Jacques Lacan and Education A Critical Introduction 1st Edition Donyell L. Roseboro Download
Jacques Lacan and Education A Critical Introduction 1st Edition Donyell L. Roseboro Download
https://ebookname.com/product/jacques-lacan-and-education-a-
critical-introduction-1st-edition-donyell-l-roseboro/
Get the full ebook with Bonus Features for a Better Reading Experience on ebookname.com
Instant digital products (PDF, ePub, MOBI) available
Download now and explore formats that suit you...
https://ebookname.com/product/ecrits-a-selection-1st-edition-
jacques-lacan/
https://ebookname.com/product/jacques-lacan-an-annotated-
bibliography-vol-i-1st-edition-various/
https://ebookname.com/product/ecrits-the-first-complete-edition-
in-english-jacques-lacan/
https://ebookname.com/product/changing-welfare-states-1st-
edition-anton-hemerijck/
Ferrets for Dummies 2nd ed Edition Kim Schilling
https://ebookname.com/product/ferrets-for-dummies-2nd-ed-edition-
kim-schilling/
https://ebookname.com/product/the-image-of-the-artist-in-archaic-
and-classical-greece-art-poetry-and-subjectivity-1st-edition-guy-
hedreen/
https://ebookname.com/product/bridge-basics-1-an-introduction-
audrey-grant/
https://ebookname.com/product/twelfth-night-or-what-you-will-
elam/
https://ebookname.com/product/emergencies-in-paediatrics-and-
neonatology-2nd-edition-stuart-crisp/
Clinical Neuroendocrinology 1st Edition Eric Fliers
https://ebookname.com/product/clinical-neuroendocrinology-1st-
edition-eric-fliers/
A C.l.P. record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any
fonn or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or
otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material
supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system.
for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work.
For my father, Donald Walter Phillips, who lives defiantly and truthfully.
With courage, I have faced Lacan and I have learned.
For my mother, Flora Riddick Phillips, who models grace and conviction.
With fortitude, I will always be a teacher.
I.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgement.. ................................................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
vii
j
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Postmodern ism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 65
Curriculum ......... . , . ....... .......................... ........................... 67
Post-structuralism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 71
Post-formalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 74
viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
To Lindsay Dunham for her careful proorreading. Any errors which remain are
entirely my own.
To my husband, Bratis D. Roseboro, for making life possible while reading and
writing Lacan.
To my girls, Ciera Joi and Maya Jasmin, for making life so wonderful despite
Lacan.
ix
I
I
I' '
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
11 CHAPTER I
I
I'
problem solve. In a more specific sense, I believe that education should be
democratic in process and content. How and what we learn should connect to the
founding principles of American government-life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. Educating should be about creating spaces in which children learn to
live organic and productive lives. It should be about creating spaces in which
children learn to define freedom and learn to practice living as free and conscientious
members of a larger community. And, finally, it should be about creating spaces in
which children learn happiness in the spiritual and unselfish sense of the word, a
happiness that reflects and speaks to their learning to live as integrated human
beings.
This does not mean that I believe democratic education is "content free," that
somehow children need not learn to read, write, or multiply. Rather, I believe and
hope that democratic education is intrinsically integrated; that whatever is studied
(whether that is science, music, drama, art, or history) always connects to children's
lived experiences in some way. Equally important, my .vision of democratic
education demands that teachers engage with students as learning professionals,
respectful of the knowledge students bring and cognizant of teaching as an intrinsic
and extrinsic process. It is a process that requires us, as educators (or future
educators) to examine ourselves as we also examine our students and the social and
cultural environments in which we live.
Jn this context, I use Lacan's theories as a springboard for a different educational
discourse, one that forces us to assess inward rather than outward. To move beyond
the linear nature of schools, a context exacerbated by developmental psychologists
like Piaget and Erikson who theorized that we can understand children's development
in stages, I argue that Lacan's theories allow us to holistically educate - to teach
cognizant of the relationship between interior and exterior spaces, between the
unspoken and the heard.
Using this context, I have organized this book purposefully with specific
emphasis on Lacan's work as a teacher and less focus on the evolution of his
theories. Since I am foregrounding the concepts of identity, language, and democratic
education, I frame the chapters around the Lacanian theories that specifically relate
to those subjects. I must caution here that I do this because this is an introductory
level text and because my emphasis is on Lacan's theoretical relationship to
education. Any psychoanalyst who is a sincere student of Lacan would (with
good reason) argue that, to truly engage with Lacan, one would need to study the
evolution of his theoretical thought from the beginning of his career until then end
because Lacan, like most theorists, spent his entire life developing, revising, and
reclaiming certain ideas. For this reason, there are few theoretical points that
remain unchanged throughout his career. It is precisely this instability which makes
Lacan so compelling as an educator - he spends his entire life learning and
teaching.
In chapter one, I situate Lacan historically and theoretically. His identity
theories, understood in conjunction with nationalist and imperialist tendencies
which pervaded Europe during the I930's and I940's as well as the global social
unrest of the 1960' s, provide the basis for my discussion of the self in relation, the
:1
1.
LACAN AS PSYCHOANLAYST AND TEACHER
In 1901, Alfred Lacan and Emilie Baudry gave birth to their first child, Jacques
Marie Emile Lacan. It was the tum of the century in France, a time when the
nation's Catholic constituency pushed for government to reflect and represent that
Catholic heritage. In the midst of this fervour, anti-semitism rose and Jewish
citizens found themselves at the center of a national debate which pitted Catholics
against Jews. One case, in particular, reflected the sentiment of the era-the
Dreyfus affair. When, in 1894, Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish captain in the French
army was charged with providing military information to Germany, conflict
erupted between representatives of the French republic, top level military officers
and Catholic officials. Despite finding evidence to prove Dreyfus' innocence, the
3
[•
'I CHAPTER I
I
the food business by selling and trading in rum, brandy, and coffee. By 1907,
Lacan's parents had given birth to three more children, Raymond (who lived for
' just two years), Madeleine, and Marc-Marie. Between 1907 and 1919, Lacan had
I attended school at the College Stanislas and he had begun to study medicine.
