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The U.S. Domestic
Intelligence Enterprise
History,
Development,
and
Operations

Darren E. Tromblay

Boca Raton London New York

CRC Press is an imprint of the

Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
CRC Press
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To the dear people of Holy Trinity Catholic Church—especially
those of the 11:30 choir—my Washington, D.C. family.
 CONTENTS
Acknowledgments xiii
About the Author xv

1 Introduction 1
1.1 Strategic Context 2
1.2 Political Context 3
1.3 Strengthening Concepts of Intelligence in the Domestic Environment 4
1.4 Positive and Negative Intelligence 4
1.5 Elements of National Power 5
1.6 Intelligence Requirements 6
1.7 Benefit for Civil Liberties 7
1.8 Paradigm for the Collection and Exploitation of Domestically
Developed Intelligence 8
1.9 Shape of This Book 9
Endnotes 11

2 Evolution of the Political Context for Intelligence in the Domestic Setting 13

2.1 The Federal Communications Act of 1934 14
2.2 Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 15
2.3 The National Security Act of 1947 17
2.4 Title III and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 18
2.4.1 Electronic Communications Privacy Act and
the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act 24
2.5 Executive Order 12333 25
2.6 President’s Surveillance Program and TSP 29
2.7 Post-9/11 Intelligence Legislation with Relevance for the Domestic
Environment 32
2.7.1 USA PATRIOT Act 32
2.7.2 Homeland Security Act 37
2.7.3 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 41
2.8 Inquiries into Failures 46
2.8.1 Congressional Pearl Harbor Investigation 47
2.8.2 Katzenbach Committee 47

v
Contents

2.8.3 Rockefeller, Church, and Pike 48

2.8.4 9/11 Commission 49
2.9 Public Opinion 51
2.9.1 Impact of Public Opinion 55
2.10 Conclusion 55
Endnotes 57

3 Components of the Domestically Oriented Intelligence Enterprise 67

3.1 Intelligence Community Agencies: Civilian 68
3.1.1 Federal Bureau of Investigation 68
3.1.1.1 Approach to Intelligence 71
3.1.1.2 Evolution of Organizational Culture 72
3.1.1.3 Headquarters Structure 77
3.1.1.4 Cyber Division 77
3.1.1.5 Counterintelligence Division 78
3.1.1.6 Counterterrorism Division 79
3.1.1.7 Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate 79
3.1.1.8 Criminal Investigative Division 80
3.1.1.9 Directorate of Intelligence 81
3.1.1.10 Operational Technology Division 82
3.1.1.11 Laboratory Division 86
3.1.1.12 Field Structure 88
3.1.1.13 Information Technology: The Bureau’s (Broken?)
Backbone 89
3.1.1.14 Investigation/Intelligence Collection 91
3.1.1.15 Impact on Intelligence Community 92
3.1.2 Department of Homeland Security 93
3.1.2.1 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 95
3.1.2.2 Immigrations and Customs Enforcement 95
3.1.2.3 Customs and Border Protection 96
3.1.2.4 Transportation Security Administration 97
3.1.2.5 U.S. Coast Guard 97
3.1.2.6 DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis 98
3.1.3 Drug Enforcement Administration 101
3.1.4 Department of the Treasury 107
3.1.5 Central Intelligence Agency 108
3.2 Intelligence Community Agencies: Military 113
3.2.1 Defense Intelligence Agency 113

vi
 Contents

3.3 Non-IC Agencies with an Intelligence Role in the Domestic

Environment: Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 115
3.4 Military Services Counterintelligence Components: Army
Counterintelligence Corps, Air Force OSI, NCIS, Defense
Criminal Investigative Service 116
3.4.1 U.S. Army 117
3.4.2 Air Force Office of Special Investigations 118
3.4.3 Naval Criminal Investigative Service 119
3.5 Conclusion 120
Endnotes 121

4 Integration by Exigency 133

4.1 Administrative Coordination 133
4.1.1 DNI Domestic Representative 134
4.1.2 Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference 134
4.1.3 Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc)/Huston Plan 135
4.2 Bilateral Cooperation between Agencies 136
4.2.1 Arrangements for Operational Coordination
between the FBI and the CIA 136
4.2.1.1 Formal Arrangements for Cooperation 136
4.2.1.2 Disruptions in the CIA–FBI Relationship 137
4.2.1.3 Culture as a Continuing Challenge 137
4.2.2 Arrangements for Operational Coordination
between the FBI and the Military 138
4.2.2.1 Formal Agreements 138
4.2.2.2 Coordination of Collection 139
4.2.2.3 Training 140
4.2.2.4 Other Avenues of Cooperation 140
4.3 Fusion Centers and Other Platforms for Multilateral Cooperation 141
4.3.1 FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces 141
4.3.2 FBI Joint Regional Intelligence Groups 143
4.3.3 FBI Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force 144
4.3.4 Department of Homeland Security and Fusion Centers 144
4.3.5 Narcotics Intelligence Fusion Centers 148
4.3.6 Gang Fusion Centers 149
4.4 Incorporation of Nonfederal Entities into the Domestically Oriented
Intelligence Mission Federal Assistance to Law Enforcement 151
4.4.1 FBI Relations with Law Enforcement 152

vii
Contents

4.4.1.1 FBI Use of Subfederal Entities to Effect Disruption 154

4.4.1.2 FBI Provision of Support to State and Local
Functions 155
4.4.2 CIA Liaison with Law Enforcement 156
4.4.2.1 CIA Collection in Furtherance of Facility Security 156
4.4.2.2 Agency Assistance to Federal Law Enforcement
Functions 157
4.4.2.3 Assistance to the CIA by Federal Law Enforcement 157
4.4.2.4 CIA Assistance to State and Local Authorities 158
4.4.3 Drug Enforcement Administration (as an IC Component)
and Law Enforcement 159
4.4.4 DOD Intelligence Entities and Law Enforcement 160
4.5 Task Forces 161
4.6 Federal Cooperation with Nongovernment Entities 162
4.6.1 Defense Industry 162
4.6.1.1 Department of Defense 162
4.6.1.2 Federal Bureau of Investigation 163
4.6.1.3 Current FBI Liaison with the Defense Industry 166
4.6.2 Critical Infrastructure and Industry 167
4.7 Private Sector Assistance to Government 169
4.7.1 Federal Bureau of Investigation 170
4.7.2 National Security Agency 171
4.8 Collaboration versus Information Sharing 171
4.8.1 Domestic Security Alliance Council 171
4.8.2 InfraGard 172
4.8.3 United States Oil and Natural Gas Crime Issues Special
Interest Group 172
4.8.4 Cyber Initiative Resource Fusion Unit 173
4.9 Academia 173
4.9.1 Identification of Subject Matter Expertise 174
4.9.2 Counterintelligence 175
4.10 Other Nonprofit Entities 176
4.11 Conclusion 178
Endnotes 178

5 Human Intelligence in the Domestic Setting 191

5.1 FBI and HUMINT 192
5.1.1 Types of Bureau HUMINT 193
5.1.1.1 Credibility of HUMINT-Derived Intelligence 194

viii
 Contents

5.1.2 Penetration of Threat: State Actors 195

5.1.3 Foreign Intelligence Opportunities 199
5.1.4 Threat Actor Penetration: Nonstate Actors 201
5.1.4.1 Foreign Intelligence 203
5.1.5 Nonstate Actors: Terrorist Organizations 204
5.2 Domestically Oriented HUMINT Collection by the U.S. Military 205
5.2.1 U.S. DOD HUMINT for Counterintelligence 206
5.2.2 Other Military Services’ Domestically Oriented Collection 208
5.2.3 Office of Strategic Services’ Domestic HUMINT 209
5.3 Central Intelligence Agency HUMINT 209
5.3.1 CIA Use of Academics as Sources of Information 209
5.3.2 CIA Use of Students as Sources of Information 210
5.3.3 U.S. Officials as Sources of Information 210
5.3.4 CIA Use of Journalists as Sources of Information 211
5.3.5 CIA Use of Social Movements as Cover for Collection 211
5.3.6 CIA HUMINT for Counterintelligence 212
5.4 Drug Enforcement Administration 215
5.5 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 216
5.6 Internal Revenue Service 217
5.7 State and Local Collection 218
5.8 Nonsource HUMINT Operations 220
5.8.1 Surreptitious Entries (i.e., “Black Bag Jobs”) 220
5.8.2 Undercover Operations 222
5.9 Conclusion 228
Endnotes 229

6 Communications Intelligence 241

6.1 Mail Interception 242
6.1.1 FBI Participation in HT/LINGUAL 243
6.1.2 FBI-Administered Mail Intercept Programs 244
6.1.3 Unilateral FBI Mail-Intercept Operations 245
6.1.4 Interagency, Mail-Derived COMINT Collection,
before the CIA 247
6.1.5 Present-Day FBI Mail Intercepts 249
6.2 Signals Intelligence 250
6.2.1 The Role of the NSA and Its Predecessors in the Domestic
Setting 250
6.2.2 The FBI as a SIGINT Agency 252

ix
Contents

6.2.3 SHAMROCK and Similar Programs of Private Sector

Cooperation 255
6.2.3.1 Central Intelligence SHAMROCK-Like Activity 258
6.2.3.2 FBI and SHAMROCK-Like Activities 259
6.2.4 Private Sector Cooperation in Developing SIGINT Capabilities 261
6.2.5 MINARET and Other SIGINT Programs with a Direct
Nexus to U.S. Persons 263
6.2.5.1 Military Collection in the Domestic Setting 266
6.2.5.2 FBI SIGINT Monitoring Involving U.S. Persons 267
6.2.5.3 Other Government Agencies’ Use of SIGINT 269
6.3 State and Local Use of SIGINT 270
6.4 SIGINT Collection, on U.S. Soil, against Foreign State and Nonstate
Actors 271
6.4.1 Military SIGINT Acquisition of Pure Foreign Intelligence
Domestically 274
6.5 Use of SIGINT as a Means to Conduct Targeted Intelligence Collection 274
6.6 Outlook 276
Endnotes 277

7 IMINT, FININT, and MASINT 289

7.1 Imagery Intelligence 290
7.1.1 Satellite-Derived IMINT 290
7.1.2 Manned and Unmanned Aircraft-Derived IMINT 291
7.1.3 Unmanned Aircraft-Derived IMINT 292
7.1.4 Ground-Based IMINT 293
7.2 Geospatial Intelligence 294
7.3 Financial Intelligence 294
7.3.1 FBI and FININT 295
7.3.2 DHS and FININT 297
7.3.3 CIA and FININT 298
7.3.4 Treasury Department and FININT 298
7.3.5 Internal Revenue Service and FININT 298
7.3.6 Drug Enforcement Administration and FININT 299
7.4 Measurements and Signatures Intelligence 299
7.4.1 FBI and MASINT 300
7.4.1.1 Identity Intelligence 301
7.4.1.2 Explosives and Other Weapons 302
7.4.1.3 Materials and Substances 302
7.4.1.4 Provenance and Deciphering of Documents 302

x
 Contents

7.4.1.5 Partnerships with Nonbureau Entities 303

7.4.1.6 Dissemination of MASINT Information
to Intelligence Partners 303
7.4.1.7 MASINT Collection via Intelligence Partners 303
7.4.2 Drug Enforcement Administration and MASINT 304
7.4.3 Department of Homeland Security and MASINT 304
7.5 Outlook 305
Endnotes 305

8 Intelligence Analysis of the Domestic Environment 313

8.1 Introduction 313
8.2 Federal Bureau of Investigation 315
8.2.1 Evolution of the Bureau’s Analytical Enterprise 316
8.2.2 Interagency Participation 324
8.2.3 Finished Intelligence Production 327
8.2.4 Dissemination of Raw Intelligence 328
8.2.5 Shortcomings of FBI Analysis 329
8.2.5.1 Politicization 329
8.2.5.2 Skewing toward Tactical 330
8.2.5.3 A Flawed Analytical Workforce 334
8.3 Central Intelligence Agency 337
8.4 Department of Defense 339
8.5 National Security Agency 340
8.6 Drug Enforcement Administration 341
8.7 Department of the Treasury, Office of Intelligence and Analysis 343
8.8 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis 344
8.9 Interagency Analytical Functions 345
8.9.1 Historical Precedents for Interagency Analysis 346
8.9.2 Department of Homeland Security Fusion Centers 347
8.9.3 National Gang Intelligence Center 348
8.9.4 Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group 349
8.9.5 El Paso Intelligence Center 349
8.10 Specialized Analytic Disciplines 350
8.10.1 Imagery Analysis 350
8.10.2 Communications Analysis 351
8.11 Outlook 353
Endnotes 354

xi
Contents

9 Disruption of Threat Actors and the Domestic Environment 367

9.1 Authorities for Disruption 368
9.2 Arrests and Prosecutions 369
9.3 Domestic Environment as a Platform for International Influence 372
9.4 Culture as an Avenue of Influence 374
9.5 Role of Geopolitically Significant Demographics 374
9.6 Academia 376
9.7 Counterintelligence and Disruption 378
9.8 SIGINT-Facilitated Disruptions 380
9.9 Covert Disruption against Domestic Groups 382
9.9.1 COINTELPRO, CPUSA 382
9.9.2 COINTELPRO, Socialist Workers Party 387
9.9.3 COINTELPRO, White Hate Groups 388
9.9.4 COINTELPRO: Black Nationalist–Hate Groups 389
9.9.5 COINTELPRO: New Left 390
9.9.6 Other COINTELPRO Operations 390
9.10 Disruption Operations Post COINTELPRO 393
9.11 Outlook 396
9.12 Conclusion 399
Endnotes 400

