Project Atom Report 2021 12
Project Atom Report 2021 12
Exploring a
Wholesale CBDC
for Syndicated
Lending
December 2021
Contents
Executive Summary 3
1. Introduction 5
2.1
Syndicated lending 10
CBDC
2.3 Utility 13
TSL
2.4 Platform 16
2.5 Platform interoperability and DvP settlement 18
3. Non-functional requirements 20
3.1 Efficiency and transaction finality 20
5. Conclusion 31
A3.
Blockchain infrastructure 36
A5. Implementation of the ERC 1400 token standard in the loan token 39
Appendix B: Acknowledgments 43
The project examined the potential use and implications of a wholesale form of CBDC, with a
focus on:
• how access to a tokenised CBDC could be extended to a wider range of wholesale market
participants than just commercial banks
• the potential benefits of integrating tokenised CBDC with a digital asset in the form of a
tokenised syndicated loan on interoperable DLT platforms
• how an enterprise-grade version of the Ethereum blockchain platform could address some
of the technical limitations in the public version of Ethereum, with a view to understanding
whether DLT could be a viable technology for this type of system.
The POC explored a two-tier model for the issuance and distribution of the wholesale CBDC
whereby the RBA would issue CBDC to commercial banks, and then banks could make the CBDC
available to eligible wholesale market participants that they sponsor onto the platform. This model
preserves several important aspects of the current role of commercial banks in the financial system,
including customer onboarding and other customer-facing activities. There are a range of potential
benefits in providing non-bank wholesale market participants with access to CBDC for settling
transactions and as a store of value. However, broader access also raises a number of policy and
legal issues that would need to be considered, including: who would be eligible to access CBDC;
how CBDC could be used; the nature of the relationship between commercial banks and their
sponsored participants; and the potential implications of commercial bank deposits migrating to
CBDC for financial intermediation and financial stability.
As regards the technology, the POC demonstrated that an enterprise-grade DLT platform with
appropriate controls on access and security could address many of the possible requirements on a
wholesale CBDC and tokenised assets platform, including in relation to certainty over transaction
finality, efficiency, security and privacy. That said, the scope of the POC was necessarily limited
and did not focus on non-functional requirements (for example, the scalability of the system, or how
it would address cyber risk). Further exploration and testing of the technology would therefore be
required to assess its suitability for a production system.
Overall, this project demonstrated many of the potential benefits and implications of issuing a
wholesale CBDC to settle transactions in tokenised assets on DLT platforms. However, as is to be
expected in a research project such as this, the project has also highlighted a range of additional
questions and issues that need to be explored to help address the question of whether there is
a case for a wholesale CBDC and how one could be developed. This project also demonstrated the
benefits of collaboration in advancing the participants’ knowledge and understanding of the role
that CBDCs and asset tokenisation could play in shaping the future of finance.
Many central banks are currently researching the potential benefits and other implications of issuing
CBDC as a complement to existing forms of money. In most economies, including Australia, the
bulk of money already exists in digital form as deposits with commercial banks, which are used
by households and businesses to make payments using a variety of electronic payment services.
Central banks also provide digital money in the form of balances held in accounts that commercial
banks and a few other types of financial institutions can hold at the central bank to settle payment
obligations between each other. The only form of central bank-issued money that is universally
accessible is physical money in the form of banknotes (i.e. cash). A CBDC would be a new digital
form of money issued by, and therefore a direct liability of, a central bank. It could be designed
for retail (or general purpose) use, which would be like a digital version of cash that is essentially
universally accessible, or for wholesale use, where it is accessible only to a more limited range of
wholesale market participants (such as financial institutions and large corporates, for example) for
use in wholesale payment and settlement systems (Figure 1).¹
1 T
his figure draws on Bjerg O (2017), ‘Designing New Money: The Policy Trilemma of Central Bank Digital Currency’, Copenhagen
Business School, CBS, MPP Working Paper.
Current Future?
Wholesale
Reserves CBDC?
Cash (ESAs) Cash
Reserves
Retail (ESAs)
CBDC?
Universally Universally
Bank Digital Bank Digital
accessible account accessible account
money money
money money money money
The RBA has been researching CBDC for a number of years, looking at both retail and wholesale
use cases. In 2020, the RBA published an article that outlined some of the possible design
considerations, and the case for and potential implications of issuing a retail CBDC.² The article
noted that while there was not a strong public policy case for issuing a retail CBDC in Australia at
present, the RBA would continue to consider the case for a retail CBDC, including how it might be
designed, the various policy implications and potential use cases.
Separate to its work on retail CBDC, the RBA has also been exploring a wholesale form of CBDC.
In a speech in 2017, the RBA Governor noted that the RBA was open to exploring whether there
was a case to issue a CBDC in the form of digital tokens that could be exchanged between
wholesale market participants in specialised payment and settlement systems based on DLT.³
Such a system could function as an alternative to the RBA’s existing real-time gross settlement
(RTGS) system, RITS, which commercial banks already use to settle payment obligations between
themselves using the balances in the Exchange Settlement Accounts (ESAs) they hold with the RBA.
This type of CBDC could offer benefits in terms of allowing payment and settlement processes to
be more closely linked with other business processes on a DLT platform (for example, the trading
of other tokenised assets), which may generate efficiencies or risk reductions for businesses.
CBDC tokens might also be able to be programmed using the smart contract functionality of DLT
platforms, enabling multi-stage transactions with potentially complex dependencies to take place
securely and automatically.
2 S
ee: Richards T, C Thompson and C Dark (2020), ‘Retail Central Bank Digital Currency: Design Considerations, Rationales and Implications’,
RBA Bulletin, September.
3 L
owe P (2017), ‘An eAUD?’, Address to the 2017 Australian Payment Summit, Sydney, 13 December.
Aside from the RBA’s research, the Australian market has also seen the development of some other
significant DLT initiatives with participation from multiple stakeholders across financial institutions,
corporates and technology companies:
• CBA has developed DLT projects spanning fixed income, agricultural commodities, small
business loans and retail payments. CBA’s most notable project was ‘Bond-i’, one of the first
digital bonds to be issued and managed on a blockchain platform globally. Bond-i is a A$110
million digital bond issued by the World Bank with eight institutional investors (including
QBE, Northern Trust and TD Securities among others) on an Ethereum-based platform built
by CBA’s Innovation Lab.
• ANZ, CBA and Westpac have formed a new venture, Lygon, in partnership with IBM and
Scentre Group. Launched in 2019, Lygon’s blockchain solution (built on Hyperledger Fabric)
enables the digitisation and automation of bank guarantees for retail property leasing.
