Army camps: history and development, 1858-2000

Introduction

The proportions of this report are determined by the availability of sources rather than the
intrinsic significance of the types of camp discussed, though it is arguable that the World War
II camps, some of which only existed for a few months as an assemblage of tents,
were, in terms of the significance of the events of which they were part, the most important
camps of all. The survival of plans and drawings, too, is unbalanced, being inversely
proportional to the amount of documentation that has survived. The available
documentation virtually comes to a halt in the early 1950s, due to ruthless weeding of
papers, and in any case it had never been policy to preserve records of individual camps.
Fieldwork and the documentation held at a local level will probably enable the remainder of
the story to be filled out. But enough material has survived to enable a narrative outline
History of the development of the Army Camp from the Crimea to the Cold War to be written.
Together with the database/gazetteer, they present an introduction to an almost wholly
unexplored field.

The modern British Army Camp may be said to have its origins in the Crimean War, where
wooden huts were supplied as sets of parts to be assembled on site. Several types were
employed, none being thought wholly satisfactory [Fig.1]. The chief complaint was that they
were unsuited as field accommodation, not being suited to dismantling and re-erection;
huts thrown up by the Sardinian troops, using only materials which were to hand, were
considered 'the nearest approach to what huts should be for an army in the field.' (Not a
universal opinion; one officer annotated his copy of Professional Papers of the Royal
Engineers containing the report on hunting in the Crimea to the effect that the improvised
design contributed to the high sickness rate of the Sardinians.) By far the best hut was the
large double boarded hospital hut (the first hospital hut ever to be issued to the Army) [Fig.2].
(Binney 1858) The fact was that the English designs had the makings of structures which
were more suitable to a semi-permanent camp than the field.

The three great camps established

The Victorian regular army, in peacetime, around 1870 numbered around 190,000 all ranks.
By comparison, the French army numbered 450,000, the German Empire 400,000 and Russia
750,000. The British army was composed of (the figures are representative, as changes were
made
• 31 regiments of cavalry, nine usually stationed in India, whose regimental peace
establishment was 27 officers and 607 men with 559 horses
• 28 brigades of artillery. The true unit, however, was the battery, the brigade being a
grouping for administrative purposes. The peace establishment for a battery of horse
artillery was five officers, 151 men and 113 horses; for field artillery it was 5 officers, 152
men and 85 horses. Seventeen brigades were normally stationed abroad
• The Engineers were grouped into 40 companies and three troops, with a large number of
officers engaged on independent duties. The peace establishment of a company was 3
officers and 93 men; the field equipment troop numbered 6 officers and 233 men, with
186 horses. The Telegraph troop comprised 6 officers, and 245 men with 42 riding and
114 draught horses; the pontoon troop 6 officers, 296 men and 20 riding and 210 draught
horses. 13 companies were normally abroad

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• The Infantry consisted of 148 battalions, 71 stationed at home. Most regiments were
composed of two battalions, theoretically allowing one to be abroad and one at home. The
war establishment of a battalion was 31 officers and 1066 NCOs and men. Each battalion
was subdivided into eight companies
The organization dictated the layout of the barrack or camp. The standard arrangement was to
house the men in 32 units holding 18 men each (figures varied according to different camps
and dates of construction, but the general principle remained), arranged by companies in
blocks of four. This only applied to the infantry; the other branches of the service had
different arrangements according to their organisation, equipment and horses.

The first permanent training ground for the Army was acquired at Aldershot, and by 1856 the
first huts had been erected in two camps laid out in regular grid patterns, known as North and
South Camps. (Douet 1998) The original nomenclature of Aldershot did not remain, but
some of the huts were to be remarkably long-lived; in 1929 some 1856 huts still survived in
the locations then known as Heath End and West End; it is not known if these had been
dismantled and relocated. In 1913 parts at least of Talavera, Salamanca and Badajos Barracks
were composed of huts dating from 1858. Two other camps, Colchester and Shorncliffe,
were laid out slightly later; a regular grid pattern was again imposed [Figs. 3, 4 and 17]. At
Colchester the camp was no longer centred around a parade ground, though that arrangement
was retained at Shorncliffe. In the London area a grid of wooden huts was set up on
Woolwich Common in the 1860s, some of which may have been pressed into use in 1914.
(WO 78/2853) By 1880 the wooden huts must have been showing their age, and a more
permanent, though still cheap, construction was proposed at Shorncliffe. This was the
concrete hut, which made its first appearance in British military architecture at that camp,
accommodating a battalion of infantry [Fig.5]. Concrete revetments had been employed at
Newhaven Fort in 1864 and experiments made on the strength of concrete bricks made with
various mixes, Portland cement proving the most durable. (Graham 1865) Almost certainly
the Shorncliffe huts were built using concrete bricks rather than using shuttering, though no
drawings of these buildings appear to survive. In 1894 A, C, E and the Army Service Corps
lines were a mix of brick, timber and concrete huts. However, the new construction could not
have been successful, as by 1896 the concrete huts disappear from the records, such as they
are.

The new Aldershot area camps

A more suitable medium for semi-permanent accommodation was about to come into use.
Galvanized iron cladding and roofing applied to a deal framework was, for a few years, to
become the preferred mode of construction of the new camps which were built in the area
surrounding Aldershot in the first years of the twentieth century [Fig.6]. They are referred to
in later inventories as being SA type huts; no official explanation of this term has been seen,
but it is probable that this is a contraction of South Africa, and that the easily shipped
galvanized iron sheets, deals, planks and battens were first used on any scale in the second
Boer War. In 1896 metal construction was used for a wash house at Shorncliffe [Fig.7]. The
First use for an entire camp appears to have been at Leipsic Barracks, Crookham, in 1900.
followed by Blackdown, Deepcut and Bordon in 1901 and Longmoor in 1902 [Fig.8].
Ceilings and linings were essential to make the buildings habitable, usually tongue and groove.
grooved matchboarding with a felt lining, but if felt was not available there were other options
such as tarred paper, asbestos, plaster on expanded metal or various proprietary compositions
[Fig.9]. Sometimes verandahs were added. Standard designs were prepared for living huts.
hospitals, stables, operating theatres, and disinfecting sheds. Great attention was paid to

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sewage disposal and water supply, as far greater difficulties arose in semi-permanent camps
than in tented camps occupied for a short time and then abandoned, or permanent barracks
where proper arrangements had been made from the beginning. (Notes 1914) These buildings
proved surprisingly durable, many of the Bordon camps giving good service in the Second
World War, and some huts survive to this day in the area. The Royal Engineer Lines at
Bordon, from 1908, introduced a different design, with 5" thick brick walls between steel
stanchions, rendered with plaster internally and rough cast externally, the steelwork carrying
the weight of the roof and windows. To save on the cost of the roof timbers, asbestos slates
were used for the roof covering [Fig.10]. No contemporary plans have been seen for the 1900-
1902 camps in the Aldershot area, but the 1914 manual illustrates the layout and water supply
arrangements for Darland Camp, near Gillingham (Kent). This held an infantry brigade of
four battalions, a field artillery brigade of three batteries and its ammunition column, and a
field company of Royal Engineers, a total of 4,650 all ranks and 820 horses. Town mains
water was available, and at the recommended allowance (when piped water was to be had) of
15 gallons a day for man and horse some 80,000 to 90,000 gallons a day would be required.
The establishment of very large semi-permanent camps would clearly create considerable
problems of supply. The drawing shows a tented camp arranged in closely grouped blocks,
with no centralised parade ground but assembly grounds for each formation. It became a
hutted camp for the duration of the First World War and remained in use for the first half of
the 1920’s, the site being re-used during the next war [Fig.11]. (Notes 1914; Scott-Moncrieff,
1922

Out of the main stream

Some camps, from an early date, were not hutted but constructed in permanent materials from
the outset. Land was procured for Fleetwood Camp in 1861 and, according to the annotation
on the first surviving plan of 1888, the buildings were constructed soon after. Six single-
storey red brick huts with slate roofs were disposed three on opposite sides of the parade, with
officers’ quarters occupying a third side. Penally Camp, built between 1860 and 1867, though
only an artillery practice camp not intended for permanent occupation was constructed from
brick and stone from the very beginning [Fig.12]. As enlarged in 1913 additional huts were
seen as more important than a parade ground, not a vital feature of an artillery camp [Fig.13].
Another artillery practice camp at Okehampton, where permanent construction began in 1894,
drew on local materials. [Figs.14 and 15] It might be thought that this substantial construction
was a concession to the Dartmoor weather, but a slightly later artillery practice camp
established at Trawsfynydd in 1903 in the even wetter climate of Snowdonia was only
provided with timber huts. Pembroke Dock Hut Barracks, despite its name, was provided in
1895 with a substantial terrace for married soldiers and Warrant officers in no way inferior to
the contemporary terraces in the town, and similarly Shorncliffe Hut Barracks in 1904
received, as well as two terraces of married quarters, an infant school for 60 pupils which
exactly reflected contemporary school design.

Late Victorian and Edwardian developments, and the beginnings of the Salisbury Plain
complex

The latter was part of the general programme, begun in the 1880s, of substantial replacements
for the housing in the three great camps. Part of Aldershot was reshaped into blocks holding two
sergeants and 108 men each, each battalion having its own parade ground [Fig.16] with
substantial married quarters [Fig.17]. Part of Shorncliffe was demolished and new huts were
built in timber construction [Figs.18 and 19]. Lydd, established as a practice camp in 1882

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and the site of many tests and experiments with explosives, was given permanent buildings
after 1893, [Fig.20] and expanded in 1900 with iron cladded huts. Much of Colchester was
rebuilt in brick and recast into larger units, while retaining the general layout [Figs.21 and
The site was still, however, characterised by a multiplicity of buildings, which was the
essential difference between a camp and a barracks, for, as has been seen, a camp could be
just as permanent a construction. These included an assortment of buildings and structures for
sanitation purposes, as built at Lydd in 1896 [Figs.23,24 and 25]. Great attention was paid to
sanitation by the Royal Engineers at this time, an entire volume of Professional Papers
(1891) being devoted to the subject. A variety of devices and processes for treating sewage
was available, some necessitating their own buildings, as in Fig. 24, for Conder’s process,
which used iron sulphate to break up the organic matter. This was trialled at Chichester
barracks during the 1880s and adopted at Lydd. The multiplicity of buildings in a camp,
together with the topography, ensured that a neat overall plan such as that of Colchester was
rarely attained or aimed at. The scattered layout of Okehampton was partly determined by the
topography and partly by the opportunity given by the virtually unlimited land available to
space out the stables for the essential prime movers of artillery [Fig.26]. Camps which
accommodated units such as the Army Service Corps, which needed a variety of buildings to
store and maintain a range of vehicles, had layouts which were governed by functional
requirements rather than neat plans, as at the rebuilt Shorncliffe {Fig.27]. The living
accommodation for the soldiers, however, was best grouped in a grid for a variety of reasons,
as also seen at Shorncliffe [Fig.28]. This meant that camps, when not purely catering for one
branch of the service, had two distinct layouts on the same site; the accretion of buildings to
cater for storage and servicing of equipment and prime movers, the range of which even at
this date was continually expanding, necessitating ad hoc additions and alterations, and the
grid of huts for the soldiers, usually placed on one side. This is well shown by the hutted
camp at Crown Hill, Plymouth (where, incidentally, the huts were not to RE design, but the
work of the Portable Hutting Company – the construction is unknown) [Fig.29].

While Aldershot, Colchester and Shorncliffe were being rebuilt and expanded, a new
greenfield site – or rather sites – was acquired on Salisbury Plain. Tented camps for artillery
practice had been set up there during the summer for several years, but now it was to become
the location of camps which were to outlast Aldershot and Shorncliffe in importance. The first
hutted barracks were ready at Bulford in 1899, and Tidworth appeared as an entry in the
Barrack Book for the first time in the same year. No drawings of Tidworth have been located.
but plans of 1905 show Bulford as taking advantage of the space available to revert to the
traditional arrangement of a parade ground around which the buildings were grouped. It
incorporated accommodation for mounted infantry; not a traditional component of the British
Army, this innovation had proved very useful during the Boer War and must have seemed to
point the way forward [Figs.30 and 31]. The infantry barrack and the mounted infantry
Barracks were self-contained areas, and Bulford was to expand through the addition of such.
units, expanding from a military village to a town, but a town where the street names, (such as
Plumer Road and Rawlinson Road) in addition to the architecture, proclaimed the nature of
the place [Fig.32].

Tidworth was built using permanent construction, unlike Bulford, which probably employed
the timber and corrugated iron hut, and the two Salisbury Plain camps represented the two
main types in use preceding 1914. In addition to the permanent and semi-permanent large
there were a few small camps employing permanent construction, as has been seen
and the permanent buildings of Penally and Okehampton. The buildings at these practice
camps were intended as a nucleus around which tented accommodation would be provided in

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summer. Musketry camps, which only needed stabling for the officers’ horses, as opposed to
the number required for hauling artillery, needed less in the way of permanent infrastructure.
The large musketry camp at Strensall, in the Yorkshire Wolds, was provided by 1888 with
enough wooden huts to house a battalion, an iron hut for the use of Warrant Officers being
added in 1901; the remainder of the site being laid out for tented camps, in each of which
permanent sheds were built to provide an essential infrastructure.

