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 Another Random Document on
Scribd Without Any Related Topics
pursuit of the enemy. The major contacted the
company commander by radio and told him to collar
his troops. The reply was, "Sir, I can't stop
them...." Neither could the enemy.(217)
The men of 3/26 stormed the hill, swarmed over
the crest, and killed anyone who stood in their
way. At 1428, the objective was secured and the
men signaled their victory in traditional Marine
Corps fashion, as Colonel Meyers later described:

On Sunday, 14 April (Easter), I helicoptered

to 881S and with Captain Bill Dabney, Company
Commander of I/3/26, personally watched the U.
S. Colors (which had been fortuitously carried
in a squad leader's pack) hoisted again over
881N. This was the signal (visual) that
Lieutenant Colonel John Studt's assault had
been completed. I watched the jungle utility-
clad Marine "shinny-up" a shrapnel torn tree
whose limbs had been sheared from the intensive
prep fires, and affix the Stars and Stripes.
(218)

With the enemy either dead or gone, the hill

again lost its value. Terrain wasn't so important
in the fluid Vietnam war, but people were and, in
that respect, Lieutenant Colonel Studt's men had
completed a very successful operation--106 North
Vietnamese were dead. In addition to the enemy
dead on the objective, air strikes and artillery
fire had completely blanketed three large groups
of NVA fleeing from the hill but because of the
dense vegetation and the approaching darkness, no
bodies were recovered. Two slightly shot-up North
Vietnamese, one of them an officer, were captured
and flown back to Khe Sanh in Colonel Meyers'
helicopter. Considering the strength of the enemy
defenses, Marine casualties were surprisingly
light--6 killed and 19 medevaced. Lieutenant
Colonel Studt stated: "... stand off plastering
with supporting arms ... prior to each assault was
the key factor here."(219)
That night the battalion commander and his
operations officer stood at the gate on 881S and
slapped the men on the back as they trooped back
into the perimeter. One Marine, a tall, lanky,
slow-talking Kentuckian, held out a captured rifle
for Lieutenant Colonel Studt's inspection--it was
filthy. During the attack, the Marine had come
face to face with the owner; both men raised their
rifles simultaneously and pulled the trigger but
only the M-16 barked out--the enemy's rifle
jammed. The survivor's explanation was simply, "I
cleaned my weapon last night, he didn't."(220)
The next morning at 0800, PCV terminated
PEGASUS. The operation was very successful and all
objectives were achieved; Route 9 was open, the
enemy had been routed, and the base itself was
relieved. The North Vietnamese had lost another
1,304 killed and 21 captured, while 41 U. S. Army
troops, 51 Marines, and 33 South Vietnamese died.
Air support again had played an important role.
There were 45 B-52 Arc Light strikes and 1,625
tactical sorties conducted during PEGASUS. Of the
latter number, 650 sorties were flown by Marines,
463 by the U. S. Air Force, 436 by carrier-based
Task Force 77, and 77 by the U. S. Army and VNAF.
From 31 March to 8 April, U. S. Air Force C-130
and C-123 aircraft delivered 843 tons of supplies
to Khe Sanh by paradrop and the low altitude
extraction system. On 9 April, the strip was
reopened to C-130s and the supply level at the
KSCB began to grow large enough so that the 1st
ACD could draw from the 26th Marines stockpile.
(221)
With the termination of PEGASUS, the 3d Marine
Division again assumed responsibility of the Khe
Sanh area. Task Force GLICK, comprised of the 26th
Marines, the 1st Marines, and the 2d Brigade(-),
1st ACD, launched Operation SCOTLAND II at 0801,
15 April. The 26th Marines, however, did not
remain in the operation very long. Three days
later, the new commanding officer and two of his
battalions were transferred to Quang Tri Base and,
for the men who had taken 77 days of the best the
NVA could offer, the defense of Khe Sanh was over.
[74](222)

FOOTNOTES:

[70] It was around this time that PCV

was formed and General Abrams departed I
Corps. General Rosson then became a key
figure in the planning of the operation.
[71] Although the rifle companies
encountered only slight resistance
during the assault, the Company A
command group, while advancing toward
the objective, took a direct hit from an
enemy mortar. The Air Officer, Captain
Walter C. Jones, III was killed as was
one radio operator; the battalion
Operations Officer, Major Ted R.
Henderson, was seriously wounded and
evacuated. The Battalion Commander,
Lieutenant Colonel Cahill and his
Artillery Officer, First Lieutenant John
K. LeBlond, Jr. were also wounded at
that time but were able to continue.
[72] In addition to the Marine killed
during the attack, nine were killed by
enemy shelling the night before. A total
of 57 Marines were medevaced.
[73] The 325C NVA Division had long
since departed the area and left the
304th to continue pressure on the 26th
Marines. Some elements of the 304th
swung to the north of the base and
replaced units of the 325C.
[74] The 2d Battalion, 26th Marines did
not return to Quang Tri with the
regiment but was transferred to the
operational control of the 4th Marines
at Camp Carroll. General Tompkins saw to
it that each man who returned from Khe
Sanh immediately received a hot shower,
a clean uniform, and a big steak dinner.
As an added touch, the 3d Marine
Division band was on hand, and greeted
each arrival with a stirring rendition
of the "Marines Hymn."
 PART IX EPILOGUE
On 23 May 1968, several members of the 26th
Marines who had fought at Khe Sanh had a reunion
of sorts in Washington, D. C. and the surroundings
were a far cry from the dirt and grime of the
combat base. The "CP" belonged to the President of
the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson. In the
Cabinet Room of the White House, the Commander in
Chief paused to honor the men of the 26th Marines
and awarded the Presidential Unit Citation to the
regiment. Colonel Lownds, whose large handle-bar
mustache had been shaved off at the direction of
"the highest possible authority"--his wife, and
Sergeant Major Agrippa W. Smith, senior enlisted
man at the KSCB, were on hand to receive the
award. While it was fitting that the 26th Marines
be cited as a unit, the President also praised the
South Vietnamese, U. S. Army, U. S. Navy, U. S.
Air Force, and Marine aviation and support units
which contributed so gallantly to the defense of
the installation.(223)
In some quarters, however, there were still
grumblings over the Khe Sanh issue. During the
siege, there had been a virtual storm of protest
from critics who opposed the Administration's
decision to hold the base. These doomsday prophets
suffered from what some military experts referred
to as the "Dien Bien Phu Syndrome." Many noted
intellectuals were in the van of this group and
throughout the battle they could not be convinced
that air and artillery support would provide the
margin of difference; they warned that the tiny
base would suffer the same fate which had been
meted out to the French garrison 14 years earlier.
(224)