• ASX Ltd started in 2017 an ambitious project to replace CHESS, its core equities clearing
and settlement infrastructure, with a new DLT-based solution developed in partnership
with Digital Asset, a New York-based technology company. While the initiative is currently
focused on the upgrade of equities post-trade infrastructure, ASX has stated that this marks
the first step of its digital asset strategy, which the exchange intends to extend to other
asset classes and services in the coming years.
Emerging economies’ motivations for retail CBDC projects tend to be related to improving
financial inclusion through greater access to payment services to unbanked residents
and enhancing their domestic payments systems more generally. Notable examples
include China’s retail CBDC project, the eCNY, which has progressed to a series of city-
wide pilots, and the launch of the Bahama’s ‘Sand Dollar’ in October 2020. In contrast,
advanced economies’ motivations for retail CBDC projects tend to relate to enhancing
payments system efficiency, safety and robustness.
Both advanced and emerging economies consider improving the efficiency of cross-
border payments as a key motivation for wholesale CBDC. This is reflected in a range of
international work programs, such as the Financial Stability Board’s Roadmap to Enhance
Cross-Border Payments, which is endorsed by the G20 and includes work to explore the
role of new payment arrangements, including CBDC. In addition, enhancing settlement
processes for digital assets remains a key motivation for central banks’ exploration of
wholesale CBDC. This is reflected in a number of wholesale CBDC projects, such as:
• Project Helvetia, a joint POC by the Bank for International Settlements Innovation
Hub Swiss Centre, SIX Group AG and the Swiss National Bank, which explored the
integration of tokenised assets and central bank money on a distributed ledger as
well as the linking of DLT to existing payment systems.
Project Atom contributes to the breadth of CBDC research by exploring the implications
of extending access to wholesale CBDC to non-bank wholesale market participants and
the implications of atomic DvP settlement on a DLT platform.
4 B
oar, C and A Wehrli (2021) ‘Ready, steady, go? – Results of the third BIS survey on central bank digital currency’, Bank for International
Settlements Papers No. 114, January.
• It integrated another digital asset in the form of a tokenised syndicated loan that allowed for
exploration of the implications of ‘atomic’ DvP settlement as well as other potential benefits
of combining CBDC and tokenised assets on interoperable DLT platforms.5
• It explored how an enterprise-grade version of the Ethereum blockchain platform could deal
with some of the technical limitations of the public version used in the RBA’s initial project.
The POC incorporated a two-tier distribution model for the issuance and distribution of the
CBDC. In this model, the central bank is responsible for issuing CBDC to commercial banks who
hold ESAs (ESA holders), who are in turn responsible for making the CBDC available to eligible
wholesale market participants (sponsored participants). The ESA holder acts as a sponsor for these
participants and is responsible for ensuring that only eligible parties can access the CBDC. This
contrasts with a model of universal access (i.e. a retail CBDC), which would raise a number of very
different challenges and considerations and was beyond the scope of this project. The advantage
of a two-tier distribution model, rather than one in which the central bank makes CBDC available to
wholesale market participants directly, is that the sponsor commercial bank retains responsibility
for a wide range of customer-facing activities that a central bank is unlikely to have a comparative
advantage or risk appetite to engage in, such as customer support, know your customer (KYC)
and probity checks, transaction monitoring for compliance with anti-money laundering (AML) and
counter-terrorism financing (CTF) obligations and general account-keeping services.
5 Atomic
DvP refers to a settlement process by which a transaction is executed and settled in an integrated and instantaneous fashion
such that the delivery of the asset and the associated payment occur simultaneously and in a way that ensures that one leg cannot occur
unless the other does. Traditionally, these legs occur in separate systems and although they may be designed to occur simultaneously,
they may well have delays or occur at different times due to separation between each system.
An SFA is usually established through a lead arranger, which is responsible for structuring the
facility and marketing it to other lenders, who form part of the syndicate, on behalf of a borrower
(Figure 2). The lead arranger may also underwrite the facility for an additional fee, lending funds to
the borrower prior to or during the establishment of the syndicate. The SFA is administered by a
facility agent (which could be one of the syndicate lenders or some other third party), which acts
as the primary point of communication between the parties. The facility agent also manages the
initial flow of funds to the borrower and the repayment of the loan by the borrower. Settlement and
repayment of syndicated loans occurs through existing payment rails provided by the banks.
Syndicate Syndicate
Lender 1 Lender 1
TSL Platform
Multiple systems Document management
Manual operations Digitised servicing processes
Lender 2 Multiple bilateral links Borrower Lender 2 Digital loan template management Borrower
... ... Digital lifecycle management
Lender 10 Lender 10
Facility agent
Facility agent
• They involve multiple participants who have overlapping roles, including intermediaries
who administer the facility and lenders.
• At settlement, all parties are required to have agreed to the same terms and a large amount
of funds must be transferred in a manner where time and certainty of settlement is important.
The distributed nature of the syndicated lending market also makes it an interesting use case in
which to experiment with DLT. Indeed, independent of any CBDC aspects, the use of DLT could
provide benefits by providing a single, technologically immutable record of the SFA that all parties
can access without relying on a central intermediary. In addition, DLT could provide benefits through
digitisation and automation of the manual and paper-based processes that are still common in the
syndicated lending market (Figure 3).
Process loan
Complex coordination documents
! across the participants
Sign
Documents
Facility agent confirms and Facility agent confirms and Manual instruction of
! reconcile payments to settle ! reconcile payments to settle ! repayments to all lenders
and update the loan registry and update the loan registry
1. A CBDC Utility, which manages the issuance, transfer and redemption of a wholesale CBDC.
2. A Tokenised Syndicated Loan Platform (TSL Platform), which manages the issuance, drawdown,
novation and repayment of a tokenised syndicated loan.
Both components share a private and permissioned blockchain network built on Hyperledger Besu,
an enterprise-grade Ethereum client (Figure 4).6,7 In the POC system, the RBA, CBA, NAB and Perpetual
were each assigned a node on the network that holds a copy of the ledger (i.e. a record of all
transactions in each of the CBDC Utility and the TSL Platform).⁸ Each time a transaction is processed,
all nodes are synchronised using a process to share and verify updates.
Sponsored Sponsored
participant participant
Node Node
Permissioned blockchain
6 In addition to Hyperledger Besu, the DLT platform consists of several other ConsenSys and third-party components that provide
additional functionality, such as management of the blockchain network and transaction privacy. Refer to Appendix A for the
technical architecture.
7 A
s a private network, access to both view transactions on the platform and operate the platform is limited. In a permissioned network,
existing participants who operate the platform must authorise any new participant to connect to the network. Permissionless networks,
which are common in public DLT platforms such as Bitcoin, allow any person to operate a node.
8 T
here was also a fifth node managed by ConsenSys for monitoring purposes. See Appendix A for more detail on the technical design.