I
'
' By 1927 Lacan was in clinical training for psychiatry and within the next three
years, he had written six neurological studies based on psychiatric cases. He
continued his clinical training in other venues, including the Paris Police Special
Infirmary for the Insane and the Hospital Henri Rouselle. For the next ten years,
until 1937, Lacan's career began to blossom as he continued writing and publishing
I
I
his work. He did not go without his own share of troubles, however; in I 936, when
'
he presented a paper on the mirror stage, he left abruptly after being interrupted by
an audience member and, in 1938, he spent considerable time re-writing an article
because editors complained that it was too obscure. In his personal life, Lacan
faced additional troubles. After marrying Marie-Louise Blondin in 1934 and
having three children with her, Lacan had another child with Sylvia Makles
Bataille. He and Marie-Louise divorced soon afterwards and the events of World
War I I soon overshadowed his personal trials.
During the war, the Societe psychoanalytique de Paris ceased all official activity
and Lacan traveled to Britain for a little over a month. During his time in Britain,
he studied with British psychiatrists and evaluated their wartime psychiatric
practice. Over the next forty years, Lacan would continue his clinical practice,
introducing psychoanalytic sessions of variable length (a practice that was
condemned by the Societe psychoanalytique de Paris). During his lifetime, he met
and developed friendships with a variety of great thinkers including the Surrealist
theorist/writer Andre Breton, the artists Salvador Dali, and Pablo Picasso, the
existentialist Jean-Paul Satre, the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, psychoanalyst Carl Jung, French Communist
philosopher Louis Althusser, and German philosopher Martin Heidegger. When he
died on September 9 at the age of 8 I , Lacan had inspired, provoked, and
challenged thousands of people who had attended his public seminars at St. Anne's
in Paris or students who attended one of his seminars at the Ecole normale supercure,
rue d'Ulm or at the law faculty at the place du Pantheon.
He had witnessed the ravaging of his country in two world wars, the mani
pulation of his government by Germans in World War II, the resistance movement
led by Charles de Gaulle during that same war, student strikes in the late I 960's,
I. and the coalescence of an international feminist movement in the early I 970's. His
presence in the international arena had even personally touched some American
students in 1966 when he visited six universities including Harvard, M IT, and
Columbia and in I 975 when he visited Yale, Columbia, and M IT. He was a teacher
4
LACAN AS PSYCHOANLA YST AND TEACHER
5
CHAPTER I
ego was a part of the unconscious), had valid interpretations of Freud's theory; the
theory was complicated and contradictory. Fink illuminates for us the importance
of Lacan re-reading of Freud to the evolution of psychoanalytic thought. Fink says,
What we can say is that, historically speaking, Hartman's reading was sterile
and unproductive. It led to very little in the way of a renewal of research and
theorization, whereas Lacan's led to a huge increase in both (like a good
interpretation in the analytic setting, it generated a lot of new material). We
can also say that Lacan's approach gave a considerable impetus to practice
(p. 45).
In contrast, theorists like Heinz Hartman used Freud to perpetuate developmental
psychology, a concept rooted in the belief that children moved through cognitive
stages. Lacan not only disputed developmental psychology, he also claimed that it
was antithetical to the spirit of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis could potentially
illuminate much more complicated, contextualized, relational human development;
to reduce it to simplistic linear stages would divorce psychoanalysis from its
infinite possibility as a method of reading/re-reading the subject.
I !
l
LACAN AS PSYCHOANLAYST AND TEACHER
condition of the experimental order), and that it be possible to insert into the
chain of symbolic identifications with which their science unifies the
diversity of its own object (the condition of the rational order) (Ecrits, 79).
What is communicable through language is, perhaps, our best representation of
what is true. Lacan's combination of historical method, psychoanalytic inquiry, and
structural linguistics would come together to push the question of truth even
further. His re-reading of Freud would lead him to question the relationship
between truth, the unconscious, and language.
Lacan's interest in the unconscious, or the subject of the unconscious, leads him
to suggest that there is a part of the unconscious that will remain forever unknown
despite the best efforts of psychoanalysis. The unconscious represents that which
cannot be directly explained through language. Unconscious thought may enter the
world through language, but it does so in indirect, convoluted ways. With the help
of psychoanalysis, a subject may begin to interpret unconscious desires that
manifest themselves through speech, action, or dreams in various ways, but even
psychoanalysis cannot explain/define the unconscious in precise ways. In fact,
Lacan specifically says,
There is often a passage in even the most thoroughly interpreted dream which
has to be left obscure; this is because we become aware during the work of
interpretation that at that point there is a tangle of dream-thoughts which
cannot be unraveled and which moreover adds nothing to our knowledge of
the content of the dream. This is the dream's naval, the spot where it reaches
down into the unknown (SE 5, p. 525/Shepherdson, 2003, p. I I 7).
Because Lacan wed his theory to structural linguistics, he believed that
representation, reality, what is known, is tied to language. Psychoanalysis, as a
method of interpretation dependent upon the spoken word, was bound by language.
And because language had/has limits, psychoanalysts would always find themselves
limited in their ability to interpret the unconscious.
For Lacan, there were three realms of knowing - the real, the symbolic, or the
imaginary orders. Psychoanalysts study the symbolic order, that which is represented
by discourse. The real is that part of the universe that we cannot capture in/through
language. And the imaginary represents a Hegelian intersubjectivity, an under
standing of one's self. Lacan visually represents the relationship between the
real, the imaginary and the symbolic with a triangle. Each side of the triangle is
connected by directional arrows with arrows pointing from the real to the imaginary
to the symbolic to the real. The real is located in the bottom right corner, the
imaginary is the top and the symbolic is located in the lower left corner. The right
side of the triangle represents reality, the left side represents truth, and the bottom
side represents semblance (83). The imaginary is the locus of the ego and, as such,
a mediator between the symbolic and the real. Lacan believes that there will always
be an unknown part of the unconscious, a part that escapes definition in language.
His theories reflect a constant engagement with the complexity and obscurity of the
unconscious.
