Section 5.

12
Underground Cable Trench

teL.

J
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.12-1
Underground Cable Trench Rev. 2

5.12 Underground Cable Trench

5.12.1 Summary of Underground Cable Trench

Baseline information for the Underground Cable Trench (Trenwa, Inc.) is provided in Section 2.0, Site
History, Description, and Baseline Condition.

The Trenwa is the trench system that contains the security system cablin CS he Trenwa is a
precast concrete cable trench that follows the PA perimeter. Th a - een 5 and 7 ft
wide and is between approximately 1.8 and 3.2 ft deep, depen locati holes are
interspersed along the Trenwa alignment. The Trenwa is cove ith pr traffic
crossings, specialized lids are in place to allow vehicular traffic renwrenwa
section is modified for these locations, including a thicker base an t inserts S.
Trenwa bedding at typical road crossings was specified to be co de and b
minimum 95 percent of maximum dry density per ASTM D1557. -

Trenwa bedding is compacted subgrade soil. Per the dr enginee , ing was not
specified except at certain locations. The design pl tare the "Soil
compaction under the trench brackets should be eq the und averae so il compaction
must equal 4000# per square ft or 28# per square ' Pedes IS and dra pipe crossings
included a minimum bedding of 3 in. of crushed nderlaith fabric. Drawings
88-185-1 and 9364-C-0012, files 47643 646 pec• ,ilud r d details for Trenwa
bedding and subgrade.

The Trenwa system is located insi ility perimete ws the fence alignment
around the site. The T enwa is cons s long, straig along most sides of the facility
except at the s f the sit e it jogs around ecurity Building and the Condensate
Storage T ," 20 orth anc ides of the Intake Structure. The Trenwa section
ends ap ely 200 ft no Intake re. Underground cabling continues beyond the
Tren , uipment connected abling e original northern section of the Trenwa
w d where the north face o ew W is located. The Trenwa system ends at a point
th onds to the north face th Warehouse, but security system cabling with handhole
acces has-been extended aroun ISFSI facility, the New Warehouse, and the security
perimet ortheast corer oft •. See drawings listed in Table 5.12-1 for location and

5.12.2 lnputs/R Ices - n guthe Analysis

Is

Table 5.12-1 lists refe- " We ided by OPPD and other documents used to support HDR's analysis.

Table5.12-1 - References for Underground Cable Trench

Document Title OPPD Document Date Page
Number Number(s)
(if applicable)
Cable Trench Layout 88-185-1 (#47643) 6/30/1988
Cable Trench Layout 88-185-2 (#47644) 6/30/1988
Cable Trench Layout 88-185-3, Rev.1 (#47645) 7/1/1988
Cable Trench Details 88-185-4 (#47646) 7/1/1988
Cable Trench Layout 89-67-1 (#49669) 3/17/1989
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.12-2
Underground Cable Trench Rev. 2
Table 5.12-1 - References for Underaround Cable Trench Pag512-2
Document Title OPPD Document Date Page
Number Number(s)
(if applicable)
Cable Trench Layout 89-67-2 (#49670) 3/17/1989
Cable Trench Details 89-67-5 (#49717) 3/17/1989
Cable Trench Layout 89-132-1 (#49750) 5/19/1989
Cable Trench Layout 89-132-2 (#49751) 5/&_ 89 _

Cable Trench Layout 89-132-3 (#49752) 5Nj

5
Cable Trench Details 89-132-4 (#497533) A. 5/10M W
Cable Trench Details 89-132-5 (#49754)=. 5/10__
Precast Concrete 9364-C-0106, Sht.
Cable Trench Layout Rev. 2 (#47449) . o n
Security System Duct Bank 9364-C-00012, Sht. 1 .
Sections and Cable Trench Details Rev. 0 (#46463) !g,"
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation 59058-EE-6A, R . 1• Ur"
ISFSI Cable Trench and Raceway (#60753). ___ M•.E
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
ISFSI Cable Trench Section & Details• 59058-. Unknow'
6 wi W
Cable Trench Layout 04-8W3' (#608 19 WV09~1004 _______

Dsg Manual 7.01, Si ehnc

Naval Facilities Engineering Command, __ __ _All

Detailed site observations-field re eld notes, and ctio ists-for the Undergrofind
Cable Trench are provided in Atta ,, 411
",.,

Observed per` e d data are as fol ows:

The covers appea ht and l ; tong the north, west, and south sides, which were
arte during site inspect
differential settlement wa - d where t renwa section varied due to connectivity to
es, changes in alignment, vehice crossing points. Because the Trenwa base is set
ab6 dard frost depth for this. ', some minor differences in the top elevation of the system
are tcted.
* The rive.t.&section of the Tre nd the section at the northeast corner of the site were not
inspecte d avy depos t in some areas and inundation by floodwaters at the northeast
corner of the sIit ern fied 4'ections were being made.
* Soils along the T i '.rnn ent were normally stable and firm. Isolated locations of soft soil
were encountered. '¶ t soil locations were observed where the soil showed signs of being
saturated or moist and 4 heir lowest strength condition. It is anticipated that the soils will dry and
re-stabilize in the future.

5.12.3 Assessment Methods and Procedures

5.12.3.1 Assessment Procedures Accomplished

Assessments were made by walking the Trenwa alignment and observing surface features of
the system (manholes), the precast concrete cover, and the ground surface adjacent to the
Trenwa cover. The surface assessment included using a 4-ft-long, 0.5-in.-diameter, steel-tipped
 Priority 1 Structures Page 5.12-3
Underground Cable Trench Rev. 2
K fiberglass T-handle soil probe to hand probe the ground surface to judge the relative soil
strength. The assessment focused on identifying conditions indicative of potential flood-related
f. impacts or damage to the utility, as follows:

* Ground surface conditions immediately adjacent to the utility including scour, subsidence
.or settlement, lateral spreading, piping, and heave
* Soft ground surface areas (native soil, engineered fill, and limestone gravel surfacing), as
determined by probing
* Water accumulations and flows in subsurface system c, o es and concrete
cable encasement pipes)
* Damage to at-grade or above-grade system feature equip
* Variance from normal installation conditions inclu I d system
features and equipment
• Operation of the system and appurtenant equipment (i. stem oper d
operating as intended?)

Additional investigations were performed to furt.

including areas where conditions indicative of
observed. These included the following nor te g
investigations:

0 GPR. (Test reports were not a) evisi(

5.12.3.2 Assessment Pr Cor

Assessments of the Trenwa not complel wing:

0 1 wa) ,served except for visual observations that were

n joints in the Trenwa cover. It is not expected that
Snrior observatioff ' rease - dence in the conclusion because it is anticipalted
gat only sediment dep n the Tre uld be observed.
,ground s 'ems and conditions was performed because it
No excavation to inspect
hwas not deemed necessar Chis structure.
iometer readings alo -river that will provide an indication of slope movement.

5.12.4 A

Identified PFMs w%% 1ll "ed as discussed in Section 3.0. The review considered the
preliminary informa ja ~irom OPPD data files and from initial walk-down observations.
Eleven PFMs associate• .... e different Triggering Mechanisms were determined to be
"non-credible" for all I1 Structures, as discussed in Section 3.6. The remaining PFMs were
carried forward as "credible." After the design review for each structure, the structure observations,
and the results of available geotechnical, geophysical, and survey data were analyzed. a number of
CPFMs were ruled out as discussed in Section 5.12.4.1. The CPFMs carried forward for detailed
assessment are discussed in Section 5.12.4.2.
 Priority 1 Structures Page 5.12-4
Underground Cable Trench Rev. 2
5.12.4.1 Potential Failure Modes Ruled Out Prior to the Completion of the Detailed
I Assessment

The ruled-out CPFMs reside in the Not Significant/High Confidence category and for clarity
will not be shown in the Potential for Failure/Confidence matrix.
Triggering Mechanism 2 - Surface Erosion
CPFM 2a - Undermining shallow foundation/slab/surfaces

Reasons for ruling out:

* The Trenwa system survey was not completed due ndati- .y at the time
of inspection. Although this PFM is not considered d on
n d.
completed, it has the potential to occur in flooded area e not bet ner'vatlons
However, due to silt deposited between the PA fencin istence
armoring, this PFM was judged to be unlikely for the 9bs -eas z
* Some localized and limited surface erosion was n ted at the sit , ng adjacent o the
sidewalls of the Trenwa. According to the Trenwa is at least 1.8 ft
surface. Undermining e was not-
below the ground red credible
because it is well below the depths of s erosion d in the fi , l e site
perimeter fence includes a 4-ft-tall Ne, sey Ba -:the bott om reinforced
section. The New Jersey Barrier is mi -d to a ete barrier is
continuous around the site, pr t fl and sitte and Trenwa.
Blockage of direct flows on e reduces elihood t surface erosion will affect
the Trenwa. -
, P)."

The Trenwa system obs'~ on was n 3 tM pleted due to inundation of the facility at the
•time of inspection. AlthoSI-his PFM is not considered credible based on present field
bbservations, it has the poA... to occur in flooded areas that are unobserved. Little or no
lifce erosion was obser iong the Trenwa, and silt deposits that were observed across
11 he. entire Trenwa,7indicate flow velocity rates that were too low to initiate
scoWwduced failure. )4oii,1nws through the northeast site were observed at the time of
field 5 •ations, ing and other structures observed from a distance appeared to be
intact an•aj q the flood. This PFM was judged to be unlikely for the unobserved
areas. _

* The Trenwa isaIlgned for some displacement and flexibility, and cabling inside the
Trenwa is a flexible system. The system will tolerate some movement without loss of
functionality or damage to enclosed utilities.
" According to the drawings, the Trenwa bottom is at least 1.8 ft below the ground surface.
Undermining of the Trenwa base was not considered credible because it is below the depths
of surface erosion observed in the field.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.12-5
Underground Cable Trench Rev. 2

Triggering Mechanism 7 - Soil Collapse (first time wetting) "-

CPFM 7a - Cracked slab, differential settlement of shallow foundation, loss of structural
support
CPFM 7b - Displaced structure/broken connections
CPFM 7c - General site settlement

Reason for ruling out:

* Soil supporting and surrounding a majority of the Tren ,previously

wetted. The peak flood elevation prior to 2011 was tt, .Ted in 1993.

Triggering Mechanism 10- Machine!dVibration-nd

CPFM I Oa - Cracked slab, differential settlement o .structural
support
CPFM 1Ob - Displaced structure/broken connections
CPFM 1Oc - Additional lateral force on below-grade v

Reasons for ruling out:

* Machine vibrations from the facility (tu and van is) have rally
occurred, and no indications of these s are ev
* Pumps used on site during the 2011 fl ere tqo b size to cause
ground or structure vibrations
# 'tia li on.

No structure movements in f soil liq ion and Itant settlement were

observed; no structure cr settlements, ral mol nts were observed.

Trigger 11- Soil Sti Liquefaction or Upward

SeepaA
.Ik•4. of shallow foundation, loss of structural
suppo.
&PFM Ib- Displac
ture/bro mnections
CPFM 1 c - Additiona ýl force on o'w-grade walls

for ruling out:

0 not been obserN

S
'.oil/piping feal )served in the missile room was determined to be too shallow
to be

Triggering Me' 12 - Rapid Drawdown

CPFM 12a - t-"' bank slope failure and undermining surrounding structures
CPFM 12b - Lateral spreading

Reasons for ruling out:

* The structures did not have evident signs of distress identified during the field assessments.
" Slope failure was not observed at the site.
* River stage level has receded and stabilized as of October 4, 2011.
Priority I Structures Page 5.12-6
Underground Cable Trench Rev. 2
-As of October 11, 2011, groundwater elevations had already had one week to stabilize to at
least a partial degree.
The river bank is armored and has historically protected and stabilized the existing river
bank.

Triggering Mechanism 13 - Submergence

CPFM 13a - Corrosion of underground utilities

Reasons for ruling out:

* Groundwater elevations controlled by Missouri Ri er elev d percolation of

storm precipitation, including winter snowmelt, wo ex underground
improvements including constructed steel and concr ement . ch, steel and
concrete site improvements are assumed to be designe .standthe co
environment of groundwater and wetted soil.
* Conditions have not been changed due to the 2011 floo

5.12.4.2 Detailed Assessment of Credible ileilur Mo

The following CPFMs are the only CPFMs ed forwa etailed ass t for the
Trenwa as a result of the 2011 flood. Thi ailed ass vided be ow.

Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subs, ce on

CPFM 3a - Undermining an en -of sh foundat sla /surfaces (due to
pumping)
CPFM 3c - Undermin utilities (due

The T r ism and ,could occur as o ows: multiple potentially connected

see h soil ba t the site, including soil backfill in utility trenches,
tench beddi re-exis • cts/voids under pavement. The paths are exposed
e locations to the odwate en areas outside the Aqua Dam perimeter or
e hole in the pavement no e Secu uilding). This network of seepage paths is
ected to pumping source e site: the Trenwa beside the Security Building and inside
:• •SCO barrier, and the n us pumps inside the perimeter of the Aqua Dam and the
SIbbarer. The pumps W,-- cerated for an extended period, maintaining a head
de pn the seepage pa h orks. Gradient was sufficient to begin erosion of
surrounhIN",l leepageAA
ered and erosion continues unarrested. Erosion extends out,
interceptile ketwor
ii lity trenches, including the Trenwa. Voids are created under and
along the Utl ., utilities, structures, and pavements. The potential damage
includes settle Trenwa. Significant settlement might cause a loss of electrical
connectivity.

Below are field observations and data that.support the likelihood of these CPFMs:
" Trenwa trenches beside the Security Building were pumped for the duration of flooding to
remove water coming in from outside Trenwa locations. This created a head differential.
" Site drainage pumps inside the perimeter of the Aqua Dam and HESCO barriers pumped
from numerous sources around the perimeter of the facility. The Aqua Dam was located in
proximity to the Trenwa along, the west, south, and east sides of the PA. The HESCO
barriers that were used to protect the Security Building crossed the Trenwa.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.12-7
Rev. 2
< -
Undergro und Cable Trench
A hole in the pavement with a void area beneath the concrete slab was observed just north
of the Security Building and east-southeast of MH-5. The hole and void area could be the
result of piping and subsurface erosion. The hole and void area are located in proximity to
the Trenwa.
Based on a conversation with the OPPD operations employee testing FP-3E on September
13, 2011, fire hydrant FP-3C, located northeast of the Security Building, was tested on
September 13, 2011, and failed. According to the OPPD operations employee, when
opening the valve to test the hydrant, the base cracked and le and the valve had to be
closed. The access cabinet was tagged-out for repair t hydrant that
failed is located in proximity to the Trenwa.
Concrete areas in the Paved Access Area and pede areas b river and Servic
Building north of where the ductbank crosses the P cc ea. ibited
distress including cracking, slab settlement, and unde s evidenc llow-
sounding pavement areas).
An area of apparent pavement settlement, located in t•ess a Area we
of the Intake Structure overhead door, is located near the no water ali

Below are field observ

* The observed hole
developed by outfli
Temporary surface
the Aqua Dam. On
observations. Con
observed hole.
* Most areas along ti

•The•_:

ie extent of the s1
4GPR data (awaitinl
IRfollowing table de -ddistress indicators and other data that would increase or
e the nntentinl I associated with these CPFMs for the Trenwa.
 Priority 1 Structures Page 5.12-8
_Underground Cable Trench Rev. 2

Conclusion

Significance
tion/DirectFloodwaterImpact
Potentialfor Degradat

Indicators for these CP'FMs have been observed. The pavement void area and fire cabinet test
failure north of the Sec:urity Building are in the proximity of the T wa. It is possible that
subsurface erosion extiends below the Trenwa northeast of the Se Bu' g. Therefore,
the potential for degrawdation due to these CPFMs is judg e h•i

Implication

The occurrence of the,se CPFMs could cause the collapse enwa. Ho e Trenwa
is flexible and will tol ,rate movement without loss of
exposed utilities. The refore, the implication of the po
low.

Confidence

There are multiple ele]ments to these CPF e inflc the

2011 flood, the hole in the pavement nort he Seci
section in the Paved A.ccess Area beeen ervioc ,Structure.
However, even thouglg-the confi n hi -that the corridor
pavement, the extent c ifthese v s not known.

Available data are not fhto a conclusion that subsurface

erosion, in the assessment is low, which

CPFMs 3a and 3c, as di•d•fie'•d above, tlfpotential for degradation is high because the
,ement void area and fire c30t test failure north of the Security Building are in the
imity of the Trenwa. Thi4 •radation could have caused enough erosion to impact the
intended functionAit
ir structure. The combined consideration of the potential for
r Ohmand the implicathif that degradation to a structure of this type puts it in the "not
iifickdi1?bAtegory. Thca4currently collected are not sufficient to rule out these CPFMs.
TheIo ,.. -e de ... e above assessment is low, which means more data or continued
mornri~~t N.M.i might be necessary to draw a conclusion.

Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Piping

CPFM 3d - Undermining and settlement of shallow foundation/slab (due to river
drawdown)
CPFM 3f- Undermined buried utilities (due to river drawdown)

These CPFMs are similar to and in addition to CPFM 3a and 3c, but instead of pumping, the
gradient is created by rapidly receding river level.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.12-9
Underground Cable Trench Rev. 2
The Triggering Mechanism and CPFM could then occur as follows: river level drops faster
than pore water pressure in the soil foundation can dissipate. A gradient is created that moves
soil into existing defects and enlarges voids under or along the Trenwa walls or utility lines.
Depending on the extent of the voids created, impacts can include the following: trench
subsidence, unsupported Trenwa sections, Trenwa failures, unsupported pipe sections, pipe
deflections, pipe failure, and possible impacts on adjacent improvements or utilities.

Field observations and data that support the likelihood of these C Is are as follows:
* Subsurface erosion is known to exist beneath buildin sl ow
unknown whether these erosion and piping features xtend the Trenwa.
Areas of soft soils were observed in localized areas ent to, idewalls.
The east segment of the Trenwa structure is relative river herefore
susceptible to subsurface piping associated with draw e river.

Field observations and data or site conditions that indicat s are unlike
follows:
0 The Trenwa has been subjected to floodin ast, and e of erosion and
piping or impacts have not been recorde *

* The east segment of the Trenwa is nea yiver. H majori e Trenwa is

well away from the river. Increased d 'ce from vd educes the likelihood of
subsurface erosion/piping related-to th r dra, ,v- '
The following are data-gaps (da quired to these C

* Geophysical investigati _o address adja areas

* Inclin§,.,trzpgta to addre ed concerns .
R . ai measur• in existing piezometers/monitoring wells
o5wing table d • pbsers
b s indicators and other data that would increase or

i ease the potential for with these CPFMs for the Trenwa.
-ation
_•Adverse (DegradationlDi•;fdoodwater Favorable (Degradation/Direct
Imact More Like . Floodwater Impact Less Likely)
•ifdfaters at a high level exist or an USACE suspended the river drawdown
eKtaAperiod of time that co#*llow between August 27 and September 18, 2011.
surrou- oils to become p ed. This gap in the scheduled reduction of dam
release rates was provided to allow
groundwater elevations to equalize with river
N, t flow elevations.
Riverbank is armored and protects against
creation of a weakened flow path.
Indications of these CPFMs have not been
exhibited or reported for previous floods.
Data Gaps:
* Field observations after river drawdown
* Geophysical investigation data to address adjacent pavement slabs
* Inclinometer data to address observed concerns
 Priority 1 Structures Page 5.12-10
Underground Cable Trench Rev. 2
• / Conclusion

Sianificant

Potentialfor Degradation/DirectFloodwaterImpact

None of the indicators for the CPFMs has been observed at the Trenwa. However, voids due to
rapid drawdown might not have been evident at the time of the fi assessments. Additionally,
the extent of voids created by rapid drawdown could be insi. ifi e tential that
degradation due to this CPFM has occurred is low.

Implication

The occurrence of these CPFMs could cause the collapse nwa. Ho e Trenwa
is flexible and will tolerate movement without loss of fun r detrimen s
exposed utilities. Therefore, the implication of the potent e n for these
low.

Confidence

The data at hand are not sufficient to rule ese CPF d to a con sion that
subsurface erosion would undermine the a. Th e, idence in the assessment
is low, which means more data are n ,ess dra n s

Summary

For CPFMs 3d and 3f, as di bove, the pot dation is low. This
degradat' ve to occ large scale to 1 e integrity or intended function of
the T consi of the potential for degradation and the implications
of adation ure of i puts it in the "not significant" category. The data
fY••e
aencollectediare cient to j•i~t these CPFMs. Therefore, the confidence in the
e ' mons o- 1ntu monitoring and inspections
might be necessary to draw a o cl s

Tri;gog.alMechanism 14• st Effects

CPF'A a,- Heav g fng, or displacement

Heave associ( " penetration below the Trenwa could occur.

The Triggering nism and CPFM could occur as follows: the trigger for frost penetration
to occur is no different than in previous years. However, higher subsurface water level and
increased moisture content of near-surface soils could increase the magnitude of frost
movement over the upcoming winter season.

Field observations and data that support the likelihood of this CPFM are as follows:
* Wet soil conditions were observed near the Trenwa structure, especially near the northeast
corner of the site.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.12-11
Underground Cable Trench Rev. 2
Field observations and data or site conditions that indicate this CPFM is unlikely are as
follows:
* Conditions required to trigger this CPFM have typically occurred every year since
construction.
* The majority of the Trenwa, except the east segment, is well away from the river and
potential subsurface water associated with the river.

The following are data gaps (data yet required to assess this

" Geophysical investigation data to address observed I

* No Condition Reports are available to review to ad of frost
heave have created problems in the past. However,
needed for increasing the confidence in the conclusion
CPFM typically happen on a yearly basis. /I
The following table describes observed distress indicators ai
decrease the potential for degradation associatedwA(

Adverse (DegradationlDirect Floodwal

C
/
Impact More Likely) F
Wet soil conditions currently exist. The Ty
npac

(for.

jone of the indicators for observed along the structure. However,

;ing temperatures II since the 2011 flood. The potential that
due to this CPFMi is low.

The occu• this !~'elow the Trenwa would likely not affect the performance of the
:Qf
Trenwa beca•-t. ly subjected to frost conditions. Therefore, the implication of the
potential the CPFMs is low.

Confidence

The potential impact on the structure from this CPFM is not known due to unknown
supporting/surrounding soil saturation levels. River and groundwater levels at this time are
such that this CPFM might occur.

The data at hand are not sufficient to rule out this CPFM or to lead to a conclusion that frost
effects would negatively affect the Trenwa. Therefore, the confidence in the assessment is low,
which means more data are necessary to draw a conclusion.
 Priority 1 Structures Page 5.12-12
Underground Cable Trench Rev. 2
Summary
(
For CPFM 14a, as discussed above, the potential for degradation is low. The combined
consideration of the potential for degradation and the implications of that degradation to a
structure of this type puts it in the "not significant" category. The data currently collected are
not sufficient to rule out these CPFMs. Therefore, the confidence in the above assessment is
"low," which means more data or continued monitoring and inspections might be necessary to
draw a final conclusion. &

5.12.5 Results and Conclusions

The CPFMs evaluated for the Trenwa are presented in the foll
the estimated significance and the level of confidence in the eN

5.12.6 RecommebnlAc.ti4l

Further forensic investiga and physical modifications are recommended to address CPFMs 3a, 3c,
3d, and 3f for the Trenwa. CPFMs 3a and 3c are associated with the distress in and near the Paved
Access Area between the Service Building and the Intake Structure (Key Distress Indicator #2). These
recommendations are described in detail in Section 4.2.5.

Also, monitoring of groundwater well data and a review of the geophysical data, when available,
should be done. The results of this monitoring will be used increase the confidence in the assessment
results. At the time of Revision 0, groundwater levels had not yet stabilized to nominal normal levels.
Therefore, it is possible that new distress indicators could still develop. If new distress indicators are
observed before December 31, 2011, appropriate HDR personnel should be notified immediately to
 Priority 1 Structures Page 5.12-13
Underground Cable Trench Rev. 2
determine whether an immediate inspection or assessment should be conducted. Observation of new
distress indicators might result in a modification of the recommendations for this structure.

5.12.7 Updates Since Revision 0

Revision 0 of this Assessment Report was submitted to OPPD on October 14, 2011. Revision 0
* presented the results of preliminary assessments for each Priority 1 Structure. These assessments were
incomplete in Revision 0 because the forensic investigation and/or monit g for most of the
Priority 1 Structures was not completed by the submittal date. Thi vi ffi' sessment Report
includes the results of additional forensic investigation and mo to s structure as
described beloW.

5.12.7.1 Additional Data Available

The following additional data were available for the Und hable Trench
Revisions 1 and 2 of this Assessment Report:

o Results of KDI #2 forensic investigation (se 2)

Additional groundwater monitoring well - - - el data D.
* Field observations of the river bank (see. ion 5.25
* Results of geophysical investigation b otechnol
G. Attachment 6).
*Results of geotechnical investigation - iele G. In . chment 6).
* Data obtained from inclinom byG I nc (s
Results of continued survey, p Rynear d Assoc (see Attachment 6).
* Field assessment of the in areas that acces- prior to Revision 0 of the
report and a visual inspe interior sectiom a where the system had been

5. ddition K sis
Revision 0, additional data have become
ailable which has clarifie gnificance nd confidence for these CPFMs. The following ,
nts the previously identi PFMs and the new interpretation of their significance and

oiom
Zae nd river stage level data from OPPD.

Data at th d groundwater have returned to nominal normal levels.

Field !river bank

No significance distress from the 2011 Flood was observed.

Results of geophysical investigation report by Geotechnology, Inc.

Seismic Refraction and Seismic ReMi tests performed around the outside perimeter of the
power block as part of KDI #2 identified deep anomalies that could be gravel, soft clay,
loose sand, or possibly voids.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.12-14
Underground Cable Trench Rev. 2
Results of geotechnical investigation by Thiele Geotech, Inc.
-tucue
Proiy
Six test borings were drilled, with continuous sampling of the soil encountered, to ground
truth the Geotechnology, Inc. seismic investigation results as part of the KDI #2 forensic
investigation. Test bore holes were located to penetrate the deep anomalies identified in the
seismic investigation. The test boring data did not show any piping voids or very soft/very
loose
1 ..
conditions
. .. .
that might be indicative of subsurface erosion/piping or related material
.. +-...-

loss or uiuv~remi.

All of the SPT and CPT test results conducted for th• Lwere compared
to similar data from numerous other geotechnical i itions been conducted
on the FCS site in previous years. This comparisor, a•achanges to
erenot
the soil strength and stiffness over that time period. .1 T test
performed in the top 10 feet to protect existing utilities.
ini
Data from inclinometers to date, compared to the origir
exceeded the accuracy range of the inclinometers e) n at the monitored
locations since the installation of the instru

* Results of continued survey by Lamp

Survey data to date compared to the o te) •ceeded the

accuracy range of the survey uip tthte monitored
locations, since the survey b. l

Additional visual inspectio ompleted sin f., iJ @F this Assesssment Report to,
assess possib hanges due ed river levels. -not visited pri or to Revision 0
were v" "ion umente of the Trenwa was found similar to the areas that
wer Interio
• ' tions of the Trenwa were complete-d where the top
n removed. r areas ed had soil deposits in the botto m of the trench.
sive areas of the Tre .ere not'• be opened. It was notexpeccted that interior
sw cnfidence e conclusion because it was anticipated that
would be observed.

irface Erosion/Piping
,ettlement of shallow foundation/slab (due to river

utilities (due to river drawdown)

The groundwa-t ! .a measured in the monitoring wells closely followesd the river level as
the floodwater re' I The data indicate that groundwater elevation was ab'out 2 ft above the
river level near the beginning of October 2011 and receded to match the rive r level by about
October 14, 2011. Therefore the differential head created by the river drawd ownV wvas
insufficient to facilitate subsurface erosion.

Triggering Mechanism 14 - Frost Effects

CPFM 14a - Heaving, crushing, or displacement
The foundation for the Trenwa is not below frost depth and is therefore subjected to frost
effects during prolonged periods of cold weather. Areas of the Trenwa that were not inspected
Prioritý 1 Structures Page 5.12-15
Under! ground Cable Trench Rev. 2
due to inundation for Revision 0 of the report have now been visited. Though there were a few
soft spots, soils in the areas visited were generally firm. In addition, the groundwater elevation
measured in the monitoring wells closely followed the river level as the floodwater receded.
The data indicate that groundwater elevation was about 2 ft above the river level near the
beginning of October 2011 and receded to the river level by about October 14, 2011. Since
current groundwater levels are not different than normal seasonal levels and prolonged cold
weather has not yet occurred, the effects of frost heave on the Trenwa are no longer applicable.

5.12.7.3 Revised Re suits

.The CPFMs evaluated for the Underground Cable Tre

which shows the rating for the estimated significance
evaluation. CPFMs 3d, 3f, and 14a for the Undergroun rcn are ! ciatec with
Key Distress Indicators. Inspections of the Trenwa not vi to Revisio visual
inspections of the inside of the Trenwa have been compleq d groundw
level data were reviewed. The results of the additional for show
ation the matrix
•f
CPFMs are ruled out. Therefore, these CPFMs are yed
representing "No Further Action Recommende CPFMs 3a and 3c
for the Underground Cable Trench are assoc.. di . Section 4.2
presents the results of additional forensic .gation th* ducted t rtain whether
these CPFMs could be ruled out. The res f the ad i Sic investigation show that
these CPFMs are ruled out. Therefore, thd PFMs of the matrix .
representing "No Further Action . m R j ..- t
Red
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.12-16
Underground Cable Trench Rev. 2
5.12.7.4 Conclusions

In the assessment of the FCS Structures, the first step was to develop a list of all Triggering
Mechanisms and PFMs that could have occurred due to the prolonged inundation of the FCS
site during the 2011 Missouri River flood and could have negatively impacted these structures.
The next step was to use data from various investigations, including systematic observation of
the structures over time, either to eliminate the Triggering Mechanisms and PFMs from the list
or to recommend further investigation and/or physical modificati o remove them from the
list for any particular structure. Because all CPFMs for th d d e Trench other
than CPFMs 3a, 3c, 3d, 3f, and 14a had been ruled out p Rev cause CPFMs 3d,
3f, and 14a have been ruled out as a result of the Revis* fnding use CPFMs 3a
and 3c have been ruled out using the results of the KD vest• d in
Section 4.2, no Triggering Mechanisms and their associa ,cor theemain
Underground Cable Trench. Therefore, HDR has conclude e 2011 Mis ver od
did not impact the geotechnical and structural integrity of ound Cable
because the potential for failure of this structure due to the o jgnificant.
Section 5.10
Turbine Building South Switchyard

~-'-< ~e

K
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.10-1
Turbine Building South Switchyard Rev. 2

5.10 Turbine Building South Switchyard

5.10.1 Summary of Turbine Building South Switchyard

Baseline information for the Turbine Building South Switchyard is provided in Section 2.0, Site
History, Description, and Baseline Condition.

5.10.2 Inputs/References Supporting the Analysis

Table 5.10-1 lists references provided by OPPD and other doc

oundation for Transformer T-,a 1.5-ft-thiSf pile cap supported on ten 10BP42 steel piles
.05-S-412). Top-of-conc evation for this foundation is 1005.5 ft.
* The tion for Transformers *A1 and TI -A2 is a 1.5-ft-thick pile cap supported on four
1OBP ~ iles (see 11405-S- •j Top-of-concrete elevation for this foundation is 1005.5 ft.
* The foun' r Transforme k-3 and TI-A4 is a 1.5-ft-thick pile cap supported on four
IOBP42st ssee 11420-2 ). Top-of-concrete elevation for this foundation is 1005.5 ft.
" The foundation. s 'Il C-3B is an approximately 0.7-ft-thick pile cap supported on
four 8-in.-diamete a, "piles with tip elevation of 997 ft (see 11405-S-412). Top-of-concrete
elevation for this foi n is approximately 1004.8 ft. The piles are reinforced with a single #7
bar centered in the pile,'with the bar having a straight development into the slab.
* The foundation for the small switchgear located on the southwest comer of the west cable trench is
an approximately 0.7-ft-thick slab-on-grade foundation.
" The Dead End/161 Structure is a two-column frame, approximately 27 ft in height, with
interconnecting cross beams. There are separate foundations for each octagonal column. The piers
are 5 ft by 5 ft by 3 ft in height. Top-of-pier elevation is 1004.5 ft. Top-of-concrete elevation for
the pile cap is 1001.5 ft. Each cap is 4 ft thick, 7 ft by 20 ft in plan dimensions, supported by six
12-in.-diameter auger cast piles with tip elevation of 940 ft (see 11405-S-414). The piles are
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.10-2
Turbine Building South Switchyard Rev. 2
reinforced with a single # 11 bar centered in the pile, with the bar having a straight development
into the slab.
" The driving criteria, tip elevation, and capacities of the 10BP42 piles are unknown. However, the
tops of the piles are capped with a plate and anchor rods for a positive shear and uplift connection
(see 11405-S-412).
* The capacities of the 8-in.- and 12-in.-diameter auger cast piles are unknown.
" A continuous cable trench is adjacent to each transformer (see 11405- -411). This conduit trench
is a cast-in-place concrete trench with intermittent drain holes in the The trench also has a
vertical drain pipe penetrating the west end of the trench with• e oted as heading
west "to storm sewer manhole." The trench backfill below a and he walls is
free-draining granular material (see 11405-S-412).
* An approximately 0.7-ft-thick concrete block separation w lnc twe sformer TI
and T1 -A2. This wall is constructed on a continuous, cast-in'" crete gra spanning
to isolated footings. The wall is laterally braced via anchor s j WF31 piles ( 5-S
414).
* The structures were originally contained within a cast-in-place retain that projecte
approximately 6 in. above the surrounding grade. 0 . ately Jun II, OPPD built an
additional approximately 0.7-ft-thick cast-in-plac. n insulate te forms (ICF)
on top of the existing wall. This additional wal '•approx 3.3 ft tall, laced the top
of concrete at about 1008.3 ft.
* Condition report summaries were not availabl r these Ur1.
" The structures were protected from flodiWate he of th od by an Aqua Dam;
however. the Aqua Dam failed for erio oft e to bei amaged, allowing
floodwater to enter the area insid
• ua Dam per !r.
" These structures were located - Aqua Dam p -ere also protected by the cast-
in-place wall• ed wall fo°,b
" The areas-nsform' -efilled with small riprap. Small depressions were dug
out in tre , spot w able pumps were placed to remove water
around the fou
I~* Val, there were no sign' ial nd these structures with the exception of a
•vtot on the southwest come IIhe west ca etrench. This soft spot resulted in differential
nt of the switch pad locatE•Uijacent to the trench.
Po mps were removing gr water from the cable trenches, and there appeared to be a
layer ment on the cable tra conduit, and on the bottom of the trench.
" Assessm aisurvey elevations i¶ 1te shows no movement of the structure.

5.10.3 Assessm thods• Procedures

5.10.3.1 Ass• • .rocedures Accomplished

Assessments of the Turbine Building South Switchyard included the following:

* Visual inspection of the exterior of the structures where accessible. Observations were
made from outside the ICF concrete wall due to "Danger - High Voltage" warning tape and
signs.
" Assessment of collected survey data to date for indications of trends in the movement of the
structure.
* Review of previously referenced documents listed in Table 5.10-1.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.10-3
Turbine Building South Switchyard Rev. 2
* Identification of relative surface soil densities (native soil, engineered fill, and limestone
gravel pavement) as determined by hand probing.
" Observations and documentation of water accumulations and flows in subsurface system
components (manholes and concrete trenches).

Additional investigations were performed. These included the following non-invasive

geophysical and invasive geotechnical investigations: &

" Seismic surveys (seismic refraction and refraction mi were not

available at the time of Revision 0.)
* Geotechnical investigations including test borings A
laboratory tests. Note that OPPD required vacuum
test holes to avoid utility conflicts. Therefore, test rel
in the upper 10 ft of site and locations where shallow
available at the time of Revision 0.)
* Inclinometers had not been installed at the time of Re
available. Inclinometer data is not required to
supplement the other data used to reach th

5.10.3.2 Assessment Procedures Not l:eted

Assessments of the Turbine Buildin Souk itchy

following:

* The interior of the cable as not obse 6ci observations that were
possible from outside cause they w d "Danger - High
Voltaaz".
systems and conditions was performed because the
kth the equipment in the switchyard.
within the ICF wall at the time of Revision 0
L3 Voltage."

5.

Identified Etwere initially reviewz, discussed in Section 3.0. The review considered the
preliminary 14#"NOtion available fro.@PPD data files and from initial walk-down observations.
Eleven PFMs a f,-d with fiv ent Triggering Mechanisms were determined to be
non-credible" fo6' rity tures, as discussed in Section 3.6. The remaining PFMs were
carried forward asc .. • er the design review for the structure, the structure observations, and
the results of available ical, geophysical, and survey data were analyzed, a number of CPFMs
were ruled out as discussed ifi Section 5.10.4.1. The CPFMs carried forward for detailed assessment
are discussed in Section 5.10.4.2.

5.10.4.1 Potential Failure Modes Ruled Out Prior to the Completion of the Detailed
Assessment

The ruled-out CPFMs reside in the Not Significant/High Confidence category and for clarity
will not be shown in the Potential for Failure/Confidence matrix.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.10-4
Turbine Building South Switchyard Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 2 - Surface Erosion
CPFM 2a - Undermining shallow foundation/slab/surfaces
CPFM 2b - Loss of lateral support for pile foundation
CPFM 2c - Undermined buried utilities

Reasons for ruling out:

* The Turbine Building South Switchyard is located a si away from the

riverbank and was within the Aqua Dam perimeter, an &subiected to
surface erosion.
* Surface erosion was not identified in or around the
during the field assessments.

Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Piping

CPFM 3d - Undermining and settlement of shallow fq
drawdown)

Reason for ruling out:

* The Turbine Building South Switchyar 'cated a s rfrom the

riverbank and was therefore not subje o subs•u drawdown.

Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subs f'ce ] ionfP

CPFM 3e - Loss of lateral s or pile fo • ion 'drawdown)

Reason for ruling out:

is locatedTM cient distance away from the

d to subsurface erosion due to river drawdown.

0 itchyard is located a sufficient distance away from the

subjected to subsurface erosion due to river drawdown.

Triggeringi•fi•hniss] AVHdoy
Ž-i'ydrodyl mic Loading
CPFM 9••
CPFM5b
CPFM 5c - Wa1•failure in flexure
CPFM 5d - Wall failure in shear
CPFM 5e - Damage by debris
CPFM 5f- Excess deflection

Reasons for ruling out:

* The structure was protected from floodwater by an Aqua Dam except during a short period
of time when the Aqua Dam failed due to being damaged, which allowed floodwater to
enter the area inside the Aqua Dam perimeter.
Priority I Structures Page 5.10-5
Turbine Building South Switchyard Rev. 2
* Visual observation did not identify distress to the structure that can be attributed to these
CPFMs.

Triggering Mechanism 6 - Buoyancy, Uplift Forces on Structures

CPFM 6a - Fail tension piles

Reason for ruling out:

* The equipment foundations within the Turbine Buildin out h that have eith(
steel or concrete piles have pile caps near the ground. ea -t subjected to n
buoyancy uplift forces.
Triggering Mechanism 6 - Buoyancy, Uplift Forces s
CPFM 6b - Cracked slab, loss of structural support

Reasons for ruling out:

* The equipment foundations within the

steel or concrete piles have pile caps n(
buoyancy uplift forces.
* The cable trench was designed with drn walls and-a foundation
drain system complete with free-drainH Mbelow the slab.
Therefore, the trench was not s , cte

Triggering Mechanism 6 - B cy, U

CPFM 6c - Displaced s ' roker

Olii•quipment
"ms f•i• withi ,pprbine Building South Switchyard that have eith er
•el or....
concrete p e caps ý. e ground surface and were not subject to net
buoyancy uplift forces.
The cable trench was des with drain holes within the trench walls and a foundation
%1rainesystem complete wit e-draining backfill on the walls and below the slab.
fflibKfore, the trench was z#5~subjected to buoyancy forces.
7 se (first time wetting)
settlement of shallow foundation, loss of structural

CPFM 7b - Dite structure/broken connections

CPFM 7c - i-1 site settlement
CPFM 7d - buckling from down drag

Reason for ruling out:

* The peak flood elevation prior to 2011 was 1003.3 ft, which occurred in 1993. The peak
flood elevation in 2011 was approximately 1006.9 ft. Elevations in the South Turbine
Switchyard are such that the area would not be subjected to first time wetting.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.10-6
Turbine Building South Switchyard Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 10 - MachineNibration-Induced Liquefaction
CPFM IOa - Cracked slab, differential settlement of shallow foundation, loss of structural
support

Reasons for ruling out:

* There is no permanent equipment within the Turbine Building South Switchyard that has
the capacity to produce significant dynamic forces due to vibr i&n.
0 Temporary pumping equipment located on the ground ithin u perimeter was
small and therefore deemed to. have inconsequential
0 Liquefaction was not observed near the Turbine B " South rd.

Triggering Mechanism 10- Machine/Vibration-Indu,

CPFM 1Ob - Displaced structure/broken connections

Reasons for ruling out:

* There is no permanent equipment within the

the capacity to produce significant dynanm.•
* Temporary pumping equipment locate he grounA was
small and therefore deemed to have in equential
* No broken structural connections or s ral di
* Liquefaction was not observe-4. the rin.rb.n

Triggering Mechanism 10 ine/Vibratiown- gu(

CPFM 1Od - Pile/pile bility A

te Turbine Building South Switchyard that has

lynoitaforces due to vibration.
ated-Ae ground within the Aqua Dam perimeter was
inconsequential effect.
the Turbine Building South Switchyard.

of Soil Strength due to Static Liquefaction or Upward

differential settlement of shallow foundation, loss of structural

* Visual observations and survey measurements indicate no structure movement. Therefore,

differential settlement and loss of structural support did not occur at the observed structures.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.10-7
.Turbine Building South Switchyard Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 11 - Loss of Soil Strength due to Static Liquefaction or Upward
Seepage
CPFM I1b - Displaced structure/broken connections

Reasons for ruling out:

* Visual observations and survey measurements indicate no structure movement. Therefore,

degradation that can be attributed to this CPFM did not occur r the Turbine Building
South Switchyard. 0
a No instances of broken connections were observed.

Triggering Mechanism 11 - Loss of Soil Strength di Ior Upward

Seepage
CPFM l1 d - Pile/pile group instability

Reason for ruling out:

* Visual observations and survey measureme ino structu• ent. Therefore,

degradation that can be attributed to this uur near th e Building
South Switchyard.

Triggering Mechanism 12 - Rapid Dra n A

CPFM 12a - River bank slope re de g surr ctures
CPFM 12b - Lateral spread'

Reason for ruling out:

is a suffi i istance away from the riverbank

)ank slope failure or lateral spreading because of
drawdown.

iggering Mechanism 13'

CPFM 13a - Corrosion
EIPFM 13b - Corrosion elements

TheNU eBu
. ;0 Switchyard has not been subjected to corrosive circumstances
that wJk c Yeyond the normal conditions. The structure was protected from
floodwate Dam except during a short period of time when the Aqua Dam
failed due to I iaged, which allowed floodwater to enter the area inside the Aqua
Dam perimeter.'

Triggering Mechanism 14 - Frost Effects

CPFM 14a - Heaving, crushing, or displacement

Reasons for ruling out:

The equipment foundations within the Turbine Building South Switchyard have either steel
or concrete piles with pile caps near the ground surface. The piles have an anchor plate
with anchor rods developed into the pile cap, indicating a positive tension connection. In
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.10-8
Turbine Building South Switchyard Rev. 2
addition, the frost uplift on the pile caps will not be different than the condition prior to the
flood.
The cable trench was designed with drain holes within the trench walls and a foundation
drain system complete with free-draining backfill on the walls and below the slab.
Therefore, the trench is not subjected to frost effects.

5.10.4.2 Detailed Assessment of Credible Potential Failure Modes

The following CPFMs are the only CPFMs carried forw ment for the
Turbine Building South Switchyard as a result of the 20' d assessment is
provided below.

Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Pipii

CPFM 3a - Undermining and settlement of shallow:
pumping)

The nearby Turbine Building has a documented histo and

groundwater drainage to broken floor and condeq
associated with the 2011 flood have increase
pipes in the floor drain system. The sump " urbin
continually pumped, maintaining the hydr gradien and broken
pipes in the system.

The Triggering Mechanism and ou the r as foll t,fe hydraulic gradient

begins erosion or increases e s 6 surroundin Seep <;s unfiltered and erosion
continues unarrested. Eros*'. ds out beneat ilding or from Manhole MH-
and
extend ard the T ding South S oids form under utilities and
th Switchyard or jacent to the Turbine Building South
•~red structures and utilities occurs and causes distress

switch•'f. dation slab located on the southwest corner of

ling on the east side adjacent to the conduit trench,

-d distress indicators and other data that would increase or

associated with this CPFM for the Turbine Building
South
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.10-9
Turbine Building South Switchyard Rev. 2
Adverse (Degradation/Direct Floodwater Favorable (Degradation/Direct
Impact More Likely) Floodwater Impact Less Likely)
Documented void under the foundation slab of There have been no observed signs of structural
the adjacent Turbine Building. distress in the CMU screen wall.
Differential settlement has occurred on the Sinkholes and other piping features were not
switch foundation located on the southwest observed during site inspections in the Turbine
comer of the west cable trench. Building Switchyard or adjacent areas, except for
the settlement notes ear the switch foundation,
and the san oil/ fea observed in the
missile r fth uilding.
Pavement failures were observed east of the
Turbine Building.
Data Gaps:
* Survey data to track trends in vertical movement of the C • n wall and ca h.
* Visual inspection of the cable trench was not possible be nch is located
was not accessible due to safety tape. Where the trench was acc emporary p
drawing water from the bottom of the trench, and the inside was co sediment.
Existence, size, and location of voids.. c
* Seismic refraction data are not yet availableA
Conclusion.;

Potentialfor Degradation/Diret bdater,Im

Many indicators for the C . been observe remove water from the
Turbin
11, MH- ugh a system of broken pipes and

grau `%pro ,he system for this CPFM. Known voids exist under the
adi urbin Bu Settlemneftý'
etlemis•-ll•
q''' s' have been observed in the Paved Access Area
the. Service Buthe I cture. Settlement of the switch foundation

near the sout ora the west trench has already occurred due t6 this CPFM.
erefore, the potential that ationn this CPFM is occurring due to the 2011 flood is

Settlem he switch faion slab near the southwest comer of the west cable trench has
already o6 due toJV S.PFM. The CMU wall is supported on shallow foundations. This
CPFM could -:%
.Ilowfoundation systems. The CMU wall could show signs of
distress, and wal i could damage adjacent facilities or equipment. Therefore, the
implication of the p6fential degradation for this CPFM is high due to the nature of the adjacent
structure.

Confidence

Observations have shown that settlement has occurred on the switch foundation slab.
Subsurface erosion is believed to have occurred under the adjacent Turbine Building
foundation and at some nearby areas of pavement.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.10-10
Turbine Building South Switchyard Rev. 2
Therefore, the confidence in the above assessment is high, indicating that repairs and more data
are necessary.

Summary

For CPFM 3a, as discussed above, the combined consideration of the potential for degradation
and the implications of that degradation to a structure of this type puts it in the "significant"
category. There is high confidence that there has been significant adation to the soil
surrounding the Turbine Building South Switchyard. Repairs an er itoring are
needed.

Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion-Piping

CPFM 3b - Loss of lateral support for pile foundation mping)

The nearby Turbine Building has a documented history of a void l e foundation and
groundwater drainage to broken floor and conde _ ,s. The fib elevations
associated with the 2011 flood have increased••41" ad fed
feedit o the broken
pipes in the floor drain system. The sump i urbine g and Ma H-5 were
continually pumped, maintaining the hydrr gradient, aturated so' and broken
pipes in the system.
• co he follo h dalcgain
The Triggering Mechanism and cou then rasfollo The ydraulic gradient
begins erosion or increases eros surroundina . s. Seep s unfiltered and erosion
continues unarrested. Eros* ds out beneath urj" ilding or Manhole MH-5 and
extends toward the Turbine South Switch ' form under utilities and
structu e Buildi Switchyard or' aint to the Turbine Building South
Snon-pi: rrted structures and utilities occurs and causes distress
ae of improve• flities,•S.

following table descried dis .shdicators and other data that would increase or
Rcrease the potential for de on associated with this CPFM for the Turbine Building
S.o, Switchyard.

'A (Degradation.Dir..I. loodwater Favorable (Degradation/Direct

JV. Impact More WINE) Floodwater Impact Less Likely)
Documann:•,d under t!•a#ation
th ae "d '',
.1 # 'pf,,i slab of Review of survey data indicates that there have
the adjacei• e Buid been no observed signs of movement of the pile
foundations.
Data Gaps: •
" Existence, sizej•d location of voids.
* Seismic refraction data are not yet available.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.10-11
Turbine Building South Switchyard Rev. 2
Conclusion

Significance

Potentialfor Degradation/DirectFloodwaterImpact

Many indicators for the CPFM have been observed. Pumping to remove water from the
Turbine Building sump and from Manhole MH-5 carried through stem of broken pipes and
granular trench backfill. This provides the system for this CPF wn 'ds exist under the
adjacent Turbine Building. Settlement issues have been ed Access Area
between the Service Building and the Intake Structure. -efore, t ial that
degradation due to this CPFM is occurring due to the 2t •ood iJ

Implication

Loss of lateral support for the pile supported foundations t .al to causeý'
instability of the foundations for the transformers. Therefore, the iation of the r
degradation for this CPFM is high.

Confidence

Subsurface erosion is believed to have oc d under,. i

foundation and at some nearby areasef pa 'ent. er, th iufficient data on the
existence, size and location of v Weteeine er this C, or will occur at this
location.A

Therefore, the confidence ird Imeans more data are necessary

to draw Aoz,

tPFM 3b, as discusseg(!e, the coi ii&i consideration of the potential for degradation
the implications of that d§graation to the&strcture puts it in the "significant" category.
re is low confidence that iNahas been significant degradation to the soil surrounding the
ý,Je Building South Switc due to the lack of test data available at thistime. More
w•antinued monitoring 4Wspections are needed.

Triggering - i.[244 Subsurface Erosion/Piping

CPFM 3c '".ned buried utilities (due to pumping)

The nearby Turbine Building has a documented history of a void below the foundation slab
with a potential for increased erosion with greater external water head (see Section 5.8).

The Triggering Mechanism. and CPFM could then occur as follows: there is a potential for the
previously documented void to erode larger voids under the Turbine Building and out to the
surrounding structures. Buried utilities within the Turbine Building South Switchyard include
cable trenches, ductbanks, underdrains, and storm drain pipes. Three fire protection pipes are
routed beneath the Turbine Building South Switchyard, just west of Transformer T1. The Aqua
Dam was placed over the fire lines near where they are routed into the Turbine Building. This
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.10-12
Turbine Building South Switchyard Rev. 2
provides a possible flow path directed toward the Turbine Building. Connectivity is possible to
flow paths feeding the broken floor and condensate drain pipes in the basement.

The following table describes observed distress indicators and other data that would increase or
decrease the potential for degradation associated with this CPFM for the Turbine Building
South Switchyard.

Adverse (DegradationlDirect Floodwater Favorabl egradation/Direct

Impact More Likely) Flooowat a.tac ss Likely)
Documented void under the foundation slab of There h no ýgns of structural
the adjacent Turbine Building. distresle s.
Differential settlement has occurred on the
switch foundation located on the southwest
comer of the west cable trench.
Data Gaps:
eVisual inspection of the cable trench was not possible becme t Js located in t
was not accessl e to safety tape. Where he tto remaorary pumps were
drawing water from the bottom of the trench, cbc e thr ws over m oediment.
" Existence, size, and location of voids. te mft C
0 Seismic refraction data are not yet availab u Tne.

Conclusion
Si--nlificance "1
Potentialfor Degradation/ oo~°dwater I

Many inegati At4e grF or observed.

f to remove water from the
TurbineMR N~ fhardo T herefo implicatio
caret ed the
systemnof broken ad
..S ubsurfaceeorovis
-rf.
.. know _-to ý,Ihave
e e ocure under foi the aCent T ne Buildsig fundetin
the systent Turbine Bunial leaed h inave been observed in the Paved Access Area
subsurfacthe Sersion e T i eB n cture.h
wTchyrd ad , en potential Bidn
However, the tre insuPFfcit dcurring tuo th e
exite 2011 flood is high.

tiCFM is ,i
Confienc a~.,.• MT sse
A large.,A•fiber of utilities a4%kiied under the Turbine Building South Switchyard, which is
adjacen .guetd s~ in the Turbine Building. The occurrence of this CPFM
could nega paIny or intended function of a number of buried utilities near the
Turbine Buil • • itchyard. Therefore, the implication of the potential degradation for
this CPFM is h" •'
whthe this CPFM ha2o1
grdeterionde il3 ccr
Confidence

Subsurface erosion is known to have occurred under the adjacent Turbine Building foundation.
With the increased head pressure due to the 2011 flood, the amount of water moving through
the system has potentially increased, which in turn increases the likelihood of instigating
subsurface erosion in the Turbine Building South Switchyard adjacent to the Turbine Building.
However, there are insufficient data on the existence, size and location of possible voids to
determine whether this CPFM has or will occur.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.10-13
Turbine Building South Switchyard Rev. 2
Therefore, the confidence in the above assessment is low, which means more data are necessary
Therefore, the confidence in the above assessment is low, which means more data are necessary
to draw a conclusion.

Summary

For CPFM 3c, as discussed above, the combined consideration of the potential for degradation
and the implications of that degradation to a structure of this type puts it in the "significant"
category. There is low confidence that there has been significant Agwadation to the soil
surrounding the Turbine Building South Switchyard due to eelaIS available at this
time. More data or continued monitoring and inspectio ed

5.10.5 Results and Conclusions

The CPFMs evaluated for the Turbine Building South Switchvar

matrix, which shows the rating for the significance and the level

Low Confidence H
(Insufficient Data)
CPFM 3b
CPFM 3c

5N

.xm
q

(D•

The following actions are recommended for the Turbine Building South Switchyard.

The settlement of the switch foundation slab located on the southwest comer of the west cable trench
should be corrected as soon as possible.

The CMU wall should be observed by OPPD on a regular basis for signs of distress such as cracking or
tipping.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.10-14
Turbine Building South Switchyard Rev. 2
Given the Low Confidence rating for CPFMs 3b and 3c, continued monitoring is recommended to
include a continuation of the elevation surveys of the previously identified targets on this structure and
surrounding site. The purpose is to monitor for signs of structure distress and movement or changes in
soil conditions around the structure. The results of this monitoring will be used to increase the
confidence in the assessment results. Elevation surveys should be performed weekly for 4 weeks and
biweekly until December 31, 2011. At the time of Revision 0, groundwater levels had not yet
stabilized to nominal normal levels. Therefore, it is possible that new distress indicators could still
develop. If new distress indicators are observed before December 31, 201 ppropriate HDR
personnel should be notified immediately to determine whether a e•• • nor assessment
should be conducted. Observation of new distress indicators m ult in ication of the
recommendations for this structure.

Further forensic investigations and physical modifications are r to ad Ms 3a, 3b,

and 3c for the Turbine Building South Switchyard. CPFM 3a, 3b, ware associ nfiltered
flow of groundwater into the Turbine Building basement drain pig (ey Dise
#1). These recommendations are described in detail in Section 4.1 3 C is associate
distress in and near the Paved Access Area between the mt .ructure an rvice Building (Key
Distress Indicator #2). These recommendations are de ail in Secti_ 5.

5.10.7 Updates Since Revision 0

Revision 0 of this Assessment Report was submi OPP cto 0 11. Revision 0
presented the results of preliminary asses ets f Sh P Stru ese assessments were
incomplete in Revision 0 because the f •nvestigati d/or mo for most of the
Priority 1 Structures was not completed he submittal ' This r n of this Assessment Report
includes the results of additional f vestigation. an date for this structure as
described below.

5.1 kvailat

ollowing additional ere avai the Turbine Building South Switchyard for
evisions I and 2 of this A ent Rep.."

Sesults of KDI #1 forensi ! stigation (see Section 4.1)

ts of KDI #2 forensic •stigation (see Section 4.2)
.essment teams from I on site for continued monitoring of the Key Distress
tnheQa.Nave visual ected the cable trenches and CMU wall where visible outside
the are" d "D ell,- High Voltage" and the settlement of the switch foundation slab
near the s e -efi•er of the west cable trench.
* Additional '&ter
f monitoring well and river stage level data from OPPD.
• Results of falling weight deflectometer investigation by American Engineering Testing, Inc.
(see Attachment 6).
* Results of geophysical investigation by Geotechnology, Inc. (see Attachment 6).
* Results of continued survey by Lamp Rynearson and Associates (see Attachment 6).
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.10-15
Turbine Building South Switchyard Rev. 2
5.10.7.2 Additional Analysis

The following analysis of additional data was conducted for the Turbine Building South
Switchyard:

" Groundwater monitoring well and river stage level data from OPPD.

Data shows that the river and groundwater have returned to noiinal normal levels.

* Results of falling weight deflectometer investigation eri'

. pe.rf. ering Testing, Inc.
.P
.g Pnr, Access
Falling Weight Deflectometer and associated GPR g perfoP
Area identified anomalies such as soft clay and bro ."Ad' d
. ground
truthing of the investigation results were performedas e KDIa-#2 nal
investigations.

* Results of geophysical investigation by Geotechnology, Inc. ,'

Seismic Refraction and Seismic ReMi tests i.Qund the o emeter ofe
power block as part of KDI #2 identified pan maiT could be V sfcly
loose sand, or possibly voids.

Results of geotechnical investiý*ton b ele Q ccwh

Six test borings were drilled Jcontinuous Aling of tl&oil encountered, to ground
truth the Geotechnolog Rl.' ismic investi "d anomalie
resul4spart of the KDIidentified in the
#2 forensic
investigation. Test bore re located to F•dee. anomaliesi f n
ses f- ion The
The•• ng data dinoffhiWany piping voids or very soft/very
1qthmvs ight be i ve of subsurface erosion/piping or related material
or movenent- ..
of the SPT and CCAll
• .:o. . o t e S T a
n tad for this Assessment Report were compared
d e su lts c onic
, similar data from num i'js~other geot&'hnical investigations that have been conducted
-to

,. the FCS site in previous•,, Mars.

I This comparison did not identify substantial changes to
k'..°soil strength and stiffnelis§Lier that time period. SPT and CPT test results were not
-eripmedin the top 10 fe protect existing utilities.