10 Conclusion 407
10.1 Legacy as a Factor in Shaping the Domestically Oriented Intelligence
Enterprise 408
10.2 Domain Awareness 408
10.3 Domestic Practices as a Model for Activities Abroad 410
10.4 Integration with the Broader U.S. Intelligence Picture 412
10.5 Activities Abroad at the Behest of State Actors 413
10.6 Activities Abroad at the Behest of Nonstate Actors 415
10.7 Exportation of Criminality 416
10.8 Realigning the Domestically Oriented Intelligence Enterprise
for Effectiveness 416
Endnotes 418

xii
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book would not be possible without the encouragement of friends
and colleagues in the field of intelligence: Frederick B., “Molly” F., Jennifer
H.K., Deborah A., Robert S., Elizabeth S., Joe McD., and many others
who shared drinks and kicked ideas around in the hope of making the
domestically­oriented enterprise work. Special thanks to my good friend
Dr. John F. Fox Jr. Finally, I am grateful to Zachary Wright of the FBI’s
Records Management Division, who did a fine job at painlessly moving
this manuscript through the prepublication review process.
All views expressed in this book are the author’s and do not represent
those of the FBI or any other component of the government of the United
States.

xiii
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Darren E. Tromblay has been an intelligence analyst­
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation for over a
decade. He holds an MA from the Elliott School of
International Affairs at George Washington University,
an MS in strategic intelligence from the National Defense
Intelligence College, and a BA in history and political sci-
ence from the University of California. Mr. Tromblay can
be reached at [email protected].

xv
 1
Introduction
The domestic environment is pivotal for the United States’ ability to
maintain an informational edge vis-à-vis state and nonstate actors. These
actors’ intentions toward U.S. interests become increasingly apparent as
the actors develop their proximity and access to the entities that embody
these interests. Most of these entities are, of course, in the domestic setting.
Counterintelligence, the prevention of an adversary’s acquisition of an infor-
mational advantage, comes most readily to mind when considering foreign
activities in the United States. However, history shows that opportunities to
seize an informational advantage, via the acquisition of positive intelligence
available due to the presence of foreign actors with unique knowledge, have
also been consistently present. This latter phenomenon will be increasingly
true because domestically available information not only directly pertains
to the United States but also transits it due to America’s role in the global-
ization of diplomacy and commerce. A domestically oriented intelligence
enterprise, if used efficiently, can provide vital information in an environ-
ment where the U.S. government possesses a home field advantage.
Unfortunately, the intelligence value of the domestic environment has
not been optimally realized. The term “domestic intelligence” has been
an incendiary within the context of American politics. However, “domes-
tic intelligence” is a wildly inaccurate characterization of what the agen-
cies responsible for operating within U.S. borders are doing. Rather than
focusing intelligence activities against domestic targets, in the fashion of
some Orwellian dystopia, federal and sub-federal agencies are identifying
intelligence information that happens to be resident within the domestic
environment. Unfortunately, the charged terminology has confounded an
open, ongoing, and responsible dialogue about how agencies tasked with

1
The U.S. Domestic Intelligence Enterprise

intelligence functions develop and deploy capabilities. The concern, para-

doxically, is that the more histrionic discussion becomes, any time “intel-
ligence” and “domestic” appear in the same sentence, the less likely that
effective, objective oversight can occur. Less oversight does not equate
with overreach. Rather, it is far more likely to result in failures because of
an inability to assess the redundancies and gaps in the de facto domesti-
cally oriented intelligence enterprise, which has emerged piecemeal dur-
ing the past century.

1.1 STRATEGIC CONTEXT

U.S. strategy provides context for intelligence activities that support it. Since
the end of the Second World War—the point at which the United States
fully recognized that it could no longer resort to isolationism and instead
needed to institute worldwide coverage—it has consistently defined its
interests in relation to the threats that it faced rather than the opportunities
by which it could advance its interests. The Cold War iteration of this tone
was set by NSC-68 in 1950, which emphasized a strategy of responding to
aggression.1 Political scientist Richard K. Betts has argued that between
the end of the Cold War and 9/11, U.S. national security policy shifted from
a focus on “threats” to one based on “opportunities.” Betts notes, “Instead
of countering immediate dangers, American policy aimed to stabilize
the world in order to prevent dangers from arising.” Remaining threats,
according to Betts, were “indirect rather than immediate, local not global.”
However, the United States, even by the end of the Cold War, had experi-
ence with localized problems posing a threat to national security concerns.
Betts concedes this when he discusses a “latter-day domino theory,” which
aimed to “prevent threats from emerging by preventing local pathologies
from metastasizing and eventually reaching Americans at home.”2 The
argument of Betts then does not actually describe an opportunity-driven
approach so much as a threat-driven approach, which took advantage of a
new global order to meet threats farther over the horizon.
Also with the end of the Cold War, U.S. intelligence tended to remain
focused on the military aspects of national power, a perspective that short-
changed the domestic setting. In the mid-1990s, the Twentieth Century
Fund issued a report that criticized the militarization of intelligence,
which shortchanged other elements of national power (ENPs), including
diplomacy and economics—the peacetime problems of a post–Cold War
world.3 (It is interesting that the United States fell into the same trap—a

2
 Introduction

narrow focus on military power—that the United States had exploited

to weaken the Soviet Union.) The foreign focus of military intelligence
did not bode well for the effectiveness of the domestically oriented intel-
ligence enterprise.

1.2 POLITICAL CONTEXT

Intelligence within the domestic setting has been even more confined
than U.S. intelligence writ large. In addition to a primarily defensive mis-
sion, shaped by U.S. strategy, the idea of intelligence operations within
the United States has consistently been a political third rail. It has been
treated as something distasteful at best and often elicited a visceral oppo-
sition at worst. The U.S. intelligence community components, operating
domestically, and the broader intelligence enterprise, have been skewed
toward a reactive approach by these elements of strategy and public opin-
ion. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was initially formed in 1908
to collect intelligence that would support enforcement of U.S. laws. After
the Second World War, the Bureau handed over foreign capabilities that
it had developed during the Second World War to the nascent Central
Intelligence Agency, arguably helping to establish that entity’s tone. (The
agency’s other precursor, the Office of Strategic Services, also brought
a threat-informed mentality, having been born of wartime operations.)
These influences arguably carried over to the broader U.S. intelligence
community, given that the director of the CIA served as the director of
the Central Intelligence—the head of the formal intelligence community—
until 2004. Attempts by various agencies to become more proactive in col-
lection have been met with public outcry.
The years following 9/11 prompted a reevaluation of U.S. intelli-
gence’s effectiveness. The results, which were meant to remedy short-
comings, dictated more of the same for the domestic setting. Although
the FBI attempted to solidify the public’s and internal audience’s aware-
ness of its integrality to intelligence, it branded itself as a threat-driven
organization. However, this was no different than what it had always
been, as it conceptually ceded the initiative to adversaries who would
continue to define the threat while the Bureau reacted. Similarly, the
Department of Homeland Security was threat defined, as it hardened
domestic entities against an attack. Missing in all of this was a consider-
ation of how the U.S. government could avail itself of the positive intel-
ligence present within the domestic setting.

3
The U.S. Domestic Intelligence Enterprise

Consistent with the United States’ primarily reactive approach to

global developments, too often the domestically oriented intelligence
agencies and authorities have come about because of intelligence fail-
ures (a phenomenon that this subset of intelligence agencies shares
with the broader U.S. intelligence community). Its roots in the Bureau
of Investigation were reactive—collecting intelligence, in an attempt to
identify perpetrators, only after a crime had occurred (an intelligence
failure on a small scale). This reactive approach carried through to the
21st century, as the FBI transformed (although with what degree of suc-
cess remains to be determined) itself and the Congress passed legislation
that created the Department of Homeland Security, bringing 22 agen-
cies under a single entity (with dubious results). Yet amid this troubling
trend, multiple agencies, including the FBI, have demonstrated flashes of
foresight and credibility, which, if encouraged, could create a culture that
emphasized both the development of an informational advantage against
an adversary and the ability to stymie threat activities.

1.3 STRENGTHENING CONCEPTS OF INTELLIGENCE

IN THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT
This book is agnostic about how intelligence is used by policy makers.
Intelligence informs decision makers. The resulting policy decisions are
directed at disrupting threats. The domestically oriented intelligence enter-
prise wields some of the tools to implement these decisions. This text sur-
veys the organization and operation of the domestically oriented intelligence
enterprise and identifies how its current ad hoc composition and capabili-
ties can be refined to support U.S. government decision makers, regard-
less of the track strategy and policy it may take. This means being able to
cover positive and negative intelligence, as well as develop cognizance of
the opportunities and conditions that federal and sub-federal entities can
exploit to disrupt adversaries’ clandestine collection and covert influence.

1.4 POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE INTELLIGENCE

There are two complementary and, at times, overlapping types of intel-
ligence. These are “negative” and “positive” intelligence information. The
term “negative intelligence,” popularized by historian Ladislas Farago,
refers to information about an enemy’s threat activity. It is collected

4
 Introduction

through disciplines such as security intelligence, counterintelligence,

counterespionage, and criminal investigations. Positive intelligence is
information that can provide decision makers with an informational
advantage against an adversary or competitor, whereas negative intelli-
gence races against the clock. The two fields of intelligence are not strictly
demarcated. As the National Security Council’s Dulles Report identified,
in the late 1940s, counterintelligence (a means of obtaining negative intel-
ligence) had not been fully exploited for its positive intelligence potential.4
The positive/negative distinction is uniquely important to bear in mind
when assessing the domestic setting. Historically, the capabilities directed
at collection have been premised on negative intelligence—apprehending
criminals, foreign spies, etc.—and will continue to be if the domestically
oriented intelligence enterprise simply builds on existing practices.

1.5 ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

Intelligence, in the domestic setting, should be closely associated with
the preservation and promotion of the U.S. national interest. This con-
sciousness of strategic importance will offset the historical emphasis on
collecting negative intelligence to disrupt a specific threat actor. However,
it is not appropriate for intelligence to serve specific policies. Instead, all
intelligence activities should be associated, conceptually, with preserving
elements of national power (ENPs).
ENPs are definitively articulated in the 2004 Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act, which describes “instruments of national
power,” as “diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland secu-
rity, and law enforcement activities.”5 Recent IC officials’ statements have
acknowledged that ENP preservation includes efforts to protect the pri-
vate sector. For instance, speaking in 2014, FBI Director James B. Comey,
addressing issues of counterintelligence, noted that foreign actors’ theft of
“innovative technology, critical research and development data, and intel-
lectual property” erodes “America’s leading edge in business and poses a
significant threat to national security.”6
Every mission, regardless of its seemingly reactive and local nature,
ultimately corresponds with an ENP. For example, violent incident
crimes undercut the ENPs of law enforcement by taxing resources and
undermining security. Local incidents also potentially have global
implications. Threat actors, such as the Soviet Union, have exploited
such episodes to embarrass Washington. For instance, the KGB pursued

5
The U.S. Domestic Intelligence Enterprise

the fomentation of racial violence in the United States, indicated, for

instance, by the proposal to bomb an African American target in New
York, with which it would attempt to implicate the Jewish Defense
League.7 In addition to making intelligence agencies’ domestic activities
more useful to national-level decision makers, the linkage of all aspects
of agencies’ missions to U.S. strategy helps to transform intransigent
agency cultures. For instance, the FBI has referred to itself as having
a dual mission of law enforcement and intelligence, which arguably
allows holdouts to insist on their participation in a law enforcement
mission rather than an intelligence mission. Recently, the Bureau has
rewritten its explanation, stating that it is “an intelligence-driven and
threat-focused national security organization with both intelligence and
law enforcement responsibilities.”8

1.6 INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

A central component of the U.S. intelligence enterprise is the orientation
of collection toward requirements. These may be viewed as a translation
of the concept of ENPs into an articulation of the items of information
that decision makers need to maintain ENPs. The National Intelligence
Priorities Framework (NIPF) is the Director of National Intelligence’s “sole
mechanism for establishing national intelligence priorities” and consists
of “intelligence topics approved by the President,” “a process of assign-
ing priorities to countries and nonstate actors relevant to the approved
intelligence topics” and a matrix displaying the priorities. Agencies are
required to associate their collection requirements to these priorities.9
Intelligence scholar Mark Lowenthal notes that there is an inher-
ent weakness in this type of system. He identifies the underlying issue
of requirements being “static” and states that “even if requirements are
reviewed and re-ranked periodically, they remain ‘snapshots’ in time.”10
The problem of priorities and associated requirements has been further
complicated by a failure of coordination. In its study, IC21: The Intelligence
Community in the 21st Century, the House of Representatives’ Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) staff noted that “[t]here is no
formal, ongoing dialogue among the various requirements committees,
and as a result, no overarching corporate view of the Community collec-
tion process against requirements targets.”11

6
 Introduction

The already lurching process of priorities and requirements is fur-

ther complicated by the introduction of concerns about domestically
oriented issues. These matters have demonstrably been relevant to the
intelligence community and the broader domestically oriented intelli-
gence enterprise. For instance, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 35,
which became effective in 1995 and outlined “a tiered structure of the
President’s prioritized intelligence needs” incorporated transnational
threats that included organized crime and narcotics.12 The director of
the FBI and the Attorney General both participate in the formulation of
national intelligence requirements to develop information in further-
ance of disrupting threats—including those from criminal actors—to the
United States.13
There is also conceivably a means for state and local requirements
to percolate upward into national-level priorities. The Department of
Justice’s Community Oriented Policing Services provided guidance to
state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies about producing “intel-
ligence information needs,” which are “questions expressed by customers
of the FBI and other intelligence producers, the answers to which sup-
port law enforcement functions.”14 Bureau participation in the national
requirements process provides a channel for these sub-federal needs to
inform national-level requirements because the FBI, as a member of the
IC, has a responsibility to “represent customer priorities in the DNI’s NIPF
process.”15 Conceivably, if properly marshaled, the FBI could bridge the
gap between sub-federal entities with an intelligence component and the
formulation of requirements against which IC entities and other collectors
could develop information.