The First World War

The Army was organised somewhat differently by this time. The infantry battalion, at about
35 officers and 1000 men, was much the same size, but it was now divided into four
companies. Four battalions made up a brigade, and three infantry brigades helped make up a
division, which also incorporated four artillery brigades and various other units, a total of
about 20,000 men. As the division was thus a complete fighting unit it seemed logical for it to
be trained as a unit, and so enormous camps of divisional size were constructed.

The First World War brought about the sudden expansion of the Army to unprecedented levels.
dimensions. At the beginning of hostilities there was accommodation available for 174,800
NCOs and men. As an immediate measure the space available for each man was reduced from
600 to 400 cubic feet and families were evicted from married quarters and put into lodgings.
These measures increased the capacity to 262,000 men, but this was only a fraction of what
was needed. Hutting had to be provided as rapidly as possible for 800,000 men; of these,
250,000 were to be in Southern Command and 200,000 in Northern Command. Orders for the
Huts were issued on August 12, 1914, and by the 14.tha complete set of drawings for a hutted
A camp to hold one battalion had been prepared by a team in the Directorate of Fortifications.
and Works under the leadership of Major Armstrong. Plans were also prepared for hospitals,
artillery, engineer and Army Service Corps units, and remount depots. The basic Armstrong
hut, the building block of the new camps, was 60 feet long by 20 feet wide with an average
height of 10 feet, and accommodated 30 men. Forty huts were provided for each battalion,
together with a cookhouse and dining rooms [Fig.33]. The cookhouses, dining rooms and
Regimental institutions used a 28-foot span variant of the basic design. At first, the huts were
given foundations of brick piers, and shortages of bricks and bricklayers caused delays; later
creosoted wooden piles were used. The framework of the huts was red fir scantlings, the
heavy demands for which caused shortages in the market and additional difficulties for a task
already made hard enough by the necessity for speed. The cladding was not specified, but
corrugated iron was almost certainly the preferred medium, though local availability of
materials would have been the determining factor. The lining was matchboard and 3 ply;
asbestos sheeting was tried at first but found to be too brittle. The haste in which the camps
had to be built meant that some of the essential infrastructures were not provided, and the lack
of roads created such problems with mud that many camps were cleared in November 1914
and only completed in the spring of 1915. (HRE V, Hunter 1926)

Selection of the sites was determined by the following principles

Availability all year round of open ground for manoeuvres, rifle ranges etc.
2. Preferably gravel or chalk soil, good drainage, an ample water supply either pure or
capable of being purified
3. Good communications; not on a main railway line so as to impede movements, but not far
away from one
4. Materials easily procurable, labor available and preferably existing systems of water,
electricity and sewerage which could be shared

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The two areas which conformed to these requirements most obviously were Salisbury Plain.
and the Aldershot district. Guidelines were laid down for the general layout of the camps. A
A camp for a battalion would take up an area of some 1,100 feet by 500 feet, the parade ground.
taking up a space of about 430 feet by 300 feet. The officers' mess, flanked by officers' living
huts, was to face one side of the parade ground. On the other side the barrack huts were to be
grouped on either side of a central line of buildings comprising the sergeants' mess, showers,
dining rooms and cookhouse, the drying room and the regimental institute. Flanking the
The parade ground was to be the guard house and offices, horse shelters, tack rooms, forage.
stores, garages and equipment store. (Hunter 1926)

These camps were enormous, the basic unit being a division of 12 infantry battalions, about
15,000 men (the divisional artillery and other units were trained elsewhere), including an
additional 10% on the standard establishment. These huge assemblies created logistic
difficulties. By the spring of 1915 Bramshott Camp (near Bordon) held over 24,000 men and
nearly 6,000 horses. The local water company had to construct an additional reservoir to cope
with this enormous demand and the Treasury was appealed to for support.
Were it not for this circumstance, Bramshott would have left no mark in the National.
Archives, for the majority of these camps were dismantled at the end of the war and the
documentation has apparently long gone. By 1921, when the Barrack Book resumed
publication, very few remained. Ripon Camp still held 13,460 other ranks – in concrete huts –
but by 1923 it was gone. The camps which survived were, however, to remain some of the
key locations of the British Army to this day. Hipswell and Scotton Camps, for example,
south of Richmond, still held their divisional complements of over 13,000 men each. They
were to be rebuilt over the following decades to form the great assembly of Catterick Camp.
The original construction of Hipswell and Scotton made use of 2” Winget blocks between
upright steel joists, or alternatively two layers of expanded metal cement plastered with air
spaces between the layers. (The Winget Company were early specialists in concrete
construction, having made concrete mixing equipment since 1908). Roughly half of the huts
were built using each system. The huts were roofed with very light steel trusses, with wood
purlins and covered with roofing felt on boards. The floors were wooden, the windows of the
hopper type, and heating was provided by stoves. (WO 32/3854)

The other great system of camps which was to survive the war was on Salisbury Plain.
Larkhill, Durrington (planned) and Fargo Camps [Figs.34, 35 and 36]. Larkhill was composed
of no less than thirty battalion camps; the plan shows that their layouts conformed to the
general guidelines. Durrington may not have been constructed: it does not figure in the
Barrack Books while the other camps on the Plain do, nor is it mentioned in Gunners at
Larkhill, which details the expansions and rebuildings of that group of camps. Photographs
and personal testimonies quoted in that book seem to show that the huts were built to the
Armstrong design and clad in corrugated iron. The chief contractor was W.E. Chivers & Sons.
of Devizes, who will figure again in the story. (James 1983) Two new locations were found
for a new type of camp. The introduction of the tank meant that an area had to be found where
the machines could be tested in secrecy before their operational introduction. Part of the
Iveagh estate near Thetford was taken over for this purpose, which would have involved the
provision of facilities for maintenance of the machines as well as housing the men. The estate
was handed back after the war, but Breckland was to become an important location for camps
in the next conflict and beyond. Bovington, an artillery range before the war and established
as a wartime hutted camp in 1914, began its permanent association with the tank in 1916,
when a school for training tank gunners was established there. Its subsequent expansion was to
be continuous, with a very large works programme being commenced in the autumn of 1918

6
to provide for the increased forces contemplated for the operations of 1919, but this was
terminated at the Armistice after about £160,000 had been spent.

Portable hutting

It will be noted that so far there has been no mention of the most famous type of all Army
huts – the Nissen, to become the predominating form of hutting used during the Second
World War and surviving for many years thereafter. This was designed in 1916 by Captain
Nissen, commanding the 29thCompany of Royal Engineers, stationed at Hesdin in the Pas de
Calais. The original design was for a hut 27 feet long by 16 feet wide, covered with bent
corrugated iron sheets on wrought iron angle frames 6'9" apart, lined with matchboarding,
though corrugated iron was later used as an alternative. The floor was wooden, as were the
ends of the hut, and the whole thing rested on wooden joists 7” × 4”. The typical
accommodation was one NCO and seven other ranks [Figs. 37 and 38]. A larger variant was
developed, 60 feet by 20 feet, with a raised clerestory running the length of the building.
Originally intended as a hospital hut, the design was also used for dining and recreation huts
[Figure 39]. An order for 27,000 was placed at the end of 1916 followed a few months later
by another for 20,000. These were required in France, not England, and it is not known if any
were in fact set up in England at the time. From the autumn of 1917 the wooden bases and
ends were made in France at base workshops. Other varieties of portable hut had preceded
the Nissen, notably a wooden hut (presumably of WO design) 60 feet long by 15 feet wide,
and made in sections 10 feet long: an unwieldy dimension, the resulting hut was on the
narrow side, but proved very serviceable. These were constructed in England and dispatched
at the beginning of the war. Armstrong and Aylwin designs were also sent to France;
supply of Aylwin huts was discontinued after the summer of 1916, having proved unable to
withstand severe winter conditions, but many Armstrong huts were despatched. These came
in two sizes, 24 feet by 15 feet and 12 feet by 9 feet 3 inches, the smaller hut being more
commonly used. They were weatherly, but very cold in winter. It is extremely unlikely that
any were employed at home. The firm of Tarrant made a great variety of successful huts, but
these were all made in their yards at Le Havre and Calais. The 'Forest' hut, designed at
Director of Works (France) HQ, was built by French contractors. The Liddell hut was also
designed by a Works officer, and was probably the type of which 1,800 were manufactured in
Switzerland in 1917 to a DW design. Finally the Weblee hut was supplied in 1918, proving
very satisfactory. Though a full description of these varieties of portable hutting would be
Essential in a history of prefabricated military buildings, only the Nissen belongs in a survey.
of camps in the United Kingdom, and its time was not yet come at this period. (WRE, France;
HRE V)

The case of Catterick

The great majority of the wartime camps were rapidly disposed of, the hutting finding a ready
market. The financial stringency imposed by the Treasury meant that no new construction on
any scale could be carried out, although many of the surviving hutted camps were showing
their age. It was determined to retain and expand Catterick and Larkhill out of the great
divisional camps, but in as economical way as possible. The retention of Catterick was as
much for financial reasons as the usefulness of the location. The cost of reinstatement of the
area to the condition it was in prior to its requisition under the Defence of the Realm Act was
estimated at £110,000, while the site could be purchased for £120,000. The concrete huts
would have to be demolished and carted away, while timber huts would have a substantial
resale value. In the circumstances, the Army Council wrote in December 1922 to the Treasury.

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recommending the purchase of the site. This was done, but the huts, though recent, were quite
unsatisfactory, and in May 1926 a committee reported on the work which had been done and
further desirable steps. As the camp had been constructed for war purposes only many of the
buildings required for a peace establishment were either non-existent or unsatisfactory.
There were no married quarters, the Supply and Ordnance depots and stores were inadequate.
stables were largely unfit for further use (still an important consideration) and there were no
vehicle sheds. The sewage and water supply systems were also far below the standards
required for a permanent camp in peacetime. New construction throughout was financially
impossible. The original estimate prepared in 1922 for the conversion of the camp was
£1,000,000. Under great pressure this eventually appeared in the Army Estimates as
£890,000. When the details were worked out it was seen that the final cost, after cutting down
on the garrison, was £1,388,000. A complete rebuild in new construction would have come to
the unacceptable sum of over £3,500,000. Consequently, it was decided to make use of as
many of the existing huts as possible. As they could not be moved the existing layout of the
camp would have to be retained. This had been arranged so as to make the maximum use of
existing open spaces and communications, with the consequences that the various Unit Lines
were laid out with little relation to each other and with areas of vacant and untidy ground in
between. The connecting roads were no more than the original country lanes that had been
resurfaced, but still retaining their original character. A plan of Catterick made in 1950 shows
this very clearly; the settlement pattern, as it would be called if it were not an army camp, is
as different as could be from the grid of Colchester [Fig.40].

The measures which had been taken were as follows. All buildings which were to be lived in.
had a half-brick wall built round the existing huts and tied in, leaving a 2” air space. Stoves
were replaced by central brick fireplaces, and sanitary annexes with modern fittings provided
with covered approaches from each hut. Buildings which were not lived in were to be clad
externally with weather boarding, fixed to battens bolted on the original steel uprights. All
roofs were made good by laying new Ruberoid over the old. Buildings necessary for a peace
establishment which could not be contrived from converting huts were built in permanent and
standard forms. The possibility of future mechanisation was taken into account by building
new stables from steel and Robertson’s Asbestos Protected Metal, which could be taken down
and rebuilt elsewhere. If necessary, a second half brick wall could be built around the
buildings and tied to the new one, so giving (as the Committee thought) a permanent
construction. If necessary, new roofs and floors and new windows could be provided. This
The last item had already been requested by Northern Command, as no way had been found to
making the hopper type windows, standard fitting in all War Camps, weatherproof; but as the
cost of this was estimated at £40,000 the matter was deferred until such time as a general
rebuild took place. This first refurbishment of Catterick was completed by February 1928, the
final bill having risen to £1,438,000 and the contractors Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co.
March 1931 further refurbishment had been done at a cost of around £1,500,000.
Yorkshire Evening Post was most impressed by the married quarters.
The fact that there is plenty of ground available and an entirely new set of quarters is
being provided, has enabled the authorities to break away from the traditional 'barrack'
quarter type and to produce groups more on the lines of a modern housing plan, with small
gardens and approach roads. The married NCOs and men at Catterick are thus in the
fortunate position of having the latest type of cottage or small house. They are being built
in groups of 4, 6, and 8, and in no case are more than eight houses grouped together. The
accommodation and character are based on the size of the family rather than on rank, and a
good deal of sensible and sympathetic imagination has been displayed on the
arrangements. They are of three types, A, B and C. A house is designed for couples

8
 without children, or with children under two years of age, and comprise living-room and
kitchen and one bedroom, bathroom, and the usual offices. B houses contain 2 bedrooms,
and C 3 bedrooms. The B type are so designed that a bedroom may be added, converting it
to a C, or one subtracted, altering it to an A type.
WO 32/3854, T 161/609/18898/2