0 Resulso nnnueds' yby Lamp Rynearson and Associates.

Survey deftto, afd•,,

, mpared to the original baseline surveys have not exceeded the
accuracy rangp,'fThe surveying equipment. Therefore, deformation at the monitored
locations, since the survey baseline was shot, has not occurred.

Follow-up inspections since Revision 0 of the report have noted that the standing water and
sediment has been removed from the cable trenches around the switchyard.. The bottom of the
cable trench was able to be viewed beyond the area labeled "Danger - High Voltage" but no
additional information regarding the trenches was obtained from this observation. The
observation also noted no visible distress or cracking of the CMU wall.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.10-16
Turbine Building South Switchyard Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Piping
CPFM 3a - Undermining and settlement of shallow foundation/slab/surfaces (due to
pumping)

CPFM 3a for the Turbine Building South Switchyard as it relates to the settlement of the switch
foundation slab near the southwest comer of the west cable trench is not associated with Key
Distress Indicators. Additional inspection since Revision 0 indicates that the switch foundation
slab was not remediated as recommended. The results of the add*_ al forensic investigation
show that this CPFM is not ruled out; therefore, the recoi da ..rowision 0 has not
changed. Therefore, assuming that OPPD implements th m isical modification
and assuming that no further concerns are identified fo M 3a a to Key Distress
Indicator #1 and #2 (see Sections 4.1 and 4.2) or throu mo i for the
Turbine Building South Switchyard (discussed in Sectio continn til
December 31, 2011), this CPFM is moved to the quadrant atrix repres o
Further Action Recommended Related to the 2011 Flood I..

Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Eros

CPFM 3b - Loss of lateral support for pile to pun
CPFM 3c - Undermined buried utilities

CPFMs 3b and 3c for the Turbine Buildin t• •ociated with Key Distress
Indicator # 1. Section 4.1 presents the resti" W ore stigation that was
conducted to ascertain whether th PF u out. slults of the additional
forensic investigations show th ecomr ins for ph •al modifications in KDI #1
are implemented that this CP led out. re, assui that no further concerns are
identified through the moni ogram for ng South Switchyard
(discusse Un5.10.6 a uing ur 2011), these CPFMs are moved
to thegVa .1e x repre". "No Action Recommended Related to the
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.10-17
Turbine Building South Switchyard Rev. 2

5.10.7.1 Revised Results

The CPFMs evaluated for the Turbine Building South Switchyard are presented in the
following matrix, which shows the rating for the significance and the level of confidence in the
evaluation. Note that the placement of CPFM 3a in the "No Further Action Recommended
Related to the 2011 Flood" is dependant on the remediation of the switch foundation slab
located near the southwest comer of the west cable trench.

In the ass'esrs-it of the@ Sltructures, the first step was to develop a list of all Triggering
Mechanismrig's could have occurred due to the prolonged inundation of the FCS
site during the U. ,sbouri River flood and could have negatively impacted these structures.
The next step was• se data from various investigations, including systematic observation of
the structures over time, either to eliminate the Triggering Mechanisms and PFMs from the list
or to recommend further investigation and/or physical modifications to remove them from the
list for any particular structure. Because all CPFMs for the Turbine Building South Switchyard
other than CPFMs 3a, 3b, and 3c had been ruled out prior to Revision 1, because CPFM 3a will
be ruled out upon completion of the remediation to the switch foundation slab described above,
and because CPFMs 3b and 3c will be ruled out when the physical modifications recommended
for KDI #1 in Section 4.1, no Triggering Mechanisms and their associated PFMs will remain
credible for the Turbine Building South Switchyard. HDR has concluded that the geotechnical
and structural impacts of the 2011 Missouri River flood will be mitigated by the
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.10-18
Turbine Building South Switchyard Rev. 2
implementation of the physical modifications recommended in this Assessment Report.
Therefore, after the implementation of the recommended physical modifications, the potential
for failure of this structure due to the flood will not be significant.
Section 5.11
Condensate Storage Tank

'V..

jv
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.11-1
Condensate Storage Tank Rev. 2

5.11 Condensate Storage Tank

5.11.1 Summary of Condensate Storage Tank

Baseline information for the Condensate Storage Tank is provided in Section 2.0, Site History,
Description, and Baseline Condition.

The 150,000-gallon welded steel plate Condensate Storage Tank is

power block and south of the Intake Structure. The tank shell is .4

The tank foundation is a 2-ft-minimum-thickness concrete ma----

driven to bedrock at approximate el. 934 ft. The top-of-concre<
slab is approximately 41 ft in diameter, resulting in a walkway ar;
within a steel sheet pile system that is driven into the riverbank tog
approximately 10 ft above bedrock.

5.11.2 Inputs/References Supporting the Analysis

Table 5.11-1 lists references provided by OPPD an d ocu

Table 5.11-1- References,

Document Title - i

background data are as follows:

* The Condensate Stora' Jeank is a welded steel storage tank designed to the American Water
Works Association (AWWA) D100-65 (see 002391).
* The tank is a flat-bottom storage tank without anchor bolts.
* Construction of the foundation is a cylindrical sheet pile wall driven through the riverbank. The
inside of the sheet pile wall was backfilled to the bottom of the slab elevation. Steel piles were
then driven within the contained sheet piles and capped with a structural cast-in-place slab (see
tank foundation drawing 11405-S-418).
* The adjacent bank is such that the eastern half of the sheet pile wall is exposed to the river from the
bottom-of-concrete slab el. 1003.5 ft to bank grade of approximately 994.4 ft, with the normal river
water elevation of 992 ft (see tank foundation drawing 11405-S-418).
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.11-2
Condensate Storage Tank Rev. 2
" The exposed side of the sheet pile wall was painted with rust-inhibiting paint and constructed with
five 3-in.-diameter weep holes at approximately 7 ft on center. These weeps are located at
approximate el. 997.5 ft.
" The steel piles are I0BP42 driven to bedrock and capped with a welded steel plate and anchor rods
providing positive shear and tension connection to the base slab. This pile size and anchor details
are the same as those shown for the transformer foundations in the Turbine Building South
Switchyard.
" The driving criteria, tip elevation, and capacities of the 10BP42 piles •unkno . However, the
top of the piles are capped with a plate and anchor rods for a ve sion connection
(see 11405-S-412).
* The Condensate Storage Tank was outside the Aqua Dam eter an ore unprotected
from the hydrostatic flood load and hydrodynamic forces ow.
" In accordance with tank levels provided by OPPD, the Cond,'- age Tank intained at
a minimum of 72 percent full for the duration of the flood eve
* At the time of inspection, the river level had dropped below u g grade. Ob
were made around the western half of the Condensate Storage Tank. was noO a
through the security gate onto the walkway on the rii bsevatio e sheet pile wall
and the surrounding riverbank were not feasible v
" There was a thick layer of river sediment alon oncrete iion and su ng grade.
" The Trenwa was covered with river sediment indicati ent h into the
trench via gaps in the removable covers. ..
.ed

* Small localized areas of erosion andr wer serv on

south sides of the Condensate Stora No eros r scour w bserved at the tank
structure.
* The tank shell, nozzle necks, ans below the fl owed signs of surface
corrosion thro s in tstem. No pi gnificant loss of plate thickness
was obse c .'ece adequately seen because of the deposit of river
sedim-%-,
The ell appears to b tard w cnt of inflection at about the painted horizontal
another point ofinfl h just lo ang••
aagnitude ofthis deviation
the r shape cann ,eterined visual observations, and therefore, it is not
Xf it meets normal AWW 0 tolerances for tank construction. It is unknown whether
this,
cause i •deformation is a result o
2011 flood. initial construction or whether it was directly or indirectly

* Because •;ilver level at the the field assessment, it was not possible to get a good view
of the east ", • de• fthe•a •er) side of the tank. Observations from just north of the
Securit icat•
p•• eii '' out-of-tolerance shape might be limited to all sides of the
Condensate Stord•e pt the east side.
* Survey data points on the north, south, and west quadrants of the tank. Assessment of
current survey data for'fiese points indicates no vertical movement.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.11-3
Condensate Storage Tank Rev. 2
5.11.3 Assessment Methods and Procedures

5.11.3.1 Assessment Procedures Accomplished

Assessments of the Condensate Storage Tank included the following:

* V isual inspection ox me exterior ox me structure, w here accessible..

" An assessment of collected survey data to date for indications trends in the movement of
the structure.
* A review of previously referenced documents listec
* A relative surface soil density test via probing was pted. ecause of the
crushed rock surface below the sediment, it was no 'b~~ e rod into the
subgrade.

Additional investigations were performed. These inclu ing non-i:

geophysical and invasive geotechnical investigations:

" Seismic surveys (seismic refraction and refr tected area.

(Test reports were not available at the time
* GPR in the protected area. (Test repo e not time Wvision 0.)
* Geotechnical test borings in the protec rea. Nc vacuum
excavation for the first 10 ft of propos st hol s ts. Therefore, test
reports will not show soil co s in upp (Test reports
were not available at the tim 'evision 0.) -

5.11.3.2 AssessmentP, s Not Comp

that were not completed include the following:

"Rection of the of the -ate Storage Tank was not accomplished due to
Firrent river levels. I river e s, the remainder of the structure will need to
be inspected.
Inspection of the riverban he north and south sides of the Condensate Storage Tank
not accomplished due• rrent river levels. Once the river level drops, the remainder
structure will need • ;nspected.
0 l -on of the tank a l dation interface was not accomplished due to the large
adjacent to the tank. Once the sediment is removed, the
rilt6e inspected.
0 flong the river that will provide an indication of slope movement.
Inclinomete been installed; therefore, readings were not available at the time of
Revision 0.

5.11.4 Analysis
Identified PFMs were initially reviewed as discussed in Section 3.0. The review considered the
preliminary information available from OPPD data files and from initial walk-down observations.
Eleven PFMs associated with five different Triggering Mechanisms were determined to be
"non-credible" for all Priority I Structures, as discussed in Section 3.6. The remaining PFMs were
carried forward as "credible." After the design review for each structure, the structure observations,
and the results of available geotechnical, geophysical, and survey data were analyzed, a number of
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.11-4
Condensate Storage Tank Rev. 2
CPFMs were ruled out as discussed in Section 5.11.4.1. The CPFMs carried forward for detailed
assessment are discussed in Section 5.11.4.2.

5.11.4.1 Potential Failure Modes Ruled Out Prior to the Completion of the Detailed
Assessment

The ruled-out CPFMs reside in the Not Significant/High Confidence category and for clarity
will not be shown in the Potential for Failure/Confidence matrix.
Triggering Mechanism 2 - Surface Erosion
CPFM 2c - Undermined buried utilities

Reasons for ruling out:

Observed surface erosion in the Condensate Storage s limited t

localized areas along the security fence south of the s r dition, only
and limited surface erosion was observed on the ground surfac ss the facility.
Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Ero
CPFM 3b - Loss of lateral support forp ndatio pumpmg -

Reason for ruling out:

The nearby Turbine Buildin e oc ente 0 ofa ow the foundation slab

with a potential for increase ion with gr external r head. For further
information see Sectio more detailed '. Distress Indicator is
presented in Section 4.1. is a potential sly documented condition to
,ero
[•er°~ ,th•theCor
nder ,StorageaTank are protected
e Building by a sheetstructures.
o the surrounding pile wall to

approxim , above and are therefore not subjected to loss of pile

Oport due to pump •

iggering Mechanism 4 static La eral Loading (water loading on structures)

PFM 4a - Overturning •
M 4b- Sliding
C Ac - Wall failure in ure
C ~.- Wall failure aear
CPF xcess n

Reasons for

* At the 2011 pea flood elevation of approximately 1006.9 ft, the Condensate Storage Tank
shell had a maximum of 1.5 ft of external water head on the tank shell.
" Overturning and sliding stability conditions are not credible because the external water
force is balanced around the circumference of the tank.
* There were no field observations or indications of tank shell deformations due to flexure or
shear.
" OPPD records indicate that the Condensate Storage Tank was maintained at a minimum of
72 percent full during the 2011 flood.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.11-5
Condensate Storage Tank Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 5 - Hydrodynamic Loading
CPFM 5a - Overturning
CPFM 5b - Sliding
CPFM 5c - Wall failure in flexure
CPFM 5d - Wall failure in shear
CPFM 5e - Damage by debris
CPFM 5f- Excess deflection

Reasons for rulin2 out:

" At the 2011 peak flood elevation of approximately .9 ft, the ate Storage Tank
shell had a maximum of 1.5 ft of external water he he t
0 OPPD records indicate that the tank was maintained m of 7 t full during
the 2011 flood.
• Overturning and sliding stability conditions are not c se there wa Q
internal liquid head resisting structure movement that waser than e e
hydrodynamic load.
* There were no field observations or indicat. ell defo _ ue to flexure or
shear.
* There were no field observations of de ound th 1,and ther as no observed
damage to the tank shell and nozzles flexur. e

Triggering Mechanism 6 - Bu , U Fo n Struc

CPFM 6ae-Fail tension pile o
CPFM 6b - Cracked sla f structural su
CPFM 6c - Displaced s rokenc

W' he 2011 peakff imately 1006.9 ft, the Condensate Storage Tank
Cell had a maxi um ý,er head on the tank shell.
OPPD records indicate A Storage Tank was maintained at a minimum of
q2 percent full during the
'ause of the internal w4 there was no condition where the piling was subjected

0 re no field obs that would indicate uplift on the tank structure.

0 Ther•-e o field of broken structural connections.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.11-6
Condensate Storage Tank Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 7 - Soil Collapse (first time wetting)
CPFM 7a - Cracked slab, differential settlement of shallow foundation, loss of structural
support
CPFM 7b - Displaced structure/broken connections
CPFM 7c - General site settlement
CPFM 7d - Piles buckling from down drag

Reasons for ruling out:

* The peak flood elevation prior to 2011 was 1003.3 i oc

0- 993. The ground
surface outside the tank is about el. 1005 ft. There 0.1 e soils reviously
saturated.
* The Condensate Storage Tank structure has a pile-su dation, erefore, loss
of structural support for shallow foundations is not cre
* No broken structural connections or structural displa bserved.
* No site settlement around the Condensate Storage Tank was o n

Triggering Mechanism 10 - MachineNibra. Liquefac

CPFM 1Oa - Cracked slab, differential s nt o foundati4of structural
support

Reasons for ruling out:

" No permanent equipment in densate S e Tank h e capacity to produce

significant dynamic forc o vibration.
" Liquefaction was not o

Trigg 10-M ibration-Induced Liquefaction

b- Ctrut~4 n connections

as"ns for ruling out:

4No permanent equipment ... Condensate Storage Tank area has the capacity to produce
ificant dynamic forcesd•to vibration.
structural conJHiMs or structural displacement was observed.
* 'wsnt°s•••i••broken
* ~~action wasntote

Triggerin•g anis . achineNibration-Induced Liquefaction

.CPFM l - i, up instability
Reasons for rlin~

* No permanent equipment within the Condensate Storage Tank area has the capacity to
produce significant dynamic forces due to vibration.
" Liquefaction was not observed.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.11-7
Condensate Storage Tank Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 11 - Loss of Soil Strength due to Static Liquefaction or Upward
Seepage
CPFM 11 a - Cracked slab, differential settlement of shallow foundation, loss of structural
support
CPFM 1lb - Displaced structure/broken connections
CPFM I1c - Additional lateral force on below-grade walls
CPFM l1 d - Pile/pile group instability

Reasons for ruling out:

* Liquefaction was not observed at the Condensate S

" Visual observations and survey measurements indic Therefore,
differential settlement and loss of support (CPFM 1
structures.
. No broken structural connections or structural displ

Triggering Mechanism 12 - Rapid Drawdown

CPFM 12a - River bank slope failure and u
CPFM 12b - Lateral spreading

Reasons for ruling out:

* The structures did not have ev sil disti,

- field assessments.
* Slope failure was not observ e site.
_--

a River stage level has rec.• d stabilized a

* As of October 11, 2011, ater elevatio qhad one week to stabilize.
0 The rarmored historically tro stabilized the existing river

a the surrounding utilities have not been subjected to

be considered beyond the normal conditions.
g-Frost Effects
crushing, or displacement

* The Condensate Storage Tank is on a deep pile foundation system that is not frost
susceptible.

5.11.4.2 Detailed Assessment of Credible Potential Failure Modes

The following CPFMs are the only CPFMs carried forward for detailed assessment for the
Condensate Storage Tank as a result of the 2011 flood. This detailed assessment is provided
below.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.11-8
Condensate Storage Tank Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 2 - Surface Erosion
CPFM 2b - Loss of lateral support for pile foundation

Observable signs of surface erosion were limited to very small localized areas at the security
fence. No large-scale surface erosion was observed around the Condensate Storage Tank or the
tank foundation. However, at the time of the inspection, the site was covered with a thick layer
of river sediment; therefore, an adequate assessment could not be completed to determine
whether areas had experienced erosion. Hand probing of the surrd, ing soil at the top of the
riverbank was not possible due to the presence of a layer of'gs T" a surface.

The following table describes observed distress indica

decrease the potential for degradation associated with
Tank.

The steefindation
Storage T is protected by a sheet pile skirt wall extending from
the bott• 1e tank to F 0 feet above the bedrock. The skirt wall would protect the
tank pile f0,tj•"iIns •Ourface erosion. The surface erosion around the skirt wall was not
deep enough t "02 wall. Therefore, the potential for degradation is low.

•g#;.Iffs ýU
~f
LI.v
;-j
R &U"&5t"
"'

The occurrence of this CPFM would negatively impact the capacity of the piling supporting the
Condensate Storage Tank. This could lead to excessive foundation movement and negatively
impact the integrity or intended function of the Condensate Storage Tank. Therefore, the
implication of the potential degradation for this CPFM is high.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.11-9
Condensate Storage Tank Rev. 2
Confidence

Indicators for this CPFM have not been observed; however, inspection of the east side of the
tank and the ground surface around the tank was not possible. Survey data to date have
indicated no trends in structure movement. The available data are not sufficient to rule out this
CPFM or lead to a conclusion that surface erosion has occurred under the Condensate Storage
Tank. Therefore, the confidence in the above assessment is low, which means more data are
necessary to draw a conclusion.

Summary

For CPFM 2b, as discussed above, the combined consi on of •h or degradation

and the implications of that degradation to a structure o it in significant"
category. The data currently collected are not sufficient toMthis CPF the 2011
flood. Therefore, the confidence in the above assessment ch means m
continued monitoring and inspections might be necessary dra clusion.

Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurfacne E iping

CPFM 3c - Undermined buried utiliti e to pu

Buried utilities in the area of the CQjalens orag mclu . Force Water (FW)
from the Condensate Storage T Tr a, th Water , and the ductbank west
of the Raw Water Piping with v s utilities.

The Triggering Mechanism M could occu Futility lines can act as possible
seepage eepage , uld connect to S pumping sources such as the
Tur Distres "ator #1 in Section 4.1), Manhole MH-5, and a number
s that were if n the A m perimeter. The pumps were operated for an
ed period (the pum Turlbi ding sump will continue to operate until the
reas in the drain pipes ar main a head differential on the seepage path
o°rks Some gradients cre•I by the heardifferential may have been sufficient to begin
on of surrounding soil. I age is unfiltered and erosion continues unarrested, erosion
-ends out intercepting t jetork of utility trenches, including the 1 0-in. FW from the
Co fns Storage Tank. T '•tentialdamage includes settlement of pipe or thrust blocks.
Settle• •ld.uld overstress e that is corroded, could cause a pipe to break, or could cause
the displ offat
a th ck, which in turn could cause failure of a pipe operating under
pressure.

The following ta scribes observed distress indicators and other data that would increase or
decrease the potential for degradation associated with this CPFM for the Condensate Storage
Tank.

Adverse (Degradation/Direct Floodwater Favorable (DegradationlDirect

Impact More Likely) Floodwater Impact Less Likely)
A documented void exists under the foundation There have been no observed indications of site
slab of the Turbine Building with a known settlement in the area directly surrounding the
hydraulic connection between groundwater Condensate Storage Tank.
elevation and flows into the building sump. A
more detailed discussion of this Key Distress
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.11-10
Condensate Storage Tank Rev. 2
Adverse (Degradation/Direct Floodwater Favorable (Degradation/Direct
Impact More Likely) Floodwater Impact Less Likely)
Indicator is presented in Section 4.1.
MH-5 on the dry side of the Aqua Dam was
pumped continually.
Pumping within the Aqua Dam perimeter.
Data Gaps:
Observation of the ground surface around the tank will be perforce the deposited sediment
is removed. i cet
Additional
Paved dataArea.
Access whll be acquired feom GPR, seismi
oe U#,1 T iet boruigsin the

Conclusion dre -"

Significance•

Potentialfor DegradationhDirect FloodwaterImpi h

The CPFM has not been observed at the struc ods ceogroundwater
pumping at MH-5 might not have been evid t e imfield asses"
Additionally, the extent of voids due to p• ffg of gro4 •..-e Turbine Building sumps
has not been determined. Indicators for t PFM h een ithin the paved area
w•_
between the Service Building and • on• te S• e ak osidct h
tatderaatonha oue
poenia othis is hig ae potential for fuirther

degradation will remain unti ing drain pi the T Building are sealed.

Implication

Tan he ground sa oea Icould cause pipe settlement, thrust block

to andd act ther ality of the Condensate Water Tank FW. The
Tank ofthe
f he pote
teti onude daio
n~i
a Ion
i CPFM is judged to be low.

nfidence

Fo rs for this CPFM

u ave, e observed; however, inspection of the east side of the
tant`*e
i ground surface ati the tank was not possible and geotechnical and geophysical
in fo 4 S orn the Pave ..45%ss Area was not complete. Survey data to date haveincae
catrego. Thre is
Lt. The availablt rehas
not sufficient to rule out this CPFM, or
leadTank
toF.a coMI&I'D
ThM t urace erosion
confidence in the abv sesetis impact
will negatively thewhich
low, Condensate
means Storage
more data
are necessary to dMiconclusion.•
Summary

For CPFM 3c, as discussed above, the combined consideration of the potential for degradation
and the implications of that degradation to a structure of this type puts it in the "not significant"
category. There is Low Confidence that there has been significant degradation to soil beneath
the Condensate Storage Tank FW due to the 2011 flood.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.11-11
Condensate Storage Tank Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Piping
CPFM 3e - Loss of lateral support for pile foundation (due to river drawdown)

The sheet pile wall enclosing the pile foundation has weep holes on the east face to allow water
to drain from the inside of the wall back to the river when the river elevation is below el. 997 ft
6 in. As the river level drops, there will be a hydrostatic head pushing water out of the weep
holes, which has the potential to erode the soils surrounding the piles from within the wall, if
Al
not properly filtered at the weep holes.
The Triggering Mechanism and CPFM could then occursa
to a level that saturates the soil surrounding the piles w'
level drops below the weep holes, there is a differentia, i
the water drains, there is a potential for the soil to erode,'
system. If the erosion were to continue, the voids couldg
lateral support for the piling. 4

The following table describes observed distress indicators and othe

decrease the potential for degradation associated PFM for
Tank.

Adverse (Degradation/Direct Floodw F(Degrada" Direct

Impact More Likely) d Q pact Less Likely)
Open weep holes in the sheet pile wa ave S ta c indicate no
potential to allow free movement . 'ent of the•7I re.
tent of th `-ep holes is to drain the sheet
ils •signed and constructed
uld not degrade the soil fill
with et pile wall.
Da
e pieations
wver)
of sied ,e 'Condensate Storage Tank foundation including the
eet willbee
petile pw~i~ ;oc the riw, as receded.
Observation of the gro" ace arouni will be performed once the deposited sediment
is removed.
fr•Observations of the weep h s not considered necessary based on the current collected data.

Siani In ce'

Potentialfor ..... irect FloodwaterImpact

The structure has ergone wetting cycles previously. It is reasonable to assume that the
foundation system and weep hole drainage system were designed to account for flooding over
the top of the weep holes. Therefore, the potential that the 2011 flood caused further
degradation for this CPFM is low.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.11-12
Condensate Storage Tank Rev. 2
Implication

The occurrence of this CPFM is not expected to negatively impact the capacity of the piling
supporting the Condensate Storage Tank, since the distance from the weep holes to the bottom
of the tank floor is about 5 feet. A 5 feet void at the top of the piles is not expected to cause the
piles to buckle. Therefore, the implication of the potential degradation for this CPFM is low.

Confidence

Indicators for this CPFM have not been observed; howev' :side of the
tank, the ground surface around the tank, and sheet pilep
Survey data to date have indicated no trends in structurw data are not
sufficient to rule out this CPFM or lead to a conclusioni, Soccurred
under the Condensate Storage Tank support slab. Theref ifidence
. 'Al
assessment is low, which means more data are necessary

Summary

For CPFM 3e, as discussed above, the combi _ 0 br degradation

and the implications of that degradation to t ýiot significant"
category. The data currently collected are , ufficientO, ue to the 2011
flood. Therefore, the confidence in the a ssess's iore data or
continued monitoring and inspecti.i g nece4

?M is simila is created by rapidly

river level i

Triggering Mechanism M could~fien occur as follows: if the river level drops

er than pore water pressi foundation soil can dissipate, a gradient could be created
,E-des the soil. Depem te extent of the voids created, impacts could include the
trench subsidenc iorted pipe sections, pipe deflections, pipe failure, and
31 b acts on adiacen ements or utilities.

The follow'm observed distress indicators and other data that would increase or
decrease the radation associated with this CPFM for the Condensate Storage
Tank.

Adverse (Degradation/Direct Floodwater Favorable (Degradation/Direct

Impact More Likely) Floodwater Impact Less Likely)
Condensate Storage Tank and utilities are located No signs of distress have been observed.
on the riverbank.
The river stage level has receded and stabilized at
a level corresponding to the nominal normal river
level at 40,000 cfs as of October 4, 2011.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.11-13
Condensate Storage Tank Rev. 2
Data Gaps:
" Observations of the east (river) side of the Condensate Storage Tank foundation including the
sheet pile will be performed once the river has receded.
" Observation of the ground surface around the tank will be performed once the deposited sediment
is removed.
" Additional data will be acquired from GPR, seismic survey, and geotechnical test borings in the
Paved Access Area.

Conclusion

Significance

Potentialfor Degradation/DirectFloodwaterImpact

The potential degradation from this CPFM may not have

have likely not receded to a nominal normal level.

None of the indicators for the CPFM has been ol

to rapid drawdown might not have been eviden•,
Additionally, the extent of voids created by , ,aw
degradation has occurred due to this CPF w.

Implication

The occurrence of this CPFM c egatively i the oper ' of the structure. This
could lead to pipe or thrust ttlement and negat mpact the integrity or
intended functionality of th sate Storage stem. The implication of the
-this

ot been o however, inspection of the east side of the

the tank s not possible and geotechnical and geophysical
fts Area was not complete. Survey data to date have indicated
3the available data are not sufficient to rule out this CPFM or
erosion will negatively impact the Condensate Storage
he confidence in the above assessment is low, which means
more a conclusion.

Summary

For CPFM 3f, as MOrussed above, the combined consideration of the potential for degradation
and the implications of that degradation to a structure of this type puts it in the "not significant"
category. There is Low Confidence that there will be significant degradation to soil beneath the
Condensate Storage Tank piping system due to the 2011 flood.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.11-14
Condensate Storage Tank Rev. 2
5.11.5 Results and Conclusions

The CPFMs evaluated for the Condensate Storage Tank are presented in the following matrix, which
shows the rating for the estimated significance and the level of confidence in the evaluation.

Low Confidence
(Insufficient Data)

CPFM 3c
I
CPFM 3e
CPFM 3f

5.1

the Condensate Storage Tank:

S In-dj~ •istortion map with results and recommendations.

0 Visual %".e tank and the ground surface around the tank
S Further fore Sphysical modifications are recommended to address CPFM 3a
(Key Distre: recommendations are described in detail in Section 4.1.3.

While inspection of thi in the sheet pile wall would be beneficial, it is not deemed
necessary at this time.

Continued monitoring is recommended to include a continuation of the elevation surveys of the

previously identified targets on this structure and surrounding site. In addition, a review of the
ongoing geophysical investigations and monitoring of inclinometer readings is recommended. The
purpose is to monitor for signs of structure distress and movement or changes in soil conditions around
the structure. The results of this monitoring will be used to increase the confidence in the assessment
results. Elevation surveys should be performed weekly for 4 weeks and biweekly until December 31,
2011. At the time of Revision 0, groundwater levels had not yet stabilized to nominal normal levels.
Therefore, it is possible that new distress indicators could still develop. If new distress indicators are
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.11-15
Condensate Storage Tank Rev. 2
observed before December 31, 2011, appropriate HDR personnel should be notified immediately to
determine if an immediate inspection or assessment should be conducted. Observation of new distress
indicators might result in a modification of the recommendations for this structure.

5.11.7 Updates Since Revision 0

Revision 0 of this Assessment Report was submitted to OPPD on October 14, 2011. Revision 0
presented the results of preliminary assessments for each Priority 1 Strucire. These assessments were
incomplete in Revision 0 because the forensic investigation and/or ni 0or t of the Priority
1 Structures was not completed by the submittal date. This revi this ent Report
includes the results of additional forensic investigation and m g tod structure as
described below.

5.11.7.1 Additional Data Available

The following additional data were available for the Con Tank fori1
and 2 of this Assessment Report:

" Results of KDI #1 forensic investigation

(s
* Results of KDI #2 forensic investigatio. Section
* Additional groundwater monitoring w d river s from OPPD.
* Field observations of the river bank (s ection
i
* Results of falling weight defi eter esti by Am gineering Testing, Inc.
(see Attachment 6).
* Results of geophysical infts 'tion by Geote ogy, In. ee Attachment 6).
" Results of geotechnical ion by Thiel V•(see Attachment 6).
* Data om inclino . y Thiele Geo (see Attachment 6).
* R~ ~ isrvey b , Rynearson and Associates (see Attachment 6).

assesse an on interface.

e: OPPD requested in m. ion from n firms that specialize in in-depth tank surveys
assist them in a follow-up• stigation fotpossible shell distortion of the tank. HDR has
ded this information to g.
5.l if dditional5'AnalysJ.0,!•

The fol1 of ona data was conducted for the Condensate Storage Tank:
haalysis

" Groundw well and river stage level data from OPPD.

Data shows t e river

r and groundwater have returned to nominal normal levels.

" Field observations of river bank

No significance distress from the 2011 Flood was observed.

Priority I Structures Page 5.11-16
Condensate Storage Tank Rev. 2
* Results of falling weight deflectometer investigation by American Engineering Testing, Inc.

Falling Weight Deflectometer and associated GPR testing performed in the Paved Access
Area identified anomalies such as soft clay and broken pavement. Additional ground
truthing of the investigation results were performed as part of the KDI #2 additional
investigations.

" Results of geophysical investigation by Geotechnology, Inc.

Seismic Refraction and Seismic ReMi tests performe of the

power block as part of KDI #2 identified deep ano tha
loose sand, or possibly voids.

" Results of geotechnical investigation by Thiele Geoteed

Six test borings were drilled, with continuous samplin t

truth the Geotechnology, Inc. seismic investigation results a
investigation. Test bore holes were located the
seismic investigation. The test boring da
loose conditions that might be indicative bsurfac material
loss or movement.

All of the SPT and CPT test re co ed fB Asses ,M_ ort were compared
to similar data from numero geo echn vestigati athave been conducted
on the FCS site in previous . This comp did no Fysubstantial changes to
the soil strength and sti _. er that time p test results were not

to the original baseline measurements, have not

meters. Therefore, deformation at the monitored
mentation has not occurred.

and Associates.

the original baseline surveys have not exceeded the

equipment. Therefore, deformation at the monitored
ine was shot, has not occurred.

Triggering iurface Erosion

CPFM I support for pile foundation

Field observations oTthe Condensate Storage Tank, after OPPD removed the deposited
sediment, identified that the surrounding grades were predominately surfaced in gravel.
Observations of the grades did not determine that surface erosion had occurred. Observations
of the sheet pile skirt wall identified the visible portions of the wall to be in good condition.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.11-17
Condensate Storage Tank Rev. 2
Significance

PotentialforDegradation/DirectFloodwaterImpact

The Condensate Storage Tank foundation is protected by a sheet pile skirt wall extending from
the bottom of the tank to about 10 feet above the bedrock. The skirt wall protected the
foundations from surface erosion. Therefore, the potential that the 2011 flood caused further
degradation for this CPFM is low.

Implication

The occurrence of this CPFM would negatively impac supporting the

Condensate Storage Tank. This could lead to excessive, 4 negatively
impact the integrity or intended function of the Condensa M the
implication of the potential degradation for this CPFM is

Confidence

The extent of surface erosion and its potential

Revision 0 due to the river sediment that hadfiMeen deposr ctlng access
and visibility. Subsequent field inspectionsaa reviev/ no structure
movement. Since the structure has been ng•ored and&n
detected, the confidence in the assessmentg , gra"Sin Rhas increased. If
further structure monitoring reve~ frte iss Ne the assessment for this
CPFM becomes high. 311t

Summary

For above tential for degradation is low because the tank

6nsapro",
4#a sheet wall. It is unlikely this degradation would have
edtcause
to impac integriM o ended function of the structure. The combined
deration of the potenti degradati0nld the implications of that degradation to a
:ure of this type puts it i,•i"not significant" category. The data collected since Revision
.sufficient to rule out this•!• assuming the previously recommended monitoring
L1Ae is continued. Therefc :reMe confidence in the above assessment is high, which means
onal data and inspect 1s~are necessary to draw a conclusion.

gerw• etchanism 3'Subsurface Erosion/Piping

PFM'3M - oss al:,ra.support for pile foundation (due to river drawdown)

Field observations6ý,e Condensate Storage Tank after OPPD removed the deposited
sediment did not idtifWy distress to the tank foundation. Observations of the sheet pile skirt
wall identified the visible portions of the wall to be in good condition.

Sianificance

Potentialfor Degradation/DirectFloodwaterImpact

The structure has undergone wetting cycles previously. It is reasonable to assume that the
foundation system and weep hole drainage system were designed to account for flooding over
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.11-18
Condensate Storage Tank Rev. 2
the top of the weep holes. Therefore, the potential that the 2011 flood caused further
degradation for this CPFM is low.

Implication

The occurrence of this CPFM would negatively impact the capacity of the piling supporting the
Condensate Storage Tank. This could lead to excessive foundation movement and negatively
impact the integrity or intended function of the Condensate Storag ank. Therefore, the
implication of the potential degradation for this CPFM is h

Confidence

The extent of subsurface erosion and its potential impa as n at the time
of Revision 0 due to the river sediment that had been deptn und the
access and visibility and not having inspected the weep h roundwater
measured in the monitoring wells closely followed the iv floodwater dev
the differential head created by the river drawdown was insufficie itate subsu e
erosion. Subsequent field inspections and a revi yed data no structure
movement- and an observation of the weep h ed neces nce the
structure has been monitored and no signs ement n detecte nfidence in
the assessment of degradation for this CP as incre• er strucre monitoring
reveals
Summary no further issues, the confidence o assess i or t becomes high.

For CPFM 3e, as discusse he potential rad low because it is reasonable

to assume that the foundation and weep ho ,stem were designed to account
for flof the les. It is unlike is degradation would have occurred
to c ty or led function of the structure. The combined
c. ation of the p or degr and the implications of that degradation to a
re of this type put
•:re sufficient to rule ou e "not + •1g•RFcategory. The data collected since Revision
cant"
&edsufeiscontined Trulet hi,,.F• hetassu tnfhe previously recommended monitoring
ule is continued. There. he confidence in the above assessment is high, which means
'Additional data and inspecti. re necessary to draw a conclusion.

T rig
v Mechanism 3- rface Erosion/Piping
Undermine
- d utilities (due to river drawdown)

Significa n,

Potentialfor Deg a on/DirectFloodwaterImpact

The groundwater elevation measured in the monitoring wells closely followed the river level as
the floodwater receded. The data indicate that groundwater elevation was about 2 ft above the
river level near the beginning of October 2011 and receded to the river level by about October
14, 2011. Therefore the differential head created by the river drawdown was insufficient to
facilitate subsurface erosion. The potential that degradation has occurred due to this CPFM is
low.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.11-19
Condensate Storage Tank Rev. 2
Implication

The occurrence of this CPFM could negatively impact the operation of the structure. This
could lead to pipe or thrust block settlement and could negatively impact the integrity or
intended functionality of the Condensate Storage Tank piping system. The implication of the
potential degradation for this CPFM is considered high.

Confidence

The extent of subsurface erosion and its potential impact pi was not known
at the time of Revision 0 due to the river sediment that een dep ound the tank
restricting access and visibility. Subsequent field insp s and rveyed data
indicate no structure movement. Since the structure has ed anof
movement have been detected, the confidence in the asses degradatio s CPFM
has increased. If further structure monitoring reveals no s, the confi
assessment for this CPFM becomes high.

Summary

For CPFM 3f, as discussed above, the pote r degra low beca differential
head created by the river drawdown was i icient to urface er sion. It is
unlikely this degradation would have occ ,to cu act tegrity or intended
fun--ction of the structure. The comtile rt pot degradation and the
implications of that degradation cteoft pe puts he not significant"
category. The data collectedsi evision 0 are icient to out this CPFM assuming the
previously recommended g schedule is ,fore, the confidence in the
above assess. e t is high, win s no addition ~inspections are necessary to

5 T•Revised. R,

Ciiac egfore Tank are presented in the following matrix,

ich shows the rating for tH cce and the level of confidence in the evaluation.
Ms 2b, 3e, and 3f for the densate Storage Tank are not associated with Key Distress
s. The results of the aijdonal forensic investigation show that these CPFMs are ruled
o e ,fore, assuming that¶ rther concerns are identified through the monitoring
proghe Condensat ige Tank (discussed in Section 5.11.6 and continuing until
D ecembeI"' l 1), ther Ms are moved to the quadrant of the matrix representing "No
Further AcAR com ec-
d Related to the 2011 Flood." CPFM 3c for the Condensate
Storage Tank is i with Key Distress Indicators #1 and #2. Sections 4.1 and 4.2
present the result• ditional forensic investigation that was conducted to ascertain whether
the CPFM could be ruled out. The results of the additional forensic investigations show that if
the recommendations for physical modifications in KDI #1 are implemented that this CPFM is
ruled out. Therefore, assuming that no further concerns are identified through the monitoring
program for the Condensate Storage Tank (discussed in Section 5.11.6 and continuing until
December 31, 2011), and the physical modifications recommended for KDI #1 are
implemented, the CPFM is moved to the quadrant of the matrix representing "No Further
Action Recommended Related to the 2011 Flood.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.11-20
Condensate Storage Tank Rev. 2

In th. CS S4 the first step was to develop a list of all Triggering

MWoI s an A ould h urred due to the prolonged inundation of the FCS
9the 201 M *ver fib could have negatively impacted these structures.
ext step was to use variou - sigations, including systematic observation of
structures over time, eithi ; liminate t Triggering Mechanisms and PFMs from the list
fto recommend further inve on and/or physical modifications to remove them from the
mr-any particular structure ecause all CPFMs for the Condensate Storage Tank other
thass 2b, 3c, 3e, and 3 ;been ruled out prior to Revision 1, because CPFMs 2b, 3e,
andy been ruled out tult of the Revision 1 findings, and because CPFM 3c will be
ruled 0 he physici •ifications recommended for KDI #1 in Section 4.1 are
implemen Tr gg echanisms and their associated PFMs will remain credible for
the Condensa_ a nk. HDR has concluded that the geotechnical and structural impacts
of the 2011 Mis• ' er flood will be mitigated by the implementation of the physical
modifications recom ended in this Assessment Report. Therefore, after the implementation of
the recommended physical modifications, the potential for failure of this structure due to the
flood will not be significant.
Section 5.13
C,÷.,

J
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.13-1
Circulating Water System Rev.2

5.13 Circulating Water System

5.13.1 Summary of Circulating Water System

Baseline information for the Circulating Water System is provided in Section 2.0, Site History,
Description,.ancd.Baseline Condition

The Circulating Water System is composed of two cast-in-place concret ittnrel cqjponents that
r the intake, S tructur
, o -,,,
Provide -latr .. to the Tur." A An
Aý "A

Building to the river. The tunnel structures intersect and stack, •esouth e.iner of the intake
structure and remain stacked under the Service Building. The tuels rota U they
I14N
T s(own sde wherethe
extend under the Turbine Building. The discharge tunnel exte•n|aair 1est •WNthe Intake
Structure then turns 600 east to the outlet located at the riverbanki the Intake S.e and the
Condensate Storage Tank. The bottom of the tunnel is generally The top oft-h -.
at el. 997 ft where thetunnels are stacked and el. 986 ft where the'Mne psde-by-side. inTdestm
is founded on 12-in.-diameter Class B steel pipe piles that are driven to bdif.ommt, ind concrete filL-
Some Class B piles are designated as tension piles and ind••ZEcieainforcing d o' provid positive
tension connection to the foundation mat.
__ Z_

The Intake Structure, Service Building,-and Turbri i.jdIng ai_.-p de- Itfidationswith
bottom floor elevations of 966 ft, 1007.5 ft, and 9 ree

The raw water discharge pipe and the Tur- .Buil'1ingsu, • pip• 'discarge into the Circulating
umppi
Water Discharge Tunnel.

5.13.2 Inputs/References Suppoi te Analysis

Table 5.13- by ® •.used

. to support HDR's analysis.

A eferencffci•:irculating Water System

Table 5.13J%..
,,.EP Document TitlI ',VOPPD Document Date Pag
Number Number(s)
(if applicable)
PiliP ubme Room &Service B, ng 16506 1/17/1975 11405-S-274
Piling P1 tke Structure 16507 1/20/1975 11405-S-275
Circu.atm.in...nnelsPlans . 16522 1/22/1975 11405-S-299
Circulating Ww u Inels Sectio.r&eetails 16523 1/22/1975 11405-S-300
Intake Structure I F ;itfon
o.i Plan & 16531 1/23/1975 11405-S-311
Details
Intake Structure & Tunq ctions & Details 16537 1/9/1975 114.05-S-317
Intake Structure & Tunnel Miscellaneous Details 16540 1/29/1975 11405-S-320
Incident Report Summary •*.>
CR 2011-5369 6/5/2011 '• All- .. .
Incident Report Summary CR 2011-5254 6/1/2061 All
Incident Report Summary CR 2011-5321 6/3/2011 All
Incident Report Summary CR 2011-5323 6/3/2011 All
Incident Report Summary CR 2011-5377 6/5/2011 All
Incident Report Summary CR 2011-5384 6/6/2011 All
Incident Report Summary CR 2011-5473 6/10/2011 All
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.13-2
Circultinig Water System ReVr 2
Table 5.13-1 - References for Circulating Water System
Document Title OPPD Document Date Page
Number Number(s)
(if applicable)
Incident Report Summary CR 2011-5737 6/22/2011 All
Incident Report Summary CR 2011-5805 6/26/2011 All
Incident Report Summary CR 2011-5932 7/1/2011 All
Turbine Building 6" and 10" Floor Drain Pipe (Summary of bnknown All
Breaks CR2009-1365)N• i' R
Summary Report of Broken Floor Drain Pipes All
.. . - •
91, Sz
tt~~p'za

Detailed site observations-field reports, field notes, and insp, he q1ih2 Mi• Circulating
Water System are provided in Attachment 8.

Observed performance and pertinent background data are as follo On

I

* No utilities are known to cross under the Circulating Wate System ,

* The Trenwa, Main Underground Cable Bank ,betw=izefflnd M-5) .-e., Raw Water
Piping, and a group of 7 pipes encased in concr -e 0L'now
'. ss over thl' o the
Circulating Water Tunnels.
* Concrete pavement in the corridor that extend be-ween t fri lding and the Intake
Structure exhibits conditions that indicate distres ,inclu dackih ettlemen, and
undermining. Pavement slab settlin g• bse ed noýWest of theraknZ tructure and east of
the abandoned acid tank. A hollow-'•qau'ng aveme a wa
m W-Ied east of the Service
truck dock.
Building thein paeenonakn Pavement g
,ditin•• was evident A4'4
the pavement cracking could be, conditionffge and use of the facility.
*King Tut b thousand ptids each) located djaent to the PA fence at the north end
of the corr-ia aQ e tena 4 ding, were loaded onto trucks and removed from this
area od.ý,,, 'Ember 14, 20'ljr' he asses•s•,tfeam observed and photographed this operation. No
•pa -displacement or b•,N1• 'I" n~wa ""N-dduring
!.1. the lifting or removal of these blocks.
paua•.oirty wise toe l
* 40Mqua Dam surrounding th Nbc I Circulating Water Tunnel.
* h•l1assSTM.
g, aB piles
25 consist
Grad of2 epip 4•l12.75-in,
., outside diameter and 0.25-in. wall thickness, which
becA252 Gfilled (Fwih,
p SI). The piles were driven closed-ended to refusal on
bedT ki filled with 4000 psi c-.igrtee(e LB-S5)
cbtA~te (see PLDBD-CS-54).
SBelow l••ar report of braloor drai pipes with reference to CR2009-1365:
- CR.0019was created~fiff rch 24, 2009.
- There are VW-0rain line. u, n parallel to each other; the 6-in. floor drain and the 10-in.
waterbox dra.' s brought in to visually inspect the drain lines because
undocumented -1. observed draining into the sump pit from both lines. They found a
break in the I - imi'n at the branch tee from the VD-193 drain valve. They could not inspect
the 6-in. floor drain because the line does not have a cleanout connection in this area and
accessibility through floor drains is restricted by,4hedfain trap at each location...: . -.

- Review of system files shows that a break in the waterbox drain line has been known for quite
some time. In 1997, a repair was attempted by core drilling holes in the vicinity the break and
pressure grouting to seal the pipe. Per the "Water Systems Report Card for Report Period
April 1 Through June 30, 1997" (memo PED/EOS SYE 97-123):
Repair of the Turbine Building Basement Drain line header was attempted during
this period. The repair procedure consisted of core drilling holes in the vicinity of
the leak and pressure grouting to seal the leak. Approximately 10 holes were
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.13-3
Circilating Water System - Rev. 2
drilled and it was estimated that a void of approximately 10 by 8 by 1 ft existed
under the concrete slab. The void was filled with cement grout but the leak could
not be stopped. Boroscope inspection of the pipe exterior performed through the
core drills showed considerable pipe damage, in more than one location. The
extent of the damage and concern over collapsing the line were determining
factors in terminating the pressure grouting operation. FC ECN 97-213 was
originated to request that a new drain header be.installed. 01
* The river bank is armored and has historically protected and stabilized",e existing river bank.
* USACE reduced Missouri River Mainstem System releases t DO0q ,sr 2, 2011.
River levels corresponding to the 40,000 cfs release rate staW i at F t_ ober 4, 2011, at
about el. 995 ft. P

5.13.3 Assessment Methods and Procedures

5.13.3.1 Assessment Procedures Accomplished 1,X M

Assessments were made by walking the corridor between uSildig and the
structures located at the riverbank and observingof, eeatures ofthenm and the paved
surface overlying the Circulating Water Tun 40. 3e is located 1lthe corridor
paving, limiting visual observation to surfacgia-vement nM nt, settlem d distress.
The surface assessment included using a 4the~ ~g 0l5-ong ~ iljc~1grs;rfc.
' ateel -tippedi
deteribefiberglass
rglassv
T-handle soil probe to hand probe the gronftf' eRbjaceWake o determine relative
•esurme3an
%n aigjit
soil strength. Soil probing
• was limifd hie:
to arpas bey,
as ( --- -hhe ofuFa~paiVng
Nt cused g c npaving
n iyn and i ion sjoints
that would accommodate the prbs, Offc g ntifying conditions
indicative of potential flood- a !impacts
,i pa or da•, t s•fiture
to the u as ao follows:

* Ground So••aras
s_• eaconditions"9
•r~ned
•,.•.• -• 0ing - and engnere
immedi-A --cent to the structure
Seas (nafi .,engineered fill, and/or limestone gravel pavement) as
by ir~bEgE(where
. pop
•!•{nae to a-graaeowe-gradeiy
dup-amage at-grade . e # features and equipment
O Variance from normal i lH7l.ation conMi including settled, tilted, or heaved pavements
in Operation of the system ipurtenantequpment
(i.e., is the system operational?)

iLcdonal investigations wererformed to further characterize the subsurface at the facility,

4
rlmfl•'rU .areaswhere conditio. mindicative of potential flood-related impacts or damage was
obsefr•eibese included thollBowing non-invasive geophysical and geotechnical
investig~tibl ••

* GPR alon W-•ptvement between the Intake Structure and the Service Building. (Test
reports were'no f, ilable at the time of Revision 0.)
* Seismic survey- seismic refraction and refraction micro-tremor) in the protected area.
(Test reports were not available at the time.-of Revision 0.) ..
. Geotechnical test borings in the PA. Note th`at OPPD required vacuum excavation for the
first 10 ft of proposed test holes to avoid utility conflicts. Therefore, test reports will not
show soil conditions in the upper 10 ft of test boring logs. (Test reports were not available
at the time of Revision 0.)
Priority 1 Structures _ Page 5.13-4
Circulating Water System Revi.- 2-11
5.13.3.2 Assessment Procedures Not Completed

Assessments of the Circulating Water System that were not completed include the following:

" Video inspection of tunnels to determine the current condition. (TV inspections are not
currently planned to be performed).
" Visual inspection of:.the tunnel outfall structure at the river was not possible due to the
current river elevation. (Visual inspection of the outfall is not urrently planned because
the river level is not expected to drop below the Discharge Tui5 o9ojp

5.13.4 Analysis

Identified PFMs were initially reviewed as discussed in Section .,i

preliminary information available from OPPD data files and from
Eleven PFMs associated with five different Triggering Mechanis"&
credible" for all Priority 1 Structures, as discussed in Section 3.672h•
forward as "credible." After the design review for each structure, the
preliminary results of available geotechnical, geophysic 1rey a number of
CPFMs were ruled out as discussed in Section 5.13.
assessment are discussed in Section 5.13.4.2.

5.13.4.1 Potential Failure Modes Rule ut Priort the of the Detailed

Assessment

Th e ruled-out CPFMs reside in tfiNN-ot Significarnj 4h Confld•e category and for clarity
wil notbe shown in the Pot v1or Failure 9101-mat"f eCn

Tr igge ARM ism 2 - Sur•Erosion

supMA:f Pile foundation

for ruling oUt:

Bathymetric survey did n -Adqntify scourat the discharge tunnel.

S!ur.face erosion was not o' led in the area of the tunnels-during the-field assessments.

gifbiig Mechanism 3 - S i.i.rface Erosion/Piping

CP0'e- Loss of latepport for pile foundation (due to river drawdown)
CPFMR j.},ndermriinbiried utilities (due to river drawdown)

* The tunnels are"a-sufficient depth below the ground surface to be outside the zone of
influence of these CPFMs.
Priority 1 Structures..,... Page 5.13-5
Circulating Water System Rev. '2
Triggering Mechanism 5 - Hydrodynamic Loading
CPFM 5a - Overturning
CPFM 5b - Sliding
CPFM 5c - Wall failure in flexure
CPFM 5d - Wall failure in shear
CPFM 5e - Damage by debris
CPFM 5f- Excessdeflection

Reason for ruling out:

The portion of this system that is subjected to hydrodi Tunnel.

The Discharge Tunnel is located on the south side (•
riverbank is protected by revetment above and upstre

Triggering Mechanism 7 - Soil Collapse (first time w4

CPFM 7a - Cracked slab, differential settlement of sl
support Q
CPFM 7b - Displaced structure/broken connefs
CPFM 7c - General site settlement
CPFM 7d - Piles buckling from down di •'V

Reason for ruling out: X11

The Circulating Water SysteaUR,4cated adjac1o "he Missjiri River. The soil
surrounding the structure #piMuningthe subgr ha been•gtii.he past or is normally in a
saturated condition. 'L:.
,

wed Liquefaction

walls

Trigj to Static Liquefaction or Upward

CPFM 11 N onal lateral force on below-grade walls

CPFM I Id - le group instability

Reason for ruling out:

* This phenomenon was not observed at the site.

Priority 1 Structures Page 5.13-6
Circulating WaterSystem Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 12 - Rapid Drawdown
CPFM 12a - River bank slope failure and undermining surrounding structures
CPFM 12b - Lateral spreading

Reasons for ruling out:

- Slope failure was not observed at the site.

* River stage level has receded and stabilized at a level correspo d.ng to the nominal normal
river level at 40,000 cfs as of October 4, 2011. '.

CPFM 13b - Corrosion of structural elements

Reasons for ruline out:

The soil surrounding the structure, including the subgr iny a saturate!
condition.
" Conditions have not changed due to flood conq4f'i"i

Triggering Mechanism 14 - Frost Effects "--

CPFM 14a -Heaving, crushing, or dis .met

Reasons for ruling out:

" The Circulating Water Syst founded bel ost level.

* Conditions have not cha l4ul.he to flood con,'

34ssessme, ible Poten i1Failure Modes

Tee CPFn oowing carried forward for detailed assessment for the
ating Water Syste flood. This detailed assessment is provided

-'i
ggering Mechanism 3 - SQb•-irface Erosion/Piping
• "M 3b - Loss of lateral•;,,.ort for pile foundation (due to pumping)

The YITime Building has ad vi-ented history of a void below the foundation dating back to
1997. T Ye .. of ground,'•tr into the Turbine Building sump through breaks in the drainage
pipes is 0n e _ejrress Indicators discussed in Section 4.
The Triggerin ism and CPFM could then occur as follows: the seepage condition will
remain until the br'a s in the drainage pipes are repaired, which means the potential for further
ero0sion continues unarrested.. Erosion could extend out, creating voids under the Circulating
Watertunnel. -. - -- -- --- "

The following table describes observed distress indicators and other data that would increase or
decrease the potential for degradation associated with this CPFM for the Circulating Water
System.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.13-7
Circulating Water-System "'Rev. 2

Adverse (DegradationlDirect Floodwater Favorable (DegradationlDirect

Impact More Likely) Floodwater Impact Less Likely)
Previously documented void under the The bottom of the tunnels is more than 5 ft below
foundation in the Turbine Building. the broken pipe locations.
Documented breaks in the drain piping below the
foundation in the Turbine Building.
Documented continual groundwater flow from
the broken drain piping into the sump in the
Turbine Building. g
The soil around the piling was not compacted to :0&
the same requirements as the material under the
Class I structures (vibroflotation effort).
Pavement distress was observed between the
Intake Structure and the Service Building. _,
Data Gaps:
The size and location of voids below the Turbine Building foundatio d.,whi
below the tunnels

Conclusion

Significance

Potentialfor Degradation/Dire(

Indicators for this CPFM have bl" observed in tfirurbine 1J.ng. A void below the mat
foundation in the Turbine BEi~is known to e? NdA.g -dwateris constantly flowing
into the sunmfrn the five drakides. Because ti N2
O d caused increased groundwater
flow thrri pipe e,,potential that the 2011 flood caused further and more
piMea-,era,
r iation dit C
Ciii %&`h. However, it is unlikely that these voids extend
iel.

'large scale could negatively impact the capacity of the piling

-,stem. This is not expected to occur to the extent that would
i,.intended function of the Circulating Water Tunnels.
potential degradation to the Circulating Water Tunnels for this

The data at hand are'not sufficient to rule out this CPFM or to conclude that physical
modificationato ensure that the.pilings that support this building have loQs$,tcapaqity-ybecause of.,..;;,
this CPFM. Therefore, the confidence in the above assessment is low, which means more data
are needed to draw a conclusion.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.13-8
Circulating Water'System Rev. 2
Summary

For CPFM 3b. as discussed above, the potential for degradation is low because it is unlikely the
voids extend downward and below the Circulating Water Tunnel. The combined consideration
of the potential for degradation and the implications of that degradation to a structure of this
type puts it in the "not significant" category. The data currently collected are not sufficient to
rule out this CPFM. Therefore, the confidence in the above assessment is low, which means
more data or continued monitoring and inspections might be necess.a. to draw a conclusion.
rfl A d~
I~-~
rti

The CPFMs evaluated for the Circulating Water System are pri
shows the rating for the estimated significance and the level of

5.13.6 Recommended:Actions:,ý

The following actions are"T.ecommended for the Circulating Water System:

Review.the .geotechnical and geophy..sical data and assess.the impact.on-the Circulating Water .System.
Further forensic investigations and.physical modifications are recommended to address CPFM 3b
associated with the Turbine Building basement drain piping system (Key Distress Indicator # 1). These
recommendations are described in detail in Section 4.1.3.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.13-9
Circulating Water System Riev. 2
5.1.3.7 Updates Since Revision 0

Revision 0 of this Assessment Report was submitted to OPPD on October 14, 2011. Revision 0
presented the results of preliminary assessments for each Priority I Structure. These assessments were
incomplete in Revision 0 because the forensic investigation. and/or monitoring for most of the
Priority I Structures was not completed by the submittal date. This revision of this Assessment Report
includes the results of additional forensic investigation and monitoring to date for this structure as
described below. J111_.

5.13.7.1 Additional Data Available

The following additional data were available for the Ciidt Revisions 1
and 2"of this Assessment Report:

* Results of KDI #1 forensic investigation (see Section

" Re silts of KDI #2 forensic investigation (see Section
• Additional groundwater monitoring well and river-sta
" Field observations of the river bank (see Sectibfr5S25.
* Results of falling weight deflectorneter in•stigatsiit 1 Inc.
(see Attachment 6).
" Results.of geophysical investigation by.}.Gdotechno LWJ
" Results of geotechnical investigation
i s• ý•'hiele Geot,"
" Data obtained, from inclinome&si!by TlViele Ge.t eh. 1ttfahment 6).
" Results of continued survey_ amp "y_.and.d (see Attachment 6).

5.13.7.2 Additional Anal

The

level data from OPPD.

levels.

No` the 2011 Flood was observed.

0 Results deflectometer investigation by American Engineering Testing, Inc.

Falling Weigh]-iDIlectometer and associated GPR testing performed in the Paved Access
Area identified anomalies such as soft clay and broken pavement. Additional ground
truthing of the investigation-results wereperformed-as-part: of-the KDI.#2 additional
investigations.

a Results of geophysical investigation report by Geotechnology, Inc.

Seismic Refraction and Seismic ReMi tests performed around the outside perimeter of the
power block as part of KDI #2 identified deep anomalies that could be gravel, soft clay,
loose sand, or possibly voids.
 Priority 1 Structures Page 513-10
.Circulating Water System .Rev, 2
* Results of geotechnical investigation by Thiele Geotech, Inc.

