The Man On The Balcony Maj Sjowall Per Wahloo Jo

Nesbo download

https://ebookbell.com/product/the-man-on-the-balcony-maj-sjowall-
per-wahloo-jo-nesbo-53725326

Explore and download more ebooks at ebookbell.com

Here are some recommended products that we believe you will be
interested in. You can click the link to download.

The Man On The Balcony Martin Beck Police Mystery 3 Sjowall Maj Wahloo
Per

https://ebookbell.com/product/the-man-on-the-balcony-martin-beck-
police-mystery-3-sjowall-maj-wahloo-per-3666128

The Man On The Balcony Edward Kendrick

https://ebookbell.com/product/the-man-on-the-balcony-edward-
kendrick-54802244

The Man On The Plane Michelle Pettyjohn

https://ebookbell.com/product/the-man-on-the-plane-michelle-
pettyjohn-58491066

The Man On The Middle Floor Moore Elizabeth S

https://ebookbell.com/product/the-man-on-the-middle-floor-moore-
elizabeth-s-61725122
The Man On The Middle Floor Elizabeth S Moore

https://ebookbell.com/product/the-man-on-the-middle-floor-elizabeth-s-
moore-231716940

The Man On The Roof Michael Stephenson

https://ebookbell.com/product/the-man-on-the-roof-michael-
stephenson-46093518

The Man On The Middle Floor Elizabeth S Moore

https://ebookbell.com/product/the-man-on-the-middle-floor-elizabeth-s-
moore-51462676

The Man On The Train Benson Clara

https://ebookbell.com/product/the-man-on-the-train-benson-
clara-10107418

The Man On The Meteor Ray Cummings

https://ebookbell.com/product/the-man-on-the-meteor-ray-
cummings-230281434
 Another Random Document on
Scribd Without Any Related Topics
 ‘Dunkirk is being defended on a considerable scale, and has already developed
substantial strength. Lines of defence are constructed on a radius of 4 to 6 miles
approximately from the enceinte of the town, which are armed by over 400 pieces
of artillery and held by 18,000 men. These works, which are strongly executed, can
be further protected by large inundations both of fresh and salt water. The fresh
water inundations are now accumulating; the salt can be turned on at any time in
two days. The place should certainly require a siege in form to reduce it, and it is
getting stronger every week. The First Lord promised the assistance of warships if
required to cover the flanks. The anchorage at Dunkirk gives sufficient water for
the Majestic class, and is certainly close to the shore. The high sandhills would
require the fire to be indirect, but otherwise there would be no difficulty. There is
nothing to cause disquietude in the measures taken for the defence of Dunkirk. It
seems probable that they are sufficient to make it not worth while for the enemy to
undertake the reduction of the fortress.
‘Calais is simply an enceinte rather larger in extent than that of Dunkirk, and
protected by a few well-executed outlying fieldworks. All that can be said about
Calais is that it could not be taken by a coup de main. It is garrisoned by 7,000
troops, but it could certainly not be counted on to hold out for more than a few
days against a determined attack.’

In the third week of September Marshal Joffre telegraphed to Lord

Kitchener asking whether a Brigade of Marines could not be sent to
Dunkirk to reinforce the garrison and to confuse the enemy with the
idea of British as well as French forces being in this area. Lord
Kitchener asked me whether the Admiralty would help in this
matter. I agreed to send the brigade if he would also send some
Yeomanry Cavalry for its local protection. He sent a regiment. I was
thus led, though by no means unwillingly, into accepting a series of
minor responsibilities of a very direct and personal kind, which made
inroads both upon my time and thought and might well—though I
claim they did not—have obscured my general view. I formed a small
administration to handle the business, in which Colonel Ollivant[64]
was the moving spirit. On his suggestion we took fifty motor
omnibuses from the London streets so as to make our Marines as
mobile as possible, and very soon we had British detachments
ostentatiously displaying themselves in Ypres, Lille, Tournai and
Douai. Many risks were run by those engaged in these petty
operations, first under General Aston and subsequently when his
health had failed, under General Paris. No mishap occurred either to
the Marines or to the Yeomanry. They played their part in the
general scheme without loss or misadventure. It was, however, with
sincere relief that a month later, on the arrival of the leading troops
of Sir John French’s Army in the neighbourhood, I transferred these
detachments to the Commander-in-Chief, and divested myself of
anxieties which though subsidiary were burdensome.
Looking back with after-knowledge and increasing years, I seem to
have been too ready to undertake tasks which were hazardous or
even forlorn. Taking over responsibility for the air defence of Great
Britain when resources were practically non-existent and formidable
air attacks imminent was from a personal point of view “some love
but little policy.” The same is true of the Dunkirk guerrilla. Still more
is it true of the attempt to prolong the defence of Antwerp which will
be related in the next chapter. I could with perfect propriety, indeed
with unanswerable reasons, have in every one of these cases left the
burden to others. I believed, however, that the special knowledge
which I possessed, and the great and flexible authority which I
wielded in this time of improvisation, would enable me to offer less
unsatisfactory solutions of these problems than could be furnished in
the emergency by others in less commanding positions. I could at
that time give directions over a very large and intricate field of urgent
and swiftly changing business which were acted upon immediately
by a great variety of authorities who otherwise would have had no
common connecting centre. So I acted for the best, with confidence
in the loyalty of my colleagues, in the goodwill of the public, and,
above all, in my own judgment which I seemed to see confirmed
from day to day by many remarkable events.