New designs of the 1920s

These married quarters were the results of the production of a fresh batch of barrack designs.
created against a tight financial position. Before the war, the average expenditure on military
works had been some £1,356,000; by the middle of the 1920’s it was £2,700,000, but the cost
of building had roughly doubled, so the building power was about the same. Excluding
maintenance and other services, about £1,200,000 was available for modernization and new
building. The Army was considerably smaller than before the war, but taking into account
modern needs and the need to replace the accommodation lost by the formation of the Irish
Free State, the necessary expenditure had not diminished. Indeed, in 1926 there was no
difficulty in compiling a list of work worth £14-15,000,000 which would become essential
within the next ten years. The necessary updates included
1. Universal provision of modern latrines and urinals
The provision of dining rooms
3. Replacing gas lighting systems, some of which were over 60 years old, with electric light
4. Provision of baths and hot and cold showers
5. Concentrating cookhouses, dining rooms and bath houses in one or adjacent blocks
6. Provision of modern cooking apparatus and kitchen space
Provision of sanitary annex to each barrack block
8. Compliance with regulation allowances of 60 square feet and 600 cubic feet per occupant
9. Provision of baths, w.c’s and hot and cold water to all married quarters
In addition, new post-war formations had to be catered for, and allowance made for the
increasing mechanisation of the Army. The formations included
Royal Corps of Signals
Royal Tank Corps
3. Army Schools – Boys’ Training, Hygiene, Education, Senior Officers’ Schools
4. Air Defence Units
5. Chemical Warfare Organizations
All these demands could only be met within budget by
• Making all possible economies in planning, by reducing the waste space in buildings,
reducing the heights of rooms where possible, and eliminating unnecessary external
features, and revising plans to simplify roofing as far as possible.
• Adopting the most economical forms of construction. Many large and substantial barracks
had been built to last a century or more were no longer where they were required or
adapted to current purposes. Military policy changed so rapidly and military development
was so fast that it would be unwise to plan for more than 30 years ahead. The ideal
The building should therefore be one that is cheap to construct, costs little to maintain, and is
warm and comfortable to live in, and would fall down of its own accord in 30 years time.
• Making fullest use possible of cheap substitutes for various building materials.
• Reducing the standards of the buildings, apart from those affecting the health of the
soldier.
This declaration of the importance of built-in obsolescence cut across the tradition of the army.
design, where camps like Bordon were seen as enforced expedients rather than the desired
norm. However, it was determined that the buildings were to be comfortable and the use of

9
Nissen huts were never mentioned or apparently considered. As a consequence, a new design,
the Light Construction type barrack block, was drawn up. This was almost as cheap as the
Bordon type, but much warmer and cheaper to maintain. They might even last longer than 30.
years. The construction adopted was steel uprights and roof trusses, with 4½ inch brick walls,
rough cast on the outside and plastered internally. The floors were solid, and heating was by
centrally placed back-to-back fireplaces. A sanitary annexe was included in each block, and
the roofs were slated with asbestos tiles. The design came in single and double storied forms;
the single storey variety could dispense with steel stanchions and the roof trusses were
supported by 9 inch brick piers. The design made as much use of cheap substitute materials as
possible, such as asbestos slates, the replacement of natural stone by artificial stone or
concrete, internal partitions formed from breeze blocks, the use of cheap bricks for internal
portions of cavity walls. Standards were reduced by using lime mortar rather than cement, and
where cement had to be used the proportions were to be 1 to 5 instead of 1 to 3. Wood
preservatives were to be used in preference to paint, cornices and moulded architraves done
Away with, standard steel casements were used and the joinery was bought in ready-made.
from the Empire [Fig.41].

This design, born of the market price of materials, was to have a very short life. In 1929 a
collapse in the price of materials brought this austerity to an end and hand-made tiles, facing
bricks and stone dressings were reinstated [Fig.42]. The married quarters at Catterick which
So impressed the Yorkshire Post correspondent were not adopted without cheaper expedients.
being tried; wooden Cuyper Houses on Salisbury Plain, Atholl Steel Houses at Larkhill and
concrete block houses at Fort George were all experimented with. (No illustrations of these
designs have been located.) However, taking the cost of extra maintenance into account, it
was doubtful if any significant financial savings were made, and these types do not appear in
the 1933 manual of the design and construction of military buildings – in which no mention at
all is made of the Nissen or any other type of demountable hutting. The married quarters,
whose design was subject to slight variation [Figs.43 and 44] plainly derive from the Garden
City tradition and compare well with contemporary council housing, though their situation at
Catterick, for example, would not have the same kind of ambiance as Letchworth.
Directorate of Fortifications and Works was well aware of this, as the first married quarters at
Catterick had been, as an economy, constructed without gardens, fences or hedges, and the
The 1926 Committee had recommended that trees be planted to form wind breaks, and that waste
areas be levelled and turfed. After 1929 it became policy to situate the buildings so as to
benefit from the maximum amount of sunlight.
1933; Lloyd Spencer, 1937)

Developments of the 1930s

The provision of married quarters at some other camps was far from satisfactory. In 1933 the
Army Council approached the Treasury with a view to reconstructing some of the WW1 huts
at Bovington for use as married quarters. What was termed ‘private enterprise of a petty
order' had led to the accumulation of a collection of sheds and disused railway carriages with
no system of sanitation or refuse disposal in the area known as Higher Wood. These were
occupied by a mix of civilians and families of married soldiers. It was proposed to make a
start in mending matters by reconstructing twelve huts into 24 married quarters, at a cost of
£3,200. The huts in question were then merely shells, and partitions were to be inserted to
provide a living room, two bedrooms, a scullery, bathroom and WC in each quarter. The
expense would be bearable as the families would be charged the regulation shilling a day
giving an income of £438 per annum. The life of the huts was estimated at 15 years so the

10
total rents would be £6,750. Maintenance costs would be £3,600, so, allowing for interest,
over £2,300 would be set off against the capital costs of £3,240. The Treasury eventually
sanctioned the rebuilding, but not without objections. In 1938 Bovington had to be expanded
to meet the needs of newly mechanised cavalry units, and an initial estimate of £500,000 for
replacing all the WW1 huts was reduced to £200,000 by deciding that all the accommodation,
except for married quarters, would be hutted (a new design had just been produced). The
rapid development of mechanisation, albeit on a scale which was to prove inadequate when
the tests of war were applied, meant that Bovington’s satellite camp, Lulworth, was provided
with a range of purpose-built facilities for instruction in tank maintenance, driving and
gunnery; a synthetic trainer was provided for practicing gunnery while on the move; an RTC
obsession which was not to serve them well in practice. The illustration shows the WW1 huts
behind the new buildings; a replacement barrack block, among other new facilities, is lightly
sketched in [Fig.45]. (T 161/1087/613)

The barrack shown is a doublet of a type proposed in 1934, to be built in a U shape with
dining rooms and cookhouses projecting from the bottom member. This design was soon
scrapped (and probably the Lulworth building was put on hold) and with the worsening
international situation and the increasing difficulty in attracting recruits it was determined to
produce a barrack block which could be seen as an incentive to join up. The original design of
the Sandhurst Block, as it was christened, was submitted to the Royal Fine Arts Commission
early in 1936, who had already suggested the modified Georgian design of domestic buildings
for the RAF. The barrack rooms held twelve men each (individual cubicles had been tried in
Redford Barracks, Edinburgh, in 1908, but proved unsatisfactory as, in official verbiage, ‘the
supervision, which is found necessary to check immoral practices, was impossible.’) Central
heating was provided by hot water radiators, and sitting rooms were provided at the scale of
one to 25 men, with 10 square feet per man. These previously unheard of luxuries were
panelled in pulpboard, give a brick fireplace as well as the central heating, a polished
hardwood floor, and, in the words of the same authority who disapproved of unwholesome
privacy, 'sumptuously furnished with divans and chairs and provided with a plug for wireless.
The introduction of this type of room into a barrack block will create a higher tone of social.
habits among the men' [Fig.46]. The next phase of the rebuilding of Catterick duly
incorporated Sandhurst blocks [Fig.47]. (Lloyd Spencer 1937)

As the Sandhurst block was introduced (emphatically a return to permanent construction) so

designs for buildings of new huts conceived with the 30 year lifespan in mind were prepared,
designs which displaced the Light Construction model of the 1920’s. These were drawn up in
1937 and amended in July 1938. Drawings were prepared for living huts for five senior and
20 junior officers, four NCOs and 20 men (alternatively 24 men) [Fig.48], a Brigade HQ, a
dining room and cookhouse for 300 men, a guardhouse for one battalion, and a gymnasium
and drill shed. These were designed for new Brigade Group Training Camps and also for
general use. Alternative constructional methods were offered; the framework was to be either
timber or steel. The steel framed huts were to be covered with corrugated iron, the timber
framed either with corrugated iron or asbestos cement sheets, the roof and walls lined
internally with matchboard, no ceiling to be provided at tie bar level. In practice the timber
Framing was by far the more common practice. Some of these huts would have been destined
for a new type of semi-permanent camp. The Territorial Army was entrusted with the Anti-
Aircraft defense of the country in 1938 and practice camps had to be provided. Yaverland, in
the Isle of Wight, is shown, with a limited range of semi-permanent structures and tentage
arranged in blocks. The area available for a parade ground is very small [Fig.49]. (Standard
Hutting 1938

11
The Army was to enter the next war with its organization altered from that of 1914, and this,
like its predecessor, would affect the dimensions of the camps. The infantry battalion was
downsized to 22 officers and 646 other ranks, and the division reduced from 12 battalions to
nine. It was accepted in principle that all infantry divisions should be completely motorised.
Together with the recollection of the logistical difficulties of some of the huge 1914-18
divisional camps, this ensured that those created in the next conflict would be of more
manageable proportions and require, at the very least, hardstandings for lorries.

The Militia Camps controversy

Whether by accident or design, these plans were ready for the greatest peacetime programme
of barrack building until that date. On April 25th1939 Neville Chamberlain's Cabinet decided
to introduce conscription, a measure which had been in the air, with influential figures having
began a press campaign in its favor in March 1938. Three days later the Treasury Inter-
The Services Committee issued a memorandum on the immediate requirements. As much use as
possible was to be made of existing barracks and camps, with hutted accommodation added.
This was estimated at £70 per man. New hutted camps were a different proposition, coming
out at £150 per man. The first estimate of costs for 1939 were
a) Camps for 20,000 AA personnel £3,000,000
b) Camps for 15,000 other personnel £2,250,000
c) Additional accommodation for 35,000 in barracks £2,450,000
d) Hutted accommodation for Officer Producing Unit £50,000
Total £7,750,000 or £8,000,000 including works staff.
It was expected that the hutted camps would be built on existing training camp sites and,
except for AA camps, little extra land would be required. The intake of conscripts (the term
militiamen was initially used, presumably in the hope that this would have some kind of
cosmetic effect; it did not stick, but the camps were known afterwards, to the War Office at
least, as Militia Camps) in 1939 was estimated at 200,000. 80,000 of these would be allocated
to ADGB (Air Defence of Great Britain, i.e. AA units) with 120,000 going to the Field Force.
As the training period would be six months, the numbers to be catered for at any one time
were ADGB 40,000, Field Force 60,000, but accommodation would not be required for all
this number, as 20,000 of ADGB would be in training camps for three months, and the other
20,000 at gun sites whose hutting had already been authorised. As regards the Field Force, a
a reduction of over 10,000 was allowed for in the expectation of shortfalls in recruitment during
the first year of conscription. But because of fluctuations in the birth rate the number
Conscripted in 1940 was expected to be some 50,000 in excess of the 1939 age group.
First conscripts were due to be called up on July 1.and so construction of the camps had to
be pressed ahead with all possible speed. By June 23rdthe position had clarified further;
hutted accommodation together with administrative and ancillary buildings had to be
provided for 120,000 men by November 15thwith accommodation for a further 20,000 – or
even more – by May 15th1940. The cost in wages of building an average camp was reckoned
as £50,000, and for administrative reasons most of the camps were grouped in clusters of two,
three or four, with major concentrations in the Salisbury Plain and Aldershot areas. The scale
of the operations was such that it was thought only major contractors would be able to handle
the work, and an initial list was drawn up of 18 firms who were invited to tender. In the end
The following firms were the main contractors for the Militia Camps.
Messrs. Cowieson Ltd.
Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. Ltd.
Messrs. Holland, & Hannen and Cubitts Ltd.

12
George Wimpey & Co. Ltd.
Henry Boot & Sons Ltd.
Messrs. Higgs & Hill Ltd.
W.E.Chivers & Sons
John Mowlem & Co. Ltd.
Wilson Lovatt & Sons Ltd.
Messrs. Rice & Sons
F.Perks & Sons
G.E.Wallis & Sons
Because of the need to get things done as fast as possible, normal tendering procedures were
dispensed with, and one of the consequences was a flurry of accusations of profiteering, lax
supervision and idling workmen being grossly overpaid. Sites particularly singled out for
rampant malpractices were Compton Down near Winchester (to be known as Bushfield
Camp) which was constructed by Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co., and the Salisbury Plain
groups, the responsibility of Chivers of Devizes. That firm had figured on a short list of firms
which the War Office had said ‘it has been found necessary in the past to watch.’ A catalogue
of errors was denounced to an MP. This included the collapse of buildings at Perham Down
and Larkhill, the use of bricks when breeze blocks would have sufficed, erecting a heating
system at Larkhill wrongly so that it had to be dismantled and rebuilt, and sewage systems at
Winterbourne Gunner, Bulford and Perham Down so faulty that the pipes had to be encased in
contract to stop leaks. That was just a start.

