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Monthly Foreign Exchange Outlook

The Foreign Exchange Outlook for July 2025 highlights a significant decline in the US dollar, with a 10.7% drop in the first half of the year, the worst performance since 1973. Key upcoming events include the expiration of reciprocal tariffs on July 9 and meetings of several central banks, with expectations for modest policy changes. The report forecasts a more modest 2.2% decline in the dollar for the second half of the year, targeting EUR/USD at 1.2000 by year-end.

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Monthly Foreign Exchange Outlook

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Foreign Exchange

Outlook

DEREK HALPENNY
Head of Research,
Global Markets EMEA and July 2025
International Securities
Global Markets Research
Global Markets Division for EMEA
E: [email protected]
KEY EVENTS IN THE MONTH AHEAD
LEE HARDMAN
Senior Currency Analyst 1) RECIPROCAL TARIFFS & US DOLLAR
Global Markets Research The June closing rates marked the half-way point of the calendar year and the US
Global Markets Division for EMEA
E: [email protected]
dollar decline of 10.7% (DXY) was the worst performance for the dollar over the first
six months of the calendar year since 1973. The same can be said for President
LIN LI Trump’s first 150 days in office – the drop for the dollar was the largest of any
Head of Global Markets Research Asia
Global Markets Research
presidential term in the floating exchange rate era back to Richard Nixon. Trump’s
Global Markets Division for Asia erratic trade policies are only part of the reason for the performance. The dollar prior
E: [email protected]
to ‘Liberation Day’ was also at that point the worst performance of the dollar in any
KHANG SEK LEE presidential term. While we remain US dollar bearish, we also believe the scale of
Associate
dollar depreciation will be much less in H2 than in H1. We forecast DXY dropping by
Global Markets Research
Global Markets Division for Asia a further 2.2% by year-end with EUR/USD at 1.2000. In July, the obvious key date to
E: [email protected] watch is the 9th July – the expiry of the suspension of reciprocal tariffs. There’s a
MICHAEL WAN chance this may pass without much volatility if, as suggested by the Trump
Senior Currency Analyst administration, up to 10 trade deals are signed with key trading partners of the US.
Global Markets Research There will also be more focus now on the passage of the ‘One Big Beautiful Bill Act’
Global Markets Division for Asia
E: [email protected]
and how quickly that can be agreed between the House and the Senate. The original
target of Trump to sign a deal into law by 4th July will not be met. The removal of
LLOYD CHAN
Senior Currency Analyst
Section 899 takes one contentious element out of the bill but it will still likely threaten
further the confidence investors have in US debt sustainability.
Global Markets Research
Global Markets Division for Asia 2) CENTRAL BANK MEETINGS AND SINTRA
E: [email protected]

Five G10 central banks will meet in July – the RBA (8th July); the RBNZ (9th); the
SOOJIN KIM ECB (24th); the FOMC (30th); and the BoJ (31st). We expect the RBA to cut its policy
Analyst, ESG and
Emerging Markets Research –
rate by 25bps given the recent weaker inflation and the fact that a 50bp cut was
EMEA discussed at the last meeting. The other central banks are likely to keep their policy
DIFC Branch – Dubai stances on hold although a very weak US jobs report and benign CPI print for June
E: [email protected] could bring the FOMC into play. The other key central bank event will be the annual
gathering hosted by the ECB in Sintra, Portugal running at the very beginning of July.
MAURICIO NAKAHODO
Senior Economist The key panel discussion will be on 1st July and will involve BoE Governor Bailey,
Fed Chair Powell, BoJ Governor Ueda and President Lagarde. President Lagarde
Banco MUFG Brasil S.A.
E: [email protected] will give a closing speech on 2nd July.

3) JULY’S CHINA POLITBURO MEETING

China has confirmed the news of a finalized trade framework with the US, although
MUFG Bank, Ltd. details are still unknown. We don’t expect the final deal on tariff rates will be much
A member of MUFG, a global financial group
different from the currently implemented 41%, as the focus of negotiations, implied by
both sides’ communications, is more about exports restrictions than tariffs
specifically. In addition to tariff stress, the Chinese economy faces domestic
challenges too and July’s politburo meeting will shed some light on potential stimulus
measures ahead.

1 Foreign Exchange Outlook │

Contents

MAJORS LATAM

US dollar 4–5 Argentine peso 36

Japanese yen 6–7 Brazilian real 37

Euro 8–9 Chilean peso 38

Pound sterling 10–11 Mexican peso 39

Chinese renminbi 12–13

Australian dollar 14

New Zealand dollar 15

Canadian dollar 16

Norwegian krone 17

Swedish krona 18

Swiss franc 19

EUROPE & S AFRICA MENA

Czech koruna 20 Saudi riyal 40

Hungarian forint 21 Egyptian pound 41

Polish zloty 22

Romanian leu 23

Russian rouble 24

South African rand 25

Turkish lira 26

ASIA

Indian rupee 27

Indonesian rupiah 28

Malaysian ringgit 29

Philippine peso 30

Singapore dollar 31

South Korean won 32

Taiwan dollar 33

Thai baht 34

Vietnamese dong 35

2 Foreign Exchange Outlook │ July 2025

Forecast rates against the US dollar - End-Q3 2025 to End-Q2 2026

Spot close
Q3 2025 Q4 2025 Q1 2026 Q2 2026
30.06.25
DXY 97.067 96.490 95.060 93.530 92.680
JPY 144.30 142.00 140.00 138.00 136.00
EUR 1.1746 1.1800 1.2000 1.2200 1.2300
GBP 1.3702 1.3800 1.3950 1.4100 1.4140
CNY 7.1637 7.2500 7.2500 7.2300 7.2000
AUD 0.6557 0.6500 0.6600 0.6700 0.6800
NZD 0.6077 0.6000 0.6100 0.6200 0.6300
CAD 1.3634 1.3600 1.3500 1.3300 1.3200
NOK 10.117 10.000 9.8330 9.5900 9.4310
SEK 9.5024 9.4920 9.2500 9.0160 8.8620
CHF 0.7953 0.7970 0.7920 0.7830 0.7800

CZK 21.042 20.760 20.250 19.840 19.510

HUF 340.17 335.60 333.30 331.10 331.70
PLN 3.6114 3.5590 3.5330 3.4920 3.4800
RON 4.3204 4.2970 4.2420 4.1970 4.1790
RUB 78.130 78.630 79.820 80.980 83.370
ZAR 17.747 17.500 17.250 17.000 17.000
TRY 39.808 42.000 43.750 45.500 47.000

