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LITERARY CRITICISM AND CULTURAL
THEORY
OUTSTANDING DISSERTATIONS
Edited by
William E.Cain
Professor of English
Wellesley College
A ROUTLEDGE SERIES
LITERARY CRITICISM AND CULTURAL
THEORY
WILLIAM E.CAIN, General Editor
EUGENIC FANTASIES
Racial Ideology in the Literature and Popular Culture of the 1920s
Betsy L.Nies
WORD OF MOUTH
Food and Fiction after Freud
Susanne Skubal
BORDER MODERNISM
Intercultural Readings in American Literary Modernism
Christopher Schedler
OUT OF TOUCH
Skin Tropes and Identities in Woolf, Ellison, Pynchon, and Acker
Maureen F.Curtin
Borislav Knezevic
Routledge
New York & London
Published in 2003 by
Routledge
29 West 35th Street
New York, NY 10001
www.routledge-ny.com
Published in Great Britain by
Routledge
11 New Fetter Lane
London EC4P 4EE
www.routledge.co.uk
“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or
Routledge's collection of thousands of eBooks please go to
www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”
Copyright © 2003 by Taylor and FrancisBooks, Inc.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the
publisher.
Portions of Chapter Two have previously appeared in the essay “An Ethnography
of the Provincial: The Social Geography of Gentility in Elizabeth Gaskell’s
Cranford.” Victorian Studies 41:3 (Spring 1998): 405–426. Copyright 1998 Indiana
University Press.
Portions of Chapter Four have previously appeared in the essays “A Study of
Aggression: A Tale of Two Cities.” Studia Romanica et Anglica Zagrabiensia 36–37
(1991–1992): 251–270; and “Dickens and Civil Society.” Studia Romanica et Anglica
Zagrabiensia 45–46 (2000–2001): 355–372.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Knezevic, Borislav
Figures of finance capitalism : writing, class, and capital in the age of Dickens
/ Borislav Knezevic.
p. cm.—(Literary criticism and cultural theory)
Includes bibliographical references (p.) and index.
ISBN 0-415-94318-3
1. English fiction–19th century—History and criticism. 2. Capitalism and
literature—Great Britain–19th century. 3. Macaulay, Thomas Babington
Macaulay, Baron, 1800–1859–Views on capitalism. 4. Capitalists and financiers
in literature. 5. Social classes in literature. 6. Capitalism in literature.
7. Finance in literature. I. Title. II. Series
PR878.C25 K57 2003
823'.809355–dc21 2002014229
ISBN 0-203-48513-0 Master e-book ISBN
Preface xi
CHAPTER THREE The Middle Class and the Novel in W.M. Thackeray’s The
91
Newcomes
Afterword 152
Notes 157
Works Cited 182
Index 187
Preface
The great, broad, true case that our public progress is far behind our
private progress, and that we are not more remarkable for our private
wisdom and success in matters of business than we are for our public
folly and failure, I take to be as clearly established as the existence of
the sun, moon, and stars.
(Dickens’s speech at the third meeting of the Administrative
Reform Association) 1
A PATRICIAN ASCENDANCY
The old historiographic wisdom that the middle class dominated the British 19th century,
riding the joint effects of industrialization and political reform, has been subject to a
thorough reexamination since the 1970s. The old orthodoxy, up to then shared by the two
most influential schools in historiography, Marxist and liberal, has been gradually
replaced by a wide consensus that the idea of the ever-rising middle class required at the
very least another look. A new society was born in the 19th century, so went the old
Literary criticism and cultural theory 6
wisdom; that a version of the old society continued is the tenor of much of the new
historiography of Britain. The most vigorous and persuasive re-view of British history
has come from David Cannadine, who, not unimportantly, is a historian of the
aristocracy. In his studies of the British aristocracy and the British class system published
over the course of the 1990s, he offered a new interpretation of British history designed
to accommodate an explanation for the per sistence of a hierarchically-based culture of
class so proverbially associated with Britain. As my choice of phrase here already
suggests, Cannadine’s perspective was not entirely new. Among the more recent
historians, it was Arno Mayer’s The Persistence of the Old Regime that insisted on the
inadequacy of the old narrative of industrialization and the rise of the middle class in the
19th century, by arguing that European aristocratic elites clung to power well into the 20th
century. In Britain, at least since Tom Nairn in the 1970s, historians began to claim that
historical evidence does not authenticate the old narrative of the ever-rising middle class.
It would therefore be scarcely fair to credit Cannadine with a historiographic Copernican
revolution. What Cannadine did do is clearly understand that such a revolution has
already taken place, and that now an inventory has to be taken of its methodological and
ideological consequences, and principally, of the changing position of the notion of class
in historiographic discourse. Undaunted by the old ideological debates in British
historiography that were heavily suffused with the idea of reading history through highly
abstract notions of class, Cannadine understands his own work as an attempt to read the
various articulations of class positions and ideologies as yet another thing to be
historicized.