Six test borings were drilled, with continuous sampling of the soil encountered, to ground
truth the Geotechnology, Inc. seismic investigation results as part of the KDI #2 forensic
investigation. Test bore holes were located to penetrate the deep anomalies identified in the
seismic investigation. The test boring data did not show any piping voids or very soft/very
loose conditions that might be indicative of subsurface erosion/piping or related material
loss or movement.
I' su' CU. U~rvr'
L. C s -' .e.
tI-ij 01 LI1 Or I ani d C.. 1Ftes~ i ut z ~
ItsI U~~ Liiiuc e niiJ.i.J,ý Piv

to similar data from numerous other geotechnical iJn' gtions t-.been conducted
on the FCS site in previous years. This comparisorl1:tfinot identi.st .s.tati al changes to
the soil strength and stiffness over that time period. • a CPT test ry ere not
performed in the top 10 feet to protect existing utilities",---

Data from inclinometers to date, compared to the origina ba•,fl n "t •'•'•
exceeded the accuracy range of the inclinometers. herefore. dei ation at the moiitored
locations since the installation of the instrum.eif•{iffifias not )ccureq4`1-

Results of continued survey by Lamp R-r° and AN :iates. 4V

Survey data to date compared to the o I baseie:surveysj.•o exceeded the

accuracy range of the survey ingqui
e iprfi. Th.eif5ire, defomiitroiit the monitored
locations, since the survey base:e§H&wasshot, h0--Not occurred';.

4 Susrface ErosionwPping -. XR
Triggering Mechanism 3 +.1ii
CPFM 3b - Loss of lfiei!support for pile fouiat~io•(T ue to pumping)

CPF61 •, W•••
ter tem is associated with Key Distress Indicator #1 and
Key.Dstress Indicatod #'Sections
. 4 P•:a-d 4.2 present the results of additional forensic
Sumii:eshgation that was conite.ted to asceA0i-,Whether this CPFM could be ruled out. The
.results of the additional foren.'s•l.investigation.shsow that if the recommendations for physical
e:NJ,-,odifications in KDI #1 are implemented that this CPFM is ruled out. Therefore, assuming
thatno further concerns are iddii-fied through the monitoring program for the Circulating
W'! er &System(discussed in Se6hn 5 13. 6 and continuing until December 31, 2011), this
CPF•M •is ved to the quadrant f the matrix representing "No Further Action Recommended
Related•t.e 21.1 0 Flood
Prio.rity 1 Structures Page 5.13-11
Circulating Water System . Rev. 2
5.13.7.1 Revised Results

The CPFMs evaluated for the Circulating Water System are presented in the following matrix,
which shows the rating for the estimated significance and the level of confidence in the
evaluation.

n,, Ye assessment of the FCS S'~.•t.res, the first step was to develop a list of all -Triggering
NNWRclanisms and PFMs that co]tiLhave occurred due to the prolonged inundation of the FCS
site diningthe 2011 Missouri-N er flood and could have negatively impacted these structures.
The nextsl's ,_was to use data4friom various investigations, including systematic observation of
the struct 6`h.des:6'Ver time,. -ieer to eliminate the Triggering Mechanisms and PFMs from the list
or to recommr .,tit estigation and/or physical modifications to remove them from the
list for any partliuffI, iticture. Because all CPFMs for the Circulating Water System other
than CPFM 3b had-6ieen ruled out prior to Revision 1, and because CPFM 3b will be ruled out
when the physical modifications recommended for KDI #1 in Section 4.1 are implemented, no
"TiggeringMeChan:isms and th~eifassociated PFMs will remain credible.for the''Grculating
Water System. HDR has concluded that the geotechnical and structural impacts of the 2011
Missouri River flood will be mitigated by the implementation of the physical modifications
recommended in this Assessment Report. Therefore, after the implementation of the
recommended physical modifications, the potential for failure of this structure-due to the flood
will not be significant.
r
Section 5.14
Deminera ized Water Tank,
Pump .House, a-gfnd RO Un
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.14-1
Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit Rev. 2

5.14 Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit

5.14.1 Summary of Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit

Baseline information for the Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit is provided in
Section 2.0, Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition.

The Demineralized Water Tank is a 33-ft-inside-diameter storage tank thf•ah-n.nd- proximately 31 ft

above grade. The tank is fabricated of stainless steel to meet the F irem, 'API Standard
650. The tank is supported around its perimeter on a continuo..s a ct te ring wall that is
about 1.2 ft wide by 2 ft tall. The interior of the tank bears on -er of s n a geotextile
filter fabric, which in turn is on top of a free-draining crushed IMF tý rgate rushed
limestone aggregate is drained by three 1.5-in.-diameter founda6, spaced equaround thoe
concrete ring wall.

The Pump House is a small pre-engineered metal building supported on a i. kab.

.-

The entire tank footprint, including the concrete ring ftsneerior crus along with the
Pump House slab, is supported on a rammed aggrega pe sol ementsys

The RO Unit resides in the northern section ofthe., i Ware dW arehouse is a

pre-engineered metal building supported onja~cas lace dr-am wall on continuous
footings that extend below frost depth. a

5.14.2 Inputs/References Supp, fil' e Analysis

Table 5.14-1 lists . ,,rovided and other ds used to support HDR's analysis.

Tablig.01 -1 Ref r-ffier tor Demi'n iiAzed Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit
Document .T.. OPPD Document Date Page
Number Number(s)
(if applicable)
SueiAt4 8/28/2009 1 of 2
DetaAi•S. 8/28/2009 2 of 2
Geopier®t cation System 4/20/2010 GEO-1 &
P09-PMN-0e(%) 9i GEO-2
Naval Facilitieýs@gieering Cornfij, 9/1986 All
Design Manual 7 .0 e s

Detailed site observatio•nsfi. d reports, field notes, and inspection checklists-for the Demineralized
Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit are provided in Attachment 8.

Observed performance and pertinent background data are as follows:

* The soils below the Demineralized Water Tank and Pump House were improved by installation of
fifty 30-in.-diameter-by-18-ft-minimum-depth rammed aggregate piers (see Geo-1 and Geo-2).
" A total of 41 rammed aggregate piers were installed below the tank footprint, and 9 were installed
under the Pump House slab.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.14-2
Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit Rev. 2
* The tank foundation system, including crushed rock interior, is shown on the site plan and detail
sheets by LRA in table 5.14-1.
* Structural drawings for the Old Warehouse are not available, so descriptions of the foundations are
assumed based on normal standard practice for foundation construction for a pre-engineered metal
building.
" The Aqua Dam surrounding the Demineralized Water Tank and Pump House failed for an
unknown amount of time, allowing floodwater to enter the area inside.the Aqua Dam perimeter.
Based on observed water marks on the Demineralized Water Tank and mp ouse, water levels
reached approximately 2.5 ft above grade. 4
* The interiors of the Pump House and Old Warehouse showegl. pgs of up eepage at
slab-on-grade joints. Other HDR employees observed up ' eepage i•s in the slab
during previous inspections.
* Site soils were saturated at the times of inspection.
" Small channels of water flow were observed as water dissipated.t. o e vicinity o an
Pump House.
* Neither the Demineralized Water Tank nor the Pump House has a foun that extends w
frost depth.
* Foundation drains for the tank were found to be ckt•ggedVitU diment at th f inspection.
* Areas of relatively soft soils were observed bydRg a soil pr e generalii €tof the tank
and Pump House, but these areas are out of the e of inflenn-e rfoundation systems.
" Probed areas around the Pump House are softwrie up An pe, ne spot near the
southwest comer of the Pump Houseu a hr soils 6be could be pushed in
to a depth of2 ft.
* In an area between the Deminerliz& _*ater Tank an, np Hous pproximately 10 ft from the
east side of the structures, the p, 7 Ib p • 1f pth of the probe. The soils
were not unifor gelayers werse6 and others stif ft4s
distance the soft soils are out of
the zone - i••feufound fo1o.e6ftems
* A void Eaedeto -be i ,to2 ft deep was observed below a transformer pad
at tph Reast comrer of t WW aarehosu tis area was pumped with a small pump for the
d.jTien of the 2011 flood.
* rOea directly east of the Old',, arehouse between the rock road and the building was dug out
Wedhd as a water collection trollg \These areas had multiple small portable pumps removing
watefýthe trench.

5.14.3 As.sesment Methods and' rocedures

5.14.3.1 , $mn' W dures Accomplished

Assessments 0e Dmineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit included the
following: V
* Visual inspection of the interior and exterior of the north side of the Old Warehouse at the
water treatment facility and also the exterior of the tank and Pump House
" An assessment of collected survey data to date for indications of trends in the movement of
the structures
* Probe of surrounding grades to determine stiffness and consistency of soils
* A review of previously referenced documents listed in Table 5.14-1
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.14-3
Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit Rev. 2
Additional investigations were performed. These included the following non-invasive
geophysical and invasive geotechnical investigations:

* Geotechnical test borings in the protected area. Note that OPPD required vacuum
excavation for the first 10 ft of proposed test holes to avoid utility conflicts. Therefore, test
reports will not show soil conditions in the upper 10 ft of test boring logs. (Test reports
were not available at the time of Revision 0.) 1

5.14.3.2 Assessment Procedures Not Completed

Assessments of the Demineralized Water Tank, Pump were not

completed include the following:

* Review of as-built construction drawings for the Old

treatment area, was not completed because at the timt
available.

5.14.4 Analysis

Identified PFMs were initially reviewed as discussedm ection:

preliminary information available from OPPD dat s and frot
Eleven PFMs associated with five different Trigg ej•g Mechai,
credible" for all Priority 1 Structures, as diseassed ecti
forward as "credible." After the detaile, Tg review fairea
• h observations,
and the results of available geotechnica physical, an ' e,
CPFMs were ruled out as discussed. .... ion 5.14.4.1. T forward for detailed
assessment are discused in Section 5QVQMVQ

5.14.4 i Eie
ltVR rntiaA t Mod~sl R,led Out Prior tc the Detailed
Assessr

ruled-out CPFMs category and for clarity

11not be shown in the Potdf4or Failure/Confidence matrix.

2 - uiiie Erosion
ningsihbow foundation/slab/surfaces
inedAied utilities

* The site was OBser d after floodwaters had begun to recede from the area. No signs of
surface erosion wen seen that could contribute to undermining of the foundations or slabs
for these structures.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.14-4
Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 4 - Hydrostatic Lateral Loading (water loading on structures)
CPFM 4c - Wall failure in flexure
CPFM 4d - Wall failure in shear
CPFM 4e - Excess deflection

Reasons for ruling out:

* In accordance with conversations with OPPD personnel, the Drn ineralized Water Tank
was kept full during the 2011 flood, resulting in no net fere. allmessures.
• The Pump House was inundated at the time of the A mi-fijfaM eIting in no net
differential wall pressures.
" Water surrounded the Pump House and Demineralize R ater o .es, creating
equal hydrostatic pressure.
* The water treatment area of the Old Warehouse was isoj dktfrpm floodwa• n
Dam.

Triggering Mechanism 5 - Hydrodynamic Loading

CPFM 5a - Overturning
CPFM 5b - Sliding
CPFM 5c - Wall failure in flexure
CPFM 5d - Wall failure in shear
CPFM 5e - Damage by debris
CPFM 5f- Excess deflection

Reasons- for ruling out:

Overlgdmflo elocity at s 4ation was very ing very minimal forces due to
hy, og. i Obse••e s ouring in this location was isolated to areas where the
fil naadea sedmee•vca
ýReka was and the Vreas (i.e., the King Tut blocks). In general, the
area had se.~dmen t.s•that wo' ~jf4ate low flow velocity.
;+loodwaters have sinc giein torecee& o the site, and no signs of distress that could be
attributed to hydrodynamic,"Iading have'be observed.

T-ring
"73 - Cracked 6slab
Mechanism
w 6b - Buyiancy, Uplift Forces
,g• •Df structural support on Structures
C-P, '416c - Displaced strauRt dfe/broken connections

Reasons for rdh"Z out

* In accordande_'"onversations with OPPD personnel, the Demineralized Water Tank

was kept full diftiiiig the 2011 flood, resulting in no net buoyancy effects.
* The Pump House was inundated at the time of the Aqua Dam failure, resulting in no net
differential wall pressures.
• Although a net uplift force from floodwaters might have occurred on the Old Warehouse
floor slabs, cracking or loss of structural support of the slabs was not observed at the time
of the inspection.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.14-5
Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 7 - Soil Collapse (first time wetting)
CPFM 7a - Cracked slab, differential settlement of shallow foundation, loss of structural
support
CPFM 7b - Displaced structure/broken connections
CPFM 7c - General site settlement

Reason for ruling out:

* Soil collapse due to first time wetting occurs immedie

Degradation related to this CPFM would have been a!

Triggering Mechanism 10 - Machine/Vibration-Indu,

CPFM I Oa - Cracked slab, differential settlement ofE
support
CPFM 1Ob - Displaced structure/broken connections

Reasons for ruling out:

* Vibrations from equipment in the Pump HuOse and

create minimal localized vibrations thaJ not cau
No signs of liquefaction were observed ring the inA

Triggering Mechanism 11 - LossbfSoipSifngt dU

Seepage W

CPMrknconned ",
CPFM 11 a- Cracked slabsiýJ.-rential settle

CPFM support stru

*,-,Displaced tr jeboe
roe onci .
f shallow
-
undation, loss of structural

Reasoifolin' &ebit.

!, Visual observations. ,rniey measr s show no structure movement. Therefore,

degradation that can be "ib, ted to this M did not occur.

1Br4ggering Mechanism 12 - Rapid Drawdown

12a - River bank s§Be ailure and undermining surrounding structures
OPUBMN 2b - Lateral spreading

Reaso n firtfii out: -

The structiikep ted outside of the PA and are a sufficient distance away from the
riverbank to be'ouiside the zone of influence of a bank slope failure.
Trggrig ecans 1 -Sumegec

Triggering Mechanism 13 - Submergence

CPFM 13b - Corrosion of structural elements

Reasons for ruling out:

* The Demineralized Water Tank and connected piping are stainless steel and have not been
subjected to corrosive circumstances that would be considered beyond the normal
conditions.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.14-6
Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit Rev. 2
" The Pump House was inundated at the time of the Aqua Dam failure. However, this
inundation duration was short, and no abnormal corrosion on the building was observed.
* The water treatment area of the Old Warehouse was isolated from floodwater by the Aqua
Dam.

5.14.4.2 Detailed Assessment of Credible Potential Failure Modes

The following CPFMs are the only CPFMs carried forward for d ssment for the
Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit as a esu flood. This
detailed assessment is provided below.

Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Piping

CPFM 3a - Undermining and settlement of shallow f"-m" ias due to
pumping)

Subsurface erosion was observed at the northeast corner o e

pumping of floodwaters occurred. The approximately 4-ft-diam
caused some undermining of the transformer fa the p some buried
conduit. Observations made by HDR in June an...urss 1 Nl through the
joints in the floor slab.

No pumping occurred in the vicinity of thQ nlnerat ae Pump House;

therefore, these structures would ne._be suWj4ted to*•i PFM.

The following table describe data that would increase or

decrease the potential for dq r the Demineralized Water
Tank, Pump Itp._se, and RO

Favorable (Degradation/Direct
Floodwater Impact Less Likely)
."-'Sble subsurface erosi'o`Ve •to pumpinr Was Erosion observed did not appear to extend deep
X
oserved under a transfornerýPad1on the ext 'ýenough to reach the foundations of the Old
northeast comer of the Old Wai-4 otse building" Warehouse.
" Žd~warehouse floor.
ýS•iS•in
the vicinity were found • of varying Soils where pumping occurred seemed to be a
desiigwhich could include liw soils that are gravel/structural fill with relatively high density,
mor~e tiJble to erosion dtu !,ipumping. which is less susceptible to erosion.
Observitih.j une andJA,& dicated water
infiltration o he K@ ttiiit buildingslab
joints.
Data Gaps: "
" The presence oýfubsurface erosion under the RO Unit in the Old Warehouse slab due to
pumping is not known to exist.
" Geotechnical borings and CPT soundings in the vicinity of the structures to determine current
soil conditions and capacities have not been conducted.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.14-7
Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit Rev. 2
Conclusion

Significance

Potentialfor Degradation/DirectFloodwaterImpact

Indicators for the CPFM have been observed, although they seem to be isolated to one area
below a transformer pad on the northeast comer outside of the 01 Warehouse and in the center
of the Warehouse floor. The void below the transformer pads wnto eJ-st and the extent of
the void can easily be observed. The void does not appe te
foundation. Because there are observed signs of flow he floo own void
adjacent to the Old Warehouse building, it is possible t, is voi 'r n s er the building
and possibly undermines the foundation, although obsei xm'o t indic is to be the
case. The potential is low that this CPFM will occur under b i'ding in the ar, using the
RO Unit.

implication

The occurrence of this CPFM could negativel 1. t acity of t.lieii-d arehouse

building foundation. This could lead to grad oundati ment but s 01not
in
"
lmpllca th" poo R, I•• 644l.•
negatively impact the integrity or intended4tion of t •e fbefore remedial action can
be implemented. Therefore, the implicati he u ion for this CPFM is low.

Confidence

The extent of subsurface eresoy 44 its potential .Pat on ldWarehouse building is not
known due to the lack of daA r-tied on subsurf•• "•. s. Because there is not enough
informati at this time,
•.:•ubsurface c~ bnl-lons he pumping occurred directly
adjacent.. . intahat could caused subsurface erosion under the building, the
cor dece for this PF-Mis- obw.

Tiinmmar,

`FiiCPFM 3a, as discussed a81', the potential for degradation is low because the extent of
"erps- ccurring is visible and, s not extend below the building foundation. The combined
c ,nsidetation
of the potentialf •gradation and the implications of that degradation to a
struct$W-F." 4this type puts in- ot significant" category. The data currently collected are not
sufficief0tle out this :of Therefore, the confidence in the above assessment is low,
which means Ainue mo•itoring is necessary to draw a conclusion.

Triggering Mechanism 14 - Frost Effects

CPFM 14a - Heaving, crushing, or displacement

The foundations for the Demineralized Water Tank and Pump House are not below frost depths
and are therefore subjected to frost effects.

The Triggering Mechanism and CPFM could then occur as follows: soils may be saturated
when the ground freezes, which would increase the potential for excessive frost heave. Drains
below the tank appear to be clogged, not allowing water under the tank to drain before it
freezes, which would not be the design intent of the tank.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.14-8
Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit Rev. 2
The Old Warehouse is on footings that extend below frost and is not susceptible to this CPFM.

The following table describes observed distress indicators and other data that would increase or
decrease the potential for degradation associated with this CPFM for the Demineralized Water
Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit.

Potentialfor Degradation/Direct

The potential for this CPFM exifW6ii the DemineVMied Waterzffi.lk and Pump House due to
the foundation systems use tse structures a d o rains below the tank. Due to
the saturated soils and the tir Wear, it is possibl *11will
freeze before the water
levels inith e hi. a chance "1reduceto norma lev ,St'usingexcessive soil expansion.
Due. 4.e td, sY a
ir.fe ,•,z•t
cycles..n•ffthe the tank and pump
putp house have been subjected to
cycles althjiptentially not to this extent and not with the drains
'b1he tank clogged I tential that this CPFM will affect the Demineralized
ý4uter Tank and Pump Hotisl-ce the incfe.
. s in effect due to the clogged drains and high
'roundwater levels is expecte{•have minmal effect.
Th'pliea ionm

The ,cdm-rence
of this CPFMcaid potentially cause some movement in the Tank and Pump
House o•fdaion esysteis
ver, because the foundations have always been subjected to
freeze-thawtqs, th 5onal movement under current conditions is not expected to cause
an excessive l se : ovement. Therefore, the implication of the potential degradation for

Confidence

At this time, it is not known whether the ground will freeze before soil water levels are able to
lower to a normal condition. In addition, the foundation drains were completely plugged with
sediment, which does not allow the crushed rock bedding to drain and could cause adverse
effects on the bottom of the tank if the ground were to freeze in this condition. Therefore, the
data at hand are not sufficient to rule out this CPFM. As a result, the confidence in the
assessment is low, which means more data are necessary to draw a conclusion.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.14-9
Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit Rev. 2
Summary

For CPFM 14a, as discussed above, the potential for degradation is low because the effects due
to frost heave are expected to cause minimal effects on the structures. The combined
consideration of the potential for degradation and the implications of that degradation to the
structures of this type puts it in the "not significant" category. The data currently collected are
not sufficient to rule out this CPFM. Therefore, the confidence in the above assessment is low,
which means continued monitoring is necessary to draw a conclus..

5.14.5 Results and Conclusions

The CPFMs evaluated for the Demineralized Water Tank, Puni iSe. e presented in
the following matrix, which shows the rating for the estimated ýqf confidence
in the evaluation.

Low Confidence
(Insufficient Data)

- "-
0) -''

5.14.6 Recommendg 4a°A•i

Continued monitoring is recommended to include a continuation of the elevation surveys of the

previously identified targets on this structures and surrounding site. The purpose is to monitor for
signs of structure distress and movement or changes in soil conditions around the structures. The
results of this monitoring will be used to increase the confidence in the assessment results. Elevation
surveys should be performed weekly for 4 weeks and biweekly until December 31, 2011. At the time
of Revision 0, groundwater levels had not yet stabilized to nominal normal levels. Therefore, it is
possible that new distress indicators could still develop. If new distress indicators are observed before
December 31, 2011, appropriate HDR personnel should be notified immediately to determine whether
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.14-10
Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit Rev. 2
an immediate inspection or assessment should be conducted. Observation of new distress indicators
might result in a modification of the recommendations for these structures.

5.14.7 Updates Since Revision 0

Revision 0 of this Assessment Report was submitted to OPPD on October 14, 2011. Revision 0
presented the results of preliminary assessments for each Priority 1 Structure. These assessments were
incomplete in Revision 0 because the forensic investigation and/or monitobrg for most of the
Priority 1 Structures was not completed by the submittal date. Thi§ývisMoth' Vssessment Report
includes the results of additional forensic investigation and monilo g to s structure as
described below.

5.14.7.1 Additional Data Available

The following additional data were available for the Deminel& e Water Tank, p
and RO Unit for Revisions 1 and 2 of this Assessment Re'"i 'N

* Additional groundwater monitoring well and. s e level da PPD.

* Results of geophysical investigation by G e C.(see A t 6).
* Results of geotechnical investigation by3 e Geote .. see Atta.h.. 6).
* Results of continued survey by Lamp parson and Ass. Attadhment 6).
Review construction
* Review of as-built ot drawi ~. o.r thee-bule ofhe
aeý s cuding the water
treatment area, wasAnot compalo
• becasat the tcne o re',ein. he drawings were not
available.

5.14.7.2 Additional Anal 4 s

The fow4 gjanalysis of additio .dtawas conducteilfor the Deminerahzed Water Tank,
Pum•H~ 'anR..i

roundwater monitoring w
ll and riV &isge
level data from OPPD.

Data shows that the river a roundwater have returned to nominal normal levels.

Results of geophysical invelstiation by Geotechnology, Inc.

S•is.Refraction andySisic ReMi tests performed around the outside perimeter of the
power6.c16ckas partsio7iK• J #2 identified deep anomalies that could be gravel, soft clay,
loose sall soi~ ds.

Results of geý,
ehical investigation by Thiele Geotech, Inc.
Six test borings were drilled, with continuous sampling of the soil encountered, to ground
truth the Geotechnology, Inc. seismic investigation results as part of the KDI #2 forensic
investigation. Test bore holes were located to penetrate the deep anomalies identified in the
seismic investigation. The test boring data did not show any piping voids or very soft/very
loose conditions that might be indicative of subsurface erosion/piping or related material
loss or movement.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.14-11
Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit Rev. 2
All of the SPT and CPT test results conducted for this Assessment Report were compared
to similar data from numerous other geotechnical investigations that have been conducted
on the FCS site in previous years. This comparison did not identify substantial changes to
the soil strength and stiffness over that time period. SPT and CPT test results were not
performed in the top 10 feet to protect existing utilities.

* Results of continued survey by Lamp Rynearson and

Survey data to date compared to the original baseline the accuracy

range of the surveying equipment. However, the devg - not of a
concern for structures of this type.

Several CPFMs were identified in Revision 0. Since Revý khave become

available which has clarified the significance and confide
presents each of the previously identified CPFMs and the,
significance and confidence based upon the new data.

Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface ErosionIIiping

CPFM 3a - Undermining and settlementsh n
pumping)

Subsurface erosion was observed at the house where localized

pumping of floodwaters occurred..4 Te '5-ft-deep void has
caused some undermining of th o--Texposing some buried
conduit. Observations made by iWkR in coming up through the
joints in the floor slab.

No rater Tank or Pump House;

for Degradation/l

"d'ipors for the CPFM have MY observed, although they seem to be isolated to one area
be6i tansformer pad on the'e$theast corner outside of the Old Warehouse. The void below
the tr~iifisfM-er pad is known.t.eist, and the extent of the void can easily be observed. The
d o ppear to e&fi elow the building foundation. Because there is a known void
adjacent to•t•eO!:Waehouse building, it is possible that this void extends under the building
and possibly UNiQnse1 the foundation, although observations do not indicate this to be the
case. The potenti4lis 6low that this CPFM will occur under the building in the area housing the
RO Unit.

Implication

The occurrence of this CPFM could negatively impact the capacity of the Old Warehouse
building foundation. This could lead to gradual foundation movement but should not
negatively impact the integrity or intended function of the building before remedial action can
be implemented. Therefore, the implication of the potential degradation for this CPFM is low.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.14-12
Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit Rev. 2
Confidence

The extent of subsurface erosion and its potential impact on the building was not known due to
the lack of data gathered on subsurface conditions. Subsequent field inspections and a review
of surveyed data indicate no significant structure movement. Since the structure has been
monitored and no signs of movement have been detected, the confidence for this CPFM is high.

Summar,

For CPFM 3a, as discussed above, the potential for degr ad

n is 1ow._ ause signs of distress
were not observed. It is unlikely this degradation woul• ve cause erosion to impact
the integrity or intended function of the structure. The bned C -V f the potential
for degradation and the implications of that degradation't• e of thi e t
"not significant" category. The data collected since Revisi, ne sufficient out this
CPFM assuming the previously recommended monltormg6 continuedor,
the confidence in the above assessment is high, which means naU ieonal data and .sons
are necessary to draw a conclusion. The data previo y thought t required to rule ou this
CPFM, which includes a geotechnical investigai eview of a '45. drawings, are no
longer required.

Triggering Mechanism 14 - Frost Effec

CPFM 14a - Heaving, crushing, or diAi aement
The foundations for the Deminerf ~ie. Wat6r T Pump H-tf e are not below frost depths
and are therefore subjected to~froef.ects. Soils Were thoug ave a potential of being
ao
saturated
sauae when hnthethe grunankoe
groundRt eeating a poten re frost heave. Drains below
the t ap eared to be cloggedý f e time of the ini e ion, not allowing water under
the
on tan•,tai•..•a would
...... N•di nidelfet
low frst M.4s the design onten
r the tank. The Old Warehouse is
o g--blwrot susceptible to this CPFM.

,S•i~ficance

P..Pqtentialfor Degradation/D in loodwater Impact

T• . undwater elevation measurded in the monitoring wells closely followed the river level as
reded.h The dicate that groundwater elevation was about 2 ft above the
river 1thebeginning4October 2011 and receded to the river level by about October
14, 2011'. lý4 ore, sat ,7!8soil conditions beyond normal are no longer an issue and the
potential foj .tii his CPFM is low.

Implication '

The occurrence of this CPFM could cause some movement in the tank and Pump House
foundation systems; however, because the foundations have always been subjected to freeze-
thaw cycles, the additional movement under current conditions is not expected to cause an
excessive increase in movement. Therefore, the implication of the potential degradation for
this CPFM is low.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.14-13
Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit Rev. 2
Confidence

At this time, it is known that the ground will not freeze before soil water levels are able to
lower to a normal condition because water levels have been determined to be at normal
conditions at the time of Revision 1 and the ground has not frozen. Therefore, the data at hand
are sufficient to rule out this CPFM. As a result, the confidence in the assessment is high,
which means no other data are necessary to draw a conclusion.

Summary
For CPFM 14a, as discussed above, the potential for de, adtion is l ause the effects due
to frost heave are not applicable due to lowered groun leve l ned
consideration of the potential for degradation and the ir 1ior tat on to the
structures of this type put it in the "not significant" categor•, - ata currentEvycoected are
sufficient to rule out this CPFM. Therefore, the confiden ove assessmen i§
which means no additional data and inspections are necessary t •o s ,a
previously thought to be required to rule out this CPF which inc O e geotechnica
information, are no longer required. -
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.14-14
Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit Rev. 2
5.14.7.1 Revised Results and Recommendations

The CPFMs evaluated for the Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit are
presented in the following matrix, which shows the rating for the estimated significance and the
level of confidence in the evaluation. CPFMs 3a and 14a for the Demineralized Water Tank,
Pump House, and RO Unit are not associated with Key Distress Indicators. Results of survey
data, ground well monitoring data, and field inspections do not indicate signs of significant
structure movement or other adverse effects that could be attribute.. o these CPFMs.
Therefore, assuming that no further concerns are identified oug rn ring program for
the Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Ut cussj•l • ion 5.14.6 and
continuing until December 31, 2011), these CPFMs wi, fmoved to rant of the matrix
representing "No Further Action Recommended Relate ete 29 •l,

Low Confidence
(Insufficient Data)

CPFM 14a

5.14.7.2 Concli

In the assessment of the FCS Structures, the first step was to develop a list of all Triggering
Mechanisms and PFMs that could have occurred due to the prolonged inundation of the FCS
site during the 2011 Missouri River flood and could have negatively impacted these structures.
The next step was to use data from various investigations, including systematic observation of
the structures over time, either to eliminate the Triggering Mechanisms and PFMs from the list
or to recommend further investigation and/or physical modifications to remove them from the
list for any particular structure. Because all CPFMs for the Demineralized Water Tank, Pump
House, and RO Unit other than CPFMs 3a and 14a had been ruled out prior to Revision 1, and
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.14-15
Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit Rev. 2
because CPFMs 3a and 14a have been ruled out as a result of the Revision I findings, no
Triggering Mechanisms and their associated PFMs will remain credible for the Demineralized
Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit. Therefore, HDR has concluded that the 2011
Missouri River flood did not impact the geotechnical and structural integrity of the
Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit because the potential for failure of this
structure due to the flood is not significant.
r

Section 5.15
Raw Water Piping
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.15-1
Raw Water Piping Rev. 2

5.15 Raw Water Piping

5.15.1 Summary of Raw Water Piping

Baseline information for the Raw Water Piping is provided in Section 2.0, Site History, Description,
and Baseline Condition.

The Raw Water Piping is a once-through cooling water system thatjzem at the component
cooling water system. The Raw Water Piping also provides direct the
, "h
component cooling water piping to selected safety-related co ts in th at the component
cooling water system is unavailable.

The Raw Water Piping serves as a conduit for discharging water r from v rces.

The system is composed of four motor-driven pumps, two strain sets, valves,
instrumentation, and controls.

Two 20-in. raw water pipes are routed between the In n the so er of the
Auxiliary Building. Alignments of the given pipes own on awings no able 5.15-1.

Raw water pipes are carbon steel pipe (Attachmemi.,1l8, OPPD W-101).
-

The first raw water lineis routed out the ýsid the ctu oint where it clears the
the Discharge Tunnel and other Intake re utility li re it b- 900 and runs about 88.8 ft
toward the Service Building. It the another 90 nd is to the south, parallel to the
Service Building. The alignment i the Service Bed to avoid Fuel Oil Tank 10
and the Undergr 'D.! ank. A ing the Unde ' able Bank north of MH-5, the
r wtI' i een
eei the ie Building and the Turbine Building South
Switchya r clearing of the Building, it is routed to the south side of the
Auxiliahr.. ding at the south ier.

T d 20-in. raw water line exils south side f the Intake Structure adjacent to and east of
oth ting utilities. The raw wa ne and adjacent utilities are concrete-encased together and
routed ýsouth. Once the utilities ý the Discharge Tunnel (see 11405-M-312 and 314), they
make a 45 o the southwest andrew a path that passes the southeast comer of MH-5. Once
beyond the 1 atsi JvlI-5, the enca tility lines are routed to. the west, and the raw water line
continues alongeint to t hwest. When the raw water line reaches a point south of the
Turbine Building itc --it makes a 45' bend and is routed to the west, parallel to the south
face of the Service Bu *l• a outside of the limits of Turbine Building South Switchyard. At a
point 18.5 ft west ofth n of where the first raw water line enters the Auxiliary Building, it
makes a 900 bend to the noifh and extends to the Auxiliary Building and penetrates into the building at
el. 996 ft.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.15-2
Raw Water Piping Rev. 2
5.15.2 Inputs/References Supporting the Analysis

Table 5.15-1 lists references provided by OPPD and other documents used to support HDR's analysis.
Table 5.15-1 - References for Raw Water Piping
Document Title OPPD Document Date Drawing No./
Number Page
(if applicable) Number(s)

Yard Piping Sheet 1 10752 .1.. 405-M-312

Yard Piping 10753 Unkn• 'U405-M-313
Yard Piping Sheet 3 10754 4, T I• -M-314
Yard Piping 10755_ wn-1
Design Basis Document SDBD-AC-RW-101 - 0-06
I
Naval Facilities Engineering Command,
Design Manual 7.01, Soil Mechanics 1%1114, All ýý

Detailed site observations-field reports, field notes heckli - eaw Water

Piping are provided in Attachment 8. A
Observed performance and pertinent background are as

* Groundwater was observed flowing bast 'ient pfof the' EFmBuilding from floor and
condensate drain pipes not designed ercept ruter. Thi ndition has a recorded
history dating back to 1997. Tmine Build dor and utilities between the
Intake Structure and the Service I g.
* Settlement f ~rnrnrsin,.the
. Main Builc MNUM-e Turbine Building, has been
Building are west of the corridor and

0 R Dam surrounding fility cro : .Mralignment of the Raw Water Piping.

S ua Dam failed for a sh od of tin• to being damaged, allowing floodwater to ente r
inside the Auai r. Surfac above the Raw Water Piping were inundated
ter
af&e the the
when facility of
perimeter th, Nae failed.
Aquai-i•ia men
0 macement Aqua Dam were inundated for an extended period.
S igj~kin the corridor (p4' i.arlve and pedestrian areas between the river and the Service
Building) h~~~'- hibited distre~i ludng' cracking, slab settlement, and undermining. However,
most of the pam t crza. o ýo the other conditions could be pre-existing conditions due the
age and use of tlrfaeg -
There is a hole in ti_ ent and void area beneath the concrete slab north of the Security
Building and east-southst of MH-5. The hole and void area are outside the perimeter of the Aqua
Dam that surrounded the facility. The pavement failure occurred at the intersection point of
pavement jointing. The hole in the pavement is irregular-shaped and is more than 1 ft wide both in
the north-south and east-west directions. The void area beneath the hole was approximated as a 4-
ft-diameter-by-0.8-ft-deep void as measured by a tape measure through the hole. The void could be
attributed to subsurface erosion.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.15-3
Raw Water Piping Rev. 2
* The hole in the pavement is near the observed discharge point of a pump operated prior to the
removal of the Aqua Dam. The void could be attributed to scour created by the discharge of the
pipe operating for an extended period in one place.
0 Fire Protection Cabinet FP-3C north of the Security Building and east-southeast of MiH-5 is located
in proximity to the pavement failure and void area. The fire hydrant was tested September 13,
2011 (reportedly), and failed. According to OPPD operations personnel testing FP-3E during site
inspections, the base of FP-3C cracked when the valve was opened. e fire hydrant was shut
down, and the access cabinet was tagged out. The cause of failure w o at the time field
observations were made.
* Pavement slab settling was observed northwest of the Intak -ture of the abandoned
acid tank.
* A hollow-sounding pavement area was noticed east of the g tr .k
" The fire hydrant located in FP-3E was being tested on Septe .011, duri
investigations. No operational problems were observed dunin on site.
-

* OPPD operations personnel testing the fire hydrant at FP-3E e 13, 2011,
questioned about other fire hydrant tests. The OPPD employee questi ted that no p a ems
were observed for the fire hydrant at FP-3D during te e informa' he problem at
FP-3C, noted previously, was gathered at this tim

5.15.3 Assessment Methods and Procedures •

5.15.3.1 Assessment Procedur c ish

Assessments were made by wal! e Raw Wa ping syst.. lignment and observing the
ground surface overlying t ound piping ace.asseesass t included
using a 4-ft-long, 0.5-in.-dia 0 eel-tipped fib, tle soil probe to hand probe the
ground q tlihe utili ents and adjac teas to determine relative soil
stree[ ocusei tifying conditions indicative of potential flood-related
in 16or dam utility s:

- Ground surface conditI rlying ediately adjacent to the utility and its
backfilled trench includi . ,, subsidence or settlement, lateral spreading, piping, and

soil, engineered fill, and/or limestone gravel pavement) as

0 in subsurface system components (manholes and concrete

0 Elove-grade system features and equipment

* Variance fi~m fiiffil installation conditions including settled, tilted, or heaved syst em
features and eqqjipment
* Operation of the system and appurtenant equipment (i.e., is the system operational?)
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.15-4
Raw Water Piping Rev. 2
Additional investigations were performed to further characterize the subsurface at the facility
including areas where conditions indicative of potential flood-related impacts or damage were
observed. These included the following non-invasive geophysical and invasive geotechnical
investigations.

* GPR. (Test reports were not available at the time of Revision 0.)
* Seismic surveys (seismic refraction and refraction micro-tremor) . (Test reports were not
available at the time of Revision 0.)
Geotechnical investigations including test borings witt4 id
laboratory tests. Note that OPPD required vacuum ion
test holes to avoid utility conflicts. Therefore, test s will R
the upper 10 ft of test boring logs. (Test reports we ava
Revision 0.)
5.15.3.2 Assessment Procedures Not Completed

Assessments of the Raw Water Piping that were not.., leted inc

* No excavation to inspect underground sY nsw

* No video inspection of the system was leted.
" Inclinometer readings along the river will prov

5.15.4 Analysis

Identified PFMs were initially revie iscussed in n 3.0. n itial review considered the
preliminary information available D data files a:. walk-down observations.
Eleven PFMs associat-d~awth five di riherina Mec ere dcetermined to be
ussed in Section 3.6. The remaining PFMs were
riew for each structure, the structure observations,
& and available survey data were analyzed, a
ftWin 5.15.4.1. The CPFMs carried forward for

Ruled Out Prior to the Completion of the Detailed

The ruli ",.heNot Significant/High Confidence category and for clarity

will not fial for Failure/Confidence matrix.

Triggering Mai nW2•

- Surface Erosion
CPFM 2a - Ui@Ermining shallow foundation/slab/surfaces
CPFM 2c - Undermined buried utilities

Reason for ruling out:

No surface erosion was observed along the surface overlying the raw water alignment. In
addition, only localized and limited surface erosion was observed on the ground surface
across the facility. The raw water system is constructed below frost depth, and sufficiently
below potential scour depths indicated by erosion features observed in other areas.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.15-5
Raw Water Piping Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 7 - Soil Collapse (first time wetting)
CPFM 7a - Cracked slab, differential settlement of shallow foundation, loss of structural
support
CPFM 7b - Displaced structure/broken connections
CPFM 7c - General site settlement

Reasons for ruling out:

" Soil supporting and surrounding the raw water lines ha, een us etted. The peak
flood elevation prior to 2011 was 1003.3 ft, which o l in und elevations
above the raw water alignments are in the range of -to 1004 w water lines
were installed as part of the original plant construc the ith the
exception of possible trench backfill above repair are back e the raw
water lines has been saturated or wetted over the cours e ost 40 years.
" The climate of the region includes times of snow accrring therwin
seasonal wet periods (springtime rain events), which can be s nt and exten a
period of days. Site soils are subjected to saturi luring sno eriods and during
extended rainstorm events. Most trenches e ckfill exhi of subsidence
within I or 2 years. After an almost 40- erio b ill o6 aw water
lines has been wetted and saturated nu s times.

Triggering Mechanism 10 - MachineVi on- Li

CPFM I0a- Cracked slab, di- tial em allow fion, loss of structural
support"
CPFM lOb - Displaced OR e/broken co s

vi r the fa rbines in the Turbine Building, pumps in the Intake

eeCPFMs
cture, or other
areevi cc .f equiprm ave historically occurred, and no indications of
are ev ' ".

Pumps used on site during •42011 floo d not cause ground or structure vibrations
ufficient to initiate soil li"I ction. Visible indications of liquefaction were not observed
Xmtund the areas where the ps were operating, and no occurrences of liquefaction were
•oted to HDR.
Nre movements.. t:.'ktive of soil liquefaction and resultant settlement were
obs ..... o structurN 4 I.ing or lateral movements were observed.

Triggering .sn~
. - Loss of Soil Strength due to Static Liquefaction or Upward
Seepage
CPFM Ila - CIcaked slab, differential settlement of shallow foundation, loss of structural
support
CPFM 1lb - Displaced structure/broken connections

Reasons for ruling out:

* The structures did not have evident signs of distress identified during the field assessments.
" Liquefaction was not observed at the site.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.15-6
Raw Water Piping Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 12 - Rapid Drawdown
CPFM 12a - River bank slope failure and undermining surrounding structures
CPFM 12b - Lateral spreading

Reasons for ruling out:

* The structures did not have evident signs of distress identified during the field assessments.
* Slope failure was not observed at the site.
* River stage level had receded and stabilized as of Octo,.- 4,
0 As of October 11,2011, groundwater elevations ha , e we ilize to at least a
partial degree.
The river bank is armored and has historically prot d e sting river
bank.

Triggering Mechanism 13 - Submergence

CPFM 13a - Corrosion of underground utilities
CPFM 13b - Corrosion of structural elements

Reasons for ruling out:

" There are no flood-induced changes to Unatur, water pipe system.

" The raw water piping system is below ilesigi wte facility.
Groundwater elevations con by qsour* 1 s, 1percolation
p, of storm
precipitation, and winter sn would be i Sct the piping system and
appurtenant improveme h uned ele designed and installed to
withstand the environme• e ondwater anhr
*Accni kh the rsaw wat• MdEv",vett-.m nrp ne-mmpri tn inrlnrl.- Ap

ý'bends in the system. Thrust blocks are normally

where groundwater and wetted soil is expected.
gradation
"lbd ofthe'"i'
in confiJ
The raw water system structural backfill, and corrosion due to
corrosive soil conditio

ing Mechanism 14 - Effects

S14a - Heaving, cn, or displacement

* The Raw"WR 4 R' "isinstalled below the depth of frost penetration.

* Conditions *h,'-'changeddue to flood conditions.

5.154.2 Detailed Assessment of Credible Potential Failure Modes

The following CPFMs are the only CPFMs carried forward for detailed assessment for the Raw
Water Piping system as a result of the 2011 flood. This detailed assessment is provided below.
Priority I Structures Page 5.15-7
Raw Water Piping Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Piping
CPFM 3a - Undermining and settlement of shallow foundation/slab/surfaces (due to
pumping)
CPFM 3c - Undermined buried utilities (due to pumping)

This Triggering Mechanism and CPFM could occur as follows: multiple potentially connected
seepage paths existed in the soil backfill at the site, including soil backfill in utility trenches,
granular trench bedding, building floor drains with open/broken j , and pre-existing
defects/voids under pavement. The paths are exposed at so lo ver floodwaters
(e.g., a hole in the ground north of the Security Buildin A ne .eepage paths is
connected to several pumping sources: the sump pit in rbine anhole MH-5,
and a series of surface pumps along the interior perime the a p
pumps were
operated for an extended period, maintaining a head di e seep networks.
Gradient was sufficient to begin erosion of surrounding soi ge is unfilt" erosn
continues unarrested. Erosion extends out, intercepting t ¶ of utility tren
including the Raw Water Piping System. Voids are create de .vement and
utility trench walls or pipes. The potential damage inal es settleme %Pe or thrust blocks.
Settlement can overstress a pipe that is corrode ia pipe to ',can cause the
displacement of a thrust block, which, in tu ca rare of a pip ting under
pressure.

Below are field observations and data tha port th looPFM:

* The raw water alignments cr_• e.ustallatio
* MH-5, located within the 10Sam Permetl s pump•o r the duration of flooding.
This created a head di Raw water lii close proximity to MH-5 and
also under ound cable b cnnected to
.

SThe,-4) nto MH-d

k 3 i .bserved on mul ip field visits. Sources of the water

* area inside he'pf -ter of te a Dam was pumped dry, which created a
•o~nditional hydrostaff betwee ide and outside of the Aqua Dam perimeter.
The area within the peri of the am was pumped from several locations,
creating points toward w p l tocation
"idaesadptni piping
dergroundwere and subsurface
observed flows
beneath the concrete tend
wouldslab to north
just flow.

*it•'ae Security Building (etA-utheast of MH-5) and directly west of the Security

Ba! conversati~l ¶hh the OPPD operations employee testing FP-3E on September
13,220••Ohyd'C, located northeast of the Security Building, was tested that day
and faile . . the OPPD operations employee, when opening the valve to test the
1hydrantthe cked and leaked, and the valve had to be closed. The access cabinet
was tagged out lr repair at that time.
* Fire hydrant FP-3D has also been marked with an impairment tag according to October 7,
2011, field observations. The tag states that there was extensive leakage when the isolation
valve was opened.
* Concrete areas in the corridor (paved drive and pedestrian areas between the east fence line
and the Service Building) have exhibited pavement distress including cracking, slab
settlement, and undermining (as evidenced by hollow-sounding pavement areas).
* The Turbine Building sump pit was pumped continually during the 2011 flood. The five
pipes connected to this sump pit are floor drain and condensate system flush drain pipes.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.15-8
Raw Water Piping Rev. 2
Since this is a floor drain system, no infiltration of ground water should occur in the system.
The infiltration of groundwater into the system indicates an open flow path of some sort. A
record of this drainage issue dates back to 1997.
An area of apparent pavement settlement, located in the driveway corridor west-northwest
of the Intake Structure overhead door, is near the northern raw water alignment.

Below are field observations and data that indicate these CPFMs are unlikely:
* Sediment accumulations and small fish were observed at the of~uanhole MIH-5 at
the time MH-5 was being emptied (on September 14, ane associa
with this CPFM. The manhole was uncovered when qua Da and the area was
flooded. Sediment and fish could have entered the ole wit rs as a result of
the Aqua Dam failure. Thus, MH-5 might not be a i ermm oint of
subsoil piping.
* Alternatively, the observed hole in the pavement no urity Buildi
been developed by outflow from the surface pumps a.i& n iated with t
Temporary surface pumps were pumping water back into the n C hoses place ver
the Aqua Dam. One of the discharge points observe 4ee photos).
Concentrated discharge flow might have eand create bserved hole.

The following table describes observed di indicato data that uld increase or
decrease the potential for degradation ass d with •,r -•
,Ra • eRa Water
ae system.
ytm
Adverse (Degradation/Direc-i lwar - Favora radation/Direct
Impact More Lik FloodwA-,- Impact Less Likely)
Electrical MH-5 was pumpep lly during "i
the flood event and created a p -uce for
underga59-fi _& z Aw0 to0wa
Pae" ý 1MRl at mufkl'7 ations
betweun e Stru d
rvice Building. Th e is loca
10e same narrow corridor. _
AF-lectrical MH-5 was pumpedfififually durime'
fI•e. flood. Fire protection ines• the electrical
, N banks that connect to the m! le.
,T4
0-hine Building sump pit),W history of
g d inflows. Flood cd6i ifins increased
the h0 k ead of waterAx,$0ig to the sump. __
Fire Hydr 3C an . have both failed
during testtection system
subsequent to .'fi cs.,e
of floodwaters from
the site. The fire H ts noted are located to the
north and south of tie Intake Structure.
Data Gaps:
* The extent of the subsurface erosion is not well known at this time.
* Geophysical investigation reports to evaluate data related to the raw water system.
* Seismic Survey (refraction/tomography and refraction microtremor).
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.15-9
Raw Water Piping Rev. 2
Conclusion

Significance

Potentialfor Degradation/DirectFloodwaterImpact

The field observations indicate that the trigger to these CPFMs might have initiated in close
proximity to the Raw Water lines. Multiple indications of subsure distress are located along
the corridor between the Service Building and the Intake Structur vement slab settlement,
undermining (as evidenced by a hollow-sounding pavem 'a), n the pavement
with visible undermining were observed in the field. F water in and impacts are
likely causes for the distress and failures observed in t d.

Fire hydrants to the north and south of the Intake Structur'

subsequent to the subsidence of floodwaters from the site.
to the north and south sides of the Intake Structure and arn
hydrants.

The raw water line also runs in close proximi

Building. Subsurface erosion due to the Tu uildinm
Refer to the discussion of Key Distress In #1 in So

With indications of distress throug t the the exists.

Implication

The occurrence of these Ca large scale c IO'd areas that would induce pipe
Therefore, the implication of the

hfiere are multiple elements seCPFM'Rhcluding the inflow of water into MH-5 during
R3&,201 1 flood, the hole in the ment north of the Security Building, and the settled
ent section in the corrid Te hydrant failures, and groundwater drainage to the Turbine
B • ý*sump. However, ev. •iugh the confidence is high that there are multiple distress
undr•indidN e extent and
i ••xetad•..vmpact to Io of these CPFMs on the raw water system is not fully

The data at h' i~~~Ciiffcent to rule out these CPFMs or to lead to a conclusion that
subsurface erost6Za§n"hs[&hdermined the Raw Water Piping system. Additional geophysical data
are needed to help ermine the possible occurrence of these CPFMs and whether they could
impact the Raw Water Piping system.

Therefore, the confidence in the above assessment is low, which means more data are necessary
to draw a conclusion.

Summary

For CPFMs 3a and 3c, as discussed above, the potential for degradation is high because distress
indicators exist in close proximity to the system. This degradation in the region could have
Priority I Structures Page 5.15-10
Raw Water Piping Rev. 2
caused erosion that impacts the integrity or intended function of the structure. The combined
consideration of the potential for degradation and the implications of that degradation to the
system puts it in the "significant" category. The data currently collected are not sufficient to
rule out these CPFMs. Therefore, the confidence in the above assessment is low, which means
more data or continued monitoring and inspections might be necessary to draw a conclusion.

Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Piping A

CPFM 3d - Undermining and settlement of shallow fw tio o river

drawdown)
CPFM 3f- Undermined buried utilities (due to riv ,do

These CPFMs are similar to CPFMs 3b and 3c, but instea t ping, the gr * s created
by rapidly receding river level. -r.-r r e e
.....
- p
The Triggering Mechanism and CPFM could then occur as follows leelii s
than pore water pressure in the soil can dissipateen • t is create noves soil into
existing defects and enlarges voids under or•al ench wal ility pipes.
Dependent on the extent of the voids create g'acts mi- ude the fofll : trench
subsidence, unsupported pipe sections, pipt• lections • 'and even-possible impacts
on adjacent improvements or utilities

Below are field observations and dt at suppo I ikelihood thmse CPFMs:

* The Raw Water Piping j d close to the ouri ank.

Below arelia-,-. ations a taor site conditio ridicate these CPFMs are unlikely:
•',system t from the River Bank. This offset from the river
reduces the k d that rap wdown and related bank failure will impact the
Astem.
4-7 Soils in the area of the MEWater PipinqRr stem and to the east are backfill materials that
were placed and compactIN ing m construction of site improvements and therefore would
expected to be less susc fle to rapid drawdown impacts. (Structural fill materials are
•exece to be homogenousaind of a structural nature. Compacted in. place, they should
'•ai omogenous soil ri1 ith no expected weak planes or layers conducive to form
S aths through.otl.
Indicafi•,ots• f this 'eVPFM were not observed during the most recent site inspection
on Oct .o
1Uer
..... 7, 2011.
SThe River B a ored and protected.

The following table describes observed distress indicators and other data that would increase or
decrease the potential for degradation associated with these CPFMs for the Raw Water Piping
system.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.15-11
Raw Water Piping Rev. 2
Adverse (DegradationlDirect Favorable (DegradationlDirect Floodwater
Floodwater Impact More Likely) Impact Less Likely)
Floodwaters were at a high level for an USACE reduced Missouri River Mainstem System
extended period, which allowed surrounding releases to 40,000 cfs on October 2, 2011. River
soils to become saturated. levels corresponding to the 40,000 cfs release rate
stabilized at FCS on October 4, 2011.
River bank is armored and has been protected in
previous floods. i
Data Gaps: . • ,
0 Observations of the riverbank following drawdown to nqmver u•ve
0 Geophysical investigation data to address observed coppprri

Conclusion
Significance

Potentialfor Degradation/DirectFloodwaterImpact

The potential for degradation exists since rive •• dequate se CPFMs to

occur. However, USACE reduced Missouri _fMant stem releas 0,000 cfs on
October 2, 2011. River levels correspondi' o the 40,O 0 ase rate sti-lized at FCS on
October 4, 2011. Groundwater levels hav. s started.tab'z tween the termination of
drawdown and the time of Revisio Teu erosion
due to river drawdown decreas me ue to • trization " ngoundwater elevations
and river elevations. The poten or degradatio I decreas.1th time.

Implication

The (•FMs w lkely only affect the utility installations near the river.
ve fafi.. aw syseegzated away from the zone of influence of these
•,•4Fs with the excepti ].fe supply #.,tat connect to the Intake Structure. Thus, the
4 most important rPonents of -•.sstem
are at the point of greatest risk from these

WAIfbundwater ver elevations stabilize, the potential head differential between

thaffP¶,l decrease, and the pass ity of subsurface erosion will also decrease. In addition, the
stabifiiý5 er embankmen -'ifes the likelihood of these CPFMs.

The implic0 othe. s affecting the Raw Water Piping system is considered low.

Confidence

The data at hand are not sufficient to rule out these CPFMs or to lead to a conclusion that
subsurface erosion has undermined the Raw Water Piping system. Therefore, the confidence in
the above assessment is low, which means more data are necessary to draw a conclusion.

Summary

For CPFMs 3d and 3f, as discussed above, the potential for degradation is considered low. The
combined consideration of the potential for degradation and the implications of that
degradation to the structure puts it in the "not significant" category. The data currently
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.15-12
Raw Water Piping Rev. 2
collected are not sufficient to rule out these CPFMs. Therefore, the confidence in the above
assessment is low, which means more data or continued monitoring and inspections are
necessary to make a final assessment.

5.15.5 Results and Conclusions

The CPFMs evaluated for the Raw Water Piping are presented in the following matrix, which shows
the rating for the estimated significance and the level of confidence in th aluation.

* Further forens sti gati d'physical modifications are recommended to address CPFMs 3a,
3c, 3d, and 3 ffM NR Piping. CPFMs 3a and 3c are associated with unfiltered flow of
AM'weWir
groundwater into t 4 oIoqp- Building basement drain piping system (Key Distress Indicator #1).
These recommendatioire described in detail in Section 4.1.3. CPFMs 3a, 3c, 3d, and 3f are
associated with the distress in and near the Paved Access Area between the Service Building and
the Intake Structure (Key Distress Indicator #2). These recommendations are described in detail in
Section 4.2.5.
* Monitoring of groundwater well data and a review of the geophysical data when available should
be done. The results of these reviews will be used to increase the confidence in the assessment
results. At the time of Revision 0, groundwater levels had not yet stabilized to nominal normal
levels. Therefore, it is possible that new distress indicators could still develop. If new distress
indicators are observed before December 31, 2011, appropriate HDR personnel should be notified
immediately to determine whether an immediate inspection or assessment should be conducted.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.15-13
Raw Water Piping Rev. 2
Observation of new distress indicators might result in a modification of the recommendations for
this structure.
Continued monitoring is recommended to include a continuation of the elevation surveys of the
previously identified targets on this utility and surrounding site. The purpose is to monitor for
signs of structure distress and movement or changes in soil conditions around the structure. The
results of this monitoring will be used to increase the confidence in the assessment results.
Elevation surveys should be performed weekly for 4 weeks and biweekly until December 31, 2011.
At the time of the writing of this version of the Report, groundwater A s had not yet stabilized to
nominal normal levels. Therefore, it is possible that new distr rndi c0
- ,,still develop. If
new distress indicators are observed before December31, 29 prop . 'R personnel should
be notified immediately to determine
r whether an immedia ection .sa
..ndcaor
ent should be
conducted. Observation of new distress indicators might re ;a I
icatF he
recommendations for this structure.
Review geophysical and geotechnical reports to evaluate the d. .e pertain to WVatur
System. Y
" Make additional river bank inspections to evaluate whether signs offa, 3c, 3d, or"eA
* Install inclinometers to monitor the river bank.
" Perform a detailed analysis of the pavement subgta' lignment avement in the
corridor between the Intake Structure and the S e Buildi _ ,laced.

5.15.7 Updates Since Revision 0

Revision 0 of this Assessment Report DI 1Fn Octob1.eO 11. Revision 0

presented the results of preliminary as ti rrity 1 StrM re. These assessments were
incomplete in Revision 0 because th, iGO d/or m,4 ring for most of the
Priority 1 Structures was not complI I d R, vision of this Assessment Report
includes the resuk-WO aM-anal foren Lnd mormonng to date for this structure as
described bel A1

'.1 Additional

following additional the Raw Water Piping System for Revisions I

2 of this Assessment

of KDI #1 forensi}i-ifestigation (see Section 4.1)

ofKDI #2 forensition (see Section 4.2)
0 g,.roundwqt.. -onitoring well and river stage level data from OPPD.
0 Field obb2 ionsf,& e'iiverbank (see Section 5.25).
0 Results offdiik t•iftht deflectometer investigation by American Engineering Testiing, Inc.
(see Attachl ,16
S Results of geop ysical investigation by Geotechnology, Inc. (see Attachment 6).
Results of geotechnical investigation by Thiele Geotech, Inc. (see Attachment 6).
0 Data obtained from inclinometers by Thiele Geotech, Inc. (see Attachment 6).
0 Results of continued survey by Lamp Rynearson and Associates (see Attachment 6).

5.15.7.2 Additional Analysis

The following analysis of additional data was conducted for the Raw Water Piping System:
,Priority 1 Structures Page 5.15-14
Raw Water Piping Rev. 2
" Groundwater monitoring well and river stage level data from OPPD.

Data shows that the river and groundwater have returned to nominal normal levels.

* Field observations of river bank

No significance distress from the 2011 Flood was observed.

" Results of failing weight deflectometer investigation byte n ring Testing, Inc.

Falling Weight Deflectometer and associated GPR _ag perfo e Paved Access
Area identified anomalies such as soft clay and bro F1 agroun

truthing of the investigation results were performed KDI . nal

investigations.

" Results of geophysical investigation by Geotechnolog nc.

Seismic Refraction and Seismic ReMi tests p. .round the perimeter of the
power block as part of KDI #2 identified dn s hat cold 1,soft clay,
loose sand, or possibly voids.