The matter was raised in the House and an enquiry which reported on November 10th1939
absolved Chivers & Sons. This was not the end of the matter, and in addition the high wages
paid at the Militia Camp sites had the effect of drawing labor away from other Army and Air
Force projects, delaying works in the Aldershot area by two months, holding up work on
Sandhurst Blocks at Catterick for the same time and bringing to an almost complete stop all
other works on Salisbury Plain. The official word on all these aspects of the Militia Camp
The program was given in the Fifth Report of the Select Committee on National Expenditure.
printed in February 1941. Supervision had been lax and the financial short cuts taken had not
been justified by the speed of construction. The final cost had in every case exceeded the
original estimate, sometimes by as much as four times. The wages offered to the lower grades
of supervisory staff were far below the market rate, so suitably qualified men were not
attracted. Not surprisingly, it was decided that the principal cause of the undoubted waste was
the very limited time available, though this could have been mitigated by forward planning, as
the introduction of conscription did not come out of the blue. This was followed up with a
report by Mr Justice Simonds of May 1941 on the various allegations which had been made.
This was comforting reading for the people involved, containing as it did the sentence, which
Sometimes I found charges of corruption and dishonesty.
based on allegations of fact which, even if the facts alleged were proved to the hilt, would
not be inconsistent with the honesty and integrity of the persons charged.’ Not surprisingly,
the Judge’s conclusions were that the War Department had investigated the matters in an
exemplary way and that the decision to take no further action was well justified. A Report of
July 1941 by the Committee of Public Accounts was the final official word on the subject.
suitably anodyne in tone. The expenditure 'was not exceptional when compared with other
cases they have reviewed of works services where urgency was the dominating factor. They
recognise that such occasions must occur and that the consequences must be accepted. But
they are anxious that the occasions shall be as few as possible, and that the unfortunate results
shall be reduced to a minimum.' An advisory committee on Army building was set up in July

13
1940 to provide guidance to avoid future fiascos; as will be seen not all of its
recommendations were accepted. (T 161/1039, T 161/1157)

The Militia Camps

The constructional dates and costs of many of these camps are known and the available
information is recorded in the Gazetteer. The building times were certainly not protracted:
Bushfield Camp, Winchester, about which many complaints of paid absenteeism had been
made, was begun in May and completed in November 1939 at a cost of £100,000. Where
everything had gone well, as at Crookham (Aldershot) the job could be done very quickly.
Work began on May 8thand the camp was ready for occupation on July 15th. The contractors
were J.B.Edwards & Co. Ltd. The construction was exceptionally rapid as the firm had just
completed the Army Technical School for Boys at Arborfield, a few miles away, and the plant
and workforce were transferred and work begun the day after the order was received. In all
1,000 men were employed, working from 7 a.m. to 8 p.m. seven days a week. The complex
include some 130 different buildings, the walls and roofs sprayed with green Solignum paint
in an attempt at camouflage. Apart from the designs for the various types of hut, standard
layouts had also been prepared. Some of the delays and additional costs involved were the
result of the selection of irregular and unsuitable sites, which meant that new layouts had to
be worked out on the spot. The standard layout was described in an upbeat Daily Telegraph
article of August 18 1939, as enthusiastic as the Yorkshire Post had been over the Catterick
married quarters. The camps were
wooden versions of the "Sandhurst Block". Though outwardly resembling the old war-
time wooden Army hut, they differ inside more greatly than a modern luxury cinema from
a pre-war music hall. They are built in blocks of six huts – in Aldershot they have been
christened 'spider blocks', as they do somewhat resemble spiders, with three huts
branching out on each side of a central corridor. Each block contains drying-rooms: the
enormous benefit of these may well be appreciated…In addition, each block contains a
bathroom, lavatories, washrooms and shower with hot and cold water…All quarters have
central heating. Not only is this generally more satisfactory from the heating point of
view…but it spares the troops many fatigues in keeping a fire at each end of a barrack
room, blacking grates, fetching coal and so on. One great improvement in the 'spider'
hutments, as in the "Sandhurst Block" is the fact that all facilities are gathered under one
roof. There are no walks in the rain to get washed. The men need only go out in order to
eat – and train. Inside barracks there are some shocks for old soldiers. Each group of living
Huts contain 6 NCOs and 120 men. Beside every bed is a radiator and an electric light.
There are plugs for switching in a wireless set. A barrack room today without a radio,
generally paid for communally on the hire system, is as rare as a dance band without a
saxophone.
No mention of irregularities during the construction of any camp was made. The basic
component, the spider block, is shown as built at Delville Camp, Cove, Aldershot, one of the
sites where the standard layout could be completely adhered to [Fig.50].

The Nissen hut made its reappearance in these camps, though not as living quarters. At
Denbury (near Newton Abbot) and Colchester, and certainly at others, 40 ft Nissens were
used as covered rifle ranges, drill halls and gymnasia. All the suppliers of components to the
Militia camps placed advertisements in the Telegraph, including Nissen Buildings, who put
themselves back on the map again by stating that their constructional methods provided light
and dry living conditions, and that special plans for complete camps had been prepared. Large
numbers of living quarters Nissens were procured and sent to France for use by the BEF;

14
these were all to be lost after the German victory [Fig.51]. The first batch of camps came in
four sizes, for complements of 923 and 1511 for anti-aircraft and searchlight training
respectively, 965 for infantry and 1161 for artillery. Exceptionally, Ripon, for Royal
Engineers, held 1791, the Royal Corps of Signals 538 at Harrogate and 956 at Catterick, with
895 RASC at Aldershot. (T 272/51)

The Ministry of Works designs

The Militia hutting scheme had consumed an enormous quantity of timber, and at the
outbreak of war the stocks in the UK were far lower than normal for the time of year. It was
clear that the inevitable great war hutting programme would have to be carried out using the
minimum amount of timber possible. The Directorate of Fortifications and Works
investigated the matter during the winter of 1939/40, drawing on the deliberations of a
committee of representatives of leading contractors under the chairmanship of Sir Malcolm
McAlpine, which had been set up in September 1939 on War Office initiative. Steel was also
likely to be in short supply and any new designs would need to use as little timber and steel as
possible but comparable with the existing models in cost, speed of erection or portability.
The huts required fell into two classes
Portable hutting for mobile searchlight positions, and use in the field generally
2. Static hutting for camps in the UK
Really portable huts had to be of timber, capable of being reduced to a flat-pack form;
Nissen could only be regarded as semi-portable. In theory it could be re-erected many times.
but in practice the cladding never fitted properly and a series of new holes had to be bored
each time it was re-erected, causing leaks, rust and general deterioration. This lesson from
experience was deployed in 1958 when it was proposed, not for the first time, to finally do
away with Nissen huts. The use of any other materials seriously detracted from portability.
It was consequently decided that the available timber and steel should be reserved for portable.
hutting, at least until the supply position improved.

Concrete was the alternative to timber as flooring; in living huts, this needed to be covered.
with linoleum, and the concrete floor needed to be lifted on sleeper walls to prevent damp
reaching the lino. In practice, a waterproof bituminous layer was specified to be used between
two 3 inch thick layers of concrete, laid directly on the ground. For walls, it was decided to
use an 8 inch cavity wall between two skins of brick laid on edge, and this proved cheaper
and simpler to construct than alternative designs using pre-cast concrete blocks. It was hoped
that enough steel would be available for stanchions to support the walls at intervals and carry
the roof trusses, but it soon became apparent that this would not be the case and reinforced
concrete piers cast in situ inside a 3 inch skin of brick on edge, into which the walling was
bonded was the preferred technique, though brick piers were sometimes employed. A small
amount of steel or timber had to be accepted as necessary, and the most practical form of roof
Trusses, as developed by April 1940, were, for single huts of small span, pre-cast concrete roof.
trusses and purlins utilizing about 8¼ cwt. of steel in a 60 feet by 19 feet hut. For larger huts
and multiple span huts trusses and purlins were built up from strip steel. Corrugated asbestos
was the ideal roofing, but could not be used if a flat roof was employed, in which case re-cast
Hollow concrete blocks were recommended. There was nothing innovative about this design.
largely because the McAlpine committee were, in the words of the official historian,
disinclined to look beyond the range of their own experience or advocate new methods and
materials whose introduction would inevitably alienate the whole building industry…the sum
total of the building industry’s advice for circumventing the timber crisis…was, in the light of
subsequent events, timid and conservative.

15
Other designs for complete huts were considered by the Directorate, the majority being
concrete constructions, which fell into two classes
1. Pre-cast units for floors and walling, with roofs as described above. These could be
dismantled and rebuilt elsewhere, though the units were often heavy and awkward to
handle, and it was difficult to make a few types of unit serve for a variety of forms of hut.
2. Castin situdesigns, generally consisting of reinforced concrete piers supporting some
form of arched roof, with block or cast in situ concrete walling. Several of these schemes
made ingenious use of traveling cradles supporting patent shuttering, but the lack of
Timber and steel for any quantity of shuttering would make any use on a large scale.
impossible.
There were many alternatives to the standard 8 inch cavity wall. For the outer skin
• Concrete blocks; Breeze blocks, cement rendered; Hollow clay or terra-cotta blocks, fair
faced, painted with bitumen emulsion.
For the inner skin
• Breeze blocks with a skimming coat or render/plaster; Hollow clay blocks, fair faced or
plastered; Composition blocks such as cement, sawdust or wood wool plastered; any
proprietary plaster faced blocks.
Other types of wall
• 11 inch brick cavity walling; Pre-cast hollow concrete blocks, rendered outside, plastered
inside; Pavement slabs outside, with dished porous concrete slab and plastered inside; 4
inch or more hollow clay or terra-cotta blocks, cement rendered outside, plastered inside;
Inner and outer skins of rendering on hessian, expanded metal lathing, or corrugated
tarred felt.
(Kohan 1952, Singer 1940)

The Ministry of Supply, set up in April 1939, took up the task of developing and producing
these huts, which figured in the War Office hutting programme for 1941. By January 21st
1941, when this was submitted, the job had been transferred to the Ministry of Works and
Buildings (MOWB), set up in October 1940 under Lord Reith. (In June 1942 it became the
Ministry of Works and Planning [MOWP] and in February 1943 the Ministry of Works
[MOW]. The references in the Gazetteer follow the usage of the documents drawn on). The
The 1941 program responded to the Quartermaster General's call for the accommodation of
720,000 men; Commands were to immediately identify sites for 72 standardized camps each
to hold 1,000 men, and three camps each to hold 2,500 men. Other camps were required for
32,000 men but no orders to reconnoitre sites had been given to Commands. By the end of
January 1941 the construction of ten 1,500 man camps, sixty 500 and thirty 250 man camps
was to have been decided. All this only accounted for 192,000 out of the 720,000. The reason
for this was that the situation was still in flux: administrative and financial agreement on the
the composition of the standard 1,000 man camp had only been reached on January 13th, and
minor alterations were still being considered. The standardization of camps of other sizes had
been proposed but considered impracticable for administrative reasons; however, the matter
was on the table again and it appeared likely that camps for 1,500, 500 and 250 men would be
standardized. It had rarely proven possible for Commands to decide on the type of
prefabricated hut for a given camp because of the uncertainty of supply of the numerous
types; in September 1940 it had been decided to use Nissen huts with side windows for
auxiliary buildings in the camps; however, the supply of side windows failed. The probable
supply of huts in 1941 was estimated as
• Nissens, 56,000
• MOWB, 9,500 of which 8,000 were already allotted

16
 • Type not decided, 10,000
In February 1941 it was proposed that the construction of depots and hutted camps should
become the responsibility of MOWB, taking over from the Directorate of Fortifications and
Works of the War Office. Defence works would remain the responsibility of DFW.
Advisory Committee on Army buildings opposed this transfer of responsibility strongly, but
their opinions were ignored.