7
CHAPTER I
With his emphasis on the unconscious and his return to Freudian psychology,
Lacan called attention to the ego (sell). But for Lacan, the juxtaposition of the ego
with the unconscious makes the ego much less stable - it is a site of murkiness
rather than a site of coherence. Lacan called into question our ability to know
ourselves. He does not follow the Cartesian logic "I think, therefore I am,"
because, for Lacan, much of what we think is beyond our ability to translate into
language. Even further, Lacan did not believe that thought presupposed being.
Rather, he argued that "being," as a subject defined by language, determined one's
thought. In this case, the subject is not merely an "I" or the ego. It is the "speaking
being" that is the subject. Through the symbolic order of language, the subject
coalesces and comes forth (Ecrits & Campbell, 2004).
For this reason, the Lacanian subject is not a material, physical entity. It
represents, instead, a relationship between words or, to be more specific, a
relationship between the meanings of words (a concept I will explore later, in
chapter 4). The subject does not merely "know" her/himself. Rather, s/he represents
what is known through language. S/he is created by the unconscious and language,
two factors that set limits and offer possibilities. Here again, we must return to
Lacan as historical psychoanalytic practitioner. If bound by language and if language
is constituted in time and in relationship, then the subject represents an intersection
of the past and the future. Thus, the Lacanian subject is temporal, connected in
complex ways to the realm of the Imaginary (the sell), the Real (the unspeakable),
and the Symbolic (language).
If we return to the question of "what is real" and "what is true?", then we must
translate Lacan's theory of the subject into a question of epistemology and cognition.
As Campbell (2004) says, "For Lacan, the question 'how do I know?' entails another
1,; question: 'who am !?"' (p. 3 I ). How and when we learn to frame these questions
becomes a critical point in the development of the ego or, in other words, in our
developing self awareness. This developing self awareness entices Lacan and
marks the significance of psychoanalytic practice. Through the psychoanalytic
process, Lacan envisions the development of the knowing subject, a subject
capable of recognizing its unconscious desires (even if these desires cannot be
translated initially) and temporality; the psychoanalytic process is a dialectic one in
which the analysand (person being analyzed) comes to understand her/himself as
incomplete. To know one's self is to recognize one's mobility in language- if we
are defined by and within language, then we are subject to the many detours of
language.
LACAN AS TEACHER/PERFORMER
8
LACAN AS PSYCHOANLA YST AND TEACHER
confined and worried that people would read his theories as static rather than
malleable. Fink (2004) best summarizes Lacan's privileging of his teaching over
his writing. He says,
But writing, even this kind of writing, has its dangers too: The reader might
be inclined to take a given text as a system or a doctrine and pick it apart, or
'deconstruct' it ... This is dangerous to Lacan for at least two reasons: I ) His
work is declarative rather than demonstrative, and the reader is hard pressed
to find an argument in it to sustain any one particular claim .. 2) He has a
.
9
CHAPTER I
11
I
Lacan's role as teacher/perfonner depended on the collusion and support of his
' students. They had to believe in his re-reading of Freud as a necessary engagement
of psychoanalysis and they also had to believe in him as the proselytizer of the
"gospel." He goes so far as to say that because he returns to Freud's exposition of
iI 'I
' the unconscious and that the unconscious "tells the truth about truth," that he is
speaking the truth about Freud (Ecrits, 868). Lacan's reverence for Freud and his
claims to be speaking the truth about Freud indicate his profound wish to be
associated with Freud. He was indeed a Freudian and, in particular, one who staked
his career on students' bequeathing upon him the same sort of reverence he gave to
Freud.
As a teacher, Lacan reveled in being the point of reference and departure for his
students. He was a mediator, of sorts, in their conversation with Freudian theory,
psychoanalysis, and philosophy. He was, by all accounts, a dynamic mediator, one
who embraced the question of "style" in both his writing and his life. Rabate
(2003), once a student at the Ecole nonnale superieure, remembers that students
viewed Lacan with awe, an almost star-like worship. They spoke of him being
"driven to the school's entrance to emerge with a beautiful woman on his ann and
make his way up to the office of Louis Althusser . . . Lacan was known to draw
crowds from the city's select quarters, a medley of colorful intellectuals, writers,
artists, feminists, radicals, and psychoanalysts" (p. I ). He was, in this sense, a
public intellectual, one who inspired and provoked with his intellect and his
personality.
As a public intellectual, he remained connected to multiple communities as he
simultaneously rejected the hierarchy of certain institutions. Liu (2003) suggests
that Lacan emerged as a pop star post World War II precisely because of his
turbulent relationship with the International Psychoanalytic Association (from
which he was eventually excommunicated) and his theoretical conflicts with other
Freudians. Perhaps more importantly, Lacan became a public intellectual (in this
sense, one who was known by the public) as he manipulated various fonns of
telecommunications to spread his messages. As Liu (2003) describes, "Playing the
master on the airwaves allowed for Lacan to perfonn as both charlatan and
master-consider his perfonnance in Television: His analytic attitude seemed like a
posture of pure provocation of his more conservative colleagues" (p. 253). Through
10
LACAN AS PSYCHOANLAYST AND TEACHER
media, Lacan spoke and he clearly expected for people to listen. Recast in
cinematic imagery, he could enact his theories for different audiences and, in so
doing, disseminate his re-reading of Freud. In truth, he could become the voice of
Freud.
Lacan also used his pedagogy and his access to radio to disrupt the political
climate of post World War II France. When the Ford Foundation rejected his
proposal to translate Ecrits into English, Lacan takes it not only as a personal
affront to his theoretical interpretation of Freud, he sees the foundation's rejection
as evidence of a much larger conspiracy on the part of America to shape/manipulate/
refashion intellectual thought across the world. Liu (2003) describes Lacan's use of
radio airwaves to voice his frustration at the rejection by the Ford Foundation by
commenting,
That he related the anecdote in a radio interview is all the more significant:
weird as he was, he understood radio's function as a super-egoic voice. Radio
transforms the voice into aural material that shakes us up because it seems to
be audible everywhere, all at once. Lacan is chiding the leftist movement for
its narvete: the demand for 'an immediate effect' is part of a fantasy of
political efficacy and critical resistance. He is warning his interlocutors that
American institutions have an invisible political effect on post-war intellectual
life, censoring and policing the translation of texts . . . (p. 258)
Even though the Ford Foundation was/is a philanthropic organization, Lacan called
into question its motives in a very public way. And while his immediate impetus
for charging the Ford Foundation with censorship may have been rooted in his
frustration at the rejection, his charge that the foundation was using its influence to
further a particular intellectual agenda would later come to light. According to Liu,
the publication of Frances Stoner Saunders' Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the
World of Arts and letters, signaled the emergence of American philanthropic
organizations into the political realm. These organizations were, according to Liu,
"engaged institutionally and ideologically with the Central Intelligence Agency in
the dissemination of an imperialist vision of post-war Europe, re-formed and re
structured under American domination" (p. 258). Lacan recognized this American
imperialism as a cultural assault, an attempt to reconstruct French intellectual
thought.