A key feature of the POC is that the CBDC Utility and the TSL Platform are interoperable. This
enables atomic DvP settlement of transactions in the tokenised syndicated loan, with the change
in ownership/status of the loan (delivery) occurring simultaneously with the transfer of the CBDC
(payment). The following sections outline the key functional aspects of the design for the CBDC
Utility and the TSL Platform, and how their interoperation enables atomic DvP settlement.
CBDC is issued (‘minted’) by the RBA in response to a request via the CBDC Utility from an ESA holder
(either as a direct request or indirectly following a request from one of its sponsored participants).
While the POC did not build any connection with RITS, a database and APIs were used to mimic
the link between off-chain ESAs and the on-chain ledger. The design envisaged that on receipt of a
request for CBDC, the RBA would:
• debit the ESA balance of the ESA holder (or the sponsoring ESA holder) by
the amount of CBDC requested
• issue (‘mint’) CBDC tokens on the CBDC Utility into the ‘wallet’ of the ESA holder (or its
sponsored participant).10
9 A
n omnibus account would be a new type of account in RITS that co-mingles the funds of different ESA holders and backs all of the
CBDC tokens on issue. The advantage of this structure is that transactions in CBDC tokens that have already been issued can occur
without the ESA balances of the relevant participants having to be continually updated.
10 A
wallet corresponds to a unique address on the Ethereum network for each participant that holds CBDC either directly or through
a sponsoring ESA holder. A sponsored participant may have more than one unique address if they have more than one sponsoring
ESA holder.
In addition to requesting issuance and redemption of CBDC, participants can also use the CBDC
Utility to transfer CBDC from one wallet to another.¹²
1 2 3 4
CBDC Approve CBDC Send CBDC to Receive CBDC
Request CBDC sponsored
Utility request in 'wallet'
participant
Debit
sponsor ESA
RITS Credit omnibus
account
* The POC used databases to simulate the activity in RITS and commercial bank systems.
At any point in time, the balance in the omnibus account in RITS would represent the total amount
of CBDC on issue. CBDC would be a claim on the assets in the omnibus account, being a liability of
the RBA. Because of the use of the omnibus account, the RBA would not need to keep a live record
in RITS of who holds the CBDC on issue at each point in time. This overcomes the challenges of
real-time reconciliation between RITS and the CBDC Utility and also has the advantage that CBDC
can continue to be transferred between participants using the CBDC Utility even if the connection
to RITS was down (although further issuance and redemption would not be possible in this case).
11 P
rocesses undertaken by an ESA holder outside the CBDC Utility and the TSL Platform (such as maintaining a record of CBDC held
by a sponsored participant) were not considered as part of the POC.
12 T
he minimum denomination of CBDC tokens was initially set at A$1 but had to be increased to A$1,000 (i.e. 1 CBDC token = A$1,000)
to deal with performance issues associated with the privacy-related encryption process implemented in the POC – see Appendix A4
for more details.
Once onboarded to the CBDC Utility, both ESA holders and sponsored participants can use a web-
based interface to acquire, transfer and redeem CBDC. These instructions are facilitated by a set of
automated rules and conditions governed by the RBA. In particular:
• Instructions from ESA holders are automatically processed by the CBDC Utility without
requiring approval by the RBA.
• When an instruction is received from a sponsored participant, the CBDC Utility requires the
instruction to be approved by the participant’s sponsor ESA holder. This is because issuance/
redemption of CBDC ultimately impacts the sponsor’s ESA. Before CBDC can be acquired or
redeemed by a sponsored participant, its sponsor ESA holder needs to review the instruction
and approve it (otherwise it expires within a certain timeframe). Upon approval to issue/
redeem, the ESA holder would debit/credit the deposit account that the participant holds
with the sponsor and funds are automatically transferred between the ESA holder’s ESA
and the omnibus account as required.¹⁴ The CBDC Utility then issues/redeems CBDC in the
sponsored participant’s wallet.
Transfers of CBDC between participants of the CBDC Utility are also governed by a set of
programmable conditions that could be defined by the RBA. For example, the transfer amount is
validated in the account of the ESA holder or the sponsored participant before the instruction for the
transaction can be submitted. If the amount transferred is greater than A$5 million, the CBDC Utility
was configured to require the approval of the recipient before processing, as a way to reduce errors
and assist in reconciliation (Figure 6). There are a range of other programmable conditions that
could have been implemented using smart contracts to improve the functionality and efficiency of
the system. For example, it would be possible to validate that a recipient was authorised to use the
platform and control the use of CBDC tokens in particular types of transactions.
13 A
digital registry, implemented through a smart contract, captures and maintains the relationship between sponsor ESA holders
and their respective sponsored participants.
14 A
ny debit/credit to the sponsored participant’s bank account would be handled through the bank’s own internal ledger system.
1 Equal to or over
2 3
CBDC Transfer request A$5 million Approve transfer Receive CBDC
for CBDC from request in 'wallet'
Utility 'wallet'
2 3
Automatic Receive CBDC
Under A$5 million approval in 'wallet'
The facility agent is responsible for configuring the syndicated loan on the TSL Platform, which
creates a smart contract with portions of the loan represented by digital tokens that can be transferred
between participants.¹⁵ Each loan token contains the key information about the syndicated loan (e.g.
amount and interest rate) and represents A$1 of debt that has been made available to the borrower
(i.e. the tokens represent a claim on the borrower). When the loan agreement is approved on the
TSL Platform, the loan tokens are initially issued to the borrower in an ‘undrawn’ state and are only
allocated to lenders in a ‘drawn’ state once drawdown of the loan occurs (Figure 7).
15 S
mart contracts are self-executing computer code running on a DLT platform which automatically perform various functions.
They allow parties to enter into agreements knowing that they will be enforced without the need to trust each other.
1 1 4 5
TSL Create loan Recieve loan Execute Receive loan
Platform facility tokens in wallet DvP tokens in 'wallet'
2
Request
drawdown
3 5
CBDC Receive CBDC
Send CBDC
Utility to borrower in 'wallet'
The loan tokens allow the TSL Platform to maintain an accurate record of the positions of each
participant in the syndicate, as well as manage the drawdown, novation and repayment of the
loan. For example, the novation of a syndicated loan would involve the transfer of ‘drawn’ loan
tokens from the wallet of one lender to another. The TSL Platform also ensures that data related
to a syndicated loan are only accessible to participants of that facility. This is important in a
system where financial institutions may participate together in one facility, but not in others.
The TSL Platform uses digital workflows, smart contracts and digital signatures to streamline a
number of steps in the syndicated loan lifecycle (Figure 8). These steps demonstrate how an
SFA may be entered into, but the project did not consider the legal requirements of executing
an SFA. Examples of the TSL Platform tasks include:
• The creation of a loan facility, which embeds information such as the facility limit, the
parties involved, the interest rate, the facility start/end date and any applicable fees (e.g.
commitment fees) into a smart contract. Digital documents are also uploaded and stored
in the platform, including term sheets and other loan documentation.