1.7 BENEFIT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES

Closely integrating domestically oriented intelligence activities with U.S.
strategy provides a strong safeguard to civil liberties. Requiring agen-
cies—regardless of whether their focus is on state or nonstate threat actors
(including domestic, criminal entities)—to clearly align and articulate the
relevance of these activities to ENPs and requirements keeps agencies
accountable to oversight. This reassures the public that an agency oper-
ating domestically will not suddenly become some rogue entity out of a
Robert Ludlum novel.

7
The U.S. Domestic Intelligence Enterprise

1.8 PARADIGM FOR THE COLLECTION

AND EXPLOITATION OF DOMESTICALLY
DEVELOPED INTELLIGENCE
The intelligence mission, within the domestic environment, needs to fit
within a strategic context. Positive collection should offset, while not sup-
planting, the strong legacy of negative intelligence. A step in this direc-
tion is to orient all agencies’ collection activities toward requirements (as
illustrated in Figure 1.1).
This is a departure from the current emphasis on resolving discrete
investigations or otherwise pursuing an issue to a definitive conclusion.

Policy/other
strategic decisions Strategic decision makers’
needs for information to
make informed choices
drive requirements

Strategic
intelligence
Intelligence collection Intelligence
Intelligence derived from requirements
affecting disruption
Actionable
contributes to addressing
intelligence
requirements

Knowledge of threat
actors/activities informs
Disruption of new requirements
specific actors
(e.g. arrest/Persona
Non Grata)

FIGURE 1.1 The domestically oriented intelligence enterprise needs a revised

paradigm to ensure maximum effectiveness. This new paradigm emphasizes the
roles that collection and disruption have in preserving ENPs (as articulated by
requirements). Out of collection against these requirements comes information
for policy makers and information that facilitates the disruption of more immedi-
ate threats. On the basis of new questions from policy makers and new insights
about threats via disruption, requirements change to reflect the most pertinent
information needs.

8
 Introduction

As illustrated in Figure 1.1, this is an important but subsidiary component

of a domestically oriented intelligence mission. Requirements-oriented
collection, covering the scope of an issue, will inevitably produce coverage
on which action can be taken. Such action may be in the form of disrupt-
ing threat actors in the near term (through measures such as prosecution)
or informing policy decisions that produce longer-term outcomes. (In
many cases, the same intelligence, developed against requirements, can
contribute to both the near- and longer-term outcomes.) The outcomes of
tactical and strategic decisions will likely contribute to a dynamic process
of requirements revision.

1.9 SHAPE OF THIS BOOK

The following chapters examine the nature of intelligence within the
domestic environment in a strategic context. The book is divided into sev-
eral overarching thematic sections: the evolution of the domestically ori-
ented intelligence enterprise; the collection capabilities of the enterprise;
the use of that intelligence, by analysis, to facilitate decision making; and
the use of intelligence to implement decisions via disruption.
The legislative and executive decisions that have shaped the develop-
ment of the domestically oriented intelligence enterprise are the topic of
Chapter 2. This covers the measures that have created new agencies and
entities (e.g., the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which established the
Department of Homeland Security, etc.) as well as the measures that facili-
tated or constrained intelligence collection (e.g., the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978). This, intentionally, does not deal with legislation
establishing prosecutable violations (e.g., the Foreign Agents Registration
Act of 1938 or the Espionage Act of 1917). Rather, the focus is on the deci-
sions that have provided capabilities rather than predications for the use
of these capabilities.
Chapter 3 provides a thorough discussion of the domestically oriented
intelligence enterprise, which includes not only the federal agencies which
fall under the auspices of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI) but also the role of non-IC entities. The latter set of agencies—
whether federal or sub-federal (state, local, and tribal)—contributes to the
awareness of threats and vulnerabilities within the domestic environment,
often through direct interaction with IC members.
The individual agencies, on which Chapter 3 focuses, are part of a
de facto intelligence enterprise due to information and capability sharing

9
The U.S. Domestic Intelligence Enterprise

relationships. Chapter 4 expounds on this concept, discussing the interac-

tions that incorporate federal and sub-federal entities into the enterprise.
In addition, several nongovernmental academic and advocacy bodies
directly engage with and provide expert input to decision making about
intelligence resources and the use of these resources. The chapter includes
consideration of these participants.
Chapter 5 brings the book into the section on collection, with its
emphasis on human intelligence (HUMINT) operations. This includes
the use of undercover officials and recruited human assets. In its focus
on intelligence information, the chapter addresses both the collection of
information from entities within the United States and the use of entities
within the United States to gather information about targets abroad, as in
the case of the FBI’s SOLO operation.
Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the technical aspects of collection, includ-
ing signals intelligence (SIGINT), measures and signatures intelligence
(MASINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT). All of these disciplines
have unique implications for the domestic environment. SIGINT, directed
against U.S. targets, is closely governed by legislation passed in 1968 and
1978. However, significant information of possible intelligence value tran-
sits the United States due to the presence of infrastructure, providing an
opportunity to collect against foreign targets from a controlled environ-
ment. MASINT and IMINT are similarly problematic in that they are
extremely valuable but also clearly intrusive.
The final two substantive chapters address the exploitation of intelli-
gence. Chapter 8 deals with analysis—the process of refining information
so that it is of value to decision makers. Analysis of information developed
within the domestic setting has historically been a weak (although not non-
existent) discipline. This is attributable to multiple factors, including a lack
of consistent policy-maker interest. The backlash against the Johnson and
Nixon administrations’ requests for information about domestic unrest
arguably soured policy makers on intelligence regarding domestic mat-
ters, until 9/11 forced the reconsideration of the need for information about
the domestic environment. In addition, the reactive approach toward many
intelligence issues within the domestic setting did not call for the analy-
sis of trends but rather deductive investigation. Chapter 9 addresses dis-
ruption. This uses intelligence assets to implement policy decisions along
two axes. The first axis is tactical—strategic, at what level is a disruptive
measure directed (e.g., prosecution of an individual criminal, use of covert
action to mislead a foreign government, etc.). The second is transparency,
which ranges from discoverable prosecution to covert action.

10
 Introduction

Intelligence functions within the domestic setting have routinely

been the impetuses for eruptions of controversy. Despite being a topic
that inspires strong sentiments, there is a dearth of scholarly work on the
evolution of the domestically oriented intelligence enterprise to provide
context for discussions. Instead, much of the literature addresses those
agencies responsible for the unique domestic mission, in the context of
the broader intelligence community. (This may actually contribute to the
controversy as the intelligence community outside the United States oper-
ates with far fewer restrictions than it does domestically.) When it is not
the subject of generic treatments, domestic activity is usually addressed
only in terms of its failings (e.g., Pearl Harbor, the CIA domestic activities
documented in its “Family Jewels” papers, the 9/11 attacks, etc.).
This book is intended to prompt a rethinking of intelligence within
the domestic environment. It takes into account the political realities, the
organizational cultures, and the evolving missions that have shaped those
agencies responsible for positive and negative intelligence and disruption
of threats on American soil. This will hopefully provide a counterweight
to future knee-jerk reactions and, instead, inspire a thoughtful approach
that uses an efficient manner to advance U.S. strategic interests while pro-
tecting the rights of Americans.

ENDNOTES
1. John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Press,
2005), 165.
2. Richard K. Betts, From Cold War to Hot Peace: The Habit of American Force,
Political Science Quarterly 127, no. 3 (2012).
3. Tim Weiner, Spy Agencies Faulted for War Focus, New York Times, June 28,
1996.
4. Michael Warner and J. Kenneth McDonald, U.S. Intelligence Community
Reform Studies Since 1947 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency,
Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), 11.
5. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-458.
6. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Statement before Senate Judiciary Committee,
May 21, 2014, available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/oversight​
-of-the-federal-bureau-of-investigation-5 (accessed November 25, 2014).
7. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The
Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books,
1999), 238.
8. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Frequently Asked Questions, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/faqs (accessed October 25, 2014).

11
The U.S. Domestic Intelligence Enterprise

9. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Community

Directive Number 204, September 13, 2007 (Washington, DC, 2007).
10. Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 2nd ed. (Washington,
DC: CQ Press, 2003), 44.
11. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, IC21: The Intelligence
Community in the 21st Century. Staff Study (Washington, DC, 1996).
12. See note 10.
13. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Directorate of Intelligence: Intelligence Cycle,
available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/intelligence-cycle
(accessed August 26, 2014).
14. U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State,
Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies (Washington, DC, 2004), 153.
15. See note 9.

12
 2
Evolution of the Political
Context for Intelligence
in the Domestic Setting
The intelligence mission, in the domestic setting, is governed by a patch-
work of legislative, executive, and judicial decisions. Two impulses have
driven the developments. On one side are the measures that respond
to threats against U.S. interests. These include President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt’s (FDR) 1934 and 1936 taskings of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), the Homeland Security Act, the President’s
Surveillance Program (PSP), and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act (IRTPA). On the other side are decisions driven by skep-
ticism. For instance, although the National Security Act of 1947 was a
recognition that the United States needed an organized intelligence
community, it also showed the influence of deep-seated concern, in the
American political psyche, regarding domestically oriented intelligence
authorities. Similarly, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
emerged in the wake of the scandals that plagued the intelligence com-
munity during the late 1960s and early 1970s.
In addition to ricocheting between the two poles of crisis—not
doing enough and doing too much—the domestically oriented intel-
ligence enterprise also reflects the influence of technocratic decisions.
These are the actions that have kept the IC functioning and organized,
rather than introducing shocks to the system. Executive Order 12333

13
The U.S. Domestic Intelligence Enterprise

(EO 12333) is the most significant example of this category of decision.

In addition, the legislative branch has periodically introduced new leg-
islation such as the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement
Act (CALEA) and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)
to keep intelligence collection capabilities up to speed with develop-
ments in technology. The regular modifications to FISA legislation are
also indicative of this trend.
Missing from the progression is a cogent public policy discussion that
articulates what the U.S. government needs to accomplish in the domes-
tic setting. Definitions abound (e.g., “foreign intelligence”; “national intel-
ligence”; “homeland security”). These terms help the informed reader
grasp the concept of intelligence within the domestic setting. However,
placing the terms “domestic” and “intelligence” in the same sentence is
a third rail which triggers a visceral reaction among voters, who equate
these concepts with an Orwellian dystopia. Policy makers must grapple
with the reality that this aversion is a strain of thought deeply embedded
in American political DNA, anchored firmly by the Fourth Amendment.
The arcane exegesis of intelligence policy is not effective against such
strong sentiments.
The U.S. government’s inability to articulate a clear vision for what
intelligence within the domestic setting means does no one any favors.
The enterprise is politically fragile, as it seems to be perpetually cast as
targeting Americans rather than collecting information of legitimate
interest, which happens to be accessible most effectively and efficiently
on U.S. soil. This fragility creates preemptive risk averseness (which is
already an inherent problem for any government entity). Arguably, this
leads to a lag between global trends and technological developments
because raising issues about new capabilities may provoke the elector-
ate’s misplaced fury (and opposition from the lawmakers beholden to
that agitated electorate). This vicious and vexing cycle brings things full
circle to the patchwork currently governing intelligence as it pertains to
the domestic setting.

2.1 THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934

In 1934, the Federal Communications Act (FCA) overhauled electronic
communications. In addition to creating a regulatory system for wire
and radio transmissions, governed by the Federal Communications
Commission, it stated that “no person not authorized by the sender shall

14
 Evolution of Political Context in the Domestic Setting

intercept any communication and divulge or publish” its contents. The

FCA was a reaction to the 1928 Supreme Court decision, which held that
Fourth Amendment protections did not cover interception, which was
effected without physical trespass.1 The FCA’s act’s prohibitions were in
force until 1940, when several executive branch decisions reinterpreted
the law’s applicability. In 1940, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) deter-
mined that the FCA’s prohibition on wiretapping only applied if the infor-
mation obtained as a result was divulged. Circulation from one member
of the government to another member did not count as “divulgence.”
Furthermore, the information could be provided for law enforcement
purposes.2 FDR authorized the FBI to engage in wiretapping against indi-
viduals suspected of subversion against the United States and advised the
Attorney General that the prohibitions did not apply to matters involving
national defense.3 These taps required the Attorney General’s approval. In
1946, the DOJ reaffirmed these interpretations of the FCA.4
The FCA only covered wire and radio communications and did not
address microphone surveillance. Thus, warrantless microphone surveil-
lance, a form of signals intelligence (SIGINT), was permissible in national
security cases, at the discretion of the agencies conducting it.5 In 1952,
the DOJ prohibited microphone surveillance that required trespass but
reversed this position in 1954 when the Attorney General authorized the
FBI to conduct microphone surveillance in furtherance of the national
interest.6 From 1954 to 1965, the Bureau had, what the Church Committee
called, “unsupervised discretion to use microphone surveillance and to
conduct surreptitious entries to install microphones.”7 In 1965, Attorney
General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach mandated that wiretaps and micro-
phones would require not only prior authority to install but also periodic
review.8

2.2 FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT

AND THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
A distinct intelligence mission, concerned with peacetime develop-
ments in the domestic environment, emerged during President FDR’s
first term. On May 8, 1934, FDR presided over a White House meeting
of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, Attorney General Homer S. Cummings,
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of Labor Francis
Perkins, and Secret Service Chief W.H. Moran.9 The reason for this meet-
ing was the growing amount of Nazi propaganda and fascist activity