This chapter, which began with good luck and success, must end,
however, with misfortune. The original War Orders had been devised
to meet the situation on the outbreak of hostilities. They placed the
pieces on the board in what we believed to be the best array, and left
their future disposition to be modified by experience. Under these
orders the 7th Cruiser Squadron in the Third Fleet, consisting of the
old cruisers of the Bacchante class (Bacchante, Euryalus (flagship),
Cressy, Aboukir, Hogue), was based on the Nore ‘in order to ensure
the presence of armoured ships in the southern approaches of the
North Sea and eastern entrance to the Channel, and to support the
1st and 3rd Flotillas operating in that area from Harwich.’ The object
of these flotillas was ‘to keep the area south of the 54th parallel clear
of enemy torpedo craft and minelayers.’ The Cruiser Force was ‘to
support them in the execution of these duties and also, with the
flotillas, to keep a close watch over enemy war vessels and transports
in order that their movement may be reported at the earliest
moment.’
This very necessary patrol had accordingly been maintained day
after day without incident of any kind happening, and we had now
been six weeks at war. In war all repetitions are perilous. You can do
many things with impunity if you do not keep on doing them over
and over again.
It was no part of my duty to deal with the routine movements of
the Fleet and its squadrons, but only to exercise a general
supervision. I kept my eyes and ears open for every indication that
would be useful, and I had many and various sources of information.
On September 17, during my visit to the Grand Fleet, I heard an
expression used by an officer which instantly arrested my attention.
He spoke of ‘the live-bait squadron.’ I demanded what was meant,
and was told that the expression referred to these old cruisers
patrolling the narrow waters in apparently unbroken peace. I
thereupon reviewed the whole position in this area. I discussed it
with Commodore Tyrwhitt and with Commodore Keyes. The next
morning I addressed the following minute to the First Sea Lord:—

September 18, 1914.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.

The force available for operations in the narrow seas should be capable of minor
action without the need of bringing down the Grand Fleet. To this end it should
have effective support either by two or three battle cruisers or battleships of the
Second Fleet working from Sheerness. This is the most efficiently air and destroyer
patrolled anchorage we possess. They can lie behind the boom, and can always be
at sea when we intend a raid. Battle cruisers are much to be preferred.
The Bacchantes ought not to continue on this beat. The risk to such ships is not
justified by any services they can render. The narrow seas, being the nearest point
to the enemy, should be kept by a small number of good modern ships.
The Bacchantes should go to the western entrance of the Channel and set
Bethell’s battleships—and later Wemyss’ cruisers—free for convoy and other
duties.
The first four Arethusas should join the flotillas of the narrow seas.
I see no sufficient reason to exchange these flotillas now that they know their
work with the northern ones.
As the “M” boats are delivered they should be formed into a separate half-flotilla
and go north to work with the Grand Fleet.
The King Alfred should pay off and be thoroughly repaired.

Prince Louis immediately agreed and gave directions to the Chief

of the Staff to make the necessary redistribution of forces. With this I
was content, and I dismissed the matter from my mind, being sure
that the orders given would be complied with at the earliest moment.
Before they could take effect, disaster occurred.
Pending the introduction of the new system, the Admiralty War
Staff carried on with the old. The equinoctial weather was, however,
so bad that the destroyer flotillas were ordered back to harbour by
the Admiral commanding the Bacchante squadron. That officer,
however, proposed to continue his patrol in the Dogger area with the
cruisers alone. The Admiralty War Staff acquiesced in the principle
of these arrangements but on the 19th instructed him to watch
instead the Broad Fourteens:—

‘The Dogger Bank patrol need not be continued. Weather too bad for destroyers
to go to sea. Arrange for cruisers to watch Broad Fourteens.’

This routine message did not of course come before me. It was not
sent, however, by the War Staff without proper consideration. In the
short steep seas which are the features of gales in these narrow
waters, a submarine would be at a serious disadvantage and could
only observe with extreme difficulty and imperfection. The rough
weather which drove in our destroyers was believed to be an
important protection against enemy submarines.
Both Admiral and Admiralty, therefore, were in agreement to leave
the cruisers at sea without their flotilla. If the weather moderated, it
was intended that one of Commodore Tyrwhitt’s flotillas should join
them there on the morning of the 20th. The sea, however, continued
so high on the 20th that the flotilla, led by the Fearless, had to turn
back to Harwich. Thus all through the 19th, 20th and 21st the three
cruisers, the Aboukir, Cressy and Hogue, were left to maintain the
watch in the narrow waters without a flotilla screen. The Admiral in
the Euryalus had to return to harbour on the 20th to coal his ship.
He left the squadron in command of the senior captain after
enjoining special precautions. There was no more reason to expect
that they would be attacked at this time than at any other. On the
contrary, rumours of German activity to the northward had brought
the whole Grand Fleet out in a southerly sweep down to the line
between Flamborough Head and the Horn Reef. Nor was there any
connection between the orders to these cruisers and the movement
of the Marine Brigade from Dover to Dunkirk which took place on
the 20th. The cruisers were simply fulfilling their ordinary task,
which from frequent repetition had already become dangerous and
for which they were not in any case well suited.
As soon as the weather began to abate on the 21st, Commodore
Tyrwhitt started off again for the Broad Fourteens with eight
destroyers, and was already well on his way when the morning of the
22nd broke. As the sea subsided, the danger from submarines
revived. The three cruisers, however, instead of going to meet their
destroyers, steamed slowly northward without zigzagging and at
under ten knots, as no doubt they had often done before. Meanwhile
a single German submarine, becoming more venturesome every day,
was prowling southward down the Dutch coast. At 6.30 a.m., shortly
after daylight, the Aboukir was struck by a torpedo. In twenty-five
minutes this old vessel capsized. Some of her boats were smashed by
the explosion, and hundreds of men were swimming in the water or
clinging to wreckage. Both her consorts had hurried with chivalrous
simplicity to the aid of the sinking ship. Both came to a dead
standstill within a few hundred yards of her and lowered all their
boats to rescue the survivors. In this posture they in their turn were
both sunk, first the Hogue and then the Cressy, by the same
submarine. Out of over 2,000 men on board these three ships, only
800 were saved, and more than 1,400 perished. The ships
themselves were of no great value: they were among the oldest
cruisers of the Third Fleet and contributed in no appreciable way to
our vital margins. But like all Third Fleet ships, they were almost
entirely manned with reservists, most of whom were married men;
and they carried also young cadets from Osborne posted for safety to
ships which it was thought would not be engaged in the great battles.
This cruel loss of life, although small compared to what the Army
was enduring, constituted the first serious forfeit exacted from the
Navy in the war. It greatly stimulated and encouraged the enterprise
of the German submarines. The commander of the fatal boat
(Lieutenant Weddigen) was exultingly proclaimed as a national hero.
Certainly the destruction with his own fingers of fourteen hundred
persons was an episode of a peculiar character in human history.
But, as it happened, he did not live long to enjoy his sombre fame. A
storm of criticism was directed at the Admiralty, and naturally it was
focussed on me. ‘Here was an instance of the disaster which followed
from the interference of a civilian Minister in naval operations and
the overriding of the judgment of skilful and experienced Admirals.’
The writer[65] of a small but venomous brochure which was
industriously circulated in influential circles in London did not
hesitate to make this charge in the most direct form,[66] and it was
repeated in countless innuendoes throughout the British Press. I did
not, however, think it possible to make any explanation or reply.
I caused the most searching inquiries to be made in the Admiralty
into the responsibility for this tragic event. The necessary Court of
Inquiry was convened. The Court found that the responsibility for
the position of the cruisers on that day was attributable to the
Admiralty War Staff telegram of the 19th which has been already
quoted. The First Sea Lord held that this was a reflection upon the
Admiralty by a subordinate Court; but it seemed to me that the
criticism was just and that it should stand. It was, however, by no
means exhaustive. One would expect senior officers in command of
cruiser squadrons to judge for themselves the danger of their task,
and especially of its constant repetition; and while obeying any
orders they received, to represent an unsatisfactory situation plainly
to the Admiralty instead of going on day after day, and week after
week, until superior authority intervened or something lamentable
happened. One would expect also that ordinary precautions would be
observed in the tactical conduct of squadrons. Moreover, although
the impulse which prompted the Hogue and Cressy to go to the
rescue of their comrades in the sinking Aboukir was one of generous
humanity, they could hardly have done anything more unwise or
more likely to add to the loss of life. They should at once have
steamed away in opposite directions, lowering boats at the first
opportunity.
I remitted all these matters to Lord Fisher when two months later
he arrived at the Admiralty; but he laconically replied that ‘most of
the officers concerned were on half pay, that they had better remain
there, and that no useful purpose would be served by further action.’
 CHAPTER XV
ANTWERP