INR 85.760 85.000 84.500 84.000 84.000

IDR 16234 15810 15650 15670 15700
MYR 4.2060 4.1500 4.1100 4.0800 4.0600
PHP 56.310 56.000 55.500 55.000 55.500
SGD 1.2733 1.2700 1.2600 1.2550 1.2500
KRW 1353.7 1370.0 1380.0 1375.0 1365.0
TWD 29.222 29.800 29.800 29.650 29.500
THB 32.474 32.800 32.500 32.400 32.300
VND 26077 26350 26300 26300 26300

ARS 1191.5 1225.0 1275.0 1325.0 1400.0

BRL 5.4494 5.3000 5.3500 5.4000 5.5000
CLP 932.04 925.00 930.00 935.00 940.00
MXN 18.857 18.500 18.750 19.000 19.000

SAR 64.750 60.000 58.000 57.000 59.000

EGP 67.570 65.000 63.000 62.000 64.000
Notes: All FX rates are expressed as units of currency per US dollar bar EUR, GBP, AUD and NZD which are expressed as
dollars per unit of currency. Data source spot close; Bloomberg closing rate as of 4:30pm London time, except VND which is
local onshore closing rate. All consensus forecasts are Bloomberg sourced.

3 Foreign Exchange Outlook │ July 2025

US dollar

Spot close
Q3 2025 Q4 2025 Q1 2026 Q2 2026
30.06.25
USD/JPY 144.30 142.00 140.00 138.00 136.00
EUR/USD 1.1746 1.1800 1.2000 1.2200 1.2300
Consensus Consensus Consensus Consensus
USD/JPY 142.00 140.00 139.00 138.00
EUR/USD 1.1500 1.1700 1.1800 1.1800

MARKET UPDATE

USD selling versus EUR continues In June the US dollar weakened further against the euro in terms of London closing
rates, from 1.1351 to 1.1746. However, the dollar strengthened modestly against the
yen, from 144.10 to 144.30. The FOMC, at its meeting in June, maintained the range
for the federal funds rate at 4.25% to 4.50%, the level reached following 100bps of
cuts last year. The FOMC is reducing its securities holdings with the pace of QT via
the cap of UST bonds allowed to roll off the balance sheet now at just USD 5bn. The
pace of reduction in the holdings of MBS is running at around USD 15bn per month.

OUTLOOK

Terrible USD performance a sign of The US dollar weakened notably again and in DXY terms fell 2.5% in June. In June
changing times we also passed the 150-day mark of President Trump’s second term in office and the
period saw the worst ever performance for the US dollar in all presidential terms in
the floating exchange rate era (back to Nixon). In addition, the dollar fell by 10.7% in
the first half of 2025 which was the worst first 6mth period of a calendar year on
record. Trump’s unpredictable approach to economic policy and the potential harm
this could do to the US economy is part of what has driven the dollar weaker. But
there are other factors too like the dollar being extremely overvalued (close to Plaza
levels from 1985 in REER terms), the end of negative rates in global fixed income
markets and Trump’s trade tariffs forcing Europe and China to focus on policies to
strengthen domestic demand conditions. The Fed’s Advanced Economy dollar index
in real terms remains around 15% above the long-term average covering the period
since 1975. There is ample scope for this correction to continue.

Fed has more work to do over the Trump’s trade tariff risks to inflation has hindered the Fed’s ability to cut rates and
coming 12mths this means the Fed likely has more easing to do than most of the rest of G10 central
banks. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick’s comments that there could be 10
trade deals signed before the 9th July reciprocal tariff reactivation date (Stephen
Miran also mentioned this) makes it much more likely that widespread high tariff rates
will not be implemented. That is good news for the global economy and it is good
news for the Fed. More modest tariff rates on a smaller number of countries will raise
the prospect of CPI being lower than feared and will open up the prospect of the
FOMC being more active in cutting rates. July remains plausible if the NFP and CPI
data in July prove much weaker than expected. While it can be argued that less trade
policy disruption is good for the US as well, we see a cyclical slowdown as still likely
given the prolonged period of restrictive monetary policy. Consumers are no longer
flush with excess savings and Trump’s economic policies will likely remain erratic and
unpredictable thus curtailing business investment and hiring.

More modest USD depreciation in H2 Having just seen the largest Jan–Jun dollar depreciation since 1973, we expect H2
selling to be more modest. Given the H1 DXY drop of 10.7%, we assume a more
modest 2.2% decline in H2, targeting EUR/USD at 1.2000 by year-end. A larger DXY
drop risk may stem from USD/JPY falling below our forecast.

4 Foreign Exchange Outlook │ July 2025

Interest Rate
Q3 2025 Q4 2025 Q1 2026 Q2 2026
Close
Policy Rate 4.33% 3.83% 3.33% 3.33% 3.33%
3-Month T-Bill 4.29% 3.78% 3.28% 3.29% 3.30%
10-Year Yield 4.23% 4.25% 4.13% 4.00% 4.00%
* Interest rate assumptions incorporated into MUFG foreign exchange forecasts.

INTEREST RATE OUTLOOK

We are starting to sound like a broken record, but we maintain our view that the
Another month has gone by and the longer the Fed waits, the more they are passively tightening conditions and may
US macro updates continue to point to need to cut beyond what is priced into the US rates market. We argue the sooner the
deceleration and a weaker consumer. Fed cuts rates in 2025 and delivers a minimum of 3 cuts of 25 bps (but we think 4 is
What is left to fully crack is the labor the right number as it brings the Fed Funds rate to their neutral level) the less cuts
market. Once it does we maintain that they need to do in the early days of 2026. The irony is that the Fed is waiting on
the Fed ultimately will need to delivery potential inflation risks that may never come, or at the very least, may only return at
four 25bp cuts. Where the risk to our the end of 2026. We think inflation upside will only happen if firms fully pass on tariffs,
view is they delay and do just 3 cuts or but more realistically, we think inflation may only return in 2026 due to Trump’s
start sooner (July which remains our domestic policies and more importantly if US bank lending ahead surges and drives
starting point) and skip September. up the money supply. For now a lot of our view hinges on the near-term path for the
labor market. If the upcoming jobs data confirms our suspicion that the NFP has
been overstated, and about to expose all of the cracks we have been flagging, the
Fed will cut in July (which remains our house view) otherwise the next Fed cut will be
in September. (George Goncalves)