During the presentation of the Presidential Unit Citation to

the 26th Marines, President Lyndon B. Johnson (C)
congratulates Sergeant Major Agrippa W. Smith (L) while
Colonel David E. Lownds (R) looks on.
There are several reasons why Khe Sanh did not
become another Dien Bien Phu. The first and most
obvious being that the Americans possessed the
overwhelming supporting arms which were not
available to the French. Contrary to the
predictions of many critics, air and artillery
were decisive and more than made up for the
numerical superiority of the enemy. Over 100,000
tons of bombs and 150,000 artillery rounds were
delivered--and delivered intelligently--by the
Americans during the siege. Much of the credit
goes to the regimental commander and his staff who
knew how to coordinate their different sources of
firepower to achieve maximum results. The NVA
learned this during the five major attacks against
the base and hill outposts.
The ability to keep Khe Sanh resupplied was
another major factor. The NVA encirclement did not
coincide with the monsoon season by accident. With
Route 9 interdicted, the fate of the garrison
hinged on the success or failure of the airlift
and apparently the North Vietnamese anticipated
that it would fail. The fact that the airlift was
successful in the face of heavy enemy fire and the
foulest weather imaginable is indeed a tribute to
the aircrews and recovery personnel but the
resupply effort went much deeper than just
delivering the goods. The Force Logistics Command
at Da Nang augmented by U. S. Army sources at Cam
Ranh Bay was responsible for the mountain of
supplies and material which sustained the 26th
Marines. An excerpt from the works of Winston
Churchill which was selected as the motto of the
Force Logistics Command best describes the vital
role these logistics agencies played: "Victory is
the beautiful colored flower. Supply is the stem
without which it could never have blossomed."(225)
Another important facet of the defense was the
close supervision and leadership provided by the
senior commanders, namely CG, 3d MarDiv, CG, III
MAF, and ComUSMACV. Since much of the supporting
arms and all of the logistical support was handled
by agencies external to the 26th Marines, constant
coordination among these three headquarters was
imperative. General Tompkins was the pivotal
figure of the triumvirate. During his daily trips
to the base, the general learned first hand what
the regimental commander needed; he not only saw
that Colonel Lownds received adequate support but
he insured that the defenders made the most of
their resources. In so doing he exposed himself to
heavy enemy antiaircraft, artillery, and mortar
fire as did General Cushman during his periodic
visits to Khe Sanh. Commenting on the strong role
played by the 3d Marine Division commander,
General Cushman later said, "General Tompkins made
or approved every major decision during the
battle."(226)
The real hero of Khe Sanh, however, was on the
opposite end of the rank scale--the individual
fighting man. For 77 days the defenders waited in
the trenchlines while the bulk of the credit and
publicity went to the artillery, fighter/bombers,
and B-52s. On several occasions the supporting
arms could not prevent major enemy assaults from
reaching the wire; at this point, it was the
Marines or ARVN Rangers, armed with rifles,
grenades, and bayonets, who stopped the North
Vietnamese--often in bitter hand-to-hand combat.
Without exception, the battalion commanders were
lavish in their praise of the young Americans and
South Vietnamese who held the perimeter and denied
the enemy a much-needed victory. In spite of the
inherent hardships which accompanied the siege and
the incessant shelling, the defenders were always
itching for a fight. The most overused expression
during the battle was, "I wish they (North
Vietnamese) would hurry up and come so we can get
this thing over with." When asked by a reporter if
the NVA troops could take Khe Sanh, one officer
answered, "Hell no, those 19-year-old Marines
won't let them."[75](227)
Finally, much of the credit for the American
success at Khe Sanh belongs to the NVA. The North
Vietnamese obliged the 26th Marines by standing
toe to toe in a slugging contest during which they
were outgunned and outfought; in effect, the enemy
destroyed himself. If there was one salient
feature which resulted in the enemy's defeat it
might well be his rigid adherence to a siege
strategy in the face of certain failure. Even when
it became obvious that the Americans were aware of
their master plan, the North Vietnamese doggedly
pursued their siege tactics without alteration.
The extremely lucrative target presented by the
massed NVA forces which ringed the base was one of
the main reasons the garrison was maintained.
Thus, the question may be legitimately asked, "Who
besieged whom?"(228)
To a lesser degree, there was a controversy
over who or what had won the battle. Proponents of
air power and strategic bombing were the most
vocal; they felt that the B-52 had been the most
decisive instrument of defense. While the
Stratofortress was a valuable asset and, without
doubt played a major role, any attempt to single
out one supporting arm as the ultimate weapon in
the battle would be futile. The B-52 was but one
part of an intricate defensive fire plan. The
bombers struck targets beyond 1,100 meters of the
base; tactical air and artillery took up the slack
to within about 250 meters and the organic
weaponry of the defenders provided close-in fires.
The system was balanced and effective but, if any
part were eliminated, the defenders would have
paid a much higher price in casualties. Both