‘If Hopes were dupes, Fears may be liars,

It may be in yon smoke conceal’d,
Your comrades chase e’en now the fliers,
And but for you, possess the field.

For while the tired waves vainly breaking

Seem here no painful inch to gain,
Far back, through creeks and inlets making,
Comes silent flooding in the main.’
Clough.

The Battle of the Marne—The Race for the Sea—Antwerp, the True Flank—
Admiralty Concern about Antwerp—The Neutrality of the Scheldt—Opening
of the Siege of Antwerp, September 28—Lord Kitchener’s Plans—Belgian
Decision to Evacuate Antwerp—Conference at Lord Kitchener’s House,
Midnight, October 2—British Ministers urge further Resistance—My
Mission to Antwerp—French Aid Promised—The Situation in Antwerp,
October 3—My Proposals to the Belgian and British Governments—Progress
of the German Attack—Strange Contrasts—Acceptance of my Proposals by
British and Belgian Governments—Chances of Success—Relief Approaching
—Fighting of October 5—The Belgian Night Attack Fails—The Front broken
in, October 6—Arrival of the British Naval Brigades—Arrival of Sir Henry
Rawlinson—Decisions of British and Belgian Council of War, Night of
October 6—The Personal Aspect—Five Days Gained.

I t is not possible to understand the British attempt to prolong the

defence of Antwerp without seeing the episode in its true setting.
The following is a simple way of reviewing the military operations in
the West up to the point which this account has now reached.
The German armies swept through Belgium intending to turn and
drive back the French left and left centre. At the same time after a
diversion in Alsace the French centre struck forward on either side of
Metz at the German left and left centre. The French hoped that this
counter-stroke would rupture the German line and paralyse the
turning movement through Belgium. However, after the whole fronts
had been in collision for several days of intense battle, it appeared
that the French counter-stroke had not ruptured the German line,
and that the turning movement through Belgium had succeeded in
driving back the French left. Thus by the twentieth day the French
right was thrown on to the defensive and their three armies of the
left and left centre and the British army were in full retreat
southward towards Paris. The Germans therefore were completely
successful in the first main shock.
But henceforward the French right stood like a rock in front of
Nancy under General de Castelnau, and at the Trouée des Charmes
under General Dubail, and the Germans sustained a series of bloody
checks. Meanwhile the French left and centre by retreating for five
marches extended the pursuing Germans to the utmost while falling
back themselves on their own reserves and supplies. And by
September 6 (the 37th day) the French armies turned and assumed
the offensive on the whole front of 120 miles from Paris to Verdun.
In addition a new French army under General Maunoury had come
into existence to the north of Paris which attacked the German right,
and all the time the resistance of the Nancy army (de Castelnau) and
of the army of General Dubail on its right continued unbreakable.
Thus from September 6 the whole of the French and German armies
and the British Expeditionary Force were locked in general battle on
a front of over 180 miles, with practically every division and all their
reserves on both sides thrown in.
This battle, which lasted for four days, was the greatest of the war.
The Germans aimed not at the capture of Paris or Verdun or Nancy,
but at the final destruction of the French military power. Had they
succeeded in breaking the French front between Paris and Verdun or
in falling upon its rear from the direction of Nancy, nearly half the
French Army, certainly more than a million men, would have been
cut off in the Verdun angle. The rest, whatever happened in the
neighbourhood of Paris, would have had to retreat to the southward
and would never again have been numerous enough to form a
complete front. Compared with stakes like these, the entry into Paris
by the German right flank or the capture of the Channel Ports by a
couple of German corps were insignificant and rightly discarded by
the German Headquarters. Once the French Army was cut in half
and finally beaten, everything would fall into their hands. They
therefore directed all their available troops to the battlefield, ignored
the Channel Ports, and compelled von Kluck, commanding their
right army, to skirt Paris and close in to their main battle front. How
near they were to success will long be debated and never decided.
But certainly they were within an ace. No military reproach lies upon
their disregard of other objectives: but only upon any failure to
disregard them. It is not to their neglect to enter Paris or seize Calais
that their fatal defeat was due, but rather to the withdrawal of two
German army corps to repel the Russian invasion of East Prussia.
The soul of the French nation triumphed in this death struggle,
and their armies, defeated on the frontier, turned after the long
marches of retreat, and attacked and fought with glorious and
desperate tenacity. British attention has naturally been concentrated
upon the intense military situation developed before and around
Paris, in which our own army played a decisive part; and the various
pressures which operated upon von Kluck have now been minutely
exposed. Attacked on his right flank and rear by Maunoury’s army
while advancing to the main battlefield, he was compelled to
counter-march first two of his corps and then his two remaining
corps in order to make head against the new danger. Thus a gap of
30 miles was opened in the German line between von Kluck and von
Bülow. Into this gap marched the battered but reanimated British
army. The tide had turned. But the whole of this great situation