Results of geotechnical investigation iel e Gex IInI

Six test borings were drilled contimous ing of th soi encountered, to ground
truth the Geotechnology, In mic investi results a.:rt of the KDI #2 forensic
investigation. Test bore• Nwere located to' ate ýep anomalies identified in the
seismic investigation. T boring data did A piping voids or very soft/very
loosji,at mightf•1 iative of subsu eosion/piping or related material

' of the SPT and Pa t results OEbted for this Assessment Report were compared
to similar data from nu is other ge j nical investigations that have been conducted
on the FCS site in prevo rs.
S This comparison did not identify substantial changes to
the soil strength and stiffn oEier that time period. SPT and CPT test results were not
i ormed in the top 10 fe SOprotect existing utilities.
D~"-
tt ... Inclinometersae cor
Mtafm.
...... " a" - , compared to the original baseline measurements, have not
exCOMheaccurae.,_a . of the inclinometers. Therefore, deformation at the monitored
location e,the•siftion of the instrumentation has not occurred.
* Results of cohffmd survey by Lamp Rynearson and Associates.

Survey data to date compared to the original baseline surveys have not exceeded the
accuracy range of the surveying equipment. Therefore, deformation at the monitored
locations, since the survey baseline was shot, has not occurred.

Updates to assessment procedures not completed are outlined in Section 5.15.3.2. Excavation
to inspect underground systems is included with the KDI#2 investigation. Video inspection of
the system was not completed and is not planned due to the expected low value of data
produced with respect to addressing these CPFMs.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.15-15
Raw Water Piping Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Piping
CPFM 3a - Undermining and settlement of shallow foundation/slab/surfaces (due to
pumping)
CPFM 3c - Undermined buried utilities (due to pumping)

CPFMs 3a and 3c for the Raw Water Piping System are associated with Key Distress
Indicator # 1. Section 4.1 presents the results of additional forensic investigation that was
conducted to ascertain whether these CPFMs could be ruled o The results of the
additional forensic investigation show that, assuming t ,mp - tat of the physical
modifications recommended for KDI #1, these CPF led refore, assuming
that no further concerns are identified through the pthe Raw Water
Piping System (discussed in Section 5.15.6 and co u e 1, 2011), these
CPFMs are moved to the quadrant of the matrix repr o Further• •
Recommended Related to the 2011 Flood." -

Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Piping

CPFM 3d - Undermining and settlement of shal f, to river
drawdown)
CPFM 3f- Undermined buried utilities Iv

CPFMs 3d and 3f for the Raw Water Pipi stem arIR N-vith Key D-istress Indicator
#2. Section 4.2 presents the results of ad al foret-' -that was conducted to
ascertain whether these CPFMs c - e out. i".l litional forensic
investigation show that these C e ru ed ou0 ere Mining that no further
concerns are identified throu onitoring pret fc Water Piping System
(discussed in Section 5.15. tinuing until 1 1), these CPFMs are moved
to the qua ft e matrix rep"• ting "No Furth ,ommended Related to the
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.15-16
Raw Water Piping Rev. 2

5.15.7.1 Revised Results and Recommendations

The CPFMs evaluated for the Raw Water Piping System are presented in the following matrix,
which shows the rating for the estimated significance and the level of confidence in the
evaluation.

,&,,assessment of the FCS OiMciures, the first step was to develop a list of all Triggering
NI 41ms and PFMs that c02111have occurred due to the prolonged inundation of the FCS
site e 2011 Missouri.jV.ir flood and could have negatively impacted these structures.
The
The ne...~,p)was to use datag-,or various investigations, including systematic observation of
nestructrt a, to use ..
the struc vser time , er' to eliminate the Triggering Mechanisms and PFMs from the list
or to recomirin.vestigation and/or physical modifications to remove them from the
list for any par ucture. Because all CPFMs for the Raw Water Piping System other
than CPFMs 3a, c, and 3f had been ruled out prior to Revision 1, because CPFMs 3d and
3f were ruled out using the results of the KDI #2 investigation presented in Section 4.2, and
because CPFMs 3a and 3c will be ruled out when the physical modifications recommended for
KDI # I in Section 4.1 are implemented, no Triggering Mechanisms and their associated PFMs
will remain credible for the Raw Water Piping System. HDR has concluded that the
geotechnical and structural impacts of the 2011 Missouri River flood will be mitigated by the
implementation of the physical modifications recommended in this Assessment Report.
Therefore, after the implementation of the recommended physical modifications, the potential
for failure of this structure due to the flood will not be significant.
Section 5.16
Fire Protection System Piping

..77
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.16-1
Fire Protection System Piping Rev. 2

5.16 Fire Protection System Piping

5.16.1 Summary of Fire Protection System Piping

Baseline information for the Fire Protection System Piping is provided in Section 2.0, Site History,
Description, and Baseline Condition.

The Fire Protection System Piping has two vertical turbine-type fire u ched for 2000 gpm at
125 pounds per square inch gauge (psig). One fire pump is drive er" and the other
fire pump is driven by a diesel engine. Both pumps deliver scr and stra souri River water
to the underground water-distribution system, which, in turn, s s the ter fire
suppression systems, the interior hose stations, and the fire hyd -•rd.

During normal operation, the system is pressurized to 125 to 135 , eld at that p •
small pressure maintenance pump (jockey pump). The primary p ospump
frequent operation of the main fire pumps. The pressure maintenance pumn omatically s
and stopped based on system pressure. The water distri b,,.:stem consist erground piping
that delivers water to the following:

" Yard hose and hydrant houses

" Wet pipe sprinkler systems . . ,,
* Dry pipe sprinkler systems
" Preaction sprinlder systems
* Deluge/water spray systems • . -

The undergroundy - main sys rovided with p -type sectionalizing valves and
underground a,2 es withe
;,I boxes (curb v es) to facilitate the isolation of
portions o4•hr o£t~fne or • ithout interrupting the supply to the remaining
system.,4E $Rater suppresslb st is pr 'ith an outside screw and yoke (OS&Y) gate
val h connects ntemal p. Each 6-in. lateral connecting the hydrant to
tikna loop has a valve instailtfo allo is on of individual hydrants for maintenance
pu4% ydrants are placed at ap•.•.mately 300-ft intervals around the yard main loop and
appro• ni1 50 ft from buildings. X;ng of the fire water distribution system is prevented by
burying fh,"Je. V~g below the frost linevtaid by routing indoor piping through heated areas. The
a .dergr main loop is tcted of 12-in. and 10-in. transite (asbestos cement) pipe and
cast (ductile iRt •fwlthg

5.16.2 Inputs/Refe • •-irting the Analysis

Table 5.16-1 lists referen , rovided by OPPD and other documents used to support HDR's analysis.

Table 5.16-1 - References for Fire Protection System PiDing

Document Title OPPD Document Date Drawing
Number Number/
(if applicable) Page Number(s)
Underground Piping Extension 44740 8/23/1990 FC-UG-1A
Underground Fire Loop 41428 Unknown E-4182
Fire Protection SDBD-FP-! 15 3/9/2011 All
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.16-2
Fire Protection System Piping Rev. 2
Table 5.16-1 - References for Fire Protection System Piping
Document Title OPPD Document Date Drawing
Number Number/
(if applicable) Page Number(s)
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 9/1986 All
Design Manual 7.01, Soil Mechanics I I I _I

Detailed site observations-field reports, field notes, and inspection chec ists-for the Fire Protection
System Piping are provided in Attachment 8.

Observed performance and pertinent background data are as foll : _

" The fire protection loop and lateral system crosses multiple ines a' he facility.
* Groundwater was observed flowing into the basement sump o ine BuildihR n floor and
condensate drain pipes not designed to intercept groundwater• mdition has a R
history dating back to 1997. The Turbine Building is west.---- con---. •,and utilities . &a
between the Intake Structure and the Service Building.
* Settlement of a column in the Maintenance Buildin e Turbine g, has been
documented. The Turbine Building and the Mai are west orridor and
associated utility alignments within the corrido "
The Aqua Dam surrounding the facility cross, e alignm protection piping at
multiple locations, including the following:
- Fire supply lines from the Intake lre ing 'rd mam* gstem.
- The fire supply line feeding FP- '
- The fire supply lateral feedinat
_g- rre hydran no ast of th• • Warehouse.
- The building fire supply lin e ew Warehou
- The fire s- . .i• that is rou L,
.g the west si 6ew Warehouse and to FP-31 and

- Th ire loo.....fire su . • extends to the west toward the Welding Fab Shop.
" "-,••irng to the so the w e .f the facility, the Aqua Dam crosses the main
j.' ''loop line northwest o , Rad Wast .. i..ng.
ong the west side of the : it appears hat the Aqua Dam was located over the top of a
,4a gitudinal alignment of a s :line that was routed to FP-3K.
- i•@1d Warehouse fire suppl i.
- ain loop where th leg extends to the south toward the site perimeter/security
fenc-~~3
The yarr" i.1oop crossft1,location of the Aqua Dam where the line runs north of the
-

Security B 2,, .
* The Aqua Dam fa. leh rt period of time due to being damaged, allowing floodwater to enter
the area inside the A•: perimeter. All surfaces above the fire protection piping were
inundated when the fact ity Aqua Dam failed.
* Areas outside the perimeter of the replacement Aqua Dam were inundated for an extended period.
" Concrete areas in the corridor (paved drive and pedestrian areas between the river and Service
Building) have exhibited distress including cracking, slab settlement, and undermining. Some of
these conditions are reported to be new, although pavement spalling and cracking is likely to have
existed prior to the flooding.
" A hole in the pavement and void area beneath the concrete slab is north of the Security Building
and east-southeast of MH-5. The hole and void area are outside the perimeter of the Aqua Dam
that surrounded the facility. The pavement failure occurred at the intersection point of pavement
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.16-3
Fire Protection System Piping Rev. 2
jointing. The hole in the pavement is irregular-shaped and is more than 1 ft wide both in the
north-south and east-west directions. The void area beneath the hole was approximated as a 4-ft-
diameter-by-10-in.-deep void as measured by a tape measure through the hole. The void might be
attributable to subsurface erosion.
" The hole in the pavement is near the observed discharge point of a pump operated prior to the
removal of the Aqua Dam. The void might be attributable to scour created by the discharge of the
pipe operating for an extended period in one place.
" The fire hydrant located in FP-3E was tested on September 13,2011, g site investigations.
No operational problems were observed during the time on si
* Fire Protection Cabinet FP-3C north of the Security Buildi east-s of MH-5 is located
in proximity to the pavement failure and void area. The rant w September 13,
2011 (reportedly), and failed. According to OPPD operatio so st during site
inspections, the base of FP-3C cracked when the valve was o e fire hy as shut
down, and the access cabinet was tagged out. The cause of fa unknownn at fi
observations were made. I
" OPPD operations personnel testing the fire hydrant at FP-3E on Septe -3,2011, wer
questioned about other fire hydrant tests. The OPPDQ • •e questione d that no problems
were observed for the fire hydrant at FP-3D durinn iigformatio e problem at
FP-3C, noted previously, was gathered at this
* Fire hydrant FP-3D has also been marked withS "n e.i ardingto.c ber 7, 2011,
field observations. The tag states that there A tensive dage e isolation valve was
opened.
Pavement slab settling was observe est of the e Struc n" east of the abandoned
acid tank.
* A hollow-sounding pavement noticed east o lding truck dock.

5.16.3 Asses 1, sandPP udes

5 ssess••dures • pshed

•4'jssessments were madeng firektection system alignment and observing surface

atures of the system, post i tor valves, fire cabinets, and the ground surface overlying the
g~er~ground pipe. The surfac assessment included using a 4-ft-long, 0.5-in.-diameter,
9l~~-~ipped fiberglass T-hand~fi1 probe to hand probe the ground surface along the utility
and adjacent areas leltermine relative soil strength. The assessment focused on
identi
follows: nditions indicd, iof potential flood-related impacts or damage to the utility as

*Ground sue•r df ns overlying and immediately adjacent to the utility and its
backfilled treii haficluding scour, subsidence or settlement, lateral spreading, piping, and
heave
• Soft ground surface areas (native soil, engineered fill, or limestone gravel pavement) as
determined by probing
* Water accumulations and flows in subsurface system components (manholes and concrete
cable encasement pipes)
• Damage to at-grade or above-grade system features and equipment
" Variance from normal installation conditions including settled, tilted, or heaved system
features and equipment
" Operation of the system and appurtenant equipment (i.e., is the system operational?)
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.16-4
Fire Protection System Piping Rev. 2
Additional investigations were performed to further characterize the subsurface at the facility,
including areas where conditions indicative of potential flood-related impacts or damage were
observed. These included the following non-invasive geophysical and geotechnical
investigations.

" GPR. (Test reports were not available at the time of Revision 0.)
" Seismic surveys (seismic refraction and refraction microtremor). (Test reports were not
available at the time of Revision 0.)
* Geotechnical investigations including test borings with d CPT) and
laboratory tests. Note that OPPD required vacuum ion __ st 10 ft of proposed
test holes to avoid utility conflicts. Test reports wi not ad conditions in the
-

upper 10 ft of site and locations where shallow utili • •xist. ' r ere not
available at the time of Revision 0.)
* Paved areas were evaluated with GPR and dynamic de ethods (i.e., ,eig
deflectometer). (Test reports were not available at th •e~
e, ision 0.) " • t

5.16.3.2 Assessment Procedures Not C

Assessments of the Fire Protection System P the

following:

* Assessment of subgrade condi the time of pavement

replacement in the Paved Acc1, and the Intake
Structure. Work in the area o

5.16.4 Analysis

Identified. .PFM•
....•:
.'. ''.
. .... viewe O Pf•~si,
"t•
E•o. .. ! ussed in Section-.O. The review considered the
prehim••n OP1•. files and from initial walk-down observations.
Eleven E!tTsssocaianggeiNing Mechanisms were determined to be
nong-. le" for all Priority I St es, as I e in Section 3.6. The remaining PFMs were
cdgrward as "credible." edgn rev for each structure, the structure observations,
and Its of available geotechnl1eophysical, and available survey data were analyzed, a
n Ms•.were ruled out as di sed in Section 5.16.4.1. The CPFMs carried forward for
detailed aRlmssemhent are discussed in Sdffin 5.16.4.2.

5.16.4 i" oientiaI Failu des Ruled Out Prior to the Completion of the Detailed
tesement.• ,
The ruled-out in the Not Significant/High Confidence category and for clarity
"•'[ide
will not be shown'•ie Potential for Failure/Confidence matrix.,

Triggering Mechanism 2 - Surface Erosion

CPFM 2a - Undermining shallow foundation/slab/surfaces
CPFM 2c - Undermined buried utilities

Reasons for ruling out:

* Minor surface erosion was observed south of the Auxiliary Building adjacent to and
extending through the inside perimeter fence. This observed surface erosion is attributed to
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.16-5
Fire Protection System Piping Rev. 2
multiple pump discharge lines that were pumped over the Aqua Dam. Discharge lines were
tied to the fence, which held them continually in place over one general area. The location
of the scour is in close proximity to where the yard fire loop is routed. The scour is
approximately 0.5 ft deep and did not appear to affect anything beyond the immediate
points of pump discharge.
'In addition, only localized and limited surface erosion was observed on the ground surface
across the entire facility. This PFM was discredited due to thedepth that fire protection
piping is installed compared to the minor scouring that was o0 ed on the site.

Triggering Mechanism 7 - Soil Collapse (first time w "

CPFM 7a - Cracked slab, differential settlement ofiga 'ow fou s of structural
support
CPFM 7b - Displaced structure/broken connections ,
CPFM 7c - General site settlement

Reasons for ruling out:

* Soil supporting and surrounding the Fire Pr ttem has bee ously wetted.
The peak flood elevation prior to 2011 w . occurre i • .
" However, isolated cases of soil collaps d be app £#4recent wate~Jie
replacements have been made. OPPD dition R s Id be required to check
for isolated cases that might exist. w
Triggering Mechanism 10 - e•Vibratio uced Li action
CPFM 1Oa - Cracked slab erential settle f shall undation, loss of structural
CPF support
is aced st"q I r. roken conned ••

Rea~dfl& ru in

I•achine
. vibrations f6,b facility i( ig and various pumps) have historically
occurred, and no indicati•eisf these P are evident.
-".,,Pumps used on site during.i011 flood were too small to cause ground or structure
J•t'rations sufficient to initiekoil liquefaction. Visible indications of liquefaction were
,w"abi.observed around the ara here the pumps were operating, and no occurrences of
" se.-tion were reporte D R.
No 9-r-ictae movemeat dIcative of soil liquefaction and resultant settlement were
observ stuc _ q.king or lateral movements were observed.

Triggering Mee 11 - Loss of Soil Strength due to Static Liquefaction or Upward

Seepage
CPFM 11 a - Cracked slab, differential settlement of shallow foundation, loss of structural
support
CPFM 1lb - Displaced structure/broken connections

Reasons for ruling out:

" The structures did not have evident signs of distress identified during the field assessments.
* Liquefaction was not observed at the site.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.16-6
Fire Protection Systema Piping Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 13 - Submergence
CPFM 13a - Corrosion of underground utilities

Reason for ruling out:

Underground utilities and structures are located below the design flood elevation for the
facility. Groundwater elevations controlled by Missouri River water elevations, percolation
of storm precipitation, and winter snow melt would be expecte 0ocontact underground
improvements including constructed steel and concrete fncili e s such, steel and
concrete site improvements are assumed to be desi • ,ith 'orrosive
environment of groundwater and wetted soil. 04 A

Triggering Mechanism 13 - Submergence

CPFM 13b - Corrosion of structural elements

Reason for ruling out:

* The only structural elements of the system are installed at

pipe bends and pipe connection points. conditions that
normally affect buried concrete thrust b -

Triggering Mechanism 14 - Frost Effec

CPFM 14a - Heaving, crushin disr,
s em,

Reasons for ruling out:

* The fire protection pipin Iled below t1 I-'st penetration. The system
*com. • re above nnr•are designe d to aecommod ate freeze/thaw cycles.
* C- cd,"n
oht' ig A
911
Arl
I flood.conditioi

1-4.2 Detailed Ass§ ent of CF l5[Potential Failure Modes

following CPFMs are th,_i CPFMs carried forward for detailed assessment for the Fire
ection System Piping as a~nast of the 2011 flood. This detailed assessment is provided

;urface Erosion/Piping
settlement of shallow foundation/slab/surfaces (due to

CPFM 34 buried utilities (due to pumping)

The Triggering Mecihanism and CPFM could occur as follows: multiple potentially connected
seepage paths existed in the soil backfill at the site, including soil backfill in utility trenches,
granular trench bedding, building floor drains with open/broken joints, and pre-existing
defects/voids under pavement. The paths are exposed at some locations to the river floodwaters
(e.g., a hole in the ground north of the Security building). This network of seepage paths is
connected to three pumping sources: the sump pit in the Turbine Building, Manhole MH-5, and
a series of surface pumps along the interior of the Aqua Dam perimeter. The pumps were
operated for an extended period, maintaining a head differential on the seepage path networks.
Gradient was sufficient to begin erosion of surrounding soil. Seepage is unfiltered, and erosion
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.16-7
Fire Protection System Piping Rev. 2
continues unarrested. Erosion extends out, intercepting the network of utility trenches,
including the Fire Protection System. Voids are created under the pavement and along the
utility trench walls. The potential damage includes settlement of pipe(s) causing joints to open,
overstressing the pipe, causing the pipe to break, or undermining thrust blocks.

Below are field observations and data that support the likelihood of these CPFMs:
The fire protection loop crosses multiple other utility lines anrckovers the entire perimeter
of the facility. Interconnectivity between crossing pipe trenc eates ossible piping
routes for subsurface water flow.
* MH-5 was pumped for the duration of flooding to r water into the manhole.
Known water sources included ducts from MH-31 a ucts run uxiliary
Building. This created a head differential.
The flow of water into MH-5 was observed on multip 1 sits. Wate 5ocumented
to be entering through two conduits on the south wall ole. It was
conclusively demonstrated that this was the only route wd ,
Sediment deposits (and fish) were observed in the bottom of th • when it was emptied
on September 14, 2011. The sediment coul '•cation of p * and subsurface
erosion.
* The area inside the perimeter of the Aq ,l..amwas p e ,ry.
which ed a
hydrostatic head condition between the .a inside utside the~Aqua Dam. The
area inside the perimeter of the Aqua was pumfr 0llocations, creating
points toward which undergro 'pipidid sU b ace fib end to flow.
* Void areas and potential pip m ation were ' ed ben the concrete slab just north
of the Security Buildin utheast of 4a"d direMwest of the Security
Building.
Base •.twPersati• PD oerat oyee testing FP-3E on September
1, fF~~ai•Me
.d northeast of the Security Building, was tested that
fg to the R U operations employee, when opening the valve to
the hydrant, e cked a ked, and the valve had to be closed. The access
cabinet wastagged ou ir.air at thiat.e"
'9 Fire hydrant FP-3D has en markedwith an impairment tag according to October 7,
m011, field observations. ig states that there was extensive leakage when the isolation
Atlve was opened.
" N-nment distress was obsld along the paved access area between the Intake Structure
and'- &','Service Building lie area north of where the fire protection piping crosses the
corriT oludes obs 'lab settlement and undermining (as evidenced by
hollow-'ain'MR t ht areas).
" The TurbinB..,•'sump pit was pumped continually during the 2011 flood. The five
pipes connec4 e ihs sump pit are floor drain and condensate system flush drain pipes.
Since this is a fibor drain system, no infiltration of groundwater should occur in the system.
The infiltration of groundwater into the system indicates an open flow path of some sort.

Below are field observations and data that indicate these CPFMs are unlikely:

• Sediment and fish were observed in the bottom of MH-5 when it was emptied on
September 14, 2011. Sediment accumulations and small fish at the bottom of MH-5 might
not be associated with these CPFMs. The manhole was uncovered when the Aqua Dam
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.16-8
Fire Protection System Piping Rev. 2
failed and the area was inundated. Sediment and fish could have been transported into the
manhole with floodwaters.
* The observed hole in the pavement, north of the Security Building, could have been
developed by outflow from the surface pumps and might not be associated with these
CPFMs. Temporary surface pumps were pumping water back into the river with hoses
placed over the Aqua Dam
* One of the discharge points was near the observed hole (See site photos). Concentrated
discharge flow could have eroded pavement and created the o ed hole.
* Fire hydrants that are part of the yard loop system havy n oodwaters have
receded from the facility. The system is pressurize , perati lated cases of
failure can be assessed as CRs are produced and re are ma
* Observed subsurface damage indicators or known 5 acorridor are
not located immediately adjacent to the Fire Protectio iping.

Yard fire loop alignments were walked and soils were pr pipe alignm
either side of the pipe alignments. Soils on site were generally fi. table. Site . at
were visibly wet or moist were the only areas wh robing sh o •eoe degree of
penetration. Only a couple of locations along oop on the est, and south
sides of the facility were observed to be wet ist. Ting table e.s observed
distress indicators and other data that wou. rease or a e potentiaiS'r degradation
associated with this CPFM for the Fire Pro(! ion Sys p

Adverse (Degradation/Direct I wats F ble (De .. n/Direct Floodwater

Impact More likel Im; Less Likely)
FP-3C failed during system t .F as te September 13,2011 and

FP-3D t an imp ag that fire hydrants marked with

stat eendistr ••oeda impairment tags, the system is operational

Ser•avicFloMi
rbtie Building
44.Struunwaer inflows. a_ histre
ions
lireased the hydraulicaowi
head

M_%-ment distress was noted at M Vle

Rh the crridor betwee !Ij.nlet
Stit01,d the Service Buiftv'• The fire
line is k .*ýp the same gWcorridor.
Electrical... Sas pu i ntinually during
the flood. F t es cross the
electrical duct n connect to the
manhole.
Data Gaps:
* Ground Penetrating Radar data are not available at the time of this draft report to assist in
determining possible void areas at the facility.
" The extent of the subsurface erosion is not well-known at this time.
* Seismic Survey (refraction/tomography and refraction microtremor).
" OPPD CRs related to fire main repairs required as part of ongoing yard system testing.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.16-9
Fire Protection System Piping Rev. 2
Conclusion

Significance

PotentialforDegradation/DirectFloodwaterImpact
Field observations indicate that this CPFM might have initiated in close proximity to the Fire
Protection yard piping system. Multiple indications of subsurfacedistress are located along the
paved access area between the Service Building and the Intake S re. Pavement slab
settlement, undermining (as evidenced by a hollow-soundq, av and a hole in the
pavement with visible undermining was observed in the Floo
. nundation and
impacts are likely causes for the distress and failures o ed in th
In addition, fire hydrant FP-3C failed during testing on , 201 l Wse of the
fire hydrant cracked when opening the valve for testing. F ant FP-3D been
marked with an impairment tag according to October 7, 2bservations.
that there was extensive leakage when the isolation valve s These condi 1y
indicate a degraded condition due to floodwater inundation. Th e l t failres incte
some form of impairment on lines that are onil -) and south Is*,f the Intake
Structure. This places known failures on thef b th supply in the Intake
Structure.

Implication

The occurrence of this CPFM cq act sectiod .sthe fire po in yard piping system
and adjacent utilities or structr• The fire prot pipe s -m loops the entire facility and
it is located in close proxim iany other utilie Ws. Since the fire protection
system eslml
utilitie• is h•gM:
•~ ressurized H .. system
; 4A•". of the sirn, impact adjacent structures or
ut spipe d pressurzed water erodes soils around the point of

/j jFire Protection Syste" ooped s. t•'nd includes isolation valves at lateral pipe
conne
s•iiection tees and on th g pop ii none
on eaol of the lateral connection. Thus, the system
%sdesignedto be shut down i ions for repair purposes with continued supply to fire supply
9)ine'on both sides of potentia •i~lbreaks. An operative fire protection system is required at
on the site. The Fire ir3'ction System has been tested since floodwaters have
rec~ePd it is an operativ nstm,
but has a minimum of two known impairments that have
shut ý" d atoera t ivie-
f
shut d6*1MV aterai fire hydraia1ies. Therefore, the implication of the potential degradation for
these CPFWsihigh.

Confidence

The fire protection system is an extensive system that circles the entire FCS facility. Therefore
problems could exist in some areas of the site that are not indicative of problems systemwide.
Indications of possible degradation exist within the paved access area between the Intake
Structure and the Service Building. The lateral and vertical extent of subsurface erosion on the
site is not known and ground penetrating radar report data have not yet been received to address
this issue in detail. Therefore, confidence with the assessment is low.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.16-10
Fire Protection System Piping Rev. 2
Summary

For CPFMs 3a and 3c, as discussed above, the potential for degradation is high because distress
indicators exist in close proximity to the system and two connected fire hydrants have failed
during testing since floodwaters have subsided. This degradation in the region could have
caused enough erosion to impact the integrity or intended function of the structure. The
combined consideration of the potential for degradation and the imaplications of that
degradation to the system put it in the "significant" category. Theata currently collected are
not sufficient to rule out this CPFM. Therefore, the confidpce o ,sessment is low,
which means more data or continued monitoring and in ns c%& Zcssary to draw a
_ýI
conclusion. ~c esr oda

Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Pipin

CPFM 3d - Undermining and settlement of shallow
drawdown)
CPFM 3f- Undermined buried utilities (due

These CPFMs is similar to CPFMs 3a and instea is created by

rapidly receding river level.

The Triggering Mechanism and C] foll• Q -r level drops faster

than pore water pressure in the s A diient is created that moves
water and soil into existingde r 4,.cent to the fire protection
system and through the soi w networks. Dependent on the
extent of the.d.ps created, i 'a' Wg effects: trench subsidence,
possible impacts on adjacent

Vdrobservations and d'.' L, .suppor

lihood of these CPFMs:
Field observation data h t been gatheed along the river bank and nearest utility
ýinstallations on a schedul regular basis to inspect for developing conditions or distress
Windicators.

Fii _ations and data conditions that indicate these CPFMs are unlikely:
* USA'GEW ced Mis!9i'Wiver Mainstem System releases to 40,000 cfs on October 2,
2011. l •.• wel• •6sponding to the 40,000 cfs release rate stabilized at the FCS on
October 4,70*31N
* Indications of:isV e of CPFM were not observed during the most recent site inspections
on October 4, 7, and October 27 2011.

The Fire Protection System Piping is offset from the river bank which reduces the likelihood
-thatrapid drawdown and related subsurface piping to the river bank will impact the Fire
Protection System Piping.

Soils in the area of the Fire Protection System Piping and to the east are backfill materials that
were placed and compacted during construction of site improvements and, therefore, would be
expected to be less susceptible to rapid drawdown impacts.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.16-11
Fire Protection System Piping Rev. 2
The following table describes observed distress indicators and other data that would increase or
decrease the potential for degradation associated with these CPFMs for the Fire Protection
System Piping.

" Inspection of the riverbank following drawdown to

" Geophysical investigation data to address any obser

Potentialfor Degradation/DirectFl dw~ lmpacc ";

Indications that subsurface erost"4i"•ii t exs wi

exist wi t e corri • etween th
Ahe the Itaetrctr
Intake Structure
and the Service Building is 'J from paven -stress ors and fire service line
failures nearest the river. st installations tection system to the river
bank are , t0n points NP orth and south the Intake Structure. The fire
protejo ms7ire sin the Intake Structure.. Subsurface erosion along the
facg.ME intake R6i44 r betweef&i1.WY trenches or lines and the nearest point of the river
the ~
,•..•S~theff
eas t , , etwsaon
ci•ti•
ctiniglf Mosbl• es that connect to the Intake Structure.
t

failure of fire hydrant FR7Wand FP-3i5lMdicate that potential problems already exist in
system. Complications ing'aed by CPFMs 3d and 3f could compound problems that
L exis t .

re is armored a historically protected and stabilized the existing river bank.

potd4ft rdegradat."i ieduced due to these improvements.

USACE redf i;iiver

Asg, Mainstem System releases to 40,000 cfs on October 2, 2011.
River levels cow Awhg to the 40,000 cfs release rate stabilized at the FCS on October 4,
2011. Groundwat&tAevels have thus started to stabilize between the termination of drawdown
reduction and the time of this report. The potential for development of subsurface erosion due
to river drawdown decreases with the time due to stabilization between groundwater elevations
and river elevations.

Implication

The occurrence of these CPFMs would likely only affect the utility installations nearest the
river. Most of the fire protection system is located well away from the zone of influence from
these CPFMs with the exception of the supply lines that connect to the Intake Structure. Thus,
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.16-12
Fire Protection System Piping Rev. 2
the two most important supply components of the system are located at the point of greatest
potential for degradation from these CPFMs.

As groundwater elevations and river elevations stabilize, the head potential between the two
conditions will decrease and the possibility of subsurface erosion will also decrease
correspondingly. In addition, the stabilized river embankment reduces the likelihood of these
CPFMs.

The implication of the CPFMs affecting the fire protection Hhste sr ed low.

Confidence

Data are not available to make a determination on subs err r due t 4 rawdown.
Time between the termination of the steady reduction of se rates an,
time without indications of subsurface erosion does not ase the likel
damage is not present. Thus, confidence with the assessmM 1 .

Summary

For CPFMs 3d and 3f, as discussed above, t ential dation iso ered low
because the potential for highly elevated waee
wa' rsus river eAevations is
unlikely due to stabilized river levels, stru I b -soilIlo and the protected
nature of the existing bank. The combine sider - of the or degradation and
the implications of that degradatif thes_ sctur s it in the '•gnificant" category.
The data currently collected are uao"ufficient to ut this C Therefore, the confidence
in the above assessment is ch means more ed monitoring and
inspections could be necessa e a final assessim

gring Mechanism .apid Dra'•lwn

•" :')CPFM 12a-_ River ban4•o• failure •n"ui~ttermining surrounding structures
-CPFM 12b - Lateral spreig

Tji iggering Mechanism an FMs could occur as follows: the river level drops faster
the-'xwater pressure in thlF~di can dissipate. The saturated soil is elevated above the
droppngier level. The a'5bank of the river provides no lateral pressure support for the
saturate&ýbif-At some p. j ere is insufficient support on the river side to support the
saturated so haC, • the soils experience slope movements or even failure. Generally,
slope failures asg~ei.'•1th rapid drawdown are relatively localized and shallow in nature;
however, deeperi iis can occur.

The river stage level has receded and stabilized at a level corresponding to the nominal normal
river level at 40,000 cfs as of October 4, 2011. At the time of the writing of this version of the
Report the groundwater levels had not yet stabilized to nominal normal levels. Therefore, it is
possible that new distress indicators could still develop. Field observation of the river bank
area has not been performed since the river level has dropped.

The following table describes observed distress indicators and other data that would increase or
decrease the potential for degradation associated with these CPFMs for the Fire Protection
System Piping.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.16-13
Fire Protection System Piping ____
____ ______ ___
___Rev. 2

Adverse (DegradationlDirect Floodwater Favorabl e (Degradation/Direct

Impact More Likely) FloodwatEer Impact Less Likely) I
The Main Fire Protection System Piping is in No distress was olbserved at the time of site
close proximity to the river, inspections.
Elevated saturated soils and elevated flood levels
provided a water source.
Data Gaps:
* Observations of the riverbank following drawdown to nominal no
* Geophysical investigation data to address any observed co?.
• Inclinometer readings which that will monitor for possibd&e n

Conclusion

Significance

Potentialfor Degradation/DirectFloodwaterImpact

The river stage level has receded and stabilized nominal normal
river level at 40,000 cfs as of October 4, 201 OE trolled and
continued river drawdown is not expected t r at Skse CPFMs.
Since it is believed that a potential for degA,., ion of but •not likely, these
CPFMs are considered low.

Implication

The occurrence of these CP a large scale he integrity of the

system. No distress has bee d during ourY the implication of
the poteae. wion for tlh& lVEMs is low.

the river bank has not been inspected for signs

confidence for these CPFMs is low.

as di'ised above, the combined consideration of the potential for

of that degradation to a structure of this type puts it in the "not
s%b,
1uver bank has not been inspected for signs of degradation and slope
failure. T1, ilt rule out these CPFMs and the confidence is low, which means
continued inspections could be necessary to draw a conclusion.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.16-14
Fire Protection System Piping Rev. 2
5.16.5 Results and Conclusions

The CPFMs evaluated for the Fire Protection System Piping are presented in the following matrix,
which shows the rating for the estimated significance and the level of confidence in the evaluation.

sic investigations and plhyZcl modifications are recommended to address CPFMs 3a, 3c,
-•he Fire Protection SystCPFMs 3a and 3c are associated with unfiltered flow of
i~thie Turbine Buildin~u _sement drain piping system (Key Distress Indicator #1).
t?•ons are describ6dti detail in Section 4.1. CPFMs 3a, 3c, 3d, and 3f are associated
miss
ani ear the - ccess Area between the Service Building and the Intake
AM
y Disr1 ,Of,#2). These recommendations are described in detail in Section 4.2.

A review of thhe geophysii'ahd geotechnical reports as they pertain to the Fire Protection System
should be done when available.

OPPD should initiate a procedure to monitor for problems during cable pulling operations. Problems
associated with cable pulling operations to and from MH-5 might be indicative of problems that could
affect the Fire Protection System.

A detailed analysis of the pavement subgrade and trench alignments should be performed if the
pavement in the paved access area between the Intake Structure, around gate one, and the Service
Building is replaced.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.16-15
Fire Protection System Piping Rev. 2
The results of proceeding recommendations will be used to increase the confidence in the assessment
results.

At the time of the writing of this version of the Report, groundwater levels had not yet stabilized to
nominal normal levels. Therefore, it is possible that new distress indicators could still develop. If new
distress indicators are observed before December 31, 2011, appropriate HDR personnel should be
notified immediately to determine whether an immediate. inspection or assessment should be
conducted. Observation of new distress indicators might result in a modi ation of the
recommendations for this structure. A. ..

5.16.7 Updates Since Revision 0.

Revision 0 of this Assessment Report was submitted to OPPD ion 0

presented the results of preliminary assessments for each Priori
incomplete in Revision 0 because the forensic investigation anc
Priority 1 Structures was not completed by the submittal date.
includes the results of additional forensic investigation and moi
described below.

5.16.7.1 Additional Data Available.

The following additional data were availa or the F Piping for

Revisions 1 and 2 of this Assessmq4,VgepR

" Results of KDI #1 forensic igation (see o

• Results of KDI #2 fore stigation (see n 4.1)•
* Addition oundwater i g well and ri el data from OPPD.
* Fi , fth riv see Section 5.2
*ni pivit..h dflpe4T inp.ictn nk.. .
A~mprJr-n t1nAn n Tfc'na Tn

0Attachment 6)
Results of geophysical m J;tigation b • technology, Inc. (see Attachment 6).
Results of geotechnical 1ta1•gatlonby "•ieleGeotech, Inc. (see Attachment 6).
,ata obtained from inc hin•ders by Thiele Geotech, Inc. (see Attachment 6).
~esults of continued su rvey ,Lamp Rynearson and Associates (see Attachment 6).

litional
The tional data was conducted for the Fire Protection System Piping:

0 Grouni ig well and river stage level data from OPPD.

Data shows that the river and groundwater have returned to nominal normal levels.

* Field observations of river bank

No significance distress from the 2011 Flood was observed.

Priority 1 Structures Page 5.16-16
Fire Protection System Piping Rev. 2
" Results of falling weight deflectometer investigation by American Engineering Testing, Inc.

Falling Weight Deflectometer and associated GPR testing performed in the Paved Access
Area identified anomalies such as soft clay and broken pavement. Additional ground
truthing of the investigation results were performed as part of the KDI #2 additional
investigations.

* Results of geophysical investigation by Geotechnology, Inc.

Seismic Refraction and Seismic ReMi tests perform &,nd t perimeter of the
power block as part of KDI #2 identified deep ano that co el, soft clay,
loose sand, or possibly voids.

* Results of geotechnical investigation by Thiele Geotec

Six test borings were drilled, with continuous samplin 't nuntered.
truth the Geotechnology,. Inc. seismic investigation results as p 5: e KDI #2 frensic•
investigation. Test bore holes were located the deep a es identified in the
seismic investigation. The test boring da pverysire
y piping veyoft/very
loose conditions that might be indicativ N
4-sbsurfac l/piping d material
loss or movement. O
All of the SPT and CPT test resitft co ted f .I Asses, ed

to similar data from numero, r gechni vestigati• , tht have been conducted
on the FCS site in previous ,ds This comp Hn did not.4 tify substantial changes to
the soil stre'ijth and sti -er that time p .CPT test results were not
perform he top 10 •e .ect existing

s dateoared to the original baseline measurements, have not

to
Meds ethe accu in e of thn• nometers. Therefore, deformation at the monitored
Uosince the in n of the Ml entation has not occurred.
* ;•Results of continued surv Lamp Rynearson and Associates.

•!• .eydata to date comp the original baseline surveys have not exceeded the
"acy range of the survim equipment. Therefore, deformation at the monitored
locltiý , since the sury e line was shot, has not occurred.

Triggering Mechim 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Piping

CPFM 3a - Undermining and settlement of shallow foundation/slab/surfaces (due to
pumping)
CPFM 3c - Undermined buried utilities (due to pumping)

Significance

Potentialfor Degradation/DirectFloodwaterImpact

Except for Turbine Building sump, conditions which could cause subsurface erosion no longer
exist due to present site and flood conditions. Site pumping sources have been removed and
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.16-17
Fire Protection System Piping Rev. 2
high groundwater conditions no longer exist. The, potential for this CPFM to occur presently
only exists in conjunction with KDI# 1. Recommended actions in conjunction with KDI#2
address a majority of the areas in question as part of the "Paved Access Area." Therefore, with
known issues being addressed and further investigated by OPPD, the potential degradation due
to this CPFM is low.

Implication

The occurrence of this CPFM could impact sections of the fm pr@ n y.•onpiping system
and adjacent utilities or structures. The fire protection ntire facility and
etem
it is located in close proximity to many other utilities a ctures. e fire protection
system is highly pressurized, failure of the system coul Mtun, - t structures or
utilities significantly if a pipe breaks and pressurized wails aro oint of
failure.

The Fire Protection System is a looped system and include Sol alvesat latera
-connection tees and on the main loop on each side of the lateral co n Thus, the sytem
is designed to be shut down in sections for repa .' swith conIidpply to fire supply
lines on both sides of potential line breaks. A rprotection s required at
all times on the site. The Fire Protection S has bee ijce floo •s have
receded and it is an operative system, but tls.a minimu 1wn impairments that have
shut down lateral fire hydrant lines. There me- the imlt ion tential degradation for
these CPFMs is high.

Confidence

With investigations and repai" iated

t with KD 'andling known issues, and
contingh dng in s and repairs as' neded and directed by geotechnical
inspetd, dressde es associated with this CPFM is high.

041rensic e
Nsresuts tei
test results ceived the issuance of the Rev 0 report have narrowed and defined
•%Vtable areas impact i'FM. Recommended actions associated with the results of
tiiensic reports and site in ons will address known problem areas and allow the
dir 4tof the expansion offi~osed investigations and repairs as necessary to address the
condigsX, eated by this The combined consideration of the potential for
degradatfrdna the imp• Hiis to that structure or system puts it in the "not-significant"
category.

Triggering ec 9i' 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Piping

CPFM 3d - Undermining and settlement of shallow foundation/slab (due to river
drawdown)
CPFM 3f- Undermined buried utilities (due to river drawdown)

Significance

PotentialforDegradation/DirectFloodwaterImpact

Based on groundwater monitoring data taken in conjunction with river drawdown and on a
continuing weekly basis, groundwater levels have been dropping at a rate that follows the river
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.16-18
Fire Protection System Piping Rev. 2

drawdown rate. Thus, the differential head necessary to create subsurface erosion due to river
drawdown is no longer present. The area most conducive to create this CPFM is nearest the
river. River bank inspections made since the issuance of the Rev 0 report show no indications
of this CPFM. The "Paved Access Area" between the Intake Structure and the Service Building
is the developed area nearest the river bank and includes most of the utility services that are
critical to the operation of the facility. Recommended actions in association with KDI#2 will
repair and address issues that are identified in the area. This will include instances of subsoil
*erosionthat could have been induced by river drawdown. The pd~tial for degradation for
this CPFM to occur is considered low. & 4&

Implication

The occurrence of these CPFMs would likely only affecl, the

river. Most of the fire protection system is located well a,
these CPFMs with the exception of the supply lines that cq
the two most important supply components of the system
potential for degradation from these CPFMs.

As groundwater elevations and river elevatio

conditions will decrease and the possibility," surface:
corres pondingly. In addition, the stabilize .er emban__dies the like1ihood of these
CPFM

The indplication of the CPFMs af&ge, t r p i ion systeým..s considered low.

Confilence

With Sindicat igh head con i no longer exist and the instigation
of rec ft pjated wit,nl.#2, confidence in the assessment associated with this
Whigh.
[ary£••' "

on these discussion itens'. e combined consideration of the potential for degradation

eimplications to that stre"•i'e or system puts it in the "not-significant category" in the
meFt matrix.

erlf echanism J2 'pid Drawdown

rf mpkslope failure and undermining surrounding structures
CPFM 1L

Significance

Potentialfor Degradation/DirectFloodwaterImpact

The river stage level has been stabilized at a level corresponding to the nominal "normal" river
level at 40,000 cfs since October 4, 2011. Rapid drawdown was controlled by the release rate
schedule set by the USACE and continued river drawdown is not expected to occur at a rate
that would initiate this CPFM. Groundwater monitoring well measurements have been taken
since floodwaters have receded from the site. Groundwater readings based on the weekly
records show the groundwater levels dropped at a rate that closely followed the river level drop
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.16-19
Fire Protection System Piping Rev. 2
rate. With groundwater levels dropping in conjunction with river levels there is little chance of
highly.elevated groundwater levels in comparison to river levels. The river bank is armored
and has historically protected and stabilized the existing river bank. In addition, no indications
of this type of failure were noted on the most recent riverbank inspection completed as of
October 27, 2011. Due to updated data and observations, the potential for degradation due to
this CPFM is considered low.

Implication

The occurrence of this CPFM on a large scale could neg of the

system. No distress has been observed during our insp of
the potential degradation for this CPFM is low.

Confidence

Based on recent data and observations, this CPFM was no eati

conditions associated with the Missouri River flood of 2011 and
associated with this CPFM is high.

Summary

Based on these discussion items, the com consid. n for degradation

and the implications to that structurir sy~ puts e not category" in the
assessment matrix.

5.16.7.1 Results and R - ndations

The CPF,,ý ,d for the .W tection System are presented in the following
significance ancl the level of confidence in the

A•PAMs 12aThe
Indicators. and results
12b foroftVthS rotectiofi••
i*tional forensic m Piping are not
investigation showassociated
that thesewith Key Distress
CPFMs are ruled
u,,Therefore, assuming thatu2od rther concerns are identified through the monitoring
Sfor the Fire Protectioily,'em Piping (discussed in Section 5.16.6 and continuing until
Dxert, ,2011), these CHI! are moved to the quadrant of the matrix representing "No
FurthlW&iion Recommend Rli.1ated to the 2011 Flood."

CP•F. 3&or th6.fi&rprotection system are associated with Key Distress Indicator # 1.
Section 4.1 ieesults of additional forensic investigation that was conducted to
sfsen
ascertain whethdif 5es5 CPFMs could be ruled out. The results of the additional forensic
investigation show•that, assuming the recommendations for physical modifications for KDI #1
are implemented, these CPFMs are ruled out. Therefore, assuming that no further concerns are
identified through the monitoring program for the fire protection system (discussed in Section
5.16.6 and continuing until December 31, 2011), these CPFMs are moved to the quadrant of the
matrix representing "No Further Action Recommended Related to the 2011 Flood."

CPFMs 3a, 3c, 3d and 3f for the fire protection system are associated with Key Distress
Indicator #2. Section 4.2 presents the results of additional forensic investigation that was
conducted to ascertain whether these CPFMs could be ruled out. The results of the additional
forensic investigation show that these CPFMs are ruled out. Therefore, assuming that no
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.16-20
Fire Protection System Piping Rev. 2
further concerns are identified through the monitoring program for the fire protection system
(discussed in Section 5.16.6 and continuing until December 31, 2011), these CPFMs are moved
to the quadrant of the matrix representing "No Further Action Recommended Related to the
2011 Flood."

IFthe assessment of the FCG ctures therest step was to develop a list of all Triggering
•1&echanisms and PFMs that c6•, have occurred due to the prolonged inundation of the FCS
sit d~uring the 2011 Missouri RiWr flood and could have negatively impacted these structures.
T n44tltep was to use data 'various investigations, including systematic observation of
the ortore•'ihan
sWWtkes overfurther.
time, eith&eý eliminate
h the Triggering Mechanisms
. and PFMs from the list
or to reeofed further ýlgation and/or physical modifications to remove them from the
hst for anyearhwlar sttrefe. Because all CPFMs for the Fire Protection System Piping other
than CPFMs3, 03:31-f,•$ 12a, and 12b had been ruled out prior to Revision 1, because
CPFMs 12a andA-I~a&ve been ruled out as a result of the Revision 1 findings, because CPFMs
3d and 3f were rulEd"ut using the results of the KDI #2 investigation presented in Section 4.2,
and because CPFMs 3a and 3c will be ruled out when the physical modifications recommended
for KDI # 1 in Section 4.1 are implemented, no Triggering Mechanisms and their associated
PFMs will remain credible for the Fire Protection System Piping. HDR has concluded that the
geotechnical and structural impacts of the 2011 Missouri River flood will be mitigated by the
implementation of the physical modifications recommended in this Assessment Report.
Therefore, after the implementation of the recommended physical modifications, the potential
for failure of this structure due to the flood will not be significant.
Section 5.17
Waste Disposal Piping

Q01-
i 9
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.17-1
Waste Disposal Piping Rev. 2

5.17 Waste Disposal Piping

5.17.1 Summary of Waste Disposal Piping

Baseline information for the Waste Disposal Piping is provided in Section 2.0, Site History,
Description, and Baseline Condition.

Waste Disposal Piping is a 2-in.-diameter stainless steel pipeline e ase ncr with several other
pipe systems. The encased utility bank is routed from the south th - ulding to the
south end of the Intake Structure. The utility bank begins adja . Trans R 1 and is routed
south of the Underground Cable Bank and MH-5. From the s est co - the encased
utility bank (including the Waste Disposal Piping) is routed to o a po h of the
discharge tunnel. At that point, it turns to the north, crosses the unnel an ates at the
south side of the Intake Structure. The concrete-encased utility b . fire protec
sanitary sewer lines, storm drain lines, demineralized water lines,.d t rground Ca
-

(Trenwa) as it is routed across the site.

-T he as-asymsed- to -co-llect;-store;- , a d contrsl -f ...
ra-diOtiewaste.' The Waste Disposal Piping is u release te once it np
to within acceptable levels.

5.17.2 Inputs/References Supporting tb na,

Table 5.17-1 lists references provided PD and othe uments to support HDR's analysis.
;,Table 5.17-%M.Mfiences for WA•• Piping
Plan(nt Title# OPPD3Do, t Drawing No/
ot• Number Page
•••h, (If applicable) Number(s)
Yard aj•heet I t 0--1 Unknown

-. ig I11M'-M-313 Unknown
• (#10753)
Yard `1r'heet 3 11405-M-314 8/3/1973
(#10754)
Waste DispC temr SDBD-WD-144 7/28/11 All
Rev._28 .Z_______ _ _,

Naval Facilities En m'jedd

mg 9/1986 All
Design Manual 7.01 ,M"11 equiics

Detailed site observations-field reports, field notes, and inspection checklists-for the Waste
Disposal Piping are provided in Attachment 8.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.17-2
Waste Disposal Piping Rev. 2
Observed performance and pertinent background data are as follows:

Groundwater was observed flowing into the basement sump of the Turbine Building from floor and
condensate drain pipes not designed to intercept groundwater. This condition has a recorded
history dating back to 1997. The Turbine Building is west of the corridor and utilities, between the
Intake Structure and the Service Building.
Settlement of a column in the Maintenance Building, north of the Turbine Building, has been
documented. The Turbine Building and the Maintenance Building ar st of the corridor and
associated utility alignments within the corridor.
The Aqua Dam surrounding the facility crossed the alignm e
* The Aqua Dam failed for a short period of time due to bei aged, odwater to enter
the area inside the Aqua Dam perimeter. Surfaces above t te • osalere
inundated when the facility Aqua Dam failed.
* Areas outside the perimeter of the facility Aqua Dam were mu ith water fo nd
period of time.
* Concrete areas in the corridor (paved drive and pedestrian areas betw iver and Se
Building) have exhibited distress, including crackin lement, an ining. However,
most of the pavement cracking or other conditionsii isting con due the age and
use of the facility. . I
* A hole in the pavement and void area beneath oncrete of the Sec rity Building
and east-southeast of MH-5. The hole and vo ea are I .. do perimeter of the Aqua
Dam that surrounded the facility. The . emr ilur ed at ection point of
pavement jointing. The hole in the ntis irreg shape a P more than 1 ft wide both
in the north-south and east-westjdi ons. The voi beneat 1 hole was approximately 4 ft
wide by 0.8 ft deep; it was meas a tape measu le. The void can be
attributed to subsu face erosion.,
__ MW. ~islcae
The holei located observed disc arge point of a pump operated prior to
the reLD••N' am d can be attributed to scour created by the discharge
of th iotperatmg for ed pei place.
FFjratection Cabinet FP-3 . of the uilding and east-southeast of MH-5 is located
4 aximity to the pavement fa d void a' It was reported that the fire hydrant was tested
Rhiber 13, 2011, and failed. gording to OPPD operations personnel testing FP-3E during
sig!s*ections, the base of FP-3qý. ked when the valve was opened. The fire hydrant was shut
downr~-be access cabinet was jed,:; out. The cause of failure was unknown at the time field
observattn . re m a de .•
rmde
* Pavement M ing was obso' northwest of the Intake Structure and east of the abandoned
acid tank. .
* A hollow-soundiing"_"e'•ea was noticed east of the Service Building truck dock.
* The fire .hydrant loc P-3E was tested on September 13, 2011, during site investigations.
No operational probleI were observed during the time on site.
* OPPD operations personnel testing the fire hydrant at FP-3E on September 13, 2011, were
questioned about other fire hydrant tests. An OPPD employee who was questioned noted that no
problems were observed for the fire hydrant at FP-3D during testing. The information on the
problem at FP-3C, noted previously, was gathered at this time.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.17-3
Waste Disposal Piping Rev. 2
5.17.3 Assessment Methods and Procedures

5.17.3.1 Assessment Procedures Accomplished

Assessments were made by walking the Waste Disposal Piping alignment and observing the
ground surface overlying the underground pipe system. The surface assessment included using
a 4-ft-long, 0.5-in.-diameter, steel-tipped fiberglass T-handle soil probe to hand probe the
ground surface along the utility alignments and adjacent areas to dctermine relative soil
strength. The assessment focused on identifying conditions~indi f tial flood-related
impacts or damage to the utility as follows:

* Ground surface conditions overlying and immediat ace and its

backfilled trench including scour, subsidence or sett I spre ping, and
heave.
• Soft ground surface areas (native soil, engineered fill, gravel pa
determined by probing.
* Water accumulations and flows in subsurface s ,m pcompon Dles and concrete
cable encasement pipes).
* Damage to at-grade or above-grade syste res it.
* Variance from normal installation conc s includi system
features and equipment.
* Operation of the system and apputen uip _1 operational).

Additional investigations were subsurface at the facility

including areas where condififi 1 impacts or damages were
observed. These were compni )hvsical and invasive
ions:

the time of Revision 0.)

micro-tremor). (Test reports were not

uding boifihgs in the vicinity of the utility to determine

cities. Note that OPPD required vacuum excavation for the
to avoid utility conflicts. Test reports will thus not show
t of test boring logs. (Test reports were not available at the

'with GPR and dynamic deflection methods (i.e., drop weight

ts were not available at the time of Revision 0.)
IncH the river that provide an indication of slope movement.

5.17.3.2 Procedures Not Completed

Assessments of the Waste Disposal Piping that were not completed include the following:

The interior of underground cable bank manholes and connecting concrete-encased cable
pipes in the Protected Area were not inspected except for visual observations that were
possible from above and behind temporary safety railings. Manholes are a confined space
as defined by OSHA regulations. In accordance with these regulations and OPPD FCS
safety procedures, manhole entry is a permit-required confined space entry and can only be
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.17-4
Waste Disposal Piping Rev. 2
performed by appropriately trained OPPD personnel. The underground cable bank and the
Waste Disposal Piping system follow a similar route, and surface indicators for the cable
bank can also be indicators for the disposal piping.
* No excavation to inspect underground systems and conditions was performed.
* No video inspection of the system was completed.

5.17.4 Analysis

Identified PFMs were initially reviewed as discussed in Section 3. considered the

preliminary information available from OPPD data files and frol
Eleven PFMs associated with five different Triggering MechaEM
"non-credible" for all Priority 1 Structures, as discussed in Sec 7 were
carried forward as "credible." After the design review for each q
and the results of available geotechnical, geophysical, and survey
CPFMs were ruled out as discussed in Section 5.17.4.1. The CPI
assessment are discussed in Section 5.17.4.2.

5.17.4.1 Potential Failure Modes Ruled Out Detailed

Assessment

The ruled-out CPFMs reside in the Not Si. 1r e "ýcategory'nd

for clarity
will not be shown in the Potential for Fai• onfideIg Sare
'na• category an

Triggering Mechanism 2 - Su oslon

CPFM 2a - Underminin shat foundatio •urf
CPFM 2c - UnderminLE utilities

a e surface overlying the Waste Disposal Piping

Wiignment. In additioiT lize ffiffimited surface erosion was observed on the
ground surface across Th&%!e Disposal Piping system is constructed
•sufficiently below pot( depths indicated by erosion features observed in other

lapse (first time wetting)

itial settlement of shallow foundation, loss of structural

roken connections
settlement

Soil supporting and surrounding the Waste Disposal Piping system has been previously
wetted. The peak flood elevation prior to 2011 was 1003.3 ft, which occurred in 1993.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.17-5
Waste Disposal Piping Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 10 - Machine/Vibration-Induced Liquefaction
CPFM 10a - Cracked slab, differential settlement of shallow foundation, loss of structural
support
CPFM 10b - Displaced structure/broken connections

Reasons for ruling out:

* Machine vibrations from the facility (turbine and various

and no indications of these CPFMs were evident.
" Pumps used on site during the flood event were insu or structure
vibrations sufficient to initiate soil liquefaction. Vii faction were
not observed around the areas where the pumps we rences of
liquefaction .were reported to HDR.
* No structure movements indicative of soil liquefaction i
observed; no structure cracking or lateral movements

Triggering Mechanism 11 - Loss of Soil Strengt u to

Seepage
CPFM 11 a - Cracked slab, differential s n
CPM1 b-support117
CPFM 11 b - Displaced structure/brok onnectlo Y

Reasons for ruling out: !N

• Liquefaction was not ob ea along the corri r acro:

* Visual observations and- MUMNeeasurements 4 ire movement. Therefore,
(CPFMs I la and lIb) did

#g-ing Mechanisio
t PFM 12a - River b.
CPFM 12b - Lateral

S• ctures. did not ha gident signs of distress identified during the field assessments.
* Slopqhaiure was not cýWs..ed at the site.
" River" ewel hag:5'eeled and stabilized as of October 4, 2011.
* As of daat NUh t report, October 11, 2011, groundwater elevations have already had
one week to e to at least a partial degree.
5s-Ia•afiZ,
* The river bank-Is-armored and has historically protected and stabilized the existing river
bank.

Triggering Mechanism 13 - Submergence

CPFM 13a - Corrosion of underground utilities

Reasons for ruling out:

* There are no flood-induced changes to the nature of the buried Waste Disposal Piping
system.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.17-6
Waste Disposal Piping Rev. 2
The Waste Disposal Piping system is located below the design flood elevation for the
facility. Groundwater elevations controlled by Missouri River water elevations, percolation
of storm precipitation, and winter snow melt would be expected to contact underground
improvements, including constructed steel and concrete facility elements. As such, steel
and concrete site improvements are assumed to be designed to withstand the corrosive
environment of groundwater and wetted soil.
* The Waste Disposal Piping system is stainless-steel pipe that is encased in concrete and
installed in an area of structural backfill. Therefore, corrosio to flood-induced site
changes is not expected.