General Tompkins and Colonel Lownds were
unstinting in their praise of all supporting arms,
as well as the logistical effort; they stressed,
and stressed heavily, that the defense of Khe Sanh
was a joint endeavor. The highly successful
results were achieved through the contributions of
all U. S. Services and the South Vietnamese. While
the Marines had been unable to find an infantryman
who could carry a 27-ton payload, neither had the
U. S. Air Force come up with a B-52 which could
man a foxhole. Both, in their own way, were
essential.(229)
The Khe Sanh story again became news in late
June 1968 and the old controversy over strategy
was rekindled. Prior to leaving his post as
ComUSMACV on 11 June, General Westmoreland visited
PCV Headquarters in I Corps and approved the
recommendations of Generals Cushman and Rosson to
raze the KSCB and withdraw all Allied forces to
the Ca Lu area. While General Westmoreland made
the decision prior to his departure, he did not
close the base at that time, because mopping-up
operations were being conducted around Khe Sanh.
In addition, large amounts of supplies had been
stockpiled there and the general deemed it more
economical to maintain the base while these stocks
were consumed in support of the operations rather
than backhaul them to Ca Lu. For these reasons, he
left the choice concerning the optimum time to
dismantle the installation up to his successor,
General Abrams. When bulldozers finally began to
level the bunkers and structures which had housed
the 26th Marines throughout the siege, the
American people wondered why the base had been so
tenaciously defended if it was to be eventually
abandoned. Had American blood been shed in vain?
Critics of the hold-out policy argued that, in the
final analysis, they had been right and those who
decided to defend the base had been wrong. Such
rationale pinpointed the inability of many
Americans to break away from the techniques
employed in past wars and recognize the
peculiarities of the conflict in Vietnam.
There were several reasons for the deactivation
of the KSCB since, for all practical purposes, the
base had outlived its usefulness. The rationale
endorsed by General Cushman and General Rosson was
threefold. First, the enemy had reduced his forces
and changed his modus operandi in the Khe Sanh
area. Secondly, the NVA artillery in Laos had
accurately targeted the base and access road which
compounded the casualty and resupply problems.
Finally and most important, General Cushman had
sufficient assets in June to pursue the mobile
offensive strategy which he had advocated strongly
for such a long time. Two U. S. Army divisions
(i.e. 1st ACD and the 101st Airborne) with their
inherent helicopter resources had been shifted to
III MAF and, during March and April, the
tremendous logistics burden associated with the
introduction of these 50,000 men into northern I
Corps had been alleviated. Since he had sufficient
maneuver elements to go on the offense in western
Quang Tri Province, General Cushman no longer
needed five battalions buttoned up in Khe Sanh.
(230)
An additional consideration for the abandonment
of the base was President Johnson's announcement
on 31 March that the U. S. would end air strikes
in North Vietnam.[76] While the decision was a
major step toward peace, it also enabled thousands
of NVA support personnel who were responsible for
road repair in North Vietnam to move further
south. These workers constructed a network of
infiltration arteries which bypassed the combat
base and the continued policy of positioning
static Allied defense installations in the path of
these routes would have been inefficient and
undesirable. In this regard, the best defense was
a highly mobile offense and while a forward
operating base for such operations was essential,
the LZ Stud/Ca Lu area was much better suited than
Khe Sanh.(231)
By the time PEGASUS was over, LZ Stud was in
full operation. The airstrip was extended to
accommodate C-123s, a Force Logistics Area was
established, and local defenses were strengthened.
The base was outside the range of the North
Vietnamese 130mm and 152mm guns in Laos and the
stretch of Route 9 from Ca Lu to the Rockpile and
eventually Dong Ha was easier to keep open. Thus,
two factors--enemy shelling and resupply problems-
-which had negated the effectiveness of Khe Sanh
as a base of operations were absent at LZ Stud.
While not physically located on the Khe Sanh
Plateau, the forces at LZ Stud controlled it. Two
forward fire bases were established in the
vicinity of the old combat base from which
extensive patrolling was conducted. Ground patrols
were supplemented by air surveillance. Whenever
contact with the enemy was made, lighting-fast
helicopter assaults were launched from LZ Stud and
were supported by the artillery of the forward
fire bases, tactical aircraft, and Huey gunships.
The enemy was attacked by these mobile forces
whenever and wherever he appeared. When a major
NVA unit was encountered, sufficient
reinforcements were also injected by helicopter.
So, the only thing that changed on the Khe Sanh
Plateau, besides the face of the combat base, was
the style and tempo of operations.(232)
The new strategy by no means diminished the
accomplishments of the men who had held Khe Sanh;
it was simply a continuation of the battle in
another form. When the leaders in Hanoi finally
accepted President Johnson's peace overtures and
consented to meet with U. S. representatives in
Paris, there was one thing that the North
Vietnamese negotiators did not possess--the battle
standard of the 26th Marines. An editorial in the
Washington Star provided an appropriate tribute to
the men of Khe Sanh:

To be sure, Khe Sanh will be a subject of

controversy for a long time, but this much
about it is indisputable: It has won a large
place in the history of the Vietnam war as an
inspiring example of American and Allied valor.
One day, in fact, the victory over the siege
may be judged a decisive turning point that
finally convinced the enemy he could not win.
(233)

FOOTNOTES:

[75] Many of these young men exhibited a

maturity beyond their years. One
message, scrawled on the back of a C-
ration carton by an anonymous Marine,
was found after the siege. It read:
"Life has a special flavor to those who
fight for it that the sheltered never
know."
[76] The attacks were halted except in
the area north of the demilitarized zone
where the continuing enemy buildup
directly threatened Allied forward
positions and where the movements of
their troops and supplies clearly
related to that threat.
 APPENDIX A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES AND FOOTNOTES
Explanatory Note: Unless otherwise noted the
material in this monograph is derived from Admiral
Ulysses S. G. Sharp, USN, and General William C.
Westmoreland, USA, Report On The War In Vietnam,
hereafter Sharp and Westmoreland, Report On The
War; Maj John J. Cahill, USMC, and Jack Shulimson,
"History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in
Vietnam, Jan-Jun65"; FMFPac, Operations of U. S.
Marine Forces Vietnam, Mar67-Apr68, hereafter
FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam; FMFPac, U. S.
Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam Mar65-Sep67
Historical Summary, Volume I: Narrative, hereafter
FMFPac HistSum; III MAF Command Chronologies
Apr67-Apr68, hereafter III MAF CmdChron; 3d Marine
Division Command Chronologies, Apr67-Apr68,
hereafter 3d MarDiv CmdChron; 1st Marine Aircraft
Wing Command Chronologies, Apr67-Apr68, hereafter
1st MAW CmdChron; 26th Marines Command
Chronologies, Apr67-Apr68, hereafter 26th Marines
CmdChron; 1/26 Command Chronologies, Apr67-Apr68,
hereafter 1/26 CmdChron; 2/26 Command
Chronologies, Jan68-Apr68, hereafter 2/26
CmdChron; 3/26 Command Chronologies, Jun67-Apr68,
hereafter 3/26 CmdChron; 3d Marines Khe Sanh
Operations After Action Report, 9Jun67, hereafter
3d Marines Khe Sanh AAR; VMGR-152 Command
Chronologies Jan68-Apr68, hereafter VMGR-152
CmdChron; Marine Corps Command Center, Status of
Forces, Apr68, hereafter MCCC Status of Forces;
Defense Intelligence Bulletins Dec67-Apr68,
hereafter DIA IntBul; Six Month Evaluation Report,
prepared by HQ, MACV 31May68; Presentation of
LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., USMC, in 1968
General Officers Symposium Book, HQMC, dtd
15Jul68; CG, FMFPac msg to CMC dtd 200327Z Mar68;
Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation
PEGASUS (C), hereafter PEGASUS AAR; Gen William C.
Westmoreland ltr to CMC dtd 14Dec68, Subj: Review
of the draft manuscript "The Battle of Khe Sanh
Apr67-Apr68," hereafter Westmoreland Comments;
LtGen Lewis W. Walt Interviews with HistBr dtd
17Dec67 and 14Jan69; LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr.,
USMC, ltr to Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3,
HQMC, dtd 26Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh,
Apr67-Apr68," hereafter Cushman Comments; LtGen
Herman Nickerson, USMC, memo to Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-3, HQMC, dtd Dec68, Subj: Review of draft
manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh Apr67-Apr68,"
hereafter Nickerson Comments; LtGen William B.
Rosson, USA, ltr to CMC dtd 18Dec68, Subj: "The
Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter Rosson
Comments; LtGen John J. Tolson, III, USA, ltr to
CMC dtd 21Jan69, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh,"
hereafter Tolson Comments; MajGen Norman J.
Anderson, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC,
dtd 2Jan69, Subj: Khe Sanh Historical Monograph,
hereafter Anderson Comments; MajGen Louis Metzger,
USMC, memo to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, HQMC,
dtd 23Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-
Apr68," hereafter Metzger Comments; MajGen John R.
Chaisson comments on draft manuscript, "The Battle
of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter Chaisson
Comments; Interview with MajGen Rathvon McC.
Tompkins, USMC, dtd 26Aug68 No. 3088 (Oral History
Collection, HistBr, HQMC), hereafter Tompkins
Interview; Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) comments on
draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh," dtd
9Dec68, hereafter DCS/Air Comments; BGen Robert P.
Keller, USMC, ltr to Deputy Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 17Dec68, Subj: "The
Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter Keller Comments;
BGen Harry C. Olson, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3
Division, HQMC, dtd 13Jan69, Subj. "The Battle of
Khe Sanh," hereafter Olson Comments; BGen Carl W.
Hoffman, USMC, ltr to CMC (Code AO3D) dtd 22Dec68,
Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter Hoffman
Comments; Chief, USAF Historical Division Liaison
Office ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd
18Dec68, Subj: Review of Historical Study, "The
Battle of Khe Sanh"; Chief, Historical Studies
Branch, USAF Historical Division ltr to HistBr, G-
3 Division, HQMC, dtd 22Jan69, Subj: Review of
Historical Study, "The Battle of Khe Sanh"; Chief,
Project CORONA HARVEST ltr to HistBr, G-3
Division, HQMC, dtd 15Jan69, Subj: Review of Draft
Manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter
Air Force Historical Comments; Interview with Col
David E. Lownds, USMC, dtd Jul68, No. 801 674/4
(Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC), hereafter
Lownds Jul Interview; Col David E. Lownds, USMC,
Interview with HistBr dtd 13Sep68, hereafter
Lownds Sep Interview; Col Frank E. Wilson, USMC,
ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 6Jan69,
Subj: Review of "The Battle of Khe Sanh,"
hereafter Wilson Comments; Col Bruce F. Meyers,
USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd
16Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh" hereafter
Meyers Comments; Interview with Col Franklin N.