The most important casualty of the new historiographic perspective is the simple view
of the 19th century as a radical break with an older power system and a massive
reorganization into a new social order. Importantly enough, the question of novelty
versus continuation weighed heavily on the minds of Victorians themselves. One of the
central protagonists of my study, Charles Dickens, famously wanted to believe that
British society was changing, but he also often spoke and wrote in great frustration that it
was not, as the speech to the Administrative Reform Association in 1855 clearly
illustrates. Supremely irritated by the undiminished power of the patrician elite, Dickens
presented in Little Dorrit, published around the same time, his most direct renunciation of
British political society. The novel’s satire centered on the Circumlocution Office, a
thinly disguised allusion to the British civil service, staffed and controlled by the
patrician elite. Little Dorrit betrayed impatience not only with patrician bureaucracy, but
also with the inability of the middle classes to achieve a distinct identity in opposition to
patrician rule. The main political question in the Dickens’s novel is not a political
question of representation; it would take a very careful reader to demonstrate that the
extension of franchise, let alone the question of universal franchise, even appears as an
issue on the political horizon of this novel. What Dickens set out to do was to educate his
readership, which I am conventionally calling here middle-class, into a sentiment of
primarily civil self-respect and independence; and to wean them from patrician influence.
True enough, Dickens was in the main careful to speak of his audiences using the
sufficiently vague term of “people,” which evoked a sense of opposition to the elite, but
did not mean the population at large. Nevertheless, even beyond the vague and almost
feudal binarism of Dickens’s rhetoric (aristocracy/people), Little Dorrit makes the
Introduction 7
language of class a problem as it attempts to grapple with a failure of middle-class
identity formation. And conversely, part of the appeal of Dickens’s novels lies in that
very undefined space of class formation, where fantasies of class mobility are as possible
as fantasies of new class identities. Such fantasies are offered as models of reform action
in civil society. As we shall later see.
How can one best describe that class system that irritated Dickens so much? According
to David Cannadine, when speaking of class Victorians utilized three models of social
description, the most pervasive being the model of hierarchy. The binary model and the
triadic model were used less often. The model of hierarchy describes society as “a
carefully graded order of rank and dignity,” the triadic model “place[s] people in discrete
collective groups [defined more by] wealth and occupation and [gives] particular
attention to the bourgeoisie;” and the binary model of social description “emphasize[s]
the adversarial nature of the social order by drawing one great divide on the basis of
culture, style of life, or politics.” 4 While at several points during the Victorian period the
language of binary or triadic differentiation seemed to enjoy rhetorical ascendancy,
Cannadine argues, the reality was that a hierarchical view of society persisted as the main
model of social description, and provided the main discursive terms in which different
social groups defined their social identity.
Cannadine’s models are certainly not exclusive to British society in the 19th century;
they have a much wider historical and geographic incidence. Nor are they mutually
exclusive; over the last three hundred years of British history, Cannadine maintains, they
could regularly be seen competing with one another as part of real political and social
struggles. The important question here is this: what is the historical reality that gave
prominence to and maintained the rhetoric of hierarchy? And since the hierarchy model is
inexplicable without reference to the persistence of the patrician elite that anchored it, the
above question is in turn connected with another one: how did it happen that the
ascendancy of a patrician elite continued well into the 19th century?
A perspective offered by Cannadine in an earlier book was that the “upper class” in
Great Britain remained powerful throughout much of the 19th century (until the third
Reform Bill which for Cannadine marked the beginning of the end of the “patrician
polity”), 5 because it thoroughly refashioned itself in the period from roughly the 1780s
to the 1820s. This refashioning was a resultant of a series of changes: “territori al
amalgamation” and “internationalization” which gave rise to an increasingly
homogeneous British (as opposed to English, Scottish, Welsh, and Irish) upper class; a
renewed vigor in the creation, hierarchization, and pageantry of the titled orders; a
growing monopoly of the upper classes in politics, civil service, diplomacy, and the state
apparatus in general; creation of “a more rational, more efficient, more capitalist
agriculture;” indirect and often direct involvement of the landed elite in the burgeoning
industrialization. The upshot of this process of refashioning of the patrician class, indeed
of “the making of the upper class,” was at least twofold. On the one hand, the new,
refurbished elite managed to continue in the governing position during the time of the
industrial revolution and the corresponding strengthening of the middle classes that
pushed for more political influence. On the other hand, the elite managed not only to
reinvent itself as a dominant group, but also to perpetuate the very terms in which
society, social relations, and especially relations of dominance were perceived—the terms
Literary criticism and cultural theory 8
of hierarchy (as opposed to other possible markers of distinction such as wealth, property,
industry, labor, etc). On this view, even the Reform Act of 1832 cannot be seen as a great
landmark in class relations, and certainly not a landmark in changing the parameters of
social description. In the long perspective, the Act was important in that it inaugurated
the era of gradual extensions of the franchise that would continue over the next hundred
years, a very slow pace indeed. But it did not have the immediate consequence of
empowering the middle class(es) at the expense of the patrician elite; if anything, the
aftermath of the Act showed that greater political representation did not necessarily
translate into greater political power for the middle classes, just as the 1867 or 1884 Acts
did not immediately result in greater political power for the working classes. For many
Victorians the promise of political change was so slow that by the 1850s the frustration
we find in Dickens was a cultural commonplace.