By 1942 the MOWP hut construction had been altered [Fig.52]. The span was 18 feet 6 inches.
internally, and the length was any multiple of six feet, though for War Department use two
lengths were standardized, one of five bays 30 feet long and one of ten bay 60 feet long. Brick
On edge cavity walling was abandoned. The main frame of the building was formed of
reinforced concrete posts and reinforced concrete rafters, bolted together. Roof covering was
either corrugated asbestos or wooden frames covered on both sides with plaster board or
hardboard, covered with roofing felt. Alternatives were slabs of fibrous plaster or wood wool,
again covered with roofing felt. The preferred wall paneling for the War Department used the
same wooden frame construction, except for buildings such as ablutions or cookhouses, where
clay blocks or 4½ inch brickwork was built in the ordinary manner between the reinforced
concrete posts. Alternatives were the use of Seco panelling, of wood wool inside a timber
frame and covered on either side with sheet asbestos, or sawdust concrete panels, lined with
hardwood on the inside. (MOWP 1942)

The Nissen Hut crisis

The variants of the MOWB huts did not prove to be a universal panacea for the crisis in the
supply of building materials. The demand for Nissens was insatiable, though a variant of the
large type of Nissen, known as the Iris, and intended for storage purposes, repeatedly failed
under the weight of snow during the hard winter of 1940/1941. The consumption of steel in
tons for these huts during 1941, and the projections for 1942, were, in quarterly terms
1941 1942
50,000 67,000
52,500 100,000
52,500 67,000
60,000 23,500
Total 215,000 Total 267,500
A standard Nissen, hardly altered since 1918 [Fig.53] used up 53 cubic feet of timber (without
floor) and 2.8 tons of steel. By the end of 1941 the Army had no less than 184,000 of these
huts; the Royal Air Force only had 30,000, but this was to grow rapidly. One of Lord Reith’s
final acts as Minister of Works in January 1941, before he was replaced by Lord Portal, was
to write a memorandum to the War Cabinet on the need to increase the use of concrete
Hutting. The Army felt that the Nissen hut was the most economical and satisfactory.
prefabricated hut. Current production was 9,000 Nissens a month, of which the War Office
took 3,500, the Air Ministry 4,500 and other departments 1,000. The War Office were
prepared to accept 500 alternatives a month. The Materials Committee had proposed to cut
timber and steel allocations to an extent which would reduce production of Nissens to 3,000 a
month; this would seriously dislocate urgent hutting programmes, as it would take months for
production to be switched to MOWB type huts. The Materials Committee wished Nissens
only to be used where the huts needed to be portable. Portal found he had to deal with a
situation where the Production Executive had decided that arrangements should be made to
stop the supply of Nissen huts after March 31st1942, the demand for portable huts being met
by replacing Nissens in permanent camps with other types. Portal pointed out the difference

17
between the types of Nissen. For the two larger types, of 24 and 35 foot span, there was no
satisfactory alternative. If the provision of all hutting was given to MOWB then development
of a substitute using corrugated asbestos could be accelerated. Substitutes were available for
the standard 16 foot Nissen, including one using curved asbestos which required steel only for
the nuts and bolts. A quarterly supply of 3,500 or 4,000 Nissens should cover all the demands
which could not be met by any other type. He recommended that the responsibility for the
the provision of standard Nissens will be transferred from the Ministry of Supply to MOWB, which
would then decide the allocation of types of hut with the greatest overall economy.

Portal recommended that, as in the first quarter of 1942 the War Office had taken delivery of
another 30,000 Nissens, and were willing to accept concrete huts at the rate of 12,000 a year,
no further deliveries of standard Nissens should be made to them for the time being. The Air
Ministry required 10,000 huts a quarter, which need not be portable, so none of their hutting
requirements in the UK need to be met by Nissens (abroad was a different matter), while the
Admiralty were happy to accept the corrugated asbestos type. In MOWB's view a quarterly
the supply of 3,500 standard Nissens would cover all requirements. Savings in timber could be
made by substituting brick for timber in the end walls, but this was resisted as it did away
with portability. Looking ahead, the requirements for the first half of 1944 would be 8,800
with timber ends and only 1,500 as a reserve without them. In June 1942 the production of
Nissen replacement types was as follows
Type Remarks Number Total forecast
in June for 1942
1942
MOWB concrete BCF type Light type in experimental 500 10,500
stage
Orlit Production now commencing 100 550
Asbestos Cement circular In production 500 8,900
section
MOWB plasterboard In production 800 22,000
MOWB sawdust concrete In production 250 9,000
MOWB Seco Production about to commence 100 4,700
Ministry of Supply. no.9 Dependent on plywood supply 2,000
Total huts 2,250 40,800
Nissen equivalents 4,000 69,700
The attempt to use non-strategic materials for camps was clearly well on track. But fresh
difficulties were to arise with the arrival of United States forces in huge numbers. This was
partly mitigated by the reduction of US standards of accommodation to the same level as the
British; this would cut the demands of Nissens by 6%.(T 246/140, T 246/150; Nissen booklet;
Other types of huts are described, and some illustrated, in Mallory & Ottakar 1973.

The BOLERO program

The arrival of the American troops and airmen and their accommodation (code name
BOLERO) meant that the production of Nissens had to be increased again, and in the spring
of 1942 a programme of 62,000 for that year was approved. The War Office and Admiralty
only took them for use abroad, but the Air Ministry refused to be fobbed off with substitutes.
They maintained that all structures on aerodromes needed to be blast-proof and only metal.
huts would do.
American reserve 20,000
Bolero construction 20,000

18
reserve
Air Ministry 16,000
War Office (overseas only) 2,000
Admiralty (overseas only) 2,000
Miscellaneous 2,000
Total 62,000
During the first half of 1942, the Ministry of Supply was producing huts to meet previous
allocations, so no work could begin on the 62,000 till July. The actual deliveries by the end of
the year were
Air Ministry 16,000
American aerodromes (from Bolero construction 11,000
reserve
WO, Admiralty, American reserve and miscellaneous 7,000
Total 34,000
(T 246/140)

1943 would be the year in which BOLERO would really make an impact. In the meantime
the whole approach to wartime camps would have to be rethought. There were many ways in
which a quart could be got into a pint pot, and these were set out in May 1942.
• Reducing 'luxurious and lavish' scales of accommodation, by decreasing floor area per
man from 48 to 32 square feet. New drugs had reduced the risk of disease from
overcrowding
• Omitting partition walls wherever possible – i.e. sub-division of officers’ quarters below
the rank of field officer
• Combining NAAFI public rooms with dining rooms
• Cutting out repair bays
• Cutting out medical inspection rooms on the present scale and substituting one 36 foot
Nissen per 1,000 men
• Cutting out guard rooms
• Greater concentration of huts to reduce paths and external services, or, alternatively,
dispersion of sleeping huts only and omission of paths and electric light to them
• Cutting out all sewage disposal
• Drastic curtailment of water supply to 10 gallons per man per day by limitation of drawing
off points and by limited and sub-divided storage
• Use of surface streams for water supply, with drastic chlorination
• Deep trench latrines, or in areas where deep water pollution is a danger, bucket latrines and
tipping into the sea, manuring cultivated areas, or use of destructors
While these Crimean conditions were prescribed for new camps, existing resources were to be
exploited to the full.
• Conversion of 1,000 man camps into 3,000 – 4,000 camps by providing tents for all
sleeping accommodation. This would involve ruthless requisitioning of agricultural land
• Severe action against Commanding Officers who did not disclose surplus requisitioned
accommodation
• Compulsory eviction to provide blocks of houses for occupation by troops
• Transfer of some of the civil population from coast towns
• Use of empty London houses for certain units which do not require tactical training areas
• Tenting up around the outskirts of towns and in open spaces of towns, combined with eviction
of civilians from houses on the fringes to provide essential ancillary buildings

19
• Legislation to compel householders to give a hot bath to soldiers on demand, up to a limit
to be specified according to facilities
• Transfer of civil population not essential to war effort to America
• Closure of public roads for use as vehicle parks
Not all of these draconian measures were to be implemented; that some of them were
suggested at all can be explained by the fact that it was probably the lowest point of the war
as far as the UK was concerned. But ramping up the level of discomfort as far as the citizens
and soldiers of this country were concerned would do little about the problem of housing the
Americans. (WO 107/102)

In November 1942, the Quartermaster General outlined the prospects. The projected number to
The arrival by the end of October 1943 was 765,000, with 85,000 still to arrive. 170,000 would be
under canvas and the camp sites had to be prepared in advance. The majority of the troops
would be located in the Western Command area, where a hutting programme for 30,500 men was
planned. If this were cancelled, the sites would be made available for tented camps, with the
necessary infrastructure of roads, water supply, latrines and cookhouses. Apart from
Providing the camp sites, the cancellation of the hutting would save £1.3 million. The most
pressing demand was for hospital accommodation. The US forces based this on a calculation
of 3% of the men at the normal sickness rate, but when operations began this would rise to
10%. In addition, a problem of their own making, colored troops (who would have to have
segregated accommodation, latrines and dining rooms, so creating more demands) were
estimated to have a higher rate of sickness (2½%). All this amounted to a demand for 90,810
beds. In the nature of things, hospitals could not be improvised in the way tented camps
could, and they needed to be prepared in advance. The solution adopted was for some of the
Militia camps to be converted and handed over, their relatively substantial construction and
spider block layout making them very suitable for this purpose. Some camps in Southern
Command were designated as convertible, for use as need arose, while some in Western
Command were dual purpose (it is not clear what the difference was).

Accommodation amounting to 9,670 beds already existed and was to be handed over. New
construction and conversions were needed for
New construction Total number of beds
36 × 834 beds 30,024
2 × 1,084 beds 2,168
3 groups of 5 × 1,084 16,260
Conversions
Militia camps 16,516
Convertible camps 7,500
Dual purpose camps 6,000
Northern Ireland 3,000
Total 91,138
The whole programme was estimated at £50,000,000. However, the diversion of American
forces to North Africa for TORCH enabled some of the pressure to be taken off and
£10,000,000 was deferred. On December 18, 1942, the War Cabinet decided that BOLERO
would proceed on the assumption that 65% of the original programme would be completed by
the end of 1943. The modified scheme included the construction of hutted accommodation in
major camps for some 90,000 troops by the end of May 1943, and 72,000 hospital beds by
August. Apart from the hospitals and camps, large storage depots were required and many of
these were provided with hutted accommodation for the staff. These camps, mostly in the
Cardiff and Newport areas were to be completed by September 30, 1943, for occupation.

20
during October. It was decided that the six dual purpose camps at Kington, Foxley and
Bewdley would be employed as hospitals and hutted camps for the staff, 662 at each hospital.
would have to be provided by the end of August 1943. By February 1 1943 25% of the
hospitals and camps had been completed, 40% of the covered storage and 60% of the open
storage, but no conversions had been completed. In March the Secretary of State for War,
P.J. Grigg wrote to Oliver Lyttelton, the Minister of Production, making it clear that hospitals
were to have priority.
One thing I am clear about and that is we should make no attempt to provide new
personnel housing beyond what is involved in our present plans. These will provide accommodations.
or huts for 615,000…Hospitals and storage are more difficult. If this country is ever to be a
staging place for the Continent and a reception place for wounded all the buildings
originally planned will be needed and we should never be forgiven if they weren’t ready
against their being required.
The majority of BOLERO accommodation was built by MOWP and MOW, but some was
constructed using US labor.
(WO 107/102, WO 107/103, WO 107/108, WO 107/110, WO 107/111)

OVERLORD

The concealment of large bodies of troops before a major offensive had been practiced by the
Germans before the spring offensives of 1918, in the unpromising areas behind the front line,
and the techniques had been written up by a Royal Academician who had advised the War
Office on camouflage matters. The elaborate techniques described there were not used in the
temporary camps used to hold troops in readiness for the D-day landings. Most of the British
troops for the initial lifts, in Forces G, J and S, were housed in Southern Command, in
Hampshire and West Sussex, in the New Forest and the Forest of Bere. In addition, Force L
was grouped in the Harwich and Tilbury areas. Natural woodland provided the cover for
many of these camps, and their layout was governed by the topography. Where possible the
the entire camp was placed in woodlands (Figs.54 and 55) and in more open country or in the
grounds of country houses the lines of hedgerows or drives were followed (Figs. 56, 57 and
58). The infrastructure included some semi-permanent structures, cookhouses (usually
Nissens) and, very importantly, hard standings for the mass of mechanised transport without
which a modern army could not operate. The normal accommodation for the soldiers was the
Bell tent, but marquees, which could be camouflaged as cottages, were used as dining rooms.
All tentage was painted with dark emulsion before erection, the entrances of the tents to face
natural cover. Strict track discipline was enforced as vehicle tracks could easily give away an
otherwise well-concealed camp. No attempt was made to conceal some camps expanded for
OVERLORD, such as Piddlehinton, which had been established for years and where any
attempt to conceal the extensions would raise suspicions. Although photographic
reconnaissance by the German Air Force was virtually non-existent by this time, these
precautions were not wasted as they were valuable practice for when the Army was
established on the continent. (Solomon 1920, WO 199/2411, WO 199/2414)

Lt. General Sir Frederick Morgan was formally appointed as COSSAC - Chief of Staff to the
Supreme Allied Commander (Designate) – on April 13, 1943, and planning the Allied
invasion began in earnest. But much work had already been done. As Morgan wrote after the
war, 'over the preceding years many and various ideas had sprung up...and had withered
away from various causes, chief among which had naturally been lack of available
resources…But almost every such idea must have left its mark, great or small, somewhere or
other in South England between Plymouth and the Wash, whether it was in the form of

21
embarkation 'hards'... of the erection of camps or depots, of road construction or rail
construction projects…There was in actuality little that was needed of original work.’ So
Good progress had been made on the infrastructure of the camps as early as the summer of.
1943