• Drawdown approval, which involves the use of digital signatures to sign loan agreements
and confirm that the conditions precedent have been met.
• Automatic calculation of fees related to the drawdown, novation and repayment of the
loan facility.
Process loan
Digital configuration and documents
coordination of the deal
Sign
Documents
Reduced operational risks, improved data sharing, communication and user experience for participants
• Initial drawdown of the loan. The lead arranger uses CBDC to fund the initial drawdown of
the loan. Settlement occurs when ownership of the loan tokens transfers from the borrower
to the lead arranger, the status of the loan tokens is updated from ‘undrawn’ to ‘drawn’ and
the required amount of CBDC tokens is transferred from the lead arranger to the borrower.
• Novation to incoming syndicate lender. An incoming syndicate lender uses CBDC to purchase
a share of the loan from the lead arranger (or another syndicate lender). Settlement occurs
when ownership of the loan tokens transfers from the lead arranger (or existing syndicate
lender) to the incoming lender and the required amount of CBDC tokens is transferred from
the incoming lender to the lead arranger (or other syndicate lender).
• Repayment of the loan. The borrower uses CBDC to repay the loan. Settlement occurs when
CBDC tokens are transferred from the borrower to the lender(s) and the equivalent amount of
loan tokens is destroyed.¹⁶
16 T
he POC was designed for a term loan facility where loan tokens are destroyed when the loan is repaid. However, it would also be
possible to accommodate a revolving credit facility whereby repaid loan tokens are returned to the borrower in an ‘undrawn’ state,
where they can be re-used for further borrowing.
1. Borrower creates a hold on 2. Lead arranger creates a hold 3. Facility agent releases the
the syndicated loan tokens on the CDBC hold and DvP is executed
Facility
agent
The lock-up mechanism is implemented through a smart contract on the CBDC Utility. The smart
contract allows participants to place a time-bound hold on the CBDC and loan tokens for use in a
specific transaction. This prevents CBDC or loan tokens from being transferred until the ‘hold’ is
removed, a specified period of time has elapsed, or the corresponding action occurs, ‘atomically’
settling the transaction and delivering the asset. The use of this form of smart contract has several
benefits. It eliminates the risk of double spending of CBDC or loan tokens, which could lead to a
settlement failure, and it allows participants to control their tokens until the transaction is completed.
A participant can remove the hold on their CBDC or loan tokens at any time, but the smart contract
will delay settlement until both of the holds have been established. The smart contract removes the
need for an intermediary (typically the facility agent) to have custody of the CBDC or loan tokens
during settlement.¹⁷
Besides coordinating and executing the DvP settlement process, smart contracts also automate
a number of other aspects of loan transactions, including fee calculations (i.e. calculating the
net proceeds to be paid to the borrower at loan drawdown after fees) and tracking changes in
ownership of the loan tokens (i.e. tracking changes in outstanding obligations to each lender).
While not implemented in the POC, it would also be possible to incorporate external data sources
into smart contract calculations.¹⁸ For example, a smart contract could use a benchmark rate to
determine repayment amounts, or draw on external data to automatically monitor compliance
with loan covenants.
17 N
ote that this smart contract is not intended to change the legal rights to the tokens, it is merely a technological feature designed to
facilitate DvP settlement.
18 A
n oracle is a third-party service that provides information from external data sources to enable smart contracts to take actions based on
data that is not stored on the DLT platform.
To address this issue, the POC used a different consensus protocol known as ‘proof of authority’
that is more appropriate for a private, permissioned network where participants know and
trust each other. This approach assigns a number of nodes as ‘validator nodes’ that take turns
(rather than compete) to verify and add transactions to the ledger in a round-robin arrangement.
Once added to the ledger, transactions are considered final and irrevocable. This more efficient
consensus process allows a significantly higher number of transactions per second to be
processed than the public version of Ethereum. However, the actual rate of transaction throughput
can vary depending on a range of factors, such as the number of nodes in the network, network
speeds and the complexity of transactions.
The POC was not developed with high throughput and scalability as key requirements and so
this aspect has not been a focus of the testing. However, demonstrations suggest that the system
processes most transactions in about 10–15 seconds. This may be adequate for a low-volume
use case like syndicated loans, but may not be adequate for higher-volume use cases like retail
payments, trading shares or other financial products. Further research would be necessary to test
the efficiency and scalability of different DLT platforms for particular CBDC use cases and to also
compare this with other technologies.
The POC implemented a privacy protocol for Ethereum called Aztec that encrypts transaction
information so that only parties to the transaction can see the details of the transaction. Aztec uses
a technique known as ‘zero-knowledge proofs’, which allows the necessary logical checks to be
performed by a validator node to verify transactions without the need for the underlying transaction
information to be revealed (see Appendix A for further details). CBDC transaction information is
encrypted, which allows participants that are not a party to a transaction to see that a transaction
occurred, but not the information about the transaction, such as the payer, payee or amount. For
the POC, the privacy solution was configured so that ESA holders have visibility of the CBDC
transactions of their sponsored participants, and the RBA has visibility of all CBDC transactions
given its role as administrator of the CBDC Utility.
The Aztec privacy protocol addressed many of the privacy concerns associated with Ethereum.
However, its application in the POC did give rise to unforeseen performance issues. In particular,
it was found that the computational demands of implementing the encryption process increase
sharply when a large number of tokens have been minted. When the minimum denomination of
CBDC tokens was initially set at A$1, it resulted in unreasonably slow transaction times. A work-
around was to increase the minimum denomination of CBDC tokens (from A$1 to A$1,000) to
reduce the number of CBDC tokens on issue at any given time. While this alleviated the
performance issues, it meant CBDC holdings and transactions must be in multiples of A$1,000,
reducing the flexibility of the CBDC as an alternative to digital account-based payment systems.
Ideally, the minimum value of a CBDC token would equal one cent so that tokens and amounts
in ESAs are fully fungible and convertible one-for-one.
There is research underway in the DLT community to address this issue. The forthcoming
version of the Aztec privacy protocol is expected to be significantly more efficient from a
computational perspective.
A different approach was used to ensure loan transaction privacy in the TSL Platform. An ‘allow list’
in the smart contract registry ensures that only participants that are a party to a loan facility are able
to view information related to the facility. This information includes the identities of other participants,
distribution of loan shares and financial information relating to the facility and borrower. For the
purpose of this project, the POC was configured such that the RBA did not have access to the TSL
Platform, nor did it have visibility of information related to individual facilities. However, the platform
could easily be configured to provide the RBA or any other relevant authority with access to some
or all of the information on a particular tokenised loan facility.