about Paris was itself only complementary to the battle as a whole.
The gaze of the military student must range along the whole line of
the French armies, the defeat of any one of which would have been
fatal. Most of all his eye will rest upon the very centre of the Paris-
Verdun line, where Foch though driven back maintained his
resistance. ‘My centre cedes. My right recoils. Situation excellent. I
attack.’ But all the four French armies between Paris and Verdun
fought with desperate valour, while Dubail and de Castelnau round
the corner maintained their superb defence. And thus, weakened by
its rapid advance, the whole German line came to a standstill. And as
this condition was reached, the penetration by the British and by the
Fifth French army on the British right, of the gap in the German line
between von Bülow and von Kluck determined both these
commanders in succession to retreat, and thus imposed a retrograde
movement upon the whole of the invading hosts. ‘The most
formidable avalanche of fire and steel ever let loose upon a nation’
had spent its force.
From the moment when the German hopes of destroying the
French armies by a general battle and thus of ending the war at a
single stroke had definitely failed, all the secondary and incidental
objectives which hitherto they had rightly discarded became of
immense consequence. As passion declined, material things resumed
their values. The struggle of armies and nations having failed to
reach a decision, places recovered their significance, and geography
rather than psychology began to rule the lines of war. Paris now
unattainable, the Channel Ports—Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne—
still naked, and lastly Antwerp, all reappeared in the field of values
like submerged rocks when the tidal wave recedes.
The second phase of the war now opened. The French, having
heaved the Germans back from the Marne to the Aisne, and finding
themselves unable to drive them further by frontal attacks,
continually reached out their left hand in the hopes of outflanking
their opponents. The race for the sea began. The French began to
pass their troops from right to left. Castelnau’s army, marching
behind the front from Nancy, crashed into battle in Picardy, striving
to turn the German right, and was itself outreached on its left. Foch’s
army, corps after corps, hurried by road and rail to prolong the
fighting front in Artois; but round the left of this again lapped the
numerous German cavalry divisions of von der Marwitz—swoop and
counter-swoop. On both sides every man and every gun were hurled
as they arrived into the conflict, and the unceasing cannonade drew
ever northwards and westwards—ever towards the sea.
Where would the grappling armies strike blue water? At what
point on the coast? Which would turn the other’s flank? Would it be
north or south of Dunkirk? Or of Gravelines or Calais or Boulogne?
Nay, southward still, was Abbeville even attainable? All was
committed to the shock of an ever-moving battle. But as the highest
goal, the one safe inexpugnable flank for the Allies, the most
advanced, the most daring, the most precious—worth all the rest,
guarding all the rest—gleamed Antwerp—could Antwerp but hold
out.
Antwerp was not only the sole stronghold of the Belgian nation: it
was also the true left flank of the Allied front in the west. It guarded
the whole line of the Channel Ports. It threatened the flanks and rear
of the German armies in France. It was the gateway from which a
British army might emerge at any moment upon their sensitive and
even vital communications. No German advance to the sea-coast,
upon Ostend, upon Dunkirk, upon Calais and Boulogne, seemed
possible while Antwerp was unconquered.
My own feeling at the outbreak of the war had been that if the right
things were done, Antwerp ought to hold out for two or even three
months, that is to say, until we knew the result of the main collision
of the armies on all the fronts—French, Russian, Austrian. I rested
my thought on Metz and Paris in 1870–71, Plevna in 1878, Port
Arthur in 1904. The fall of Namur unsettled these foundations. Still
Antwerp, even apart from its permanent fortifications, was a place of
great strength, fortified by rivers and inundations, and defended by
all that was best in the Belgian nation and by practically its whole
Field Army.
I was from the beginning very anxious to do everything that could
be done out of our slender resources to aid the Belgian King and
nation to maintain their stronghold, and such small items as the
Admiralty could spare in guns and ammunition were freely sent. The
reports which we received from Antwerp and the telegrams of the
Belgian Government already at the beginning of September began to
cause me deep concern. So also did the question of the Scheldt,
whose free navigation both for troops and munitions seemed vital to
the Belgian people.
I thought that Antwerp should be made to play its part in the first
phase of the war by keeping as many German troops as possible out
of the great battle. If the Belgian Army defending the city could be
strengthened by British troops, not only would the defence be
invigorated, but the Germans would be continually apprehensive of a
British inroad upon them from this direction, the deadliness of which
Lord Roberts’s strategic instinct had so clearly appreciated. It was
true that we had no troops in England fit to manœuvre in the field
against the enemy. But the defence of the fortified lines of Antwerp
was a task in which British Territorial troops might well have played
their part. Accordingly on September 7 I sent a memorandum to the
Prime Minister, Sir Edward Grey and Lord Kitchener emphasising
the importance of Antwerp, particularly from the naval standpoint:—
[Click anywhere on map for high resolution image.]