By April 6th(a good illustration of the planning that preceded the setting up of COSSAC) a
first list of camps for assembly area A (Forest of Bere) was prepared, with brief commentaries
on the sites. By April 22a similar preliminary list had been prepared for area C, the
Winchester area and the New Forest. Area D, East Dorset, was not as wooded as areas A and
C. The areas themselves had been designated as early as March. Each area was divided into
sub-areas, each of which contained a group of camps; where Militia camps existed, these were
used and enlarged, as in the case of Bushfield [Figs.59 and 60]. The sub-areas were originally
divided into Reception camps, where arriving units were lodged before being allocated to
Marshalling camps. Weymouth, Gosport and Portsmouth were the transit areas through which
the troops would pass on their way to embarkation, and the main thoroughfares through these
towns would in effect become camps as the troops and vehicles waited their turn to load
[Figs.61 and 62]. What natural cover existed was on undulating ground, and was in places
swampy. Camp sites were in many cases grouped closely and lack of concealment of one
camp or vehicle park might lead to the discovery of adjacent concentrations. Open stretches
of road were to be kept clear of parked vehicles when possible and strict vehicle discipline
enforced. It was estimated that it would take 2,500 men two months to complete the necessary
work in assembly areas A, C and D. The original intention was to make use of very large
hostels established for civilian workers at Fareham and Chandler’s Ford, but this idea was
dropped, probably because they held men whose contribution to the war effort was
indispensable, such as aircraft workers in the Cunliffe Owen factory at Eastleigh airport,
engaged in making and modifying Seafires. By September 3 it was reported that all work in
the Hants & Dorset district would be completed within the next few days. A report of July
10thon Area B, the New Forest, noted that it offered good cover, was thickly wooded and had
no outstanding topographical features to serve as landmarks for aircraft. Most camps were
either existing tented camps or requisitioned buildings. At this stage these camps were just
numbered. (WO 199/2309)

The Cornish assembly areas, N and O, were reported on from the point of view of their
concealment in September 1943. Ten points were made.
The areas did not provide good cover, but in the tin mining and china clay districts the
The rough nature of the ground should provide an excellent background for darkened tentage.
2. In agricultural areas very strict track discipline should be observed, with cookhouses and
dining rooms located near existing buildings.
3. Men must be kept under cover as much as possible, or where no cover exists, in small
groups. Men on roads are clearly visible from the air.
4. If games are played this should be as far from the camp as possible.
Only the roads already selected should be used.
6. When vehicles are parked, maximum advantage must be taken of existing cover.
Vehicles on open roads should be parked nose to tail in irregular groups with camouflage
nets pooled.
8. When road widening is necessary all spoil should be covered and new surfaces darkened.
Windscreens must be covered.
10. Tentage and permanent structures should be treated as shown on issued drawings.
Camps at St Mewan and St Blazey were to be BOLERO camps. In fact, in Devon and
Cornwall all became BOLERO areas. (WO 199/2410)

22
However, the provision was still inadequate, and on October 19, 1943, War Office approval
was asked for additional accommodation in the A B C and D areas, this being tented camps
for 58,000 men and hardstandings for 8,000 vehicles. The breakdown was
Area Required Existing Tented camps required for
A 28,400 10,600 17,800
B 11,600 nil 11,600
C 43,600 25,700 17,900
D 24,000 13,900 10,100
Total 107,600 50,200 57,800 (actually 57,400)
The accommodation needed to be more than doubled. The camps were to be in blocks of 500.
with one cookhouse to feed all ranks, and separate dining rooms for officers, warrant officers,
NCOs and other ranks. It had been found that a scale of 16 ablutions per 1,000 men sufficed.
Baths were to be in Nissen huts if these were available. The existing scale of latrines at 5%
was inadequate owing to the spread of the camps, and it was suggested that the provision be
increased to 7½% where necessary. The layout of some of the completed camps was not
ideal: in many cases a peacetime layout had been adhered to which segregated officers, NCOs
and other ranks, and the shape of some camps, dictated by the strips of woodland which
concealed them, had exaggerated this separation, so that officers were hundreds of yards away
from their men. In Marshalling and Spare Sub-Area camps where units as such had ceased to
exists, it was essential that the officers' lines should be close to the men in all parts of the
camps, and this was equally desirable in Reception Sub-Area camps. By October 28 the 1943
The camp programme had been completed in Assembly Areas A and C, but no expansion work.
had been done. In Area B nothing had been done, and in Area D the 1943 programme was
completed and the extensions were to be completed in 14 days. The scale of the camp
the programme was continually revised upwards, drastic enlargements becoming necessary when
on January 21stIn 1944, the Supreme Commander accepted Montgomery's proposals to increase
the number of divisions in the first assault from three to five.

United States camps

The American Army built many camps using its own materials and labor, which do not
figure in the British archives, but in the build-up to OVERLORD many British camps were
used by them. On February 2and1944 an additional camp on Southampton Common was
ordered to be completed by the 12thon a Special Scale, which approximated to the Summer
Scale of accommodation. In order to make the camp as comfortable as possible for winter use
American type tents were to be used, British pattern tents only being resorted to if these were
unavailable. In connection with the logistics of OVERLORD, it was suggested that a new
Hutted camp be constructed at Marchwood for Inland Water Transport personnel. On
February 15th21stArmy Group was informed that the camps in Sub-Area W, Marshalling
Area A would be completed to basic essentials by the end of the month, and tented camps to
Summer Scale put up in March. Of these, Bury Lodge, Horndean and part of West Walk were
intended for US forces, but an agreement had been reached that they could be used by 21st
Army Group during the OVERLORD period, and it was hoped that they would be available
before that. In February 1944 Bushfield and Hursley were occupied by US troops. That month
it was decided that the fences surrounding all camps in Marshalling Areas were to consist of
triple Dannert wire.

A memorandum was sent to 21stArmy Group giving an account of the accommodation in

Marshalling Areas in the Centre Zone. This was in four classes.

23
1. Normal. Available for British troops.
2. BOLERO. Allotted to US forces.
3. OVERLORD. Specially constructed for marshalling the Expeditionary Force.
4. BOLERO-cum-OVERLORD. Originally selected for US occupation. Where this was new
accommodation it was to be constructed on a phased programme ending in April 1944.
When planning accommodation for OVERLORD, the War Office policy was to use
these camps in a dual role owing to their position in relation to the ports of embarkation.
It then set out a formidable list of the difficulties being encountered. Owing to the necessity
for training 3 Canadian Division in its assault role, arrangements were made in October 1943
to bring 32,000 Canadian troops into Southern Command, in return for which the US were
allocated accommodation as follows
South Eastern Command (existing accommodation) 23,000
South Eastern Command (new tented camps) 4,500
Southern Command (new tented camps) 4,500
Total 32,000
All the 27,500 in South Eastern Command would be needed for British troops if that area was
to carry out its task in the 21stArmy Group concentration plan. The US troops displaced had
to be housed elsewhere. The programme of accommodation for US troops was
a) Hutted camps – existing.
b) Tented camps – to be erected between March 15thand April 30th.
c) Tented expansions to hutted camps where necessary – between the present and April 30th.
In certain cases, BOLERO-cum-OVERLORD camps were being expanded by tentage on
OVERLORD scales. BOLERO tented camp scales were considerably higher than British.
Summer Tented, and OVERLORD scales were a compromise between the two. Marshalling
Areas A, B, C and D had the following distribution
Overlord Bolero
A. Portsmouth 29,050 4,500
B. Southampton 44,750 11,250
C. Lymington 11,096 Nil
D. Portland 25,770 12,678
These capacities bore no relation to the requirements of the formations to be accommodated.
and were based, in the absence of a plan, on a SHAEF estimate of four tides loading capacity
in each area. B and C were required for both British and US troops and were to be jointly
D was intended for US forces and was to be staffed by US personnel. A was intended
for British troops and was to be staffed by British personnel. D was occupied by an American
Assault division which had planned a combined operations training exercise for early March,
and in order to carry this out work on certain camps had to be hastened for them to be
completed to basic essentials by March 1st. Similarly, in A, work had to be reorganised to
complete one Sub-Area for the use of 21 stArmy Group. All these changes set the work back
and extra labour would be needed if the target dates were to be met. Further difficulties would
be caused by present arrangements for D, where OVERLORD expansion of BOLERO camps
For about 3,000 troops, it was scheduled to be completed with basic essentials by March 1.stthis
would be the only accommodation available for the 10,200 men of a Brigade Group of 50
Division, proposed to be moved into the area after March 9th, and then only if the US troops
taking part in their own exercise were ejected. It was essential, therefore, that a decision be
made as to whether 50 division were to train there, as there was not room for both.

In Area B 50 Division required accommodation for 7,000 men by March 24thThis was a
possibility, but to accomplish this work it would have to be concentrated on certain camps,
which would delay completion of four others (with a capacity of 4,000) until April 7th, and

24
hardstandings and administrative installations would be similarly delayed. Furthermore, roads
leading to the embarkation hards were not yet completed, and work on them could not
proceed as long as exercises were taking place. The existing roads were poor and had
deteriorated further at the hands of Canadian troops in training. The construction programme,
in fact was seriously delayed. There were seven reasons for this –
1. Lateness in arrival of Pioneer Corps and Royal Engineer Companies upset the original
calculation of the total labour required.
It was found necessary to winterise accommodation for the Pioneer labour because of
their low health category.
3. Delay in War Office approval of layouts and uncertainty of SHAEF requirements for
embarkation capacity.
4. Increased demands for work, for instance – Wireless installations and 13 huts for 21st
Army Group at Fort Southwick. Completion of camp for workers on Whale units.
Construction of a camp near Poole after the decision to use that port was made.
Construction of a bombproof HQ for Movement Control HQ, Southampton.
5. Shortage of transport in the initial stages.
6. Delay in delivery of War Office controlled stores, also shortage of basic materials, e.g.
stone and sand.
Lack of plant on some jobs has led to absorption of manual labour.
Area B was more backward than the others, especially on road work, as it was given the
lowest priority by SHAEF, there being considerable doubt as to what extent the Navy would
use the hards there, if at all. Eventually HQ of Area B had decided to go ahead anyway and
Accommodation for 11,000 was being prepared, although only 4,640 were required for
sustained movement. It was expected that the extra accommodation would be invaluable if, as
appeared probable, three Assault divisions were to be loaded from A B and C instead of two
as originally planned.

Training clearly had to be done, but in view of the short time available and the size of the
21stThe Army Group had been asked to coordinate all exercises and to consult sufficiently.
time to allow proposals to be examined in relation to the work which would be affected, and
to make arrangements so that as little disruption to the work as possible would be caused. The
premature use of hardstandings, for example, might mean complete reconstruction. This co-
ordination had not been carried out, and as a consequence 50 Division and US troops had
conflicting claims in Area B. A future source of friction might arise from the fact that
Accommodation for 15,750 in Areas A and C was BOLERO-cum-OVERLORD. Under the
present arrangements it had been decided that US troops would move out on D-21 and go into
bivouac if necessary, but under the proposed movement of 50 Division into this area on April
1st, it would be necessary to move the men earlier and agreement on a high level would be
necessary. It was unlikely that the US would agree to put the whole of this number into
bivouac while British troops moved into their better accommodation at so early a date, but a
A fairer proportion of lower scale accommodation might be acceptable. Finally, the US had
agreed to be responsible for providing tentage and cots in Areas B, C and D. Unless this was
forthcoming, and there were indications that the stores would not be available in time, there
There would not be sufficient British tentage to equip the British Assault areas B and C by April 1.st,
and certainly not for D, for which the US were entirely responsible, but into which it was
proposed to put a Brigade of 50 Division. No major exercises could take place in B or C until
Tentage was provided either from British or US resources.

It was hoped to accommodate about 10,200 troops in the Portland area between March 9thand
April 10thwith 7,000 in the Lymington area from March 30th(the date had been postponed).

25
Then a further 17,000 would arrive, joined by the Portland contingent by April 10. Dewlish,
Came House, Bradford Down A and Down Wood would be completed by February 15thand
these were Bolero camps. Non-BOLERO camps to be completed at the same time were
Lytchett Minster, Broadmayne A and Martinstown. The Royal Engineers and Pioneer Corps
needed to work on these camps could not be accommodated in them: the whole capacity was
needed for the Field Force. It was proposed to use Martinstown, Lytchett Minster and the
non-BOLERO portion of Came House to house them. Brockenhurst A and B were due to be
completed by March 22nd, and on their completion the first target of 7,000 could be met. The
requirements of the Portland area would be exactly met by the completion of the following
camps by March 9th.
Yellowham 1,200
Kingston Russell 2,500
Bradford Down B 1,000
Bincombe 2,000
Chickerell (the non-BOLERO portion) 1,000
Winterbourne Abbas 2,500
10,200

By March 9ththe locations of the briefing centres for the forthcoming operation had been
decided. 48' long by 35' wide Romney huts were to be used in all cases; they were to be
within wired enclosures with separate latrines. The Romney hut has not figured so far in the
story as it was intended for storage, not accommodation. Designed by the Directorate of
Fortifications and Works, and named after its offices, this replaced the unsatisfactory Iris hut;
it was built in 8 foot modules, the normal length being 96 feet [Fig.63]. The tubular steel
frame was normally covered with corrugated iron, but canvas could be employed as an
alternative, and probably was for these essential but ephemeral buildings. Tents were also
required to house the instructional aids. On April 2ndinstructions for equipping the Romney
Hut briefing rooms were issued. Sixty spectators were to be seated in a horseshoe shape.
around a briefing model 16 feet square. Sufficient space was to be left behind the model for
the briefing officer to stand, and for a wall map to be fitted. Both the model and the wall map
were to be well illuminated. Waiting rooms were to be established in the store tents. These
were for preliminary instructions with the aid of a wall map or blackboard, and as collecting
centers for the various conferences, and were to be painted a dark color so that they could be
used after blackout. By the end of April the final capacities of camps and vehicle standings
had been determined.
Men Vehicles
A 34,558 4,759
B 13,228 1,798
C 53,270 7,070
D 31,400 5,120
Total 132,456 18,747
(WO 199/2286, WO 199/2287, WO 199/3095, WO 199/3068, WO 199/3069, WO 199/2989)

In the Essex and Suffolk many of the OVERLORD camps were created by dismantling
already existing camps and using the materials to erect new ones closer to the transit areas of
Ipswich, Felixstowe and Tilbury. The copious documentation which survives for the camps in
Southern Command does not exist for East Anglia, but it appears that a minimum of 21 camps
were cannibalised, mostly in the Cambridge area, and 51 OVERLORD camps created.
Concealment on the scale employed in Southern Command was apparently not attempted.