Cannadine’s analysis takes into account the rise of the language of class in the 19th
century, but he is also very careful to distinguish it from the language of the rise of class:
“if the middle class arose as anything during those years [the early 19th century], it was
largely as a new rhetorical formation.” 6 The very term “middle class” only emerged at
the end of the 18th century, succeeding but not entirely superseding the older appellations
such as “middle ranks” and “middle orders,” and its use, according to Cannadine,
intensified in the years leading up to the First Reform Bill. While certain social groups
identified more readily with the term than others, it would be wrong to assume that
middle-class identity was a discursive reflection of an objective social reality. Rather, it is
much more useful to see it as a rhetorical construct that sought to impose a sense of class
interest and sentiment on an otherwise rather diverse seg ment of society. That the term
middle classes was equally commonly used in the Victorian period testifies to the fact
that even the triadic model (upper, middle, lower or aristocracy, middle class, working
class) often appeared in a hybrid triadic/hierarchical form. 7 In fact, much of Victorian
literature participated in that project of making—rhetorically—a single middle class, and
Dickens in particular invested both his civic activism and his writing with the discontent
that there was no unified middle class where he wanted to see one.
However, in order to understand the success of the patrician elite in the 19th century
and Dickens’s anxieties about the failure of the middle class, we must move in ever wider
circles of historical context. If traditional power, albeit refashioned, had such a way of
asserting itself over the course of the 19th century, then part of the reason for its
ascendancy must lie in the character of the political and social process in which this
power was couched and exercised. No less than a constitutional perspective needs to be
brought to bear on this question—what was it that allowed the patrician elite to not only
keep reinventing itself, but also to impose on the rest of society its own idea of the British
polity? In The Break-up of Britain (1977), Tom Nairn argued that the settlement of the
Glorious Revolution of 1688 set the course of British history for the next couple of
centuries. The Revolution created and institutionalized a culture of compromise between
the landed aristocracy and the middle class, one of the results of which was that political
modernization in Britain ended up on a slower track than on the continent, where
representative democracies were emerging through revolutionary transformation, that is,
presumably through a clean break with the old regime.
Tom Nairn wrote his book on the break-up of Britain in the 1970s, spirited by both a
Introduction 9
neo-nationalist and a neo-Marxist opposition to the structure of the British state. Twenty-
five years later, his expectation that before long the British state was going to undergo a
constitutional change, possibly to the point of break-up, has a peculiar resonance. The
British state is now being reformed, though the ultimate outcomes of that reform process
are still not in sight. Certainly, Nairn’s expectations from the 1970s were not quite
accommodated by the gradualist devolution espoused by Tony Blair nor by the
transnational context supplied by the European Union, itself an unfinished process that
will most likely continue to have an impact on the future evolution of national identities
and polities in the British isles. But there still is validity to Nairn’s overall analysis of the
historical character of the British polity over the last three hundred years, and it lies
primarily in his assumption that the British polity developed a form of state substantially
different from continental polities. The British revolutionary era, which lasted from the
1640s to 1688, produced the British state; the second revolutionary era, unfolding from
1776 to 1815, suggests Nairn, gave birth to modem constitutionalism, in imitation of the
British example. The British state was “the first state-form of an industrialized
nation” (14), but its peculiarity was that it remained a “transitional” one, characterized by
a form of government that was “patrician as well as representative” (19). This transitional
state, forged by the settlement of 1688, inaugurated the idea and the era of representative
democracy, but it never fully implemented that idea. It retained significant trappings of
the pre-modern state, including a hereditary house (which is only now being dismantled
by the government of Tony Blair).
Another aspect of the British state-form that was not repeated by postrevolutionary
continental situations has to do with the relationship between civil society and the state:
in Britain, “one social class was the State […] one part of civil society wholly dominated
‘the state’ and lent it, permanently, a character different from its rivals” (25). This class
monopolizing the personnel of the state was the territorial aristocracy (which was, let us
not forget, well-versed in agrarian capitalism, unlike continental aristocracies). This class
was not a rigid, exclusive club, but a “co-optive elite,” absorbing certain elements of the
middle classes. After 1688, Nairn claims, the elite established a state-form that eventually
“turned into ‘the nightwatchman state’ of the Industrial Revolution, and presided over the
most dramatic initial phase of world industrialization” (26). Unlike the continental state-
form, with its insistence on formality and impersonality of the political process, the
British was a “low-profile” state. It cultivated a climate of informality and personal
domination in civil and political life—the boundary between civil and political societies
in Britain was soft and loose, allowing for easy patrician access to government and
administration, and the political process favored the agency of dominating personalities.