Pippin, USMC, dtd 24Jun68, No. 2907 (Oral History
Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Interview with Col
Johnnie C. Vance, Jr., USMC, dtd 20Jun68, No. 2909
(Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Col
Robert D. Brown, USAF, ltr to HQMC (AO3D) dtd
8Jan69, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh" hereafter
Brown Comments; Col Robert E. Brofft, USAF, ltr to
HQMC (AO3D) dtd 8Jan69, Subj: Monograph, "The
Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter Brofft Comments;
LtCol John F. Mitchell, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3
Division, HQMC, dtd 31Jan69, Subj: Comments on
"The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter Mitchell
Comments; LtCol Harry L. Alderman, USMC, ltr to
HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, Subj: "The Battle of
Khe Sanh" hereafter Alderman Comments; LtCol James
B. Wilkinson, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division,
HQMC, dtd Dec68, Subj: Response to HQMC ltr AO3D-
rem S807 373 of 6Dec68, "The Battle of Khe Sanh,"
hereafter Wilkinson Comments; LtCol John A.
Hennelly, USMC, comments on draft manuscript, "The
Battle of Khe Sanh" of 15Feb69, hereafter Hennelly
Comments; Interview with LtCol Edward J. A.
Castagna, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History
Collection, HistBr, HQMC); LtCol Francis J. Heath,
Jr., USMC, comments on draft manuscript, "The
Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter Heath
Comments; LtCol Frederick J. McEwan, USMC, ltr to
HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 30Dec68, Subj:
Comments on "The Battle of Khe Sanh Apr67-Apr68,"
hereafter McEwan Comments; LtCol Johnny O.
Gregerson, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC dtd
3Jan69, Subj: Review of a draft copy of the
historical monograph: "The Battle of Khe Sanh,
Apr67-Apr68," hereafter Gregerson Comments; LtCol
John C. Studt, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC dtd
24Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh"
manuscript, hereafter Studt Comments; Interview
with LtCol Harry T. Hagaman, USMC, dtd 2Mar68, No.
2548 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC);
LtCol William J. White, USMC, comments on draft
manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68"
n.d., hereafter White Comments; Interview with Maj
William J. Sullivan, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621
(Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Maj John
A. Shepherd, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division,
HQMC, dtd 2Jan69, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh,
Apr67-Apr68" hereafter Shepherd Comments; Taped
comments of Maj Matthew P. Caulfield, USMC, on the
draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-
Apr68" dtd 2Jan69, hereafter Caulfield Comments;
Interview with Maj Matthew P. Caulfield, USMC, dtd
10Feb68, No. 2535 (Oral History Collection,
HistBr, HQMC); Maj Wayne M. Wills, USMC, ltr to
HistBr, G-3, HQMC, dtd 2Jan69, Subj: Historical
Monograph, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68,"
hereafter Wills Comments; Maj Harper L. Bohr,
USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC, dtd 18Dec68, Subj:
Comments concerning "The Battle of Khe Sanh"
hereafter Bohr Comments; Maj Jerry E. Hudson,
USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC, dtd 2Jan69, Subj:
Review of Historical Monograph of Khe Sanh,
hereafter Hudson Comments; Maj Mirza M. Baig,
USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC dtd
23Dec68, Subj: Comments on draft manuscript, "The
Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" hereafter Baig
Comments; Maj William H. Dabney, USMC, comments on
draft manuscript n.d., "The Battle of Khe Sanh,
Apr67-Apr68" hereafter Dabney Comments; Maj
William H. Dabney, USMC, Interview with HistBr dtd
10Jan69; Maj Earl G. Breeding, USMC, comments on
draft manuscript dtd 22Dec68, "The Battle of Khe
Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter Breeding Comments;
Interview with Capt Earl G. Breeding, dtd Jul68,
No. 2121 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC);
Maj Kenneth W. Pipes, USMC ltr to HistBr, G-3
Division, HQMC, n.d., Subj: Khe Sanh Manuscript,
hereafter Pipes Comments; Interview with Capt
Kenneth W. Pipes, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral
History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); 1stLt James M.
Alexander, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division,
HQMC, n.d., Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-
Apr68" hereafter Alexander Comments; Interview
with 1stLt James M. Alexander, USMC, dtd 26Apr68,
No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC);
Interview with 1stLt William L. Everhart, USMC,
dtd 10Feb68, No. 2535 (Oral History Collection,
HistBr, HQMC); Interview with Sgt Timothy B.
Keady, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History
Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Interview with HM3
Frank V. Calzia, USN, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral
History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); LCpl Michael A.
Barry, USMC, Interview with HistBr dtd 17Feb69;
Cornelius D. Sullivan, et al., The Vietnam War:
Its Conduct and Higher Direction (Washington, D.
C.: The Center For Strategic Studies, Georgetown
University, 1968) (U), hereafter Sullivan, et al.,
The Vietnam War; Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-
Nams (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965 ed.)
(U); Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., USMC, Soldiers
of the Sea (Annapolis: United States Naval
Institute 1962 ed.) (U); Capt Ken Kashiwahara,
USAF, "Lifeline to Khe Sanh," The Airman, v. XII,
no. 7 (Jul68) (U), hereafter Kashiwahara,
"Lifeline to Khe Sanh"; Washington Star, 25May68,
p. 13 (Early Bird) (U); Washington Star, 9Jun68,
p. 1-E (Early Bird); Baltimore Sun, 25May68, p. 2
(Early Bird) (U). All documentary material cited
is located in the HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC and,
unless otherwise noted, carries an overall
classification of Secret.