26
four tented camps each holding 1,000 men, for example, being constructed along the
Southend bypass. The area held two camps used for novel purposes: Waldringfield and
Wolverstone camps, at least one on the Deben estuary, were used by troops working dummy
landing craft – Bigbobs – as part of the FORTITUDE strategic deception plan.
199/3095

By May 2nd the build-up of the Overlord forces was well underway, though the camps were
still far from fully occupied. After the Allies were successfully lodged in France the immense
camping scheme could be run down. On June 19thit was ordered that all camps in Area A,
with the exception of Roche Court, could be reduced from their expanded capacity to their
original capacity. No reductions were to be made in Area C for the moment. On June 27 it
It was decided to use the north camp at Emsworth for accommodating 400 ATS and 100.
vehicles. The cookhouses were thought to be adequate, but the following works needed to be
done.
Showers. Partitioning and screening and provision of hose or roses at shoulder height.
Latrines. Adequate, but should be screened and Elsan closets installed.
Ablutions. Adequate, but to be screened, fitted with duckboards and hot water to be
available at each from Soyer stoves.
Drying rooms. Adequate, but electric light to be installed in one with two plugs for
electric irons.
Medical. Existing Nissen hut to be fitted with electric light for use as a sick bay, the
second Nissen hut to be used as a medical inspection room for ATS only.
Recreation. Two Nissen huts exist which are fitted with electric light and will be used.
as recreation rooms.
Living accommodation. Three beds to a tent.
In early July, complaints were made about the conditions of Roche Court. It was accepted that
there were grounds for these, but in extenuation it was pointed out that a large number of the
original camp personnel had been withdrawn and replaced by men without training. The camp
had been in use for almost four years and the difficulties involved in keeping it clean and
Orderly were considerable. Troops passing through before had been well satisfied with the
arrangements, but it was understandable that men left in a marshalling camp for more than
two or three days would be thoroughly bored. In the Salisbury Plain area, tented camps
housing the residues of formations were to be closed down as they became empty and the
canvas returned. The Bustard camp, however, was to be retained for units of 38 Division, and
Lavington was earmarked for occupation as a disinfestation camp. In July, British vehicle
movement ceased through Area C, and some camps were reallocated as a consequence.
Harefield was used for British personnel movement; the vehicle standings were to be used by
US forces were reallocated to Moor Hill. Hiltingbury C was made available for RAF personnel.
and vehicles as required. The balance of the accommodation was available for US forces
(primarily USAAF). Toothill had 400 spaces reserved for Women’s Services (primarily
British); the remaining personnel accommodation (1,240) and vehicle standings were to be
used by US forces. Moor Hill, Netley Hill and Southampton Common A, formerly used by
British forces were to be transferred to the US. Southampton Common B was about to be
reconstructed, but as long as practicable the available portion was to be used by US forces.
All other camps in the area were allocated to US forces. Three camps in D Area, Dewlish,
Lytchett Minster, Poundbury and Marabout were transferred to B area and used by the US.
forces. Popham was closed on August 5, 1944, finding a new function as a POW camp. On
On July 10, it was decided that Horndean, West Walk South, Padnell, and Creech Walk B would
close forthwith. Bury Lodge and Emsworth were partly closed, retaining staff to deal with 600
and 800 respectively. On July 25 it was decided to close Rowlands Castle, Grenville Hall,

27
Bury Lodge, Rooksbury and Fairthorn. By the end of the first week in September Emsworth,
Cowplain, Stakes House and Creech Walk A were to be closed, and the US transit camps at
Broadlands and Nightingale Wood A and B were to close, Hursley A and B reopening in their place.
place. The use of Toothill for British servicewomen was to cease by September 14. West
Walk North and Brooklands closed during the week ending September 25th, and during the
week ending October 9thRoche Court, Park Gate, Fort Monckton and Fort Brockhurst closed.
(WO 199/2368)

The post-War situation

Before the war the Army had consisted of about 150,000 all ranks, mostly located in the four
divisional areas of Aldershot, Salisbury Plain, Catterick and Colchester, the London-
Woolwich-Chatham area and the regimental depots. At the end of hostilities the army
numbered millions and the United Kingdom was awash with Army camps of all kinds and
sizes. Most of the OVERLORD camps had gone, though some were retained; Hiltingbury, for
example, was supplied with asbestos huts and used as emergency housing. In deciding what
was to be retained and what was to be rebuilt, a Sub-Committee was convened in March 1945
to consider the accommodation of the post-war Army. It was assumed
• The scale of accommodation would be 60 square feet per man.
• Some construction would be permitted, but no major building programme could be.
envisaged
• It would be possible to dispose of unsuitable premises.
• That the purchase of suitable properties would be possible
• That there would be conscription lasting for twelve months
• That the post-war Army would be trained in the UK
A new branch of the Directorate of Quartering was formed to take stock of the existing
accommodation under the following heads
War Department buildings
2. War Department buildings with wartime hutting
3. Requisitioned ground with hutted camps
4. Large properties with considerable hutted additions
Areas were allocated to regular divisions; Airborne and Armoured to Salisbury Plain; Infantry
to Aldershot, Catterick, Colchester and the Folkestone-Dover area. The training areas in
Breckland were provisionally earmarked for retention. The locations of existing Army
Schools were classified as either suitable for retention, needing to be replaced by new sites,
be continued on an interservice basis, or still under consideration. A small number of
completely new schools was also proposed. By July 1945 the Order of Battle was being
worked out and it appeared that the Army might consist of thirteen divisions, including
reservists and volunteers. The distribution of the divisions should reflect that of the Territorial
Army in peace, so that the auxiliary forces should be able to make use of much of the same.
accommodation without interfering with the needs of the active Army. A likely distribution of
the divisions would be
Scottish Command 2 divisions
Northern Command 2 or 3 divisions
Eastern Command 4 divisions (including one in London District)
Southern Command 2 divisions
Western Command 3 divisions
Only two operational considerations needed to be assumed: the airborne division should be
located so that it could be quickly moved to the Continent in an emergency, and that an
An infantry brigade or brigade group should be stationed in Northern Ireland. It was not.

28
necessary to lay any stress on the defence of the east or south-east coasts, nor to insist on
extensive dispersal against air attack. The four active divisions would be allocated
One armoured division Southern Command, Tidworth and Bulford area
One airborne division Southern Command, Salisbury Plain
One infantry division Northern Command
One infantry division Southern Command, Aldershot
(WO 32/11733, WO 32/11736)

By December 1947, many of the wartime camps had been dismantled and the land
derequisitioned. The Secretary of State for War, Emmanuel Shinwell, wrote a memorandum
on the current situation, based on the work of the Committee on Accommodation and clearly
reflecting War Office views. All barracks, except the most recently constructed, required
extensive modernization to bring them up to current standards of acceptability. The barracks
at Aldershot were solid enough but needed gutting and rebuilding. Some, such as those at
Tidworth had been virtually wrecked by American Forces and was uninhabitable until major
reconstruction was carried out. Although the regular Army would be smaller in future, as a
consequence of withdrawal from India for a start, the Army at home, when garrisons in
Europe had been withdrawn (he was writing before the formation of NATO) would be larger
and contain a large anti-aircraft element which would be dispersed in centers where
Permanent barracks did not exist. In addition, there would be a need for new centres to train.
National Servicemen and regular recruits. As a consequence, extensive use would still have to
be made of hutted camps, which currently varied from 'the excellent Militia type to the low
grade Nissen variety. Maintenance had been neglected during the war and heavy expenditure
was now required to maintain the minimum standards. As many training establishments were
located in these camps, a reasonable standard of living had to be provided if National Service
was going to be successful. All the hutted camps available would be needed for the present.

The accommodation for single soldiers could be broken down as

Permanent accommodation Men
In adapted castles and forts 6,400
In barracks built 1770-1800 12,500
In barracks built 1800-1860 25,000
In barracks built 1890-1910 60,000
In barracks built 1910-1939 76,000
Temporary accommodation
Hutting built up to 1938 15,000
Hutting built from 1938, Militia types 107,000
Huts built from 1938, war types 234,000
Only 13% of accommodation in permanent buildings dated from after 1920, and of this total
only about 2% was up to 1948 scales. The breakdown of the hutting was
Before 1914 1%
World War 1 3%
Militia hutting 21%
World War 2 types 43%
Percentage of all accommodation is 68%
huts

The only reasonable accommodation was provided by the 1910-1939 barracks and the Militia
hutting. This sheltered 183,000 men out of a total of 535,900. The total bed requirement in the
Army in the UK was likely to approximate to 240,000 in the future, so there would be a

29
shortfall of acceptable accommodation for 57,000. However, the situation was worse than
that, for some of the good accommodation was in places where there was no good reason for
locating troops in peacetime and many reasons why in the national interest they should be
withdrawn, such as occupying good agricultural land or national parks, and some of the bad
Accommodation was very suitably located.

By the time that the QMG presented a paper for consideration by the Army Council in August
In 1949, the pre-war garrison areas were filled to capacity, as were the barracks of the County.
regiments. It appeared likely that the Army was going to remain larger by at least 50,000 men
than before the War, for the following reasons
• The greatly increased size of AA Command
• The new training organisation for National Servicemen
• New Army organisations
• Increased storage and workshop requirements
• Increases in Pay and Record offices
In February 1950 a paper was drawn up showing the existing accommodation in the UK and
the units then in occupation, comparing it with the position in 1939. The dates of many of the
Wartime constructions were given. (WO 163/275, WO 163/348)

In December 1950 the priorities for rebuilding were settled at last. This was part of the long
term building policy recommended by the Committee for the Concentration of War
Department Buildings and Land, set up by Emmanuel Shinwell in September 1949. Unless
immediate steps were taken to plan ahead, to increase the annual estimates to complete the
program within a reasonable time (15-20 years) and provide additional engineer staff for
for planning purposes, the backlog would become unmanageable and the effect on Army morale
and recruiting might become very serious. The policy came under three headings
• Building new barracks for the long term deployment of the Army in the UK
• Modernizing or reconstructing existing barracks
• Replacement of hutted camps by permanent construction.
The last, as seen above, was the most pressing problem. The priorities for replacement were
Priority Type of structure Estimated life from date of
erection
1 Nissen and plasterboard 10 years
2 Timber and miscellaneous (including 20 years
concrete, asbestos etc.)
3 Militia type 30 years
The Nissen and plasterboard huts were thus due for replacement. The hutted capacity to be
replaced, broken down by Commands, was
First priority for Second priority Third priority Total by
replacement for replacement for replacement
Commands
Eastern 1,676 10,003 8,156 19,835
Command
Northern 3,182 27,637 4,783 35,602
Command
Scottish 190 1,874 2,064
Command
Southern 3,030 17,110 21,000 41,140
Command
Western 9,030 13,743 7,400 30,173

30
Command
Northern Ireland 350 500 600 1,450
Totals 17,458 70,867 41,939 130,264
Reference to the Gazetteer will show what a small proportion of the enormous number of
camps recorded were rebuilt. The building of new barracks for 19,000 all ranks was
recommended, together with 198 for modernization or reconstruction, to hold a total of
107,000 all ranks. The cost of all this was roughly estimated, at June 1951 prices, at
New barracks £24,000,000
Modernizing existing barracks £60,000,000
Replacing the hutted camps £130,000,000
These figures demonstrate, perhaps more clearly than anything else, the indispensable part
which the hutted camp played in the history of the British Army. (WO 163/352, WO 163/350)

NATO and after

The situation in 1950 differed from that of 1925 in that although traditional homes for the
British Army had been lost shortly after a war (Ireland in the first case, India in the second),
ample accommodation and training grounds were available in West Germany, so providing an
opportunity for discarding more obsolete or unsuitable camps than would otherwise have been
the case. The most significant victim was to be Aldershot, the former principal home of the
British Army. In 1951, an observer contrasted the scene there with that of the days of his
youth, lamenting its lost glories. ‘Not a regiment, not a battalion, not a battery in the whole
length and breadth of Aldershot’s immense area; nothing but schools! Barracks bearing a
deserted appearance; stables empty; barrack squared devoid of activity; not a sentry to be seen
even at Government House... (French 1951) He had an axe, possibly shared by some of his
contemporaries, to grind; all this was the fault of 'the internal (or should it be infernal)
combustion engine.' And of course, this was the case, even if his disdain was not shared by
most professional soldiers or expressed as part of a whole package of nostalgia. But it was not
only mechanisation which reduced Aldershot to its present vestigial state. The London
commuter belt, whose housing relentlessly encroached the area, was no longer an adequate,
let alone an ideal location for a major army camp. There was a growing demand for public
access to open spaces which had been appropriated during the war; what had to be borne
during the struggle for survival was not tolerable in peacetime, though the Army managed to
hang on to Salisbury Plain and Dartmoor (probably the two most high-profile examples); in
Recent years have made a plausible case for its tenure on the grounds of nature conservation.
Here again, NATO membership has reduced the wear and tear; with Lüneburg Heath
available only a limited amount of training need be carried out on the Plain. But the traffic has
not all been one way; for many years West German tank units were a familiar sight on the
Castlemartin ranges in Pembroke, and the upgrading of the accommodation there was
probably in part due to their presence.

