winner-take-all basis. Two different electoral systems are
therefore in play, potentially leading to conflicts that are based on the natural differences of the
systems.

Tendency towards authoritarianism

A prime minister without majority support in the legislature must either form a coalition or, if
able to lead a minority government, govern in a manner acceptable to at least some of the
opposition parties. Even with a majority government, the prime minister must still govern within
(perhaps unwritten) constraints as determined by the members of his party—a premier in this
situation is often at greater risk of losing his party leadership than his party is at risk of losing the
next election. On the other hand, winning the presidency is a winner-take-all, zero-sum game.
Once elected, a president might be able to marginalize the influence of other parties and exclude
rival factions in his own party as well, or even leave the party whose ticket he was elected under.
The president can thus rule without any party support until the next election or abuse his power
to win multiple terms, a worrisome situation for many interest groups. Yale political scientist
Juan Linz argues that:

The danger that zero-sum presidential elections pose is compounded by the rigidity of the
president's fixed term in office. Winners and losers are sharply defined for the entire period of
the presidential mandate ... losers must wait four or five years without any access to executive
power and patronage. The zero-sum game in presidential regimes raises the stakes of presidential
elections and inevitably exacerbates their attendant tension and polarization.

Constitutions that only require plurality support are said[by whom?] to be especially undesirable, as
significant power can be vested in a person who does not enjoy support from a majority of the
population.

Some political scientists say that presidential systems are not constitutionally stable and have
difficulty sustaining democratic practices, noting that presidentialism has slipped into
authoritarianism in many of the countries in which it has been implemented. According to
political scientist Fred Riggs, presidentialism has fallen into authoritarianism in nearly every
country it has been attempted.[3][4] Political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset pointed out that
this has taken place in political cultures not conducive to democracy and that militaries have
tended to play a prominent role in most of these countries. On the other hand, an often-cited[by
whom?]
list of the world's 22 older democracies includes only two countries (Costa Rica and the
United States) with presidential systems.

In a presidential system, the legislature and the president have equal mandates from the public.
Conflicts between the branches of government might not be reconciled. When president and
legislature disagree and government is not working effectively, there is a strong incentive to use
extra-constitutional measures to break the deadlock. Of the three common branches of
government, the executive is in the best position to use extra-constitutional measures, especially
when the president is head of state, head of government, and commander-in-chief of the military.
By contrast, in a parliamentary system where the often-ceremonial head of state is either a
constitutional monarch or (in the case of a parliamentary republic) an experienced and respected
figure, given some political emergency there is a good chance that even a ceremonial head of
state will be able to use emergency reserve powers to restrain a head of government acting in an
emergency extra-constitutional manner – this is only possible because the head of state and the
head of government are not the same person.[citation needed]

Ecuador presented as a case study of democratic failures over the past quarter-century. Presidents
have ignored the legislature or bypassed it altogether. One president had the National Assembly
teargassed, while another disagreed with congress until he was kidnapped by paratroopers. From
1979 through 1988, Ecuador staggered through a succession of executive–legislative
confrontations that created a near permanent crisis atmosphere in the policy. In 1984, President
León Febres Cordero tried to physically bar new Congressionally appointed supreme court
appointees from taking their seats.

In Brazil, presidents have accomplished their objectives by creating executive agencies over
which Congress had no say.[citation needed]

Dana D. Nelson, in her 2008 book Bad for Democracy,[5] sees the office of the President of the
United States as essentially undemocratic[6] and characterizes presidentialism as worship of the
president by citizens, which she believes undermines civic participation.[6]

Political gridlock

Some political scientists speak of the "failure of presidentialism" because the separation of
powers of a presidential system often creates undesirable long-term political gridlock and
instability whenever the president and the legislative majority are from different parties. This is
common because the electorate often expects more rapid results than are possible from new
policies and switches to a different party at the next election. [2] These critics, including Juan
Linz, argue that this inherent political instability can cause democracies to fail, as seen in such
cases as Brazil and Chile.[citation needed]