15
The U.S. Domestic Intelligence Enterprise

in the United States, which was viewed by some, according to histo-

rian Raymond Batvinis, not as an indigenous movement but rather as
“a scheme being financed and directed by the German government
through its Washington embassy and various consulates throughout
the country.”10 At FDR’s instruction, the Bureau conducted a one-time
overview of the fascist movement, which Hoover described as an “intel-
ligence investigation.”11 On May 10, 1934, field offices received instruc-
tions to conduct an investigation of the Nazi movement, with particular
emphasis on antiracial and anti-American activities having any possible
connections with official representatives of the German Government in
the United States.12
This meeting represented a departure from the previous paradigm
of intelligence collection, contributing to a strategic awareness of national
security rather than merely serving a departmental interest. Hoover
used the fig leaf that these collection activities served the Department of
Labor’s Immigration Service.13 However, with a tasking that clearly origi-
nated from the Oval Office, domestically oriented intelligence collection
became a unique mission. Batvinis noted another important precedent
that emerged from this meeting: the “broader and more sweeping infor-
mational inquiries” joined the investigation of specific federal offenses as
part of the Bureau’s sanctioned mission.
This model was further codified by a similar inquiry into commu-
nist influences within the United States. On August 24, 1936, FDR met
with Hoover and requested the coverage of communist activities.14 The
meeting’s proceedings again challenged the approach to intelligence in
which individual agencies collected information to suit their distinct,
parochial needs. Hoover pointed out to the president that the responsi-
bilities for the collection of this information were spread across multiple
agencies. FDR solved this diffusion of functions the following day by
granting the responsibility to Hoover, via an informal memorandum of
understanding that these tasks would technically be conducted on behalf
of the U.S. Department of State.15 This could be done, Hoover’s argu-
ment went, because both Communism and Fascism were international in
scope, thereby falling under State Department purview.16 (The informal
memorandum, which FDR insisted on, fearing the flap potential of a for-
mal assignment, has never been found.17) Secretary of State Cordell Hull
accepted this reasoning with distinct enthusiasm, giving his support to
“go ahead and investigate the cock-suckers.”18 This endorsement did not
make it into Hoover’s official account of the meeting. By executive order,

16
 Evolution of Political Context in the Domestic Setting

the Bureau was responsible for all investigations relating to espionage,

sabotage, and neutrality violations.19
The 1936 tasking increased the scope of authorities granted by the
1934 request. Rather than a one-time effort, this was to be “a more sys-
tematic collection of intelligence” according to the Church Committee.20
Furthermore, according to Hoover’s interpretation of the 1936 tasking,
the FBI had a newfound, sweeping responsibility that included not only
Communism and Fascism but also “all other organizations or groups
advocating the overthrow or replacement of the Government of the United
States by illegal methods.”21 Unlike Hoover’s previous attempts to develop
systematic awareness of subversive activities, this new development could
not be ended by a discomfited Attorney General.

2.3 THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

With the end of the Second World War, it became clear that the United
States could not, again, revert to an isolationist mentality. In an effort to
ensure that another surprise attack akin to that which occurred on Pearl
Harbor would not happen again, it was necessary to develop an organized
intelligence enterprise that could maintain vigilance and keep decision
makers advised of emerging challenges to U.S. interests. Hashing out the
solution to this problem, which would eventually be codified by execu-
tive and legislative actions, produced a tense Washington debate over the
responsibilities for domestically oriented intelligence.
Philosophies about the role of intelligence services were an underlying
area of contention. President Harry S. Truman was distinctly concerned
about the emergence of a “gestapo,” and this fear, harbored by a man
whose experience was in backroom machine politics rather than policy, set
the tone for a crucial development in U.S. national security. This concern
drove Truman to reject the DOJ’s plan for worldwide intelligence coverage,
which would have enshrined the FBI’s role as both a national and inter-
national collector.22 Such a project would build on the foundation of the
Bureau’s Special Intelligence Service the FBI’s wartime apparatus, which
conducted clandestine collection throughout most of Latin America. In
addition, the Bureau recognized that sources of foreign intelligence did
exist in the domestic field, a point that contributed to tension between
Hoover and Lt. Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, director of Central Intelligence
from 1946 to 1947, over the exploitation of this information. When Truman

17
The U.S. Domestic Intelligence Enterprise

established the National Intelligence Authority (NIA)—another permuta-

tion of the early intelligence community—it included a representative of
the president and the secretaries of state, war, and navy but did not include
the FBI.23 This reflected the secretaries’ conclusion that police work and
foreign intelligence should remain separate.24 When Congress passed the
National Security Act in July 1947, it did little to resolve the debate about
the domestic environment, with its only nod to the subject in terms of intel-
ligence being a prohibition against the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
having “police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security
functions.” The legislation enshrined a reality against which Hoover had
warned, in 1946, on a handwritten note that read, “The powers that be
think it practical to divide domestic and foreign intelligence. Such a move
will create another ‘Pearl Harbor’” (Figures 2.1 and 2.2).
The cumulative outcome of the NIA and the National Security Act
was ambiguity about the intelligence mission as it pertained to the
domestic environment. Before this bifurcation, there had been little con-
cept of “domestic” versus “foreign” intelligence. It became legally, or at
least politically, perilous for the CIA to engage in collection domestically.
Meanwhile, the Bureau, despite its previous intelligence experience, was
relegated to the role of a security agency. The U.S. homeland, which should
have been a region where the IC could most easily obtain information
of value to policy makers (as it was an area where foreign actors’ inten-
tions vis-à-vis American interests would become most apparent), instead
continued to be a site of duplicated efforts and uncoordinated activities.
The only difference between the ad hoc enterprise before the National
Security Act and the uncoordinated efforts that would characterize the
domestically oriented intelligence mission following the passage of this
legislation was that ambiguity had been memorialized in law.

2.4 TITLE III AND THE FOREIGN

INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
The next significant developments for intelligence in the domestic envi-
ronment occurred on the opposite ends of a 10-year span, between 1968
and 1978. The two pieces of legislation—the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)—
provided the foundations for modern SIGINT collection pertaining to the
domestic setting. Both pieces of legislation came in the wake of increased
scrutiny directed at domestically conducted intelligence activities. The

18
 Evolution of Political Context in the Domestic Setting

FIGURE 2.1 From an intelligence viewpoint, the Hoover quote about splitting
domestic and foreign intelligence is important, as it shows that there was recogni-
tion, even before the current U.S. intelligence community was established, that valu-
able insights would be lost by not incorporating the domestic environment into the
United States’ approach to intelligence collection and disruption of threats.

19
The U.S. Domestic Intelligence Enterprise

FIGURE 2.2 The Hoover quote about the O.S.S. illustrates the antipathy that the
split engendered and that, as illustrated by the discussion of FBI–CIA relations,
continued for decades.

20
 Evolution of Political Context in the Domestic Setting

1968 Omnibus Crime Control legislation followed the Attorney General’s

imposition of stricter controls on electronic surveillance. FISA became
law in the wake of multiple disclosures about perceived overreach by the
intelligence community that infringed on the civil liberties of American
citizens. Both laws remain works in progress due to the evolution of tech-
nology, which produces scenarios that legislators who drafted these laws
could not possibly have foreseen.
Efforts to define the ground rules for the use of electronic surveil-
lance began 10 years before the passage of FISA legislation. The Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 included guidance regard-
ing these activities in Title III. Areas of concern included the following:
actions to use electronic means for intelligence collection, availability of
technology to conduct electronic surveillance, and rules on introduction
of intercepted material in legal proceedings.25 Title III was a response to
the Supreme Court’s recognition that the Fourth Amendment protected
oral communication transmitted electronically. Because the court did not
include national security matters in its decision, Congress did not attempt
to regulate surveillance related to these issues.26
This legislation, as its title indicates, was formulated in the context of
addressing criminal activities. However, as discussed previously, the intel-
ligence understanding of criminal activity, as opposed to foreign intelli-
gence, is an arbitrary distinction when it comes to assessing the impact of
developments on U.S. interests. Therefore, the 1968 legislation should be
viewed as part of a larger puzzle. It addressed an aspect of intelligence
collection, which was necessary but contributed to the fragmentation of
the domestically oriented intelligence enterprise at the same time by set-
ting criminal intelligence on a separate path from foreign intelligence.
The governance of domestic SIGINT directed at foreign intelligence
information went through multiple permutations before the passage
of FISA legislation. The first proposal, in 1974, would have built on the
Omnibus Crime Control legislation’s Title III to regulate the interception of
wire and oral communications in the United States. This version obtained
little support.27 A 1976 proposal, favored by the executive branch, received
consideration. This would have addressed wire communication acquired
within the United States, radio communications, and other techniques
such as the domestic usage of microphone surveillance. The version
passed in 1978 (Public Law 95-11) applied to the targeting of specific U.S.
persons, in the United States, regardless of whether the surveillance was
directed at domestic or international communications. FISA, unlike Title
III, does not require probable cause that a proposed target has committed,

21
The U.S. Domestic Intelligence Enterprise

is committing, or will imminently commit a crime. Rather, it requires a

showing of probable cause to believe that the target is a foreign power or
an agent of a foreign power.
Within the FISA legislation, in addition to definitions of “foreign
power,” “agent of a foreign power,” and “international terrorism,” was an
explicit definition of “foreign intelligence information.” This last element
consisted of the following:
(1) information that relates to and if concerning United States person is
necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect against—(A) actual
or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power; (B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power; or (C) clandestine intelligence activi-
ties by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent
of a foreign power; or (2) information with respect to a foreign power or
foreign territory that relates to, and if concerning a United States person,
is necessary to (A) the national defense or the security of the United States
or (B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.

This definition, particularly the second section, is relevant as it enshrines

the idea that positive intelligence (rather than simply information on
threats) can be obtained domestically.
The 1978 legislation, in its legal precision, was premised on regulating
intelligence collection against technology of the day. Not surprisingly, the
balance of U.S. decision makers’ legitimate needs against the civil liberties
of the American public became distorted as methods of communication
evolved through subsequent decades. Multiple U.S. intelligence officials
argued, during the run-up to FISA reform in 2007, that while the 1978 act
had been drafted in the context of international communications being
primarily transmitted by satellites, this had since transitioned to the pri-
mary means of transmission being via undersea fiber optic cables.28 A
counterargument to the government’s claim can be found in the working
paper, published jointly by Brookings, Georgetown Law Center, and the
Hoover Institution, by David S. Kris.29
In addition to addressing the evolving ways by which Americans
engaged in communications with foreign entities, FISA reform had to
address the issue of wholly foreign communication, which had an increas-
ing nexus to the domestic environment. James Bamford noted in his book
The Puzzle Palace, “NSA’s monitoring of telex and other data communica-
tions entering and leaving foreign embassies and other foreign controlled
properties” and “monitoring of the dedicated, or leased, communica-
tions circuits used exclusively between foreign establishments within the

22
 Evolution of Political Context in the Domestic Setting

United States” are exempted from FISA requirements.30 As Kris points out,
FISA legislation never applied to the surveillance of two parties abroad,
even when the call was routed through, and wiretapped in, the United
States.31 However, the legislation did not (nor could it) account for modern
possibilities such as two foreign entities’ usage of e-mail and the storage
of that e-mail on U.S. servers.32
Congress has made multiple amendments to FISA in subsequent years.
In 1994, an amendment permitted the FISA Court to approve applications
for warrantless physical searches. In 1998, Congress again amended FISA,
authorizing application to the FISA Court for orders compelling certain
categories of businesses to provide records. The 1998 amendment required
that the application specify that the records were needed for an investi-
gation to gather foreign intelligence and information or an investigation
concerning international terrorism and that “specific and articulable facts”
provided reason to believe that the person to whom the records were per-
tinent was a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.33 The PATRIOT
Act, discussed below in greater detail, included Section 215, which again
amended FISA, lowering the standard of proof necessary, by requiring
only a stipulation that the investigation was to obtain foreign intelligence
information not concerning a U.S. person or to protect against interna-
tional terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, so long as the inves-
tigation is not conducted solely based on activities protected by the First
Amendment.34 This change removed the language regarding “specific and
articulable facts” and changed the focus of the FISA request for an individ-
ual under investigation to gathering intelligence about broader threats: col-
lection of foreign intelligence information, protecting against international
terrorism, or protecting against clandestine intelligence activities.35,36
Subsequent legislation has attempted to remedy the increasing gap
between FISA legislation and technological realities. A temporary legisla-
tive fix was implemented, following the conclusion of Terrorist Surveillance
Program (TSP) activities in 2007 via the Protect America Act.37 These fixes
were then incorporated into the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 and added
new procedures for targeting non-U.S. persons abroad without individual
court orders, a new requirement to obtain an individualized court order
when targeting U.S. persons abroad, and new procedures that can be used
to obtain court orders authorizing the targeting of U.S. persons abroad
for electronic surveillance, the acquisition of stored communications, and
other means of acquiring foreign intelligence information.38
FISA will perpetually be a topic of controversy for multiple legal
and practical reasons. First, its provisions, both those instituted by the

23
The U.S. Domestic Intelligence Enterprise

PATRIOT Act and the FISA Amendment Act of 2008, require periodic
renewal, providing natural points for a national discussion on these mat-
ters. Furthermore, from a practical perspective, the continued evolution of
communication technology requires a concurrent reevaluation of whether
FISA provisions are keeping pace with the environment from which intel-
ligence is derived.