Largest Jan–Jun dollar depreciation % CHANGE IN DXY FROM JANUARY TO JUNE BY YEAR
since 1973

Source: Bloomberg, Macrobond

Soft data flagging risk of higher MUFG GMR US INFLATION INDEX VS. OFFICIAL CPI YOY, %
inflation ahead

Source: Bloomberg, Macrobond

5 Foreign Exchange Outlook │ July 2025

Japanese yen

Spot close
Q3 2025 Q4 2025 Q1 2026 Q2 2026
30.06.25
USD/JPY 144.30 142.00 140.00 138.00 136.00
EUR/JPY 169.49 167.60 168.00 168.40 167.30
Consensus Consensus Consensus Consensus
USD/JPY 142.00 140.00 139.00 138.00
EUR/JPY 164.00 164.00 163.00 162.50

MARKET UPDATE

JPY weakens further In June the yen weakened versus the US dollar in terms of London closing rates from
144.10 to 144.30. In addition, the yen weakened versus the euro from 163.57 to
169.49. The BoJ at its meeting in June maintained the key policy rate at 0.50%,
following the 25bp hike in January, the first 25bp rate hike since before the GFC in
2007. The BoJ is also continuing with the policy of cutting JGB monthly purchases at
a pace of JPY 400bn per quarter but announced in June that the pace of reduction
will be reduced to JPY 200bn per quarter effective from Q2 2026.

OUTLOOK

Yen underperformance The yen weakened marginally versus the US dollar in June and apart from the dollar
was the worst performing G10 currency in June. The yen suffered more than most
earlier in June as the Middle East geopolitical risks fuelled a surge in crude oil prices
that hit the yen given Japan’s dependency on imported energy. We would assume
that if the Middle East remains more stable then this risk premium will shrink helping
the yen to catch up and potentially outperform. Besides the geopolitical risk, the
outlook for crude oil is quite bearish as was underlined by the IEA monthly report in
June. As mentioned here last month, FDI outflows may have also played a role in
yen underperformance. The purchase of US Steel Corp by Nippon Steel could have
been a supportive factor for USD/JPY in June although there is no way of knowing
when and how exactly that flow may go through the FX market. If it has gone through
it adds to the scope for the yen to play catch-up and outperform going forward.

Yen support from BoJ The yen may have been negatively hit by the actions to limit upside risks to JGB
yields. The BoJ announced at its meeting in June that the pace of QT per quarter
would be cut from JPY 400bn per month to JPY 200bn – this had been flagged
ahead of the announcement as a possibility. The MoF also cut the issuance of super-
long JGBs that should help reduce upside yield risks. However, we see rates at the
front-end of the curve as being more important and issuance at the front-end will
increase in the updated MoF plans while the BoJ is likely to turn more hawkish and
potentially could be in a position to hike rates again by September. The US tariff
plans will be important but there is a good chance that Japan will reach a deal with
the US to avoid the reciprocal tariff and possibly to reduce the auto tariff to the
baseline 10%, subject to a quota. Inflation remains high and food inflation in
particular could influence inflation expectations. Shunto wage negotiations mean
another year of strong wage growth and the continued weakness of the yen will likely
encourage a more hawkish approach by the BoJ. The US will likely be expecting
such an approach given their complaints over the BoJ policy impact on the yen.

Yen gains ahead Divergence in monetary policy should become more apparent in H2 with the Fed
restarting its easing cycle and still high inflation in Japan prompting BoJ monetary
tightening. Reciprocal tariffs hitting Japan would curtail BoJ action but not Fed action
and hence we still see scope for yen gains from still very undervalued levels.

6 Foreign Exchange Outlook │ July 2025

Interest Rate
Q3 2025 Q4 2025 Q1 2026 Q2 2026
Close
Policy Rate 0.50% 0.50% 0.75% 0.75% 1.00%
3-Month Bill 0.43% 0.50% 0.70% 0.80% 0.90%
10-Year Yield 1.43% 1.50% 1.60% 1.70% 1.80%
* Interest rate assumptions incorporated into MUFG foreign exchange forecasts.

INTEREST RATE OUTLOOK

BoJ cautious for now but another hike The 10-year JGB yield declined in June, by 7bps to close at 1.43%. The drop
seems most likely followed a sharp rise in May when there were signs of increased investor concerns
over debt sustainability and supply-demand imbalances. This was adressed through
the BoJ QT pace being cut by 50% to JPY 200bn worth of JGB purchases per month
per quarter. The MoF also shifted issuance to shorter maturities to help the long-end.
Risks will remain and renewed UST bond instability would have knock-on effects on
JGBs as well. We also have seen foreign investors return to the JGB market in June
with weekly data showing foreign investor buying in three of the last four weeks so
sentiment has improved. There is only currently 5bps of tightening priced for the
September meeting and given the inflation data in June surpirsed to the upside, we
believe the markets are under-estimating the risks. A credible strategy for helping
stabilise longer-term yields would be modest monetary tightening to enhance inflation
credibility and help to strengthen the yen. We continue to expect a moderate
increase in 10-year JGB yields over the forecast period.

Stable Middle East supportive for the USD/JPY VS. CRUDE OIL
yen

Source: Bloomberg, Macrobond

BoJ plans to slow pace of QT BOJ OUTRIGHT PURCHASES OF JGBS

7 Foreign Exchange Outlook │ July 2025

Euro

Spot close
Q3 2025 Q4 2025 Q1 2026 Q2 2026
30.06.25
EUR/USD 1.1746 1.1800 1.2000 1.2200 1.2300
EUR/JPY 169.49 167.60 168.00 168.40 167.30
Consensus Consensus Consensus Consensus
EUR/USD 1.1500 1.1700 1.1800 1.1800
EUR/JPY 164.00 164.00 163.00 162.50

MARKET UPDATE

EUR advances In June the euro strengthened marginally versus the US dollar in terms of London
closing rates, moving from 1.1351 to 1.1746. The ECB, at its meeting in June cut the
key policy rate by 25bps to 2.00%, following 175bp of cuts since last year. The ECB
is running down APP securities and started PEPP run-off in July last year with about
EUR 425bn of securities estimated to roll off the balance sheet in 2025.