• Access to the private and permissioned blockchain network was restricted to authorised
nodes. In practice, it is likely these nodes would be operated by, in respect of the CBDC
Utility, the RBA and some or all of the ESA holders, which would be authorised by the RBA,
and in respect of the TSL Platform, the lead arranger, facility agent and lenders.
• Cryptographic techniques using public/private keys are used to access accounts and to sign
and submit transactions on the DLT platform.²⁰ ESA holders would be responsible for managing
their own private keys and the private keys of their sponsored participants.
• Access to the CBDC Utility is restricted to authorised users that have been nominated by
the RBA or sponsored by an ESA holder. Similarly, access to the TSL Platform is restricted to
authorised users that have been sponsored by an ESA holder. In the POC, participants accessed
the CBDC Utility and/or TSL Platform using a username and password. More advanced access
controls, such as two-factor authentication, could also have been implemented.
20 P
ublic/private key cryptography is a form of encryption that uses two different keys: a private key (that a user keeps secret) and a
public key that can be shared with others. When a user signs a transaction, their private key is used to generate a random string of
characters or ‘hash’ that is attached to the transaction. Other participants can then apply the user’s public key to the hash to verify that
the transaction was submitted by the authorised user and that the contents of the transaction are correct and have not been altered.
• The RBA holds a unique role in the POC system as the issuer of CBDC tokens and operator
of RITS. In the event of an outage to RBA systems (e.g. RITS), requests by participants
to issue or redeem CBDC tokens would be unable to be processed. Participants could,
however, transfer CBDC issued prior to the outage to RBA systems. This risk would be
mitigated through the RBA’s usual business continuity and back-up arrangements.
• As noted earlier, the POC uses a form of consensus known as ‘proof of authority’, which
relies on a small number of trusted validator nodes to verify transactions. This approach
requires a minimum of four validator nodes for the network to function correctly and reach
consensus; if there are fewer than four validator nodes the network will stop verifying
transactions.²¹ The risk of there not being enough operational validator notes could be
reduced by running more nodes (e.g. by a greater number of ESA holders) or the running
of multiple nodes by the RBA and/or ESA holders (as part of normal operations or business
continuity arrangements). Consideration would also need to be given to operating nodes
in dispersed geographic locations to reduce the risk of outages related to natural disasters,
for example.
21 S
ee Appendix A3 for more information on the consensus mechanism.
The POC allowed for the possibility that interest could be paid on CBDC balances. This would be
an important policy decision for the RBA, with potentially significant implications for how CBDC was
used. One possibility would be to not remunerate CBDC balances; depending on the level of interest
rates in the economy, this could create incentives to minimise overnight CBDC holdings.²² Such an
approach might be appropriate where the CBDC is mainly designed to facilitate payments rather
than be a store of value. Alternatively, the RBA could pay interest on CBDC balances, possibly at the
same rate as on ESA balances. A further decision is whether interest would be paid directly to the
CBDC holder (whether an ESA holder or a sponsored participant) or just to the ESA holder (in respect
of all CBDC held by it and its sponsored participant). In the latter model, it would be a commercial
decision of the ESA holders as to whether and how they pay interest to their sponsored participants
for their CBDC holdings.
The POC envisages that CBDC would be issued to ESA holders and their sponsored participants in
exchange for ESA balances. The level of ESA balances is important for the RBA’s monetary policy
settings, including because it influences the cash rate (i.e. the interest rate on unsecured overnight
loans of ESA balances between banks), which is targeted by the Reserve Bank Board and is the key
short-term (near) risk-free benchmark rate in Australia. Accordingly, policy decisions around how
this form of CBDC would be operationalised could have implications for how the RBA implements
monetary policy. For example, if CBDC was primarily used to facilitate payments and earned no (or
relatively little) interest, demand for CBDC may be fairly low, stable and predictable, and so the effect
on ESA balances would likely be more manageable, at least in normal circumstances. On the other
hand, if there was stronger demand to hold CBDC as a store of value (e.g. because it earned an
attractive rate of interest and/or was seen as a safe asset, particularly by entities that ordinarily do
not have access to ESAs), then this higher level of holdings could be associated with greater volatility
of flows and therefore greater volatility in ESA balances (and potentially the cash rate).
22 A
similar outcome could be achieved with a negative interest rate on CBDC balances.
In exploring how to provide wider access to CBDC, the presumption is that there would be a range
of potential benefits of providing eligible non-bank wholesale market participants with access to
CBDC for settling transactions and to hold as a store of value. For example, in the syndicated loans
use case explored in this project, there could be efficiency and risk management benefits to the
facility agent given its role in administering syndicated lending facilities, which involves coordinating
payments between syndicate members. Non-bank wholesale participants would also benefit from
having another option for where they could hold their liquid assets, and one that would also not
carry any credit risk as it would be a claim on the central bank.
Under the model considered in this project, issuing CBDC transforms a liability on the RBA held by
a commercial bank with whom the RBA has a relationship, into a liability on the RBA that can be
held by a wider range of sponsored wholesale market participants with whom the RBA does not
have a direct relationship. While issuing CBDC to sponsored participants is not intended to create a
relationship between sponsored participants and the RBA, holding CBDC could be seen as holding a
claim on a portion of the balance of the omnibus account. A detailed assessment of the implications
of using an omnibus account structure in the issuance of CBDC was beyond the scope of the project
and further work would be required to clarify the nature of the legal claim associated with holding a
CBDC, especially where an entity does not otherwise have a relationship with the central bank.
23 L
egally, the sponsored participant would hold a claim on the RBA. However, the nature of the arrangements between sponsored
participants and their sponsor commercial banks was not considered as part of this project.
The two-tier issuance model preserves several important aspects of the current role of commercial
banks in the financial system, including their role in onboarding and providing services to their
customers. Expanding access to CBDC to eligible wholesale customers of ESA holders would provide
those entities with access to a digital form of central bank money that they otherwise would not have
access to. Depending on a range of factors, including the interest rate applying to CBDC and the
convenience that CBDC offers for payments, there could be significant demand to hold CBDC as an
alternative to commercial bank deposits. Any large-scale displacement of commercial bank deposits
by CBDC could have implications for credit conditions and the provision of credit in the economy. The
impact this has on credit conditions will partly depend on the competitive response of the non-bank
financial sector. It is beyond the scope of this report to examine these potential impacts in detail, but
a key point to highlight is that widening access to a CBDC has the potential to influence the role of
banks in financial intermediation and the provision of credit in the economy, which would need to be
carefully considered in the design of any CBDC.
In the POC, sponsored participant access to CBDC was controlled by ESA holders. In theory, the RBA
could place restrictions on who could access CBDC and how it could be used. These restrictions
could take several forms, some of which would be more complex to implement than others. It is likely
that access to a wholesale CBDC would be restricted to wholesale market participants that require
the use of a CBDC for settlement. However, further consideration would need to be given to:
• whether sponsored participants should be further restricted in how they can use CBDC (e.g.
in this example, whether it can be used for payments to other participants that are unrelated
to syndicated loans).