Some camps, like stable blocks, were the victims of advancing technology. The abolition of
coastal defence gunnery in 1956 did away with the sites and their related infrastructure, as did
the abolition of Anti-Aircraft Command. The switch from static gun sites to guided weaponry
led to the closure of Manorbier and an additional role for Larkhill. But the closure of camps
has been compensated for by the enormous advances made in all forms of electronics and
communication devices, even if the procurement and supply has not necessarily kept step with
the theoretically possible.

31
With the removal of the Warsaw Pact threat, real or imagined, the Army is likely to continue
to shrink, though, as recent years have shown, its foreign deployments have by no means
decreased. But these troops abroad are in far different situations from those in far-off days at
the Curragh and in India, or more recently in North Germany; they are emphatically not
places suitable for the large-scale training or exercising of troops. Future investment is likely
to remain concentrated in the Salisbury Plain and Catterick areas, where the British Army
camp is likely to see further developments.

Summary: Types of Camp

The camps fall into distinct categories, though not necessarily distinctive designs and forms.
Taken chronologically, they are
1. The great training camps of the 1860s, of huts arranged in rectangular grids which mirror
the simple organisation of the infantry, all nearly completely rebuilt in permanent
materials by the end of the century (Fig.3)
2. Smaller camps, sometimes made from permanent materials, probably to accommodate battalions detached for
training purposes
3. Artillery practice camps with a limited permanent infrastructure intended to support
tentage, some of these accumulated collections of permanent buildings around them; as
this happened the type original type renewed itself elsewhere (Fig.26)
4. Semi-permanent camps, mostly in the Aldershot area, making great use of corrugated iron
and remarkably long-lived; the first camps to be built with a definite age span in mind (30
years)
5. The large Salisbury Plain camps, often on the site of tented camps, subdivided into
battalion-size units, the surviving plans of the Larkhill group probably representing the
arrangement of the great Divisional camps of the First World War (Fig.36)
6. Camps created for circumstances peculiar to the First World War, some of which survived
(Porton) and others did not (Elveden)
7. The rebuilding of those few chosen to remain, notably Catterick and the Salisbury Plain
group, at first to a limited budget. The differing topographies of the areas produced very
different layouts, the existing country lanes being used at Catterick while a grid of roads
was created anew in the Larkhill area (Fig.40)
8. The introduction of the Sandhurst block and a general attempt to upgrade camps shortly
before 1939, including the transformation of Bovington from a collection of sheds to a
properly equipped centre for armoured forces (Figs. 46 and 47)
9. The Militia Camp, made up of well-built wooden huts and intended to train a battalion.
10. Previously existing camps, which had Militia type huts added during the war
11. Wartime camps, largely employing Nissen huts for accommodation, but also a variety of
other economy designs (also employed in 10)
12. Specialist camps, some of which again survived the war and some did not; examples
being AA practice camps (survived) and emergency military prisons (did not survive)
water transport camps, coast artillery practice camps and more generated by the demands
of the time
13. BOLERO camps for US forces, including convertible and dual-purpose hospital camps,
several of which were retained after the war
14. OVERLORD camps, tented around a semi-permanent infrastructure, intended for a very
limited time and mostly dismantled after the operation (Figs. 55 and 56)
15. Post-war rebuilding, firstly of camps based on the Nissen hut, then those constructed from
other emergency materials, and finally of the Militia hutting
16. New building post-1950

32
Bibliography
Primary sources

Documentary classes in TNA

T1 Treasury correspondence
T 161 Treasury Supply Division files
T 246 Papers of the Ministry of Supply and its successors
T 272 Papers dealing with rating of Government properties
WO 32 War Office administration files
WO 107 Quartermaster General’s papers, including Barrack Books running from
1892 to 1914, and 1921 to 1935
WO 115 Directorate of Army Medical Services
WO 163 Army Council committees, including surveys, mostly from 1950, of
WO accommodation
WO 199 Home Forces records
WORK 46 Papers used by C.M.Kohan in writing the official history of Works and
Buildings

Printed
Captain Binney, Reports on Hutting made by the Board of Officers assembled in the Crimea,
and Observations and Suggestions on the Subject, in Papers on Subjects connected with the
Duties of the Corps of Royal Engineers, new series VII, Woolwich, 1858
Lieut. Col. G. Graham, Experiments on Limes and Cements, in Papers on Subjects connected
with the Duties of the Corps of Royal Engineers, new series XIV, Woolwich, 1865
Notes on Semi-permanent RE Works on Active Service &c. Chatham, 1914, cited as Notes
S.J. Solomon, Strategic Camouflage
Major-General Sir George Scott-Moncrieff, article Barracks and Hutments, in Encyclopaedia
Britannica, 12th ed.,1922
Work of the Royal Engineers in the European War, 1914-1919. Work under the Director of
Works (France), Chatham 1924, cited as WRE, France
Work of the Royal Engineers in the European War, 1914-1919. Miscellaneous, Chatham
1927, cited as WRE, Misc
Major R. Hunter, article Barracks, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 13thed., 1926
Major G.B.O. Taylor, The trend of modern ideas in Barrack construction, in The Royal
Engineers' Journal, 1927
Major-General Sir Ernest Swinton, Eye-Witness, London, 1932
The Design and Construction of Military Buildings, [London], 1933, cited as Design &
Construction
A. Lloyd Spencer, The History and Development of Modern Military Buildings, in The Royal
Engineers' Journal, part 1, 1937, part 2, 1938
Standard Hutting. Hutting Designs for Brigade Group Training Camps and for general use,
[London], 1938, cited as Standard Hutting
Major C.M. Singer, Notes on alternative materials and methods of construction for War
Hutting, in The Royal Engineers' Journal, 1940
Nissen Hut, pamphlet issued by the Nissen Company, 1941? cited as Nissen booklet
MOWP Standard Huts, [London], 1942, cited as MOWP
Handbook of the Romney Hut, [London], 1942
Lieut.General Sir Frederick Morgan, Overture to Overlord, London 1950

33
Secondary sources
Good-bye to Boot and Saddle
C.M. Kohan, Works and Buildings. History of the Second World War, Civil series. London
1952
History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, vol.V, Chatham. 1952, cited as HRE V
The Tanks
Architecture of Aggression
N.D.G. James, Gunners at Larkhill, Henley-on-Thames, 1983
J.Douet, British Barracks 1600-1914, London, 1998
Secret Classrooms
Plain Soldiering must be mentioned, though a copy has not been located. The three items
below are representative of a large number of local publications which it has not been
possible to see
M.F.Mace, Sussex Wartime Relics and Memorials, Newhaven, 1997
P. Longstaff-Tyrrel
Anon. The Fovant Badges Society, Salisbury, n.d.

Plans

In NMR
WO 78/2808/1 Aldershot Church 1863
WO 78/3388 Aldershot general plan 1891
WO 78/3332 Aldershot North and South camps 1888
WO 78/2538 Aldershot N camp 1876
WO 78/3172 Aldershot N camp, gym, 1880
WORK 43/817 Aldershot N camp, married quarters, 1892
WORK 43/818 Aldershot N camp, married quarters, 1892
WO 78/2786 Aldershot N camp, prison governor’s house, 1877
WORK 43/816 Aldershot N camp, warden’s quarters, 1892
WO 78/2813 Aldershot RE train and ASC stables
WO 78/4540 Aldershot roads 1882
WO 78/2832 Aldershot S camp
WO 78/2059 Aldershot S camp 1874
WO 78/4640 Aldershot S camp 1890, site plan for Brig.Gen’s
quarters
WO 78/3268 Aldershot S camp, magazine, 1884
WO 78/3293 Aldershot S camp, riding school, 1886
WO 78/2955 Aldershot S camp, schoolmistress’ quarters
WORK 43/902 Aldershot Stanhope lines, slaughterhouse drain, 1900
WORK 43/905 Aldershot Stanhope lines, abattoir, 1904
WORK 43/906 Aldershot Stanhope lines, additions to abattoir, 1942
WORK 43/903 Aldershot Stanhope lines, cattle lair, 1901
WORK 43/932 Aldershot Wellington Lines, 1896
WO 78/3050 Artillery camp at Hay, 1882
WORK 43/625 Binnington 1933
WO 78/2963 Blackdown Camp, Deepcut 1920
WO 78/3216 Blandford 1918

34
WO 78/2304 Browndown
WO 78/3679 Bulford 1905
WORK 13/192 Camp post office, Bordon 1907
WORK 13/601 Camp post office, Bulford 1914
WORK 13/187 Camp post office, Shorncliffe 1905
WORK 13/441 Camp post office, Tadworth 1910
WORK 43/638 Catterick proposed pavilion, 1940
WORK 43/453 Catterick sports ground, 1938
WORK 43/451 Catterick 1938
WORK 43/452 Catterick 1938
WORK 43/454 Catterick 1938
WORK 43/455 Catterick 1938
WORK 43/457 Catterick 1938
WORK 43/458 Catterick 1938
WORK 43/636 Catterick 1940
WORK 43/640 Catterick 1940
WORK 43/629 Catterick first aid posts, 1933
WORK 43/456 Catterick foundations, 1938
WORK 43/639 Catterick Regimental Institute, 1940
WORK 43/637 Catterick splinter proof post
MPHH 1/607 Colchester 1860
WORK 43/438 Colchester 1867
WO 78/3471 Colchester 1881
WO 78/673 Colchester 1884
WO 78/3255 Colchester 1886
WO 78/3475 Colchester 1895
WO 78/3596 Colchester 1899
WORK 13/703 Conversion of hut, Blackpool 1919
WO 78/3102 Crownhill 1902
WORK 43/733 Delville Camp, Cove, 1941
WORK 43/734 Delville Camp, Cove, 1941
WORK 43/735 Delville Camp, Cove, 1941
WORK 43/736 Delville Camp, Cove, 1941
WO 78/3358 Fleetwood hutments, 1888
WO 78/3296 Horfield 1887, just shows Campfield
WO 78/2841 Kingholm 1871, just shows campfield
MPHH 1/501 Landguard hut barracks, 1881
WORK 21/28/15 Latrines 1910/11
WORK 43/407 Lulworth 1935
WO 78/3526 Lydd 1896
WO 78/3141 Lydd 1903
WO 78/3682 Lydd 1906
WO 78/3061 Lydd 1908
WO 78/3017 Lydd 1910
WO 78/3334 Okehampton 1887
WO 78/4547 Okehampton 1892
WO 78/3547 Okehampton 1897
WO 78/3519 Pembroke Dock Hut Barracks, Married Quarters, 1895

35
WO 78/3037 Penally 1913
WORK 43/626 Scagglethorpe 1933
WORK 43/627 Scampston 1933
WORK 43/628 Scampston 1933
WO 78/3541 Shornclife 1896
MR 1/1253 Shorncliffe
MPHH 1/406 Shorncliffe
WO 78/3247 Shorncliffe 1883
WORK 43/1 Shorncliffe 1883
WO 78/3509 Shorncliffe 1896
WO 78/3553 Shorncliffe 1897
WO 78/3402 Shorncliffe 1899
WO 78/3595 Shorncliffe 1899
WO 78/3078 Shorncliffe 1902
WO 78/3709 Shorncliffe Hut Barracks, Married Quarters, 1904
WO 78/3097 Shorncliffe married quarters, 1902
WORK 43/654 Stokes Bay 1945
WO 153/978 Wareham camp & Bovington exercise area, 1917/18
WO 78/2724 WD standard steel framed huts, 1939
WO 78/2853 Woolwich Common Hut Barracks, 1860s?

In RE Library, Chatham
420/SW/6/002 Durrington camp, n.d. [1915?]
420/SW/6/003 Larkhill camp, n.d. [1915?]
0001 Penally 1860
0003 Penally 1860
0004 Penally 1861
0005 Penally 1861
0006 Penalty 1861
0002 Penally 1867
420/SW/6/001 Rollestone camp, n.d. [1915?]
Uncatalogued Wyke Regis

36