For Lacan, television was not the only medium by which he taught the world.
Tape recorders consistently captured his voice as he gave his noted seminars.
Students, of all ages and dispositions, could listen to his voice repeatedly. The tape
recorder, in a sense, magnified Lacan's presence and rendered him safely stored to
the annals of history. As Liu (2003) adds, "Lacan's feedback loop was plugged into
the various low-tech media: the spontaneity and obscurity of his speech was
guaranteed by the transcription that was made for his eyes only. His audience had
to be all ears, or else smuggle in tape recorders of their own . . ." (p. 262). In these
recordings, Lacan emerged as both ruler and captive; he licensed the recording, a
recording which would confine his speech to reel/tape. In this confinement, people
would try to pin him down, to continuously playback his recorded voice in an
II
CHAPTER I
effort to solidify his arguments. It seems a strange contradiction, that this teacher
who resisted being pinned down, would sanction the recording of his seminars, an
act which would most definitely lead to others believing they had finally "caught"
his meaning. But if we understand Lacan as a teacher who craved a particular
reverence from his students and the public, then we can understand why audio and
visual mediums attracted him so immensely.
Tape recordings and the transcriptions which would ultimately stem from
them captured Lacan's interest for other reasons as well. His fascination with the
slipperiness of language led him to make clear distinctions between the spoken and
written word. In his speeches, he performed in more spontaneous ways. Written
language could not reflect the same sort of improvisation. Liu (2003) best describes
the tension inherent in transcribing Lacan's seminars when she remarks, ··we can
also recognize that transcription captures the spontaneity of the improvised and the
extemporaneous in a pedagogical performance . . . the process of editing a
transcription adds another layer of complexity to the attempts to reconstitute the
unpredictability of the pronouncement" (p. 266). Without a doubt, Lacan's
seminars were works in progress; his efforts to re-work them long after they were
given proved that he appreciated both the spoken and written word. He used each
for different purposes; the spoken word provided more freedom. It was, in a way,
libratory. Writing, on the other hand, allowed him the space to solidify his thoughts,
to attune himself to the specific difficulties of language, and to reconstruct it in
purposeful ways.
Lacan's ultimate act as a teacher was to found his own school in 1964. He
initially called it the Ecole Francaise de Psychanalyse and he later changed the
name to the Ecole Freidienne de Paris. With this act of separation, Lacan distinguished
himself as scholar, teacher, and politician. He would control all administrative and
intellectual decisions for the school and, most importantly, he would serve as the
primary pedagogue for the school. In creating his own mini-universe, he centered
himself. This school would represent a special psychoanalytic space, a space in
which he could bring together the clinical and the pedagogical. It would be a space
that embraced unpredictability. Liu (2003) paints a picture of Lacan's psychoanalytic
practice after the founding of his school (the EFP) by quoting, at some length,
Roudinesco's description of Lacan's work as a clinician,
. . . [T]the door at the rue de Lille was open to anyone and without
appointment: to members and non-members, to analysands and the 'sick,' to
robbers, thugs, psychotics, and the troubled . . . In sum, anyone could show up
at his home to discuss absolutely anything . . . Very early on, Lacan
contracted the habit of no longer giving appointments at fixed times. He was
unable to refuse anyone and anyone could come to his sessions according to
his whim or need. The Doctor's house was an immense asylum in which one
could move about freely, its doors open from morning to night, among first
editions, artistic masterpieces, and piles of manuscripts (p. 268).
In this environment, just as he had done in founding his school, Lacan situates the
"Other," (the unconscious of his students). Just as he had emphasized Copernican
12
LACAN AS PSYCHOANLAYST AND TEACHER
As I stated at the outset of this chapter, I understand Lacan as an educator, one who
blended his clinical practice with his teaching and public speaking in dynamic
ways. I am an educator rooted in cultural studies discourse and, in that framework,
I profess that our pedagogical practices should reflect democratic principles. Many
researchers are now equating quality education with democratic education, a
concept that grounds our constitutional government. These educators have argued
that democratic education emphasizes engaged learning, is attune to issues of
justice and equity, and is intricately connected to the "real world" (Apple, 1982;
Carlson & Apple, 1998; Dewey, 1902 & 1932; Freire, 1998; Giroux, 1988; hooks,
1994 & 2003; Shapiro & Purpel, 2005; Spring, 2006). It is a concept of education
in which democracy is about experience and process, one in which teaching and
learning are forever linked-there is no latter without the fonner (Freire, 1998;
West, 1999).
Democratic education is not politically neutral. It is always a political act,
shaped by the moral and ethical attitudes of teachers, students, parents, and
administrators. As Shapiro and Purpel (2005) state, "We believe that education is
always (and everywhere) about the business of legitimizing and reproducing
existing values, and ways of Iife--0r about working to oppose them" (p. xiii). To
understand schools as intricately connected to the real world is to understand that
education should create more ethically and socially responsible citizens, citizens
who are attune to the suffering in the world and who recognize the possibility of
meaningful education decreasing that suffering. In this way, democratic education
fosters spaces for discussion, debate, contestation and creation. It gives students
unlimited opportunities for discovery and pushes us to challenge the current ways
in which education is an alienating experience, particularly for students of color
and students in poverty (Banks, 2002; hooks, 1994 & 2003; Kozol, 1991; Carlson
& Apple, 1998; Martin, 1985).