Another consideration is how any restrictions on access to and use of wholesale CBDC would
be enforced on sponsored participants, with whom the RBA does not have a direct relationship.
Restrictions could be implemented a number of ways using DLT, including via the use of ‘allow/deny’
lists and programming access and usage rules into the smart contracts that govern the use of the
CBDC tokens. In addition, as CBDC is only accessible by an ESA holder or a sponsored participant
through its sponsoring ESA holder, further consideration would need to be given to questions related
to the operation of the CBDC. For example, whether a sponsored participant would be able to hold
CBDC in multiple wallets or with multiple ESA holders, or how CBDC holdings should be managed
when a relationship between an ESA holder and a sponsored participant ends.
• What entities (if any), other than the RBA, would be authorised to operate a node?
• Should entities other than the RBA be permitted to validate CBDC transactions, and
should the RBA be involved in validating syndicated loan transactions?
• What access should a node operator be granted to the information held on the node?
• Should there be different node holders or different nodes for the CBDC Utility and the
TSL Platform?
These questions have both technological and legal elements. While the POC highlighted a number
of potential resilience benefits resulting from the decentralised nature of the system, there remains
potential for systemic risk. This relates to the underlying technology and entities that play a role in
operating and managing that technology. While the use of DLT enables the validation and recording
of transactions to be decentralised, some components of the system are not decentralised and
there would continue to be a role for a system operator in maintaining the system. This would
present a similar set of risks to those in centralised systems, augmented with a different set of risks
stemming from the decentralised operation of the blockchain components of the system. Legal and/
or regulatory measures may be required to protect against these risks. This may include, for example,
ongoing commercial arrangements between the RBA, the operator of the CBDC Utility, as well as any
node operator, or regulatory oversight if the system was assessed to be systemically important.
In implementing the tokenised syndicated loan on the TSL Platform, the project focused on the
digitisation of back-office functions related to the origination and servicing of those facilities. In
this regard, the POC demonstrated potential efficiency gains and risk reduction from replacing
highly manual and paper-based processes. Because the design of the POC retained the roles
and functions performed by existing participants in the syndicated lending market, additional
gains through the use of DLT by reducing or removing the involvement of some participants and
processes were not explored. For example, the approval and settlement functions performed by
a facility agent, which typically acts as an intermediary between the syndicate lenders and the
borrower, could have been further automated through the TSL Platform and indeed one of the
key advantages of DLT is removing the need for intermediaries. One possibility is that the facility
agent’s role could evolve to become the operator or administrator of the TSL Platform, for example.
Aside from the potential automation, efficiency and risk benefits of digitising syndicated loans on
a DLT platform, other potential benefits discussed during the project included the possibility of
standardising loans and slicing them into much smaller tranches. This could open them up to a
much broader investor base and support a more active secondary market.
24 F
or example, RITS provides ESA holders with tools (during RITS hours) to manage the level of ESA balances allocated to the FSS,
including the ability to set trigger points for the automatic top up or withdrawal of balances.
The TSL Platform was designed to test the technological (as opposed to the legal) process for
entering into the agreement. As it is currently designed, the platform includes a digital copy (in PDF
form) of the SFA executed outside the platform. The terms entered on the platform (some of which
are implemented as smart contracts) reflect some of these agreed terms but are not the agreement
itself. Another important consideration is whether an SFA could be legally entered into and managed
through the TSL Platform. Were the TSL Platform to be developed further, it will be necessary to
ensure that an SFA entered into through the platform meets all requirements of the parties and is
legally enforceable. This would require an in-depth review of the SFA’s terms to determine which
are required to be entered into and customisable on the TSL Platform, which are to be held on any
blockchain part of the platform and which are to remain outside the platform. Further standardisation
of the SFA’s terms, which are typically quite bespoke, would also be necessary to fully realise the
efficiency gains from the TSL Platform’s digital workflows. Further, for this to be legally enforceable,
reliance on electronic signatures should be considered.
It will also be necessary to ensure appropriate rules around operation of the platform are in place.
These rules would give effect to the purpose for which the TSL Platform is created, and manage
access to the TSL Platform by users. These rules are likely to be set out in additional documents,
which form the legal architecture for the TSL Platform and manage the relationships and interactions
of all parties who will access the TSL Platform. Once established, the legal architecture should enable
the platform to operate in the digital environment with the ability to, where necessary, step into an
analogue environment and back into the digital environment as necessary.
In the absence of a CBDC, the TSL Platform could be configured to initiate a payment by sending
a secure message (e.g. via an API) to a non-DLT payment system. The payment system, which could,
for example, be RITS or the NPP, would verify the payment request, execute the payment and send
a confirmation message back to the TSL Platform.
However, the use of existing payment systems to settle transactions on a DLT platform could
introduce additional risks and complexities related to the need for frequent on/off-chain
interactions and creating additional potential points of failure in the settlement process. Without
having carried out a technical design or POC considering how a DLT-based system might interact
with RITS or NPP, it is difficult to assess how significant these issues are.
A further consideration is that while a DLT-based CBDC may not offer many apparent benefits
when used solely for syndicated loans, the benefits could be significantly greater if there were
a much larger range of assets and/or business processes on DLT that could also utilise a CBDC.
Indeed, it is possible that the availability of a CBDC on a DLT platform could act as a catalyst
for innovation in the use of DLT for digitising assets and business processes, with significant
implications for efficiency and risk in a range of wholesale markets.
Finally, it is worth noting that instead of (or in addition to) a CBDC, it is possible that privately-
issued digital assets such as stablecoins could also function as a settlement asset in DLT-based
systems such as that explored in this project.²⁶ However, for a stablecoin to offer comparable
benefits to a CBDC in this context, it would likely need to be denominated in a fiat currency and
be fully backed by safe and liquid assets, such as government securities or other highly rated
securities, have well-designed governance arrangements and be appropriately regulated. It is
unlikely that cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, which are not denominated in fiat currency, backed
by any assets or have any issuer standing behind them, would be a suitable settlement asset in
DLT-based asset markets.
25 T
he reservation function in RITS enables near real-time settlement of interbank obligations relating to property transactions by
linking lodgement of the property title transfer with the financial settlement process. See: De Freitas G and E Fitzgerald (2021),
‘Property Settlement in RITS’, RBA Bulletin, March.
26 A
stablecoin is a type of privately issued digital asset (or crypto-asset) that is specifically designed to maintain a stable value
relative to a national currency or other reference asset, with the intention of making them more attractive as a means of payment
or store of value. One way they seek to maintain a stable value is by holding assets that back the coins on issue, which is supposed
to ensure redeemability at par. See: Richards T (2021), ‘The Future of Payments: Cryptocurrencies, Stablecoins or Central Bank
Digital Currencies?’, Address to Australian Corporate Treasury Association, Sydney, 18 November.