OUTLOOK

EUR gains notably After a month of consolidation in May the euro broke further higher in June hitting a
high versus the US dollar not seen since September 2021, well before the Russian
invasion of Ukraine that triggered a major move lower. The euro was in fact the
number one performing G10 currency in June with some developments reinforcing
confidence amongst investors that Europe can manage with further currency
strength. The German IFO Business Climate Index, the Composite PMI and the ZEW
Expectations index all increased in data released in June underlining increased
optimism linked to Germany’s fiscal expansion plans that will see both infrastructure
and defence spending increase notably. The NATO summit in June also resulted in
an agreement for countries to reach a defence spending target of 5% of GDP by
2035 which will also likely benefit German companies more given the greater
weighting in manufacturing toward defence compared to other countries. ECB
President Lagarde at the policy meeting in June repeated her comments made in
May that there was an opportunity for the euro to increase its role as a reserve
currency highlighting the openness of the authorities to further currency appreciation.

Further gains likely We have raised our EUR/USD forecasts by two to three big figures (previous Q3; Q4;
Q1 2026 1.1500; 1.1800; 1.2000) reflecting the unanticipated speed of the move
higher to this point and the still relatively conservative pricing for Fed rate cuts
through H2 compared to our expectations. We have maintained our view that the
ECB will cut on two further occasions this year based on the assumption that the US
will introduce a 20% reciprocal tariff on the EU. The communication from President
Lagarde was certainly consistent with the ECB ending its back-to-back pace of cuts
and moving to a quarterly pace. If the reciprocal tariff plans prove less than expected
for the EU or globally, the ECB may be more cautious in cutting. ECB officials have
been clear that they believe the job of bringing inflation back under control has been
achieved and to cut further would reflect risks to the downside for inflation. A credible
inflation targeting track record and a AAA sovereign credit at the heart of Europe
could well prove attractive for global investors seeking to diversify away from the US
and ECB bond flow data does show a stable, notable inflow from abroad.

EUR higher with 1.2000 very Given the EUR gains and seeing limited risk for any notable correction lower, we see
achievable now the 1.2000-level now as very achievable later this year. The euro remains the anti-
dollar and small shifts in portfolio flows or hedging to reduce US dollar exposure will
inevitably be to the benefit of Europe and the euro.

8 Foreign Exchange Outlook │ July 2025

Interest Rate
Q3 2025 Q4 2025 Q1 2026 Q2 2026
Close
Policy Rate 2.00% 1.75% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50%
3-Month Bill 1.96% 1.70% 1.50% 1.55% 1.55%
10-Year Yield 2.61% 2.40% 2.50% 2.55% 2.65%
* Interest rate assumptions incorporated into MUFG foreign exchange forecasts.

INTEREST RATE OUTLOOK

10-year bund yields more stable ahead The 10-year bund yield increased again, by 11bps to close at 2.61%. With the ECB
policy rate now at the widely deemed neutral rate, the 10-year yield is likely to
reflect that more by trading in narrower ranges going forward. Of course a sudden
risk-off shock will fuel volatility but the euro-zone economy is now on a better footing
with fiscal policy set to expand notably in Germany. With Germany having ample
capacity for fiscal loosening, the impact has been modest with the 10-year yield
trading mostly in a 2.40%-2.60% range, the same range as in January and February
before the German fiscal announcement that saw the 10-year yield surge through the
2.80% level. We also suspect that low inflation will act to counter fiscal-related upside
pressures on yields. The negotiated wage annual growth tracker for the euro-zone
has plunged from over 5% at the end of last year to signal a year-end rate for this
year of just 1.425%. The scale of euro appreciation will also add to disinflationary
pressures that will help limit upside yield pressures on fiscal expansion. The ECB’s
EUR TWI is up nearly 6% year-to-date. We see the 10-year German bund yield
trading only modestly lower and remaining in a relatively narrow range.

EUR strengthens as rate differentials EUR/USD VS. 10YR YIELD SPREAD

narrow

Source: Bloomberg, Macrobond

Slowing wage growth should feed NEGOTIATED WAGES VS. SERVICES CPI YOY, %
through to lower service sector
inflation

Source: Bloomberg, Macrobond

9 Foreign Exchange Outlook │ July 2025

Pound sterling

Spot close
Q3 2025 Q4 2025 Q1 2026 Q2 2026
30.06.25
EUR/GBP 0.8572 0.8550 0.8600 0.8650 0.8700
GBP/USD 1.3702 1.3800 1.3950 1.4100 1.4140
GBP/JPY 197.72 196.00 195.30 194.60 192.30
Consensus Consensus Consensus Consensus
GBP/USD 1.3500 1.3600 1.3700 1.3800

MARKET UPDATE

GBP appreciation versus USD In June the pound strengthened further against the US dollar in terms of London
closing rates from 1.3477 to 1.3702. However, the pound weakened against the euro
from 0.8422 to 0.8572. The MPC, at its meeting in June, kept the key policy rate
unchanged at 4.25% which followed four 25bp cuts since August last year.

OUTLOOK

Risk conditions important for GBP For much of June the pound lagged in performance versus G10 but then went from
one of the worst performing currencies to finish June the third best performing
currency. The turnaround coincided with the shift in risk conditions following the
ceasefire between Israel and Iran. While there was no big risk-off move given
equities remain well underpinned, inflation risks jumped following the surge in crude
oil prices. The UK, more than most, is more vulnerable to day-to-day energy market
moves (in particular natural gas) due to limited storage capacity and the surge in
energy prices was a bigger negative risk for the UK. The ceasefire and the 15%
plunge in crude oil prices helped lower natural gas prices and the outlook if
geopolitics stabilises is bearish for oil, as was underlined by the IEA in its monthly
report. An external shock is not what the UK needs given the signs of a weakening
labour market. The PAYE jobs data revealed a 109k drop in employment. The PMI
Composite data for Q2 (49.83) was lower than in Q1 (50.86) when real GDP growth
expanded by 0.7% Q/Q pointing to that being a one-off. Real GDP is expected to
slow back to 0.2% or possibly even 0.1% Q/Q in Q2.

MPC could become more open to a Weak underlying growth could well at some stage prompt a shift in the MPC’s
faster pace of rate cuts “gradual and careful” approach to monetary easing – which is seen as implying one
cut per quarter. The MPC vote of 6-3 highlights a risk bias to cut faster and the
statement cited the potential for labour market slack to open up and help moderate
wage growth going forward. The MPC added that it would remain “vigilant” about
Middle East developments but with that inflation risk fading it certainly would help the
case for a faster pace of cuts although that will be determined more from domestic
factors, and most specifically pay growth. Hence, if the PAYE jobs data was to
confirm a softer labour market with further job losses and energy prices were to
remain under control with better Middle East conditions, we could well see a faster
pace of cuts emerge later in the year. We also are likely to see the BoE announce a
slowing of the pace of QT. Governor Bailey in June stated that the QT decision would
be “more interesting” this year and that pervious debt market conditions and sell-offs
would be factors taken into account when reviewed. A decision will be announced at
the September MPC meeting.