‘The Admiralty view the sustained and effective defence of Antwerp as a matter
of high consequence. It preserves the life of the Belgian nation: it safeguards a
strategic point which, if captured, would be of the utmost menace.’

In order to save Antwerp, two things were necessary: first, effective

defence of the fortress line; and second, free uninterrupted
communication with the sea. The first was tolerably well provided for
by the Belgian Army which could easily be reinforced by British
Territorial troops. But the second essential, the free communication
with the sea, was a larger matter, and in it were involved our
relations with the Dutch. I proposed that we should request the
Dutch Government to give a free passage up the Scheldt to Antwerp
for whatever troops and supplies were needed. I pointed out further
that it was impossible to try to supply an army at Antwerp by Ostend
and Ghent; that the appeals which the Belgians were then making to
us to send 25,000 troops to co-operate with an equal number of
Belgian troops for the purpose of keeping open the line Antwerp-St.
Nicholas-Ghent-Bruges-Ostend was a counsel of despair.
 ‘It involves practically a flank position for a line of supply protected by forces
large enough to be hit hard and perfectly powerless against any determined
German attack which it is thought worth while to deliver. At any moment a punch
up from Brussels by a German division or larger force would rupture the line, and
drive the troops trying to hold it to be disarmed on neutral Dutch territory or into
the sea.’

I dwelt on the disadvantages to the Allies of a neutrality which kept

the Rhine open for Germany and closed the Scheldt to Antwerp.
As these questions are still of some delicacy I have thought it
better to summarise rather than reprint my memorandum. But I
draw the reader’s attention to the date—September 7.
I still think that strong representations to the Dutch Government
might well have induced them to grant this relief to Antwerp and the
Belgian nation in their agony. The original guarantee of Belgian
neutrality was given to the Government of the Netherlands, and it
would have been a natural and legitimate demand that they should
put no needless obstacle in the way of its fulfilment. The sympathies
of Holland for the sufferings of Belgium were naturally restrained by
the fear of sharing her fate. But a neutral Holland was of far more
use to Germany than a hostile, a conquered, or even an allied
Holland. Once Holland was attacked by or allied to Germany we
could close the Rhine, and if we were in alliance with Holland, the
Texel and other Dutch islands of enormous strategic importance
would become available for the forward action of the British Navy.
We should in fact have that oversea base without which a British
naval offensive was impossible. I do not therefore believe that if
Holland had agreed to open the Scheldt for the succour of Antwerp,
Germany would have declared war upon her. There would have been
a long argument about interpretations of neutrality in which the
Germans, after their behaviour, would have started at a great
disadvantage. I still think that if Holland could have said to Germany
‘the English are threatening us with a blockade of the Rhine if we do
not open the Scheldt,’ Germany would have accepted the lesser of
two evils.
The Foreign Secretary did not, however, feel able to put this grave
issue to the Dutch Government. Neither did Lord Kitchener wish to
use the British Territorial Divisions in the manner proposed, and
while adhering to my own opinion I certainly do not blame him. He
would not send any Territorials into Antwerp, nor was anything
effective done by the Allies for the city during the whole of
September. From the moment when German Main Headquarters
had extricated and reformed their armies after the failure at the
Marne, the capture of Antwerp became most urgently necessary to
them. Accordingly on the afternoon of September 9, as is now
known, the German Emperor was moved to order the capture of that
city. Nothing was apparent to the Allies until the 28th. The Belgian
and German troops remained in contact along the fortress line
without any serious siege or assaulting operations developing. But on
the 28th the Germans suddenly opened fire upon the forts of the
Antwerp exterior lines with 17–inch howitzers hurling projectiles of
over a ton.
Almost immediately the Belgian Government gave signs of
justified alarm. British intelligence reports indicated that the
Germans were seriously undertaking the siege of Antwerp, that their
operations were not intended as a demonstration to keep the Belgian
troops occupied or to protect the lines of communication.
Information had come from Brussels that the Emperor had ordered
the capture of the town, that this might cost thousands of lives, but
that the order must be obeyed. Large bodies of German reserve
troops were also reported assembling near Liége. In view of all these
reports it was evident that the rôle of our small British force of
marines, omnibuses, armoured cars, aeroplanes, etc., operating from
Dunkirk was exhausted. They had no longer to deal with Uhlan
patrols or raiding parties of the enemy. Large hostile forces were
approaching the coastal area, and the imposture whereby we had
remained in occupation of Lille and Tournai could be sustained no
longer.
Lord Kitchener was disquieted by the opening of the
bombardment upon the Antwerp forts. He immediately sent (on
September 29) a staff officer, Colonel Dallas, into the city to report
direct to him on the situation. On the evening of October 1 this
officer reported that:—

‘The Belgian War Minister considered the situation very grave. Did not think
that resistance to the German attack could be maintained by defensive measures
only within the fortress. That the only way to save Antwerp from falling was by a
diversion from outside on the German left flank. That the French had offered a
division and that he looked forward to co-operation by an English force also if that
could be arranged.’

The minister had also said

‘That a Belgian cavalry division and some volunteers, and possibly two divisions
of the Belgian Field Army would be able to assist in the operation which would be
most effective in the neighbourhood of Ghent.’