At the same time, this state was marked by an “absence of a strong, centralized state
armature” (27), underscoring the low-maintenance image of the whole constitutional
arrangement. This state, which Nairn occasionally calls “patrician” and occasionally
“crypto-bourgeois,” was supported by a particular “constitution of civil society
itself” (27), in which patrician influence remained strong.
Nairn locates the defining element of post-1688 British civil society in the “upper-class
compromise.” Cooperation between the landed aristocracy and the middle class in
avoiding political modernization was first cemented in the realm of civil society. The
interests common to the two classes had to do with the expansion and defense of the
Literary criticism and cultural theory 10
empire, which supplied the patricians with administrative jobs and the middle classes
with an international political framework for the laissez-faire economy; economic
homogeneity between the two classes, with a sort of capitalist agriculture emerging in the
late 17th century (an agrarian revolution preparing some of the ground for the subsequent
industrial revolution); and a joint stance against the industrial working class emerging
with the industrial revolution as a social force seeking political representation, which
strengthened the reasons for a political alliance of the upper classes in the political realm
and reinforced the cautiousness and gradualness in reforming the political-institutional
infrastructure of the country. 8 In this perspective, the history of the relationship between
the patrician elites and the middle class(es) in Britain is less one of grudgingly accepted
compromise, than of convenient cooperation. While there were frictions between these
two classes and their various segments, Nairn argues that the compromise was such that it
“furnished sufficient homogeneity among the upper strata for mutual adjustments to be
possible, and for the question of power never to be made too acute.” 9
While in The Break-up of Britain Nairn did not examine in great detail the role of the
British constitution in supporting that homogeneity, he made the important point that the
unique character of the British state—and the British constitution as the legislative
infrastructure of that state—is indispensable to any discussion of the “upper-class
compromise.” Nairn rightly argues that the patrician elite exercised power, and combined
its civil and political identities, in a manner that was both very personal and informal. It
almost goes without saying that the very informality was possible due to some very
formal attributes of the British constitution. Due to its decentered existence as a series of
acts enacted and modified over many centuries through complicated negotiations between
forces of tradition and forces of innovation, the British constitution is of course a
notoriously complicated concept to fix in discourse. But that complicated legal entity had
always involved quite uncomplicated and quite conspicuous modes of securing patrician
privilege and creating the framework of law and custom that ensured that the state
remained, formally and informally, a preserve of the landed elite throughout the 18th and
19th centuries (and of other elites, some would argue, in the 20th century).
Interconnectedness among the upper classes, the parliament, the government, the
administration, the Anglican Church, the ancient universities, and the military had been
for a long time a central part of that intricate arrangement of law that made up the British
constitution. It is only slowly and with a great legislative reluctance that disabilities were
lifted against Catholics and Jews over the course of the 19th century, granting them full
privileges of political citizenship—to name a few cases of formal inaccessibility of the
state apparatus on the grounds of religion. One should consult Cannadine’s Aspects of
Aristocracy for more complete information on the formal exclusiveness of the British
state in class terms, and in particular on the class make-up of the personnel of
government.
Of course, the upper-class compromise of which Nairn spoke goes beyond the purely
constitutional context. Therein lies precisely one of the driving questions of new British
historiography—trying to explain why even after the various religious emancipations and
franchise extensions the patrician elite at mid-19th century continued to dominate the
state apparatus, including the legislature, the government, the civil service, the diplomatic
service, the military, and the Anglican church (which remained an established, that is,
Introduction 11
state religion). Regardless of whether this domination was facilitated by a lack of middle-
class political ambition or through patrician familiarity with the mechanisms of power, or
both, it is certain that it was supported by the complicated constitutional informality of
the British state, which defined its constitution in terms of privilege, not of right. If
Nairn’s diagnosis of “informality” carries explanatory weight, it is because of this
constitutional privileging of privilege. As any reading of Dickens’s Circumlocution
Office satire will show, Dickens did not merely denounce the incompetence of a patrician
bureaucracy; what fueled his frustration was the formal armature of the British state that
facilitated patrician informality in the exercise of power.
Nairn’s analysis raised a fundamental question about the way we imagine the
operations of capitalism in British history. It is easy to confuse the commonplace of
England as the “first industrial nation” with the idea that it was also a nation in which
industrialization was the foremost force of social formation. In contrast to what was once
a conventional wisdom, Nairn argued that the English class compromise had entailed “the
containment of capitalism within a patrician hegemony, which never, either then or since,
actively favored the aggressive development of capitalism or the general conversion of
society to the latter’s values or interests.” 10 In other words, not only did not capitalism in
Britain form a political structure suited to its own purposes, but the very opposite
happened: the structure of British political hegemony created a form of capitalism suited
to its own purposes.