FOOTNOTES:

(1) Major John J. Cahill, USMC and Jack

Shulimson, "History of U. S. Marine
Corps Operations in Vietnam, Jan-Jun65,"
pp. 67, 68, 126 (S).
(2)FMFPac, Marine Opns in Vietnam,
Jun67, pp. 5-12 (S).
(3)Ibid.
(4)3d MarDiv CmdChron, Oct68, p. 11 (S).
(5)FMFPac, Marine Opns in Vietnam,
Mar67, p. 15 (S).
(6)3d Marines Khe Sanh AAR, p. 7 (S);
Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger 1965 ed.), p.
3.
(7)Westmoreland Comments.
(8)3d Marines, Khe Sanh AAR, p. 12 (S).
(9)Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt
Interview with Historical Branch dtd
17Dec68 and 14Jan69 (S).
(10)3d Marines, Khe Sanh AAR, pp, 7-30
(S).
(11)Ibid.
(12)Ibid., pp. 32-33 (S).
(13)FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam,
May67, p. 11 (S).
(14)Ibid., pp. 7-10, 19 (S).
(15)FMFPac HistSum, pp. 7-17 (S).
(16)FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam,
Jul67, pp. 9-13 (S).
(17)Ibid.
(18)FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam,
Sep67, pp. 52-73 (S); 3d MarDiv
ComdChron, Sep67, p. 25 (S); Chaisson
Comments; Personal observations of the
author.
(19)Westmoreland Comments; Metzger
Comments.
(20)FMFPac, Marine Opns in Vietnam,
Oct67, pp. 24-36 (S).
(21)Metzger Comments.
(22)26th Marines CmdChron, May67, p. 4
(S).
(23)Ibid.
(24)26th Marines CmdChron, Jun67, p. 4
(S).
(25)Ibid., Jul67, p. 4 (S).
(26)Col Lownds tape No. 801 674/4 (S);
26th Marines CmdChron, Aug67, p. 4 (S);
Metzger Comments.
(27)Wilkinson Comments.
(28)Col Lownds Tape No. 801 674/4 (S);
26th Marines CmdChron, Aug67, p. 4 (S),
Brown Comments.
(29)26th Marines CmdChron, Nov67, p. 4
(S).
(30)Cushman Comments; Hoffman Comments.
(31)26th Marines CmdChron, Dec67, p. 4
(S).
(32)Alderman Comments.
(33)Bohr Comments.
(34)Hudson Comments.
(35)FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam, Jan
68, pp. 8, 9; III MAF CmdChron, Jan and
Feb68 (S); 26th Marines CmdChron, Feb68,
p. 60 (S); Lownds Sep Interview (S).
(36)Lownds Sep Interview (S); 3/26
CmdChron, Jan68, p. 10 (S); Caulfield
Comments.
(37)Lownds Sep Interview (S); 26th
Marines CmdChron, Jan68, p. 4 (S).
(38)3/26 CmdChron, Jan68, p. 3 (S).
(39)2/26 CmdChron, Jan68, p. 2 (S).
(40)Ibid.; Breeding Comments; Caulfield
Comments.
(41)26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68, pp. 3,
4 (S); Lownds Sep Interview (S).
(42)FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam,
Jan68, p. 10 (S).
(43)26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68, pp. 3,
4 (S); 3/26 CmdChron, Jan68, p. 3 (S);
Alderman Comments; Dabney Comments;
Caulfield Comments.
(44)Ibid.]
(45)Dabney Comments.
(46)Ibid.; 26th CmdChron, Jan68, pp. 3,
4 (S); 3/26 CmdChron, Jan68, p. 3 (S);
Alderman Comments; Dabney Comments.
(47)Ibid.
(48)Cushman Comments; Tompkins Interview
(S); Lownds Sep Interview (S); Wilkinson
Comments; Pipes Comments; 26th Marines
CmdChron, Jan68, p. 5 (S).
(49)Caulfield Comments.]
(50)Alderman Comments.
(51)Caulfield Comments.
(52) Ibid.
(53)3/26 CmdChron, Jan 68, p. 3 (S);
Caulfield Comments.
(54)Lownds Sep Interview (S); Interview
with Major Matthew P. Caulfield, USMC
dtd 10Feb68, No. 2535 (Oral History
Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); Caulfield
Comments.
(55)Dabney Comments; Caulfield Comments.
(56)Ibid.; 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68,
p. 4 (S); Lownds Sep Interview; White
Comments.
(57)Pipes Comments.
(58)Wilkinson Comments.
(59)26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68, p. 4
(S); Hudson Comments.
(60)Interview with First Lieutenant
William L. Everhart, dtd 10Feb68 No.
2535 (Oral History Collection, HistBr,
HQMC) (S); Hennelly Comments.
(61)26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68, p. 9
(S); FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam,
Jan68, p. 11 (S); Tompkins Interview
(S); Hudson Comments.
(62)Lownds Sep Interview (S).
(63)26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68, p. 9
(S).
(64)Cushman Comments.
(65)Ibid.; Westmoreland Comments.
(66)Westmoreland Comments.
(67)Ibid.; Sharp and Westmoreland,
Report on The War, p. 163.
(68)26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68, pp. 4,
11 (S); Lownds Sep Interview (S).
(69)Lownds Sep Interview (S); Baig
Comments.
(70)Wilkinson Comments.
(71)26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68, p. 4
(S); Lownds Sep Interview; Wilkinson
Comments.
(72)26th Marines CmdChron, Jan68, pp. 3,
4 (S); III MAF CmdChron, Jan68, pp. 3-10
(S).
(73)Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on
The War, p. 158.
(74)Presentation of Lieutenant General
Robert E. Cushman, Jr., USMC, in 1968
General Officers Symposium Book, dtd
15Jul68 (S).
(75)Sullivan, et al., The Vietnam War,
pp. 101-104.
(76)Ibid., Sharp and Westmoreland,
Report on The War, p. 235.
(77)Ibid.
(78)Sullivan, et al., The Vietnam War,
p. 99.
(79)Ibid.
(80)Lownds Jul Interview (S).
(81)Ibid.
(82)Ibid.; CG FMFPac msg to CMC, dtd
200327Z Mar68 (S).
(83)Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews (S).
(84)Dabney Comments.
(85)Ibid.
(86)Ibid.
(87)Ibid.; Caulfield Comments.
(88)Dabney Comments.
(89)Lownds Jul Interview (S).
(90)Mitchell Comments.
(91)Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews (S);
Tompkins Interview (S).
(92)Ibid.; Mitchell Comments.
(93)26th Marines CmdChron, Feb68, p. 8
(S); Interview with Captain Earl G.
Breeding, USMC, dtd Jul68, No. 2121
(Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC)
(S): Breeding Comments.
(94)Ibid.