2.4.1 Electronic Communications Privacy Act

and the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and the Stored Wire
Electronic Communications Act were passed in 1986. These pieces of leg-
islation are commonly referred to cumulatively as ECPA. Title I of ECPA,
usually known as the Wiretap Act, outlines prohibitions on interception,
use, and disclosure of “wire, oral, or electronic communication.” It also
provides exceptions for judicially approved federal and state interception
of communications and regulates the use and disclosure of information
obtained through these methods.39 Title II, the Stored Communication Act,
protects the contents of files stored by service providers and also protects
records held about subscribers. Title III of ECPA governs the use of pen
registers and trap-and-trace devices. Pen registers capture dialed numbers
and related information about outgoing calls. Trap-and-trace devices cap-
ture information (metadata) about incoming calls. Neither device captures
the content of conversation. The passage of ECPA meant that the govern-
ment had to obtain a court order that certified the information acquired
was relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. However, ECPA did
permit the FBI to obtain “subscriber information and toll billing records
information, or electronic communication transactional records” from a
“wire or electronic communications service provider” in furtherance of
a foreign counterintelligence investigation. Congress amended ECPA in
1993, expanding the legislation’s National Security Letter (NSL) authority
by allowing access to the subscriber and toll billing records of additional
persons who were in contact with an individual of interest.40 ECPA also
had implications for state-level collection because states were supposed to
enact standards that tracked with federal requirements.41
In 1994, Congress passed the Communications Assistance to Law
Enforcement Act (CALEA). This bill required telecommunication carriers
to ensure that its facilities and services could facilitate law enforcement
officials’ electronic surveillance, pursuant to court orders. It also man-
dated that manufacturers and providers ensure that equipment, facilities,

24
 Evolution of Political Context in the Domestic Setting

and services were modified to ensure continued ability for law enforce-
ment monitoring, as technology evolved.42 The DOJ set requirements and
allowed industry to develop its own technology accordingly.43 However,
according to journalist Shane Harris, this dialogue between government
and industry was tense, with telecom companies believing that the DOJ’s
list of specifications, issued in 1995, “exceeded reasonable needs.”44
CALEA has become increasingly dated in its authorities. For services
using technology that postdated the ECPA and CALEA, there is no stipu-
lation that they build in the technology to facilitate interception.45 Rather,
there is only a vague requirement to provide “technical assistance.” As
with FISA, the drafters of the legislation could not anticipate changes in
the communications sector, and thus the law does not compel coopera-
tion from services such as social media networks.46 Consequently, accord-
ing to FBI officials, in mid-2014, wiretap orders against a variety of threat
actors, including foreign agents, spies, and other criminals, are not being
fulfilled.47

2.5 EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333

Executive Order 12333 (EO 12333) was the next significant development,
for domestically oriented intelligence activities, following the passage of
FISA, in 1978. This time it was the executive branch that promulgated the
change. Issued in 1981 (and since amended), EO 12333 provided a sweep-
ing definition of intelligence agency roles and responsibilities. It linked all
activities to the premise that
the United States intelligence effort shall provide the President and the
National Security Council with the necessary information on which to
base decisions concerning the conduct of foreign, defense and economic
policy, and the protection of United States national interests from foreign
security threats.48

A critical concept of EO 12333 is the delineation of jurisdiction and

authorities for collection. The most significant for the domestic environ-
ment is the FBI, to which the order gives authority for counterintelligence,
domestically; for the collection, or support of collection, against foreign
intelligence information, domestically; and for the production and dis-
semination of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information.
In addition to providing authorization for action by the FBI, EO 12333
also clearly defines the FBI as the linchpin in other domestically oriented

25
The U.S. Domestic Intelligence Enterprise

collection. It specifies that “the collection of foreign intelligence or coun-

terintelligence within the United States shall be coordinated with the
FBI.”49 Although the responsibility for the full spectrum of intelligence
present within the United States makes the Bureau essential to the archi-
tecture of the de facto domestically oriented intelligence enterprise, the
role of coordinator also indicates that there are other entities which may
engage in clandestine collection on U.S. soil. EO 12333 identifies the CIA
as one of the entities that may work in the United States (this is addressed
more thoroughly in Chapter 5 on human intelligence, or HUMINT).
Furthermore, the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence elements of
the armed services are recognized as having a legitimate domestic role, so
long as it is coordinated with the Bureau.
In addition to defining the architecture of the domestically oriented
intelligence enterprise, EO 12333 provides clear guidance about the acqui-
sition and handling of information regarding U.S. persons. Collection,
retention, and dissemination of this information are regulated by the
various department heads, in concert with the Attorney General. The
information which EO 12333 deemed to be of legitimate interest to
the intelligence community included “information that is publicly avail-
able or collected with the consent of the person concerned”; “information
constituting foreign intelligence or counterintelligence, including such
information concerning corporations or other commercial organizations”;
“information obtained in the course of a lawful foreign intelligence,
counterintelligence, international narcotics or international terrorism
in­vestigation”; and “information concerning persons who are reasonably
believed to be potential sources or contacts for determining their suitabil-
ity or credibility.”
Beyond collection, EO 12333 addressed undisclosed participation
and sharply limited intelligence services’ ability to influence the activi-
ties of domestic organizations. (The most significant example of this type
of influence was the FBI’s COINTELPRO operations, which came to pub-
lic attention a decade before the issuance of EO 12333. COINTELPRO is
addressed in Chapter 9 on influence activities.) Members of the intelli-
gence community were prohibited from participating in any organization
without disclosing their affiliation to appropriate officials of the organi-
zation, “except in accordance with procedures established by the head of
the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General.” In those
instances where undisclosed participation is approved, it may not be
undertaken

26
 Evolution of Political Context in the Domestic Setting

for the purpose of influencing the activity of the organization or its mem-
bers except in cases where (a) The participation is undertaken on behalf
of the FBI in the course of a lawful investigation, or (b) The organization
is composed primarily of individuals who are not United States persons
and is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power.

EO 12333 governs not only the type of information which can be col-
lected but also the techniques used to collect it. The order makes clear that
“agencies within the Intelligence Community shall use the least intrusive
collection techniques feasible within the United States … Agencies are not
authorized to use such techniques as electronic surveillance, unconsented
physical search, mail surveillance, physical surveillance, or monitoring
devices” unless they are approved by both the head of the agency engaged
in the activity and the Attorney General. Furthermore, the order pro-
hibited specified agencies from using certain techniques: the CIA could
not use electronic surveillance domestically; most unconsented physical
searches, if not done by the FBI, were prohibited, as were most physical
surveillances of individuals not done by the FBI.
Of particular interest to understanding the intelligence enterprise
within the domestic environment is EO 12333’s handling of the relation-
ship between the U.S. intelligence community and the law enforcement
agencies. Of greatest significance, the order articulates that members of
the intelligence community can, unless otherwise prohibited, “participate
in law enforcement activities to investigate or prevent clandestine intel-
ligence activities by foreign powers or international terrorist or narcotics
activities.” (An example of the prohibition would be the specific exclusion
of the CIA, by the National Security Act of 1947, from internal security
functions.) In addition, intelligence agencies are authorized to “provide
specialized equipment, technical knowledge, or assistance of expert per-
sonnel for use by any department or agency, or, when lives are endan-
gered, to support local law enforcement agencies.”
After September 11, the United States began to rethink how it
approached aspects of the intelligence mission as it pertained to the
domestic setting. This resulted in several significant changes, including
the creation of a new leadership for the intelligence community, a new
department, and a new term (“homeland security”) for an old concept. To
keep EO 12333 current, George W. Bush issued a new version of this docu-
ment in 2008, which reflected the post-9/11 changes. The new element in
policy making was evident in the reformulated statement of goals, which
now included the Homeland Security Council (HSC) among intelligence

27
The U.S. Domestic Intelligence Enterprise

consumers. EO 12333 also officially acknowledged that the Director of

National Intelligence (DNI) would serve as the head of the Intelligence
Community and act as the principal advisor on intelligence matters to the
president, the National Security Council, and the HSC. The DNI, in 15 of
the 24 sections which detail the director’s authority, has final sign-off on
decisions.50
EO 12333, as amended, also made changes to how the Intelligence
Community addressed substantive issues of concern. For the first time,
it discussed the role of Mission Managers who would serve as principal
substantive advisors on all or specified aspects of intelligence related to
designated countries, regions, topics, or functional issues. Regardless of
topic, there is not a single area where domestically oriented collection
cannot contribute insight, given the presence of foreign intelligence infor-
mation within the United States. Most relevant to the discussion of the
domestic environment, however, is the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence’s National Intelligence Manager for the Western Hemisphere.
A 2013 joint duty assignment posting for the Deputy NIM-WH indicates
the significant domestic focus on this position. Major duties and respon-
sibilities included direction and oversight of programmatic operations
“for national intelligence issues related to the U.S. homeland”; helping
to “lead an IC-wide Homeland Security Strategy Board that will help
guide NIM-WH efforts in better integrating the work of the IC focused on
national intelligence related to the U.S. homeland”; “lay the groundwork
to integrate homeland security and law enforcement information into the
broader national intelligence enterprise”; and “work with IC elements and
fellow NIM offices develop homeland-related initiatives within the con-
text of foreign and foreign inspired intelligence trends.” Furthermore, in
required knowledge, skills, and abilities, the position description noted
the need for “expert knowledge of non-IC law enforcement partners at the
federal, state, and local level.”51,52
The revised EO 12333 also highlighted a much expanded role for enti-
ties that are not members of the formal IC, or, in some cases, even of the
federal government or any government at all. Recognizing that awareness
of and the ability to protect the domestic environment were the responsi-
bilities of many entities most of which were not among the 16 agencies (plus
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence), EO 12333 states that
state, local, and tribal governments are critical partners in securing and
defending the United States from terrorism and other threats to the
United States and its interest. Our national intelligence effort should

28
 Evolution of Political Context in the Domestic Setting

take into account the responsibilities of State, local and tribal govern-
ments, and, as appropriate, private sector entities, when undertaking the
collection and dissemination of information and intelligence to protect
the United States.

These updates as with so many decisions regarding the intelligence

community did not escape criticism. When the revised EO 12333 debuted,
six members of the House Intelligence Committee walked out of a meet-
ing, in protest of what they believed was inadequate White House consul-
tation in formulating the changes.53 The American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) raised concerns about the possibility that the DNI could request
non-intelligence agencies to gather information. Furthermore, the ACLU
worried that the incorporation of nonfederal entities, including private
companies, meant that these organizations could request IC collection on
their behalf.54 The New York Times quoted Michael German, the national
security policy counsel for the ACLU, saying, “When you have govern-
ment and private companies operating together in secret, I think that’s
very problematic.”55 (It is worth noting that German was an FBI Special
Agent for more than a decade, which makes his concern about this devel-
opment strange because the Bureau was working with industry vis-à-vis
its Plant Survey program before the outbreak of World War II and has con-
tinued to do so until the present day, with its Counterintelligence Strategic
Partnerships efforts.)

2.6 PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND TSP

The executive branch, in the aftermath of September 11, took steps to
increase its SIGINT coverage to bolster its awareness of the threat from
terrorism. President George W. Bush first authorized a program of war-
rantless eavesdropping, by the National Security Agency, in 2002 (which
became public in a 2005 New York Times story).56 Subsequently, President
George W. Bush acknowledged that he had authorized the National
Security Agency to conduct a Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP)—also
known as the President’s Surveillance Program (PSP)—to intercept com-
munications with a nexus to the domestic environment by parties with a
connection to Al Qaeda.57 Bush invoked constitutional authority to con-
duct warrantless wartime surveillance of the enemy. The original FISA
legislation included a provision for such surveillance but seemingly on a
much more limited scope in Section 111, which stated,

29
The U.S. Domestic Intelligence Enterprise

Notwithstanding any other law, the President, through the Attorney

General, may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order
under this title to acquire foreign intelligence information for a period
not to extend fifteen calendar days following a declaration of war by the
Congress.58

The administration instead claimed that the program had dual bases. The
first was in the joint resolution passed by Congress (Authorization for the
Use of Military Force [AUMF]), which gave the White House approval for
the use of “all necessary and appropriate military force” to pursue those
entities responsible for the September 11 attacks. (Readers should recall
that the National Security Agency, as an element of the Department of
Defense, is a military component.) The president also relied on the invoca-
tion of inherent presidential powers.59 Robert Mueller, who was the FBI’s
director at the time, claimed that he knew of no lives saved or terrorist
acts averted because of the TSP.60 In fact, he referred to the program as a
“time suck.”61
The question of authorities invested in the president by the AUMF
has broader implications for understanding intelligence in the domestic
setting. The administration’s Office of Legislative Affairs argued that by
authorizing the president to engage in activities, directed at the perpe-
trators of September 11, globally, it implicitly included the homeland.62
The concept of international threats becoming a manifestation within
the United States has been a longstanding problem for the intelligence
community, becoming a topic of public concern during the Palmer raids,
which followed the First World War, when U.S. authorities attempted to
disrupt a violent, transnational anarchist movement (in an admittedly
ham-fisted manner) and was again a high-profile matter during Cold War
efforts to stymie Soviet and Chinese influenced transnational communist
movements.
The problems with warrantless surveillance were less about the
activity and more about its relationship to the law. As the Congressional
Research Service noted, in early 2006, every president since FDR (who,
as indicated, previously was supportive of using executive authority to
support sweeping intelligence activities in the domestic setting) until the
mid-1970s, when the Church and Pike Committees caused skepticism
about U.S. intelligence, had asserted their authority to engage in war-
rantless electronic surveillance and used this prerogative.63 Although the
Bush administration was firmly within this tradition, the legislative and
executive parameters had changed. A second problem, which became

30
 Evolution of Political Context in the Domestic Setting

public in the aftermath of the New York Times’ late-2005 disclosure, was
that the NSA may have begun engaging in these surveillance activities
before they were authorized by the president to do so. The Washington Post
cited “an informed U.S. official” to this effect in December 2005.64 This
issue appeared again early in 2006 when Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi
released a declassified letter, pertaining to an early October 2001 hearing
at which then-NSA Director General Michael Hayden provided informa-
tion about surveillance activities. Pelosi inquired as to whether Hayden
had received specific presidential authorities to expand the NSA’s collec-
tion activities, to which Hayden had advised that he had relied on his own
authorities, as director of the NSA.65
Looking past the legal controversy, warrantless electronic sur-
veillance was arguably necessary because of changing technologies,
coupled with the evolving nature of threat actors’ behavior. According
to Hayden, the FISC process was intended to facilitate the long-term
monitoring of agents of an enemy power. In contrast, the NSA’s war-
rantless surveillance responded to rapid changes in communication,
with most monitoring conducted for only a matter of days or weeks.66
Furthermore, the NSA’s technology apparently outpaced the require-
ments for obtaining FISC authorization because it did not rely on the
specific coverage of a specific line but rather intercepted selected com-
munications in real time from a variety of channels.67 The administra-
tion, however, did note efforts to comply with the FISA process to the
extent possible. In early 2006, Hayden explained that once a subject who
had been identified through the technologically diffuse monitoring was
identified as significant, the NSA did go to the FISC to “drill down” for
all communications.68
In the wake of public uproar, government inquiry into the propri-
ety of the NSA’s activities was nil. The White House effectively blocked
an investigation by the U.S. DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility
(DOJ OPR) in mid-2006 by refusing to grant the appropriate clearances
to the attorneys who would conduct the inquiry. A White House spokes-
man justified the administration’s refusal to cooperate with DOJ OPR by
saying that the program had undergone legal review every 45 days by
officials, including the Attorney General.69 The legislative branch also
receded from initial calls for a congressional inquiry. In early 2006, the
senators who had requested an investigation agreed to a move to adjourn
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence without voting on a motion to
initiate a review of the NSA’s program.70

31
The U.S. Domestic Intelligence Enterprise

2.7 POST-9/11 INTELLIGENCE LEGISLATION

WITH RELEVANCE FOR THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT
In the first half of the decade following September 11, several pieces of
legislation became law. These were the USA PATRIOT Act, the Homeland
Security Act, and the IRTPA. All of these had significant ramifications for
intelligence activities with a domestic nexus. Although they most nota-
bly created a new department (the Department of Homeland Security)
and an entirely new overseer (the Director of National Intelligence),
they also effectively expanded the domestically oriented intelligence
enterprise by acknowledging the role that nonfederal entities played in
both collecting and acting on intelligence in furtherance of U.S. national
security.