GBP support but a faster MPC easing Pound gains versus the dollar but depreciation versus the euro remains the view.
a pace a bigger risk Relative to last month we see increased risks that the MPC could go back-to-back
with cuts in August and September if labour market data remains weak. That points
to downside risks for GBP relative to our forecasts.

10 Foreign Exchange Outlook │ July 2025

Interest Rate
Q3 2025 Q4 2025 Q1 2026 Q2 2026
Close
Policy Rate 4.25% 4.00% 3.75% 3.50% 3.50%
3-Month Bill 4.24% 3.95% 3.70% 3.45% 3.50%
10-Year Yield 4.49% 4.40% 4.20% 4.30% 4.30%
* Interest rate assumptions incorporated into MUFG foreign exchange forecasts.

INTEREST RATE OUTLOOK

More conviction in lower Gilt yields The 10-year Gilt yield declined in June, by 16bps to close at 4.49%. The big move in
June came on the day of the release of the labour market data and the 109k drop in
employment reported from PAYE tax data provided the strongest indication yet that
the UK labour market is weakening. The data also revealed a sharper slowdown in
wage growth and the data led the MPC to conclude that “slack was opening up” in
the jobs market that should see wage growth slow. Easing geopolitical risks and a
sharp reversal in natural gas prices will help ease concerns over upside risks to
inflation. We will need to see continued weak labour market data for upside inflation
risks to ease enough to allow for back-to-back rate cuts – this is certainly becoming a
bigger risk. Governor Bailey has also signalled the scope for a cut to the pace of QT
from the current GBP 100bn per year which is likely now being priced and helping
limit upside momentum in yields. With a trade deal in place with the US, reciprocal
tariffs being implemented would likely be seen by the UK as a negative global
demand shock that would potentially add to the chances of a pick-up in the pace of
easing. We maintain our view of modestly lower 10-year Gilt yields.

GBP strengthens as risk of another GBP/USD VS. CRUDE OIL FUTURES (INVERTED)
negative energy price shock recedes

Source: Bloomberg, Macrobond

Services inflation remains sticky UK CPI SERVICES YOY, %

curtailing BoE’s willingness to speed
up rate cuts

Source: Bloomberg, Macrobond

11 Foreign Exchange Outlook │ July 2025

Chinese renminbi

Spot close
Q3 2025 Q4 2025 Q1 2026 Q2 2026
30.06.25
USD/CNY 7.1637 7.2500 7.2500 7.2300 7.2000
USD/HKD 7.8499 7.8400 7.8400 7.8400 7.8400
Consensus Consensus Consensus Consensus
USD/CNY 7.2000 7.1900 7.1900 7.1300
USD/HKD 7.8000 7.8000 7.8000 7.8000

MARKET UPDATE

Mild CNY appreciation against US In June, USD/CNY moved from 7.1975 to 7.1637. On 20th June, the PBoC kept the
dollar in June 1Y and 5Y LPR at 3.00% and 3.50% respectively, after lowering them by 10bps in
the prior month.

OUTLOOK

Doubling down on consumption The release of May’s economic data pointed to slowing economic growth dragged
initiatives would still be the best lower by an underwhelming housing sector and decelerating growth in manufacturing
defence against external headwind FAI and infrastructure FAI. That said, the government’s trade-in programs helped to
ahead support stronger-than-expected retail sales growth in May, though seasonal factors
and an earlier promotion of the “618” shopping festival may have also played a role.
Looking ahead, the government would likely continue to focus on boosting
consumption, as well as giving more attention to the housing sector. For the former,
the NDRC confirmed that the third batch of funds for the consumer goods trade-in
program will be dispatched in July after allocating RMB 81bn each in January and
April, providing a well-paced dispatchment to sustain retail sales growth momentum.
While the entire annual fund of RMB 300bn is expected to only be used up by year-
end as planned, a mild top-up is possible as external downward pressure intensifies
in 2H. Meanwhile, six state organizations including the PBoC jointly issued guidelines
on 24th June to step up financial support to boost consumption with 19 measures
from 6 aspects, among which is to encourage financial institutions to extend loans to
the services consumption sector through structural policy tools. In addition, we think
the government will roll out additional measures to stabilize the housing market, as it
matters for consumer sentiment and their willingness to spend.

The negative impact of tariffs should Our call for a mild increase of USD/CNY largely rests on a weaker growth outlook for
become more visible on China’s China’s economy. We expect a growth slowdown from 5.4% in Q1 to 4.2-4.3% in Q4
exports and overall economy, weighing putting downward pressure on the CNY albeit partly offset by broad-based US dollar
on CNY weakness. Our FX forecast considers a potential final tariff imposed by US on its
imports from China not much different from current 41%. Recently, Howard Lutnick
told Bloomberg that China is going to deliver rare earths to US and once China did
that, “we’ll take down our countermeasures”. We think that the focus of tariff talks
between US and China may be more on exports and investment/technology
restrictions, rather than tariff rates. China’s Ministry of Commerce confirmed the
news of a finalized trade framework with the US on 27th June, with China to review
and approve eligible exports application of controlled-items and US to
correspondingly cancel a series of restrictive measures on China. We are aware of
the mild strengthening of CNY recently, but it was mainly driven by external factors
and with minimal pricing-in of the domestic stress ahead, in our view. The PBoC’s
lower USD/CNY fixing recently is likely reflective of the weaker US dollar trend, not
shifting of preference for a stronger CNY. A potential PBoC rate cut and weaker
exports in Q3 and H2 due to dissipating front-running exports are set to weigh more
on the CNY.

12 Foreign Exchange Outlook │ July 2025

Interest Rate
Q3 2025 Q4 2025 Q1 2026 Q2 2026
Close
LPR 1Y 3.00% 2.80% 2.60% 2.60% 2.60%
7-Day Repo Rate 1.40% 1.20% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00%
10-Year Yield 1.65% 1.55% 1.55% 1.65% 1.75%
* Interest rate assumptions incorporated into MUFG foreign exchange forecasts.