Triggering Mechanism 14 - Frost Effects

CPFM 14a - Heaving, crushing, or displacement

Reasons for ruling out:

" The Waste Disposal Piping system is installed below t dep .. st penetrati
* Conditions have not changed due to flood cond",
0 i-y, ti "•'11 !••
5.17.4.2 Detailed Assessment of Cre re Modes _

The following CPFMs are the only CPFMsried fo *led assessment for the
Waste Disposal Piping system as a result .201 T d assessment is
provided below.
Triggering Mechanism 3 - Sy I..face Erosion" ng
CPFM 3a - Undermini ttlement of sh• .f Ia s/surfaces (due to
umping)
Cilned bun ,ities (due to pumping)
$.,ggering
. c MA d CPFMt&`7M occur as follows: multiple potentially connected
4 age paths existed in' backfl ste including soil backfill in utility trenches,
'.zranular trench bedding, bdk' gLfloor drasvifikith open/broken joints, and pre-existing
efects/voids under pavemen z.g, paths are exposed at some locations to the river
'waters (e.g., a hole in theýg`uind north of the Security Building). This network of seepage
pi onnected to several pjbiiiJJing sources: the sump pit in the Turbine Building, Manhole
series of sur ps located along the interior of the. Aqua Dam perimeter.
The pu .S.%pre operatedAf 4ran, extended period of time, maintaining a head differential on the
seepage r iorks Qent was sufficient to begin erosion of surrounding soil. Seepage
is unfiltered osnues unimpeded. Erosion extends out, intercepting the network
of utility trench' j 'ing the Underground Cable Bank. Voids are created under the
pavement an alo e utility trench walls. The potential damage includes settlement of the
Underground Cable Bank and manholes causing a loss of electrical connectivity.

Below are field observations and data that support the likelihood of these CPFMs:
" MH-5 was pumped for the duration of flooding to remove water entering into the manhole.
Known water sources included ducts from MH-3 1 and ducts running to the Auxiliary
Building. This created a head differential.
" The flow of water into MH-5 was observed on multiple field visits. Sources of the water
could not be determined.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.17-7
Waste Disposal Piping Rev. 2
" Sediment deposits (and fish) were observed in the bottom of the MH-5 when it was emptied
on September 14, 2011. The sediment could be an indication of piping and subsurface
erosion.
" The area inside the Aqua Dam perimeter was pumped dry and created a hydrostatic head
condition between the area inside and the area outside of the Aqua Dam perimeter. The
inside the Aqua Dam perimeter was pumped from several locations creating points where
underground piping and subsurface flows would tend to flow.
" Avoid area and potential piping location were observed benea e concrete slab just north
of the Security Building and east-southeast of MH-5.
* Based, on a conversation with an OPPD operations e ee tes E on September
13, 2011, fire hydrant FP-3C, located northeast of t "curity s tested on
September 13, 2011, and failed. According to the o e ns em , when
opening the valve to test the hydrant, the base cracke ed and the .ad to be
closed. The access cabinet was tagged out for repair a. e.
* Pavement distress was observed along the driveway c o en the Intake
and the Service Building. The area north of where the duct b ses the corri r-'
includes observed slab settlement and unde evidence ow-sounding
pavement areas).
* The Turbine Building sump pit was pu continuahe o five
pipes connected to this sump pit are flo2....i
..
.'•rain and
.. . . .. system fli
udrain pipes.
Since this is a floor drain system, no i o ~sation
ndwa ou the system.
The infiltration of groundwater o fth em - es s open flow path.

Below are field observations anda a that indicat se CPFM e unlikely:

* Sediment and fish were 'in the bottom • it was emptied on
Septembe -011. Sedii acumulations an -. :fish at the bottom of MH-5 might
no: -a M 'a,ath
these §,The manhole was uncovered when the Aqua Dam
ALansported intoJ
int th.. iq s le2anunI-t . Mters. Sediment and fish could have been
Ziunater.
with 0l",
• hole' in te
"'_.ýThe observed hole
i~~e vm
tM fithI ntnol
wbserved aebe
he Security Building, could have been
developed by outflow fri'e surface pdmfips and might not be associated with these
- CPFMs. Temporary surfa-h'p mps were pumping water back into the river with hoses
...... of the discharge points was near the observed hole
over the Aqua Dam .•ne
nlaced
Yeffence figure/photo ordy report). Concentrated discharge flow could have eroded
paden.ht and created Berved hole.

Data Gaps R.Attill

re to assess these CPFMs):

* The extent ubsurface erosion is not known at this time.

* GPR data. (Tes reports were not available'at the time of Revision 0.)
* Seismic Survey - refraction/tomography and refraction microtremor. (Test reports were not
available at the time of Revision 0.)
The following table describes observed distress indicators and other data that would increase or
decrease the potential for degradation associated with these CPFMs for the Waste Disposal
Piping system.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.17-8
Waste Disposal Piping Rev. 2
Adverse (DegradationlDirect Floodwater Favorable (Degradation/Direct Floodwater
Impact More Likely)
I I r
Impact Less Likely)
i

A hole in the pavement with a void space beneath Alternatively, the observed hole could have been
was observed north of the Security Building and developed by outflow from the surface pumps
east of MH-5. This location was outside the Aqua and not be associated with this CPFM.
Dam perimeter and could be a sinkhole that Temporary surface pumps were pumping water
developed due to subsurface erosion. back over the Aqua Dam. One of the pump
discharge points was near the observed hole.
Concentrated dis e flo ould have created
the obse . ,•laole.
Data Gaps:
* Geophysical investigation data to address observed c
* Geotechnical investigation data to address observed
* Existence, size, and location of voids

Conclusion

Significance

PotentialforDegradation/Direct

Indicators for these CPFMs have been ob

Piping in multiple locations during field i is of subsurface
failures in the vicinity, the potent4a d high.

Implication

The - scale coifflýý id areas that would induce pipe

settl could lead to excessive movement and negatively
impi ff the Waste Disposal Piping system. Therefore, the
`5ese CPFMs is high.
431:e

ii. are multiple elements to ie CPFMs. The inflow of water into MH-5 during the flood
evne hole in the pavemenji h of the Security Building, and the settled pavement section
in thtt i'idor. However, ev "iugh the confidence is high that there are some voids under
the the t of these voids is not known.
tecf5M.ri.. rri-n;• th,,,1-1f o e

The data at e no cient to rule out these CPFMs, or lead to a conclusion that
subsurface erogi dermined the Waste Disposal Piping system. Therefore, the
confidence in the assessment is low, which means more data are necessary to draw a
conclusion.

Summary

For CPFMs 3a and 3c, as discussed above, the potential for degradation is high because
indicators for these CPFMs have been observed. This degradation could have caused erosion
that impacts the integrity or intended function of the structure. The combined consideration of
the potential for degradation and the implications of that degradation to a structure of this type
puts it in the "significant" category. That data currently collected are not sufficient to rule out
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.17-9
Waste Disposal Piping Rev. 2
these CPFMs. Therefore, the confidence in the above assessment is low, which means more
data or continued monitoring and inspections are necessary to draw a conclusion.

Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Piping

CPFM 3d - Undermining and settlement of shallow foundation/slab (due: to river
drawdown)
CPFM 3f- Undermined buried utilities (due to river dr do

These CPFMs are similar to CPFMs 3a and 3c. but ins adient is created
by rapidly receding river level.

The Triggering Mechanism and CPFMs could then occur s: river le faster
than pore water pressure in the soil can dissipate. A grad - ated that mov
soil into existing defects. The flow enlarges voids along t-ti ch as it mov
the soil toward the river via piping features or networks. Other con es include
to adjacent structures, including fire protection rground c nk, raw
piping, and the Underground Cable Trench.

Field observations and data that support t elihood

Conditions required to trigger the e C had curr e of Revi, sion 0.
Therefore, field observations ta sup e likel" ese CPFM s could not
be made.
* The river was still be, . Future river drawdown
conditions could initi

Fi that indicate these CPFMs are unlikely:

at a level corresponding to the nominal normal
Mier level at 40,000Ho9k Octobe r - 1. Field observations that indicate that these
CPFMs are unlikely ha-' been mad V
The Waste Disposal Pipintskffset from the river bank. This offset from the river bank
1 drawdown and related subsurface piping to the river bank
R•l-£duces the likelihood thatv vist
IIIpact
w[ pact the Waste Disp• 'VPiping System.
0 iSa the area of the Wi t'-Disposal Piping System and to the east are backfill materials
thafert1 aced and c ied during construction of site improvements and therefore
W Wod9xpected,,, ss susceptible to rapid drawdown impacts.
* Void spa surface erosion would have to be significant to create conditions
to cause system to fail.

Data Gaps (data has yet to be acquired to assess these CPFMs):

* Observations of the riverbank following drawdown to normal river elevations.

" Geophysical investigation data to address observed concerns.
* Geotechnical investigation data to address observed concerns.

The following table describes observed distress indicators and other data that would increase or
decrease the potential for degradation associated with these CPFMs for the Waste Disposal
Piping system.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.17-10
Waste Disposal Piping Rev. 2
Adverse (DegradationlDirect Favorable (DegradationlDirect
Floodwater Impact More Likely) Floodwater Impact Less Likely)
Flood waters were at a high level for an USACE suspended the river drawdown
extended period of time which allowed between August 27, 2011 and September 18,
surrounding soils to become saturated. 2011. This gap period in the scheduled
reduction of dam release rates was provided to
allow groundwater elevations to equalize with
river flow elevations•t&
The river bank s and tects against
the creatio e th.
Indicatio ese CP not been
exhibited ported.,N-.... us floods.
"Observations of the riverbank following drawdown to noelevations.t. •,• ;

Significance.

PotentialforDegradation/Directto

The potential for degradation aitsince ground levels not yet reached a nominal
normal level. Sincitsbea at a potential f graKenwill affect the structure, these

ccurrence of these - could n impact the operation of the structure. This

ud lead to pipe settlemea
t egative ct the integrity or intended functionality of the
aste Disposal Piping systeMMI erefore, the implication of the potential degradation for these
CPFMsrcs is high.

0o ~ence

The pot~fif•llk5 act tture

c from these CPFMs is not known due to unknown future
river drawdath es. 'd*idwater levels are such that these CPFMs could still occur.

The data at hand%&ý"pt sufficient to rule out these CPFMs, or lead to a conclusion that
subsurface erosion'as undermined the Waste Disposal Piping system. Therefore, the
confidence in the above assessment is low, which means more data are necessary to draw a
conclusion.

Summary

For CPFMs 3d and 3f, as discussed above, the potential for degradation is high because
groundwater levels have not yet reached nominal normal levels. This degradation could cause
erosion that impacts the integrity or intended function of the structure. The combined
consideration of the potential for degradation and the implications of that degradation to a
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.17-11
Waste Disposal Piping Rev. 2

structure of this type puts it in the "significant" category. The data currently collected are not
sufficient to rule out these CPFMs. Therefore, the confidence in the above assessment is low,
which means more data or continued monitoring and inspections is be necessary to draw a
conclusion.

5.17.5 Results and Conclusions

The CPFMs evaluated for the Waste Disposal Piping are presented in the
shows the rating for the estimated significance and the level of coja~enq

* Review geophy 4 g-4ýnidgitqenical reports to evaluate the data as they pertain to the Waste
Disposal Piping. •
" Inspect the interior ofP .-5. Inspect walls, floor, cover, joints, and duct bank penetrations.
Obtain a photographic record of conditions.
" Perform a detailed analysis of the pavement subgrade and trench alignments, if the pavement in the
corridor between the Intake Structure and the Service Building is replaced.

5.17.7 Updates Since Revision 0

Revision 0 of this Assessment Report was submitted to OPPD on October 14, 2011. Revision 0
presented the results of preliminary assessments for each Priority I Structure. These assessments were
incomplete in Revision 0 because the forensic investigation and/or monitoring for most of the
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.17-12
Waste Disposal Piping Rev. 2
Priority 1 Structures was not completed by the submittal date. This revision of this Assessment Report
includes the results of additional forensic investigation and monitoring to date for this structure as
described below.

5.17.7.1 Additional Data Available

The following additional data were available for the Waste Disposal Piping for Revisions 1
and 2 of this Assessment Report: ,,L

* Results of KDI #1 forensic investigation (see Sectio

* Results of KDI #2 forensic investigation (see Secti
* Additional groundwater monitoring well and river s
* Field observations of the river bank (see Section 5.2•
" Results of falling weight deflectometer investigation byý
(see Attachment 6).
* Results of geophysical investigation by Geotechnology,
. Results of geotechnical investigation by Thiel .h
* Data obtained from inclinometers by Thiel -
* Results of continued survey by Lamp R on an 6).

5.17.7.2 Additional Analysis

The following analysis of additio ýta w ond - for Piping:

Groundwater monitorin d river stage data

Data shawpstatthe river a ndwater have r nominal normal levels.

* A~d~hervat Il ir hank'l~

lo significance was observed.

,Results of falling weight diflebtometer investigation by American Engineering Testing, Inc.

FAllig Weight Deflectom aslnd associated GPR testing performed in the Paved Access
•lentified anomahies h as soft clay and broken pavement. Additional ground
trui i"Mthe ivestig# esults were performed as part of the KDI #2 additional
in,

* ReultsofiZI investigation report by Geotechnology, Inc.

Seismic Refraction and Seismic ReMi tests performed around the outside perimeter of the
power block as part of KDI #2 identified deep anomalies that could be gravel, soft clay,
loose sand, or possibly voids.

" Results of geotechnical investigation by Thiele Geotech, Inc.

Six test borings were drilled, with continuous sampling of the soil encountered, to ground
truth the Geotechnology, Inc. seismic investigation results as part of the KDI #2 forensic
investigation. Test bore holes were located to penetrate the deep anomalies identified in the
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.17-13
Waste Disposal Piping Rev. 2
seismic investigation. The test boring data did not show any piping voids or very soft/very
loose conditions that might be indicative of subsurface erosion/piping or related material
loss or movement.

All of the SPT and CPT test results conducted for this Assessment Report were compared
to similar data from numerous other geotechnical investigations that have been conducted
on the FCS site in previous years. This comparison did not identify substantial changes to
the soil strength and stiffness over that time period. SPT and test results were not
performed in the top 10 feet to protect existing utilities.:.4ý

Data from inclinometers to date, compared to the 6 1baseliii' ements, have not
exceeded the accuracy range of the inclinometers. fore, • the monitored
locations since the installation of the istrumentatio , -urred.

* Results of continued survey by Lamp Rynearson and

Survey data to date compared to the original baseline surveys I exceeded t e

accuracy range of the surveying equipment- deformati monitored
locations, since the survey baseline was sh ed. 0

Updates to assessment procedures not comp-k d are ou tion .17. Excavation

to inspect underground systems is include fth the K 2 in on. Video inspection of
the system was not completed andsot pl du anti ow value of data
oin Js o e mA s were ompleted and are no longer
deemed necessary.

Triggering Mechanism 3- ace Erosion

CPf 1 ent of shallow o ndation/slab/surfaces (due to

3c- PeObhuried u u to pumping)

"1¢PFMs 3a and 3c for thet ta"psposal Pig System are associated with Key Distress
lnh-dicator #1. Section 4.1 pres&&tsthe results of additional forensic investigation that was
to ascertain show
•.:ucted•sice, mvestigation th at, ssu"CPFMs could be ruled out. The results of the additional
whethe-•ese
h ,vsssuming the recommendations for physical modifications for
KD5ia•e..,implemented, the-7PFMs are ruled out. Therefore, assuming that no further
concerns,-M identlfied throM ithe. monitoring program for the Waste Disposal Piping System
(discusse 1 bS~ction 5.1,7t,•6-,nh continuing until December 31, 2011), these CPFMs are moved
to the quad heicxrepresenting "No Further Action Recommended Related to the
2011 Flood." `fte recommended in Section 5.17.6 regarding the interior
'bseivation
inspection of NMl ±54isýno longer needed because CPFMs 3a and 3c will be ruled out when the
physical modifications recommended for KDI # 1 in Section 4.0 are implemented.

Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Piping

CPFM 3d - Undermining and settlement of shallow foundation/slab (due to river
drawdown)
CPFM 3f- Undermined buried utilities (due to river drawdown)

CPFMs 3d and 3f for the Waste Disposal Piping System are associated with Key Distress
Indicator #2. Section 4.2 presents the results of additional forensic investigation that was
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.17-14
Waste Disposal Piping Rev. 2
conducted to ascertain whether these CPFMs could be ruled out. The results of the additional
forensic investigation show that these CPFMs are ruled out. Therefore, assuming that no
further concerns are identified through the monitoring program for the Waste Disposal Piping
System (discussed in Section 5.17.6 and continuing until December 31, 2011), these CPFMs
are moved to the quadrant of the matrix representing "No Further Action Recommended
Related to the 2011 Flood."

5.17.7.1 Revised Results

The CPFMs evaluated for the Waste Disposal Piping

matrix, which shows the rating for the estimated signi
evaluation.

In the assessmentf0tlie FCS Structures, the first step was to develop a list of all Triggering
Mechanisms and PFMs that could have occurred due to the prolonged inundation of the FCS
site during the 2011 Missouri River flood and could have negatively impacted these structures.
The next step was to use data from various investigations, including systematic observation of
the structures over time, either to eliminate the Triggering Mechanisms and PFMs from the list
or to recommend further investigation and/or physical modifications to remove them from the
list for any particular structure. Because all CPFMs for the Waste Disposal Piping other than
CPFMs 3a, 3c, 3d, and 3f had been ruled out prior to Revision 1, because CPFMs 3d and 3f
were ruled out using the results of the KDI #2 investigation presented in Section 4.2, and
because CPFMs 3a and 3c will be ruled out when the physical modifications recommended for
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.17-15
Waste Disposal Piping Rev. 2

KDI # 1 in Section 4.1 are implemented, no Triggering Mechanisms and their associated PFMs
will remain credible for the Waste Disposal Piping. HDR has concluded that the geotechnical
and structural impacts of the 2011 Missouri River flood will be mitigated by the
implementation of the physical modifications recommended in this Assessment Report.
Therefore, after the implementation of the recommended physical modifications, the potential
for failure of this structure due to the flood will not be significant.
Section 5.18
Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping

AA A

J
B
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.18-1
Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping Rev. 2

5.18 Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping

5.18.1 Summary of Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping

Baseline information for the Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping is provided in Section 2.0, Site
History, Description, and Baseline Condition.

The Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping consist of three fuel tanks as d s ly piping located
inside the protected area. The purpose of these tanks is to provi oi emergency diesel
generators and diesel water pumps. Fuel tank FO- 1 is an 18,0 on stee ound tank
founded on a pile-supported concrete slablocated south of the iary tank FO-10 is
an 18,000-gallon steel underground tank founded on a pile-sup e sla outside the
east wall of the Service Building. Tanks FO-1 and FO-10 supply e diesel-p
generators. Fuel tank FO-27 is a 500-gallon, concrete, abovegro cated outsi
of the Intake Structure. Fuel tank FO-27 is supported by a concre laart of thes
supported
Structure." Intake Structure This tank supplies fuel for the diesel-powered • inside the ntake
mp

5.18.2 Inputs/References Supporting the Anal

Table 5.18-1 lists references provided by OPPD ther do ts upport HDR's analysis.
•Table 6.18-1 - Refere rr F Il OWAN g Wan&'ýr'Piping
Document Title -- OPP rmen t Date Page
• • x "(i a r Number(s)

Yard Piping S )_Unknown

____11405-M-31_
Yard Pipj • • • 1405-M-313 (#10753) Unknown
Yard ý eet3 05-M-314 (#10754) 8/3/1973
T ., ations 'qW r -4 18 (#16588) Unknown
1'T1 -412 (#16583) 1/29/1973
SDBD-DG-112 1/19/2011 All
SDBD-STRUCT-503 6/22/2010 All
9/1986 All

Detailed site obse - -fi s, field notes, and inspection checklists-for the Fuel Oil
Storage Tanks and ided in Attachment 8.

Observations and pertine ckground data are as follows:

* Utility lines run in close proximity to tanks FO-1 and FO-10.

" Tank FO- 1 is surrounded by a perimeter security fence and could only be inspected from outside
the fence.
* A sand boil/piping feature was observed (originally reported in CR 2011-7265) near the southwest
comer of the Missile Shield Room. This room is on the outside of the south wall of the Auxiliary
Building and has an unfinished, pea-gravel floor surface. Tank FO-1 is south of this Missile Shield
Room and fuel oil piping enters this room below floor elevation very near the observed boil/piping
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.18-2
Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping Rev. 2

feature. The Main Underground Cable Bank (MH-1 to the Auxiliary Building portion) runs
through the subsurface, in proximity to the location of the boil/piping feature.
" A hollow-sounding pavement area was noticed east of the Service Building truck dock; this area is
in proximity to underground fuel tank FO-10.
" Groundwater was observed flowing into the basement sump of the Turbine Building from floor and
condensate drain pipes not designed to intercept groundwater. This condition has a recorded
history dating back to 1997. The Turbine Building is west of the corrior and utilities are located
between the Intake Structure and the Service Building.
" Settlement of a column in the Maintenance Building, north o T, has been
documented.
" Water inflow into MH-5 occurred during the flood event s obse site visits and
photographed.
* The Aqua Dam surrounding the facility crossed the alignmen e protect water
piping, the underground utility bank, the underground cable b e circulatio
tunnels.
* The Aqua Dam failed for a short period of time due to being damage , g floodwate enter
the. area inside the Aqua Dam perimeter. Surfaces a te utilities undated when the
facility Aqua Dam failed.
" Areas outside the facility Aqua Dam were inun or an e eriod o
" Concrete areas in the corridor (paved drive an estrian the river .nd Service
Building) have exhibited distress including cr .g, sla me dermining. However,
most of the pavement cracking or the co ons -e, pre- - onditions due the age
and use of the facility.
" There is a hole in the pavement . d area beneat concret north of the Security
Building and east-southeast of he hole and - side the perimeter of the Aqua
Dam that surr e facility. ement failure the intersection point of
pavement*. the t is irregular in shape and is more than 1 ft wide both
in the an t direct e void area beneath the hole is approximately 4 ft
wid ft deep; it was d bya asure through the hole.
* e in the pavement is n observe rge point of a pump operated prior to the
al of the Aqua Dam. The an be a ted to scour created by the discharge of the pipe
. for an extended period - e in one place.
SFir' tion Cabinet FP-3C no i the Security Building and east-southeast of MH-5 is located
in pro o the pavement fail .. d void area. It was reported that the fire hydrant was tested
Septem 011 and failed. rding to OPPD operations personnel testing FP-3E during site
inspections, e of FP-3 ed when opening the valve. The fire hydrant was shut down
and the access a was out. The cause of failure was unknown at the time field
observations were
* Pavement slab settli observed northwest of the Intake Structure and east of the abandoned
acid tank.
" The fire hydrant located in FP-3E was being tested on September 13, 2011, during site
investigations. No operational problems were observed during the time on site.
" OPPD operation personnel testing the fire hydrant at FP-3E on September 13, 2011, were
questioned about other fire hydrant tests. The OPPD employee questioned noted that no problems
were observed for the fire hydrant at FP-3D during testing. The information on the problem at FP-
3C, noted previously, was gathered at this time.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.18-3
Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping Rev. 2
* The enclosure for fuel tank FO-27, outside the Intake Structure, is designed to withstand an
external hydrostatic load due to flooding of the Missouri River to el. 1014.5 ft (see SDBD-STRUC-
503).
" The concrete support slabs for fuel tanks FO-1 and FO-10 are 15 ft wide by 25 ft long by 3 ft thick
and are founded on four 10BP42 steel-bearing piles. The top of the support slab for tank FO-I is at
el. 989 ft and the top of the support slab for tank FO-10 is at el. 990 ft.
" The driving criteria, tip elevation, and capacities of the 10BP42 piles e unknown. However, the
top of the piles are capped with a plate and anchor rods for a positive and plift connection
(see 11405-S-412).
" The piles are anchored to the support slab through a welde ap pl -in. diameter bent
rods that protrude into the slab.
" The tank is attached to the slab by two hold-down straps an t supp with 1.5-in.-
diameter bent rods.
" The river bank is armored and has historically protected and s e existing
* USACE reduced Missouri River Mainstem System releases to ,O n October 2
River levels corresponding to the 40,000 cfs release rate stabilized at t on October , 11,
at about el. 995 ft.

5.18.3 Assessment Methods and Procedures

5.18.3.1 Assessment Procedures Ac lished

Assessments were made by obse u fe fthesy cess points and vent/fill

pipes) and the ground surface o ng the unde r nd fuel s e tanks. The surface
assessment included using g, 0.5-in.-dia stee d fiberglass t-handle soil
probe to hand probe the gro ce along the ts and adjacent areas to
determ ' strengt. sessmet focu identifying conditions indicative of
poti acts or to the utility as follows:

inc i und fare con verlyindmediately adjacent to the utility and backfill.

o ater accumulations an in
t subsuo ace system components (manholes and concrete
gble encasement pipes)go
.
SGPaR e to at-grade or abowr n 'ade system features and equipment.
S~e from normal inc ion conditions, including settled, tilted, or heaved system
fe a equiPme R
Additional "' re performed to further characterize the subsurface at the facility
icuigare . ... it... io....
ns indicative of potential flood-related impacts or damage were
observed. These composed of the following non-invasive geophysical and invasive
geotechnical investigations.

" GPR. (Test reports were not available at the time of Revision 0.)
" Seismic surveys (seismic refraction and refraction micro-tremor). (Test reports were not
available at the time. of Revision 0.)
" Geotechnical investigations including borings in the vicinity of the utility to determine
current soil conditions and capacities. Note that OPPD required vacuum excavation for the
first 10 ft of proposed test holes to avoid utility conflicts. Test reports will thus not show
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.18-4
Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping Rev. 2
soil conditions in the upper 10 ft of test boring logs. (Test reports were not available at the
time of Revision 0.)
Paved areas were evaluated with GPR and dynamic deflection methods (i.e., drop weight
deflectometer). (Test reports were not available at the time of Revision 0.)

5.18.3.2 Assessment Procedures Not Completed

Assessments ofthe-Fuel-Oil Storage Tanks and Piping that were pleted include the
following:

a No excavation to inspect underground, systems and tior

5.18.4 Analysis

Identified PFMs were initially reviewed as discussed in Section 34

preliminary information available from OPPD data files and from own
unedobse
to be -'
Eleven PFMs associated with five different Triggering Mechanisir s were d
"non-credible" for Priority 1 Structures, as discussed in 5. There FMs were carried
forward as "credible." After the design review for e ions, and the
results of available geotechnical, geophysical, and data w zed, a nu f CPFMs
were ruled out as discussed in Section 5.18.4.1. PFMs c td for deta. ed assessment
are discussed in Section 5.18.4.2. -

5.18.4.1 Potential Failure M( the C n of the Detailed

Assessment

The ruled-out CPFMs reside' category and for clarity

will not,1 ý ý Pote .ix.

FM
Ffg2b - Loss of
Mecha:• -M
FM 2c - Undermin

for ruling out:

0 •ce erosion was c ýd along the surface overlying the Fuel Oil Storage Tanks
ng. In addition• localized and limited surface erosion was observed on the
grou * ce acros:2i cility. Therefore surface erosion-induced failure is discounted
as a le to this system.

Triggering Mec ,4 - Hydrostatic Lateral Loading (water loading on structures)

CPFM 4c - Wa failure in flexure
CPFM 4d - Wall failure in shear
CPFM 4e - Excess deflection

Reasons for ruling out:

* Underground storage tanks and buried piping are designed to be below the groundwater
surface.
" The tanks were nearly full during the 2011 flood.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.18-5
Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 5 - Hydrodynamic Loading
CPFM 5a - Overturning
CPFM 5b - Sliding
CPFM 5c - Wall failure in flexure
CPFM 5d - Wall failure in shear
CPFM 5e - Damage by debris
CPFM 5f- Excess deflection

Reason for ruling out:

Fuel storage tanks FO-1 and FO-10 are located bel ound an - usceptible to
hydrodynamic loading. Fill and vent pipes for thes we o oving water
following the failure of the Aqua Dam and until it w e ucture fuel
storage and pipelines (FO-27) are above ground. Fuel s components ible t
this loading show no observable signs of movement

Triggering Mechyad suou tncy, Uplift Forae Ten

Structue i
CPFM 6b - Cracked slab, loss structural
of
CPFM 6c - Displaced structure/broken c

Reasons for ruling out:

" Undergrmund storage tanks antflodevetw u ndged

of the groundwater

SThVisibe indicaionnearly fuea the 2011 fl

wTerg
C erin anismn d -stru, ,•apse
en (first ti
connections

7d - Piles from do
asons for ruling out:
dsupporting
l and surroui •the Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping has been previously
d..Th peak flood el nprior to 2011 was 1003.3 ft. which occurred in 1993.
Nuiiation of soil sett. utwas observed during site inspections pertaining to these
vbainoiiitesiiufcin
orstrfactue. etanks. ".

Triggering •%• ••-Machine/Vibration-Induced Liquefaction

CPFM 10 d-......
structureibrokencontis
CPFM 10d - le group instability

Reasons for ruling out:

" Machine vibrations from the facility (turbine and various pumps) have historically occurred
and no indications of these CPFMs are evident.
" Pumps used on site during the flood event were judged of insufficient size to• cause ground
or structure vibrations to initiate soil liquefaction.
" Visible indications of liquefaction were not observed around the areas where the pumps
were operating and no occurrences of liquefaction were reported to HDR.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.18-6
Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping Rev. 2

* No structure movements indicative of soil liquefaction and resultant settlement were

observed; no structure cracking or lateral movements were observed.

Triggering Mechanism 11 - Loss of Soil Strength due to Static Liquefaction or Upward

Seepage
CPFM I1 b - Displaced structure/broken connections
CPFM 11 c - Additional lateral force on below-grade walls
CPFM 1 d - Pile/pile group instability

Reason for ruling out:

* This has not been observed on site.

Triggering Mechanism 12 - Rapid Drawdown n4 n s

CPFM 12a - River bank slope failure and undermini ng structure
CPFM 12b - Lateral spreading

Reasons for ruling out:

* The structures did not have evident si

" Slope failure was not observed at the
" River stage level has receded and stat at a to the nominal normal
river level at 40,000 cfs as of el 11. A
a The river bank is armored is cted and~bilIzed the existing river
bank.
Triggerinrg
T e _Mn anism 13 - rgei
CP aon of X1

for ruling out:

Underground fuel tanks at

otective coating and cor Sallowance in design. There are no flood-induced changes
N' , corrosive nature of 1 vironment.
6 eground store FO-27, is a ConVault fuel oil storage tank. This tank is a
ficased steel ing are
e tank. resistant
The exteriortosurfaces
corrosionofby
thedesign, through
concrete the useisof
encasement
col #Af
painte• omponents for this tank are located at the top of the tank and not
exposed
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.18-7
Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 14 - Frost Effects
CPFM 14a - Heaving, crushing, or displacement

Reasons for ruling out:

a Fuel oil storage tanks FO-1 and FO-10 are pile-supported with the pile caps located well
below frost depth, thus not subject to frost heave.
* Fuel storage tank FO-27 is supported by the Intake Structure, *ch is pile-supported and
not susceptible to frost effects. Piping for this tank is b1 I ccommodate
some movement.
* Conditions have not been changed due to the flood

5.18.4.2 Detailed Assessment of Credible Potenti des

The following CPFMs are the only CPFMs carried forwa ed assessme
Oil Storage Tanks and Piping as a result of the 2011 flood. es s are only
to tanks FO-1 and FO-10 and associated piping beca Tank FO- orted on the ntke
Structure. The detailed assessment is provided

Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface E fPipin

CPFM 3b - Loss of lateral support for foundati imping)
CPFM 3c - Undermined buried utiliti e to g)

Subsurface structures in the gen ni of th oil tanks , ing that were pumped
during the flood due to gro infiltration i ed Ma -5 and the Turbine
Building sump pit.

This T ism an could occur as ows: multiple potentially connected

see , tench
sh' beddi _. soiln baflo
thewith
site, open/broken backfill
including soiljoints, in utility trenches,
and pre-existing
"s/voids under pave epot age includes settlement of pipe. Settlement
overstress a pipe that is ' sed and c use a pipe or its connections to break, which
cause failure of the pip stem.

g are field observatioms 'ddata that support the likelihood of these CPFMs:

Building was pumped continually during the flood event. The five
pipesd to t p pit are floor drain and condensate system flush drain pipes.
Since th• o tn system, no infiltration of groundwater should occur in the system.
The infiltr iundwater into the system indicates an open flow path.
" MR-5 was pur" for the duration of flooding to remove water entering into the manhole.
Known water sources included ducts from MH-31 and ducts running to the Auxiliary
Building. Pumping created a head differential.
* The flow of water into MH-5 was observed on multiple field visits. Sediment deposits (and
fish) were observed in the bottom the MH-5 when it was emptied on September 14, 2011.
The sediment could be an indication of piping and, subsurface erosion.
* A void area was observed beneath the concrete slab just north of the Security Building and
east-southeast of MH-5.
* Based on a conversation with the OPPD operations employee testing fire hydrant FP-3E on
September 13, 2011, fire hydrant FP-3C, located northeast of the Security Building, was
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.18-8
Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping Rev. 2

tested on September 13, 2011, and failed, According to the OPPD operations employee,
when opening the valve to test the hydrant, the base cracked and leaked and the valve had
to be closed. The access cabinet was tagged out for repair at that time.
0 Pavement distress was observed along the driveway corridor between the Intake Structure
and the Service Building. Distress indicators include observed slab settlement and
undermining (as evidenced by hollow-sounding pavement area).

Following are field observations and data that indicate these C

* No indications of soil subsidence or piping were obs ar

piping system for tanks FO-1 and FO-10.
* Site soils above and around tank FO-10 and around rien•
and stable. Soil probing indicated no soft spots at th
* Sediment and fish were observed in the bottom of M-H
September 14, 2011. Sediment accumulations and s
not be associated with this failure mode. The manhole was -
failed and the area was inundated with water. nt and fis
transported into the manhole with floodwa
a The observed hole in the pavement, no e Sec ild ig, co" ., been
developed by outflow from the surface .ps and associate ith these
failure modes. Temporary surface p ere Pu into the river with
hoses placed over the Aqua
I D On e di ge po r the observed hole
(verify and reference a figur eld port) centrate ge flow might have
eroded pavement and create 5 observed ho
0 Observed subsurface d dicators or kn
-€ damage in the corridor are
ntt-locatedimmediately !to the fuel st enl

Dat ed to !se CPFMs):

&PR data and reportm bee"q ed for assessment of subsurface conditions.

Seismic Survey (refrac I()graph efraction microtremor).

Ilowing table summan2 served distress indicators and other data that would increase
rase the potential for d ation associated with these CPFMs for the Fuel Oil Storage
iping system.

Adveiifta 1b, Idatioi Floodwater Favorable (Degradation/Direct Floodwater

0ly) Impact Less Likely)
Water was p M ly pumped from the Soils were firm and stable surrounding tanks FO- 1
Turbine BuilNdi*n and MH-5 and FO-10.
Slab settlement wa )tednorthwest of tank FO- No soil subsidence was noted above or adjacent to
27. tanks FO-1 and FO-10.
Data Gaps:
* Geophysical investigation data to address observed concerns.
* Geotechnical investigation data to address observed concerns.
* Existence, size, and location of voids
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.18-9
Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping Rev. 2
Conclusion

Significant

PotentialforDegradation/DirectFloodwaterImpact

None of the indicators for these CPFMs have been observed at the structures. However, voids
due to pumping of MH-5 might not have been evident at the time the field assessments.
Additionally, the extent of voids due pumping of groundw in rb uiding sump
has not been determined. Field observations indicate th tial ation has
occurred due to these CPFMs is low.

Implication

Depending on the location and extent of the subsurface er CPF

pipe movement or tilted foundations negatively impacting or intended
the Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping. Therefore, the implication otential de tion
for these CPFMs are high.

Confidence
The data at hand are not sufficient to rule ese C o a conclusion that the
Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping aror bec erm se of these CPFMs.
Therefore, the confidence in the asse sment ,which a more data are necessary
to draw a conclusion.

Summary

For discuss P, the combined consideration of the potential for

de n and the ons of adation to a structure of this type put it in the "not
"category. current1 l cted are not sufficient to rule out these CPFMs.
,erefore, the confidence above ass• t is "low," which means more data or
ntinued monitoring and in ns are necessary to draw a conclusion.

Trigg echanism 3 - .surface Erosion/Piping

CP - Loss of IA,. upport for pile foundation (due to river drawdown)
CPF der turied utilities (due to river drawdown)

The Trigge affums'm and CPFM could then occur as follows: the drop in elevation of
.the river is eooccur at a higher rate than the drop in elevation of the groundwater.
an increased groundwater gradient. This increase could allow for subsurface
erosion to occur.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.18-10
Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping. Rev. 2
Following are field observations and data that support the likelihood of these CPFMs:

* Flood waters were at a high level for an extended period of time and saturated soils under
and adjacent to facility site improvements.
" The observed void area beneath the concrete slab north of the Security Building and the
pavement distress observed along the driveway corridor between the Intake Structure and
the Service Building, support the likelihood that subsurface pi ing features/networks from
within the site to the river exist.

Following are field observations and data or site conditi in CPFMs are
unlikely:

* Tank FO-1 is located south of the Auxiliary Buildin fro t bank. Tank
FO- 10 is offset from the river bank, outside the east wa Service Bu The
offset from the river bank reduces the likelihood that own and rel
subsurface piping to the river bank will impact these compon oid spaces c
subsurface erosion would have to be significant eate conditi ause the Fuel Oil
Storage Tank system to fail.R

Data Gaps (data still required to assess the FMs):

* Gauge report data for the fuel oil ta g, reco fuel es in the tanks and
observations by OPPD emplo ke part er reuirements).

The following table describe ed distress or and r data that would increase or
decrease the potential for d n associated s for the Fuel Oil Storage

dpýwate rl mhk .h Floodwater Impact Less Likely)

Favorable (DegradationfDirect
P otei a

ended
•der andperiod
d ofntmight
adjacent to facility d soilsb een 2011.
tweenThis gap period
August in the
27, 2011 andscheduled
September 18,

river
fow
elvatons
vments. reduction of dam release rates was provided to
'•"° • "allow groundwater elevations to equalize with

' • •Riverbank is armored; bank has been

•,P protected in previous floods.
Data Gap •P
0 Obserr 9 H rbank following drawdown to normal river elevations.
Noe aftheidctrs
0 Geophysical i~ a aPfore
t hee
ation datahaveobeen
to address observed obssperved
concerns. a the sructures. Howevrnod
Geotechnical investigation data to address observed concerns.

Conclusion

Sig-nificance

Potentialfor Degradation!DirectFloodwaterImpact

None of the indicators for theses CPFMs have been observed at the structures. However, voids
due to rapid drawdown might not have been evident at the time of the field assessments.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.18-11
Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping Rev. 2
Additionally, the extent of voids created by rapid drawdown could be insignificant. The
potential that degradation due to these CPFMs has occurred is low.

Implication

Depending on the location and extent of the subsurface erosion, these CPFMs could manifest as
pipe movement or tilted foundations which could negatively impact the integrity or intended
function of the Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping. Therefore, the Aplications of the potential
degradation for these CPFMs are high.

Confidence

The data at hand are not sufficient to rule out these CP ac thatthe
Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping are or could become u d because CPFMs.
Therefore, the confidence in the above assessment is low, ns more da
to draw a conclusion.

Summary

For CPFMs 3e and 3f, as discussed above, bine ration of ntial for
degradation and the implications of that d tion to f this typ t it in the "not
significant" category. The data currently cted ar u i rule out these CPFMs.
Therefore, the confidence in the ab ass nti whi more data or
continued monitoring and inspe enecess Iraw a c u n.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.18-12
Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping Rev. 2
5.18.5 Results and Conclusions

The CPFMs evaluated for the Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping are presented in the following matrix,
which shows the rating for the estimated significance and the level of confidence in the evaluation.

Confidence High Confidence

fficient Data) (Sufficient Data)

CPFM 3c
I
CPFM 3e
CPFM 3f

5.18.6 ended

g actions are recomm dfor the FSf Storage Tanks and Piping: Review the
and geophysical dataa ess the impct on the Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping.
Lsic investigations and p I modifications are recommended to address CPFMs 3b, 3e,
PFMs are associated urbine Building basement drain piping system (Key Distress
Indicator
and 3f. N '•' ,avement failure ai ole in and near the access area southwest of the
condensate si nk (Key Dist "Iicator #2), and Column settlement in the Maintenance Shop
building (Ke y 13i ndicato ese recommendations are described in detail in Sections 4.1,
4.2 and 4.3.

CPFM 3c for fuel tank V3 1Ibe addressed under separate investigation due to the following:
1. The observed sand-boil/piping feature in the Auxiliary Building missile shield room is not
associated with or addressed in the KDI investigations.
2. The distance from fuel tank FO-1 to the access corridor, reduces the likelihood that results from the
KDI investigations could be used to rule out CPFM 3c for fuel tank FO-l.

Also, inventory control and leak detection results should continue to be monitored and compared to the
results of inventory control and leak detection prior to the 2011 flood.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.18-13
Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping Rev. 2
At the time of Revision 0, groundwater levels had not yet stabilized to nominal normal levels.
Therefore, it is possible that new distress indicators could still develop. If new distress indicators are
observed before December 31, 2011, appropriate HDR personnel should be notified immediately to
determine whether an immediate inspection or assessment should be conducted. Observation of new
distress indicators might result in a modification of the recommendations for this structure.

5.18.7 Updates Since Revision 0

Revision 0 of this Assessment Report was submitted to OPPD on ob 0 evision 0

presented the results of preliminary assessments for each Priori c assessments were
incomplete in Revision 0 because the forensic investigation an onito st of the
Priority 1 Structures was not completed by the submittal date. evis t essment Report
includes the results of additional forensic investigation
Rpr: and mon e for a
described below.

5.18.7.1 Additional Data Available

The following additional data were available for e .il Storage sad Piping for
Revisions 1 and 2 of this Assessment Report:

* Results of KDI #1 forensic investigati eae SectioET

SResults of KDI #2 forensic investigati ee Sec In.2
" Results of KDI #3 forensic in ati eS 4.3)
* Additional groundwater mo well and stge 1ev j afrom OPPD.
* Field observations of the Secti '25). n(see
" Results of falling weigh I meter investi erican Engineering Testing, Inc.

invsti ~y Geotechnology, Inc. (see Attachment 6).

s of geote ' vestiga Thiele Geotech, Inc. (see Attachment 6).
'ata obtained from eters b e. Geotech, Inc. (see Attachment 6).
sults of continued s Lamp son and Associates (see Attachment 6).

,.7.2 Additional Analys'

S FMs were identifi •Revision 0. Additional analysis related to CPFMs 3b, 3e,
and 3 ussed in Secti $ifor KDI #1, Section 4.2 for KDI #2, and Section 4.3 for KDI
#3. In a to analysis ciated with the KDIs, analysis of the additional data listed above
has clarifi i d confidence for these CPFMs. The following analysis of
additional da ted for the Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping:

" Groundwater Monitoring well and river stage level data from OPPD.

Data shows that the river and groundwater have returned to nominal normal levels.

* Field observations of river bank

No significance distress from the 2011 Flood was observed.

Priority 1 Structures Page 5.18-14
Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping Rev. 2
* Results of falling weight deflectometer investigation by American Engineering Testing, Inc.

Falling Weight Deflectometer and associated GPR testing performed in the Paved Access
Area identified anomalies such as soft clay and broken pavement. Additional ground
truthing of the investigation results were performed as part of the KDI #2 additional
investigations.

* Results of geophysical investigation report by Geotechnology

Seismic Refraction and Seismic ReMi tests perform nd perimeter of the

power block as part of KDI #2 identified deep ano that co el, soft clay,
loose sand, or possibly voids.

" Results of geotechnical investigation by Thiele Geotec

Six test borings were drilled, with continuous sampli t countered,

truth the Geotechnology, Inc. seismic investigation results as p e KDI #2 fore .sc
investigation. Test bore holes were located the deep es identified in the
seismic investigation. The test boring da y piping very soft/very
loose conditions that might be indicativ ubsurac piping o d material
loss or movement.

All of the SPT and CPT test re co .ed feAsses _ ort were compared
to similar data from numero geo echn vestigati t have been conducted
on the FCS site in previo . This comp, n did no rtify substantial changes to
the soil strength and sti er that time p • CPT test results were not
perform he top 10 f6 tect existing
.••
.r~sto dat: ared to the original baseline measurements, have not
Seded the accu e oft ometers. Therefore, deformation at the monitored
• cations since the in n of the entation has not occurred.

Results of continued surve •Lamp Rynearson and Associates.

eydata to date cop h rgnlbaseline sreshav~e not exceeded the

cy range of the su equipment. Therefore, deformation at the monitored
Ug

10 since the s ." seline was shot, has not occurred.

Updates to e ures not completed are outlined in Section 5.18.3.2.

The following pr, he previously identified CPFM 3c for fuel tank FO-1 which is not
associated with I and the new interpretation of the significance and confidence based on
the new data.

Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Piping

CPFM 3c - Undermined buried utilities (due to pumping)

A sand boil/piping feature was observed in the Auxiliary Building, missile shield room. This
feature is an indication of subsurface erosion near fuel tank FO- 1, more specifically, the fuel
tank piping into the Auxiliary Building.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.18-15
Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping Rev. 2
Significance

Potentialfor Degradation/DirectFloodwaterImpact

Indication of this CPFM has been observed. This appears to be isolated to an area inside the
missile shield room. From feature documentation and plant construction plans, the observed
feature coincides with the fuel tank piping route into the Auxiliary Building. The potential is
high that this CPFM has occurred with respect to the fuel tank pip system.

Implication

The occurrence of this CPFM could negatively impact nction el tank FO-1
piping system. Subsurface erosion occurring over a far lead t ettlement, or
broken pipes or connections, negatively impacting the int tended f the fuel
piping system. Except for the boil/piping feature, no othe bsidence or
observed inside or outside the missile shield room. There e, jication of th.
degradation for this CPFM is considered low.

Confidence

The extent of subsurface erosion and the p ial impa ctures w ot known due
to the lack of data gathered on subsurface itions. eqa inspections and a
review of surveyed data indicate n c *ove n site. tures have been
monitored and no signs of move ye en d . d. The I e of this CPFM could
be inadequate to initiate mov d associate age oft u rrounding structure and
piping system. Therefore, dence for this 'al mode is high.

the p for degradation and the implications of that

ation to a structu
've assessment is "high, type p
means p e "significant"
Imdfcto category.
sncsay The confidence in the

Revised Results a cmedain

T .s evaluated for the Oil Storage Tanks and Piping are presented in the following
mat Mi• shows the ratWg the estimated significance and the level of confidence in the
evaluati. M 3c for Oil Storage Tanks and Piping (tank FO-1) is not associated
with the ess rs. The recommendations for physical modifications to
remediate im ed with this CPFM are as follows: excavate the sand boil/piping
feature in the mis ield room to determine the extent of potential undermining; then
backfill the pipe treah as necessary with compacted granular material. Following the
implementation of this recommended physical modification, and assuming that no further
concerns are identified through the monitoring program for the Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and
Piping (discussed in Section 5.18.6 and continuing until December 31, 2011), this CPFM is
moved to the quadrant of the matrix representing "No Further Action Recommended Related to
the 2011 Flood." CPFMs 3b, 3e, and 3f for the Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping are
associated with Key Distress Indicator KDI #1, KDI #2, and KDI #3. Section 4.1, Section 4.2,
and Section 4.3 present the results of additional forensic investigation that was conducted to
ascertain whether these CPFMs could be ruled out. The results of the additional forensic
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.18-16
Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping Rev. 2
investigations show that if the recommendations for physical modifications in KDI #1 and KDI
#3 are implemented that these CPFMs are ruled out. Therefore, assuming that no further
concerns are identified through the monitoring program for the Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and
Piping (discussed in Section 5.18.6 and continuing until December 31, 2011), these CPFMs are
moved to the quadrant of the matrix representing "No Further Action Recommended Related to
the 2011 Flood."

Low Confidence e~pce.I

(Insufficient Data)

8.7.2 Conclusions

A.eassessment of the FCS Mr yes, the first step was to develop a list of all Triggering
isms
mi.e,
and PFMs that c Iave occurred due to the prolonged inundation of the FCS
sit he 2011 MissourIi r flood and could have negatively impacted these structures.
The n %was to use da various investigations, including systematic observation of
the struc. r time o eliminate the Triggering Mechanisms and PFMs from the list
or to recoin e , estigation and/or physical modifications to remove them from the
list for any par cture. Because all CPFMs for the Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping
other than CPFM .c, 3e, and 3f have been ruled out prior to Revision 1, because CPFM 3c
has been ruled out assuming the implementation of the recommended physical modifications
presented in the paragraph above, and because CPFMs 3b, 3e, and 3f will be ruled out when the
physical modifications recommended for KDIs #land #3 in Sections 4.1 and 4.3 are
implemented, no Triggering Mechanisms and their associated PFMs will remain credible for
the Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping. HDR has concluded that the geotechnical and structural
impacts of the 2011 Missouri River flood will be mitigated by the implementation of the
physical modifications recommended in this Assessment Report. Therefore, after the
implementation of the recommended physical modifications, the potential for failure of this
structure due to the flood will not be significant.
Section 5.19
Main Underground Cable Bank,
Auxit Building to Inta
Auxiliary
Structure
• .. ..... . .. .. .•_ .. .. .. . V.•...•.. ...

.; :.. .=..;
•" "=== : ''.•: • :.-=- ='•?2 ..:i;." ;" .?i=, ?-:"•:• :i•i." : •=:"•.: •!.'•w•

I
S"
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-1
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2

5.19 Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure

5.19.1 Summary of Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure

Baseline information for the Main Underground Cable Bank from the Auxiliary Building to the Intake
Structure is provided in Section 2.0, Site History, Description, -and Baseline Condition.

The portion of the Main Underground Cable Bank system covered der ect' extends from the
Auxiliary Building to MH-3 1, which is adjacent to the southwes ro - Structure. There
are two duct banks that begin at the south face of the Auxiliary ing. ucts turn 90' and
combine into one 7-ft-wide, 3-ft, 2.5-in.-deep, concrete-encas t-ba runs east to
MH-5 in a corridor between the outside face of the Turbine Bu SotWUaru. At
MH-5 the ducts are split into two separate duct banks before pen manhole. cts then
turn 900 to the north and run parallel to the east face of the Servi Southeast
of Fuel Oil Tank 10, the duct bank turns to the northeast and angl o Intake Struc
Adjacent to the southwest corner of the Intake Structure, the duct bank ma al bend tot east
and terminates at MH-3 1. The duct bank configuration etween d MH-3 1. The
size of the duct bank entering MH-31 is 4 ft 9 in wid. ep per re plan data.
The conduits from MH-31 feed into the west side ntake S From fie rvations,
MH-31 is partially filled with insulation installed 'e north aIs of the structure and
which reduces the open space of the manhole to a narr rea.

5.19.2 Inputs/References Supportin. a ,

Table 5.19-1 lists references provid PPD and othe e d to support HDR's analysis.
- Re r ain Und ound Cable Bank,
ME •
• o. . . .,df ri W•. un:
Sxilia _a•.ifRg to Intake Structure
cu "~mn~titlNF Document Date Drawing
mnmber No./
Aif 14a (i licable Page Number(s)
Ui und Duct System • 60184 • 12/13/2002 CE-79-3
Site 1qbnderground Ducts - ManholesL 12582 Unknown 11405-E-319
Outdoof ".%.g - Fence Grounding P
Undergrou' i .. & Manholes 12583 Unknown
Sections & DU ,',,..
Underground DucM• anholes • 12584 Unknown 1 1405-E-321
Sections & Details sf
Underground Ducts & 12585 Unknown 11405-E-322 SH.3
Sections & Details
Electrical Underground Duct Bank - Site 16581 Unknown 11405-S-410
Plan
Foundation-Plan Transformer Yard Unknown 11405-S-411
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 9/1986 All
Design Manual 7.01, Soil Mechanics

Detailed site observations-field reports, field notes, and inspection checklists-for the Main
Underground Cable Bank from the Auxiliary Building to the Intake Structure are provided in
Attachment 8.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-2
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2
Observed performance and pertinent background data are as follows:
* OPPD assistance is required for inspection of the electrical duct bank manholes and appurtenant
system components. Access and egress into the manholes will be required by OPPD personnel to
assist in the evaluation of the system.
" Water levels in the system require that manholes and appurtenant ducts be pumped dry before the
interior of manholes can be inspected.
* MH-5 was opened by OPPD employees and then emptied by Thiele N technical employees using
a "Jet-Vac" on Wednesday, September 14, 2011. The water 1e p . g of vacuuming
activities measured 8.8 ft from the rim of the manhole. Due size uum storage tank,
multiple trips were made to empty the manhole.
" After MI--5 was emptied, observations were made to dete if in f uld be
observed. No drainage into the manhole was observed durn 15 min er the
manhole was emptied. Approximately I hour and 10 minutes 1 a ditional
accumulation was observed when rechecking the manhole.
* The Aqua Dam surrounding the facility crossed the Undergro d Ca k.
* The Aqua Dam failed for a short period of time due to damaged, • floodwater to enter
the area inside the Aqua Dam perimeter. All surfa Undergro le Bank were
inundated when the facility Aqua Dam failed.
* Equipment outside the perimeter of the replac Aqua D undated f extended
period of time. A hole in the pavement and v '?rea ben e e slab is north of the
Security Building and east-southeast of MH- e hol oid a btside the perimeter of
the Aqua Dam that surrounded the faJ r Th iave ailre att the intersection point
of pavement jointing. The hole in t ement is ' atr-shape is more than I ft wide
both in the north-south and east f, ections. The• en hole was approximated as a
4-t-imee-b-I -i-ee o .asured by a tap ugh the hole.
* The remova
holen t is near t 'd edeatibuted
discharge to scour acreated
pump operated prior to the
by the discharge of the
pump gfo n . eriod a n one place or to subsurface erosion.

* Fir ction Cabinet FP- of the Building and east-southeast of MH-5 is located
mity to the pavement d void scussed above. The fire hydrant was tested on
mber 13, 2011 (reportedly ailed. Accrdn to OPPD operations personnel testing FP-
3• si te inspections, the ba •P-3C cracked when opening the valve. The fire hydrant
wa• .. wn and the access cb astagdo.
Concr
" e corridor that exte etween the Service Building and the Intake Structure
exhibits s that indicat ss including cracking, slab settlement, and undermining.
Pavement s g was d northwest of the Intake Structure and east of the abandoned
acid tank. A "ct a•ou
vement area was noticed east of the Service Building truck dock.
And pavement cr - evident throughout the entire area, although most of the pavement
cracking could be pret . N.mg conditions due the age and use of the facility.
* Flow into the basemenrt ump of the Turbine Building from the building floor drain system is
occurring and has a recorded history dating back to 1997.
* Settlement of a column in the Maintenance Building, north of the Turbine Building, has been
documented. The Turbine Building and the Maintenance Building are west of the corridor and
associated utility alignments within the corridor.
* The fire hydrant located in FP-3E was being tested on September 13, 2011, during site
investigations. No operational problems were observed during the time on site.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-3
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2
OPPD operation personnel, testing the fire hydrant at FP-3E, were questioned about other fire
hydrant tests. The OPPD employee questioned noted that no problems were observed for the fire
hydrant at FP-3D during testing. The information on the problem at FP-3C, noted previously, was
gathered at this time.

5.19.3 Assessment Methods and Procedures

5.19.3.1 Assessment Procedures Accomplished

Assessments were made by walking the cable bank alignm irface features of
the system (manholes) and the ground surface overlying bank. The
surface assessment included using a 4-ft-long, 0.5-in.-d r.glass T-handle
soil probe to hand probe the ground surface along the ud t areas to
determine relative soil strength. The assessment focused ying con( tý icative of
potential flood-related impacts or damage to the utility as

* Ground surface conditions overlying and immediate .y adjacei tility and its""
backfilled trench including scour, subsidenc_ 'ng, piping, and
heave.
* Soft ground surface areas (native soil, e ered fi tone gra, ement) as
determined by probing.
" Water accumulations and flows in sub ce sy IMp iholes and concrete
cable encasement pipes). A& A
0 Damage to at-grade or a and eqi .nt.
0 Variance from normal ir ina sel9 tilted, or heaved system
features and equipment.
0 s the system operational).

characterize the subsurface at the facility

itial flood-related impacts or damage were
sive geophysical and geotechnical

•. (Test reports were n " ilable at the time of Revision 0.)

Acr surveys (seismic tion and refraction micro-tremor). (Test reports were not
a t at the time of n 0.)
Geo 1 investig" including test borings with field tests (SPT and CPT) and
laborat Ss.N OPPD required vacuum excavation for the first 10 ft of proposed
test holes' ' conflicts. Test reports will, therefore, not address soil conditions
in the upper site and locations where shallow utilities exist. (Test reports were not
available at thel.me of Revision 0.)

5.19.3.2 Assessment Procedures Not Completed

Assessments of the Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure, that were
not completed include the following:

• The interior of underground cable bank manholes and connecting concrete-encased cable
pipes in the Protected Area were not inspected except for visual observations that were
possible from above and behind temporary safety railings. Manholes are a confined space
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-4
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2

as defined by OSHA regulations. In accordance with these regulations and OPPD FCS
safety procedures, manhole entry is a permit-required confined space entry and can only be
performed by appropriately trained OPPD personnel.
0 No excavation to inspect underground systems and conditions was performed.
0 No camera inspection of the system was completed.

5.19.4 Analysis

Identified PFMs were initially reviewed as discussed in Section 3. the

preliminary information available from OPPD data files and fro-
Eleven PFMs associated with five different Triggering MechaAi
"non-credible" for all Priority I Structures, as discussed in Sec ' were
carried forward as "credible." After the design review for eachj
and the results of available geotechnical, geophysical, and survey
CPFMs were ruled out as discussed in Section 5.19.4.1. The CPFN
assessment are discussed in Section 5.19.4.2.

5.19.4.1 Potential Failure Modes Ruled 0•

Assessment

All of the ruled-out CPFMs reside in the ignifica and for

clarity will not be shown in the Potential t ilure/•

Triggering Mechanism 2 - Sui

CPFM 2a - Underminin gsh
CPFM 2c - Undermined

ainurfae erososerved
Underground k. In aa e ground surface overlying
, only localized the surface
and limited alignment of thewas
erosion
observed on the ground' e across t cility. The Main Underground Cable Bank
system is constructed at ranging from about 5 to 11 ft below existing ground surface
sufficiently
sd below pot scour depths indicated by erosion features observed in
areas.

se (first time wetting)

settlement of shallow foundation, loss of structural

CPFM 7b structure/broken connections

'N"jivl

CPFM 7c - G( I site settlement

Reason for ruling out:

* Soil supporting and surrounding the Main Underground Cable Bank system has been
previously wetted. The peak flood elevation prior to 2011 was 1003.3 ft, which occurred in
1993.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-5
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 10 - Machine/Vibration-Induced Liquefaction
CPFM 10a - Cracked slab, differential settlement of shallow foundation, loss of structural
support
CPFM lOb - Displaced structure/broken connections
CPFM 10c - Additional lateral force on below-grade walls

Reasons for ruling out:

• Machine vibrations from the facility (turbine and vario u NipuleAA~storically occurred
and no indications of these CPFMs are evident.
* Pumps used on site during the flood event were ins ent to ca• d or structure
vibrations sufficient to initiate soil liquefaction. Vis ndici -o tie'action were
not observed around the areas where the pumps wer nd no o ces of
liquefaction were reported to HDR.
No structure movements indicative of soil liquefactio * t settleme
observed; no structure cracking, or lateral movements, ered.