A somewhat similar view can be found in the work of P.J.Cain and A.G.Hopkins,
whose recent history of British imperialism was written in the like spirit of reappraising
the forces and agents that shaped British history in the last three centuries. Seeking to
explain the economic context of British imperialism, Cain and Hopkins have argued that
“the metropolitan economy” needs to be at the “center of the analysis” (5). In the process
of examining that economy, they de-emphasize (but profess not to minimize) the
significance of industrial capitalism, and focus instead on service-sector capitalism, for
the understanding of whose role they “lay stress on the concept of gentility and its
relation to economic activ ity and political authority” (4). Starting their analysis with the
revolution of 1688, Cain and Hopkins follow the development of a gentlemanly order,
born out of co-operation between the landed elite and service-sector capitalists, the latter
primarily composed of City financiers and merchants. Without explicitly referring to
Arno Mayer’s book, Cain and Hopkins seek to demonstrate that the “gentlemanly order”
presiding over British capitalism from 1688 to deep into the 19th century, was not a
continuation of the old regime; rather, the regime inaugurated by 1688 was substantially a
new order, much of whose “innovative character stemmed from the financial revolution it
helped to sponsor.” This resulted in “the creation of a new form of capitalism headed by
improving landlords in association with improving financiers who served as their junior
partners.” 11 The emphasis on the historical newness of the gentlemanly order is indeed
helpful in allowing for a distinction to be made between the persisting forms of feudal-
absolutist states on the continent and the British state-form. This eliminates some of the
problems of Mayer’s approach, which came close to conflating the two developments
under the category of old regime. By seeing the post-1688 British regime as distinct and
new, one can also better appreciate its ability to act as an agile power regime and to
opportunely keep reshaping itself under pressures of new social developments such as
Literary criticism and cultural theory 12
industrialization while still preserving an elitist position and composition.
That the change of 1688 revolved around a substantially new position of finance
capitalism, as Cain and Hopkins suggest, is by no means a novel argument. A modern
proponent of it is P.G.M.Dickson, who placed the discussion of financial developments in
the center of the study of the revolution of 1688. 12 A Victorian who had arrived at pretty
much the same conclusion much before Dickson was T.B.Macaulay. In his History of
England, Macaulay argued that the establishment of the Bank of England and the creation
of national debt created a dynamic of mutual dependence of finance capital from the City,
economic growth, imperial expansion and interest in political stability. But if Cain and
Hopkins’s interpretation of 1688 is not new, they gave a new name to what they saw as
the specifically British type of capitalist economy arising from the 1688–“gentlemanly
capitalism.” In addition, trying to explain the British empire through metropolitan
contexts, they also produced a more complete understanding of how the metropolitan
polity itself was to a large extent arranged the way it was arranged because of imperial
concerns. The empire, whether it be the “formal” or the “informal” empire under British
domination in the 19th century, created the playing field for service-sector capitalism
which is at the center of Cain and Hopkins’s analysis.
The temporally long and geographically expansive perspective assumed in their
analysis allows them to argue that the history of Britain during the British Empire
requires a discussion of the continuity of the governing elite, its ability to reinvent itself
over the period of three centuries. This is of course similar to the positions taken by Nairn
and Cannadine; what Cain and Hopkins bring into focus more than the other two
historians is the smoothness of transition from the patrician regime as it existed at the
close of the 17th century to the gentlemanly governing elite in Britain at the beginning of
the 20th century, an elite that was no longer exclusively patrician but that certainly was
not merely bourgeois, and that definitely did not represent the triumph of industrial
capital. The very term gentlemanly capitalism comfortably embraces the fact that the
patrician caste managing the revolution of 1688 was already composed of genteel
capitalists (in fact, capitalist landowners), and that the revolutionary settlement could not
have been possible without the supporting role of newly arisen finance capitalism.
Equally comfortably does this term embrace the fact that by the end of the 19th century
service-sector capitalism was the most important and most dynamic part of the British
economy. Of course, the constitution of the gentlemanly elite changed over time: by “the
late nineteenth century, […] the amalgamation had taken place and the landed interest,
once the senior partner, had come to lean heavily on money made in the service sector,
especially in the City of London. The nineteenth-century gentleman was therefore a
compromise between the needs of the landed interest whose power was in decline and the
aspirations of the rising service sector” (33).