INTEREST RATE OUTLOOK

Weak fundamentals and loose liquidity The 10-year CGB yield edged lower by 6bps to 1.65% in June. We expect it to
conditions favours a further (mild) remain low in Q3 and possibly edge lower. Current real interest rates are at elevated
decline in the China 10-year CGB yield levels due to deflation. Elevated real interest rates are not conducive to the release of
consumer demand too. This deflationary environment and a challenging growth
prospect require the PBoC to deliver more rate cuts, to reduce the real cost of
funding in the economy. We expect the PBoC to further cut the 7-day reverse repo
rate by 20bps in Q3 and Q4 respectively, and to further cut reserve the requirement
ratio in the second half of the year. Historical experiences indicate that fundamentals
are the core factor that determines bond performance. Looking forward, weak overall
economic fundamentals (decelerating economic growth in H2) and overall loose
liquidity conditions to jointly support a the bond market. Additionally, as global
geopolitical risks and the risk between US and China remain high, these would imply
that risk-free assets are still the favoured assets. China’s bond yields will likely trend
down in Q3. China’s 10-year Treasury bond yield may fall to 1.55% or even lower
temporarily.

Current USD/CNY level is not fully USD/CNY PAIR IS TRACKING A LOWER DXY INDEX LATELY
pricing risk of slowdown for China’s
economy going forward

Source: Bloomberg, MUFG GMR

Rate cuts would help support the FURTHER RATE CUTS WOULD BRING 10-YEAR CGB YIELD LOWER
housing sector as well, with a lower
mortgage rate

Source: Bloomberg, MUFG GMR

13 Foreign Exchange Outlook │ July 2025

Australian dollar

Spot close
Q3 2025 Q4 2025 Q1 2026 Q2 2026
30.06.25
AUD/USD 0.6557 0.6500 0.6600 0.6700 0.6800
AUD/JPY 94.618 92.300 92.400 92.460 92.480
EUR/AUD 1.7914 1.8150 1.8180 1.8210 1.8090
Consensus Consensus Consensus Consensus
AUD/USD 0.6500 0.6700 0.6700 0.6800

MARKET UPDATE

AUD advances further In June the Australian dollar strengthened further against the US dollar in terms of
London closing rates from 0.6434 to 0.6557. The RBA did not meet in June and
hence the key policy rate remained at 3.85%, following the 25bp cut in May, the
second cut this year after 425bps of hikes between May 2022 and November 2023.

OUTLOOK

AUD to grind higher The Australian dollar was steadily advancing in June before the conflict between
Israel and Iran prompted a reversal lower. With that risk receding, the Australian
dollar has managed to recoup some of those losses which leaves AUD/USD at levels
beyond our expectations (our previous year-end forecast was 0.6500). As a result,
we have revised modestly higher our forecast levels. There are numerous risks
ahead however that argue for only a modest revision higher to our forecasts. Firstly,
while Middle East risks may be receding, there remains the crucial trade risk with the
expiry of the suspended reciprocal tariff on 9 th July approaching. Trade risks are set
to become the focus once again. A widespread implementation of the tariffs would
undermine confidence in global growth and that would see AUD underperform many
other G10 currencies. AUD now appears priced for good news and limited reciprocal
tariffs being implemented. Hence, upside for AUD on good news will be limited with a
bigger downside risk on more aggressive tariff action. Secondly, the RBA is showing
some signs of turning more dovish. A 50bp rate cut was discussed at the May policy
meeting with the minutes revealing the view of the RBA that it’s well positioned to
respond to global risks if required. Three rate cuts are fully priced by year-end which
is more than most other G10 central banks that could lend to underperformance. Iron
ore prices fell to the lowest level since September last year and the IEA published a
bearish outlook for energy markets which could undermine AUD performance ahead.

RBA rate cut expectations have AUD/NZD VS. SHORT-TERM YIELD SPREAD
undermined AUD

Source: Bloomberg, Macrobond

14 Foreign Exchange Outlook │ July 2025

New Zealand dollar

Spot close
Q3 2025 Q4 2025 Q1 2026 Q2 2026
30.06.25
NZD/USD 0.6077 0.6000 0.6100 0.6200 0.6300
NZD/JPY 87.691 85.200 85.400 85.560 85.680
AUD/NZD 1.0790 1.0830 1.0820 1.0810 1.0790
Consensus Consensus Consensus Consensus
NZD/USD 0.6000 0.6200 0.6200 0.6200

MARKET UPDATE

NZD strengthens In June the New Zealand dollar strengthened against the US dollar in terms of
London closing rates from 0.5971 to 0.6077. However, the New Zealand dollar
weakened marginally against the Australian dollar, from 1.0775 to 1.0790. The RBNZ
did not meet in June and hence the key policy rate remained at 3.25%, following
cumulative easing to 225bps since August last year.

OUTLOOK

NZD to advance slowly further The New Zealand dollar had been grinding higher in June but then reversed course
due to the conflict in the Middle East that disrupted that move briefly before resuming.
Prior to the Middle East disruption, NZD had traded at levels not seen since October
last year. There are certainly signs that the New Zealand economy is recovering after
the recession in Q2 and Q3 last year. In the two quarters since, GDP has expanded
by 0.5% and 0.8% Q/Q. The Q1 GDP gain of 0.8% was the strongest since Q2 2023.
That said, the RBNZ is likely not yet finished with monetary easing and after the GDP
rebound, the economy likely slowed in Q2, no doubt in part due to increased global
uncertainties related to trade. ANZ Business Confidence fell sharply in both April and
May reflecting trade uncertainties. The forward rates market is priced for one further
cut and partially one additional cut and the implied trough in the policy rate of around
2.90% is close the RBNZ projection of 2.85%. NZD volatility is more likely to come
from developments abroad especially given the reciprocal tariffs are scheduled to
become active again from 9th July. Market participants appear somewhat complacent
to the risk of a hit to global growth expectations with many assuming Trump will back
down again (TACO!). That leaves NZD vulnerable to trade-related turmoil in July and
August. We have raised our NZD/USD forecasts (Q4 was 0.6000) but maintain a
cautious profile given these external risks.

Economic growth picks up in New REAL GDP GROWTH

Zealand

Source: Bloomberg, Macrobond

15 Foreign Exchange Outlook │ July 2025

Canadian dollar

Source: Bloomberg, Macrobond

20 Foreign Exchange Outlook │ July 2025

Hungarian forint

Spot close
Q3 2025 Q4 2025 Q1 2026 Q2 2026
30.06.25
EUR/HUF 399.56 396.00 400.00 404.00 408.00
USD/HUF 340.17 335.60 333.30 331.10 331.70
HUF/JPY 0.4242 0.4230 0.4200 0.4170 0.4100
Consensus Consensus Consensus Consensus
EUR/HUF 410.00 413.50 415.00 418.00

MARKET UPDATE

Modestly stronger In June the Hungarian forint strengthened modestly against the euro in terms of
London closing rates moving from 403.95 to 399.56. The National Bank of Hungary
(NBH) held the base rate at 6.50%.