Triggering Mechanism 11 - Loss of Soil Stre Static Liq n or Upward

Seepage
CPFM IIa - Cracked slab, differential ment ofs undation, of structural
support
CPFM 1lb - Displaced structure/broke nnect'
CPFM 1ic -Additional later eo .e owi walls

Reasons for ruling out:

• Thess ~ owed nos, distress at t[ ,'ld assessments.

# •rng Mechanir ubmer•

PM1a- Corrosio degue

ason for rulingot

.ground utilities and res are located below the design flood elevation for the
Groundwater el ns controlled by Missouri River water elevations, percolation
of'• .ecipitation• nter snow melt would be expected to contact underground
impro incltu f nstructed steel and concrete facility elements. As such, steel and
concrete•• nts are designed to withstand the corrosive environment of
groundwate d soil.
Triggering Mechanism 14 - Frost Effects
CPFM 14a - Heaving, crushing, or displacement

Reasons for ruling out:

* Utility not adversely affected due to frost heave as long as joints remain tight.
* Manholes are founded below frost level and should not heave.
" Conditions have not been changed due to flood conditions.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-6
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2
5.19.4.2 Detailed Assessment of Credible Potential Failure Modes
The following CPFMs are the only CPFMs carried forward for detailed assessment for the
Underground Cable Bank Inside the PA as a result of the 2011 flood. This detailed assessment
is provided below.

Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Piping

CPFM 3a - Undermining and settlement of shallow foundatio ab/surfaces (due to
pumping)
CPFM 3c - Undermined buried utilities (due to pumr

The Triggering Mechanism and CPFMs could occur a ws: III ially connected
seepage paths existed in the soil backfill at the site, incl kfill. i trenches,
granular trench bedding, building floor drains with open/binsmts, and pre•• 9g
defects/voids under pavement. The paths are exposed at s-, ns to the riv
(e.g., a hole in the ground north of the Security building).is n. of seepage pa
connected to several pumping sources: the sump pit the Turbine g, Manhole M-5,
and a series of surface pumps along the interior Dam per e pumps were
operated for an extended period of time, maii fferential o epage path
networks. Gradientwas sufficient to begin e n of su soil. Se s unfiltered
and erosion continues unarrested. Erosion nds out, e networ of utility
trenches, including the Underground Cabl k. Vo e cr er the pavement and
along the utility trench walls. The tia ag des se f cable bank and
manholes causing a loss of elec ectivity

Following are field observ data that sup od of these CPFMs:

•MH- for the of flooding t e water entering into the manhole.
nclude om MH-31 and ducts running to the Auxiliary
-m.This c end di .1.
e flow of water inc was o n multiple field visits. Sources of the water
were not documented.• •
Sediment deposits (and i ere observed in the bottom the MH-5 when it was emptied
September 14, 2011. T diment could be an indication of piping and subsurface
on.
* inside the Aqua perimeter was pumped dry and created a hydrostatic head
• een the side and the area outside of the Aqua Dam. The area inside
te peri as pumped from several locations creating points toward which
undergro " &subsurface flows would tend to flow.
SA void arential piping location was observed beneath the concrete slab just north
of the Securi llding and east-southeast of MH-5.
* Based on a conversation with the OPPD operations employee testing FP-3E on September
13, 2011, fire hydrant FP-3C, located northeast of the Security Building, was tested that day
and failed. According to the OPPD operations employee, when opening the valve to test
the hydrant, the base cracked and leaked and the valve had to be closed. The access cabinet
was tagged out for repair at that time.
* Pavement distress was observed along the driveway corridor between the Intake Structure
and the Service Building. The area north of where the duct bank crosses the corridor
includes observed slab settlement and undermining (as evidenced by hollow-sounding
pavement areas).
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-7
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2
The Turbine Building sump pit was pumped continually during the flood event. The five
pipes connected to this sump pit are floor drain and condensate system flush drain pipes.
Since this is a floor drain system, no infiltration of groundwater should occur in the system.
The infiltration of groundwater into the system indicates an open flow path of some sort.

Below are field observations and data that indicate these CPFMs are unlikely:
* Sediment and fish were observed in the bottom of MH-5 whe, *was emptied on
September 14, 2011. Sediment accumulations and smallfish _ bottanm of M1H-5 might
not be associated with these CPFMs. The manholesw ov Q e Aqua Dam
failed and the area was inundated. Sediment and fis w d have ,. rted into the
manhole with floodwaters.
* The observed hole in the pavement, north of the Se been
developed by outflow from the surface pumps and mi "eassociate, ese
CPFMs. Temporary surface pumps were pumping w to the river
placed over the Aqua Dam. One of the discharge poin as e eed
Concentrated discharge flow might have eroded avement and the observe e.
* Subsurface erosion paths are limited betwee Structur e Service Building.
The top of the Circulation Tunnel extend Paveme in the area are
in the range of±1004 ft. Thus, for a lar tion of idor bee- Intake
Structure and Service Building, the on, ssible s iiicrpath is rectly beneath
the pavement slab.
" Any void spaces created by s ace' ion ave to cant to create
conditions to cause the duct I fail.
* Observed subsurface da,, dicators or kn' nstanc damage in the corridor are
not located immediatel t to the Main em uct Bank.
Data 'tired to hese CPFMs):

Daask c d, await rts). The occurrence and extent of subsurface

rosion is not known ime.
Seismic Survey - refrac 0mography refraction microtremo.

Ilowing table describes ed distress indicators and factors that would increase the
n a m-iated with these CPF M tnd factors that would make these CPFMs less likely.

-grada Ict Favorable (DegradationlDirect Floodwater

Floodw• ppact , -,"Ikely) Impact Less Likely)
A hole in the •••,id space Alternatively, the observed hole could have been
underneath was 0h of the developed by outflow from the surface pumps and might
Security Building an I of MH-5. This not be associated with these CPFMs. Temporary
location was outside the Aqua Dam surface pumps were pumping water back over the Aqua
perimeter and might be a void developed Dam. One of the pump discharge points was near the
due to subsurface erosion. observed hole (see photo). Concentrated discharge flow
could have created the observed hole.
-i
MH-5 was pumped continually during the
time the site was flooded.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-8
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2
Adverse (Degradation/Direct Favorable (Degradation/Direct Floodwater
Floodwater Impact More Likely) Impact Less Likely)
Monitoring well data seems to indicate a
cone of influence around the facility that
might be attributable to the subsurface
drainage flowing to the Turbine Building
sump
Data Gaps:
* Ground Penetrating Radar data are not available at the time of.Revi determining
.in

possible void areas at the facility % w

Conclusion

Significance

PotentialforDegradation/DirectFloodwaterImpact

MH-5 was continually pumped during the flood ev created a f head differential
that created a potential direct path along the e]- %ankfor su erosion. In
addition, areas of pavement distress were ob in t or betwee ke Structure
and the Service Building that might be tie -5 pu - s, a direc .ential source
for subsurface erosion is linked to the sys .nd pote of subsurface erosion are
• located in the region of the duct ban lii t.

The Turbine Building sump, ref , ey Distr dicator 4 Iso creates a potential
subsurface erosion path tha.•. flect the elec bank it is located closest to the
facility. Groundwater momn ell readings seW . that there is a zone of
influenc ttribute d.,wdown from a rce such as the Turbine Building
-,

sumwater, - s, high head conditions created the potential for

m-nubsurfu to poin o pressure (i.e., pumped locations) during the 2011
voentia.fr.i
e ptetil ordegradatio sdr H

ationW

The • ound cable ban tructural entity. The cables in the duct bank are flexible and
some ection c rated. Small signs of distress due to this CPFM might be
noticeable )Demployees who work installing cables. A large-scale failure
vfoid
ductg -- of the cables would likely only be possible in' the case of a very
large Lar•-, •gound voids usually present surface indications of underground
distress. Therefoi "e* implication of degradation for these CPFMs is low.

Confidence

Information on the duct bank is limited to inspection information gathered from observations
made along the duct bank alignment and visual observations made through the top of MH-5
and MH-3 1. Detailed information was not available from an inside inspection of the manholes
or from information provided by OPPD employees. Therefore, the confidence in the above
assessment is low. "Low Confidence" indicates that additional information and studies are
required to increase the confidence in the above findings.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-9
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2
Summary

For CPFMs 3a and 3c, as discussed above, the combined consideration of the potential for
degradation and the implications of that degradation to the system puts it in the "significant"
category. As discussed, the potential for degradation is composed of two parts. The potential
for subsurface erosion appears to be high based on flood-induced conditions and data regarding
the Turbine Building sump and MH-5. However, the potential for subsurface erosion
impacting the underground duct bank to a point of failure without- ible signs of distress prior
to failure of the system appear to be low. The data current oil e ufficient to rule
out this CPFM. Therefore, the confidence in the above a ment ich means more
data or inspections might be necessary to draw a cclnch

Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Pipin_

•
CPFM 3d - Undermining and settlement of shallow fd`datm due to rive
drawdown)
CPFM 3f- Undermined buried utilities (due wdown)
This CPFM is similar to CPFMs 3a and 3c,, stead og, the gra' created by
rapidly receding river level.
The Triggering Mechanism and CQ s cc_. hen as fr level drops faster
than pore water pressure in the s. dation c lpate. At ie ttis created that moves
water and soil into existing defe- nd enlarges along t le bank and through the soil
toward the river via piping ,. or networks. ces include damage to
adjacent struc es such as f evtion piping, ra png, and the Trenwa.

Fiel that su e likelihood of these CPFMs are as follows:

d observation o er bank been completed since the river release rate
abilzed at 40,000 c on Oct 2011. The nearest utility installations have
notbeen
dicators.observed on a r •basis to ipect for developing conditions or distress

rvations and data or conditions that indicate this CPFM is unlikely are as
folldo ,

* US ced Mis ver Mainstem System releases to 40,000 cfs on October 2,

2011. esponding to the 40,000 cfs release rate stabilized at the FCS on
October 4,U•
0 The Main Un round Cable Bank is offset from the river bank. This offset reduces the
likelihood that rapid drawdown and related subsurface piping to the river bank will impact
the Main Underground Cable Bank.
* Soils in the area of the Main Underground Cable Bank and to the east are backfill materials
that were placed and compacted during construction of site improvements and, therefore,
would be expected to be less susceptible to rapid drawdown impacts.
* Void spaces created by subsurface erosion would have to be significant to create conditions
to cause the duct bank to fail.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-10
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2
Data Gaps (data have yet to be acquired to assess these CPFMs):

* Inspection of the riverbank following drawdown to normal river elevations.

* Geophysical surveys (GPR, seismic refraction and refraction micro-tremor) in the protected
area. (Test reports were not available at the time of Revision 0.)
* Geotechnical test borings in the protected area. Note that OPPD required vacuum
excavation for the first 10 ft of proposed test holes to avoid utility conflicts. Therefore, test
reports will not show soil conditions in the upper 10 ft of test A*Pig logs. (Test reports
were not, available at the time of Revision 0.)

The following table describes observed distress mdi, increase the

risk associated with these CPFMs and factors that w likely.

Adverse (DegradationlDirect Floodwater

Impact More Likely)
Floodwaters inundated the site for an extended
period of time and totally saturated site soils.

'for De•

nearest installation ofth " ' Underground Cable Bank system to the river bank is MH-
ated at the southwest co f the Intake Structure. The structure is located on the west
. e structure and a dire nection from the manhole to the river bank is not possible.

The n-•• is armored •s historically protected and stabilized the existing river bank.
The pote degra reduced due to these improvements.

USACE reduc River Mainstem System releases to 40,000 cfs on October 2, 2011.
River levels corre ing to the 40,000 cfs release rate stabilized at the FCS on October 4,
2011. Groundwater levels had thus started to stabilize between the termination of drawdown
reduction and the time of Revision 0. The potential for development of subsurface erosion due
to river drawdown decreases with the time due to stabilization between groundwater elevations
and river elevations. The potential for this CPFM thus decreases with time as long as
subsurface erosion has not instigated and created a flow path that will be subject to future
impacts.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-11
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2
As groundwater elevations and river elevations stabilize, the head potential between the two
conditions will decrease and the possibility of subsurface erosion will also decrease
correspondingly. In addition, the stabilized river embankment reduces the likelihood of these
CPFMs.

Overall, the potential for degradation is considered low for these CPFMs.

Implication

The underground cable bank is a structural entity. The r. : are flexible and
some minor deflection can be tolerated. Small signs of4 due FM might be
noticeable to experienced OPPD employees who work • ge-scale failure
of the duct bank and shearing of the cables would likelyM eof a very
large void. Large underground voids usually present surf WItMtions of u 6096und
distress. Therefore, the implication of degradation for tht low.

Confidence

Data are not available to make a determinatioN drawdown.

Time between the termination of the steady tion of rates amost current
time without indications of subsurface erol does not at damage is
not present. Thus, confidence with the as., ent is b0

Summary

For CPFMs 3d and 3f, as di above, the co d 0 ation of the potential for
degradation and the implicati1 4hat degradatio Wiem put it in the "not significant"
categor 4 the pot tifor degradation I sidered low because the potential
for hU.i .wate s versus river e.levations is unlikely due to stabilized
ie, and the prc)tected nature of the existing bank.
rule out1this CPFM. Therefore, the confidence
•i~~re data or continued monitoring and
inal assessmer

(water loading on structures)

CPFM 4V

The Triggering MdWanism and CPFMs could occur as follows: water level rises and imposes
additional unbalanced lateral pressure on manhole walls exceeding shear or flexure capacity of
the wall and/or causing excessive deflection or failure. Alternatively, the wall transfers load to
supporting elements, overloading them. The supporting elements fail allowing below-grade
walls to fail. These CPFMs are credible only for possible degradation to manhole MH-5. The
remainder of the system is non-structural (a poured concrete encasement with no walls, floors,
or roof structures) or was not exposed to hydrostatic loading beyond design standards (MH-31
was flooded and therefore balanced as regards hydrostatic loading).
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-12
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2
Following are field observations and data that support the likelihood of these CPFMs:
MH-5 was pumped for the duration of flooding to remove water coming in from duct banks
extending between the Auxiliary Building and MH-3 1. Floodwaters outside the Aqua Dam
perimeter were above grade and possibly created a hydraulic head condition greater than
the design standard for underground structures (i.e., hydraulic loading to the ground
surface).

Following are field observations and data that indicate these

" No movement or distress of MH-5 concrete cover w
" After pumping MH-5 dry on September 14, 2011, ni" noted over a
1 hour and 10 minute time period.

Following are observations and data still required to assess

* Visual inspection and photographs of the inside of MH-

" Visual inspection of the inside of MH-31 was no•a de.
manhole prevents access and visual inspect'
* Basis of design/design assumptions fort 0 e

The following table describes observed di s indic

risk associated with these CPFMs and fac at w a]

Adverse (Degra
Floodwater Impa
MH-5 was continually Manho lnderground
I 5-bur utilities are
designed water conditions and forces.
No leakage was noted after observing MH-5 get pumped
hdry with high groundwater conditions still existing.

FloodwaterImpact

Indicators fori> • CPFMs 4c, 4d, and 4e on only the MH-5 element of the Main
Underground Ca k have been observed. These include continual pumping from
manhole MH-5 and oodwater elevations above the ground surface outside the Aqua Dam
perimeter, resulting in hydraulic head conditions greater than the design standard for MH-5.
However, MH-5 is designed for high groundwater conditions and forces. The possible
additional forces related to about 3 ft of additional head from floodwaters outside the Aqua
Dam perimeter are not believed to be sufficient to cause degradation of MH-5 due to these
CPFMs. In addition, following pumping MH-5 dry on September 14, 2011, no visible water
inflow was noted over a 1 hour and 10 minute time period. Therefore, the potential for
degradation to the Main Underground Cable Bank system due to CPFMs 4c, 4d, and 4e is low.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-13
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2
Implication

As stated, a couple of CPFM 4c, 4d, and 4e indicators have been observed supporting low (or
unlikely) potential for degradation to the MH-5 element of the Main Underground Cable Bank
system. The occurrence of CPFMs 4c, 4d, and 4e on a large scale could result in degradation
of MH-5 including wall failure in flexure, shear, or deflection. For degradation from these
CPFMs to impact service (i.e., damage that renders electrical cables carried by the system
inoperable), degradation would need to result in complete failure elements of
MH-5 and this is not deemed likely. Therefore, the implic n : for these
CPFMs is low.

Confidence

Currently, evidence supporting possible degradation of,

Underground Cable Bank system is based on possible f
observations of physical site conditions as discussed ab(
information obtained through geophysical surveys co [
element of the Main Underground Cable Bank s
Revision 0. Therefore, the confidence in the
indicates that additional information and s are reqi
above findings. X

Summary

For CPFMs 4c, 4d, and 4e, as sed above, t bined deration of the potential for
degradation and the implic ' that degradati puts it in the "not
significant"at, . The
d tly collected cient to rule out or confirm
these -. dat a or d monitoring an inspections might be necessary to

g Mechanism 6 - t~ncy, Uplift Forces on Structures

6b - Cracked sl ab, f structural support
6c - Displaced stru,••/broken connections

PFMs could occur as follows! water level rises and water is

uplift force. This uplift force exceeds the weight of the
structure, abs to crack and buckle. Additional damage could include
structure broken utility connections.

Following are and data that support the likelihood of these CPFMs:
* MH-5 was pumped for the duration of flooding to remove water coming in from duct banks
extending between the Auxiliary Building and MH-3 1 and possible other sources. This
created a head differential.
* Water levels outside the Aqua Dam perimeter created hydrostatic uplift forces on MH-5
while it was being pumped that were potentially greater than the hydrostatic forces that the
manhole was designed to resist.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-14
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2
Following are field observations and data that indicate these CPFMs are unlikely:
* No movement or distress of MH-5 concrete cover was observed.
* After MH-5 was emptied, observations were made to determine if inflow of water could be
observed. No drainage into the manhole was observed during the initial 15 minutes after
the manhole was emptied. Approximately 1 hour later, no additional water accumulation
was observed.

Following are observations and data still required to assess these

* Visual inspection and photographs of the inside MEL

" Visual inspection of the inside of MH-31 was not a annot on the
sides of the manhole prevents access and visual ins
* Basis of design data for the system are unknown.

The following table describes observed distress indicators a!i

risk associated with these CPFMs and factors that would make th

annole
's-around the access
manhole
top of the structure that
buoyancy on the

Impact

MH-5 --ated inside t fiia Dam perimeter and was pumped continually during the
flood eve wa••60z•f-'
wtexisted outside the Aqua Dam perimeter, creating a hydraulic
head conditi e corridor within the Aqua Dam perimeter created a barrier that
prevented the , om equalizing on the inside of the Aqua Dam. The confined water
potentially transmi•? uplift forces to structures in the area inside of the Aqua Dam perimeter
including MH-5 which was pumped during the same time as the high hydrostatic forces. The
potential for degradation due to flood conditions was increased above design norms. The
potential for buoyancy forces and chances of degradation was offset by the weight of sandbags
and other materials on top of the manhole. Overall, the potential for degradation is considered
low for these CPFMs.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-15
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2
Implication

Underground structures are normally designed for groundwater conditions and will experience
buoyancy forces. In addition, sandbag installation on top of MH-5and a pipe extension
connected to the manhole opening that extended above the hydrostatic head conditions helped
weigh down the structure and offset buoyancy induced by flood conditions. No indications of
movement or distress were noted from surface observations. Since groundwater, levels have
dropped with river drawdown, the implication of degradation relaftAto these CPFMs occurring
is considered low. AI

Confidence

As discussed, the potential for degradation is considere impacts

due to buoyancy is no longer a factor. Since no apparent is
expected due to the groundwater elevations at the presentq in
results is high.

Summary

For CPFMs 6b and 6c, as discussed above, mbine for

degradation and the implications of that d ation to tli
significant" category. As discussed, the p tial f M red low because the
potential for buoyancy impacts fro°1od gmritio confidence in the
above assessment is high. WA

12b -

• 'Triggering Mechanisn PFMs c' ,curas follows: the river level drops faster
pore water pressure in t 1can dissipate. The saturated soil is elevated above the
ing river level. The slo nk of the river provides no lateral pressure support for the
s•u•a d soil. At some point ,e,,isinsufficient support on the river side to support the
sa ils. At that point, poils experience slope movements or even failure. Generally,
slope ' associated w d drawdown are relatively localized and shallow in nature;
however, failures cur.

The river stag ceded and stabilized at a level corresponding to the nominal normal
river level at 40," as of October 4, 2011. At the time of Revision 0, the groundwater
levels had not yet st ilized to nominal normal levels. Therefore, it is possible that new
distress indicators could still develop. Field observation of the river bank area has not been
performed since the river level has dropped.

The following table describes observed distress indicators and other data that would increase or
decrease the potential for degradation associated with this CPFM for the Underground Cable
Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-16
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2
Adverse (Degradation/Direct Floodwater Favorable (DegradationlDirect
Impact More Likely) Floodwater Impact Less Likely)
The Main Underground Cable Bank is in close No distress was observed at the time of HDR's
proximity to the river, site inspection.
Elevated saturated soils and elevated flood levels
provided a water source.
Data Gaps:
* Observations of the riverbank following drawdown to nominal no]
* Geophysical investigation data to address any observed con ns.i
* Inclinometer readings which that will provide an indica4,J. lo

Conclusion

Significance

Potentialfor Degradation/DirectFloodwater Impact

The river stage level has receded and stabilized

river level at 40,000 cfs as of October 4, 201
continued river drawdown is not expected t ir at a
potential for degradation for this CPFM is. ered 1(

Implication

The occurrence of this CPFM o& ge scale c01 ativel, act the integrity of the
cables in the trench. No di been obser ections, however.
Therefore, the implication 0 ntial dear, M is low.

the river bank has not been inspected for signs

`confidence for this CPFM is low.

•ed above, the combined consideration of the potential for

Efthat degradation to a structure of this type puts it in the "not
tbank has not been inspected for signs of degradation and slope
failure, thi out this CPFM and the confidence is low, which means
continued ctions might be necessary to draw a conclusion.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-17
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2
5.19.5 Results and Conclusions

The CPFMs evaluated for the Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure
are presented in the following matrix, which shows the rating for the estimated significance and the
level of confidence in the evaluation.

ain Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to

4d, 4e, 6a, and 6b. These actions are discussed, separately

* Further forensi• nd physical modifications are recommended to address CPFMs 3a

and 3c for the Ma round Cable Bank. These CPFMs are associated with unfiltered flow
of groundwater into t',l- rbine Building basement drain piping system (Key Distress Indicator
#1). These recommendations are described in detail in Section 4.1.
* CPFM 3a, 3c, 3d, and 3f are associated with the distress in and near the Paved Access Area
between the Service Building and the Intake Structure (Key Distress Indicator #2). These
recommendations are described in detail in Section 4.2.

Actions to address CPFMs listed:

* Continued monitoring is recommended to include a continuation of the elevation surveys of the

previously identified targets on this structure and surrounding the site. The purpose is to monitor
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-18
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2
for signs of structure distress and movement or changes in soil conditions around the structure.
The results of this monitoring will be used to increase the confidence in the assessment results.
Elevation surveys should be performed weekly for 4 weeks and biweekly until December 31, 2011.
At the time of Revision 0, groundwater levels had not yet stabilized to nominal normal levels.
Therefore, it is possible that new distress indicators could still develop. If new distress indicators
are observed before December 31, 2011, appropriate HDR personnel should be notified
immediately to determine whether an immediate inspection or assessment should be conducted.
Observation of new distress indicators might result in a modification .e recommendations for
this structure.
* Inspect the interior of MH-5, including walls, floor, cover,ji nd penetrations.
Obtain photographic record of conditions.
* Inspect the interior of MH-31 as practical.
" Have OPPD initiate a procedure to monitor for problems du ullinu olin
Unusual/non-typical conditions encountered or noted during c, ing operatio db
documented, reported, and evaluated for additional investiga e (i.
resistance is encountered during cable pulling, then consider vii o ca spectin of
problem and adjacent ducts.)
* Perform a detailed analysis of the pavement subgra aignmen pavement in the
corridor between the Intake Structure and the SeI
* Perform detailed geophysical analysis (GPR seismic the systeubgrade and
trench alignments if failure is suspected or if -. ent/ne ements indicate failure
due to subsurface erosion or piping.
" Review geophysical and geotechnic s t valu data as rtain to the
Underground Cable Bank.
" Observe the river bank for signsi adation and s ilur

5.19.7 Update,s ision 0m

Revision ' ssess wass" d to OPPD on October 14, 2011. Revision 0
presentof preeimmin essmen ch Priority 1 Structure. These assessments were
inco in Revision 0 because ensic n ion and/or monitoring for most of the
Pr Structures was not compl the submiItal date. This revision of this Assessment Report
inc i results of additional fore avestigation and monitoring to date for this structure as
describ w.

5.19 1dditional Data ble

The follo iti 'were available for the Main Underground Cable Bank for
Revisions 1 , s
*sessment Report:
" Results of KDN• forensic investigation (see Section 4.1)
* Results of KDI #2 forensic investigation (see Section 4.2)
" Additional groundwater monitoring well and river stage level data from OPPD.
* Field observations of the river bank (see Section 5.25).
* Results of falling weight deflectometer investigation by American Engineering Testing, Inc.
(see Attachment 6).
* Results of geophysical investigation by Geotechnology, Inc. (see Attachment 6).
* Results of geotechnical investigation by Thiele Geotech, Inc. (see Attachment 6).
* Data obtained from inclinometers by Thiele Geotech, Inc. (see Attachment 6).
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-19
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2
* Results of continued survey by Lamp Rynearson and Associates (see Attachment 6).

* Inspection reports for MH-5 and MH-3 1.

5.19.7.2 Additional Analysis

The following analysis of additional data was conducted for the Main Underground Cable
Bank:

" Groundwater monitoring well and river stage level data.

Data shows that the river and groundwater have ret 1 levels.

* Field observations of river bank

No significance distress from the 2011 Flood was obs 4

" Results of falling weight deflectometer investigation by Inc.

Falling Weight Deflectometer and associa -. Access

Area identified anomalies such as soft cl.b broke
truthing of the investigation results we 'ormed
investigations.

* Results of geophysical invesf repo by chn

Seismic Refraction and ReMi tests p ed a fthe outside perimeter of the

power block as part of entified deep a. could be gravel, soft clay,
loos , ..."Jblyvoi .

I.',.
Il %, V'Utu'%',l, 11%l'..

th conýfiW sampling of the soil encountered, to ground

ismic investigation results as part of the KDI #2 forensic
,ere located to penetrate the deep anomalies identified in the
)oring data did not show any piping voids or very soft/very
idicative of subsurface erosion/piping or related material

All of T
an &-rst results conducted for this Assessment Report were compared
to similar merous other geotechnical investigations that have been conducted
ont s evious years. This comparison did not identify substantial changes to
the soil strengthiand stiffness over that time period. SPT and CPT test results were not
performed in the top 10 feet to protect existing utilities.

Data from inclinometers to date, compared to the original baseline measurements, have not
exceeded the accuracy range of the inclinometers. Therefore, deformation at the monitored
locations since the installation of the instrumentation has not occurred.

0 Results of continued survey by Lamp Rynearson and Associates.

Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-20
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2
Survey data to date compared to the original baseline surveys have not exceeded the
accuracy range of the surveying equipment. Therefore, deformation at the monitored
locations, since the survey baseline was shot, has not occurred.

" Results of Inspection report by OPPD for MH-5:

The results of the inspection indicate no apparent damages caused by 2011 flooding.

* Results of Inspection report by OPPD for MH-31 (OPP, CR 4

Pictures of exposed concrete surfaces did not show. ions o a cracks or

damage to the concrete walls and floor. Steel cond N port • I ers were
extremely corroded. The corrosion damage was ge an t related to
the 2011 flood.

Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Piping

CPFM 3a - Undermining and settlement of shallow foundatio rfaces (due f
pumping)
CPFM 3c - Undermined buried utilities (d

Significance

Potentialfor Degradation/Direct dw a

Except for Turbine Building su - onditions in ,e to sub ce erosion no longer exist

due to present site floo ons. Site pu sour ve been removed and high
groundwater conditions no ist. The pote PFM to occur only exists in
conjunc 1. Som ons produced surface erosion might still exist
fronL Areas ed by forensic investigations with indications of
s .evsubsurface g bee
-aye sed for further investigation and repair as
b,• Recommen e s i co 0 n with KDI#2 address a majority of the areas in
stion as part of the "Pa =e ea..0 erefore, with known issues being addressed
further investigated by the implication of the potential degradation due to this
Ais low.

The un able NA structural entity. The cables in the duct bank are flexible and
some mino tion tolerated. Small signs of distress due to this CPFM might be
noticeable to W, PPD employees who work installing cables. A large-scale failure
of the duct bank earing of the cables would likely only be possible in the case of a very
large void. Large un' erground voids usually present surface indications of underground
distress. Therefore, the implication is low.

Confidence

With investigations and repairs associated with KDI #1 and #2 handling known issues, and
contingencies for expanding investigations and repairs as needed and directed by geotechnical
inspectors, confidence in addressing issues associated with this CPFM is high.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-21
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2

Summary

Forensic test results received since the issuance of the Rev 0 report have narrowed and defined
probable areas impacted by this CPFM. Recommended actions associated with the results of
the forensic reports and site inspections will address known problem areas and allow the
direction and expansion of proposed investigations or repairs as necessary. The combined
consideration of the potential for degradation and the implications to that structure or system
puts it in the "not-significant" category.

Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Pipin

CPFM 3d - Undermining and settlement of shallo dation/si to river
drawdown)
CPFM 3f- Undermined buried utilities (due to river.,.

Significance

PotentialforDegradation/DirectFloodwaterImpact

Based on groundwater monitoring data taken ith rivern and on a

continuing weekly basis, groundwater level been at a rate t ely follows
the river drawdown rate. Thus, the differe head nec eate subs' ce erosion due
to river drawdown has not occurred. The a most c ive this CPFM is nearest
the river. River bank inspections massing._ iss af o, show no
indications of this CPFM. The -cce s Arv een the, k Structure and the
Service Building" is the deve rea nearest t eb n cludes most of the utility
services that are critical to tion of the fa 0 nded actions in association
with KDI #2 1 address issu
• - are encountere, This will include instances of
subsoiL d have duced (however un kely) by river drawdown. The
pot e this occur is considered low.

underground cable bank' •rcturaefe ity. The cables in the duct bank are flexible and
•minor deflection can• be •ted. Small signs of distress due to this CPFM might be
n- . l to• experienced OPshaig•mployees who work installing cables. A large-scale failurevr
o f" ý bank and shai e cables would likely only be possible in the case of a vr
large•v . ,ge undergrq aids usually present surface indications of underground

distress. ,l ifore, the tion is low.

Confidence

With groundwater ci ta indicating the absence of a high head condition and the instigation of
recommendations associated with KDI#2, confidence in the assessment associated with this
CPFM is high.

Summary

Based on the above discussion items, the combined consideration of the potential for
degradation and the implications to that structure or system puts it in the "not-significant
category" in the assessment matrix.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-22
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 4 - Hydrostatic Lateral Loading (water loading on structures)
CPFM 4c - Wall failure in flexure
CPFM 4d - Wall failure in shear
CPFM 4e - Excess deflection

Significance

PotentialforDegradation/DirectFloodwaterImpact

Based on groundwater monitoring data taken in conjunct and on a

continuing weekly basis, groundwater levels have been,
the river drawdown rate. Thus, hydrostatic loading corm, longer exist
and the structures are designed for normal groundwaterl
susceptible to this CPFM would have been MH-5. From
manhole, no indications of this CPFM were apparent. T1
CPFM of having occurred is low since hydrostatic loads
conditions were limited. The manhole is intact, ap e rs
signs of leakage at the time of previous inspecti.
reveal significant degradation due to the 201 otential -. • dation due to
this CPFM is considered low.

Implication

As stated, a couple of CPFM 4e' dic e bee ed supporting low (or

unlikely) potential for degrad; the MI-5 e 0t
oftheASX Underground Cable Bank
system. The occurrence of: 4c, 4d, and 4e could result in degradation
of MH-5 includ4in' wall failui •ure,
shear, or ee For degradation from these
CFM• •• .. ce (i.e, d..hat renders elec cal cables carried by the system
e Iult in complete failure of supporting elements of
y. re, the implication of degradation for these

ftt monitoring well readings are now down to an elevation

Eonfidence is high that no additional impacts due to flooding
'undwater elevations and on inspections of MH-5 that
indicate

Summary

For CPFMs 4c through 4e, based on these discussion items, the combined consideration of the
potential for degradation and the implications to that structure or system puts it in the "not-
significant category" in the assessment matrix.

Triggering Mechanism 12 - Rapid Drawdown

CPFM 12a - River bank slope failure and undermining surrounding structures
CPFM 12b - Lateral spreading

The groundwater monitoring well data and river level data indicate that excess pore pressures
due to river drawdown had generally dissipated by about October 14, 2011. Field observations
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-23
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2
of the River Bank on October 20, 2011, did not identify deformation of the River Bank that
could be attributed to slope failure or lateral spreading. Therefore, neither slope failure nor
lateral spreading occurred due to the 2011 flood.

5.19.7.3 Revised Results and Recommendations

The CPFMs evaluated for the Main Underground Cable Bank from the Auxiliary Building to
the Intake Structure are presented in the following matrix, which 9ws the rating for the
estimated significance and the level of confidence in the ev atic -

CPFMs 3a and 3c for the Main Underground Cable Ba m the Building to the
Intake Structure are associated with Key Distress Indic 1. S ents the results
of additional forensic investigation that was conducted ,etr PFMs could
be ruled out. The results of the additional forensic invest :i ow that i
recommendations for physical modifications in KDI #1 nted that thes'••
ruled out. Therefore, assuming that no further concerns ar denh them
program for the Main Underground Cable Bank from the Auxiliarn g to the IntakeE
Structure (discussed in Section 5.19.6 and conti ecember 1J), these CPFMs
are moved to the quadrant of the matrix repr ee nActionmended
Related to the 2011 Flood."

CPFMs 3d and 3f for the Main Undergro able B om e.liary Building to the
Intake Structure are associated wi y s r #2. ''.2 presents the results
of additional forensic investigat'• was cond t scert ether these CPFMs could
be ruled out. The results of e t ional forensi estigati ow that these CPFMs are
ruled out. Therefore, assum r nofurther cort it ified through the monitoring
program for ain Underg . able Bank fro Building to the Intake
-iary

Struc ection . d continuing ut December 31, 2011), these CPFMs

are e them ' resenting "No Further Action Recommended
Sto the 201l•F

PFMs 4c, 4d, and 4e for t Underg idCable Bank from the Auxiliary Building to
Intake Structure are not a ted with Key Distress Indicators. Groundwater monitoring
a 4ve been gathered since evision 0 report and indicate groundwater levels have
eelow a level that ca ostatically load the system and create these CPFMs.
Imp to the effects of ing and high hydrostatic head conditions were assessed by
interna tion of MU A internal assessment of MH-5 found no indications of flood
damage a esults - dditional forensic investigation show that these CPFMs are ruled
out based on-' . - Lditions. Therefore these CPFMs move to the quadrant of the
matrix represeng• • urther Action Recommended Related to the 2011 Flood."
CPFMs 12a and 12b for the Main Underground Cable Bank from the Auxiliary Building to the
Intake Structure are not associated with Key Distress Indicators. River bank inspections have
been made and groundwater monitoring data have been gathered since the Revision 0 report.
The results of the additional forensic investigation show that these CPFMs are ruled out.
Therefore, assuming that no further concerns are identified through the monitoring program for
the Main Underground Cable Bank from the Auxiliary Building to the Intake Structure
(discussed in Section 5.19.6 and continuing until December 31, 2011), these CPFMs will be
moved to the quadrant of the matrix representing "No Further Action Recommended Related to
the 2011 Flood."
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.19-24
Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiiiary Building to Intake Structure Rev. 2

{Low Confidence High Confidence

(Insufficient Data) (Sufficient Data)

(U
U-

0
0
CL .4-.
U)

75 ,2
U)
U-.
0
a- .4.6
0
z

sessment oftt tructur t step was to develop a list of all Triggering

anisms and PFMs d have d due to the prolonged inundation of the FCS
e during the 2011 Missou r flood ould have negatively impacted these structures.
next step was to use data various investigations, including systematic observation of
ctures over time, eithe iminate the Triggering Mechanisms and PFMs from the list
o mend further inves on and/or physical modifications to remove them from the
list articular struc cause all CPFMs for the Main Underground Cable Bank
from th ary Build* e Intake Structure other than CPFMs 3a, 3c, 3d, 3f, 4c, 4d, 4e,
6b, 6c, 12b hai ruled out prior to Revision 1, because CPFMs 4c, 4d, 4e, 6b, 6c,
12a, and 12b d out as a result of the Revision 1 findings, because CPFMs 3d and
3f were ruled 0o results of the KDI #2 investigations, and because CPFMs 3a and 3c
will be ruled out w the physical modifications recommended for KDI #1 in Section 4.1 are
implemented, no Triggering Mechanisms and their associated PFMs will remain credible for
the Main Underground Cable Bank from the Auxiliary Building to the Intake Structure. HDR
has concluded that the geotechnical and structural impacts of the 2011 Missouri River flood
will be mitigated by the implementation of the physical modifications recommended in this
Assessment Report. Therefore, after the implementation of the recommended physical
modifications, the potential for failure of this structure due to the flood will not be significant.
Section 5.20
Meteorological Tower and
Miscellaneous Structures

--- 4 .4:0,

j
rI
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.20-1
Meteorological Tower and Miscellaneous Structures Rev. 2

5.20 Meteorological Tower and Miscellaneous Structures

5.20.1 Summary of Meteorological Tower and Miscellaneous Structures

Baseline information for the Meteorological Tower and Miscellaneous Structures is provided in
Section 2.0, Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition.

The Meteorological Tower is located to the far north of the owner-cnr op The tower is a
three-post truss tower extending 360 ft above grade. The base o we ed at a single
center point that is pinned to a 7-ft by 7-ft by 4-ft, 6-in.-deep s . oting nds 4 ft below
grade. Guy wires are used to support the tower against lateral The orted by
multiple wires in three directions at 1200 intervals. The tower seve 1points by
wires in each of the three directions. The top four wires extend to an 290 ft base of
the tower. The bottom three wires extend to a smaller deadman the base of
larger deadman is 8 ft by 6 ft by 4 ft deep and is located 4 ft belo a smaller dea
by 4 ft by 3-ft-deep and is located 4 ft below grade.

There is a weather tower Instrumentation Shelter loc the Meteo 1Tower. The
building is about 11.3 ft by 11.3 ft and is construct a 6-in. c slab with thickened
edge. The walls are constructed with approximat .7-ft mas

5.20.2 Inputs/References Supporting

#t nunW

Table 5.20-1 lists references provide D and othe uments. 'to support HDR's analysis.

Table 5.20-1- References MM'.-ftorological Trn. Rs•cellaneous Structures

nt Title Date Page
Al nt•itle Document Number(s)

,•, ".. •:.• alrmlicable)

A n or 100 Meter Weather To E-11 16957 Unknown F-4000
1•iL Weather Tower Electrical inmunication 16958 Unknown F-4001
Mod7 WE34keries Section "20ft" 22775 8/9/1971 C-036-020-
012
Model T-Aý'% .n 2.2774 8/24/1973 C-036-020-
________014

1Oft Boom Moun .. ea i 22776 3/26/1976 C-100-145-

______k_ 7603 26
Base and Anchor Details.. 22784 2/26/1976 D-100-036-
___760218-1
360ft T-36 Tower 22785 2/18/1976 D-100-036-
760218
Plan & Details of Weather Tower Instrumentation Shelter 41304 Unknown D-4685
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Design Manual 9/1986 All
7.01, Soil Mechanics I I I

Detailed site observations-field reports, field notes, and inspection checklists-for the Meteorological
Tower and Miscellaneous Structures are provided in Attachment 8.
Priority 1 Strucures Page 5.20-2
Meteorologica'ower and Miscellaneous Structures Rev. 2

Observed performance and pertinent background data are as follows:

* Soils aroind the Meteorological Tower were found to be soft when probed with a fiberglass
T-probe. It was possible to plunge the probe into the ground up to handle depth with little force.
* There is i large area n6rth and west of the Meteorological Tower that is lower in elevation than the
surrounding area and it still had standing water during observation.
* Several of the guy wire anchors are covered by a significant number o vines growing up the wires,
or have small trees growing around the anchor locations. Vegetation ared to have been present
prior to flooding. The vines growing up the guy wires are we b trees that are
growing are large, indicating that they have been growing f ral y
There is a seveal-inch-thick layer of sediment covering th ess roa eorological
Tower and Insrumentation Shelter; however, there was no e ge ad.
" The maximun surveyed flood elevation for the Meteorologi s not kno ever,
observation ihdicates the maximum depth was approximately ve existing th.
Meteorologi~al Tower. The maximum flood elevation at the on Shelter
approximately 2,5 ft above finish floor.
" Observatici inside the Instrumentation Shelter was ue to larg es of mold
growing itside, visible through a window in the s of stru ess were
noted.
" Design dawings show the tops of the deadm hors to of fill. g the visual
inspectin, the grade was probed at the locati f the d d one of the anchors
was fotnd to be only 2 ft under the so' er e no of ero area. Areas that
were observed nearby have several f d osite iment.
There is fencing around the Met cal Tower s e,excl the guy anchor locations,
and tie Instrumentation Shelte ation on the ce is not available. However,
based on observ it is appro 8 ft tall with of barbed wire at the top.
Minimal d d arou e of the fencing.
5 .2
.3e nt M t or c

.3.1 Assessment P res Acc shed

: sments of the Meteorolo Tower and Miscellaneous Structures include the following:

terological Tow• mertinl Shelter, and surrounding grades were visually

in September• r signs of distress.
csAre -built geotechnical reports to determine possible weak points in the
constr affected by the flood.
Probe of s grade to determine softness and consistency of soils near the
sr ctures.

5.20.3.2 Assessment Procedures Not Completed

Assessments of the Meteorological Tower and Miscellaneous Structures that were not
completed in6lude the following:

* A review of survey data to-date for indications of trends in the movement of structures.
Requested survey information for the Meteorological Tower is not yet available.
Priority 5Structures Page 5.20-3
Meteorological Tower and Miscellaneous Structures Rev. 2

5.20.4 Analysis
Identified PFMs were initially reviewed as discussed in Section 3.0. The review considered the
preliminary information available from OPPD data files and from initial walk-down observations.
Eleven PFMs associated with five different Triggering Mechanisms were determined to be
"non-credible" for all Priority 1 Structures, as discussed in Section 3.6. The remaining PFMs were
carried forward as "credible." After the design review for each structure, the structure observations,
and the results of available geotechnical, geophysical, and survey data wekalyzed, a number of
CPFMs were ruled out as discussed in Section 5.20.4.1. The CPF Al i& r detailed
assessment is discussed in Section 5.20.4.2. it

5.20.4.1 Potential Failure Modes Ruled Out PriorS

Assessment

The ruled-out CPFMs are in the Not Significant/High Co

not be shown in the Potential for Failure/Confidence mat

Triggering Mechanism 2 - Surface Erosion

CPFM 2a - Undermining shallow foun

Reason for ruling out:

* No surface erosion was visible g spe, f deposited sediment

were observed in surroundiný ,

Triggering Mechanism 3 ;
CPFM 3a - Underrinir )n/slab/surfaces (due to

dynamic Loading

Flows and velocities in the area observed were small, which is supported by the lack of
scouring. Sediment deposits several inches thick were observed on top of the pavement
surrounding the Meteorological Tower and the Instrumentation Shelter. No damage from
debris was observed. The Meteorological Tower, excluding the guy anchor locations, and
the Instrumentation Shelter are surrounded by fencing that protected them from moving
objects. A minimal amount of debris was observed around the fencing.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.20-4
Meteorological Tower and Miscellaneous Structures Rev. 2
* The Meteorological Tower and Instrumentation Shelter are no longer inundated and no
signs of distress have been observed.

Triggering Mechanism 10 - Machine/Vibration-Induced Liquefaction

CPFM 10a - Cracked slab, differential settlement of shallow foundation, loss of structural
support

Reason for ruling out:

Permanent equipment or temporary equipment that ha duce significant

dynamic forces due to vibration was not operated n Mete Tower or
Instrumentation Shelter during a saturated conditio _vehicle being
used was not observed to cause liquefaction.
Triggering Mechanism 10- Machine/Vibration-Induc
tion
CPFM IOb- Displaced structure/broken connections

Reason for ruling out:

Permanent equipment or temporary equ t that hi significant

dynamic forces due to vibration was n erated n Fower or
Instrumentation Shelter during a satur- conditi
used was not observed to caus e

Triggering Mechanism 11 f Soil Stren ue

Seepage
CPFM 11 a - Cracked sla ential settleme foundation, loss of structural
rt

ru"in•

'Visual observations shg hnent. Therefore, degradation that can be

attributed to this CPFM the Meteorological Tower.

ing Mechanism 12 - I Drawdown

,k12a -River bank, ailure and undermining surrounding structures

Reason out:

* Both str sufficient distance away from the river to not be influenced by this
CPFM.

Triggering Mechanism 12 - Rapid Drawdown

CPFM 12b - Lateral spreading

Reason for ruling out:

* Power and signal cables used by the structures are at a sufficient distance away from the
river to not be influenced by this CPFM.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.20-5
Meteorological Tower andMiscellaneous Structures Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 13 - Submergence
CPFM 13b - Corrosion of structural elements

Reason for ruling out:

The structures have not been subjected to a corrosive environment that would be considered
beyond normal conditions. The structure has been in operation for more than 30 years and
has been exposed to environmental conditions over this time.

Triggering Mechanism 14 - Frost Effects

CPFM 14a - Heaving, crushing, or displacement

Reasons for ruling out:

" The Meteorological Tower foundation is below frost

* The Instrumentation Shelter is on a 6-in. concrete slab 'di0 to heave frN
conditions. However, the conditions the Instrumentati She &e subject to hot
different than what would have occurred bef.

5.20.4.2 Detailed Assessment of Credi .tentia Modes

The following CPFMs are the only CPF ed fo

Meteorological Tower as a result e 20 od. is provided
below.

Triggering Mechanism 7
CPFM 7c - General site

The occur as follows: the soils become saturated,

passive pressure resistance. The overall capacity
J*sgn capacity.

Rower wereTound to be soft when probed with a fiberglass T-

Be probe into the ground up to handle depth with little force.
Wining the capacity of the deadman anchors against the
3 passive soil pressures in conjunction with the self weight of
the dT •pressures. The soft soils found around the site could reduce
the passI 'the soils due to loss of shear strength, resulting in a reduction
in overall n anchors.

This PFM does to the Instrumentation Shelter.

The following table describes observed distress indicators and other data that would increase or
decrease the potential for degradation associated with this CPFM for the Meteorological
Tower.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.20-6
Meteorological Tower and Miscellaneous Structures Rev. 2

Adverse (Degradation/Direct Floodwater Favorable (Degradation/Direct

Impact More Likely) Floodwater Impact Less Likely)
Soft soils around the deadman anchors.
The Meteorological Tower design is a failure-
critical structure. -_I
Data Gaps:
* Design assumptions used for the passive pressure resistance for ti iman anchors are
unknown due to detailed design information not being rew
" Information on the soils from past geotechnical reports •ai e except as
discussed in the baseline information.

Conclusion

Significance

Potentialfor Degradation/DirectFloodwaterImpact

Soft soil conditions were observed near the could re lassive

pressure resistance of the soils and, in turn, , Rchors. Since
the soils around the deadman anchors were- n due to this
CPFM is high. I

Implication

The occurrence of this *of the deadman anchors.

This could lead to the integrity or intended
functio, of the potential degradation
for t •

assumptions for the )uld not bg6ompared with existing conditions; therefore, the
hand are not sufficient le out this CPFM, or lead to a conclusion that physical
cation must be done to ie that the support for the Meteorological Tower is
H= as intended.

Summa
For CPFM 7,e above, the combined consideration of the potential for degradation
and the implicaf hat degradation to the structure puts it in the "significant" category.
The data currently ilected are not sufficient to rule out this CPFM. Therefore, the confidence
in the above assessment is low, which means more data or continued monitoring and
inspections could be necessary to draw a conclusion.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.20-7
Meteorological Tower and Miscellaneous Structures Rev. 2
5.20.5 Results and Conclusions

The CPFMs evaluated for the Meteorological Tower and Miscellaneous Structures are presented in the
following matrix, which shows the rating for the estimated significance and the level of confidence in
the evaluation.

the Meteorological Tower and Miscellaneous Structures:

Given t0j-'. onfidence Rating fofi CPFM, continued monitoring is recommended to include
elevations"". on this structure. g prpose is to monitor for signs of structure distress and
movement or, in soil condit around the building. The results of this monitoring will be
used to increase (dencekl. ssessment results. Elevation surveys should be performed
weekly for 4 week til December 31, 2011. At the time of Revision 0, groundwater
levels had not yet stabi minal levels. Therefore, it is possible that new distress indicators
could still develop. If ne tress indicators are observed before December 31, 2011, appropriate
HDR personnel should be notified immediately to determine whether an immediate inspection or
assessment should be conducted. Observation of new distress indicators could result in a modification
of the recommendations for this structure.
In addition, OPPD should provide information on how the deadmen for the Meteorological Tower
were designed (i.e., was passive pressure used or just the dead load of the anchor?). If the tower was
designed using just the dead load of the anchor, then the potential for degradation does not remain
significant indicating that the recommended survey schedule can be ceased.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.20-8
Meteorological Tower and Miscellaneous Structures Rev. 2
5.20.7 Updates Since Revision 0
Revision 0 of this Assessment Report was submitted to OPPD on October 14, 2011. Revision 0
presented the results of preliminary assessments for each Priority 1 Structure. These assessments were
incomplete in Revision 0 because the forensic investigation and/or monitoring for most of the
Priority 1 Structures was not completed,by the submittal date. This revision of this Assessment Report
includes the results of additional forensic investigation and monitoring to date for this structure as
described below.
5.20.7.1 Additional Data Available

The following additional data were available for the M logic evisions 1
and 2 of this Assessment Report:

* Additional groundwater monitoring well and river sta from OP

* Results of continued survey by Lamp Rynearson and oci e Attachme
" An Assessment Team from HDR visited the Met ological To ctober 27, 21 1,to
document current conditions in that area.
5.20.7.2 Additional Analysis

Analysis of the additional data listed abo clarif i ce and confidence of the
assessment. The following analysa Add 1d cond e Fuel Oil Storage
Tanks and Piping:

Groundwater monitori nd river stage t )PPD.

Dat, river an ' dwater have re to nominal normal levels.

* ts of conti , y by earson and Associates.

Survey data to date co to the o baseline surveys have exceeded the accuracy
range of the surveying e ' nt. The significance of this fact is discussed below.
ing Mechanism 7 - S ollapse (first time wetting)
7c - General site s tent

The folk ssessmen evision 1 of this Assessment Report indicated that the soils
were soft err••sot1 in., but there were stiffer soils below this layer that required a
substantial e t he probe rod to its full depth. These soils are within expected
stiffness levels f ted field in an alluvial setting and indicate that the soils are less
saturated than whe 'ihey were inspected for Revision 0 of the report.

The data available for the survey points that have been established are outside of the accepted
range; however, there is no constant trend that has formed. Visual inspection of the survey
points on the guy wires noted that the points were located on the turnbuckles of the wires. The
wires are easily affected by wind movement. It was also noted that standing on a vine next to
the south guy wires pulled on the wire lowering the survey point. Either of these observations
could account for the movement outside the accepted tolerance. Three of the four locations
being surveyed do not show movement outside of the accepted tolerance when reviewing the
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.20-9
Meteorological Tower and Miscellaneous Structures Rev. 2
first and last measurement taken; indicating any additional movement outside the tolerance
should not be expected. The groundwater elevation measured in monitoring wells closely
followed the river level as the floodwater receded. The data indicate that groundwater
elevation was about 2 ft above the river level near the beginning of October 2011 and receded
to the river level by about October 14, 2011. Therefore the differential head created by the
river drawdown was insufficient to facilitate subsurface erosion.

Siganificance

Potentialfor Degradation/DirectFloodwaterImpact

The initial field assessment noted that soft soils were p arou anchors.
This was accomplished by probing surrounding soils to t with little or
no resistance. The follow-up assessment for Revision 1 o sessment R icated
that, though the soils could still be considered soft, subs was needed
probe rod to its full depth. Due to the soils becoming less a firmer the p or
degradation due to this CPFM is low.

Implication

The occurrence of this CPFM could negat impact f the dea an anchors.
This could lead to movement of the anch 'd neg imý integrity or intended
function of the Meteorological To re, t licati potential degradation
for this CPFM are high.
Confidence•

Tent for 1 of this Asse Report indicates that soils are

bec r bd firme ey data available for this revision are outside of the
a rngewbut
d•itional aing
movemnen e ofathe t tend. The analysis
d tolerance of the survey
is not expected. data indicates
Overall,.the data
liable suggest that soil • ns hawe ved. Therefore, the confidence for this CPFM
ih.

Foras discussed the combined consideration of the potential for degradation

and the t i ofnt rdation to the structure put it in the "not significant" category.
The data c im Sion 0 are sufficient to rule out this CPFM. Therefore, the
confidence in 'sessment is high.

CPFM 7c for the Meorological Tower is not associated with Key DistressIndicators. The
follow-up assessment for Revision 1 of the Assessment Report indicates that the soils at the
Meteorological Tower are less saturated and firmer. Passive pressure capacity of the deadmen
is no longer reduced as much as it would have been when the soils were more saturated. The
results of the additional forensic investigation as of this revision show that this CPFM is ruled
out. However, the monitoring program discussed in Section 5.20.6 should continue.
Therefore, assuming that no further concerns are identified through the monitoring program for
the Meteorological Tower (discussed in Section 5.20.6 and continuing until December 31,
2011), this CPFM is moved to the quadrant of the matrix representing "No Further Action
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.20-10
Meteorological Tower and Miscellaneous Structures Rev. 2
Recommended Related to the 2011 Flood." In addition, the information requested in Section
5.20.6 regarding the design capacity of the deadman anchors and a review of any geotechnical
data will no longer be needed.

5.20.7.1 Revised Results

The CPFM evaluated for the Meteorological Tower is presented in the following matrix, which
shows the rating for the estimated significance and the level of co ence in the evaluation.

Low Confidence
(Insufficient Data)

Du
2

-=a

N---

N NPI

Conclusions
In the nt of the FG "ctures, the first step was to develop a list of all Triggering
Mechani uld have occurred due to the prolonged inundation of the FCS
s•-FMs,,s.
site during t ..1.. ..
.. River flood and could have negatively impacted these structures.
The next step w•,• &ata from various investigations, including systematic observation of
the ucres ove either to eliminate the Triggering Mechanisms and PFMs from the list
or to recommend further investigation and/or physical modifications to remove them from the
list for any particular structure. Because all CPFMs for the Meteorological Tower other than
CPFM 7c had been ruled out prior to Revision 1, and because CPFM 7c has been ruled out as a
result of the Revision 1 findings, no Triggering Mechanisms and their associated PFMs remain
credible for the Meteorological Tower. Therefore, HDR has concluded that the 2011 Missouri
River flood did not impact the geotechnical and structural integrity of the Meteorological
Tower because the potential for failure of this structure due to the flood is not significant.
Section 5.21
Original Steam Generator Storage
Building (OSGS)

'A
g

I
2

L
i7
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.21-1
Original Steam Generator Storage Building Rev. 2

5.21 Original Steam Generator Storage Building

5.21.1 Summary of Original Steam Generator Storage Building

Baseline information for the Original Steam Generator Storage Building (OSGS) is provided in
Section 2.0, Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition.

5.21.2 Inputs/References Supporting the Analysis

Table 5.21-1 lists references provided by OPPD and other doc sued t IDR's analysis.
Table 6.21 -1 - References for Original Steam G o geg .
DocumentrTitle d notsanOPrD
!....' ... Document•
-?,:?iii.Number,
- (Ofapplicable k-

Original Steam Generator Storage Facility Sheet 4 as7fols-053

' /2005
Original SteareGenerator Storage Facility R eug s on a c250o6-Cd021
Grade _ft
provdediAtc
Naval
DesignFacilities Engineering
Manual 7.01, Command,
2o
Soil Mechanics• 1 9 All

Detailed site observations"-fieldr I notes, a klistsfor the OSGS are

provided in Atta st uh

Obser e nt ce S t back ata are as follows:

GS is a reinforced-co tructure ts on a concrete mat foundation. No

ction documents existe survey . cdtare; efore,a"biinformation about its
was derived
srauction uShere.nstruction repair for the mat foundation and visual
"Tpevation for the OS 022 ft.
" The pe~a . = levation in 201 approximately 1006.9 ft.
"The OSGS i•. hest stt,
st od}
m the Missouri River.
" The OSGS is e e••elevation from the river.

5.21.3 Assessment a nd Procedures

5.21.3.1 Assessment Procedures Accomplished

Assessments of the OSGS include the followingr:

" Visual inspection of the exterior of the'structure.

" Assessment of collected survey data t~o-date for indications of trends in the movement of the
structure. 7:-?. :...
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.21-2
Original Steam Generator Storage Building Rev. 2
5.21.3.2 Assessment Procedures Not Completed

Assessments of the OSGS that were not completed include the following:

Visual inspection of the interior of the structure was not completed because access to the
structure is not possible. However, inspection of the interior of the structure is not
necessary to reach a confident final conclusion.

.5.21.4 Analysis
Identified PFMs were initially reviewed as discussed in Sectio The re sidered the
preliminary information available from OPPD data files and itial ervations.
Eleven PFMs associated with five different Triggering Mechano ermin
"non-credible" for all Priority 1 Structures, as discussed in Sectio e remaini were
determined to be "not applicable" to the OSGS; therefore, none w rward fo
assessment.

5.21.5 Results and Conclusions

Due to the OSGS' relative proximity to the Missou r, its e relative t oodwaters,
and type of construction, there is no PFM related e 2011 fl hat is appl le to the
OSGS.