Lack of accountability

In such cases of gridlock, presidential systems are said by critics[who?] not to offer voters the kind
of accountability seen in parliamentary systems. It is easy for either the president or the
legislature to escape blame by shifting it to the other. Describing the United States, former
Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon said "the president blames Congress, the Congress blames
the president, and the public remains confused and disgusted with government in Washington".[7]
Years before becoming President, Woodrow Wilson (at the time, a fierce critic of the U.S.
system of government) famously wrote "how is the schoolmaster, the nation, to know which boy
needs the whipping?"[8]

An example is the increase in the federal debt of the United States that occurred during the
presidency of Republican Ronald Reagan. Arguably, the deficits were the product of a bargain
between President Reagan and the Democratic Speaker of the House of Representatives, Tip
O'Neill. O'Neill agreed to tax cuts favored by Reagan, and in exchange Reagan agreed to budgets
that did not restrain spending to his liking. In such a scenario, each side can say they are
displeased with the debt, plausibly blame the other side for the deficit, and still claim success.

Impediments to leadership change

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Another alleged problem of presidentialism is that it is often difficult to remove a president from
office early. Even if a president is "proved to be inefficient, even if he becomes unpopular, even
if his policy is unacceptable to the majority of his countrymen, he and his methods must be
endured until the moment comes for a new election".[9] John Tyler was elected vice president and
assumed the presidency because William Henry Harrison died after thirty days in office. Tyler
blocked the Whig agenda, was loathed by his nominal party, but remained firmly in control of
the executive branch. Most presidential systems provide no legal means to remove a president
simply for being unpopular or even for behaving in a manner that might be considered unethical
or immoral provided it is not illegal. This has been cited[citation needed] as the reason why many
presidential countries have experienced military coups to remove a leader who is said to have
lost his mandate.

Parliamentary systems can quickly remove unpopular leaders by a vote of no confidence, a

procedure that serves as a "pressure release valve" for political tension. Votes of no confidence
are easier to achieve in minority government situations, but even if the unpopular leader heads a
majority government, he or she is often in a less secure position than a president. Usually in
parliamentary systems a basic premise is that if a premier's popularity sustains a serious enough
blow and the premier does not as a matter of consequence offer to resign prior to the next
election, then those members of parliament who would persist in supporting the premier will be
at serious risk of losing their seats. Therefore, especially in parliaments with a strong party
system, other prominent members of the premier's party have a strong incentive to initiate a
leadership challenge in hopes of mitigating damage to their party. More often than not, a premier
facing a serious challenge resolves to save face by resigning before being formally removed—
Margaret Thatcher's relinquishing of her premiership being a prominent example.

On the other hand, while removing a president through impeachment is allowed by most
constitutions, impeachment proceedings often can be initiated only in cases where the president
has violated the constitution or broken the law. Impeachment is often made difficult; by
comparison the removal a party leader is normally governed by the (often less formal) rules of
the party. Nearly all parties (including governing parties) have a relatively simple process for
removing their leaders.

Furthermore, even when impeachment proceedings against a sitting president are successful,
whether by causing his removal from office or by compelling his resignation, the legislature
usually has little or no discretion in determining the ousted president's successor, since
presidential systems usually adhere to a rigid succession process which is enforced the same way
regardless of how a vacancy in the presidency comes about. The usual outcome of a presidency
becoming vacant is that a vice president automatically succeeds to the presidency. Vice
presidents are usually chosen by the president, whether as a running mate who elected alongside
the president or appointed by a sitting president, so that when a vice president succeeds to the
presidency it is probable that he will continue many or all the policies of the former president. A
prominent example of such an accession would be the elevation of Vice President Gerald Ford to
the U.S. Presidency after Richard Nixon agreed to resign in the face of virtually certain
impeachment and removal, a succession that took place notwithstanding the fact that Ford had
only assumed the Vice Presidency after being appointed by Nixon to replace Spiro Agnew, who
had also resigned due to scandal. In some cases, particularly when the would-be successor to a
presidency is seen by legislators as no better (or even worse) than a president they wish to see
removed, there may be a strong incentive to abstain from pursuing impeachment proceedings
even if there are legal grounds to do so.