OUTLOOK

Domestic political & Middle East risks The performance of the forint was mixed in June. In the first half of the month the
are headwinds for forint forint strengthened resulting in EUR/HUF testing support at the 400.00-level. The
forint was supported by favourable conditions for carry trades. The higher yields on
offer in Hungary remain attractive and financial market volatility was falling at the
start of the month reflecting less concern amongst global investors over the negative
impact on global growth from protectionist trade policies. The NBH remains reluctant
to cut rates further to support growth given conerns that it would weaken the forint
and add to upside inflation risks. Headline inflation in Hungary picked up to 4.4% in
May moving back above the top of the NBH’s tolerance range between 2.0% and
4.0%. Higher inflation and weaker growth provide a less favourable macro
combination for the forint. Hungary’s economy unexpectedly contracted again albeit
marginally by -0.2% in Q1 and annual growth was flat. If weak growth continues and
the NBH remains reluctant to lower rates, it will increase pressure on the government
to loosen fiscal policy ahead of next year’s parliamentary elections in April as Prime
Minister Orban seeks to win re-election. The latest opinion polls show the opposition
centre-right Tisza Party extending its lead to an unprecedented 15 percentage points.
While a victory for the Tisza Party would be welcomed as a positive catalyst for the
forint, it could act as a negative for the forint in the interim by reinforcing pressure on
the government to provide bigger stimulus to win back votes. S&P recently placed
Hungary’s credit rating on “negative watch” moving it closer to a downgrade to junk.

Forint supported by favourable EUR/HUF VS. HUF CARRY ATTRACTIVENESS

conditions for carry trades

Source: Bloomberg, Macrobond

21 Foreign Exchange Outlook │ July 2025

Polish zloty

South African rand

Argentine peso

Spot close
Q3 2025 Q4 2025 Q1 2026 Q2 2026
30.06.25
USD/ARS 1191.48 1225.0 1275.0 1325.0 1400.0
ARS/JPY 0.1211 0.1160 0.1100 0.1040 0.0970
EUR/ARS 1399.52 1445.5 1530.0 1616.5 1722.0
Consensus Consensus Consensus Consensus
USD/ARS 1277.5 1357.5 1427.5 1566.0

MARKET UPDATE

Modestly stronger In June the Argentine peso strengthened modestly against the US dollar in terms of
London from 1,200.0 to 1,191.5. The Argentine central bank (BCRA) maintained the
Leliq policy rate at 29.00%.

OUTLOOK

Peso to weaken “gradually” weaken The peso has been consolidating at lower levels against the US dollar in June after
adjusting lower in April when the government largely removed currency controls.
From 14th April, the Argentine authorities have allowed USD/ARS to float within a
band between 1,000.0 and 1,400.0 that will gradually widen over time by roughly 2%
per month. The BCRA committed to neither purchase nor sell US dollars in the FX
market unless USD/ARS hits the extremes of the bands. In reality USD/ARS has
traded within a narrower range so far between 1,100.0 and 1,200.0 in May and June.
It has not stopped the BCRA from stepping up intervention in the futures market
where the short US dollar position in May was the highest since September 2023.
The gradual weakening of the peso has helped to ease upside risks to the inflation
outlook. The monthly rate of inflation in Argentina has continued to slow falling to 1.5%
in May compared to 4.2% a year ago – a positive development for President Milei
ahead of the parliamentary elections in October. Argentina’s economy is continuing
to grow strongly as well expanding by an annual rate of 5.8% in Q1. The IMF is
scheduled to carry out its first program review of the recent USD20 billion loan
agreement. The IMF loan has helped Argentina to partly rebuild FX reserves. The
BCRA has also announced steps to boost US dollar reserves including allowing local
currency bonds to be purchased with US dollars, and eliminating minimum time
requirements for foreign investors to hold on to some Argentine bonds. Overall, we
still believe that the peso is overvalued undermining Argentina’s competitiveness.

IMF loan helps to rebuild FX reserves ARGENTINA FX RESERVE HOLDINGS

Source: Bloomberg, Macrobond

36 Foreign Exchange Outlook │ July 2025

Brazilian real

Spot close
Q3 2025 Q4 2025 Q1 2026 Q2 2026
30.06.25
USD/BRL 5.4494 5.3000 5.3500 5.4000 5.5000
BRL/JPY 26.480 26.790 26.170 25.560 24.730
EUR/BRL 6.4009 6.2540 6.4200 6.5880 6.7650
Consensus Consensus Consensus Consensus
USD/BRL 5.6700 5.7200 5.8000 5.8400

MARKET UPDATE

Stronger In June the Brazilian real strengthened against the US dollar in terms of London
closing rates from 5.7217 to 5.4494. The Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) raised the
Selic policy rate by 0.25 percentage point to 15.00%.

OUTLOOK

Improving conditions for carry trades The real has strengthened further against the US dollar in June resulting in USD/BRL
encouraging stronger BRL hitting a fresh year-to-date low of 5.4240 on 30th June. Unlike other emerging market
currencies, the recent flare up of geopolitical risks in the Middle East has had limited
negative impact on the real. The real continues to derive support from the broad-
based weakening of the US dollar and the easing of fears over downside risks to
global growth from trade disruption. The upcoming deadline for higher “reciprocal
tariffs” on 9th July poses a challenge to improving investor risk sentiment. Trade deal
announcements in the coming weeks/months or an extension to the delayed
implementation of tariffs would be the most favourable outcome for the real. At the
same time, the real continues to benefit from the higher yields on offer in Brazil which
alongside the recent drop in financial market volatility is making the real more
attractive as a carry currency. Yields in Brazil were lifted further after the BCB
delivered another 25bps rate hike in June lifting the policy rate to 15.00%, the highest
policy rate since 1H 2006. The BCB now plan to keep the policy rate at current highly
restrictive levels for a “very prolonged” period indicating that rate cuts are unlikely at
least until next year. The resilience of Brazil’s economy to higher rates is
encouraging the BCB to push back expectations for rate cuts. As a result, domestic
fiscal concerns are not currently sufficient to prevent a stronger real. Lawmakers
recently voted to block a decree that increases so-called IOF taxes on some financial
transactions undermining the government’s efforts to meet their fiscal targets.