The Commander of the Antwerp fortress also considered the

situation grave, and while Colonel Dallas was with him a message
arrived to say that Fort Ste. Catherine had fallen, that the German
troops had pressed forward between it and the adjoining work, and
had occupied the Belgian infantry trenches at this point.
Colonel Dallas further reported that according to the Belgian
headquarters the German Army in Belgium comprised—‘Siege army,
consisting of the 3rd Reserve Army Corps, 1 division of marines, 1
Ersatz reserve division, 1 brigade of Landsturm, 2 regiments of
pioneers, 1 regiment of siege artillery.’ And that ‘The troops of the
Military Government of Brussels consist of a weak Landwehr
brigade and some Bavarian Landsturm, number unknown.’

The Belgian Field Army was about 80,000 strong, in addition to

which there were some 70,000 fortress troops. Four divisions of the
Belgian Army were defending the southern portion of the outer
perimeter of the Antwerp defences, with the 5th Division in reserve,
and one weak division was at Termonde. A cavalry division of about
3,600 sabres was south-west of Termonde guarding communications
between Antwerp and the coast. Ghent was held by some volunteers.
On the night of October 1, Sir F. Villiers reported that

‘On southern section of the outer line of forts German attacks continued to-day,
and in the afternoon the enemy’s troops disabled fort Wavre, Ste. Catherine and
adjoining works, and occupied Belgian trenches at this point.’
The Belgian troops were, however, still holding out on the Belgian
side of the River Nethe.
Lord Kitchener now showed himself strongly disposed to sustain
the defence or effect the relief of Antwerp, and to use the regular
forces he still had in England for this purpose, provided the French
would co-operate effectively. Early in the afternoon of October 2 he
moved Sir Edward Grey to send the following telegram to the British
Ambassador at Bordeaux:—

‘The French Government should be informed that military advisers here

consider that in view of the superior forces Germany has in the field there, the
dispatch of a French Territorial division with the additions proposed in ten days’
time, together with the force we are prepared to send, would not be able effectively
to force the Germans to raise the siege of Antwerp.
‘Unless something more can be done they do not advise the dispatch of the force.
We are sending some heavy artillery with personnel to assist Belgians.
‘Situation at Antwerp is very grave, and French Government will fully realise the
serious effect on the campaign that would be entailed by its loss.
‘Unless the main situation in France can be decided favourably in a short time,
which would enable us to relieve Antwerp by detaching a proper force, it is most
desirable that General Joffre should make an effort and send regular troops to
region of Dunkirk, from which post they could operate in conjunction with our
reinforcements to relieve Antwerp.
‘We can send some first-line troops, but not sufficient by themselves to raise the
siege of Antwerp, and we cannot send them to co-operate with any but French
regulars.
‘If General Joffre can bring about a decisively favourable action in France in two
or three days the relief of Antwerp may be made the outcome of that, but if not,
unless he now sends some regular troops the loss of Antwerp must be
contemplated.’

All he was able to send to Antwerp was the following:—

‘Be very careful not to raise hopes of British and French forces arriving quickly to
relieve Antwerp. The matter has not been decided, as the Territorial division
offered by France in ten days’ time would, in my opinion, be quite incapable of
doing anything towards changing the situation at Antwerp. I have represented this.
Unless a change is made, I consider it would be useless to put in our little force
against the very superior German forces in the field round Antwerp.’
 He then entered in some detail upon the few guns he was sending,
giving particular directions about the use of the two 9·2’s.
Up to this point I had not been brought into the affair in any way. I
read, of course, all the telegrams almost as soon as they were
received or dispatched by Lord Kitchener, and followed the situation
constantly. I warmly approved the efforts which Lord Kitchener was
making to provide or obtain succour for Antwerp, and I shared to the
full his anxieties. I saw him every day. But I had no personal
responsibility, nor was I directly concerned. My impression at this
time was that the situation at Antwerp was serious but not
immediately critical; that the place would certainly hold out for a
fortnight more; and that meanwhile Lord Kitchener’s exertions or
the influence of the main battle in France would bring relief. So
much was this the case that I proposed to be absent from the
Admiralty for about eighteen hours on the 2nd–3rd October.
I had planned to visit Dunkirk on October 3 on business connected
with the Marine Brigade and other details sent there at General
Joffre’s request. At 11 o’clock on the night of the 2nd I was some
twenty miles out of London on my way to Dover when the special
train in which I was travelling suddenly stopped, and without
explanation returned to Victoria Station. I was told on arrival I was
to go immediately to Lord Kitchener’s house in Carlton Gardens.
Here I found shortly before midnight besides Lord Kitchener, Sir
Edward Grey, the First Sea Lord, and Sir William Tyrrell of the
Foreign Office. They showed me the following telegram from our
Minister, Sir Frederick Villiers, sent from Antwerp at 8.20 p.m. and
received in London at 10 p.m. on October 2:—

The Government have decided to leave to-morrow for Ostend, acting on advice
unanimously given by Superior Council of War in presence of the King. The King
with field army will withdraw, commencing with advanced guard to-morrow in the
direction of Ghent to protect coast-line, and eventually it is hoped to co-operate
with the Allied armies. The Queen will also leave.
It is said that town will hold out for five or six days, but it seems most unlikely
that when the Court and Government are gone resistance will be so much
prolonged.
Decision taken very suddenly this afternoon is result of increasingly critical
situation. I have seen both Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, who
maintain that no other course was possible, in view of danger that the King’s
Government and field army will be caught here.