5.21.6 Recommended Actions

In the assessment of the FCS Stru first step w velo t of all Triggering
Mechanisms and PFMs that could urred due to th undation 0f the FCS site
during the 201 1 r flood d have negativ acted these structures. The next
step was to vesti including systematic observation of the structures
over tim• to eliminat " gering • aaisms and PFMs from the list or to recommend
frthe~ igation and/or phy odificat •emove them from the list for any particular
str ere were no applicab s e rthe OSGS. Therefore, HDR has concluded
th -11 Missouri River flood - impact the geotechnical and structural integrity of the OSGS
beca otential for failure oft cture due to the flood is not significant.
Section 5.22
Switchyard

'1'L

j
S
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.22-1
Switchyard Rev. 2

5.22 Switchyard

5.22.1 Summary of Switchyard

Baseline information for the Switchyard is provided in Section 2.0, Site History, Description, and
Baseline Condition.

The Switchyard is located west of the Old Warehouse Building between drainageways to its east
and west. The drainage is channeled flowing north into culverts dr in h k. Ground
surface elevations within the Switchyard vary from approximat 2 rainage swales to
a crown ridgeline of 1007 ft. A temporary levee with an appro top at ft was constructed
around most of the Switchyard to protect it from the floodwat Sw* e discussed in
four categories: the 161-kilovolt (kV) Switchyard, the 345-kV e Sou hyard, and
general site surfacing/security fencing.

The 161-kV Switchyard is in the western section outside the temp ry ee Figure 5.
161-kV Building is located in the southwest corner of the yard. A tempor hen berm wi a 12-ft
accessible top width surrounds the 161-kV Building co o the leve 1n-kdg
has a finished floor elevation of 1005.6 ft. The eart construct econd sandbag
berm constructed closer to the structure. The sand xn was oodwater on and was
covered with plastic to reduce infiltration. Farthe h, a tra ce (T4) ada temporary
sandbag berm around it, enclosed by the levee. nts o cot berm comprised of
rock reside inside the sandbags. The san be as a oodwa ion and was covered
with plastic to reduce infiltration. Over itch Tow. d Trans ison Towers outside the
levee were subjected to floodwaters ground utiliti ten t ctures were subjected to
percolating floodwaters. Storm dr carrying flow nside the containment berm
were plugged due J .tion ofth .ipes. Parts o intake were observed at the
southwest co , odwate into the protective sandbag berms at the 161 -kV
BuildingaEtran cture olled by numerous sump pumps.
The B itchyard is in the s portion te (see Figure 5.22-1). All facilities in the
So itchyard are inside the te *. levee. "insformer structure (TI) is located in the
so 9.comer. A pre-existing oil ' inment berm comprised of rock surrounds the transformer.
Storm 1 es carrying flow from aea inside the containment berm were plugged due to
inundatid outlet pipes. Parts storm a observed at the southwest containment
area. A se •hnsformer structu, )is located in the southeast corner. An oil containment berm
comprised of r . ounds the"41g.•
j-,- fier. Storm drain pipes carrying flow from the area inside the
containment berm lugged.% inundation of the outlet pipes. An erosion channel in the west
bank of the drainage .# t.was observed as possibly the outlet for the storm outlet pipe. Parts
...
of the storm intake wer ed at the northeast containment area. The South Switchyard area has
overhead Switch Towers af Transmission Towers that were subjected to saturated subgrades.
Underground utilities between the structures were subjected to percolating floodwaters. A manhole
structure southwest of T2 had the lid removed and was being pumped at the time of the inspection. A
precast trench heads west from the manhole to another vault in the southwest corner of the Switchyard.
The lids from the precast trench have been removed and are adjacent to the trench. The precast trench
opening into the manhole is open. The trench is nearly full of sediment the farther the distance from
the manhole, with water up to the top surface at the west end. The visual appearance of the sediment
in the trench suggests that the manhole pump pulled in the sediment from around the trench until the
pump was turned off and the water drained out, leaving the sediment. Low areas inside the levee on
the south and east end have ponded water up to a few inches deep.
 *
Power Pole
*
Light Pole
# Sandbag
O•oTernporary Levee
X- Fence
0
Utilities Power Transformer
04
Ea 345 Ckt Brkr
=- 161 Ckt Brkr
U, r-lArea Boundaries 135 270 I
U)
Structures S"M IFeet I
|
No Priority Assigned
Priority i DATE
Priority 2 Switch Yard Detail
Fort Calhoun Station Oct 2011
Utilities
No Priority Assigned
FIGURE
-Priority
I Omaha
Public Power
Disbict Plant and Facility Geotechnical
Priority 2
& a
and Structural Assessment HRx 5.22-1
&
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.22-3
Switchyard Rev. 2
The 345-kV area of the Switchyard is the largest area. All facilities in the 345-kV Switchyard are
inside the temporary levee. In the southwest section of the Switchyard is the 345-kV West Building.
To the east of this building is the 345-kV East Building. The 345-kV West Building has a finished
floor elevation of 1005.75 ft. The 345kV East Building has a finished floor elevation of 1007.5 ft.
Sandbag berms were constructed around the 345-kV East Building and the 345-kV West Building even
though they are inside the levee. A 161-kV transformer and towers are situated slightly east of 345-kV
East Building. An oil containment berm comprised of rock surrounds the transformer. Parts of a
storm intake were observed at the southeast containment area. A Shunt tor is situated in the
northeast corner of the 345-ky area. An oil containment berm co ~se unds the Shunt
Reactor. Storm drain pipes carrying flow from the area inside tai were plugged
due to inundation of outlet pipes. A crushed corrugated metal ayligh drainageway to
the east was observed after water levels subsided. Parts of the in re d at the
southeast containment area. The 345-kV Switchyard area has o tch To
Transmission Towers that were subjected to saturated subgrades. ound utilitie e t
structures were subjected to percolating floodwaters. Because o provision
drainage, low areas inside the levee on the east end have ponded water up dep ow
inside the levee on the western edge had shallow pondedNmero sumps were utilized
the berms and the levee to remove infiltration.
inside

No drawings are available to determine if the r, cing has improveiWhscompleted

prior to placement. It could not be determined 1rushed r a laced on a geotextile
fabric. The Switchyards (161-kV, 345-kV, c i) are s dfencing. Parts of the
fencing had been reworked due to flood i eg fencin outheast comer of the
Switchyard was removed to construct p leve tempora ate and fence were placed
after the construction of the tempor e. tyfe.• was ed along the entire north end
of the Switchyard starting nearcthe n c f the, hyard where the temporary
levee was const orary fe constru ide the levee from the 161 -kV
permanent .g. ost att comer of the Switchyard. The temporary fence
accumula is inclu i oles, hes, wooden pallets, and trash from floodwaters
comin _ e site. Some of ic was dby sump pump piping strung over the top of the
pumped floodvm

52 .. ,/References Suppo e Analysis

Table 5.: references proA TPD and other documents used to support HDR's analysis.
• Tat
I - References for Switchyard Page
AQnf TKifl
OPPD Document Date
Date Page.
NumberN Number(s)
-- (if applicable) nnw
IlnTpgah 45S21
Site Plan Topography Sitei 45711 Unknown 11405-S-251,
Sheets 2.3
Switchyard Area Grading Plan 8/23/1968 11405-S-279
Plan General Site Grading 8/23/1968 11405-S-283
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 9/1986 All
Design Manual 7.01, Soil Mechanics

Detailed site observations-field reports, field notes, and inspection checklists-for the Switchyard are
provided in Attachment 8.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.22-4
Switchyard Rev. 2
Observed performance and pertinent background data are as follows:

* For the duration of the 2011 flood event, the 161-kV Switchyard area was inundated by
floodwaters. The temporary levee construction access blocked water from flowing across the
Switchyard. The 161-kV Building and transformer structure had sandbag berms constructed to
protect these structures from inundation. Sump pumps continually pumped seepage water back
over the berms.
" For the duration of the 2011 flood event, the 345-kV and South Swit rd areas were protected by
the temporary levee. Security fencing along the northern edg e as reworked due
to flooding. Some of the permanent fencing was removed t ct . Temporary
security fencing along this perimeter collected floating de the fib oming in to the
site.
* The Shunt Reactor, TI through T4 Transformers, and the sp ansform unded on
augered cast-in-place piles supporting a mat foundation.
* The other Switchyard structures are supported by 2- to 5-ft-d d piers 5 to
* The buildings are supported by shallow continuous spread footings e to frost dep a
grade-supported slab.

5.22,3 Assessment Methods and Procedures

5.22.3.1 Assessment Procedures Ac fished

Assessments of the Switchyard i. d th o low

" A visual inspection of general to o smkh d soft subgrade areas.

* A visual inspection oft . r of the build
" A vis n of the of the buildin ctures.
lcture.
ected su ta to-date
.
for indications of trends in the movement of

eview of previou mente 'on reports, as-built building plans, and

geotechnical reports to •ine poss ak points in the buildings' construction that
could be affected by the ]

i al•.,investigations wer ormed. These included the following non-invasive

gIand invasive geo cal investigations;

Geo I investi cuding test borings with field tests (SPT and CPT) and
laboratb• w pleted near the Switchyard. Note that OPPD required vacuum
excavatior Jten feet of proposed test holes to avoid utility conflicts. Test reports
will thus not' soil conditions in the upper ten feet of site and locations where
shallow utilitiesexist. (Test reports were not available at the time of Revision 0.)
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.22-5
Switchyard Rev. 2
5.22.3.2 Assessment Procedures Not Completed

Assessments of the Switchyard that were not completed include the following:

" Pump water out of underground utilities for further investigation. Floodwater elevations
are not sufficiently below grade to allow pumping utilities dry without continued
infiltration. Priority of staff is pumping Protected Area utilities.
* Geophysical testing such as GPR or seismic refraction was no nsidered necessary for the
Switchyard.A" k, &
5.22.4 Analysis

Identified PFMs were initially reviewed as discussed in Secti Ithe

preliminary information available from OPPD data files and Mons.
Eleven PFMs associated with five different Triggering Mech
"non-credible" for all Priority 1 Structures, as discussed in S
carried forward as "credible." After the detailed design revi
inspections, and the results of available geotechnical,g a
number of CPFMs were ruled out as discussed in Se
detailed assessment are discussed in Section 5.22.4

5.22.4.1 Potential Failure Modes Ruld ut Pric the Detailed

Assessment A

The ruled-out CPFMs reside d category and for clarity

will not be shown in the PoM

2 - Si rosion
S ndation/slab/surfaces
ppo
:d utili• e foundation

was protected by the temporary levee or sandbag berms.

l-kV Switchyard was inundated, but there was no flow over

* No was observed during the field assessments.

Triggering MA.IR• • - Subsurface Erosion/Piping

CPFM 3e - LU. l lq
ateral support for pile foundation (due to river drawdown)

Reason for ruling out:

* The Switchyard is a sufficient distance from the river to be outside the zone of influence of
the CPFM.
Priority I Structures Page 5.22-6.
Switchyard Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Piping
CPFM 3f- Undermined buried utilities (due to river drawdown)

Reason for ruling out:

* The Switchyard is a sufficient distance from the river to be outside the zone of influence of
the CPFM.

Triggering Mechanism 5 - Hydrodynamic Loading

CPFM 5a - Overturning
CPFM 5b - Sliding
CPFM 5c - Wall failure in flexure
CPFM 5d - Wall failure in shear
CPFM 5e - Damage by debris
CPFM 5f- Excess deflection i

Reason for ruling out:

* The majority of the Switchyard was prol

The northwest corner of the 161-kV S ad was
the site.

Triggering Mechanism 7 - Soil ps tI

CPFM 7a - Cracked slab, di is lenit shallo)& idhIion, loss of structural
support
CPFM 7b - Displaced roken connl
CPFM 7c - General sitet
CP n-. ckling drag

ruling

There was potential forI me wi some of the fills above el. 1003.3; however,
no settlement was obser

ng Mechanism 10 - hine/Vibration-Induced Liquefaction

lOa - Cracked sla] erential settlement of shallow foundation, loss of structural
support
CPF1X DisplaA, mcture/broken connections
CPFI4 up instability

Reason for

* The Switchyard has not been subjected to machine vibrations, and no liquefaction was
observed on site. Therefore, machine/vibration-induced liquefaction failures are not
credible.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.22-7
Switchvard Rev. 2

Triggering Mechanism 11 - Loss of Soil Strength due to Static Liquefaction or Upward

Seepage
CPFM 11 a - Cracked slab, differential settlement of shallow foundation, loss of structural
support
CPFM 1lb - Displaced structure/broken connections
CPFM lId - Pile/pile group instability

Reason for ruling out:

0 Liquefaction was not observed at the site.

Triggering Mechanism 12 - Rapid Drawdown

CPFM 12a - River bank slope failure and und sti
CPFM 12b - Lateral spreading

Reason for ruling out:

* The Switchyard is located a sufficient dista n the therefore is

outside the zone of influence of a bank sl,

Triggering Mechanism 13 - SubmergenI

CPFM 13a - Corrosion of undergroun• I
CPFM 13b - Corrosion of stru I el .ts

Reason for ruling out:

0 The Switchyard has not jected to corr Wances that would be considered

or , ement

ation systems are below frost level. Therefore, frost effects

and foundation conditions. The structures have always

rature with moist to saturated soils.

ment of Credible Potential Failure Modes

The following CPP s are the only CPFMs carried forward for detailed assessment for the
Switchyard as a result of the 2011 flood. This detailed assessment is provided below.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.22-8
Switchyard Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Piping
CPFM 3a - Undermining and settlement of shallow foundation/slab/surfaces (due to
pumping)
CPFM 3b - Loss of lateral support for pile foundation (due to pumping)
CPFM 3c - Undermined buried utilities (due to pumping)

The Triggering Mechanism and CPFMs could occur as follows: the site soils are erodible, and
some of the gradients may be sufficient to facilitate erosion. If se ge is unfiltered and
infiltration continues unarrested, voids could develop. Du th -jknown pumping
points throughout the site, voids that develop could resu °'ndations.
de

The following table describes observed distress indicat d otlt uld increase or
decrease the potential for degradation associated with the S)

Adverse (DegradationlDirect Floodwater legradatiorce

6act Lessl_
Impact More Likely)
K'&ard structures
A substantial amount of sand was observed ofvth'e
inside electrical trenches that were connected to a )v an ear
manhole that was being pumped. A
Voids at conduit locations around the 161 -kV
Building were observed in the general vicini
pump locations. i

Voids were observed around the

transformer pad.
Data Gaps:
a Site grade=nstruction is n'

As have been observed. The sand in the trench after

m the soils surrounding the trench, therefore, the
CPFMs has occurred due to the 2011 flood is high.

The occurrence • CPFMs on a large enough scale could negatively impact the trench
structure. This cou id lead to excessive trench unit movement and negatively impact the
integrity of the utility. Therefore, the implication of the potential degradation for these CPFMs
is high

Confidence

The extent of subsurface erosion and its potential impact to the utilities in the Switchyard is not
known due to the lack of data gathered on subsurface conditions. Since there is not enough
information on the subsurface conditions at this time and the pumping on site could have
caused undermining and/or settlement, the confidence for these CPFMs is low.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.22-9
Switchyard Rev. 2
Summary

For CPFMs 3a through 3c, as discussed above, the combined consideration of the potential for
degradation and the implications of that degradation to a structure of this type puts it in the
"significant" category. There is low confidence that there has been significant degradation to
the soil surrounding the Switchyard due to the lack of test data available at this time. More
data or continued monitoring and inspections are needed.

5.22.5 Results and Conclusions

The CPFMs evaluated for the Switchyard are presented in the rig m; h shows the
rating for the estimated significance and the level of confidenc

Low Confidence mce

(Insufficient Data)
CPFM 3a
CPFM 3b
CPFM 3c

U-

0
Z

5.22.6 Rpcomn ~ ctioA

The following actionw iended for the Switchyard:

Given the Low Confidence'kRating for these CPFMs, continued monitoring is recommended to
continue elevation surveys on this structure. The purpose is to monitor for signs of structure distress
and movement or changes in soil conditions around the building. The results of this monitoring will be
used to increase the confidence in the assessment results. tlIevation surveys should be performed
weekly for four weeks and biweekly until December 31, 2011. At the time of Revision 0, groundwater
levels had not yet stabilized to nominal levels. Therefore, it is possible that new distress indicators
could still develop. If new distress indicators are observed before December 31, 2011, appropriate
HDR personnel should be notified immediately to determine whether an immediate inspection and/or
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.22-10
Switchyard Rev. 2
assessment should be conducted. Observation of new distress indicators may result in a modification
of the recommendations for this structure.

5.22.7 Updates Since Revision 0

Revision 0 of this Assessment Report was submitted to OPPD on October 14, 2011. Revision 0
presented the results of preliminary assessments for each Priority 1 Structure. These assessments were
incomplete in Revision 0 because the forensic investigation and/or monit p g for most of the
Priority 1 Structures was not completed by the submittal date. Thi evi th* ssessment Report
includes the results of additional forensic investigation and moni to s structure as
described below.

5.22.7.1 Additional Data Available

The following additional data were available for the Swit evisions 1
Assessment Report:

" Additional groundwater monitoring well and e level da PPD.

* Results of geotechnical investigation by (see A t 6).
* Results of continued survey by Lamp on and es (see A ent 6).

5.22.7.2 Additional Analysis

The following analysis of additi was con for the ar

* Groundwater monitor' d river sPPD.

Dat river a dwater have re to nominal normal levels.

sdaatigai
of geotu ele
Geotech, Inc.
ra1geof the g equiCP mesnt. T for this Assessment Report were compared
to similar data from nuh inother R eotvhnical investigations that have been conducted
n the FCS site cin previof s. This comparison did fotheentify substantial changes to
oil strength and stiffnie er that tithe period. SPT and CPT test results were not
cniec based in the top 10 f protect existing utilities.
•Res. tinued ."y Lamp Rynearson and Associates.
SurveyN " ''•d pared to the original baseline surveys have exceeded the accuracy
range of the' ,g equipment. The significance of this fact is discussed below.

Three CPFMs were identified in Revision 0. Since Revision 0, additional data have become
available which has clarified the significance and confidence for these CPFMs. The following
presents the previously identified CPFMs and the new interpretation of its significance and
confidence based upon the new data.•
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.22-11
Switchyard Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Piping
CPFM 3a - Undermining and settlement of shallow foundation/slab/surfaces (due to
pumping)
CPFM 3b - Loss of lateral support for pile foundation (due to pumping)
CPFM 3c - Undermined buried utilities (due to pumping)

The data available for survey points have shown no movement outside the accepted tolerance
levels except the following point: TW 29. TW 29 is a 161-kV p the southeastern comer
of the Switchyard. The data for TW29 show that there wa el c e between the
first and second survey. Data have held steady since. inal ey data point was
taken when the area around the pole was flooded. Bas the con follow-on data
point elevations in non-flooded conditions, we believe e baeb elevation does
not correlate with later data and is an error.

SPT and CPT test results did not identify substantial ch, strength A
SPT and CPT test results were not performed in the top Feet ; existing L

The groundwater elevation measured in the mo the river level as

the floodwater receded. The data indicate th 1 ft above the
bout
river level near the beginning of October 20 d rece
October 14, 2011.

CPFMs 3a through 3c for the Swit d t as vit tress Indicators.

Results of survey data, nearby g ical ata, 'r n ormg, and nearby field
inspections do not indicate s* tructure mo t h investigation
- verse effects that could be
attributed to these CPFMs. Its of the add show that these
CPFMs .. ut. Thereto•muming that no cems are identified through the
5.22.6 and continuing until
t of the matrix representing "No
I Flood."
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.22-12
Switchyard Rev. 2
5.22.7.1 Revised Results

The CPFMs evaluated for the Switchyard are presented in the following matrix, which shows
the rating for the estimated significance and the level of confidence in the evaluation.

Low Confidence High Confidence

(Insufficient Data) (Sufficien Data)

.M

0'
aC

CPf
CPf
LL

0
z

.7.2 Conclusions

e assessment of the FCS i~tures, the first step was to develop a list of all Triggering
isms and PFMs that c ave occurred due to the prolonged inundation of the FCS
g the 2011 Missouri flood and could have negatively impacted these structures.
The was to use dat- various investigations, including systematic observation of
the s ver time, e .i eliminate the Triggering Mechanisms and PFMs from the list
or to recon rthr igation and/or physical modifications to remove them from the
list for any MDtýre. Because all CPFMs for the Switchyard other than CPFMs 3a,
3b, and 3c had e• out prior to Revision 1, and because CPFMs 3a, 3b, and 3c have been
ruled out as a resul the Revision 1 findings, no Triggering Mechanisms and their associated
PFMs remain credible for the Switchyard. Therefore, HDR has concluded that the 2011
Missouri River flood did not impact the geotechnical and structural integrity of the Switchyard
because the potential for failure of this structure due to the flood is not significant.
r

Section 5.23
Transmission To wers

KK 7ý.
.. P

7:A
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.23-1
Transmission Towers Rev. 2

5.23 Transmission Towers

5.23.1 Summary of Transmission Towers

Baseline information for the Transmission Towers is provided in Section 2.0, Site History,
Description, and Baseline Condition.

The following three types of transmission towers reside on the pro

345kV Lattice Transmission Towers

There are four 345 kV lattice transmission towers labeled U n rty. The
superstructure is constructed of a tapered steel truss frame t o an un eight due
to the lack of available drawings. The trusses are supported o t each of the l
The piers are founded on pile caps below grade which are su ing pile
arrangements.
Pile Piles
depths below theare
pile12cap
in. range
in diameter andtothe
from 20 69 pile pecity
f. material/ for the • are u
onsincaen
uplift piling option that may be implemented on cof the to eexact pile
group type and uplift piling location forracho 0

161kV Single Pier Transmission Towers

There are numerous single column tr e"s tHe proper superstructures are
oge- galvanized steel colut e xsend t nknownsa ue to lack of available
drawings. Th e supolrd by ah e appicaion
bed thetwo
f o Turbine Building South
Switchyard and the Switchyardhat orted on a sise ;Q advanced to depths
varying from 2 55 ft. Th• a ve vertical al I reinforcing for the full depth.
5.3.r2d snformation design for the 16 1kV
transmb
.2d lel s5edad heothest r d north of the site is unknown.

Q ost Wood Transmi2 ers

6al dul-omnwooden er existn the property. No drawings are available for
•oweefowhti n n the standard installation of these towers, they are
pr be supported by a dir• bed application of the wood pole in soil. Bottom portions
of the , ole are encased in al sleeve.
5.2.2 I'pu•s the Analysis

Table 5.23-1 lists re • , ted by OPPD and other documents used to support HDR's analysis.

TM6 5.23-1 - References for Transmission Towers

Document Title OPPD Document Date Page
Number Number(s)
(if applicable)
161 kV Transmission Line Anchor Bolt C-8140-1 5/26/2004
Foundations
Transmission Plan & Profile Lines 70 & 76 2/3/2011 N/A
Circuit I
345kV Foundations for Lattice Towers E-4600 6/17/1968
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.23-2
Transmission Towers Rev. 2
Table 5.23-1 - References for Transmission Towers
Document Title OPPD Document Date Page
Number Number(s)
(if ap licable)
345kV Foundations for Lattice Towers Pile E-4602 6/17/1968
Foundation Table
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 9/1986 All
Figure 5.23-1 7.01, Soil Mechanics
ManualdDesign 10=20141'& AN/A

Detailed site observations-nfield reports, field notes, and anspehepsi the Transmission
Towers are provided in Attachment 8.

Observed performance and pertinent background follows beloe.

The *to wers inundated

ae with water for the duration of the the ember, o
Figure 5.23-1, Sheets I through 3):

-TowerST #70 8-,

which hado woatersot
nn n the h ntr buto
shoed novlent

water marks on the tower or pier an ege I'l ISprest-

e Some towers were still inundated wml •r aa e reach inicservation during the
site inspection (see Figue 5.23-1tS 1 through 3
0 The posts of the double wood R smisslon Toa 9 08 appeared saturated
extending svrlfeet above gra
• Aseset
Soils arou f ernmsinTwesicue
" the ex h following
of those in payee areas and those that were not in
inundat. •--e soft od with a fiberglass probe. The probe was

Si, the towers are supp gydn he towers with guy acoswr bevdt
S ead man anchor except '• •STE; #122, S # 13,. STS # 14, and STS #25 which have
201emforksgs
=,anchor of dsge
dis
toeor pess.
foundations. ' • vg s r
*Li•' oe• i•aln
:ce erosionr was noted ill! ,egne
bserve areas. Most areas had deposited sediments.

5.23.3 Ass;s ethos fed ures

5.23.3.1 •cedures Accomplished

Assessments t .rofnsmission Towers included the following:

" The towers and surrounding grades were visually inspected in August and September of
2011lfor signs of distress.
• An assessment was made of collected survey data to-date for indications of trends in the
movement of the structures.
r

Section 5.24
iam Underground Cable Bank.
A.7-
Au. t ar..... ..;

N. • •/.9v
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.24-1
Main Underground Cable Bank, MH-1 to the Auxiliary Building Rev. 2

5.24 Main Underground Cable Bank, MH-1 to Auxiliary Building

5.24.1 Summary of Main Underground Cable Bank, MH-1 to Auxiliary Building

Baseline information for the Main Underground Cable Bank from MH-I to the Auxiliary Building is
provided in Section 2.0, Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition.

The portion of the Main Underground Cable Bank system covered under ecti t:extends from
MH-1 to the Auxiliary Building. M-I is located near the southet-•or me itchyard. A duct
bank from the switchyard connects to the north wall of MH-1.'l. is loca. ., aofMH-I1 and west
of the old warehouse. The duct bank between MH-1 and MH-aoouted eeaa 'e rthwest comer
of the new Maintenance Garage and King Tut Wall. From I s edas nds to MH-
3, which is located inside the Rad Waste Building. Between MH-t.•• -L-3,the dufi• croses
beneath the old warehouse addition, the site perimeter and securi nd the "Tren
trench. From MH-3 the duct bank is routed to the south and out o e Waste Buildi
MH-4. At MH-4, the cabling turns east 900 and extends east to the point heturns 90a
terminates outside of the Auxiliary Building. Outside o RuxRi•ary Buildi duct bank turns
vertically upward and terminates above grade in a pul..AN f the duct rminate in the
pull box adjacent to the Auxiliary Building are set a, 005.0 karingto dra'jgnl 1405-E-320.
.

The duct bank between MH-4 and the Auxiliary Building runs daacefi e face of ie Auxiliary
Building. A "Missile Shield Room" addition to t Iadn4lt subsequent to
construction of the duct bank and is locat rect]S er the in Und V~able Bank.

5.24.2 Inputs/References Supporting the Analysis ,

Table 5.24-1 lists references provide' PD and other d'l. ,used to support HDR's analysis.
Table 5•42•Rifi ~s~for Main UiarIground Cable Bank, MH-1 to Auxiliary Building
DocumehtT ' OPPD Date Page
Document Number(s)
(if applicable)
Un gud Duct System 60184 12/13/2002 CE-79-3
Desel'Ghrator Enclosure Plan & Detk H-s'SH-
1 24002 Unknown 13007.18-EC-
1-8A-,1
Site Plan UnZt
!qnd Ducts - Manl_ eý utdoor 12582 Unknown 11405-E-319
Lighting-Fence Gr}tdig
Underground Duc-M hI ons & Details, SH 12583 Unknown

Undergroundosr
Ducts & ations-fiectlons & Details, SH 12i584 Unknown 11405-E-321,
2 ClB SH. 2
Underground Ducts & Manhole Sections & Details 12585 Unknown 11405-E-322,
SH. 3
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Design Manual 9/1986 All
7.01, Soil MechanicsIIII

Detailed site observations--field reports, field notes, and inspection checklists--for the Main
Underground Cable Bank from MH-1I to the Auxiliary Building, are provided in Attachment 8.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.24-2
Main Underground Cable Bank, MH-1 to the Auxiliary Building Rev. 2
Observed performance and pertinent background data are as follows:

* Groundwater was observed flowing into the basement sump of the Turbine Building from floor and
condensate drain pipes not designed to intercept groundwater. This condition has a recorded
history dating back to 1997. For further information see Section 5.8. A more detailed discussion
of this Key Distress Indicator is presented in Section 4.1.
* Settlement of a column in the Maintenance Building, north of the Turbine Building, was
documented by OPPD and HDR personnel. A CR describing the eve, ondition, and related
issues was created by OPPD and is on record. The Turbine Building M•I enance Building
are located east of the Auxiliary Building. A more detailed dis.ision o ' y Distress
Indicator is presented in Section 4.3
The Main Underground Cable Bank (MH-4 to the Auxiliary'.4dig, ýn er the Auxiliary
Building Missile Shield Room.
* The Main Underground Cable Bank alignment, where it passes ea the Missil i o
is located adjacent to fuel oil tank 1 (FO-1) and the associate e iping.
" A sand boil/piping feature was observed (originally reported in CR 2' 65) near the so est
comer of the Auxiliary Building, in the Missile Shie • - This roo ii ated along the south
wall of the Auxiliary Building and has an unfinish 21 fioor surfa 'el oil storage
tank FO-1 is located outside the Missile Shield Ream, with elep iping ent-m, einthe
room below
floor elevation near the observed boil/iping fe~kilfe.
* The Aqua Dam surrounding the facility crossed.Ke Main n"rgr6, d@-able Bank.
* The Aqua Dam failed for a short period. f time'duie to beiig damag iatl.No ,ing floodwater to enter
the area inside the Aqua Dam perimef.urfaces ab4 ] e Main Un rgrcound Cable Bank were
inundated with water when the A qu ILm failed. •
King tut blocks (20 to 25 thousanfitl&odnds per block) I o ae a, t to the Protected Area fence
at the northeast epd of the site wefhed onto trucks sper load) and removed from
this area on,,';, W ' 4 2011. T•e•sessment team observed and photographed this operation.
Pavemerx~di'j m6l
ein dlection wi•iKitobserved during the lifting or removal of these
blocksaA'_ditionally, defTc 6n of as not observed where loaded trucks crossed
varoi ility alignments wlhySiting the
*1 "was opened and pumpedot~i y OPPD enci6yees on Wednesday, September 7, 2011. The
'IIvel prior to beginning pufiping activities was level to the bottom of the manhole concrete
cov~er ording to OPPD employ.:suestioned while observing pumping operations.
*MH-~aslso opened and pumpgb, t by OPPD employees on Monday, September 13, 2011. An
OPPD e, pl5y.ee entered MH-1 aI 4ý4gotographed the interior walls once the manhole was emptied.
The emplO no~ted that craqks:djcent to the cable duct openings were a pre-existing condition
that existed pfiSo6t-he 20,14406W event.
MH-1 pump dischfar.S ituted to a large swale located along the east side of the switchyard.
The water level wassgific'Wantly lower than the rim and cover of the manhole at the time of initial
pumping. Water level ii the swale had dropped an additional 1 ft or 2 ft lower at the time of the
second pumping.
* Pumping operations to empty the manhole required emptying the connecting duct banks and
adjoining manholes to the level of the connecting ducts.
• OPPD employees pumping MH-I the first day stated that MH-2 had been pumped dry the day
prior.
" Manhole pumping operations were performed after flood waters had receded to the point where the
manholes were accessible.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.24-3
Main Underground Cable Bank, MH-1 to the Auxiliary Building Rev. 2
* A swale crosses the duct bank east of MH-2. Minor localized surface erosion was observed along
the banks of the swale north of the Maintenance Garage and where it crosses the duct bank.
* On September 13, 2011, Thiele Geotechnical Services was hydro-excavating for soil borings south
of the new, six-bay, Maintenance Garage. At the time of field observations, vacuum excavations
had proceeded to a 2-ft depth and exposed a reinforced gravel road section composed of Geo-grid
installed in 6-in. layers. Four layers of Geo-grid were visible at the time of field observations. The
lateral extents of the Geo-grid reinforcement in the gravel surfaced areas are not known at this
time.

5.24.3 Assessment Methods and Procedures

5.24.3.1 Assessment Procedures Accomplished

Assessments were made by walking the cable bank alignmrMdn4observing s'r`e eatures of
the system (manholes) and the ground surface overlying th84dpgkound cable ba
surface assessment included using a 4-ft-long, 0.25-in.-diafheteir,, Ipped
T-handle soil probe to hand probe the ground surfacealong the utih• a*,.,; ents and ad acent
areas to determine relative soil strength. The as•esf.i.i-nt cused on i. Amng conditions
indicative of potential flood-related impacts o ge Me utility as foi..

* Ground surface conditions overlying an,, mediatel jac1to the utility and its
backfilled trench including scour, subs,iece or sr nent,!, sreading piping, and
heave.
* Soft ground surface areas (n i enginee and/or".l, estone gravel pavement) as
determined by probing.
* Water accumulations arif..fl9w•s).in subsurface systM"q onents (manholes and concrete
cable encasement pipes).
* D &gXf6t-rd M aabove--, sstem features and equipment.
* 1 ce fro nora tallation co'j tions, including settled, tilted, or heaved system
• •atures and equipmr ms
"Operation of the systemland appurtena ipment (i.e., is the system operational).

.#,dditional investigations wer6pefrformed to further characterize the subsurface at the facility

~iu g areas where conditidWitdicative of potential flood-related impacts or damage was
observkThese included the.4'f6iwing:

* GPR_.•3r`seports wer hot available at the time of Revision 0.)

Paved aresvere emlffd-with GPR and dynamic deflection methods (i.e., drop weight
deflectome i Wtsr eports were not available at the time of Revision 0.)

5.24.3.2 Assessment Procedures Not Completed

Assessments of the Main Underground Cable Bank from MH-1 to the Auxiliary Building that
were not completed include the following:

The interior of underground cable bank manholes and connecting concrete-encased cable
ducts were not inspected except for visual observations that were possible from above and
behind temporary safety railings. Manholes are a confined space as defined by
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations. In accordance with
these regulations and OPPD Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) safety procedures, manhole entry
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.24-4
Main Underground Cable Bank, MH-1 to the Auxiliary Building Rev. 2
is requires a confined space entry permit and can only be performed by appropriately
trained OPPD personnel.
No excavation to inspect underground systems and conditions was performed. Unless field
conditions are observed that might indicate problems, this assessment is not warranted.

5.24.4 Analysis

Identified PFMs were initially reviewed as discussed in Section 3.0. Theileview considered the
preliminary information available from OPPD data files and from ido,intial bservations.
Eleven PFMs associated with five different Triggering Mechanismsre dKfm 6d to be
"non-credible" for all Priority 1 Structures, as discussed in Sec ]pi6 The e ig PFMs were
carried forward as "credible." After the design review for each sc.icture the•s Feobservations,
and the results of available geotechnical, geophysical, and surv T i re analy zeber of
CPFMs were ruled out as discussed in Section 5.24.4.1. The CPFi]Is ed forward 0 iled
assessment are discussed in Section 5.24.4.2.

5.24.4.1 Potential Failure Modes Ruled Out Prioro the Corn i of the DetaHed
Assessment

The ruled-out CPFMs reside in the Not Sigg,"an tigh I nce catego for clarity
will not be shown in the Potential for Fail"-ut onfidence ai.

t
Triggering Mechanism 2 - Surfac,-Eros4on
CPFM 2a - Undermining sha 0Abundation/I RZsurfaces
CPFM 2c- Undermined burA!Mltilities.

Reasons for ruling out:

TNsj u eevrsinnwasbw
e-
as, observeh
0C•surae t.. ... Main Underground Cable Bank manholes or on the
t• enc a eeont..""
prncasements. V•i'th
• al"ia , f this system's underground concrete cable
4 * Only localized and limifets&&face erosi Zias observed on the ground surface across the
'Jacility. The Main Undefrgo•iod Cable Bank system is constructed at depths sufficiently
:"belw. potential scour depthsinicated by surface erosion features observed in other areas.

TriHeU`gg Mechanism 4 - #,$y ostatic Lateral Loading (water loading on structures)

CP p c_~e~
Wall failurei•m:1 xure
CPFTVf~dWall failute'iimshear
CPFM 4Eea.,e sss•deflection

Reasons for rulinriut:

* This segment of the Main Underground Cable Bank system was not pumped while the site
was inundated with water. Manholes in this segment (MH-1, MH-2, and MH-4) were not
pumped until flood waters had receded to below ground surface elevations and the
manholes were vehicle accessible. Prior to pumping, the system was flooded and not
susceptible to hydrostatic loads.
* Underground structures are designed for hydrostatic pressures as a standard practice.
* According to OPPD staff, this system was pumped on numerous occasions in the past due
to high groundwater conditions.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.24-5
Main Underground Cable Bank, MH-1 to the Auxiliary Building Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 6 - Buoyancy, Uplift Forces on Structures
CPFM 6b - Cracked slab, loss of structural support
CPFM 6c - Displaced structure/broken connections

Reason for ruling out:

This segment of the cable bank was not pumped while the site was inundated by flood
water. Manholes in this segment (MH-1, MH-2, and MH-4) ' not pumped until the
water level had receded. Prior to pumping, the system was flo d refore it was not
susceptible to uplift forces.

Triggering Mechanism 7 - Soil Collapse (first time t

CPFM 7a - Cracked slab, differential settlement ofs
support
CPFM 7b - Displaced structure/broken connections
CPFM 7c - General site settlement

Reason for ruling out:

* Soil supporting and surrounding the Main X ergroi been

previously wetted. The peak flood ele n prior to occurred in
1993.

Triggering Mechanism 10 - Ma.cin./Vii ratio u

CPFM 16a - Cracked slab, derential settlern ,of loss of structural
support 4
CPFM Ob - Displaced
CPRO ýTý--itional

•'Machine vibrations froh ief'acility (ttiibhze and various pumps) have historically occun ed
and no indications
n-i ofdthe
usd e '4 •eident
PFMs are evident.
w,,mps used on-site duringefood event were too small to cause ground or structure
vi tions sufficient to initiate soil liquefaction. Visible indications of liquefaction were
Iolooberved around the a#ia Xwhere the pumps were operating, and no evidence of
liefaAti'on was reportedl-toýHDR.
a licative of soil liquefaction and resultant settlement were
tintz or lateral movements were observed.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.24-6
Main Underground Cable Bank, MH-1 to the Auxiliary Building Rev. 2
Triggering Mechanism 11 - Loss of Soil Strength due to Static Liquefaction or Upward
Seepage
CPFM 11 a - Cracked slab, differential settlement of shallow foundation, loss of structural
support
CPFM 1lb - Displaced structure/broken connections
CPFM 1Ic - Additional lateral force on below-grade walls

Reason for ruling out:

0 Static liquefaction results from a relatively small di, an unstable

condition that allows a liquefaction failure to occur!
Indications of liquefaction have not been observed

Triggering Mechanism 12 - Rapid Drawdown

CPFM 12a - River bank slope failure and undermin
CPFM 12b - Lateral spreading

Reason for ruling out:

* This condition pertains to slope instabili gociate f the river

level. Since this segment of the Main Hnerground away from
the river, the potential for these CPFM. remot-4,

Triggering Mechanism 13 -
CPFM 13a - Corrosion of

Ud~o [iei d stru? •s lgare located below the design flood elevation for the
[a•il'y. GrounJ deil•vation • ledtero"ed
by Missouri River water elevations, percolation
!_fstorm precipitati0o 4intersnow would be expected to contact underground
improvements, includifn structed st"'ahd concrete facility elements. As such, steel
and concrete site improvemelts are assumed to be designed to withstand the corrosive
environment of groundwa 'd wetted soil.

ggening Mechanism 14 is Effects

PON 4a - Heaving, qrush-ing, or displacement

* Utility cablix glisWit!rigid and not subject to major damage due to frost-induced
-r
displacement.
" Manholes and the bottom of the duct banks are founded below frost level.
" Saturated soil conditions have occurred in the past Conditions have not been ch iaflQ'ed due
to flood conditions.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.24-7
Main Underground Cable Bank, MH-1 to the Auxiliary Building Rev. 2
5.24.4.2 Detailed Assessment of Credible Potential Failure Modes

The following CPFMs are the only CPFMs carried forward for detailed assessment for the
Main Underground Cable Bank from MH-1 to the Auxiliary Building as a result of the 2011
flood. This detailed assessment is provided below.

Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Piping

CPFM 3a - Undermining and settlement of shallow foundatioAXslab/surfaces (due to
pumping)
CPFM 3c - Undermined buried utilities (due to pum_;Y

The Triggering Mechanism and CPFMs could occur as.f. ws: M P. nially connected
seepage paths exist in the soil backfill at the site, includm Ja ii in nches,
granular trench bedding, broken building floor and condensater , ains pipes, pr e ing
defects/voids under pavement, etc. The paths may be ex• a Mses e locations R.-A
flood waters (e.g.,c open ground along areas outside the Aqua
eeter). hf Dpath en'= This nsoc•
seepage paths is connected to several pumping source I.U... the sump
h interi•"W Au Bui
pit *Ml e Turbine Daming,
Manhole MH-5, and a series of surface pumps 1Italo g the AquaDa
perimeter. The pumps were operated for an Jg time, manlt%216fg a head
differential on the seepage path networks. ,'dent was suffident to begin n of
surrounding soil. The potential damage inQ. es settleinl • ain Underground Cable
Bank and manholes causing a loss of eleciica conne•Y. -..

Pumping of MH- 1, MH-2, and ý4Asfter floodwataeis receded &6ated'temporary and minor
drawdown effects. The temperrawdown woi~dl~ause a hE differential on the seepage
path networks already creat , h higherhead c ios, causing additional
increment o c ical damag. ,.
Belo. -'oe 1-obi s and ddtadha&,,support the likelihood of these CPFMs:
'.6undwater flows weren w ••i bserved• ig
into the basement sump of the Turbine Building
from
ad cone~~i~~aintipes
foor digned
'no to intercept groundwater. This
condition has a recordedWiij'i;, dating býaffk to 1997. The Main Underground Cable Bank
S terminates at the southeastt4i!iier of the Auxiliary Building, which is directly adjacent to
theTurbine Building.
a"l a inside the Aqua lDi1was pumped dry and created a hydrostatic head between the
insi•eind. outside the Aqu.avPDam perimeter. The inside the Aqua Dam perimeter was
pumfidrom severalAcMOns, creating locations where suction increased the potential
head differential be~tWiw area inside and the area outside the Aqua Dam perimeter.
A sand boil•rr
building. "
• gcondition was observed within the exposed floor of the auxiliary

* Manholes were pumped to remove water that accumulated due to the flood event. This
created a head differential.

Below are field observations and data that indicate these CPFMs are unlikely:
* Trench settlement along the alignment of the duct banks was not observed.
* Soil probing along the duct bank alignments indicated soils were generally firm and stable.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.24-8
Main Underground Cable Bank, MH-1 to the Auxiliary Building Rev. 2
Data Gaps (data yet required to assess these CPFMs):

* GPR data and reports have not been delivered for assessment of subsurface conditions.

The following table describes observed distress indicators and other data that would increase or
decrease the potential for degradation associated with these CPFMs for the Main Underground
Cable Bank from MH-1 to the Auxiliary Building.

Adverse (Degradation/Direct Floodwater Favorable (0 atJp4"/Direct

Impact More likely) Floodater Im¶a-tlL.es Likely)
The southwest comer of the Turbine Building is N A
located adjacent to the termination point of the
duct bank. __
Water was pumped from several manholes. Manholeswe *dIl
ated during7qJ' od
event and Nverelpt umped until fldo
waters hadrece the manholese
accessible Th7e m esre only pumpe
fora-sqha-t duration OfM .,i
The area inside the Aqua Dam perimeter was -" AN
pumped from several locations.
Sand boil/piping feature observed in Auxiliar • .
Building Missile Shield Room.____ ____ ____

Data Gaps: ., s Ap
"
* GPR data were not available att Kl*e of evisio 1 assis n e psb
areas or paths at the facility.

Conclusion

Poentigfor Degradationi$1•'irectFlo 6vaber Impact

catosfor
this CPFM h' en observ, !'I he Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building
hyl~ich is directly adjacent to Underground Cable Bank. The voids below the base
,'-slalibin the Turbine Building aeiekn'own to exist with heavy flows of water being pumped from
t'....i. Since the 2011 flood aused increased flow through the broken drain pipes, the
potentW1 that the 2011 flood caus6ed further and more rapid degradation due to these CPFMs is
high.4;
Implicationh&•

The occurrence ofAthese CPFMs could potentially cause the collapse of the Main Underground
Cable Bank. HoweVer, the integrity of system of cables in the trench may not be impacted due
to the flexibility of the cables. Therefore, the implication of the potential degradation for this
CPFM is low.

Confidence

The extent of subsurface erosion and its potential impact to the Main Underground Cable Bank
is not known due to the lack of data gathered on subsurface conditions. Since there is not
enough information on the subsurface conditions at this time and the pumping in the Turbine
Building could have caused subsurface erosion, the confidence for these CPFMs is low.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.24-9
Main Underground Cable Bank, MH-1 to the Auxiliary Building Rev. 2
Summary

For CPFMs 3a and 3c, as discussed above, the potential for degradation is high because the
pumping in the Turbine Building and the sand boil/piping feature in the Auxiliary Building.
This degradation could have caused enough erosion to impact the integrity or intended function
of the structure. The combined consideration of the potential for degradation and the
implications of that degradation to a structure of this type puts it in the "not significant"
category. The data currently collected are not sufficient to rule ou these CPFMs. Therefore,
the confidence in the above assessment is low, which mea or a r inued monitoring
and inspections may be necessary to draw a conclusion. Q

5.24.5 Results and Conclusions

The CPFMs evaluated for the Main Underground Cable Bank

are presented in the following matrix, which shows the rating
level of confidence in the evaluation.

Low Confidence
(Insufficient Data) _

".b =._ 2

5.24.6 Recommended Ac•ons

Further forensic investigations and physical modifications are recommended to address CPFM 3a and
3c for the Main Underground Cable Bank. CPFM 3a and 3c are associated with unfiltered flow of
groundwater into the Turbine Building basement drain piping system (Key Distress Indicator # 1).
These recommendations are described in detail in Section 4.1.

Also, a review of the geophysical data when available should be done. The results of this review will
be used increase the confidence in the assessment results. At the time of Revision 0, groundwater
levels had not yet stabilized to nominal normal levels. Therefore, it is possible that new distress
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.24-10
Main Underground Cable Bank, MH-1 to the Auxiliary Building Rev. 2
indicators could still develop. If new distress indicators are observed before December 31, 2011,
appropriate HDR personnel should be notified immediately to determine whether an immediate
inspection and/or assessment should be conducted. Observation of new distress indicators may result in
a modification of the recommendations for this structure.

5.24.1 Updates Since Revision 0

Revision 0 of this Assessment Report was submitted to OPPD on 0( 2011. Revision 0

presented the results of preliminary assessments for each Priority 14 were
incomplete in Revision 0 because the forensic investigation and/,rii
Priority 1 Structures was not completed by the submittal date.
includes the results of additional forensic investigation and moi•6
described below.

5.24.1.1 Additional Data Available

The following additional data were available for the Main U:

MH-1 to the Auxiliary Building for Revisions1 a Ehi,

* Results of KDI #1 forensic investigatio , Section*;41

* Additional groundwater monitoring well; and river A,
* Results of geophysical investigation by,Neotech
* Results of geotechnical investigdibf]n by)1-ieleeiietch

5.24.1.2 Additional Analysis

The following..analysis of addi•'.n..1idata was condu4.e 0 Main Underground Cable Bank

from M10 t Bull
.&&uxtiliarv Ali

level data from OPPD.

ive returned to nominal normal levels.

report by Geotechnology, Inc.

c ReMi tests performed around the outside perimeter of the

identified deep anomalies that could be gravel, soft clay,

Results of~g6tcJfihcl investigation by Thiele Geotech, Inc.

Six test borings 'were drilled, with continuous sampling of the soil encountered, to ground
truth the Geotechnology, Inc. seismic investigation results as part of the KDI #2 forensic
investigation. Test bore holes were located to penetrate the deep anomalies identified in the
seismic investigation. The test boring data did not show any piping voids or very soft/very
loose conditions that might be indicative of subsurface erosion/piping or related material
loss or movement.

All of the SPT and CPT test results conducted for this Assessment Report were compared
to similar data from numerous other geotechnical investigations that have been conducted
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.24-11
Main Underground Cable Bank, MH-1 to the Auxiliary Building Rev. 2
on the FCS site in previous years. This comparison did not identify substantial changes to
the soil strength and stiffness over that time period. SPT and CPT test results were not
performed in the top 10 feet to protect existing utilities.

Triggering Mechanism 3 - Subsurface Erosion/Piping

CPFM 3a - Undermining and settlement of shallow foundation/slab/surfaces (due to
pumping)
CPFM 3c - Undermined buried utilities (due to pumping)

Significance

PotentialforDegradation/DirectFloodwaterImpact

Indicators for this CPFM have been observed in the Turbn BMuIling and Au uilding,
which is directly adjacent to the Main Underground Cablee voids bel base"
slab in the Turbine Building are known to exist with heavy flows- tr be ig
pump M'
the sump. Since the 2011 flood caused increased flow through the No drain pipes,
potential that the 2011 flood caused further and mar irapd.leg gderadar
ada i rN/de this CPFM is
high. The Turbine Building Sump drainage i a e allowd
OW1I as parto eport
recommendations to address this issue haveb5ee• made and implemented d$ition, a sand
boil/piping feature in the Auxiliary Buildidiissile Shil mo A" sno s ted during post flood
inspections. Based on implementation and pair of isue6associa,,with
.. t :'••: ssie n~ 6, KDI#1
qi,thpoeiafr and for
the potential
instigation of assessment and necesat' repis .. in
degradation of this system is lo,1

Implication

The occur eli"; ibis CPFM cou~dhicuse the collaps e Main Underground Cable Bank.
HoweeN~;intg .esithen od
V.ystem trench might not be impacted due to the
flteAMiN of the cablZOssNRefore, thf'imp Kcation of the potential degradation for this CPFM

eonfidence

1-h gioundwater elevations ha dropped to a level where they no longer can impact the
sy9tEt ,Based omainten can•{ repair activities planned in conjunction with KDI#1 and in
the NVIiitShield room, co-"4,n~ce is high that problems associated with these CPFMs will be
address PPD.
p0 ,•1j/:
Sum m ary , i . 7'::;.:
As discussed, the potential for degradation is low because the pumping in the Turbine Building
and the sand boil/piping feature in the Auxiliary Building are being addressed based on the
recommendations for each. The combined consideration of the potential for degradation and
the implications of that degradation to a structure of this type put it in the "not significant"
category. The data currently collected are sufficient to rule out this CPFM. Therefore, the
confidence in the above assessment is high.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.24-12
Main Underground Cable Bank, MH-1 to the Auxiliary Building Rev. 2
5.24.1.1 Revised Results and Recommendations

The CPFMs evaluated for the Main Underground Cable Bank from MH- 1 to the Auxiliary
Building are presented in the following matrix, which shows the rating for the estimated
significance and the level of confidence in the evaluation. CPFMs 3a and 3c for the Main
Underground Cable Bank from MH- 1 to the Auxiliary Building are associated with Key
Distress Indicator # 1. Section 4.1 presents the results of additional forensic investigation that
was conducted to ascertain whether these CPFMs could be ruled o• The results of the
additional forensic investigations show that if the recommendatioI scal modifications
in KDI #1 are implemented that this CPFM is ruled out. efore, s that no further
concerns are identified through the monitoring progran :*Ze Maij' egound Cable Bank
from MH-1 to the Auxiliary Building (discussed in Se avr 24.6gifi to5M.g until
December 31, 2011), these CPFMs are moved to the qua**.3n ning
tmatrx'
"No
Further Action Recommended Related to the 2011 Flood." r

Low Confidence
(Insufficient Data)

CPFM 3c

5.24.1.2

In the assessment of the FCS Structures, the first step was to develop a list of all Triggering
Mechanisms and PFMs that could have occurred due to the prolonged inundation of the FCS
site during the 2011 Missouri River flood and could have negatively impacted these structures.
The next step was to use data from various investigations, including systematic observation of
the structures over time, either to eliminate the Triggering Mechanisms and PFMs from the list
or to recommend further investigation and/or physical modifications to remove them from the
list for any particular structure. Because all CPFMs for the Main Underground Cable Bank
from MH-1 to the Auxiliary Building other than CPFMs 3a and 3c have been ruled out, and
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.24-13
Main Underground Cable Bank, MH-1 to the Auxiliary Building Rev. 2
because CPFMs 3a and 3c will be ruled out when the physical modifications recommended for
KDI #1 in Section 4.1 are implemented, no Triggering Mechanisms and their associated PFMs
will remain credible for the Main Underground Cable Bank from MH-1 to the Auxiliary
Building. HDR has concluded that the geotechnical and structural impacts of the 2011
Missouri River flood will be mitigated by the implementation of the physical modifications
recommended in this Assessment Report. Therefore, after the implementation of the
recommended physical modifications, the potential for failure of this structure due to the flood
will not be significant. &I
 SECTION 7.0

.f- •rr .2-

A .

• .•~~~~
..
.'
. o.... .... .............

AA

~
•°•,~ ~~ ~ ~ .... ,..,:•.,•
~ ~ S.,•.•.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~a R".,.••••..
.•'

Irk

,:..•.•:.-...•: -,..i.•.••.•
. •, ....
h.... .... ....
...... ,..,••:. ..,•, .. f .. . .••.•-:%M•i....
.. . . .
 Page 7-1
Summary and:Conclusiofis -"'--Rev.
- 2

7.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

7.1 Scope and Purpose

The FCS Plant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment hasbeen completed to identify
and describe the effects of the 2011 flood on Structures at the site. Specifically, the objective of this
Assessment Report is to present HDR's assessment of changes to the soil," rock that supports the
structures at FCS that may have negatively impacted those structure•.

Revision 0 of this Assessment Report was submitted to OPPD I.6°icber Revision 0

presented the results of preliminary assessments for each Prio tructu f-4 I of this
Assessment Report was submitted to OPPD on November 28, 721dn ided ud- enfor"ation
related to Priority I Structures. These assessments were incompl t~iner { 'ds on 0 a 3 I
because the forensic investigations and/or monitoring for most oftij y I Structure•4n..•5'
.
completed by the submittal date. Revision 2 of this Assessment 'ort 'des updated ri,
Priority I Structures to include additional monitoring data and the results 3196ional forensic
investigations for the Key Distress Indicators. Revisio re ents the e the assessments
for each of the Priority 2 structures.
This section of the report provides a brief summa the proce. se 2 onduct thesructure
assessments. Conclusions and recommendations hen presented reg Fito the geotechnical
conditions at the FCS site, the Key Distres~sr§ dic• and A1iority i,2 brity 2 structures.

7.2 Summary of the Assessmentf 6cess

The Flood of 2011 inundated portio 9a FCS site for ;r'k" onths. Peak flood depths
across the site a- ý,Wffpaed betWeeNand 4 feet, and fl....elocities over the site were
generally ~ ~con T ts of this flooding were assessed by frst conducting
a systemnaihd thorough VIsMa hervation eh structure to identify any outward signs of distress
cause 1h.. '6flood. After the i bservatio, &a on the 2011 flood, including the areal extent,
• water velocities, an ...fect on gro;11 ater at the FCS site, were compiled. Baseline
Wdd 'e geology, geomorpholog .technical, and design conditions prior to the 2011 flood were
also :Ted. A list of flood-induce mechanisms (Triggering Mechanisms) was
identifi~einggering Mechanisms co [have caused degradation to the soil and/or rock that supports
the FCS s RUN .and/or caused dir ipacts to structures due to the force of the floodwaters
(Triggering Meelfa-sms). Exam "•'Triggering Mechanisms include settlement, erosion, stability,
hydraulic actionlM- ost actiosi ing the list of potential Triggering Mechanisms, a list of PFMs
was developed. PF y "in which a structure might fail. Failures are any errors or defects,
gyet4
and can be potential o amples of PFMs include undermining and settlement of shallow
foundation/slab, undermI turied utilities, and loss of lateral support for pile foundations. A
detailed list of Triggering Mechanisms and PFMs is presented in Table 7-1.
 Page 7-2
Summary andl onclusions, ReV. 2
Table 7-1 - Tri gering Mechanisms and Potential Failure Modes
Triggering Triggering PFM
Mechanism echanism No. Potential Failure Mode
No.
]a Undermining shallow foundation/slab
River Bank lb Loss of lateral support for pile foundation
Erosion/Scour Ic Undermined buried utilities pipes/cables
Id Additional lateral force on piles •
2a Undermining shallow foundap.nrslal . .
Surface Erosion 2b Loss of lateral support for,$e &ndatioM "
2c Undermined buried utieh iAf
3a Undermining and settlerintishallo,,Mf~ndaaJVo (due to pumping)
3b Loss of lateral support for PRO Iaton (due to pujg.)
3c Undermined buried utilities .tpeitmping)
Subsurface Undermining and settlementý' shai, undatin/slab Mo(mayeA.-
Erosion/Piping 3d drawdown) M,
3e Loss of lateral supp-0 ._pile foundationi , r'iver drawdown)
3f Undermined b.W N ýe to river dra I-,
______ Sinkhoe
3g d rment due jbp. g into karst v'k•
4a Overturn "It"
Hydrostatic Lateral 4b Sliding .,
Loading (water 4c W fil
loading on a- • .f,-•
structures) 4d • •l]failure in sheqW.
e~1..xcess deflectionil '%4
___ _.

JDverturning
ing
'55"1 ".10
A ,'AT4
. VA,rh M.":& 5c ýt!W.lfnfailure in flexure
''I z"r- :"-i r,-l L -.-

A .06ading- *'I` i•5d

T I wný5 d I
"Vitiffire in shear
in shear
--- l. I Dam~Qi~tieris
Excess dR
Buoyancy, Uplift
L. . , Forces on . . •Cracked slab, loss of structural support
• ,•Structures 6c. b isplaced structure/broken connections
". RCracked slab, differential settlement of shallow foundation, loss of
•, structural support
7-.i "SI@,lapse
,p ((first tl Displaced structure/broken connections

l7c General site settlement

<_ _ 7d Piles buckling from down drag
8 Soil Solutioiiii,•r 8a Not applicable

9a Cracked slab, differential heave of shallow foundation, loss of structural

support
9 Swelling of 9b Displaced structure/broken connections
Expansive Soils
9c Fail tension piles
9d Additional lateral force on below-grade walls
 .... Page 7-3
Sufnmary and Coniclusions.. -_-LRv. 2.
Table 7-1 - Triqgerinq Mechanisms and Potential Failure Modes
Triggering Triggering PFM
Mechanism Mechanism No. Potential Failure Mode
No.
Cracked slab, differential settlement of shallow foundation, loss of
Machine/Vibration- - tructural support
10. Induced l0b Displaced structure/broken connections
Liquefaction Wc Additional lateral force on below-grajowalls
10d Pile/pile group instability *,0.. A4&.,
Cracked slab, differential sOMIffienknt of j-,y ndation, loss of
Loss of Soil structural support
Sr due to* Ib Displaced structure/brok•.T, nectiqM0
Static Liquefaction Ic Ada lal c
or Upward Seepage Ile Additional lateral frce onO.OVr waus "'W
lid Pile/pile group instability .
12 Rapid Drawdown 12a River bank slope failure ane.peO
W,•. I surrounding srU-1u0dip
;1 -
12b Lateral spreading tj

13a Corrosion of undergp.u.4.t. utilities '

13 Submergence 1b Corrosion of r,%
14 Frost Effects 14a Not applica&d . . .
Karst Foundation
15 ClapsF 15a Piles punc g, through ON-h.ub°to additional loading
- Triggering Mechanism 5 applies to only the Missguri RRQ, ihere wnW
... velocsuover the FCS site.