Thus, while the term “gentlemanly capitalism” does not make visible the actual
evolution of the gentlemanly elite—its many editions and internal gradations and
distinctions that shaped up and disintegrated over the centuries—it does emphasize the
continuity between elites at different points in British history after 1688. This continuity
in turn had to do with reproduction of a specific “gentlemanly” attitude towards both
governance and wealth. As in the case of the gentlemanly prototype, the medieval knight,
the idea of gentleman came to be associated with “adher[ing] to a code of honour which
Introduction 13
placed duty before self-advancement” (23). The making of a gentleman, while requiring
support in the form of wealth, was not constituted by wealth alone; in fact, “[a]
gentleman required income, and preferably sizeable wealth, but he was not to be sullied
by the acquisitive process any more than he was to be corrupted by the power which
leadership entailed” (23). The duties of governance were accepted as a responsibility not
to be compromised by hunger for wealth and power. It is of course one of the
commonplaces of Victorian studies to point to Victorian revivals of chivalric
medievalism in literature, architecture, and art. The Victorian fascination with the
medieval world of chivalry, Cain and Hopkins point out, went hand-in-hand with an
unyielding emphasis in public schools and in the ancient universities of Oxford and
Cambridge on classical studies—both forms of retro-culture worked to reinforce the
ideological formation of “an elite cadre dedicated to the service of the state” (31).
Under the gentlemanly regime of distinction, not all kinds of wealth were equally
valued: aristocratic status ranked as the most prestigious manner of possessing wealth,
which often came with a “contempt for the everyday world of wealth creation and of the
profit motive as the chief goal of activity” (24). In course of the evolution of gentility
over the centuries, other classes affected such contempt, including service-sector
capitalists, higher clergy, commissioned officers, and the learned professions. One of the
corollaries of the casual attitude towards acquisition of wealth, but also towards
performance of work, claim Cain and Hopkins drawing on Jonathan Powis’s study
Aristocracy, was the genteel penchant for the cult of the amateur in every kind of political
or social activity. Finally, part of the reason for the historical success of the gentlemanly
ideology is that, as Cain and Hopkins point out, “the English gentleman was made as well
as born” (22). Certainly, any history of the genesis of gentlemanly culture and ideology
would have to account for the fact that the “gentlemanly” had always been meant as more
inclusive than “noble” or “aristocratic” (already Chaucer’s tales offer telling evidence of
the difference)—a concept with a built-in space for further inclusivity. The concept of
gentility proved flexible enough to allow for gradual expansion and co-optation over
centuries, even as it remained subject to the sanction of the elite (genteel status was
ultimately a matter of perception by the social groups already secure in their possession
of it).
While Cain and Hopkins offer of necessity a sketchy attempt to discuss the genealogy
and ideology of gentility, the brunt of their argument is that the “gentlemanly” ideology
established itself as a crucial factor in the overall development of British capitalism.
Since the normative aristocratic model of wealth acquisition boasted no visible
connection with the world of work, under this system of prestige the forms of acquisition
that involved a greater degree of invisibility were seen as more eligible for co-optation
into the elite than the forms that involved a direct connec-tion to production. A literary
example, among a myriad, in evidence: one of Dickens’s arch-scoundrels, Mr Rigaud in
Little Dorrit, defines himself as “not so much a man of business, as what the world calls
(arbitrarily) a gentleman” (399). While Rigaud’s statement is a reminder that gentlemanly
status is an uncertain affair that requires in-group sanction, it also suggests that the idea
of gentility presupposes a distance from the visible and striving production of wealth. In
the 19th century, the model of coming into wealth associated with territorial aristocracy
continued to serve as the norm, so that an indirect and inconspicuous relation to the
Literary criticism and cultural theory 14
creation of wealth certainly facilitated the ideological incorporation of first finance
capital and then commercial capital into the governing elite. By now numerous studies
have been done on the co-optation of different segments of the middle classes into the
patrician elite; typically, such co-optation involved an emulation of the lifestyle of the
aristocracy—middle-class magnates typically aspired to purchase a broad-acred estate in
the country, as well as to achieve ennoblement, i.e. official conferral of patrician status.
Both the emulation and the ennoblement were significantly sooner and much more often
accessible to service-sector capitalists, especially financiers, and much more rarely, and
much later, to industrialists. 13 Cain and Hopkins show that the manner in which the
ranks of the gentlemanly elite were replenished has to be read side by side with the ascent
of service-sector capitalism in the British economy and the relegation of manufacturing
capitalism to a subordinate role. A related development, British loss of the leading role in
industrialization in the second half of the 19th century, cannot be fully explained without
reference to the persistence of the ideology of gentility.
Charles Dickens, without the benefit of hindsight that we have, often mused in
frustration that technological modernization in Britain was not accompanied by political
modernization, and even predicted that the British technological edge would soon be lost.
That Dickens (among others) became preoccupied with such uneven speeds of
modernization is one of the reasons why the mid-Victorian period merits special
attention. As Dickens clearly saw in the 1850s, the terrific transformative potential of
industrialization was stymied by the structure of British civil and political societies.