I saw that my colleagues had received this news, which they had
already been discussing for half an hour, with consternation. The
rapidity with which the situation had degenerated was utterly
unexpected. That the great fortress and city of Antwerp with its triple
line of forts and inundations, defended by the whole Belgian Field
Army (a force certainly equal in numbers to all the German troops in
that neighbourhood), should collapse in perhaps forty-eight hours
seemed to all of us not only terrible but incomprehensible. That this
should happen while preparations were in progress both in France
and England for the relief or succour of the city, while considerable
forces of fresh and good troops undoubtedly stood available on both
sides of the Channel, and before General Joffre had even been able to
reply to Lord Kitchener’s telegram, was too hard to bear. We looked
at each other in bewilderment and distress. What could have
happened in the last few hours to make the Belgians despair? Our
last telegram from Colonel Dallas, received that afternoon, had said:
‘Situation unchanged during night and Germans have not made
further progress. Great slaughter of Germans reported and
corresponding encouragement to Belgians, who are about to
undertake counter-attack in neighbourhood of Fort Ste. Catherine.’
And now a message at 10 p.m. announced immediate evacuation and
impending fall!
Those who in years to come look back upon the first convulsions of
this frightful epoch will find it easy with after knowledge and
garnered experience to pass sagacious judgments on all that was
done or left undone. There is always a strong case for doing nothing,
especially for doing nothing yourself. But to the small group of
Ministers who met that midnight in Lord Kitchener’s house, the duty
of making sure that Antwerp was not cast away without good cause
while the means of saving it might well be at hand was clear. I urged
strongly that we should not give in without a struggle: and we
decided unitedly upon the following telegram to Sir F. Villiers:—

October 3, 1914, 12.45 a.m.

 The importance of Antwerp being held justifies a further effort till the course of
the main battle in France is determined. We are trying to send you help from the
main army, and, if this were possible, would add reinforcements from here.
Meanwhile a brigade of Marines will reach you to-morrow to sustain the defence.
We urge you to make one further struggle to hold out. Even a few days may make
the difference. We hope Government will find it possible to remain and field army
to continue operations.

On the other hand, the danger of urging the Belgian Government

to hold out against their considered judgment without a full
knowledge of the local situation was present in every mind, and even
if the forces for the relieving army were to come into view, there was
much to be arranged and decided before precise dates and definite
assurances could be given. We were confronted with the hard choice
of having either to take decisions of far-reaching importance in the
utmost haste and with imperfect information, or on the other hand
tamely to let Antwerp fall.
In these circumstances, it was a natural decision that some one in
authority who knew the general situation should travel swiftly into
the city and there ascertain what could be done on either side. As I
was already due at Dunkirk the next morning, the task was confided
to me: Lord Kitchener expressed a decided wish that I should go; the
First Sea Lord consented to accept sole responsibility in my absence.
It was then about half-past one in the morning. I went at once to
Victoria Station, got into my train which was waiting, and started
again for Dover. A few minutes before I left, Lord Kitchener received
the answer to his telegram of the 2nd from the British Ambassador in
Bordeaux. Sir Francis Bertie said that before he could carry out the
instructions sent him about Antwerp, he had received a letter from
the French Foreign Minister stating that with the shortest delay
possible two Territorial Divisions, complete with artillery and
cavalry, would be sent to Ostend for the relief of the fortress. This
was to be without prejudice to what the French Government
expected to do very soon in respect of ‘a contemplated combined
movement, French, British and Belgian, on the extreme left of
General Joffre’s armies which indirectly would have the effect of
causing German troops in the neighbourhood of Antwerp to retreat,
and so effect its relief.’ The French Government, he said, could not go
back on their decision to employ Territorials. The French Foreign
Minister declared that the Territorials were good troops, better in
some respects than some of the Regulars, and that they were sending
two divisions complete, with artillery and cavalry, instead of one. Sir
Francis Bertie added that the French Government had received
reports from its Attaché in Antwerp stating that ‘though the military
situation there was not good, it could not be regarded as really bad.
The Germans had suffered severe losses in the attacks which they
had made on some of the outer works. Those attacks had not been
simultaneous, which fact indicated that the Germans were not in
great force, had only a limited siege train and not more than two
army corps before Antwerp.’
Meanwhile a telegram was also sent (1.15 a.m. October 3) by Sir
Edward Grey to the Belgian Government saying that I would arrive
on the morning of the 3rd.

‘It is hoped that the First Lord of the Admiralty, who is fully acquainted with our
views, may have the honour of an audience with the King before a final decision as
to the departure of the Government is taken.’

On this the Belgian Council of War, sitting at dawn on the 3rd,

suspended the order for the evacuation of the city.

‘I communicated at once with Minister of War,’ telegraphed Sir F. Villiers,

October 3, 6.37 a.m. ‘He summoned a meeting of Ministers, who, after
deliberation, informed me that, awaiting arrival of First Lord they had decided to
postpone departure. Audience with King for Mr. Churchill will be arranged for at
as early an hour as possible.’

Lord Kitchener now threw himself into the task of concentrating

and organising a relieving Army. He telegraphed at 9.40 a.m. on
October 3 asking the French War Minister to make all preparations
to send the proposed two divisions with cavalry and artillery
complete as soon as possible and to let him know how soon they
could be dispatched. He was asked in reply whether he would prefer
one Territorial Division with a complete brigade of Fusiliers Marins.
He replied that he preferred the two divisions, and that the question
of time was of the greatest importance and urgency. He was told,
however, that it had been decided to send the Fusiliers Marins after
all. He replied that whichever was most convenient to the French
should be sent, so long as it was sent with the least delay possible. He
telegraphed to his Staff Officer in Antwerp, Colonel Dallas, at 2.15
p.m. October 3:—

‘What force in your opinion would suffice? Give full details of what troops are
most required to deal with the situation in co-operation with the Belgian Field
Army.
‘The French Government say they will send two divisions with full complement
of cavalry and artillery, but I do not yet know when they will be available. If a corps
of our troops, under Sir John French, together with the 7th Division, and cavalry
division from here, [were] concentrated at Lille in order to attack the right flank of
the main German Army and drive it back, would this action, if accomplished in
about four or five days, in your opinion, relieve the situation at Antwerp quickly
enough to prevent the fall of the place, or must any troops employed to relieve
Antwerp be sent there via Zeebrugge, and, if so, can you give me approximately the
longest time we can have to get troops there, so that I can inform the French
Government?’