• how access to a tokenised CBDC could be extended to a wider range of wholesale market
participants, including those that would not ordinarily have access to ESAs at the RBA
• integration of a digital asset in the form of a tokenised syndicated loan to explore the
implications of atomic DvP settlement as well as other potential benefits of combining CBDC
and tokenised assets on interoperable DLT platforms
The project used a two-tier model for issuing CBDC, in which CBDC is issued by the RBA to ESA
holders, which in turn can facilitate the acquisition of CBDC by their sponsored wholesale market
participants. This model preserves several important aspects of the current role of commercial banks
in the financial system, including their role in onboarding and providing services to their customers.
This is a key point of difference from other wholesale CBDC projects, which have tended to focus
on the use of wholesale CBDC by commercial banks. There are a range of potential benefits of
providing non-bank wholesale market participants with access to CBDC for settling transactions and
as a store of value. However, further consideration is needed on who would be eligible to be
a sponsored participant and the appropriate level of controls that would be imposed on their use
of CBDC.
Tokenisation of the SFA focused on the digitisation of back-office functions related to the origination
and servicing of those facilities. In this regard, the POC demonstrated significant efficiency gains
and risk reduction from replacing the highly manual and paper-based processes still used in these
markets. Aside from the potential automation, efficiency and risk benefits of digitising syndicated
loans on a DLT platform, other potential benefits from tokenisation include the possibility of
fractionalising these loans to make them available to a broader investor base, thereby enhancing
liquidity in these markets.
More generally, the availability of a tokenised form of money on a DLT platform could also act as
a catalyst for innovation in the use of DLT for digitising assets and business processes. Careful
consideration of the legal architecture to give effect to a wholesale CBDC and the issuance
and management of a tokenised SFA on a DLT platform would be required before undertaking
further work in this area. This would include analysis of contractual arrangements as well as an
assessment of relevant regulatory and legislative requirements.
Overall, the project has advanced our knowledge on the technical feasibility and implications
of using DLT for a wholesale CBDC and tokenised assets. In particular, the POC demonstrated
that an enterprise-grade DLT platform with appropriate controls on access and security could
address many of the requirements for a wholesale CBDC system, including in relation to
transaction finality, efficiency, security and privacy. The exploration of the tiered distribution model
has highlighted a range of issues that would need to be considered in opening up access to a
CBDC more broadly. More generally, the project has suggested a number of areas where further
research and experimentation will be required to address the question of whether there is a case
for a wholesale CBDC and how one could be developed.
1. A CBDC Utility, which manages the issuance, transfer and redemption of a tokenised
CBDC (CBDC tokens).
2. A Tokenised Syndicated Loan Platform (TSL Platform), which manages the issuance,
drawdown, novation and repayment of a tokenised syndicated loan (loan tokens). The
two platforms are interoperable, which allows the CBDC Utility to execute payments to
settle transactions (e.g. loan drawdown, novation, and repayment) initiated on the TSL
Platform. Figure 10 provides a summary of the features of the two types of tokens and
the corresponding applications.
Token value 1,000 AUD Token value 1,000 AUD of the syndicated loan facility
Total value Balance deposited in omnibus account Total value Total loan facility limit
Token type zk-ERC20 (zero knowledge asset) Token type ERC 1400
Token registry ESA holder 1 Non-ESAH 1 Non-ESAH 2 Non-ESAH n Token Registry Undrawn Drawn Repaid
Direct instructions Acquire CBDC Redeem CBDC Issuance Submit CPs Approve CPs Issue loan tokens
Indirect instructions Request acquisition Request redemption Drawdown Instruct drawdown Instruct funding Execute settlement
Approvals Approve acquisition Approve redemption Approve transfer Novation Instruct novation Instruct payment Execute settlement
Transfers & holds Direct transfer Hold for transfer Hold for DvP Repayment Calculate amount Instruct payment Reduce loan
Cloud Infrastructure
Hosting Infrastructure Layer
AWS
The infrastructure at the bottom of the stack stores all the data and core logic of the two applications.
It comprises two sub-layers:
• The Hosting Infrastructure Layer leverages Amazon Web Services cloud infrastructure to
host off-chain application data and services. For example, the databases used to simulate the
balances of ESAs and commercial bank accounts are hosted in this layer.
• The Blockchain Infrastructure Layer validates and records all the data and transactions that
are processed on the private blockchain network. It maintains a distributed, synchronised
record of the balances of CBDC and loan tokens held in participants’ wallets. More details on
the blockchain network configuration and the wallet management solution are provided in the
following sections.
• CBDC token configured as a zero-knowledge asset leveraging the Aztec protocol, which
supports private issuance, transfer and redemption of CBDC (see details below).
• Holdable token and hashed time-locked contract (HTLC) smart contract extension that
enables conditional transfers of CBDC and atomic settlement against loan tokens.
Dedicated instance of the Auth0 API to authenticate the users accessing the application.
– Indirect acquisition and redemption of CBDC for a sponsored participant with the
approval of their sponsor ESA holder.
– Conditional transfer of CBDC with approval of the recipient for amounts greater than
A$5 million.
– Conditional transfer of CBDC with approval of the facility agent for atomic DvP
settlement of tokenised syndicated loan transactions.
• A dedicated user interface built in React that enables users to submit instructions and view
their balances and transaction records.
• Loan token configured as an ERC 1400 token, which is an Ethereum token standard
commonly used for tokens which are financial instruments (see details below).
• Holdable token and HTLC smart contract extension that enables conditional transfers of
loan tokens and atomic settlement against CBDC tokens.
• Dedicated instance of the Auth0 API to authenticate the users accessing the application.
• Dedicated instance of the Codefi Assets API with additional custom-built workflows that
manage the following events in the syndicated loan lifecycle:
– Repayment, which instructs the repayment of a loan in CBDC and the ‘burning’ of
loan tokens.
Hyperledger Besu leverages the IBFT 2 (Istanbul Byzantine Fault Tolerance 2) consensus
mechanism, which is a voting-based proof-of-authority algorithm. This consensus algorithm allows
approved nodes, known as validators, to validate transactions and blocks. Validators take turns to
create new blocks, which must be signed by a super-majority (greater than 66 per cent) of validators
before the block is added to the blockchain. IBFT 2 is an enterprise-grade consensus algorithm
designed for high transaction throughput and immediate finality. It can achieve immediate finality
because there is a single version of the blockchain and a single block proposed at any given block
height. Because block creation rotates between validators, a faulty node cannot exert long-term
influence over the chain.