Retroactively, historians have come to refer to the mid-Victorian period as the age of
equipoise, implying some sort of a historical truce during which the level of social
conflict ebbed in the face of economic growth and social cooperation.
It is opportune at this point to remember that industrialization in Britain was a world-
first experience, and therefore in some measure a learning process. Eric Hobsbawm
divided British industrialization into two phases, the first one based on textile industry
(1780–1840), and the second one on coal and iron (1840–1895). By the time the second
phase began to unfold, Hobsbawm argues, industrialists were no longer unfamiliar with
the rules of the industrial game. In the early, pioneering years of industrialization
manufacturing capitalists sought to create profits by long working hours and low wages,
but already by the 1840s they began to realize that shorter working hours and higher
wages did not mean decrease in productivity. Factory legislation, such as the Ten Hours
Act of 1847 sped up such processes, but it did not initiate them—they were already being
set in motion by the northern industrialists who became known as “New Model”
employers. Certainly this does not explain fully the reasons for the relative social peace
between industrial workers and manufacturing capitalists in the 1850s, but it does help
put in perspective the tremendous novelty and the terrible human cost of the early years
of industrialization, and offset those years by the subsequent improvements in the
condition of the working class. The fact remains that by 1850 the condition of England,
of which Thomas Carlyle wrote, was in the public eye no longer as dramatically tied to
the condition of the working class, of which Friedrich Engels wrote. On the other hand,
the achievements of industrial capitalism opened up new ways of perceiving the
condition of the country within a narrative of modernization. As Hobsbawm put it, “the
railway became a sort of synonym for ultra-modernity in the 1840,” 14 and many a
Introduction 15
Victorian writer marveled at the social consequences of the railway boom. In 1851, the
Great Exhibition was staged in London, and this spectacle of unprecedented proportions
projected to Britons as well as the world an image of British industrial superiority. But if
at the outset of the 1850s technological innovation seemed to provide a uniquely British
promise of social progress, it also could not help but foreground the anachronism of other
aspects of British society.
It is in this gap between the possibilities and failures of modernization that much of
Dickens’s writerly ethos resided. At the beginning of the 1850s Dickens started
Household Words, a miscellany in which he often ran editorials exposing and
condemning the obsolescence of British political society, and summoning wishfully the
power of the steam engine to dispel it. Dickens’s most concentrated novelistic critique of
British political society was presented in Little Dorrit, one of the first modern critiques of
state bureaucracy (admittedly, we could say after Nairn that the bureaucracy itself was a
“transitional one). In the Circumlocution Office Dickens created the image of a state
apparatus whose defining principle was “how not to do it,” 15 meaning how to avoid
taking care of public business—and “all the business of the country went through [it].” 16
The obscure and absurd inefficiency of the Office conveys a recognizably Dickensian
topos of labyrinthine wastefulness of British institutions (akin to the later portrait of the
Chancery in Bleak House). The Office is mainly staffed with members of an aristocratic
family, the Barnacles, who “were dispersed all over the public offices, and held all sorts
of public places.” 17 Indeed, of the Barnacles there are “shoals.” Irresistible colonization
of the state apparatus by the Barnacles is accompanied by their attitude of casual
entitlement towards the business of government. An advocate of meritocracy, Dickens
was a keen critic of aristocratic entitlement, the culture of informality, and the cult of the
amateur that informed the British civil service at mid-century. One of the corollaries to
Little Dorrit in Household Words was a 1856 article published under the title “Nobody,”
a scathing attack on the posture of unaccountability assumed by the patrician civil
servant. 18
However, Dickens did not portray the Barnacles’ attitude towards government as a
mere habit, a leftover from an older order of things, but as a matter of political choice and
expediency. A junior Barnacle in the Circumlocution Office “fully understood the
department to be a politico-diplomatic hocus-pocus piece of machinery for the assistance
of the nobs in keeping off the snobs.” 19 Dickens barely had a class war in mind: the
Barnacles use the armature of government not so much in a power struggle as in a
jockeying for compromises with the “snobs.” What is left unsaid, but is nevertheless
strongly assumed, is that the “snobs” cannot be entirely kept off; rather, they are
gradually and selectively brought into the fold of the governing elite. That indeed is the
premise underwriting the story of Merdle the banker, whose position in the City of
London also ensures him “Society” connections, and whose finance capital is needed for
the support of the gentlemanly governing elite and its regime of power. Another form of
middle-class failure in the novel is William Dorrit’s pursuit of a genteel lifestyle. It takes
two to reproduce this particular regime of power—the novel condemns, in its
melodramatic way, what it perceives as middle-class collusion with the patrician political
culture. A Barnacle member of the Circumlocution Office is described as “altogether
splendid, massive, overpowering, and impracticable” 20 —while there is an obvious
Literary criticism and cultural theory 16
exasperation here with the indifference and ceremonious inefficiency of British political
society, there is also a sense that it is hard to imagine for this order of things to change—
the latter clearly coinciding with Dickens’s view that the middle class lacks enthusiasm
for attempting political reform. Middle-class sub-servience in the contemporary field of
power was all the more lamentable to Dickens because he felt that one of the results of
the persistence of the patrician elite is devaluation of precisely the social achievements
and attitudes associated with the middle class. For instance, the indifference of the
patrician bureaucracy forces the industrial inventor Doyle to peddle his inventions
abroad—a distinctly Dickensian proposition that Britain is losing its position of world
leader in new technology and industrialization. For Dickens, the failure of political
modernization (or the absence of administrative reform) also led to economic failure.