In essence, I argue that, as democratic educators, we find ourselves dedicated to
process-to renegotiating our theoretical understandings of what democratic
education is. And, it means that we must claim/envision/create multiple subject
positions which demand that the political not end at the personal (Carlson and
Apple, 1998). I suggest that public education is democratic life, rooted in discourse
and positioned through naming, critique, and deconstruction. As a democratic
educator, I am committed to broadening our theoretical understanding of
democracy in public schools and, in that spirit, I use Lacanian psychoanalysis, with
its emphasis on language and identity, to deepen our notions of what schools could
do to foster meaningful learning experiences for children.
13
CHAPTER I
NOTES
1 We should also understand the mirror as symbolic of the reflective environn1ent. Children learn to
define themselves by '"seeing" themselves in others, by gauging people's reactions to them, and forming
a self identity outside of themselves. In other words, the child's self identity
14
CHAPTER 2
If Lacan were to return today to examine the United States' system of public
education, l suspect he would question the purposes of public education. As a
student of history, he would have been well aware of the founding principals
of our public education, from its tenuous Jeffersonian beginnings to the common
school movement in the l 830's and to the school desegregation efforts of the
twentieth century. If, in his return, he were briefed on the current state of U.S.
education by any politician or policy maker, l suspect that he would suffer through
a litany of quantitative data which would, naturally, highlight our immense
progress in "leaving no child behind." He would hear of the closing of the
achievement gap, increasing test scores, and standardization of curriculum. I
suspect, however, that he would not hear of increasing disparities in school funding
for schools/districts with high minority populations. I imagine it would take him
some time and perhaps some personal investigation to discover that we are
identifying students by proficiency scores rather than name. I f he took the time, as
I believe he would, he would also learn of the events of Columbine and Red Lake,
school shootings by boys who used their schools as platforms on which to launch
personal protests.
If Lacan were to return today, l believe he would say that students in U.S.
schools are experiencing multiple identity crises, crises which represent the
speaking of unconscious thoughts and desires. He would ask us, as educators, to
talk about how we attune ourselves to the shaping of identity. How do we, in our
teaching and practice, listen for the unspeakable? Or, how do we speak the
unspeakable? And, if we have no answer for these corollary questions, we are not
truly educating. For Lacan, the self is a complicated concept, one rooted in his
belief that psychoanalysts in his era had misrepresented the self as only a
conscious, speaking being. Lacan, in contrast, believed that our existence as "I"
depended upon the subject of the unconscious. To ignore the unconscious then
would be tantamount to inviting disaster. If we ignore the subject or "I" as the
unconscious. then we assume that our actions are always conscious ones that we
enact with clarity and purpose. Since Lacan believes that the unconscious drives
our actions, he would envision schools as places of exchanges of the unconscious,
places where someone (presumably the teacher with the student) needs to
consistently work at reading and interpreting these exchanges.
Lacan's interest in the construction and development of self might allow us to
reconsider the purpose of education. Various educational theorists have argued that
we need to teach to the whole child 1 but they have presumed that we all know who
the whole child is. While this may seem to be a simplistic statement, I believe it
15
CHAPTER 2
In 1936 Lacan delivered his first lecture on the mirror stage. He cut short his
talk at the 1 6th Congress of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA)
after being interrupted by Ernest Jones who was, at the time, chairman of the
conference proceedings. Lacan, feeling jilted by the interruption, refused to submit
his paper for publication in the conference proceedings. Thanks to the faithful
notes of Fran�oise Dolto, we have access to the text that Lacan delivered in
preliminary form one month before the actual IPA conference. In it, Lacan outlined
what would become one of his most often cited theories, that of the mirror stage
I
I and the development of self identity. This theory brings together Lacan's
psychoanalytic training and his philosophy because he partners the "!" of the ego
I with the "I" of the philosophical subject (or the subject of mankind). In this way,
I' he puts the unconscious in relationship-the subject is thus tied to other people and
to history. It is contextualized by the environment that surrounds it even though it
(the subject, the "!") may not be able to articulate this relationship.
To explain, I shall begin with a brief synopsis of Lacan's mirror stage theory.
Lacan suggests that between the ages of six and eighteen months, a child learns to
recognize her/himself in the mirror. The mirror is both a literal and figurative
concept. It represents both the physical mirror and the environment as mirror (we
see who we are in others). When the child recognizes her/himself in the mirror,
s/he develops a self concept; s/he is no longer a disjointed set of limbs but comes
together as a whole body. As Lacan says,
It suffices to understand the mirror stage in this context as an identification,
in the full sense analysis gives to the term; namely, the transformation that
takes place in the subject when he [assume] an image-an image that is
seemingly predestined to have an effect at this phase, as witnessed by the use
in analytic theory of antiquity's term, 'imago' . . . But the important point is
that this form situates the agency known as the ego, prior to its social
determination, in a fictional direction that will forever remain irreducible for
i i
any single individual or, rather, that will only asymptotically approach the
"
subject's becom ing, no matter how successful the dialectical synthesis by
which he must resolve, as /, his discordance with his own reality (Ecrits, 94).
For Lacan, the mirror stage is critical because it is in this recognition of her/himself
as a whole being that the child begins to construct a self identity in relation to the
16
MIRRORING: REFLECTIVITY, IDENTITY, AND SUBJECTI VITY
other objects or people in the mirror. Equally important, however, Lacan argues
that the child's first recognition of her/himself in the mirror is an "othering." The
child first sees her/himself as an other and then, later comes to identify the baby in
the mirror as her/himself.
Let me attempt to explain this concept using a visual image. Let's pretend that
we have a nine month old baby girl. Her name is Maria. We place baby Maria in
front of a mirror and she giggles and tries to touch the baby in the mirror. We say,
like most parents, "Look at yourself in the mirror Maria, that's you! Do you see
yourself?" At this point, our little darling does not recognize herself. Despite our
best efforts, she has no idea that the baby in the mirror is actually her. Now, let's
imagine that baby Maria is fifteen months old. She sees herself in the mirror,
touches her head, and notices that the baby in the mirror also touches its head. She
is amazed. So, she tries something else. She touches her stomach. The baby in the
mirror also touches its stomach! After a few more experiments, Maria comes to
realize that the baby in the mirror is actually her. She then becomes fascinated with
herself. She stands in front of the mirror and kisses her image. For Lacan, this
moment of identification is critical because it marks a transition from "other" to
"I."