At 7.35 on the same afternoon the composition of the French

contingent was received from the British Ambassador:—

‘87th Territorial Division from Havre, under General Roy, consisting of 12

battalions of infantry, 2 groups of artillery (90–millimetre guns), 2 squadrons of
reserve cavalry (Dragoons), now being formed at Dunkirk, 1 engineer company,
headquarters and staff and usual services attached to a division.
‘The Fusiliers Marins brigade, under command of Rear-Admiral Ronarc’h, will
be composed of two regiments of Fusiliers Marins (6,000), 86 mitrailleuses
manned by seamen (260), 1 regiment of Zouaves (2,000). Total of contingent
about 23,000 men.
‘The Havre division will embark there on 5th October, and should be landed at
Dunkirk 7th October.
‘The Fusiliers Marins brigade will be sent to Dunkirk by land instead of by sea. It
will arrive at Dunkirk at about same time as the Territorial division, namely, 7th
October.’

I did not reach the city till after 3 p.m., and after consulting with
Colonel Dallas I was visited by the Belgian Prime Minister. Monsieur
de Broqueville was a man of exceptional vigour and clarity both of
mind and speech. He had been called to the helm of the Belgian State
at the moment of the decision not to submit to wrongful aggression.
He explained to me the situation with precision. General de Guise,
the commander of the fortress, added his comments. The outer forts
were falling one by one. Five or six shells from the enormous German
howitzers were sufficient to smash them to their foundations, to
destroy their defenders even in the deepest casemates, and to wreck
the platforms of the guns. Now the forts of the inner line were being
similarly attacked, and there was no conceivable means of preventing
their destruction one after another at the rate of about a fort a day.
The army was tired and dispirited through having been left so long
entirely upon its own resources without ever a sign of the Allies for
whom they had risked so much. Material of every kind—guns,
ammunition, searchlights, telephones, entrenching materials—was
scanty. The water supply of the city had been cut off. There were
many rumours of German sympathisers in its large population. At
any moment the front might be broken in under the heavy artillery
attack which was then in progress. But this was only half the danger.
The life and honour of the Belgian nation did not depend on
Antwerp, but on its army. To lose Antwerp was disastrous; to lose the
army as well was fatal. The Scheldt was barred by a severe
interpretation of neutrality. The only line of retreat was by a
dangerous flank march parallel to the Dutch frontier and the sea-
coast. Two Belgian divisions and the cavalry division were staving off
the Germans from this only remaining line of retreat. But the
pressure was increasing and the line of the Dendre was no longer
intact. If Ghent fell before the Belgian Army made good its retreat,
nothing would be saved from the ruin.
In these circumstances they had decided first to withdraw to what
was called the entrenched camp on the left bank of the Scheldt, that
is to say, towards their right; and, secondly, in the same direction
through Ghent towards the left flank of the Allied armies. These
orders had been suspended in consequence of the telegram from the
British Government.
I then exposed Lord Kitchener’s plan and stated the numbers of
the French and British troops already available for the assistance of
the Belgian Army. I emphasised the importance of holding the city
and delaying the Germans as long as possible without compromising
the retreat of the army. I pointed out that the issue of the battle for
the seaward flank still hung in the balance, and that the main armies
were drawing nearer to Belgium every day. I asked whether the
relieving forces mentioned, if actually sent, would influence their
decision. They replied that this was a new situation; that had this
help been forthcoming earlier, events might have taken a different
course. Even now, if their line of retreat were safeguarded by the
arrival of Allied troops in the neighbourhood of Ghent, they were
prepared to continue the resistance. I thereupon drew up, with their
approval and agreement, the following telegram to Lord Kitchener:—

Antwerp, October 3, 1914, 6.53 p.m. (received 9.45 p.m.)

‘Subject to confirmation on both sides, I have made following arrangement with
M. de Broqueville, Prime Minister:—
‘Every preparation to be made by Belgian Government now for a resistance of at
least ten days, and every step taken with utmost energy. Within three days we are
to state definitely whether we can launch big field operation for their relief or not,
and when it will probably take effect. If we cannot give them a satisfactory
assurance of substantial assistance within three days, they are to be quite free to
abandon defence if they think fit. In this case, should they wish to clear out with
field army, we (although not able to launch the big operation) are to help their field
army to get away by sending covering troops to Ghent or other points on line of
retreat. Thus, anything they will have lost in time by going on defending Antwerp
with all their strength will be made up to them as far as possible by help on their
way out.
‘Further, we will meanwhile help their local defence in all minor ways, such as
guns, marines, naval brigades, etc.
‘I have put the terms high to avoid at all costs our undertaking anything we could
not perform, and also to avoid hurry in our saying what troops we can spare for big
operations. You will be able, as your telegram No. 7 (to Colonel Dallas) indicates, to
do much better than this, and to give decided promise within three days, but the
vital thing is that Belgian Government and army should forthwith hurl themselves
with revived energy into the defence.
‘Attack is being harshly pressed at this moment, and half measures would be
useless, but Prime Minister informs me that they are confident they can hold out
for three days, pretty sure they can hold out for six, and will try ten.
‘This arrangement, if adopted, will give time necessary for problem to be solved
calmly.
‘Two thousand marines are arriving this evening.
Welcome to our website – the perfect destination for book lovers and
knowledge seekers. We believe that every book holds a new world,
offering opportunities for learning, discovery, and personal growth.
That’s why we are dedicated to bringing you a diverse collection of
books, ranging from classic literature and specialized publications to
self-development guides and children's books.

More than just a book-buying platform, we strive to be a bridge

connecting you with timeless cultural and intellectual values. With an
elegant, user-friendly interface and a smart search system, you can
quickly find the books that best suit your interests. Additionally,
our special promotions and home delivery services help you save time
and fully enjoy the joy of reading.

Join us on a journey of knowledge exploration, passion nurturing, and

personal growth every day!

ebookbell.com