Improving conditions for carry trades USD/BRL VS. CARRY ATTRACTIVENESS

boosting demand for BRL

Source: Bloomberg, Macrobond

37 Foreign Exchange Outlook │ July 2025

Chilean peso

Spot close Q3 2025 Q4 2025 Q1 2026 Q2 2026

30.06.25
USD/CLP 932.04 925.00 930.00 935.00 940.00
CLP/JPY 0.1548 0.1540 0.1510 0.1480 0.1450
EUR/CLP 1094.8 1092.0 1116.0 1141.0 1156.0
Consensus Consensus Consensus Consensus
USD/CLP 940.00 934.50 940.00 940.00

MARKET UPDATE

CLP strengthens modestly further In June the Chilean peso strengthened modestly against the US dollar from 942.50 to
932.04. The BCCh, at its meeting in June kept the key policy rate unchanged at
5.00% for the fifth meeting, following seven rate cuts in 2024 totalling 325bps.

OUTLOOK

Rate cuts look to be coming The peso gained by 1.1% in June against the dollar which resulted in the peso being
undermining CLP the second worst performing LatAm currency in June after ARS. The escalation of
the conflict between Israel and Iran saw larger peso selling in part due to the
monetary policy meeting coinciding with this uncertainty and the signal from that
meeting being that the rate cutting cycle could resume over the coming months. The
decision to keep the policy rate unchanged was unanimous but acknowledged that
inflation risks had subsided compared to earlier in the year. That would mean that the
policy rate, under the baseline scenario, would be “approaching its range of neutral
values” – which is estimated to be in a range of 3.5% - 4.5%. That implies that Chile’s
real policy rate could narrow further with the annual CPI rate at 4.4%, well above the
3.0% target. Annual inflation has been above the target since 2021. The current real
policy rate doesn’t provide much cushion to protect against external risks and is
considerably smaller than in Brazil and Mexico. Furthermore, Chile is more
vulnerable to higher energy prices given it imports nearly all its energy needs. Still,
with the ceasefire between Iran and Israel holding, that negative peso risk is
receding. The peso also has the China trade risks that will likely linger and with
reciprocal tariff risks elevated ahead of 9 th July and again for China in August, the
global backdrop remains unfavourable for peso appreciation. In these circumstances,
some modest CLP depreciation seems feasible.

USD/CLP maintains performance USD/CLP VS. 200-DAY MOVING AVERAGE

around long-term trend

38 Foreign Exchange Outlook │ July 2025

Mexican peso

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42 Foreign Exchange Outlook │ July 2025

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43 Foreign Exchange Outlook │ July 2025

Commentaries. Any prices or quotations contained herein are indicative only, do not represent firm quotes as to either price or size and should not be used for
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Our Credit Strategy recommendations incorporate valuations (relative value) and the author’s fundamental view on the security. The fundamental credit view of an
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Definitions

Positive:

Credit: We expect the credit spread to tighten, on an interest rate hedged basis

Neutral:

Credit: We expect the credit spread to remain stable, on an interest rate hedged basis

44 Foreign Exchange Outlook │ July 2025

Research

London: Tokyo

MR DEREK HALPENNY MR TEPPEI INO

Head of Research, Global Markets EMEA Tokyo Head of Global Markets Research
& International Securities T: +81 (0) 50-3842-1288
T: +44 (0)20 7577 1887
MS SUMINO KAMEI
MR LEE HARDMAN Senior Analyst
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45 Foreign Exchange Outlook │ July 2025

Common questions

Geopolitical risks in the Middle East primarily affect Japan through crude oil price fluctuations, as Japan is highly dependent on energy imports, thus impacting the yen's volatility. Similarly, Singapore is affected by global trade uncertainties, which could influence its currency by altering investor perceptions of economic stability and by impacting trade relations and energy costs .

Shifting JGB issuance to shorter maturities could expose Japan to rollover risks, as frequent refinancing may be needed, especially if market conditions shift unfavorably. While this strategy aims to manage long-term yield pressures and stabilize the market, it may increase susceptibility to future interest rate fluctuations and liquidity demands .

The modification of the S$NEER policy band by the MAS signifies a response to global economic uncertainties, aiming to maintain currency competitiveness amid volatile trade conditions. By keeping the S$NEER within the upper bounds, the MAS seeks to balance export competitiveness with controlling imported inflation, thereby supporting Singapore's economic stability and growth prospect .

Stabilization of the Middle East could reduce the geopolitical risks that have previously led to a surge in crude oil prices. Since Japan relies heavily on imported energy, a stable Middle East would likely lead to lower crude oil prices, which could reduce the risk premium on the yen and support its performance against the US dollar .

A US-Philippines trade deal resulting in reduced tariffs is expected to strengthen the Philippine peso against the USD, as it would decrease trade barriers, potentially increase exports, and improve foreign direct investment, thereby enhancing economic confidence and potentially appreciating the currency .

The Bank of Japan's decision to reduce the pace of quantitative tightening by decreasing monthly JGB purchases helps stabilize the long-end of the yield curve. This measure mitigates potential supply-demand imbalances and alleviates investor concerns over debt sustainability, allowing for a moderated increase in the 10-year JGB yield .

The potential delay in Federal Reserve rate cuts is influenced by the anticipation of inflation risks that may not materialize until the end of 2026. Additionally, if firms do not fully pass on tariffs and US bank lending does not surge, inflation pressures may stay subdued, delaying rate cuts. The situation also hinges on labor market trends; if job data reveals weaknesses as suspected, the Fed might cut rates sooner .

Foreign investor sentiment is crucial for Japan’s JGB market stability because foreign purchases provide necessary capital inflows that can mitigate domestic market pressures, such as debt sustainability concerns and yield volatility. Returning foreign investment, as observed in recent weeks, indicates improved confidence which supports yield curve stability and reduces market disruptions .

The ECB's rate cuts have contributed to the euro's strengthening against other G10 currencies after a phase of consolidation, by boosting investor confidence in the European economy's resilience and fiscal strategies, particularly in Germany. This has led to the euro outperforming other major currencies, supported by positive shifts in economic indicators like the IFO Business Climate Index .

Domestic policies, such as those implemented during Trump's presidency, could influence future inflation by impacting factors like tariffs and fiscal spending. If tariffs are fully passed on to consumers or if there is a significant boost in bank lending, it could drive up money supply and inflation. However, these effects are contingent on employment trends and broader economic contexts .

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