Because we first see ourselves in the mirror as an other, as some other baby, we
do not conceive of ourselves as a distinct and unified "!." Instead, we
question/wonder why the baby in the mirror is as s/he is, why s/he looks like s/he
does. Lacan says the baby in the mirror represents a specular image. The specular
image is the one that we see or perceive. Lacan, in fact, says, "The specular image
seems to be the threshold of the visible world, if we take into account the mirrored
disposition of the imago of one's own body in hallucinations and dreams" (Ecrits,
95). He goes on to add that this mirrored image, whether reflected in a physical
mirror or in other people who look like us, gives us a false sense of being. Because
a baby does not initially recognize the reflection in the mirror as her/himself, but
sees or feels other people around her/him, the baby senses that s/he is a being like
the others but can not articulate why s!he is like the others (or different from the
others). Fink (2004) elaborates on this false sense of being,
In the mirror stage, the ego is precipitated due partly to the tension owing to a
lack of unity and coordination in ourselves. We sense that we are not beings
like the other unified beings we see around us; there is as yet nothing we can
point to as a discrete, total being (something that can be counted as a One).
Instead, there is a conspicuous lack of being; being as such is missing prior to
the anticipatory action of the mirror state (which creates a One where there
was none). This is why Lacan tends to associate the ego with false being (p.
1 00).
For Lacan then, the mirror stage is critical in the construction of the ego or self
identity. It marks the beginning of our move from false to social being (thinking of
ourselves as the center of the universe) to understanding ourselves in relationship
to others and the environment.
I7
CHAPTER 2
When a child recognizes her/himself in reflection, s/he moves from the specular
to the social "I." At this point, the child becomes more than just an image. S/he
becomes an image in a larger social context. What matters to the child is no longer
just instinctual. It is visual and spatial. Once the child comes to understand and
accept her/his reflective image as a self, then s/he begins to identify with or in
contrast to the other images in the mirror.2 Lacan explains this point by saying, "It
is this moment that decisively tips the whole of human knowledge [savoir] into
being mediated by the other's desire, constitutes its objects in an abstract
equivalence due to competition from other people, and turns the I into an apparatus
to which every instinctual pressure constitutes a danger, even if it corresponds to
the normal maturation process" (Ecrits, 98). Once we see ourselves in the mirror,
we are no longer alone. We come to define ourselves as a part of a predetermined
;j, universe.
In recognizing ourselves in the mirror, we come to identify reality. We take note
of how large or small objects are around us. We begin to determine what is
important and what is not, to distinguish between what is necessary and what is
desirable. We enter into a constant negotiation of lived reality. Lacan sums this up
best by saying,
The function of the mirror stage thus turns out, in my view, to be a particular
case of the function of imagos, which is to establish a relationship between
an organism and its reality---0r, as they say, between the lnnewe/t and the
Umwe/t . . . the mirror stage is a drama whose internal pressure pushes
precipitously from insufficiency to anticipation-and, for the subject caught
up in spatial identification, turns out fantasies that proceed from a fragmented
image of the body to what I will call an 'orthopedic' form of its totality-and
to the finally donned armor of an alienating identity that will mark his entire
mental development with its rigid structure (Ecrits, 96-97).
For Lacan then, the mirror stage is marked by a particular constriction. The
moment we recognize ourselves in the mirror is the very moment we begin to
recognize the external reality which shapes our existence. We are no longer a
nebulous collection of parts moving without regard. We are, instead, a unified
whole that has limits. Just as our parts (limbs) are connected, we are similarly
connected to and constrained by the world around us.
If we continue with our analysis of Lacan's mirror stage. we must also consider the
content in the mirror, the environment which the mirror projects. For the moment,
let's consider the other people who might be reflected in the mirror. If baby Maria
sees herself in the mirror with a parental figure (or someone else), she will notice
that this person is looking at her. As a consequence, she will begin to see herself in
relation to this person. She learns to identify herself as an "I" precisely because
someone else is identifying her as such. This has profound implications for the
construction of identity. It is, as Lacan terms, the beginning of the formation of an
18
MIRRORING: REFLECTIVITY, IDENTITY, AND SUBJECTIVITY
alienating identity, one that is created based partly upon the reflections/reactions of
the parental figure(s) in the mirror.
In this sense, the emotional, psychological, or physical reactions that the
parental figure(s) reflect in the mirror contextualize the child's interpretation of
"L" If the reaction is one marked by love, care, or compassion, the child will begin
to construct a self identity in reaction to those reflected emotions, If, instead, the
reaction is one marked by disgust, hate, or apathy, the child will begin to construct
a self identity in response to those, The child thus sees in the mirror a reflected
relationship. It is a relationship that s/he is a part of yet it is also a relationship that
allows the child to create an "I" beyond a sensory or instinctual awareness, It is a
reflected image in which the child is both the creator and the created simultaneously.
S/he generates a reaction from a parental figure and, in that reaction, the parental
figure treats the child as a distinct and separate entity.
Thus the mirror stage signals the coming of consciousness for the child, a
consciousness that is determined by the presence of someone else in the mirror
with the child. It is a consciousness predicated on the assumption that there will be
someone else in the mirror. And, once the child distinguishes between herself and
the "Other" in the mirror, she constructs her self identity by "reading'" others,
Fink (2004) describes the child's development of self consciousness in the following
passage:
According to Lacan, self-consciousness arises in the following manner:
By internalizing the way the Other sees one, by assimilating the Other's
approving and disapproving looks and comments, one learns to see oneself as
the Other knows one. As the child in front of the mirror turns around and
looks to the adult standing behind her for a nod, recognition, a word of
approval or ratification-this is the reformulation of the mirror stage in
Seminar VIII (Chapters 23 and 24) presupposed here-she comes to see
herself as if from the adult's vantage point, comes to see herself as if she
were the parental Other, comes to be aware of herself as if from the outside,
as if she were another person (p. I 08),
If we consider the implications of this othering, of the child learning to see herself
from the adult's vantage point, then we come to understand why Lacan refers to the
self identity (ego) created in the mirror stage as false being. Because the process of
creating this "I" began with a disjointed sense of self prior to the mirror stage and
because, in the mirror, the child develops a self identity through the eyes of
someone else in the mirror, the self is really more of a projection.