Further development of the solution beyond a POC would require the implementation of a more
robust blockchain network with an increased number of validator nodes more broadly distributed
across the participating entities. Future implementations of the blockchain network could also
consider segregating on-chain data between the CBDC Utility and the TSL Platform. This could be
achieved by either:
• maintaining a single blockchain network for both applications and leveraging Hyperledger
Besu’s privacy groups to establish sub-groups of nodes that validate and store application-
specific transactions and data (private state) (Figure 12)
• establishing a separate blockchain network for each of the two applications, each maintained
by the relevant entities. Interoperability solutions, such as HTLCs and cross-chain bridges,
could be implemented to integrate the two networks (Figure 13).
CBDC
chain
Cross chain
bridge
TSL
chain
The solution implemented for Project Atom also leverages Codefi Orchestrate, a ‘blockchain
middleware’ API developed by ConsenSys that acts as the link between applications and the
underlying blockchain network. Codefi Orchestrate enables a range of functionality in the CBDC
Utility and the TSL Platform, which significantly simplifies user interactions with the blockchain
layer, including:
The Aztec protocol implements privacy through the Aztec cryptographic engine, which uses a
system of ‘notes’ to privately record CBDC token balances. The RBA is configured as a notary
in the Aztec cryptographic engine and has viewing rights on the private token balances and
transfers. When a participant instructs the issuance, transfer or redemption of CBDC, a smart
contract calls the Aztec cryptographic engine to update the ownership and/or value of one or
more notes. Each of the nodes in the blockchain network can verify the integrity of a transaction
without knowing the parties to a transaction, their balances or the transaction value.
Figure 14 outlines the technical steps involved in the private transfer of CBDC tokens.
Throughout the POC we observed performance issues related to the use of ZKPs. The time to
complete a zero knowledge transaction increases significantly as the number of notes in circulation
increases (Table 1). This reflects an increase in the complexity of the proofs that are calculated
by the Aztec cryptographic engine and the time to complete a typical transaction increases from
around 3 seconds to more than 10 seconds. In addition, the computation effort to complete each
transaction (measured in ‘gas’) increases significantly (Table 2).²⁷
27 Computation
effort on an Ethereum network is measured in gas, which refers to the cost necessary to process a transaction; in the POC,
this cost was set to zero, therefore the use of ZKPs did not have any implications for the cost of processing transactions.
A5. Implementation of the ERC 1400 token standard in the loan token
ERC 1400 is a token standard introduced in late 2018 to facilitate the tokenisation of securities and
other financial instruments on the Ethereum blockchain. It provides a set of standardised properties
and control mechanisms that can be used to restrict the usage and transfer of the token to meet
regulatory requirements.
• injection of signed data ‘certificates’ into issuance, transfer and redemption transactions to
add conditions and check the validity of transactions
• creation of token partitions (i.e. partially fungible token classes and states) through the
attachment of metadata to the partial balance of a token holder
• setup of an entity (e.g. an issuer, an agent or a regulator) as a controller that has the ability
to approve transactions and force the transfer of tokens.
In Project Atom, the ERC 1400 token standard was used to implement the loan token.
• The participants to the syndicated loan are captured in an allow list, which is used to validate
their interaction with the syndicated loan smart contract.
• Partitions are used to manage the state of the token as it moves through the lifecycle of
the syndicated loan (e.g. undrawn to drawn).
The facility agent is configured as the token controller and is able to approve transactions,
enforce settlement and even force the transfer of loan tokens, which could be used to resolve
issues that require it to unilaterally update the loan registry.
param2
Ensures the input parameters have been
validated by the issuer API.
Certificate
Etc.
The TSL Platform also leveraged Codefi Assets, a ConsenSys product that enables the issuance
and management of tokenised securities and other financial instruments. Codefi Assets’ APIs and
user interfaces were modified and extended to implement the core workflows of the tokenised
syndicated loan and enable the instruction and execution of the underlying token transactions.
The solution implemented in Project Atom achieves atomic DvP settlement by using ‘token holds’ and
HTLCs. Token holds allow a third party to transfer tokens on behalf of the token holder, while imposing
transaction-specific conditionality on the tokens, which prevent the token holder from using the tokens
in a different transaction unless the hold is cancelled. The tokens are essentially locked or reserved
through a sort of self-escrow mechanism, but remain in the account of the token holder. In addition
to enabling DvP settlement, token holds are also used to implement conditional transfers of CBDC
tokens. For example, in transfers greater than A$5 million, the sender has the option to require the
recipient approve the incoming transfer.
HTLCs enable a smart contract to implement a time-based escrow that requires the recipient to
acknowledge a transfer within a certain period of time. The combination of token holds and HTLCs is
particularly suitable for enabling DvP settlement in more complex scenarios, such as:
• cross-chain swaps, where the tokens to swap are hosted on two different blockchain networks
• swaps involving private assets, such as when one or both of the assets are represented by
private tokens (e.g. the CBDC token).
In these scenarios, HTLCs enable atomic DvP settlement through a two-stage process. An initial
‘commit’ phase, in which each party puts their asset on hold, is followed by a ‘reveal’ phase. Once the
first leg of the transaction is claimed, the second leg is automatically released to the counterparty. In
Project Atom, the CBDC token is implemented as a zero-knowledge asset. For this reason, the POC
leverages both the token hold and HTLCs mechanisms to enable DvP settlement through dedicated
and interoperable smart contract extensions applied to both the CBDC token and the loan token:
1. The first party initiates the DvP process by creating a hold on the loan token with a random
secret (hash) generated by HTLC extension.
2. The secret is shared with the counterparty through an API integration. The counterparty uses
the secret to create a hold on the CDBC token. At this point both assets are on hold and can
only be swapped by using the same secret.
3. The first party uses the secret to release the hold on the CBDC token and claim it. This
simultaneously triggers the release of the loan token to the counterparty.
Figure 16 describes the process for a loan drawdown transaction. Communication between participants
is implemented via APIs.
1 Execute hold to initiate settlement Passes info & hash 1 Execute hold to initiate settlement
• Set amount of loan tokens secret • Set amount of CBDC tokens (passed by APIs)
• Set intended recipient (lead arranger) • Set intended recipient (borrower, passed by APIs)
• Set expiry date (optional) • Set expiry date (optional)
• Generate hash secret • Set hash secret (same as loan token, passed by APIs)
• Sign transaction (facility agent on behalf of borrower) • Sign transaction (lead arranger)
Confirms hold on
Secret reveal to execute settlement CBDC Secret reveal to execute settlement
3 3
• Check hash secret (must match CBDC token) • Check hash secret (must match loan token)
• Check digital signature of lead arranger • Check digital signature of facility agent (on behalf
of borrower)
Steering Committee
Project Group
Michael Tran
Mehul Shaha
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