Since prime ministers in parliamentary systems must always retain the confidence of the
legislature, in cases where a prime minister suddenly leaves office there is little point in anyone
without a reasonable prospect of gaining that legislative confidence attempting to assume the
premiership. This ensures that whenever a premiership becomes vacant (or is about to become
vacant), legislators from the premier's party will always play a key role in determining the
leader's permanent successor. In theory this could be interpreted to support an argument that a
parliamentary party ought to have the power to elect their party leader directly, and indeed, at
least historically, parliamentary system parties' leadership electoral procedures usually called for
the party's legislative caucus to fill a leadership vacancy by electing a new leader directly by and
from amongst themselves, and for the whole succession process to be completed within as short
a time frame as practical. Today, however, such a system is not commonly practiced and most
parliamentary system parties' rules provide for a leadership election in which the general
membership of the party is permitted to vote at some point in the process (either directly for the
new leader or for delegates who then elect the new leader in a convention), though in many cases
the party's legislators are allowed to exercise a disproportionate influence in the final vote.

Whenever a leadership election becomes necessary on account of a vacancy arising suddenly, an

interim leader (often informally called the interim prime minister in cases where this involves a
governing party) will be selected by the parliamentary party, usually with the stipulation or
expectation that the interim leader will not be a candidate for the permanent leadership. Some
parties, such as the British Conservative Party, employ some combination of both
aforementioned electoral processes to select a new leader. In any event, a prime minister who is
forced to leave office due to scandal or similar circumstance will usually have little if any ability
to influence his party on the final selection of a new leader and anyone seen to be having close
ties to such a prime minister will have limited if any serious prospect of being elected the new
leader. Even in cases when an outgoing prime minister is leaving office voluntarily, it is often
frowned on for an outgoing or former premier to engage in any overt attempt to influence the
election (for example, by endorsing a candidate in the leadership election), in part because a
party in the process of selecting a new leader usually has a strong incentive to foster a
competitive leadership election in order to stimulate interest and participation in the election,
which in turn encourages the sale of party memberships and support for the party in general.
Walter Bagehot criticized presidentialism because it does not allow a transfer in power in the
event of an emergency.

Under a cabinet constitution at a sudden emergency the people can choose a ruler for the
occasion. It is quite possible and even likely that he would not be ruler before the occasion. The
great qualities, the imperious will, the rapid energy, the eager nature fit for a great crisis are not
required—are impediments—in common times. A Lord Liverpool is better in everyday politics
than a Chatham—a Louis Philippe far better than a Napoleon. By the structure of the world we
want, at the sudden occurrence of a grave tempest, to change the helmsman—to replace the pilot
of the calm by the pilot of the storm.

But under a presidential government you can do nothing of the kind. The American government
calls itself a government of the supreme people; but at a quick crisis, the time when a sovereign
power is most needed, you cannot find the supreme people. You have got a congress elected for
one fixed period, going out perhaps by fixed installments, which cannot be accelerated or
retarded—you have a president chosen for a fixed period, and immovable during that period: ...
there is no elastic element ... you have bespoken your government in advance, and whether it is
what you want or not, by law you must keep it ...[10]

Opponents[who?] of the presidential system note that years later, Bagehot's observation came to life
during World War II, when Neville Chamberlain was replaced with Winston Churchill.

However, supporters of the presidential system question the validity of the point. They argue that
if presidents were not able to command some considerable level of security in their tenures, their
direct mandates would be worthless. They further counter that republics such as the United
States have successfully endured war and other crises without the need to change heads of state.
Supporters argue that presidents elected in a time of peace and prosperity have proven
themselves perfectly capable of responding effectively to a serious crisis, largely due to their
ability to make the necessary appointments to his cabinet and elsewhere in government or by
creating new positions to deal with new challenges. One prominent, recent example would be the
appointment of a Secretary of Homeland Security following the September 11 attacks in the
United States.

Some supporters of the presidential system counter that impediments to a leadership change,
being that they are little more than an unavoidable consequence of the direct mandate afforded to
a president, are thus a strength instead of a weakness in times of crisis. In such times, a prime
minister might hesitate due to the need to keep parliament's support, whereas a president can act
without fear of removal from office by those who might disapprove of his actions. Furthermore,
even if a prime minister does manage to successfully resolve a crisis (or multiple crises), that
does not guarantee and he or she will possess the political capital needed to remain in office for a
similar, future crisis. Unlike what would be possible in a presidential system, a perceived crisis
in the parliamentary system might give disgruntled backbenchers or rivals an opportunity to
launch a vexing challenge for a prime minister's leadership.