(95)Ibid.
(96)Ibid.; Dabney Comments.
(97)Ibid.
(98)White Comments.
(99)26th Marines CmdChron, Feb68, pp. 8-
10 (S); Tompkins Interview (S).
(100)Ibid.; Lownds Jul Interview (S);
Hennelly Comments.
(101)Hennelly Comments.
(102)Hudson Comments.
(103)Wilkinson Comments.
(104)Lownds Sep Interview; Caulfield
Comments.
(105)Anderson Comments.
(106)Westmoreland Comments; White
Comments; 26th Marines CmdChron, Feb68,
pp. 4-8 (S).
(107)DIA IntBul.
(108)26th Marines CmdChron, Feb68, pp.
8, 48 (S); Mitchell Comments.
(109)Ibid.
(110)Lance Corporal Michael A. Barry
Interview with HistBr, dtd 17Feb69.
(111)Ibid.
(112)26th Marines CmdChron, Feb68, pp.
8, 48, 49 (S); Mitchell Comments.
(113)26th Marines CmdChron, Feb68, p. 49
(S).
(114)Ibid., p. 51 (S).
(115)Air Force Historical Comments; 1st
MAW CmdChron, Feb68, p. 8 (S).
(116)Wilkinson Comments; White Comments.
(117)26th Marines CmdChron, Feb68, p. 51
(S); Kashiwahara, "Lifeline to Khe
Sanh".
(118)Ibid.; Lownds Sep Interview (S).
(119)VMGR-152 CmdChron, Feb68, p. 4 (S);
Gregerson Comments.
(120)Kashiwahara, "Lifeline to Khe
Sanh"; Meyers Comments; Brown Comments;
Air Force Historical Comments.
(121)Ibid.; Lownds Jul Interview (S).
(122)Ibid.
(123)Information provided by the Marine
Corps Command Center on 19Feb68.
(124)Ibid.
(125)1st MAW CmdChron, Jan, Feb, Mar68
(S); Wilson Comments.
(126)Ibid.
(127)Dabney Comments.
(128)Ibid.
(129)Wilson Comments.
(130)DCS/Air Comments.
(131)Breeding Comments.
(132)See 1st MAW CmdChron, Jan, Feb,
Mar68 (S); CG FMFPac msg to CMC dtd
200327Z Mar68 (S).
(133) Wilkinson Comments.
(134)CG FMFPac Msg to CMC dtd 200327Z
Mar68 (S); Lownds Jul Interview (S).
(135)See 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan,
Feb, and Mar68 (S).
(136)Lownds Sep Interview (S).
(137)26th Marines CmdChron, Jan, Feb,
and Mar68 (S); Lownds Sep Interview;
Interview with Major William J.
Sullivan, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621
(Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC)
(S); Hennelly Comments; Gregerson
Comments; Air Force Historical Comments.
(138)1st MAW CmdChron, Jan and Feb68
(S).
(139)Ibid., Debrief Sheets (S).
(140)Dabney Comments.
(141)1st MAW CmdChron, Feb 68, p. 2-2
(S); Pipes Comments.
(142)Interview with Lieutenant Colonel
Harry T. Hagaman, USMC, dtd 2Mar68, No.
2548 (Oral History Collection, HistBr,
HQMC) (C).
(143)Information supplied by U. S. Air
Force Public Information Office, 16Oct68
(U); Chaisson Comments; Air Force
Historical Comments; Brofft Comments.
(144)Tompkins Interview (S).
(145)Ibid.; Lownds Sep Interview (S);
Kashiwahara, "Lifeline to Khe Sanh."
(146)Air Force Historical Comments; 26th
Marines CmdChron, Jan, Feb and Mar68
(S); Tompkins Interview; Baig Comments.
(147)Gregerson Comments.
(148)Lownds Jul Interview (S); Interview
with Major William J. Sullivan, USMC,
dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History
Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); Gregerson
Comments.
(149)Lownds Sep Interview (S); Interview
with First Lieutenant James M.
Alexander, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621
(Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC)
(S); Hennelly Comments.
(150)Interview with Major William J.
Sullivan, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621
(Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC)
(S); Interview with First Lieutenant
James M. Alexander, USMC, dtd 26Apr68,
No. 2621 (Oral History Collection,
HistBr, HQMC) (S); 26th Marines
CmdChron, Jan, Feb and Mar 68 (S);
Gregerson Comments.
(151)Ibid.
(152)Ibid.
(153)Lownds Interview; Hennelly
Comments.
(154)Hennelly Comments.
(155)Baig Comments.
(156)Hennelly Comments.
(157)Ibid.; 26th Marines CmdChron, Jan,
Feb and Mar68 (S); Baig Comments.
(158)Ibid.
(159)Baig Comments.
(160)Ibid.
(161)Ibid.
(162)Ibid.; Interview with Lieutenant
Colonel Edward J. A. Castagna, USMC, dtd
Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History
Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); Colonel
Robert D. Heinl, Jr., USMC, Soldiers of
the Sea (Annapolis: United States Naval
Institute 1962 ed.) p. 563.
(163)Baig Comments.
(164)Six Month Evaluation Report, HQ
USMACV, 31May68 (S); Interview with
Colonel Franklin N. Pippin, USMC, dtd
24Jun68, No. 2907 (Oral History
Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S).
(165)1/26 CmdChron, Jan and Feb68 (S);
CG FMFPac msg to CMC dtd 200327Z Mar68
(S); Information provided by Research,
Development, and Study Division, HQMC,
8Nov68 (U); Lownds Jul Interview (S).
(166)26th Marines CmdChron, Jan and
Feb68 (S); Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews
(S).
(167)26th Marines CmdChron, Jan, Feb and
Mar68 (S).
(168)Dabney Comments.
(169)Ibid.
(170)Lownds Sep Interview (S); Interview
with Sergeant Timothy B. Keady, USMC,
dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History
Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S).
(171)Baltimore Sun, 25 May, p. 2 (Early
Bird) (U).
(172)Interview with First Lieutenant
James M. Alexander, USMC, dtd 26Apr68,
No. 2621 (Oral History Collection,
HistBr, HQMC) (S); Interview with Major
William J. Sullivan, USMC, dtd 26Apr68,
No. 2621 (Oral History Collection,
HistBr, HQMC) (S); Interview with
Colonel Johnnie C. Vance, Jr., USMC, dtd
20Jun68, No. 2909 (Oral History
Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); Interview
with Major John A. Shepherd, USMC, dtd
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