2.7.1 USA PATRIOT Act

The first piece of legislation was the Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act (more commonly known as the USA PATRIOT Act). This
act modified the concept of foreign intelligence adding “international ter-
rorist activities” to the definition of foreign intelligence, contained in the
amended National Security Act of 1947, which had previously defined for-
eign intelligence as “relating to capabilities, intentions, or activities of for-
eign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign
persons.”71
Furthermore, the bill, in its judicial authorities, acknowledged that
geography continued to be increasingly irrelevant for intelligence. In the
changes that Congress made to authorities for retrieving e-mail, it recog-
nized the borderless nature of this method of communication. Although,
previously, only a federal court in the district where the e-mail was stored
could issue a warrant for access, courts where an offense impacted were
permitted to issue orders applicable “without geographic limitation.”72
In districts where either an international or domestic terrorist crime had
taken place, a similar measure allowed magistrates to issue search war-
rants that could be executed outside the district.73
One of the Act’s most significant implications for the domestic set-
ting was in the area of SIGINT—specifically the monitoring of electronic
conversations. The Bush administration requested a lower standard
of approval for a FISA-authorized surveillance, advocating a change in

32
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 POLYEUCTE.

Plus elle est volontaire, et plus elle mérite.

NÉARQUE.

Il suffit, sans chercher, d'attendre et de souffrir.

POLYEUCTE.

On souffre avec regret quand on n'ose s'offrir.

NÉARQUE.

Mais dans ce temple enfin la mort est assurée.

POLYEUCTE.

Mais dans le ciel déjà la palme est préparée.

NÉARQUE.

Par une sainte vie il faut la mériter.

POLYEUCTE.

Mes crimes, en vivant, me la pourraient ôter.

Pourquoi mettre au hasard ce que la mort assure?
Quand elle ouvre le ciel, peut-elle sembler dure?
Je suis chrétien, Néarque, et le suis tout à fait;
La foi que j'ai reçue aspire à son effet.
Qui fuit croit lâchement, et n'a qu'une foi morte.

NÉARQUE.

Ménagez votre vie, à Dieu même elle importe;

Vivez pour protéger les chrétiens en ces lieux.

POLYEUCTE.
L'exemple de ma mort les fortifiera mieux.

NÉARQUE.

Vous voulez donc mourir?

POLYEUCTE.

Vous aimez donc à vivre?

NÉARQUE.

Je ne puis déguiser que j'ai peine à vous suivre.

Sous l'horreur des tourments je crains de succomber.

POLYEUCTE.

Qui marche assurément n'a point peur de tomber:

Dieu fait part, au besoin, de sa force infinie.
Qui craint de le nier, dans son âme le nie,
Il croit le pouvoir faire, et doute de sa foi.

NÉARQUE.

Qui n'appréhende rien présume trop de soi.

POLYEUCTE.

J'attends tout de sa grâce, et rien de ma faiblesse.

Mais, loin de me presser, il faut que je vous presse!
D'où vient cette froideur?

NÉARQUE.

Dieu même a craint la mort.

POLYEUCTE.
Il s'est offert pourtant; suivons ce saint effort;
Dressons-lui des autels sur des monceaux d'idoles.
Il faut (je me souviens encor de vos paroles)
Négliger, pour lui plaire, et femme, et biens, et rang,
Exposer pour sa gloire et verser tout son sang.
Hélas! qu'avez-vous fait de cette amour parfaite
Que vous me souhaitiez, et que je vous souhaite?
S'il vous en reste encor, n'êtes-vous point jaloux
Qu'à grand'peine chrétien j'en montre plus que vous?

NÉARQUE.

Vous sortez du baptême, et ce qui vous anime,

C'est sa grâce qu'en vous n'affaiblit aucun crime;
Comme encor tout entière, elle agit pleinement,
Et tout semble possible à son feu véhément:
Mais cette même grâce en moi diminuée,
Et par mille péchés sans cesse exténuée,
Agit aux grands effets avec tant de langueur,
Que tout semble impossible à son peu de vigueur:
Cette indigne mollesse et ces lâches défenses
Sont des punitions qu'attirent mes offenses;
Mais Dieu, dont on ne doit jamais se défier,
Me donne votre exemple à me fortifier.
Allons, cher Polyeucte, allons aux yeux des hommes
Braver l'idolâtrie, et montrer qui nous sommes;
Puissé-je vous donner l'exemple de souffrir,
Comme vous me donnez celui de vous offrir!

POLYEUCTE.

A cet heureux transport que le ciel vous envoie,

Je reconnais Néarque, et j'en pleure de joie.
Ne perdons plus de temps; le sacrifice est prêt;
Allons-y du vrai Dieu soutenir l'intérêt;
Allons fouler aux pieds ce foudre ridicule
Dont arme un bois pourri ce peuple trop crédule;
 Dont arme un bois pourri ce peuple trop crédule;
Allons en éclairer l'aveuglement fatal;
Allons briser ces dieux de pierre et de métal:
Abandonnons nos jours à cette ardeur céleste;
Faisons triompher Dieu: qu'il dispose du reste.

NÉARQUE.

Allons faire éclater sa gloire aux yeux de tous,

Et répondre avec zèle à ce qu'il veut de nous.

Les deux amis se rendent en effet au temple, font un grand

scandale parmi les païens, troublent la cérémonie, brisent les idoles.
Voici comment un païen, spectateur de cette scène, raconte ce qu'ils
ont fait:
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Et devers[21] l'orient assuré son aspect,
Qu'ils ont fait éclater leur manque de respect.
A chaque occasion de la cérémonie,
A l'envi l'un et l'autre étalait sa manie,
Des mystères sacrés hautement se moquait,
Et traitait de mépris les dieux qu'on invoquait.
Tout le peuple en murmure, et Félix s'en offense;
Mais tous deux s'emportant à plus d'irrévérence:
«Quoi! lui dit Polyeucte en élevant sa voix,
Adorez-vous des dieux ou de pierre ou de bois?»
Ici dispensez-moi du récit des blasphèmes
Qu'ils ont vomis tous deux contre Jupiter[22] mêmes.
«Oyez,[23] dit-il ensuite, oyez, peuple; oyez, tous:
Le Dieu de Polyeucte et celui de Néarque
De la terre et du ciel est l'absolu monarque.
Seul être indépendant, seul maître du destin,
Seul principe éternel, et souveraine fin.
C'est ce Dieu des chrétiens qu'il faut qu'on remercie
Des victoires qu'il donne à l'empereur Décie;
Lui seul tient en sa main le succès des combats;
Il le veut élever, il le peut mettre à bas;
Sa bonté, son pouvoir, sa justice est immense;
C'est lui seul qui punit, lui seul qui récompense:
Vous adorez en vain des monstres impuissants.»
Se jetant à ces mots sur le vin et l'encens,
Après en avoir mis les saints vases par terre,
Sans crainte de Félix, sans crainte du tonnerre,
D'une fureur pareille ils courent à l'autel.
Cieux! a-t-on vu jamais, a-t-on rien vu de tel?
Du plus puissant des dieux nous voyons la statue
Par une main impie à leurs pieds abattue,
Les mystères troublés, le temple profané,
La fuite et les clameurs d'un peuple mutiné,
Qui craint d'être accablé sous le courroux céleste.
 On arrête Polyeucte, on le mène en prison; on traîne au supplice
son ami.
Lui pourrait se sauver encore; car il est le gendre du gouverneur.
On cacherait cet éclat à l'empereur. On ne lui demande que de se
taire et de se tenir tranquille. Cette hypocrisie le révolte. Il préfère
mourir. Il s'enivre à l'idée du sacrifice et des récompenses divines qui
l'attendent. Saisi par l'enthousiasme religieux, il s'écrie:
Source délicieuse, en misères féconde,
Que voulez-vous de moi, flatteuses voluptés?
Honteux attachements de la chair et du monde,
Que ne me quittez-vous, quand je vous ai quittés?
Allez, honneurs, plaisirs, qui me livrez la guerre:
Toute votre félicité,
Sujette à l'instabilité,
En moins de rien tombe par terre;
Et, comme elle a l'éclat du verre,
Elle en a la fragilité.

Ainsi n'espérez pas qu'après vous je soupire.

Vous étalez en vain vos charmes impuissants;
Vous me montrez en vain par tout ce vaste empire
Les ennemis de Dieu pompeux et florissants.
Il étale à son tour des revers équitables
Par qui les grands sont confondus;
Et les glaives qu'il tient pendus
Sur les plus fortunés coupables
Sont d'autant plus inévitables
Que leurs coups sont moins attendus.

Tigre altéré de sang, Décie impitoyable,

Ce Dieu t'a trop longtemps abandonné les siens:
De ton heureux destin vois la suite effroyable;
Le Scythe[24] va venger la Perse et les chrétiens.
Encore un peu plus outre, et ton heure est venue;
Rien ne t'en saurait garantir;
Et la foudre qui va partir,
Toute prête à crever la nue,
Ne peut plus être retenue
Par l'attente du repentir.

Que cependant Félix m'immole à ta colère;

Qu'un rival plus puissant éblouisse ses yeux;
Qu'aux dépens de ma vie il s'en fasse beau-père
 Qu aux dépens de ma vie il s en fasse beau père,
Et qu'à titre d'esclave il commande en ces lieux:
Je consens, ou plutôt j'aspire à ma ruine,
Monde, pour moi tu n'as plus rien:
Je porte en un cœur tout chrétien
Une flamme toute divine;
Et je ne regarde Pauline
Que comme un obstacle à mon bien.

Saintes douceurs du ciel, adorables idées,

Vous remplissez un cœur qui vous peut recevoir:
De vos sacrés attraits les âmes possédées
Ne conçoivent plus rien qui les puisse émouvoir.
Vous promettez beaucoup et donnez davantage:
Vos biens ne sont point inconstants;
Et l'heureux trépas que j'attends
Ne vous sert que d'un doux passage
Pour nous introduire au partage
Qui nous rend à jamais contents.

C'est vous, ô feu divin que rien ne peut éteindre,

Qui m'allez faire voir Pauline sans la craindre.
Je la vois: mais mon cœur, d'un saint zèle enflammé,
N'en goûte plus l'appas dont il était charmé;
Et mes yeux, éclairés des célestes lumières,
Ne trouvent plus aux siens leurs grâces coutumières.

Son beau-père, sa femme, que Polyeucte aime de toute son âme,

le supplient de feindre seulement quelque temps. Sa femme lui dit:
 Vous n'avez point ici d'ennemi que vous-même;
Seul vous vous haïssez, lorsque chacun vous aime;
Seul vous exécutez tout ce que j'ai rêvé:
Ne veuillez pas vous perdre, et vous êtes sauvé.
A quelque extrémité que votre crime passe,
Vous êtes innocent si vous vous faites grâce.
Daignez considérer le sang dont vous sortez,
Vos grandes actions, vos rares qualités;
Chéri de tout le peuple, estimé chez le prince,
Gendre du gouverneur de toute la province;
Je ne vous compte à rien le nom de mon époux,
C'est un bonheur pour moi qui n'est pas grand pour vous.
Mais après vos exploits, après votre naissance,
Après votre pouvoir, voyez notre espérance;
Et n'abandonnez pas à la main d'un bourreau
Ce qu'à nos justes vœux promet un sort si beau.

Polyeucte lui répond:

Je considère plus; je sais mes avantages,
Et l'espoir que sur eux forment les grands courages.
Ils n'aspirent enfin qu'à des biens passagers,
Que troublent les soucis, que suivent les dangers;
La mort nous les ravit, la fortune s'en joue;
Aujourd'hui dans le trône, et demain dans la boue;
Et leur plus haut éclat fait tant de mécontents,
Que peu de vos Césars en ont joui longtemps.
J'ai de l'ambition, mais plus noble et plus belle:
Cette grandeur périt, j'en veux une immortelle,
Un bonheur assuré, sans mesure et sans fin,
Au-dessus de l'envie, au-dessus du destin.
Est-ce trop l'acheter que d'une triste vie
Qui tantôt, qui soudain me peut être ravie;
Qui ne me fait jouir que d'un instant qui fuit,
Et ne peut m'assurer de celui qui le suit?