Finally, many[who?] have criticized presidential systems for their alleged slowness to respond to
their citizens' needs. Often, the checks and balances make action difficult. Walter Bagehot said
of the American system, "the executive is crippled by not getting the law it needs, and the
legislature is spoiled by having to act without responsibility: the executive becomes unfit for its
name, since it cannot execute what it decides on; the legislature is demoralized by liberty, by
taking decisions of others [and not itself] will suffer the effects".[10]

Defenders of presidential systems argue that a parliamentary system operating in a jurisdiction

with strong ethnic or sectarian tensions will tend to ignore the interests of minorities or even treat
them with contempt – the first half century of government in Northern Ireland is often cited as an
example – whereas presidential systems ensure that minority wishes and rights cannot be
disregarded, thus preventing a "tyranny of the majority" and vice versa protect the wishes and
rights of the majority from abuse by a legislature or an executive that holds a contrary viewpoint
especially when there are frequent, scheduled elections.[citation needed] On the other hand, supporters
of parliamentary systems contend that the strength and independence of the judiciary is the more
decisive factor when it comes to protection of minority rights.

British-Irish philosopher and MP Edmund Burke stated that an official should be elected based
on "his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience", and therefore should
reflect on the arguments for and against certain policies before taking positions and then act out
on what an official would believe is best in the long run for one's constituents and country as a
whole even if it means short-term backlash. Thus defenders of presidential systems hold that
sometimes what is wisest may not always be the most popular decision and vice versa.

Differences from a parliamentary system

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A number of key theoretical differences exist between a presidential and a parliamentary system:

 In a presidential system, the central principle is that the legislative and executive
branches of government are separate. This leads to the separate election of president, who
is elected to office for a fixed term, and only removable for gross misdemeanor by
impeachment and dismissal. In addition he or she does not need to choose cabinet
members commanding the support of the legislature. By contrast, in parliamentarianism,
the executive branch is led by a council of ministers, headed by a Prime Minister, who
are directly accountable to the legislature and often have their background in the
legislature (regardless of whether it is called a "parliament", an "assembly", a "diet", or a
"chamber").
 As with the president's set term of office, the legislature also exists for a set term of office
and cannot be dissolved ahead of schedule. By contrast, in parliamentary systems, the
prime minister needs to survive a vote of confidence otherwise a new election must be
called. The legislature can typically be dissolved at any stage during its life by the head
of state, usually on the advice of either Prime Minister alone, by the Prime Minister and
cabinet, or by the cabinet.
  In a presidential system, the president usually has special privileges in the enactment of
legislation, namely the possession of a power of veto over legislation of bills, in some
cases subject to the power of the legislature by weighted majority to override the veto.
The legislature and the president are thus expected to serve as checks and balances on
each other's powers.
 Presidential system presidents may also be given a great deal of constitutional authority
in the exercise of the office of Commander in Chief, a constitutional title given to most
presidents. In addition, the presidential power to receive ambassadors as head of state is
usually interpreted as giving the president broad powers to conduct foreign policy.
Though semi-presidential systems may reduce a president's power over day-to-day
government affairs, semi-presidential systems commonly give the president power over
foreign policy.

Presidential systems also have fewer ideological parties than parliamentary systems. Sometimes
in the United States, the policies preferred by the two parties have been very similar (but see also
polarization). In the 1950s, during the leadership of Lyndon B. Johnson, the Senate Democrats
included the right-most members of the chamber—Harry Byrd and Strom Thurmond, and the
left-most members—Paul Douglas and Herbert Lehman. This pattern does not prevail in Latin
American presidential democracies.

Overlapping elements

In practice, elements of both systems overlap. Though a president in a presidential system does
not have to choose a government under the legislature, the legislature may have the right to
scrutinize his or her appointments to high governmental office, with the right, on some
occasions, to block an appointment. In the United States, many appointments must be confirmed
by the Senate, although once confirmed an appointee can only be removed against the president's
will through impeachment. By contrast, though answerable to parliament, a parliamentary
system's cabinet may be able to make use of the parliamentary 'whip' (an obligation on party
members in parliament to vote with their party) to control and dominate parliament, reducing
parliament's ability to control the government.