Using the knowledge compiled for i"b ... e on each sr dure's standard (for example,
shallow or deep founded building of, eutility), a list :140--l PFMs was compiled for each
structure. These V.- screened .rmine if they wvTr&27dible" (CPFMs), which means a
particular PF Go .ed or .eAn progress due to the changes caused by the 2011
flood. Th. detei-m Aon of wh
aled Triggering Mechanisms for the CPFMs could
have b. were actually inithi the fi0 t ntial for degradation/direct floodwater impact).
As .a• some PFMs were deter d to be noW ible. For example, PFMs arising from river
ba~i•.• i.on were eliminated becausqi-.evidence orbank erosion was observed. A detailed list of
PFM ted from detailed study•.,esented in Section 3.6.

During defci. ssessment, when add al data was available including the results of the systematic
visual obser' a secondary sc -g took place to rule out more of the CPFMs. This might have
resulted in the er idtaonof all, CPFMs initially identified for a particular structure, or there
could be remaining-."4M re discussed in detail in this Assessment Report. Also, the PFMs
screened out as non-c •i ,n initial screening described above were reviewed again in light of
the additional availab le -WAdetermine if they should be added back to the list of CPFMs. The
remaining CPFMs were ev -uated to determine first the potential for degradation to the soil or rock
..that supports the structure and/or the. direct floodwater impacts due to the 2011flood and~then .the
implications of that degradation to a structure of that particular design type. The combina ion o:f the
potential for degradation/direct floodwater impact and the implications of that degradation/impact is
termed the "potential for failure" and is then categorized as "significant" or "not significant." The final
step in the analysis was to evaluate the "confidence" in the potential-for-failure significance
determination as either "low" or "high."
 Page 7-4
.. S-Tm a rY aand CCon-clusio.snI-:: .R-v•.
. . 2

7.3 Principal Findings of the Comparative Geotechnical Analysis

Comparison of geotechnical data for pre-flood and current investigations indicates that there was no
observable difference in the overall geotechnical conditions at the site and that the foundation materials
have not been disturbed or significantly weakened by the prolonged inundation caused by the 2011
flood. Comparison of seismic refraction data from the pre-flood and current investigations reveals
similarrma2nitude of seismic wave velocities over the full depth of the overburden soils..and.no
observable differences between pre- and post-flood conditions were identiffi from this work.

Based on these findings and evaluations, the overall geotechnica le have not been
significantly altered due to the sustained high water. The obseEN ints is consistent
with the relatively wide range of strength and stiffness and cori• ypically
encountered in the alluvial soils within the Missouri River valle gggs-.are planned
at the FCS site, and data from these SPTs willbe incorporated in
However, these findings are considered applicable only to those
at the site. The upper 10 feet were hydro-excavated to avoid dar
layer may have been disturbed from underseepage beneath the-te nent
of utility backfill during drawdown of the river level an.-

7.4 Key Distress Indicators K,.

During the site visual assessments, three problemreas were 6.b. ially indicated that
the 2011 flood had changed the site's geotecrhnicaie phs .J observed problem
areas, referred to as Key Distress Indica kD ar ]c

1. Increased groundwater flow in-

2. Pavement failure and sinkhole Intake Structure and Service
Building p• •
3. Co umnera

The Yure8V E,ach of the observed KDIs was evaluated using

.gge nIgchanism, to identify the CPFMs, to identify
same PFM, and to recommend remedial measures
inm d condition.

7.4.1 Tuif

7.4.1.1 Is

The Turbine B1 ih'Mt ',Iment floor drilling and subgrade testing identified both a number of
significant voids ,,.,sfpots as well as zones of competent soil. Table 4-2 provides the drill-hole
number (see Figure¶-3 for drill-hole locations), depth to void and thickness of soft zone (per
DCP).. The lateral extent and interconnectedness of identified voids can only be -inferred from..
. e aiaila(.able d-a•a However, somezonies such as the voids encounterEd -in DCP 2-6, DCP""I.-. ,,
•th...
DCP 1-5 and DCP 2-8 are both significant enough and close enough in lateral distance that we
conclude that these voids are part of a connected void system. All of these voids are close to
where both the 10-inch and 6-inch drain lines run adjacent to each other and have multiple
bends where joints may be more susceptible to cracking or separation in the pipe.. In this
scenario, significant groundwater inflow into the drainage system is likely. There also are,
however, zones where there is little to no evidence of voids or subgrade deterioration such as in
 . :.Page 7-5
Summary and-Conclusions :__ Rev. 2
testing locations 2-10, 2-11, 2-12, 1-8, 2-14, and 2-18. Overall the data support the following
conclusions:

* The Triggering Mechanism of subsurface piping of soil material due to the sump operation
and seepage/flow into the drainage system pipes is occurring.
" Voids are significant and interconnected.
" The foundation subgrade is not affected uniformlyby this Triggering Mechanism.

Regarding CPFM 3b - Loss of lateral pile support due to sulhsurfr siAad piping (due to
pumping) for the Turbine Building. As discussed in Secti. 78, t • s of the void and
the potential effects on lateral pile support were consideW The mn id thickness is
6.54 feet in DCP test location 2-8 and the elevation of mom
i's 80.63 ft. The
deepest void in DCP test location 1-6 is 3.79 feet thick wrom a e, V 97654.
For the worst case in the collected data, pile support could b " limited areas: evatioi
976.54. The maximum length of loss of lateral piling sup otto void, calcu
bottom of the pile cap at elevation 983.5 to the lowest voidboto ion at 976
7 feet. There are a total of 10 locations were zero unt zones at elevation greater
than three feet below the bottom of slab elevati . .. mately 987j•m of pile cap
elevation 984). Of these 10 zero blow sn greater blow per
tha
drill-horelOt esshavan
1 foot. The remainder of the drill-hole localshave co r greater blow per two
inch material to within 3 feet of the botto .the foun_• n atthe bottom of the pile
cap elevation (el. 984).

Based on the available informatr-, without a itative ysis we find that the loss of
lateral piling support shown t llected data. th Tipe Building, over the limited
areas suggested by the coll& a does not in e A icant risk of piling failure is
present" in. nditions dul resence ofthe__ voids. Therefore, we have ruled
out C bine Bui t should be noted that the subsurface erosion piping
Tri W echani ...going a ateral pile support could be compromised in the
void thickness tconf.u ,%increase. Seismic considerations have not been
ssed for this report an' not a bconclusion with respect to the effect of voids
V lateral pile support durin' V ic loadin
, 'ata from the Turbine BuiIH sub-slab investigations cannot be used to rule out
b. for other pile-suppoii1structures in the vicinity of the Turbine Building, including:
Cont• •t Building, AuxikhlilBuilding, Service Building, Circulating Water System,
Turbi Uffli g South S yard, and the Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping.

Two other CPRM' ssCe ed with KDI #1 and Triggering Mechanism #3 have not been ruled
out by the Turb q "gin sub-slab investigations and have the potential to continue to affect
structures other th~iiThe Turbine Building. They are:

: " CPFM 3a - Undermining and setti emientofshallo•-''fundation/slab/siff aces (diuteto

pumping)
0 CPFM 3c - Undermined buried utilities (due to pumping)

Structures potentially affected include: Technical Support Center, Fire Protection System, Raw
Water Line, Security BBRE's, Maintenance Shop, Underground Cable Trench (Trenwa), Waste
Disposal Piping, Main Underground Cable Bank, Blair Water System, Demineralized Water
System, Turbine Building South Switchyard, Fuel Oil Tanks and Piping, PA
 Page 7-6
Summary and Conclusions Rev. 2
Paving/Sidewalks/Outdoor Drives, Sanitary Sewer System, and Condensate Storage Tank
*(buried utilities portion of system). For this Triggering Mechanism to affect these structures, a
void would have had to progress beyond the Turbine Building Basement foundation and extend
under the Structures listed above. The fact that the flow into the broken pipes has been
occurring for many years makes the hypothesis that the voids could have extended beyond the
Turbine Building foundation and under the Structures listed above more plausible. The
collected data showing that voids were found'at the perimeter of th~e Turbine Building basement
between the pile caps at II locations also suggests that piping of raterial from beyond the
Turbine Building Basement subgrade may have occurred. ..
The Triggering Mechanism of subsurface erosion/pipin oil fro r n te
pin h dsa,&•oi ys~ah Turbein
nthe
Building basement and perhaps beyond continues as lo ,thed remains
unrepaired. Voids, soft zones, and associated groundwa art' .mg flow l continue
to enlarge and extend out from the drainage and sump systd yr time unless •e•flw
e of
water into the sump system is stopped. Therefore, CPFM-!.W 3c for the
listed above cannot be ruled out and remain credible until the foiT-cl, • oremedial
"
recommendations are implemented to stop the Trigger.mg MechanisgN

7.4.1.2 Recommendations

OPPD should perform remedial work to sY10 e uncontr.iied mage of the 6roundwater into
the broken Turbine Building basement dr J.ge syste .ing ..,khe
voids beneath the
basement floor slab. The first prigis toW the ge of ter into the drainage
system as quickly as possible to
st,IN.
ae" Triggrr'
T P !echanism.i he quickest and easiest way
to stop the flow of groundwatear the sump is tU ck the dippge system pipes at their
termination points into the alternative t
; e10 i:{he existing drainage system is
to abandonp*-i,s ting system y, and replace .above-structural-floor-slab
sysplm ernative would be to construct a new system that is
entie•en •tjfoie bbase M ._ig•,or that ýM§,J 'Jtpilizepump(s) to remove water from the existing
o j 41
fl -•ifains and the tu• ins. A tion would be to trench cut the 7 inch concrete
• ¢~ing on the structural rib |low spa6 -installation of new drain pipes. Both these
• t ions would facilitate morn. ing and acc~eto the system should repairs be necessary.

~lition to drainage systemtn lir, the voids created by the subsurface erosion/piping should
l5d• These voids were a einty caused by groundwater flow through the broken
drain',agstem pipes. Becai1he extent of the voids cannot be defined beyond the perimeter
of the T Ii .Buiding,the 7,.me of the material required to fill the voids should be
m s e
measured'. ie'g.,de
ay •
aQW.N. fthe extent of the voids.

The repair/r pl the drainage system and filling of the voids to return the foundation
soils and subgrad V,:pre-pipe break condition will allow us to rule out CPFMs 3a, 3b, and 3c
for the Structures listed in Section 4.1.3. To fill the voids and determine the volume of the
voids a grouting program should be .•-implemented.

The grouting program design should include:

* Specifications for a grout mix that has the proper rheologic and chemical properties to
ensure a balanced, stable mix that will maximize penetration and long-term performance.
* Specifications for a grout mix that can displace very soft disturbed zones and that can
provide long term support for the piles, footing, and slabs.
 Page 7-7
Summary and Cbnrdlusions Rev. 2
* Identification of the grout pressure(s) necessary to provide for maximum grout penetration
into voids, and soft zones within the subgrade soil material.
* Identification of the maximum grouting pressure allowable to avoid damage to any
structures and utilities. Particular attention should be given to the under-slab drain pipes in
the event that they are repaired and re-used.
* A plan for real-time, full-time, monitoring and recording of:.
- Grout volufmies and pressures under the direction of a qualified engineer at the time of
the grouting.
- Any movement of key Structures during grouting me cDrati oft
;rn B asem--'nTýN•'i n after the
- Groundwater elevations outside of the Turbine B •Ig Bae" %ring anda
hK ,0
grouting operation.
" A sequence/logic tree for grout program progressio . ..... ,.
* A plan for the drilling of verification holes to includep (;aI ty tests to as ess the affect
of the grouting program on the subgrade soils. ' AV
* A grouting acceptance protocol by the Engineer. -
* A system to report all of the grouting and monitoring data on a fdbasis to the er.
" A final report including all data, results and .dtOt• dveIop
e grout tak •"s;'e grouting
- es
contractor. This should include data on g o each location,
verification holes and results, and moni g and data that w6 pport the
conclusion that the subsurface voids h een fille.

As mentioned previously, OPPD sId c er ab

• the , drainage pipes that
are in place below the Turbine B* basement slab. A -?gnp ing to grout the voids
after the existing drainage pines been
Aps e be 1111likly crush the pipes
likelye -ageor evencrsthpie
and complicate the grouting., .• to th dr . l
. remediation.

This spe9011i5. -f groutinq-" tion is necessa to properly treat the subsurface

voids..provide cation and documentation that the program was a
suA 9s'l ,We recomme :. electio°% ecialty grouting contractor experienced in
,i 'erng this type ofSiI re-bid sef ih criteria should be developed and potential
lers should be pre-quaii' ased on t c r
, time of the writing oft ort, it--was not certain that a grouting contractor could be
K x - at could implement a gam that would yield the data necessary to rule out the
rerng:,PFMs described - Discussions with specialty grouting contractors will be
schedlibi-4dsoon as possi? . e future to ascertain if they have the capability to provide the
data necessa•to rule out remaining CPFMs.

7.4.2 Paved AccessýKe• a

7.4.2.1 Summar of Analysis

Forensic investigations w'vere pe-rored wiere observed pavement distress was most -
prominent, at locations coincident with shallow underground structures and utilities, and where
recent seismic surveys identified low velocity features (locations where potential for
degradation related to the Triggering Mechanisms and CPFMs associated with KDI #2 was
identified).
 Page 7-8
Summary and-Conclusions- Rev. -

Excavation and subgrade testing identified no evidence of piping erosion, voids, or subsidence
of site fills. Field SCP testing of the exposed subgrade indicated that stiff to very stiff soils
were generally encountered in the upper 3 feet below the ground surface or pavement. Based
on the observations made and tests results obtained, the fill soils in the locations exposed and
tested are compact, cohesive soils that are not susceptible to piping erosion. SPT borings did
not identify voids or very soft/very loose conditions that might indicate piping or related
material loss nor did they identify, changes in soil relative density following the 2011 flood;,;
Inclinometer and survey monitoring indicates that movement of oqijte subsurface soils or
structures has not occurred.

Possible Triggering Mechanisms and related CPFMs id'if ied for A1 d the PAA
include:

* Subsurface Erosion and Piping (due to pumping). CPF and 3c.

* Subsurface Erosion and Piping (due to rapid river draAb
ýFMs 3d, 3e, -fqZ,.

Based on the observations and test results, the individual distress in ."t•3rzs that comprise KDI
#2 are not attributed to the possible Triggering N WJidentified 42: Subsurface
Erosion and Piping (due to pumping); and, S,7uface E andPipi V to rapid river
FAN
drawdown).

Our investigation for KDI #2 also indicate t the T-..ggring P imof Subsurface
Erosion and Piping (due to rapid rFdraw n) wa ot initia fI 2011 flood and that
the CPFMs related to this Triggtgegmg echanismAhxEuding CP 3d, 3e, and 3f, are not
credible. ý01i

However, t~e•:iggering Mec.....nof Subsurfac sn a Piping (due to pumping) and

ts74rigger calenasm, incuing CPFM 'a, 3b, and 3c cannot be
rule t•f6a '." -- associatea lthe PAA. Even though this Triggering Mechanism
d6" t appear to have, C, 'd the distr bserved in the PAA, their root cause (damaged
r. me uilding sub-flo pipes and p i as identified by investigations in
"• .1~e Turbine Building baserr• ontinues. timber of other Priority I and Priority 2
•~sctures have been assigned ",Msthat are related to this remaining credible Triggering
T nism and its related CPt, These other structures differ from KDI #2 and the PAA in
t trong evidence of dist as beidentified or documented through assessment
obse~f~.~ins or ongoing sur ;onitoring.

Priority VSfructures in h egory include:

" Security BB
* Turbine Building' South Switchyard
" Condensate Storage Tank
* Underground (TRENWA) Cable Trench
" Circulation Water System
* Demineralized Water System (line)
* Raw Water Piping
* Fire Protection System Piping
* Waste Disposal Piping
* Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping
 Page 7-9
Rev. 2
Su'mmary and Conclusions
0 Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to Intake Structure
S Blair Water System
0 River Bank

Priority 2 Structures in this category include:

" Service Building

" Sanitary Sewer System

The potential for impact to the above Priority I and Prioj the Triggering
Mechanism of Subsurface Erosion and Piping (due to CPFMs related
to this Triggering Mechanism remain credible until theT4 Z4d to KDI #I as
presented below are implemented and completed. Conti'
structures will be required after these recommendations
evaluate if the recommended actions were effective and
deemed credible.

HDR concluded that the Subsurface Erosion/Pip k

giT
most-likely did not extend outside the perim_,_,
the power block. This conclusion suports- '•ftling ou
to pumping) CPFMs associated with this •gering M•e

* Security Building -
" Intake Structure A1135"ON
* River Bank

7.4.2.2

Thi o~f thsK~N. orensic i$gatlon have ruled out potential Triggering
harisms andi assoclHPF ls thnatfirld have been the cause of the observed distress.
vever, it could not be'.A-i entirely reDtIht CPFMs associated with KDI #1, which is
ciated with the uncontrol rainage of"le groundwater into the broken Turbine Buildin
ement drainage system pipmW4 2 :These CPFMs will only be ruled out when the physical
Rl!cations presented for K4 , as presented in Section 4.1 of this Assessment Report, are

7.4.3 Mai

7.4.3.1 Ilysis

Forensic investig~fi consisting of concrete floor slab drilling and field and laboratory
subgrade testing was completed in the Maintenance Shop to evaluate subsurface conditions
near Key:IDistress Indicator.-(KDI) #3. This Key Distrtss Indicator consists. of--.di.'fferentil;,.....
settlement of Building Column MG-I15, presumed differential settlement of the nearby floor
slab, and cracked nearby masonry partition walls. These building distresses were observed at
the southwest comer of the building immediately adjacent to the north side of the Turbine
Building during facility assessments.
 Page 7-10
Summary and Conclusions Rev. 2
Possible TriggeringMechanisms identified for KDI #3 include:

" Subsurface Erosion and Piping (due to pumping); and

" Soil Collapse (due to first time wetting).

Observations of the conditions underlying the floor slab in the vicinity of Column MG-15
confirm that the subgrade has subsided and a void space has.developed. The void space ranges
from about none to 8.5 inches in depth below the bottom of the floslab and extends about 15
feet to the north, east and west-northwest of Column MG-1l. Th I..,1 nt of void
beneath the floor slab to the south, southeast and southwe•s a not ed by this
investigation.

Field testing including SCP and DCP tests on the subgr d• ''06 '0Wthe oS,•b did not
identify the presence of voids or soft soils below the top of ddrae at tested i 0i nbs. Field
observations and laboratory testing from this investigatiowma -.._e,
the previous ®RBI
investigation are in general agreement and indicate that tne-igen ame`Joess derive~dlt fiJtihe
vicinity of Column MG-15 consists of medium stiff totiff, low plIst I.silt that has
allowable bearing pressure of 2,000 psf or gr te.fiel d obseb norfield and
laboratory testing performed, for this investigt 1ihaepor fl plac 6 1 pr conditions
that would result in subgrade or column se,i,7. entof the ag'[$ .ude observe.

Based on these observations and field and ratory s ubsdence and resultant
void identified below the floor slab, ... nd
vol ~And thdimn"tor.resu l .. urensettemen
ret. relate Settement
cracking expressed in nearby mqa'srf''alls is nt to-
eTriggering Mechanism of
Soil Collapse (due to first time., l ng). As such .CPFMs 0 ciated with this Triggering
Mechanism; 7a -CrackedS- I. erential SettleW fh SheIAUk Foundation, and Loss of
Structural S 7.b - Displa r ucture/Broken8- n ns; and 7c - General Site
Settle•rggj•.difor the M nance Shop.

1 in to the dis mal Mainteian . Shop, cracks have recently been observed and
Uk'imented in the TecnmS1 pr Buii'.h•-n areas located south, southwest, and west of
Maintenance Shop distre' a (area ofsNgrade void, settled column, and wall cracking).
V10 e results of the assessment'rlhe Technical Support Center (see Section 5.5) indicate that
istress s associated with'Y #3. Therefore, the Triggering Mechanism ofSoil Collapse
ahifl Mlssociated CPFMs listef.labove are also ruled out for the Technical Support Center.

The re 0•this KDI #3 forenbsic investigation show that the Triggering Mechanism of
"ubsurfaalli..n'ng (due to pumping) is likely responsible for the subsidence and
related voi d .. tt1 distress in the Maintenance Shop and the distress (cracked walls) in
the Technical] tr.nter. Voids, material loss, and material movements have been
identified by vef tions in the Turbine Building Basement (KDI #1) including along the
north wall of the Turbine Building which is a shared/adjoining wall with theMaintenance
Shop. Theievoids/subgrade settlement and distress oliserved.inthe.MaintenanceShop are.
believed to be directly related to deep subsurface piping erosion and soil losses occurring at and
radiating out from damaged subfloor drain pipes in the Turbine Building subgrade.

Based on the KDI #1 investigation, it appears that material has been removed below the
Turbine Building north wall through piping as a result of the hydraulic gradient created by the
breaks in the subfloor drain pipes. Piping has been evidenced by depressed groundwater levels,
measured voids below the Turbine Building basement floor slab, and sediment accumulated in
 .Page 7-11
Summary and Conclusions Rev. 2
the Turbine Building sump pit. The depressed groundwater-levels and void conditions are
more prominent near the northwest portion of the Turbine Building adjacent to the observed
KDI #3 structural distresses. We presume that the piping and void conditions extend north
beyond the extents of the Turbine Building basement floor slab and below portions of the
Maintenance Shop (and Technical Support Center). The soil column above the presumed
piping and void condition is thought to be subsiding as a block unit, or column and translating
to the ground surface resulting in-the void space observed below the floor slab. It should be
noted that our investigation was not exhaustive. Subgrade void sp•g was not delineated to the
south, southeast, or southwest (see Figure 4-1 1), which are.;t ard&h cJpns of
observed/measured groundwater flow, groundwater lows;.aný oidsi6ljo~lfe Turbine
Building basement. It should also be noted that wall cracriig expreseAg- .,$1ie Maintenance
Shop masonry walls of the Men's restroom appears to bE -.'andmgferaclC, pEhure appears
larger than previously noted during structure observation -ih g.Septem]••i2.0,..).

7.4.3.2 Recommendations V,
IL Z
v,

The results of the KDI #3 forensic investigations havefound that thl' .3tr..ess observed in both
the Maintenance Shop (failed column) and the 1ec TTl Support (cra dwalls) are not
associated with the Triggering Mechanism 7.Sol CoSllapse (ue to first fi•eting)
-7c) •°tled out by this
Therefore the CPFMs associated with this ]7.jggermg Mechanm (7a
forensic investigation. The results show thAi4he distres a• -ofltf:e4aintenance Shop and the
Technical Support Center are connected to•I #1, w,liieis ass~bi 'dwith
the uncontrolled
drainage of the groundwater into th• okek rIurbn6nBiiddng b t'drainage system
piping. KDI #1 is associated wifi•h-eTriggering Id-hanism of.-1lbs urface Erosion/Piping
(due to pumping) and the CRVC hlicable to the ntenan, -'op and Technical Support
Center is 3a - Undermining "a1n7.'.e-,ement of shall". slab
(due to pumping). This
CPFM wilLon .b.,,ruled out wlh.hfile physical modi1ic .fios present ed for KDI # 1, as
prese#f ' [S ,U this Asqse ent Report, are implemented.

L.11s110ecommended that ,,..]mplemeiyMsical

iei modifications to remediate the distress in the
Mvfiitenance Shop as plann dhelical eia g). This may or may not affect adjacent
tmasonry walls exhibiting sefilhment crackin'g-However, this does nothing to mitigate the
Ikey cause of the observed ]t,&tenance Shop distresses, Subsurface Erosion and Piping. Nor
-d.W'.r ensure that further distres will not be realized in other structural components of the
buiiidlAimin nearby areas that mi4railso be affected by Subsurface Erosion and Piping but not yet
expressfhngany observable distfess. Future distress could include other building support
columns7UA'djacent elevatorishaft, and other nearby masonry walls (load bearing or not). It
should be noter6,that ourna`vefilggation did not determine the extent of settlement or voids to the
south, southeasEt• rsouth.est of settled Column MG-15.

No further investigations are recommended for the purposes of this Assessment Report.
However, further investigations could be undertaken by the owner as part of the design for the
remedial work to repaifiihe Maiiitenaince Shibp -and Te-dhn•zail Supj5&rtCeetei'-distress. This
could include investigation of the subgrade below the floor slab in the Maintenance Shop to the
south, southeast, and southwest of Column MG-1 5 to include drilling, coring, SCP and DCP
tests, soil sampling, and laboratory testing as appropriate to delineate the area of subsiding
subgrade and identify other structural building elements at risk. It is further recommended that
the physical modifications outlined in the KDI #1 forensic investigations be competed before
the physical modifications to remediate the distress in the Maintenance Shop and Technical
Support Center are implemented. This is to ensure that the subsurface erosion/piping
 Page 7-12
Summary and Conclusions Rev. 2
associated with the broken pipes under the Turbine Building basement slab is halted.
Continued subsurface erosion/piping would most likely reduce the efficacy of any physical
modifications designed to remediate the distress in the Maintenance Shop and the Technical
Support Center.

7.5 Status of Priority 1 Structural Assessments

In the assessment of the FCS Structures, the first step was to develop a lisftf all Triggering
Mechanisms and PFMs that could have occurred due to the prolonged inufiAfpn offthe FCS site
during the 2011 Mivissouri River flood and couid have negativelyimp~ated uaes :S.•.uctures. The next
step was to use data from various investigations, including systematic observs iOf the structures
over time. either to eliminate the Triggering Mechanisms and PE•,l'. froms -6st •oh).recommend
further investigation and/or physical modifications to remove them •nit.. list for-any.particular
structure. The results of the Assessment are detailed for each o therit I Structures inthe
paragraphs below.

7.5.1 Intake Structure

Because all CPFMs for the Intake Structure other thaniCPFs. 1."t2aa..2aad 12b hadbeIenruled out prior to
Revision 1,.and because CPFMs 12a and 12b havebe6n' ruled ouAsýisresult ofthe Rision I findings,
no Triggering Mechanisms and their associated PEMs:remain cr iBflh.:.Itrlhe Intake Sfructure.
Therefore, I-DR has concluded that the 2011 Missah River flobd did n-U@@npact the geotechnical and
structural integrity of the Intake Structurebgauseqih&"otentriailfor failu ldki 'structure due to the
flood Is not significant. "
•, 2%,•
"•,..?•~~~~~~q-Ej... •rc..: '.•:- •,•.',•••

7.5.2 Auxiliary BuildingF

Because all CPA 7.gg uxiliary Bul•,.

B ing. other than CPFX,4M3b' had been ruled out prior to
Revision adb,60-Mu'eU -b. will bel diout-i: when the physical modifications recommended for
KDI #1 i Secft6ion 4.1 are impleem"nted, no Trig-geing Mechanisms and their associated PFMs will
remain;r.d.ble for the Auxiliary-,Bulding. HIDRijasd§cioncluded that the geotechnical and structural
impd f the 2011 Missouri River' f..od will be tlaed by the implementation of the physical
m:bMod lions recommended in this Assessment Report. Therefore. after the implementation of the
recomNiq`,4qO physical modifications'Ahe potential for failure of this structure due-to--the flood will not
be signitfi anft

7.5.3 ContaildIff~i-jht

Because all C C ri.ment other than CPFM 3b had been ruled out prior to Revision 1,
and because CPFM t T ml"4tj•ed out when the physical modifications recommended for KDI #1 in
Section 4.1 are im pleme o Triggering Mechanisms and their associated PFMs will remain
credible for the Containment., HDR has concluded that the geotechnical and structural impacts of the
2011 Missouri River flood will be mitigated by the implementation of the physical modifications
recommended in this Assessment Report. Therefore. after the implementation of the recommended
physical modifications, the potential for failure of this structure due to the flood will not be significant.

7.5.4 Rad Waste Building

Because all CPFMs for the Rad Waste Building other than CPFMs 7b and 7d had been ruled out prior
to Revision 1. and because CPFMs 7b and 7d have been ruled out as a result of the Revision I
 Page 7-13
Summary and Conclusions - Rev. 2
findings, no Triggering Mechanisms and their associated PFMs remain credible for the Rad Waste
Building. Therefore, HDR has concluded that the 2011 Missouri River flood did not impact the
geotechnical and structural integrity of the Rad Waste Building because the potential for failure of this
structure due to the flood is not significant.

7.5.5 Technical Support Center

Because all CPFMs for the Technical Support Center other than CPFMs 34,.•a6b, 6c, 7a, 7b, and 7c had
been ruled out prior to Revision 1, because CPFMs 6b, 6c. 7a, 7b and 7cidheenrtuled out as a result
of the Revision i findings, and because CPFM 3a wiil be ruled'" oQt.f en tnepys-a... modifeations
recommended for KD1s #1 and #3 in Section 4.1 and 4.3 are ill Dented, noTriggering Mechansms
and their associated PFMs remain credible for the Technical Siffift CenterMA ¶DRNhas
be M.•ozds concluded
oll thatthat
the geotechnical and structural impacts of the 2011 Missouri Ri ' be mifij...by the
implementation of the physical modifications recommended in t.i . .ent Report -JN1refore,..
after the implementation of the recommended physical modificati6n,', ;k.6ptential for fa?1..e:,4s--
structure due to the flood will not be significant.

7.5.6 n'•fl
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation ,f5:'4,-•%

Because all CPFMs for the ISFSI have been ruled otU.nb Trigge fg-t echanisms and eir associated
PFMs remain credible for the JSFSI. Therefore, HIR has cone]Ithe I Missouri River
flood did not impact the geotechnical and structurahntegnty' ofhe ISlSbeai se the potential for
failure of this structure due to the flood istos ioniPn t .

7.5.7 Security Building .

Because all CPFMs for the Security -BANdi h other than CPF 3O, 12a, and 12b had been ruled
out prior to Revisii6iýaor fid because CPFMs3a 3d, 12a and e21iiave been ruled out as a result of the
Revision I fi.dis.notngggerng Mechanism's 4and their associated PFMs remain credible for the
Security BIiMrng• Thereforei{NThRN.as conclUded..that the 2011 Missouri River flood did not impact
the geofptnica1 and structural lntfery of the SeouiityBulding because the potential for failure of
s7',ture due to the flood is nolSl:g
. thi~: cant.

7.5.8 ''Tubine Building

Because a1UG].-FMs for.the Turbine B. uiiing other than CPFM 3b had been ruled out prior to Revision
1, and becauseGPM 3b has been r lg'd;6ut by the additional forensics investigations for KDJ #1 (see
Section 4. 1), novft'gring Mechaffms and their associated PFMs will remain credible for the
Turbine Building. HIDRLhas cdinclded that the geotechnical and structural impacts of the 2011
Missouri River flood vi•h1er.migated by the implementation of the physical modifications
recommended in this Ass 'nti Report. Therefore, after the implementation of the recommended
physical modifications, the potential for failure of this structure due to the flood will not be significant.

7.5.9 Security Barricaded Ballistic Resistant Enclosures

Because all CPFMs for the Security BBREs other than CPFMs 3a and 3d had been ruled out prior to
Revision 1, and because CPFMs 3a and 3d will be ruled out when the physical modifications
recommended for KDI #1 in Section 4.1 are implemented, no Triggering Mechanisms and their
associated PFMs will remain credible for the Security BBREs. HDR has concluded that the
geotechnical and structural impacts of the 201 1 Missouri River flood will be mitigated by the
 Page 7-14
Summary and Conclusions - Rev. 2

implementation of the physical modifications recommended in this Assessment Report. Therefore,

after the implementation of therecommended physical modifications, the potential for failure of this
structure due to the flood will not be significant.

7.5.10 Turbine Building South Switchyard

Because all CPFMs for the Turbine Building South Switchyard other than CPFMs.3a, 3b, and 3c had
been ruled out prior to Revision 1, because CPFM 3a will be ruled out upon completion of the
remediation to the switch foundation slab described in Section 5.10,%and b."Eause CPFMs 3b and 3c
will be ruled out when the physical modifications recommended Ao Di #•A-i
I ection 4. no
Triggering Mechanisms and their associated PFMs will remainwredible for theiTurbine Building South
Switchyard. HDR has concluded that the geotechnical and strucal impactsof the6 201I Missouri
River flood will be mitigated by the implementation of the physib o dffications rdeoimmended in this
Assessment Report. Therefore. after the implementation of the re& .ii-ended physicalro.ifications,
the potential for failure of this structure due to the flood will not be.ifilat.

-7.5.11 Condensate Storage Tank

Because all CPFMs for the Condensate Storage Tank othan I., s 2b, 3c 3e and 3f had been
ruled out prior to Revision I, because CPFMs 2b. _&.arid 3f have-,`en5 led out asý aresult of the
Revision I findings, and because CPFM 3c will bemiii'ed out whe}h:piscal modifications
recommended for KDI #1 in Section 4.1 are implemdnted, noTriggeringfZlhan isms and their
associated PFMs will remain credible for thdeCondrt ate Sfto~oK Tank ;•.Hih"s concluded that the
geotechnical and structural impacts of tht•2-.Missouri flood wiiUbe mitigated by the
}j['er
:;,j implementation of the physical modifricirids recommen dým this Asse sment Report. Therefore,
after the implementation of the rec.i.ftiinded physical mdiic-atiogt••4he potential for failure of this
sgtructure due to the flood.will not be Sig-'mIcant.

7.5.12 U
... n desgtou
*'PF'
nd'--abhleff•e-n
fo the ch 4
Becaus&allCPFMs forthe Under#.6erid Cable Trenth (Trenwa) other than CPFMs 3a. 3c, 3d, 3f, and
l4a¢1YaZgbeen ruled out prior to RevIsiRn1J because- Q,@FMs 3d, 3f, and 14a have been ruled out as a
reMi0,Y-the Revision I findinas, andcfl2cause CPFMs 3a and 3c have been ruled out using the results
of thF4KDf`#2 investigation presentedinfSection 4.2, no Triggering Mechanisms and their associated
PFMs remiain"redible for the Undergroui Cable Trench. Therefore, HDR has concluded that the
2011 Misso•uýa ,er flood did not imqtý the geotechnical and structural integrity of the Underground
Cable Trench because the potentialforfIilure of this structure due to the flood is not significant.

7.5.13 Circulating -ater- Syste'n.

Because all CPFMs for tFh'dirculating Water System other than CPFM 3b had been ruled out prior to
Revision 1, and because CPFM 3b will be ruled out when the physical modifications recommended for
•_-KDI#.I in..Section 4.4. are implemented noTriggering-Mechanisms and .their.assbciated.tFMs~wi.ll
remain credible for the Circulating Water System. T-DR has concluded that the geotechnical and
structural impacts of the 2011 Missouri River flood will be mitigated by the implementation of the
physical modifications recommended in this Assessment Report. Therefore, after the implementation
of the recommended physical modifications, the potential for failure of this structure due to the flood
will not be significant.
 Page 7-15
Summary and Conclusions -. ReV.' 2
7.5.14 Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit

Because all CPFMs for the Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit other than CPFMs
3a and 14a had been ruled out prior to Revision 1, and because.CPFMs 3a and 14a have been ruled out
as a result of the Revision 1 findings, no Triggering Mechanisms and. their associated PFMs will
remain credible for the Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit. Therefore, HDR has
._ concluded that the 2011 Missouri River flood~did~not impact the geotechnical and structural integrity
0; of the Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit because the<ý.tential for failure of this
structure due to the flood is not significant.

7.5.15 Raw Water Piping...

Because all CPFMs for the Raw Water Piping System other thaini-CPEM' 3 3c 3d`iid 3f had been
ruled out prior to Revision 1, because CPFMs 3d and 3f were ruled'out using the result-s fthe KDI #2
investigation presented in Section 4.2. and because CPFT\ls 'a and3c i. be ruled out wheiie..
physical modifications recommended for KDI # 1 in Section 4.1 arierimp"lemeted, no Trigg-enn :
Mechanisms and their associated PFMs will remain credible for the Raw Va -P#,ping System7.-HDR
has concluded that the geotechnical and structural impactgbf the 2011 MissounaRIver flood will be
mitigated by the implementation of the physical modif"l 6nmended in th ."ssesssment
Report. Therefore, after the implementation of thes8ecommendedpPysical modificat;ijO the potential
for failure of this structure due to the flood will-notd s can , '-,>ig

7.5.16 Fire Protection System Piping • . . ..( , , 2 i ,' :

Because all CPFMs for the Fire Protecti-System Pipinmwfter than C0EM's 3a, 3c, 3d. 3f, 12a. and
12b had been ruled out prior to Revdsiqul4,- d because CPFMNffi2a andil12-.b have been ruled out as a
result of the Revision 1 findings, becausG6PFMs 3d and 3f-; ee out using the results of the KDI
#2 investigation,,-p 4 211 and~because CP~-3ana;d 3c will be ruled out when the
?$---s~'ý,tý--XiýSection

21," ~~
be~~ • :.5ý-I.ý -. .:,.'•.-.',•:• 1 . -...2
be~~niillgated by the implementationi4 fie physlcali•i•ifications recommended in this Assessment
...7
Repyic• impleme- ttion of the recommended physical modifications, the potential
herefore, after the
for fail this structure due to tMse flgbd will not be significant.
se-$,d
.. p Piping•

Because all CPF•. ftor, the waste-Dip oal Piping other than CPFMs 3a, 3c, 3d, and 3fRhad been ruled
out prior to Revisi05iThbecause GP.FMs 3d and 3f were ruled out using the results of the KDI #2
* investig•ation presentedti Sectioni 4.2, and because CPFMs 3a and 3c will be ruled out when the
physical modifications recomm"iended for KDI # 1 in Section 4.1 are implemented, no Triggering
7..7W/" ~ ~ and sosIPpn
Mechanisms their associated PFMs will remain credible for the Waste Disposal Piping. HDR has
strutctural impacts
.:..concluded that the geotechnical and J7./lPpn
//t
the 2011 Missouri.Riversfiood
te of hnCFs3, c .will be.. ue
mitigated by the implementation of the physical modifications recommended ind this
n Assessment
fhdbe

• Report. Therefore, after the implementation of the recommended physical modifications, the potential
for failure of this structure due to the flood will not be significant.
/P
 Page 7-16
Summary and Conclusions RevI 2
7.5.18 Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping

Because all CPFMs for the Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping other than CPFMs 3b, 3c, 3e, and 3f
have been ruled out prior to Revision 1, because CPFM 3c has been ruled out assuming the
implementation of the recommended physical modifications presented in Section 5.18, and because
CPFMs 3b, 3e, and 3f will be ruled out when the physical modifications recommended for KDIs #1 and
#3 in Sections 4.1 and 4.3 are implemented, no Triggering Mechanisms and their associated PFMs will
remain credible for the Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping. HDR has concluded that the geotechnical
and structural impacts of the 2011 Missouri River flood will be mitigate&db:ý2,e implementation of the
physical modifications recommended in this Assessment R epoa1--1eiretiaer,,ne impiementation
of the recommended physical modifications, the potential for fMTA of this siirf e.,due to-the flood
will not be significant.

7.5.19 Main Underground Cable Bank, Auxiliary Building to n takerStructure,.

Because all CPFMs for the Main Underground Cable Bank from the Auxiliary Building to t1ht•k-e
Structure other than CPFMs 3a, 3c, 3d, 3f. 4c, 4d, 4e, 6b, 6c, 12a. and 12bhadbeen ruled out prior to
Revision 1, because CPFMs 4c, 4d, 4e, 6b, 6c, 122a. andJo-I2W1taRV~e been ruled ouis~a result of the
Revision 1 findings, because CPFMs 3d and 3f wereIdiitt-y.-t-tejesults of th :-DI #2
investigations, and because CPFMs 3a and 3c will bie$iuiled out when the Physical m'odifications
recommended for KDI #1 in Section 4.1 are implein'tited, no Ti' :g-ige echanisms and their
associated PFMs will remain credible for the Maifik...Ldergro-uid Cablý!kB, from the Auxiliary
Building to the Intake Structure. IDR has coucluU•l:dihat irgeotechnical afid structural impacts of
the 2011 Missouri River flood will be m.'fte'd by the im~pIeentation oihe physical modifications
recommended in this Assessment Rep•oov-.Therefore, afte'ie implementation of the recommended
physical modifications, the potentihl'f~ u of th is str
_4
.......
ciuetOe flood will not be significant.

7.5.20 Meteqoro',oVi k rand Mi-6laineous Structures

Because adll-CPFMs for the Mb p1o~gical T6oer.6ther than CPFM 7c had been ruled out prior to
Revision;ij,ýi:and because CPFM 7, li.been ruled ij@kas a result of the Revision 1 findings, no
TIrg'permgo Mechanisms and their aEcahted PFMs reffain credible for the Meteorological Tower.
Th'fref ,IHDR has concluded that tlE2.01 I Missouri River flood did not impact the geotechnical and
structbi tegrity of the Meteorologib1 Tower because the potential for failure of this structure due to
the flood -i nificant. S.

7.5.2 1 Orii am Generator ge Building

.
*. . _-.' g9. . .....

There were no appli'4ie•CP sdentified for the OSGS. Therefore, HDR has concluded that the
2011 Missouri River nonC~ddada-ot impact the geotechnical and structural integrity of the OSGS
because the potential foCr ire of this structure due to the flood is not significant.

-7.5.22 Switchyard ,.

Because all CPFMs for the Switchyard other than CPFMs 3a, 3b, and 3c had been ruled out prior to
Revision 1. and because CPFMs 3a, 3b, and 3c have been ruled out as a result of the Revision I
findings, no Triggering Mechanisms and their associated PFMs remain credible for the Switchyard.
Therefore, HDRfhas concluded that the 2011 Missouri River flood did not impact the geotechnical and
structural integrity, of the Switchyard because the potential for failure of this structure due to the flood
is not significant.
 Page 7-17
Summary and Conclusions Rev: 2
7.5.23 Transmission Towers

Because all CPFMs for the Transmission Towers other than CPFM 7c had been ruled out prior to
Revision 1, and because CPFM 7c has been ruled out as a result of the Revision I findings, no
Triggering Mechanisms and their associated PFMs remain credible for the Transmission Towers.
.i"Therefore, HDR has concluded that the 2011 Missouri River flood did not impact the geotechnical and
structural integrity of the Transmission Towers because the potential for failure of this structure due to
t,'he flood is not significant.

7.5.24 Main Underground Cable Bank, MH-i to Auxiiiary Buildi•g ,

Because all CPFMs for the Main Underground Cable Bank fromw- -1 to~t1iu a• Buiding other

than CPFMs 3a and 3c have been ruled out, and because CPFM:"nd 'Z ill be rued•ut when the
physical modifications recommended for KDI #1 in Section 4.] af'"x.p"t kmented, no Tiggering
Mechanisms and their associated PFMs will remain credible for t a• nderground Cb21&,Bank]i->i
from MH-I- to the Auxiliary Building. HDR has concluded that t-ageoi al. and structA
of the 2011 Missouri River flood will be mitigated by the implementation 4 ¶ie physical modif"dations
recommended in this Assessment Report. Therefore, afteuif•i ib ementation of£the recommended
physical modifications, the potential for failure of this -' -•'c- 1 the flood " it be significant.

/.: 7.5.25 River Bank ISO,

Because all CPFMs for the River Bank othevahan'PFMs 30.!37d, 12a, a M5i~hd been ruled out prior
to Revision I and because CPFMs 3a, 3td-l021a1'and 12b hameybeen ruled tA< 0a result of the Revision
1 findings, no Triggering Mechanisms an._'heir associatdc' s rem -redible for the River Bank.
Therefore, HDR has concluded that.th' I Missouri Ri, food.dI~ot impact the geotech1ca1 and
structural integrity bfthe River Bank%:e ause the potential fi' fairof this structure due to the flood
isnot si~~4

7.5.26 BlajW:ater Systemrn ,

Becauise&'f CPFMs for the Blair W•.teFSystem othi4tfn CPFMs 3a. 3c, 7a, 7b, and 7c have been
ruled•oiitubecause CPFMs 7a, 7b, and7_,•c ',Will be ruled out as a result of the Revision I findings and the
impliemenianlhtion of the physical modificot'ns-recommended in Section 5.26. and because CPFMs ')a
and 3 c il0gribuled out when the physitl Imodifications recommended for KDIs #1 and #3' in Section
4.1&and 4.4-ame.-nplemented no Trg.eiig Mechanisms and their associated PFMs will remain
credible for theaiia.Water System H:DR has concluded that the geotechnical and structural impacts
of the 2011 MisseuriRiver floodcwi•lbbe mitigated by the implementation of the physical modifications
recommended in this'A,.•sessmenf•R--eport. Therefore, after the implementation of the recommended
physical modifications,"thpotential for failure of this structure due to the flood will not be significant.

7.5.27 Demineralized Water System

Because all CPFMs for'the Deemineralized Water System other than CPFM 3c had been ruled out prior
to Revision 1, and because CPFM 3c will be ruled out when the physical modifications recommended
for KDIs #1 and #3 in Section 4.1 and 4.3 are implemented, no Triggering Mechanisms and their
associated PFMs will remain credible for the Demineralized Water System. HDR has concluded that
the geotechnical and structural impacts of the 2011 Missouri River flood will be mitigated by the
implementation of the physical modifications recommended in this Assessment Report. Therefore,
 Page 7-18
Summary and Conclusions Rev. 2
after the implementation of the recommended physical modifications, the potential for failure of this
structure due to the flood will not be significant.

7.5.28 Camera Towers and High Mast Lighting

Because all CPFMs for the Camera Towers and High Mast Lighting other than CPFMs 3a. 3d, 12a,
and 12b had been ruled. out prior to Revision 1, and because CPFMs 3a, 3d, 12a, and 12b hav'e.been:
ruled out as a result of the Revision I findings, no Triggering Mechanismsand their associated PFMs
remain credible for the Camera Towers and High Mast Lighting. Theref6fjV R,-h'•as concluded that
the 20 11 Missouri River flood did not impact the geotechnicai ana.structur a tegry of the Camera
Towers and High Mast Lighting because the potential for failure6ofthis strucliine&due to the flood is not
significant. '.• "...................... ..-...%..4.. .: ).'....... ••.....'72:

7.6 Status of Priority 2 Structure Assessments " " ,

In the assessment of the FCS Structures. the first step was to develop6 a lisoýfria] TggerinýA'
Mechanisms and PFMs that could have occurred due to the prolonged inundattn..of the FCS sitej
during the 2011 Missouri River flood and could have negdtel•'iipacted the'.- ctures. The next
step was to use data from various investigations, includ&-,•svstematic observatioffthe structures
over time, either to eliminate the Triggering Mechasisi" and PF~g.fom the list or11.Iircommend
further investigation and/or physical modifications&•iOemove them6iiomthe list for ani particular
structure. The results of the Assessment are detaile&tfor eac"h;•Ihe Pritg'-y,.Structures in the
paragraphs below. -,.

7.6.1 New Warehouse -,

Because all CPFMs for the New Wai'e'h-bGsehave been ruled:•Z,1 po Tiggering Mechanisms and their
associated PFM.sz•e=rdidable for the•"' w.
....,Warehouse. Thýeif6ire, HDR has concluded that the
6d64 neiompact flRig oltechnical and structural integrity of the
2011 MissourTi V rg&ff4'g
New Ware k because the poteitial for faihiieof this structure due to the flood is not significant.

Svice Building
7.6..2S.

Becatigeu.1.&tlCPFMs._for the Service Bufdiag other than CPFM 3b had been ruled out prior to Revision
2. an d b•eeasCPFM 3b will be ruledMutwhen the physical modifications recommended for KDI #1
in Section "ý.Idr.pimplemented. no Triggring Mechanisms and their associated PFMs will remain
credible for th&eiva'.ice Building. 1-RW has concluded that the geotechnical and structural impacts of
the 2011 Missouai i-Riier flood will,,be .mitigated by the implementation of the physical modifications
recommended in tt As-essment !Report. Therefore, after the implementation of the recommended
physical modifications`e-p'Otential for failure of this structure due to the flood will not be significant.

7.6.3 Chemistry/Radiation Protection Building

Because all CPFMs f6r the CARP Building have been ruled out, no Triggering Mechanisms and their
associated PFMs remain credible for the CARP Building. Therefore, HDR has concluded that the
201 1 Missouri River flood did not impact the geotechnical and structural integrity of the CARP
Building because the potential for failure of this structure due to the flood is not significant.
 Page 7-19
Summary and Conclusions Rev. 2
R
7.6.4 Maintenance Shop

Because all CPFMs for the Maintenance Shop other than CPFM 3a have been ruled out, and because
CPFM 3a will be ruled out when the physical modifications recommended for KDIs #1 and #3 in
Section 4.1 and 4.3 are implemented, no Triggering Mechanisms and their associated PFMs will
remain credible for the Maintenance Shop. HDR has concluded that the geotechnical and structural
impacts of the 2011 Missouri River flood will be mitigated by theimplementation of the physical
modifications recommended in this Assessment Report. Therefore, after fte. implementation of the
recommended physical modifications, the potential for failure of thjisstruX .due4•lo.he flood will not
be significant.,.
N .. , 4.
7.6.5 Maintenance Fabrication Shop

Because all CPFMs for the Maintenance Fabrication Shop have bde4,3-i '1dout. no Trigg g
Mechanisms and their associated PFMs remain credible for the M-h"gig ce FaIbcatin•S ,
Therefore, HDR has concluded that the 2011 Missouri River flood".id no'tixipact the geote- • iand
of thi.
structural integrity of the Maintenance Fabrication Shop because the poteAfor-ailure
structure due to the flood is not significant.

7.6.6 PA Paving, PA Sidewalks, and Outdoor:•i~es • ,€

Because all CPFMs for the PA Paving, PA Sidewa.ks and u1:r Dties ,other than CPFMs 2a, 3a,
7a, 7b, and 7c have been ruled out, and because CE 2.s 3a . ru le "dhithe physical
modifications recommended for KDI #1i: i,. $ cton arei;nplemented ;aId because CPFMs 2a, 7a.
7b, and 7c will be ruled out when OPPD petesther itn work, no Triggering
&'fipee ter menrsrainwoknoTigig
Mechanisms and their associated PEsRMW lI remain credieffori t eVAOIPaving, PA Sidewalks, and
Outdoor Drives. HDR has concluded e geotechnicai-fad icral impacts of the 2011 Mssour
River flood will e•im-.,,.te , týhe imp I§htation
, of the physi-al modifications recommended in this
rpr o Nf q recommended physical modifications the potential
for failu r .his structure d ueMph ~lood w41-06b significant.

7. Potable Water Piping .

Becau&-•MIhCPFMs for the Potable W.Vbi-Piping other than CPFM 7c have been ruled out. and
because CP• 4,7c will be ruled out as-a'eRpult of placing engineered fill in locations where soil
subsidenceý,,.. .•:aseecurred (detailed in,,R,••ion 6.7), no Triggering Mechanisms and their associated
PFMs will reminarnedible for the -t4abeWater Piping. Therefore, HDR has concluded that the 2011
Missouri River flb'beNdid not im-ad e geotechnical and structural integrity of the Potable Water
Piping because the p~titial f •ire of this structure due to the flood is not significant.

7.6.8 Sanitary Sewei-.

Because-all. CPFMs for the Sanitary Sewer Systemother than CPFMs 3a and 3c have been ruled. out,
and because CPFNTs 3a and 3c will be ruled out when the physical modificatiinsrecomrmendedTor
KDI #1 in Section 4.1, and the physical modifications to MH-tI(detailed in Section 6.8)are
implemented, no Triggering Mechanisms and their associated PFMs will remain credible for the
Sanitary Sewer System. HDR has concluded that the geotechnical and structural impacts of the 20 11
Missouri River flood will be mitigated by the implementation of the physical modifications
recommended in this Assessment Report. Therefore, after the implementation of the recommended
physical modifications, the potential for failure of this structure due to the flood will not be significant.
 Page 7-20
Summary and Conclusions Rev. 2

7.6.9 Maintenance Storage Building

Because all CPFMs for the Maintenance Storage Building have been ruled out, no Triggering
Mechanisms and their associated PFMs remain credible for the Maintenance Storage Building.
Therefore, HDR has concluded that the 2011 Missouri. River flood did not impact the geotechnical and
structural integrity of the Maintenance Storage Building because the potential for failure of this
structure due to the flood is not significant.

7.6.10 Old Warehouse

Because all CPFMs for the Old Warehouse have been ruled out -oTriggerigMnhanisms and their

associated PFMs remain credible for the Old Warehouse. Theiefqr e, HDRha."sco•i'cided that the 2011
Missouri River flood did not impact the geotechnical and sructw. of the OldQf'arehouse
because the potential for failure of this structure due to the flood isnt,' significant.

7.6.11 Training Center -> "-

Because all CPFMs for the Training Center have been ruledo•u&t,,,mo Triggering.Mchanisms and their
associated PFMs remain credible for the Traininp Center,:;~Therefore, HDR has con•ciuded that the
2011 Missouri River flood did not impact the geotechiii'al and -suMemI,"h integrityvf1t1iieTraining
Center because the potential for failure of this structuke due to thiffho.d' jisot sicnificant

7.6.12 Administration Building 41.,M-7

Because all CPFMs for the AdministrationBuilding have,:been ruled out`Io Triggering Mechanisms
and their associated PFMs remain crf.ib1e:for the Administation Buicing. Therefore, HDR has
concluded that the 2011 Missouri RiN& flood did not impacd.-te7tgeoteEhinical and structural integrity
r ohis structure due to the flood is not
of the Administrati•ionBulcing because th&e otential for failu'e
significant.~

7.6.11 H5azardous Material Sior,;g@e .Buildng>KK

Bebaise.--all CPFMs for the Hazardoug.,. 'MaterialStorage Building have been ruled out, no Triggering
Me(hNa.tI s and their associated PF~sremain credible for the Hazardous Material Storage Building.
Theref i'.ýfR has concluded that th 01Q I Missouri River flood did not impact the geotechnical and
structuralmritguty of the Hazardous M -ial Storage Building because the potential for failure of this
structure due7t t ood is not signfiTnt.

7.6.14 Maintenance Garage,-

Because all CPFMs for the•'N`I4intenance Garage have been ruled out, no Triggering Mechanisms and
their associated PFMs remain credible for the Maintenance Garage. Therefore, HDR has concluded
that the 2011 Missouri River flood did not impact the geotechnical and structural integrity of the
Mainten-iiance Garage b'cadse the potential for failiuire.bf this structure: due to-the-floodis 'not
significant.

7.6.15 Tertiary Building

Because all CPFMs for the Tertiary Building (Boat Storage) have been ruled out. no Triggering
Mechanisms and their associated PFMs remain credible for the Tertiary Building (Boat Storage).
Therefore. HDR has concluded that the 2011 Missouri River flood did not impact the geotechnical and
 Page 7-21
Summary and Conclusions - Rev. 2

structural integrity of the Tertiary Building (Boat Storage) because the potential for failure of this
structure due to the flood is not significant.

7.6.16 Spare Transformer Pads

Because all CPFMs for the Spare Transformer Pads have been ruled out, no Triggering Mechanisms
.and.their-associated PFMs remain credible for the Spare Transformer Pads. The!refore, HDR has
concluded that the 2011 Missouri River flood did not impact the geotechniical and structural integrity
of the Spare Transformer Pads because the potential for failure of this strf"!Le duelo the flood is not
significant. ,

7.6.17 Shooting Range

Because all CPFMs for the Shooting Range other than CPFM 2a hael61ee :ause
CPFM 2a will be ruled out when the physical modifications recommien
implemented, no Triggering Mechanisms and theirassociated PFMfswTh
Shooting Range. HDR has concluded that the geotechnical and structuralf
Missouri River flood will be mitigated by the implementat16ii-the physi
recommended in this report. Therefore, after the l ihdetn6i%,kb"the re
modifications the potential for failure of this structuiue to the fo!w.1

7.6.18 Gravel Parking Lots

Because all CPFMs for the Gravel Par] ..iffring Mechanisms and
their associated PFMs remain credible ýýIore, HDR has concluded
that the 2011 Missouri River flooddiN ructural integrity of the
Gravel Parking Lots because the poteii to the flood is not significant.

7.6.19 Sewa.d.e.:.Laaoons,

BecauseI'ECPFMs for the Sewaef ýagoons otlhft1an CPFMs 6c, 7b, and 7c have been ruled out, and
becatffsCPFMs 6c, 7b, and 7c wiliR$E; rled out wrAdeMe physical modifications recommended in
Se&Uio6. 19 are implemented, no Tfiggering Mechanisms and their associated PFMs will remain
credAie for.the Sewage Lagoons. 16Di As concluded that the geotechnical and structural impacts of
the 20f1" k.isuri River flood will be mitigated by the implementation of the physical modifications
recommended in this report. Therefor.eafter the implementation of the recommended physical
modifications ,i.hbotential for faiyi.r this structure due to the flood will not be significant.
Iv

SECTION 9.0
AUA CHMENTC

7, '4¼~'

.. .. . . .. .• .,• .
I 4

,c 4A~-~"'
i II
A,

A A 4'

-Th ;-~~.m

,4h '~ 'I

4' 4~-.

A-' '~

.4-h

. . '•.7:
S

, - 4'.

'4: N

i
 Page 9-1
Attachments Rev. 2
9.0 ATTACHMENTS

9.1 Attachment 1- Deaggregation Plots

9.2 Attachment 2- Structural Baseline References
9.3 Attachment 3- FCS Site Inspection Checklists
9.4 Attachment 4- Triggering Mechanisms and Potential Failure Modes by Structure
9.5 Attachment 5- Supporting Data for Comparative Evaluation of Geotechnical Analyses
9.6 Attachment 6- Geotechnical Data from Subconsultants and OPPD
9.7 Attachment 7- Photo Documentation
9.8 Attachment 8- Field Reports, Field Notes, and inspection Checklists