What needs to be stressed here is that in lamenting the slowdown in British political and
social modernization Little Dorrit is not merely an indictment of the political society in
Britain, but also of its civil society—inasmuch as Dickens held that the British middle
class failed to build an effective civil society in opposition to the patrician political
monopoly.
Another remarkable contemporary critique of British civil society that I want to bring
into focus came from W.M.Thackeray, who in fact popularized the term snob that
Dickens was to use later in Little Dorrit In The Book of Snobs, a satirical piece published
serially in Punch in 1846–47, Thackeray gave the term snob its modern meaning. The
work amounts to an exercise—albeit a satirical one—in class ethnography. Asserting that
“Snobs are to be studied like other objects of Natural Science,” 21 Thackeray summoned
the image of a systematic discourse of social analysis. The idea of ethnography (or
ethnology as it was known at the time to disciplinary pioneers like J.C.Pritchard) was in
its disciplinary cradle at the time; the founders of ethnology saw the discipline as a
branch of natural science, aspiring to both the perceived methodological solidity and the
prestige that natural science was beginning to enjoy in this age of scientific and
technological progress. Disciplinary ethnography started out as a way of interpreting
accounts of unfamiliar cultures in other parts of the globe, very often in the imperial
realm. But some areas of the domestic social world were increasingly becoming opaque,
necessitating some form of systematic exploration and explanation, so that a
protoethnographic idea of putting presumably unfamiliar domestic cultures on record
informed a good deal of contemporary discourse, literary and otherwise. For instance,
another Punch contributor, Henry Mayhew, started publishing his own form of class
ethnography of the London poor a few years after Thackeray’s catalog of the snobs of
England. An ethnographic design was built into the premise (again a satirical one) of
Pickwick Papers, Dickens’s novel that ushered in a new novelistic era. Another novelistic
form of ethnography followed with the industrial novel: the novelists such as Disraeli and
Gaskell offered detailed descriptions of (their perception of) the working-class way of
life. Such novelistic documentarism was meant to record and explain the ways of a part
of the national culture presumably unfamiliar to the implied readership of such works
(the middle- and upper-class audiences), and it participated in creating an image of the
culture of the working class and the urban poor in ways similar to the government-
commissioned reports such as Chadwick’s Sanitary Report and the journalism of amateur
documentarists like Henry Mayhew. To use Cannadine’s terminology, the Victorian
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THE BLUE GROSS " No," said the other priest; " reason is
always reasonable, even in the last limbo, in the lost bor derland of
things. I know that people charge the Church with lowering reason,
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himself is bound by reason. ': The other priest raised his austere
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uni verse ? ' "Only infinite physically," said the little priest, turning
sharply in his seat, ; not infinite in the sense of escaping from the
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only to listen to the metaphysical gossip of two mild old parsons. In
his impatience he lost the equally elaborate answer of the tall cleric,
and when he listened again it was again Father Brown who was
speaking : " Reason and justice grip the remotest and the loneliest
star. Look at those stars. Don't they look as if they were single
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THE BLUE GROSS the first time there was another note in
his voice beside his triumph. "Well, it was like this," said the little
priest, speaking in the same unaffected way. "I went back to that
sweet-shop and asked if I'd left a parcel, and gave them a particular
address if it turned up. Well, I knew I hadn't; but when I went away
again I did. So, instead of running after me with that valuable
parcel, they have sent it flying to a friend of mine in Westminster."
Then he added rather sadly : ' I learnt that, too, from a poor fellow
in Hartlepool. He used to do it with handbags he stole at railway
stations, but he's in a monastery now. Oh, one gets to know, you
know," he added, rubbing his head again with the same sort of
desperate apology. " We can't help being priests. People come and
tell us these things." Flambeau tore a brown-paper parcel out of his
inner pocket and rent it in pieces. There was nothing but paper and
sticks of lead inside it. He sprang to his feet with a gigantic gesture,
and cried : * I don't believe you. I don't believe a bumpkin like you
could manage all that. I believe you've still got the stuff on you, and
if you don't give it up — why, we're all alone, and I'll take it by force
! " 'No," said Father Brown simply, and stood up also, ' you won't
take it by force. First, because 29
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