PAULINE.

Voilà de vos chrétiens les ridicules songes;

Voilà jusqu'à quel point vous charment leurs mensonges;
Tout votre sang est peu pour un bonheur si doux!
Mais, pour en disposer, ce sang est-il à vous?
Vous n'avez pas la vie ainsi qu'un héritage;
Le jour qui vous la donne en même temps l'engage.
Vous la devez au prince, au public, à l'État.

POLYEUCTE.

Je la voudrais pour eux perdre dans un combat;

Je sais quel en est l'heur, et quelle en est la gloire.
Des aïeux de Décie on vante la mémoire;
Et ce nom précieux encore à vos Romains,
Au bout de six cents ans lui met l'empire aux mains.
Je dois ma vie au peuple, au prince, à sa couronne;
Mais je la dois bien plus au Dieu qui me la donne:
 a s je a do s b e p us au eu qu e a do e
Si mourir pour son prince est un illustre sort,
Quand on meurt pour son Dieu, quelle sera la mort!

PAULINE.

Quel Dieu?

POLYEUCTE.

Tout beau, Pauline: il entend vos paroles,

Et ce n'est pas un Dieu comme vos dieux frivoles,
Insensibles et sourds, impuissants, mutilés,
De bois, de marbre, ou d'or, comme vous les voulez:
C'est le Dieu des chrétiens, c'est le mien, c'est le vôtre:
Et la terre et le ciel n'en connaissent point d'autre.

PAULINE.

Adorez-le dans l'âme, et n'en témoignez rien.

POLYEUCTE.

Que je sois tout ensemble idolâtre et chrétien!

PAULINE.

Ne feignez qu'un moment, laissez partir Sévère[25],

Et donnez lieu d'agir aux bontés de mon père.

POLYEUCTE.

Les bontés de mon Dieu sont bien plus à chérir:

Il m'ôte des périls que j'aurais pu courir,
Et, sans me laisser lieu de tourner en arrière,
Sa faveur me couronne entrant dans la carrière;
Du premier coup de vent il me conduit au port,
Et, sortant du baptême, il m'envoie à la mort.
Si vous pouviez comprendre et le peu qu'est la vie,
 Si vous pouviez comprendre et le peu qu est la vie,
Et de quelles douceurs cette mort est suivie!....
Mais que sert de parler de ces trésors cachés
A des esprits que Dieu n'a pas encor touchés?

Pauline s'est contenue jusque-là. Elle a allégué la raison, et

l'intérêt de Polyeucte. Mais enfin, devant son obstination, elle s'irrite.
Elle-même ne compte donc pas aux yeux de Polyeucte! Il ne la
regrette donc point! Il n'a donc pour elle aucun attachement, qu'il la
quitte si facilement, si froidement!
Elle s'écrie:
 Cruel! (car il est temps que ma douleur éclate,
Et qu'un juste reproche accable une âme ingrate)
Est-ce là ce beau feu? sont-ce là tes serments?
Témoignes-tu pour moi les moindres sentiments?
Je ne te parlais point de l'état déplorable
Où ta mort va laisser ta femme inconsolable;
Je croyais que l'amour t'en parlerait assez,
Et je ne voulais pas de sentiments forcés:
Mais cette amour si ferme et si bien méritée
Que tu m'avais promise, et que je t'ai portée,
Quand tu me veux quitter, quand tu me fais mourir,
Te peut-elle arracher une larme, un soupir?
Tu me quittes, ingrat, et le fais avec joie;
Tu ne la caches pas, tu veux que je la voie;
Et ton cœur, insensible à ces tristes appas,
Se figure un bonheur où je ne serai pas!
C'est donc là le dégoût qu'apporte l'hyménée?
Je te suis odieuse après m'être donnée!

POLYEUCTE.

Hélas!

PAULINE.

Que cet hélas a de peine à sortir!

Encor s'il commençait un heureux repentir,
Que, tout forcé qu'il est, j'y trouverais de charmes!
Mais courage, il s'émeut, je vois couler des larmes.

Polyeucte pleure en effet; car il aime Pauline, mais il aime son

Dieu plus encore: «Oui, je verse des larmes, dit-il.
J'en verse, et plût à Dieu qu'à force d'en verser
Ce cœur trop endurci se pût enfin percer!
Le déplorable état où je vous abandonne
Est bien digne des pleurs que mon amour vous donne;
Et si l'on peut au ciel sentir quelques douleurs,
J'y pleurerai pour vous l'excès de vos malheurs:
Mais si, dans ce séjour de gloire et de lumière,
Ce Dieu tout juste et bon peut souffrir ma prière,
S'il y daigne écouter un conjugal amour,
Sur votre aveuglement il répandra le jour.
Seigneur, de vos bontés il faut que je l'obtienne;
Elle a trop de vertus pour n'être pas chrétienne:
Avec trop de mérite il vous plut la former,
Pour ne vous pas connaître et ne vous pas aimer,
Pour vivre des enfers esclave infortunée,
Et sous leur triste joug mourir comme elle est née.

PAULINE.

Que dis-tu, malheureux? qu'oses-tu souhaiter?

POLYEUCTE.

Ce que de tout mon sang je voudrais acheter.

PAULINE.

Que plutôt....

POLYEUCTE.

C'est en vain qu'on se met en défense:

Ce Dieu touche les cœurs lorsque moins on y pense.
Ce bienheureux moment n'est pas encor venu;
Il viendra, mais le temps ne m'en est pas connu.

PAULINE
 PAULINE.

Quittez cette chimère, et m'aimez.

POLYEUCTE.

Je vous aime,
Beaucoup moins que mon Dieu, mais bien plus que moi-même.

PAULINE.

Au nom de cet amour, ne m'abandonnez pas.

POLYEUCTE.

Au nom de cet amour, daignez suivre mes pas.

PAULINE.

C'est peu de me quitter, tu veux donc me séduire?

POLYEUCTE.

C'est peu d'aller au ciel, je vous y veux conduire.

PAULINE.

Imaginations!

POLYEUCTE.

Célestes vérités!

PAULINE.

Étrange aveuglement!

POLYEUCTE.

Éternelles clartés!
 te e es c a tés

PAULINE.

Tu préfères la mort à l'amour de Pauline!

POLYEUCTE.

Vous préférez le monde à la bonté divine!

PAULINE.

Va, cruel, va mourir; tu ne m'aimas jamais.

POLYEUCTE.

Vivez heureuse au monde, et me laissez en paix!

Polyeucte reste inflexible. Il est ému pourtant, il pleure; mais

mentir, trahir ses amis, renier son compagnon qui est mort pour lui,
surtout se trahir soi-même, il ne peut. Il mourra. Il le déclare à Félix
et à Pauline.
Que tout cet artifice est de mauvaise grâce!
Après avoir deux fois essayé la menace,
Après m'avoir fait voir Néarque dans la mort,
Après avoir tenté l'amour et son effort,
Après m'avoir montré cette soif du baptême,
Pour opposer à Dieu l'intérêt de Dieu même,
Vous vous joignez ensemble! Ah! ruses de l'enfer!
Faut-il tant de fois vaincre avant que triompher!
Vos résolutions usent trop de remise;
Prenez la vôtre enfin, puisque la mienne est prise.
Je n'adore qu'un Dieu, maître de l'univers,
Sous qui tremblent le ciel, la terre et les enfers;
Un Dieu qui, nous aimant d'une amour infinie,
Voulut mourir pour nous avec ignominie,
Et qui, par un effort de cet excès d'amour,
Veut pour nous en victime être offert chaque jour.
Mais j'ai tort d'en parler à qui ne peut m'entendre.
Voyez l'aveugle erreur que vous osez défendre:
Des crimes les plus noirs vous souillez tous vos dieux;
Vous n'en punissez point qui n'ait son maître aux cieux.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
J'ai profané leur temple et brisé leurs autels;
Je le ferais encor, si j'avais à le faire,
Même aux yeux de Félix, même aux yeux de Sévère,
Même aux yeux du sénat, aux yeux de l'empereur.
 Polyeucte demande qu'on le mène à la mort.
(Polyeucte.)
P. 66-67.

C'en est trop: on le mène au supplice, et, tout à coup, émue par
tant de courage et de constance, sa femme elle-même se fait
chrétienne. Brusquement, elle demande à son père le supplice:
 Père barbare, achève, achève ton ouvrage;
Cette seconde hostie est digne de ta rage:
Joins ta fille à ton gendre; ose: que tardes-tu?
Tu vois le même crime, ou la même vertu:
Ta barbarie en elle a les mêmes matières.
Mon époux en mourant m'a laissé ses lumières;
Son sang, dont tes bourreaux viennent de me couvrir,
M'a dessillé les yeux, et me les vient d'ouvrir.
Je vois, je sais, je crois, je suis désabusée:
De ce bienheureux sang tu me vois baptisée:
Je suis chrétienne enfin, n'est-ce point assez dit?
Conserve en me perdant ton rang et ton crédit;
Redoute l'empereur, appréhende Sévère:
Si tu ne veux périr, ma perte est nécessaire;
Polyeucte m'appelle à cet heureux trépas;
Je vois Néarque et lui qui me tendent les bras.
Mène, mène-moi voir tes dieux que je déteste;
Ils n'en ont brisé qu'un, je briserai le reste.
On m'y verra braver tout ce que vous craignez,
Ces foudres impuissants qu'en leurs mains vous peignez,
Et, saintement rebelle aux lois de la naissance,
Une fois envers toi manquer d'obéissance.
Ce n'est point ma douleur que par là je fais voir;
C'est la grâce qui parle, et non le désespoir.
Le faut-il dire encor, Félix? je suis chrétienne;
Affermis par ma mort ta fortune et la mienne;
Le coup à l'un et l'autre en sera précieux,
Puisqu'il t'assure en[26] terre en m'élevant aux cieux.

Devant tant de grandeur, le père lui-même se sent touché, et

embrasse la religion qui inspire de tels dévouements et un tel esprit
de sacrifice:
 Je cède à des transports que je ne connais pas;
Et, par un mouvement que je ne puis entendre,
De ma fureur je passe au zèle de mon gendre.
C'est lui, n'en doutez point, dont le sang innocent
Pour son persécuteur prie un Dieu tout-puissant;
Son amour épandu sur toute la famille
Tire après lui le père aussi bien que la fille.
J'en ai fait un martyr, sa mort me fait chrétien:
J'ai fait tout son bonheur, il veut faire le mien.
C'est ainsi qu'un chrétien se venge et se courrouce:
Heureuse cruauté dont la suite est si douce!
Donne la main, Pauline. Apportez des liens:
Immolez à vos dieux ces deux nouveaux chrétiens.
Je le suis, elle l'est, suivez votre colère.

Corneille a voulu nous montrer par là combien sont puissants sur

des cœurs, bons du reste et pitoyables, l'exemple du courage et la
vertu du sacrifice.
Il nous a montré surtout, dans tout le cours de la pièce, ce que
c'est qu'être attaché à sa foi, ce que c'est qu'avoir l'horreur des
hypocrisies, des lâchetés, des défaillances de conscience. Nous
n'aurons pas sans doute l'occasion de proclamer nos convictions au
risque de notre vie, ni avec de grands éclats, comme Polyeucte. Mais
nous aurons mille occasions de pratiquer le respect de nous-mêmes;
nous aurons à triompher de cette fausse honte, ridicule et basse, qui
nous porte à dissimuler une bonne pensée quand nous la voyons
dédaignée ou raillée autour de nous. C'est alors qu'il faut nous
rappeler Polyeucte, et, en bravant les petits martyres de la vie
commune, qui sont les moqueries des méchants et les mépris des
sots, montrer un peu de son courage et de son élévation de
caractère.
 CHAPITRE VIII.
NICOMÈDE.

Il faudrait que tous les Français lussent Nicomède et en

apprissent par cœur les plus beaux passages. C'est celle des
tragédies de Corneille qui est la plus capable d'élever notre âme, et
de nous enseigner une chose difficile à bien savoir, l'attitude qui
convient à des vaincus.
Partout ailleurs Corneille nous montre l'amour de la patrie. Mais
aimer son pays puissant et glorieux n'est pas une chose difficile; un
peu de fierté y suffit; c'est aimer son pays abaissé et vaincu qui est
la vraie marque d'un bon cœur et d'un pur patriotisme.
C'est ce sentiment-là, si rare et si précieux, que la tragédie de
Nicomède fait éclater à nos regards.
Figurez-vous que les Romains, ce peuple si puissant dont vous
venez de voir que Corneille aime à nous rapporter les grandes
actions, étaient maîtres de presque tout le bassin de la mer
Méditerranée et d'une partie de l'Asie-Mineure. Or, en Asie-Mineure
précisément, il y avait encore quelques rois indépendants, mais si
effrayés de la puissance romaine qu'ils en étaient «comme
stupides», pour me servir de l'expression énergique d'un écrivain du
e
XVIII siècle, Montesquieu. C'étaient «des rois en peinture», comme
dit Corneille lui-même.
 L'un d'eux, Prusias, roi de Bithynie, se trouvait dans l'état que
voici: sa femme, Arsinoé, était dévouée aux Romains et leur
instrument en Bithynie; son fils, Attale, avait été élevé à Rome,
comme otage, pour devenir plus tard une espèce de lieutenant des
Romains en Bithynie sous le nom de roi; Prusias lui-même avait été
forcé de livrer aux Romains leur vieil ennemi Annibal, qui s'était
réfugié auprès de lui.
Voilà sans doute de mauvais modèles à nous proposer. Mais
heureusement Prusias, d'un précédent mariage, a un autre fils, le
vaillant Nicomède, qui est tout le contraire de son père et de sa
belle-mère Arsinoé. Il y a aussi à la cour de Prusias sa pupille,
Laodice, reine d'Arménie, qui a le caractère aussi haut et aussi
généreux que Nicomède.
Ces deux jeunes gens sont les ennemis des Romains et savent
parler d'une façon hautaine à leur ambassadeur Flaminius. Arsinoé,
de concert avec Flaminius, cherche à faire tomber Nicomède dans un
piège. Elle forme un complot contre lui, l'accuse de trahison auprès
de Prusias, qui l'écoute trop; et Nicomède, malgré toutes les
victoires qu'il a remportées, accusé par Arsinoé, chargé par
Flaminius, vu avec défiance par son père, est comme traqué de
toutes parts.
C'est plaisir de voir comme il tient tête de tous les côtés. A
Arsinoé, sa belle-mère, il répond avec une fierté magnifique. Lui,
traître et fourbe! Allons donc!
 Vous ne savez que trop qu'un homme de ma sorte,
Quand il se rend coupable, un peu plus haut se porte;
Qu'il lui faut un grand crime à tenter son devoir...
Soulever votre peuple, et jeter votre armée
Dedans les intérêts d'une reine opprimée...
C'est ce que pourrait faire un homme tel que moi
S'il pouvait se résoudre à vous manquer de foi.
La fourbe[27] n'est le jeu que des petites âmes,
Et c'est là proprement le partage des femmes.