For Lacan, the mirror stage came to symbolize less of an actual developmental
stage and more of a process. Just as he understood the mirror as figurative and
literal, so did he perceive the mirror stage to be a complex negotiation of identity
which could not be reduced to a mere stage. According to Rabate (2003), "In the
context of Lacan 's thinking, the idea of a mirror stage no longer has anything to do
with a real stage or phase in the Freudian sense, nor with a real mirror. The stage
becomes a psychic or ontological operation through which a human being is made
by means of identification with his fellow-being" (p, 29). Lacan did, however
19
CHAPTER 2
conceive of the mirror stage as a process with a definitive beginning and ending.
From his theory of the mirror stage, he postulates the idea of the subject, a
theoretical construction of self that he distinguishes from the ego.
Ultimately, I suggest that the child's construction of self in relationship to
other(s) in the mirror represents situational reflectivity. The image that the child
develops of her/himself depends on the context of the situation presented in the
mirror. Situational reflectivity demands that we ascertain how the mirror came to
be and how people came to be in the mirror. The mirror, though physically
constructed has a context, a history. The other(s) in the mirror have a context, a
history that determines their position in the mirror. If these people are caregivers
for the child, then they have a historicized understanding of the child. They can
remember their relationship to the child. Context and history shape the relationship
reflected in the mirror. Though the child may not grasp this context, s/he is
inevitably tied to, created by, and reflected in circumstances that have a history.
The mirror, for example belongs to a timeline; there is a story that explains it
existence. How might that story reflect upon or impact the child's construction of
self? We must also consider the context of the child's interaction with the mirror.
How, why, and when the mirror is placed within the child's field of engagement
(or vice versa) could have profound implications for the child's understanding of
self. Whether or not the child encounters the mirror on her/his own, is placed
before the mirror playfully, or left in front of the mirror in disgust would provide
different encounters with the mirror and, possibly, different constructions of self.
If we consider situational reflectivity with a figurative mirror, then we can also
understand how history and context affect our construction of a self identity. If
there is no physical mirror, then our understanding of self is completely contingent
upon the reaction of others and the response of other environmental conditions to
our existence. Let's use an example here. If I have a physical mirror and I can see
into that mirror, then I can see myself without another person in the mirror. Once I
recognize that the baby in the mirror is a reflection of my image, and then if I
encounter the mirror alone, I can interact with myself, observe myself in the
mirror. If, however, there is no physical mirror or I have no sight, I rely more
heavily on others to treat me as a whole and unified self.4
To push the concept of the mirror further, let's analyze the materiality of a
literal mirror. The material contexts of the mirror are equally as important as the
situational contexts. This I shall call material reflectivity. What kind of mirror is it?
How is it framed and what condition is it in? Does its material condition reflect
care or neglect and how might the child possibly interpret either case? Is it a large
mirror that affords the child a wider physical context, and thus more possibilities
for comparison when beginning to define the "I"? Or, is it a small mirror with
limited scope and people with which to compare? And what if there is no mirror in
the literal sense? Once the child recognizes her/himself in the mirror, then s/he will
begin to scrutinize the other people in the mirror as well as the mirror itself.
Although Lacan associated the mirror stage with Freud's concept of narcissism (the
child becomes fixated with her/himself in relation to the other(s) in the mirror),
' I .,1
other of Lacan's contemporaries suggested that the mirror stage was not based only
I
I 20
'I '
I
MIRRORING: REFLECTIVITY, IDENTITY, AND SUBJECTIVITY
on primary narcissism, Melanie Klein (as do !), for example, also focused on the
importance of object relations in the construction of identity, Providing that the
child does not develop a completely narcissistic personality, fixated on her/himself,
s/he will begin to focus on the environment reflected in the mirror. And, later, the
child will begin to question the construction of the mirror itself,
The mirror, in the literal and figurative sense, represents much more than a
reflective place. When Lacan argues that the mirror stage represents the transition
from the specular to the social "!," he interprets the mirror as a representation of
the social world. In it, the child comes to see her/himself as engaged with others. In
this stage, presence and absence are both equally important. What the child can see
in the mirror can be interpreted. And what the child can not see also affects her/his
interpretation, From the moment the child recognizes her/himself in the mirror,
s/he begins an important journey towards becoming a subject. Lacan would
emphasize the significance of this transition throughout his work. He would link
the subject to Freud's topography of the id, ego, and superego by distinguishing
between the "I" of the subject and the "I" of the ego. Lacan associated the "I'' of
the ego with consciousness and the I of the subject with the unconscious. This
" "
distinction would have tremendous impact on the field of psychoanalysis and our
understanding of identity.
Though Lacan would never attribute his theory of the mirror stage to any one
person, he did draw on the work of psychologist Henri Wallon. Five years before
Lacan attempted to deliver his first lecture on the mirror stage, Wallon had
developed a mirror test by placing a child in front of a mirror and watching the
child gradually learned to recognize itself in the mirror. Rabate (2003) posits the
relationship between Wallon and Lacan's theories:
In Wallon's view, the mirror test demonstrates a transition from the specular
to the imaginary to the symbolic. On 1 6 June 1936 Lacan revised Wallon's
terminology and changed the epreuve du miroir into the Stade du miroir
('m irror stage'}-that is, mixing two concepts, 'position' in the Kleinian
sense and 'phase' in the Freudian sense, He thus eliminated Wallon's
reference to a natural dialectic. (p. 29)
As Lacan further develops his theory, he sets himself apart from Wallon by
emphasizing the unconscious in the construction of self identity. For Lacan, the
mirror stage marked the emergence of the subject (of the unconscious) because the
ego (conscious) would begin to understand itself as connected to and in conflict
with people who are not always what they seem. Since the ego mediates between
the Imaginary (self awareness), Real (the world that cannot be captured in
language), and Symbolic (the world as represented by language) realms, the ego
links the conscious self to the world through discourse.