Quand, feignant pour Nicomède une amitié calculée, Arsinoé

demande sa grâce à Prusias: «Grâce?» dit Nicomède...

De quoi, madame? est-ce d'avoir conquis

Trois sceptres, que ma perte expose à votre fils?
D'avoir porté si loin vos armes dans l'Asie,
Que même votre Rome en a pris jalousie?
D'avoir trop soutenu la majesté des rois?
Trop rempli votre cour du bruit de mes exploits?
Trop du grand Annibal[28] pratiqué les maximes?
S'il faut grâce pour moi, choisissez de mes crimes.
Les voilà tous, madame, et si vous y joignez
D'avoir cru des méchants par quelque autre gagnés,
D'avoir une âme ouverte, une franchise entière,
Qui, dans leur artifice, a manqué de lumière,
C'est gloire et non pas crime à qui ne voit le jour
Qu'au milieu d'une armée, et loin de votre cour,
Qui n'a que la vertu de son intelligence,
Et vivant sans remords, marche sans défiance.

A Flaminius, l'ambassadeur romain, Nicomède montre un visage

intrépide, au moment même où son père l'abandonne et le livre à
ces Romains si puissants et si terribles: «De quoi se mêle Rome?»
s'écrie-t-il, «où prend-elle le droit d'imposer ses volontés au roi de
Bithynie?»—«Ce sont là les leçons d'Annibal», réplique Flaminius;
Nicomède répond froidement:
Annibal m'a surtout laissé ferme en ce point
D'estimer beaucoup Rome, et ne la craindre point.
On me croit son disciple, et je le tiens à gloire,
Et quand Flaminius attaque sa mémoire,
Il doit savoir qu'un jour il me fera raison
D'avoir réduit mon maître au secours du poison[29],
Et n'oublier jamais qu'autrefois ce grand homme
Commença par son père[30] à triompher de Rome.

FLAMINIUS.

Ah! c'est trop m'outrager!

NICOMÈDE.

N'outragez plus les morts.

PRUSIAS.

Et vous, ne cherchez point à former de discords[31];

Parlez, et nettement, sur ce qu'il me propose.

NICOMÈDE.

Eh bien! s'il est besoin de répondre autre chose,

Attale doit régner, Rome l'a résolu,
Et puisqu'elle a partout un pouvoir absolu,
C'est aux rois d'obéir alors qu'elle commande.
Attale a le cœur grand, l'esprit grand, l'âme grande,
Et toutes les grandeurs dont se fait un grand roi;
Mais c'est trop que d'en croire un Romain sur sa foi.
Par quelque grand effet voyons s'il en est digne,
S'il a cette vertu, cette valeur insigne:
Donnez-lui votre armée, et voyons ces grands coups;
Qu'il en fasse pour lui ce que j'ai fait pour vous;
Qu'il règne avec éclat sur sa propre conquête,
Et que de sa victoire il couronne sa tête
 Et que de sa victoire il couronne sa tête.
Je lui prête mon bras, et veux dès maintenant,
S'il daigne s'en servir, être son lieutenant.
L'exemple des Romains m'autorise à le faire:
Le fameux Scipion[32] le fut bien de son frère,
Et lorsqu'Antiochus fut par eux détrôné,
Sous les lois du plus jeune on vit marcher l'aîné.
Les bords de l'Hellespont, ceux de la mer Egée,
Les restes de l'Asie à nos côtés rangée,
Offrent une matière à son ambition...

Nicomède, en présence de Prusias, son père,

brave Flaminius, ambassadeur de Rome.
(Nicomède.)
P. 76-77.

Flaminius le prend de haut à son tour. Rome est puissante, et

pourrait bien ne pas permettre au jeune prince de lâcher ainsi la
bride à ses projets aventureux—Nicomède ne répond qu'avec plus de
fermeté:
J'ignore, sur ce point, les volontés du roi:
Mais peut-être qu'un jour je dépendrai de moi,
Et nous verrons alors l'effet de ces menaces.
Vous pouvez cependant faire munir ces places,
Préparer un obstacle à mes nouveaux desseins,
Disposer de bonne heure un secours de Romains,
Et si Flaminius en est le capitaine,
Nous pourrons lui trouver un lac de Trasimène[33].

PRUSIAS.

Prince, vous abusez trop tôt de ma bonté:

Le rang d'ambassadeur doit être respecté,
Et l'honneur souverain qu'ici je vous défère...

NICOMÈDE.

Ou laissez-moi parler, Sire, ou faites-moi taire.

Je ne sais point répondre autrement pour un roi
A qui dessus son trône on veut faire la loi.

PRUSIAS.

Vous m'offensez moi-même, en parlant de la sorte,

Et vous devez dompter l'ardeur qui vous emporte.

NICOMÈDE.

Quoi! je verrai, seigneur, qu'on borne vos Etats,

Qu'au milieu de ma course on m'arrête le bras,
Que de vous menacer on a même l'audace,
Et je ne rendrai point menace pour menace!
Et je remercîrai qui me dit hautement
Qu'il ne m'est plus permis de vaincre impunément!
 Attale, qui vient d'arriver de Rome, ne connaît pas son frère
Nicomède; il le rencontre avec Laodice, et l'entendant parler sans
ménagement des Romains, lui dit: «Prenez garde! Rome peut tirer
vengeance de vos propos sur elle.»
 NICOMÈDE.

Rome, seigneur!

ATTALE.

Oui, Rome; en êtes-vous en doute?

NICOMÈDE.

Seigneur, je crains pour vous qu'un Romain vous écoute;

Et si Rome savait de quels feux vous brûlez,
Bien loin de vous prêter l'appui dont vous parlez,
Elle s'indignerait de voir sa créature
A l'éclat de son nom faire une telle injure,
Et vous dégraderait peut-être dès demain
Du titre glorieux de citoyen romain.
Vous l'a-t-elle donné pour mériter sa haine,
En le déshonorant par l'amour d'une reine?
Et ne savez-vous plus qu'il n'est princes ni rois
Qu'elle daigne égaler à ses moindres bourgeois?
Pour avoir tant vécu chez ces cœurs magnanimes,
Vous en avez bientôt oublié les maximes.
Reprenez un orgueil digne d'elle et de vous;
Remplissez mieux un nom sous qui nous tremblons tous.
Et sans plus l'abaisser à cette ignominie
D'idolâtrer en vain la reine d'Arménie,
Songez qu'il faut du moins, pour toucher votre cœur,
La fille d'un tribun ou celle d'un préteur;
Que Rome vous permet cette haute alliance,
Dont vous aurait exclu le défaut de naissance,
Si l'honneur souverain de son adoption
Ne vous autorisait à tant d'ambition.
Forcez, rompez, brisez de si honteuses chaînes;
Aux rois qu'elle méprise abandonnez les reines,
Et concevez enfin des vœux plus élevés,
 Pour mériter les biens qui vous sont réservés.

ATTALE.

Si cet homme est à vous, imposez-lui silence,

Madame[34], et retenez une telle insolence.
Pour voir jusqu'à quel point elle pourrait aller,
J'ai forcé ma colère à le laisser parler;
Mais je crains qu'elle échappe, et que, s'il continue,
Je ne m'obstine plus à tant de retenue.

NICOMÈDE.

Seigneur, si j'ai raison, qu'importe à qui je sois?

Perd-elle de son prix pour emprunter ma voix?
Vous-même, amour à part, je vous en fais arbitre.
Ce grand nom de Romain est un précieux titre,
Et la reine et le roi l'ont assez acheté
Pour ne se plaire pas à le voir rejeté,
Puisqu'ils se sont privés, pour ce nom d'importance,
Des charmantes douceurs d'élever votre enfance.
Dès l'âge de quatre ans ils vous ont éloigné;
Jugez si c'est pour voir ce titre dédaigné,
Pour vous voir renoncer, par l'hymen d'une reine,
A la part qu'ils avaient à la grandeur romaine.

Prusias enfin, excellent homme, mais très faible, cherche à

ramener son fils à des sentiments de douceur et de résignation.
Sans perdre un instant le respect qu'il lui doit, Nicomède lui fait
sentir la grandeur du rôle qu'il oublie, et les hauts devoirs que le
titre de roi lui impose.
 PRUSIAS.

Nicomède, en deux mots, ce désordre me fâche.

Quoi qu'on t'ose imputer, je ne te crois point lâche.
Mais donnons quelque chose à Rome qui se plaint
Et tâchons d'assurer la reine qui te craint.
J'ai tendresse pour toi, j'ai passion pour elle,
Et je ne veux pas voir cette haine éternelle,
Ni que des sentiments que j'aime à voir durer
Ne règnent dans mon cœur que pour le déchirer.
J'y veux mettre d'accord l'amour et la nature:
Être père et mari dans cette conjoncture...

NICOMÈDE.

Seigneur, voulez-vous bien vous en fier à moi?

Ne soyez l'un ni l'autre.

PRUSIAS.

Et que dois-je être?

NICOMÈDE.

ROI!
Reprenez hautement ce noble caractère.
Un véritable roi n'est ni mari ni père;
Il regarde son trône, et rien de plus. Régnez;
Rome vous craindra plus que vous ne la craignez.
Malgré cette puissance et si vaste et si grande,
Vous pouvez déjà voir comme elle m'appréhende[35],
Combien en me perdant elle espère gagner,
Parce qu'elle prévoit que je saurai régner.
 Cependant Arsinoé vient à bout de ses mauvais desseins.
Nicomède est arrêté, enchaîné. Flaminius va le jeter sur un vaisseau
qui est tout prêt, et l'emmener à Rome.
Mais le peuple, qui adore Nicomède, qui ne veut pas d'Attale pour
«roi en peinture» et des Romains pour maîtres, le peuple se révolte,
cerne le palais. Prusias, Arsinoé sont pâles de terreur. Laodice, qui
est, elle aussi, aimée du peuple à cause de sa haine pour Rome, les
prend généreusement sous sa protection. Mais Nicomède, qu'est-il
devenu? Il a été sauvé. Au moment où on l'entraînait vers le
vaisseau de Flaminius, un inconnu, suivi de quelques amis, s'est
élancé, a poignardé le chef des gardes qui l'emmenaient, a mis en
fuite les autres, a calmé la sédition en montrant au peuple Nicomède
sauvé. Quel est cet inconnu?
C'est Attale, le faible et insignifiant Attale, à qui nous n'avons
guère pris garde jusqu'à présent, qui a même été traité de très haut
par Nicomède, mais qui, à écouter les mâles paroles de son grand
frère, a senti peu à peu le noble désir de rivaliser de vaillance avec
lui et même de le vaincre en générosité. Il se découvre comme
sauveur de Nicomède, et celui-ci le remercie avec la chaleur
généreuse qui lui est habituelle:
 NICOMÈDE.

Ah! laissez-moi toujours à cette digne marque

Reconnaître en mon sang un vrai sang de monarque.
Ce n'est plus des Romains l'esclave ambitieux,
C'est le libérateur d'un sang si précieux.
Mon frère, avec mes fers vous en briserez bien d'autres,
Ceux du roi, de la reine, et les siens et les vôtres.
Mais pourquoi vous cacher en sauvant tout l'Etat?

ATTALE.

Pour voir votre vertu dans son plus haut éclat;

Pour la voir seule agir contre notre injustice,
Sans la préoccuper par ce faible service,
Et me venger enfin ou sur vous ou sur moi,
Si j'eusse mal jugé de tout ce que je voi.

Et remarquez ce que peut la fermeté de cœur, et l'autorité que

donne à un vaincu, presque à un captif, la dignité, la noblesse d'une
courageuse attitude. Ce Nicomède est à la fin de la pièce comme le
chef et le maître. Attale s'est fait son élève et son partisan. Arsinoé
s'humilie devant lui; Prusias proclame «qu'avoir un fils si grand est
sa plus grande gloire»; Flaminius lui-même lui parle avec respect.
C'est qu'il n'y a rien qui impose comme le courage, comme l'âme
énergique et obstinée qui espère contre toute espérance, et pour
tout dire d'un mot, comme la volonté. C'est un homme du temps de
Corneille, et qui l'admirait fort, qui a dit: «Rien n'est impossible: il y
a des voies qui conduisent à toutes choses; et si nous avions assez
de volonté, nous aurions toujours assez de moyens»[36].
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