Lacan, however, would suggest that the mirror stage is important because, in it,
the child creates a self identity based upon unconscious desire (of the child and the
21
(I ,
I
CHAPTER 2
other(s) in the mirror). S/he begins to believe that the "I" (of the ego) or the "I" of
the conscious is the only "!." The child learns (through its observation of others) to
reject unconscious desires and thus mistakes the "I" of the conscious as the one and
only self. Campbell (2004) attempts to explain this point when she comments,
For Lacan, the mirror stage can be understood 'as an identification ' which
forms the ego-ideal and hence precipitates the ego. For Lacan, identifications
are always situated in the imaginary order because they reflect the ego's
narcissistic perceptions . . . Lacan argues that in imaginary identifications, the
object is caught in the ego's meconnaissance or misrecognition of the other
as a self. The ego misrecognizes the other in its specular reflections,
perceiving the other as identical to itself. The identificatory object is known
only as the same as self, and with that misrecognition comes a refusal of
difference. In a desire for sameness, the ego perceives only those qualities
that are identical to it, so that it refuses difference in the object. The identi
ficatory object functions not as an Other but as an imaginary counterpart, an
other that the self imagines to reflect it (p. I 0 I).
Because the child embraces the reflection in the mirror as its own, then it identities
as that reflection; it becomes that child. In doing so, the child focuses more on how
i s/he is like the child in the mirror rather than how s/he is different. By failing to see
I difference, the child develops a self concept that is unable or unwilling to accept
unconscious desires that may contradict the perception that s/he is just like the
reflection in the mirror.
Since the ego, according to Lacan, is unable to accept that unconscious desires
define it, then it can not truly represent the "!." To capture the essence of the "I,"
Lacan uses the term subject. The subject recognizes that it is defined in the
Symbolic order by language. In chapter 3 I will talk more about the significance of
discourse to Lacanian analysis, but here, a brief explanation is in order. Discourse
(or language) is governed by rules and works in patterned ways. These rules and
patterns construct meaning for us. Lacan would argue that we enter the world
through and with language. Language defines us; it allows us to define ourselves.
The subject, then, only becomes a subject within language. And, because Lacan
believes the unconscious is structured like a language, it manifests itself in
patterned, although perhaps unpredictable, ways. Lacan believes the ego ignores
these complexities.
As I stated before, the mirror stage represents a development of self
consciousness, a coming to understanding of the self as a "thinking self." When the
I'
child learns to see itself in the mirror through the eyes of others, s/he begins to
operate with a Cartesian sense of the world. The Cartesian' ego believes, "I think,
therefore I am." According to Fink (2004), "The Cartesian ego assures itself it
exists due to a consciousness that stands outside the ego that transcends the ego: a
consciousness of consciousness or a consciousness raised to the second power. . . "
(p. I 09). It is important here to re-emphasize this Cartesian split because it is a
western way of viewing the world that grounds our existence. Instead of following
the Ubuntu logic, "I belong, therefore, I am," we develop a self consciousness based
22
M I RRORING: REFLECTIVITY, IDENTITY, AND SUBJECTIVITY
on the premise that thinking (or cognition) creates the self, In doing so, we
foreground "logic" and background feeling or emotion,
In contrast, the subject claims no self knowledge, It can not consider itself an
object of reflection because it is driven by the unconscious and the unconscious
does not consider itself an "L" As a result, Fink (2004) says, "The subject may be
dead and not know it, want something and not know it, and even speak without
knowing it , , , The unconscious is not something one knows but, rather, something
that is known" (p, 109). For Lacan, this would become the major distinction between
the "I" of the mirror stage and the subject. In narcissistic fashion, the "I" of the
mirror stage mistakenly assumes that it is a self, It presumes that because it sees
itself"outside of the self," or through the eyes of others, that it has self consciousness.
But Lacan would argue that this is a false consciousness, that we do not recognize
our unconscious selves in the mirror and, without doing so, we cannot really know
who we are, The subject, however, is not created by the mirror; it is created by
language. And since the unconscious manifests itself through language, the subject
is a better representation of who we really are.
Indeed, Lacan's belief that the unconscious was structured like a language' led
him to suggest that the subject could never truly know itself, He goes so far as to
query, "Once the structure of language is recognized in the unconscious, what sort
of subject can we conceive of for it?" (Ecrits, 800). Lacan puts forth the subject as
a speaking subject, one that enunciates unconscious desires. He specifically says,
I am merely referring obliquely to what I am reluctant to cover with the
inevitable map of clinical work. Namely the right way to answer the question
'who is speaking?' when the subject of the unconscious is at stake. For the
answer cannot come from him ifhe does not know what he is saying, or even
that he is speaking, as all of analytic experience teaches us (Ecrits, 800).
For Lacan, psychoanalytic practice is inextricably bound with the subject and the
subject represents the unconscious through language. If the subject represents the
unconscious through language, then the discourse of the subject is questionable, at
best. We can never be sure if the words that we speak are truly indicative of the
unconscious. They may, instead, reflect a poor representation of it.
To further explain his point, Lacan describes the psychoanalytic session as a
space that interrupts false discourse. Since the speaking subject uses language that
can not grasp the full intent of the unconscious, then the psychoanalyst cannot
merely analyze the words that come forth in the psychoanalytic session. Lacan
explains,
Lest our hunt be in vain, we analysts must bring everything back to the cut
qua function in discourse, the most significant being the cut that constitutes a
bar between the signifier and the signified. Here we come upon the subject
who interests us since, being bound up in signification, he seems to be
lodging in the preconscious. This would lead us to the paradox of conceiving
that discourse in analytic session is worthwhile only insofar as it stumbles or
even interrupts itself-were not the session itself instituted as a break in false
23
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
The text on this page is estimated to be only 20.83%
accurate
Our website is not just a platform for buying books, but a bridge
connecting readers to the timeless values of culture and wisdom. With
an elegant, user-friendly interface and an intelligent search system,
we are committed to providing a quick and convenient shopping
experience. Additionally, our special promotions and home delivery
services ensure that you save time and fully enjoy the joy of reading.
ebookname.com