2025:BHC-AS:31184

49.WP.5424.2014.doc

HARSHADA H. SAWANT / Amberkar

(P.A.)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO.5424 OF 2014

The Vice President, Somaiya Trust and Anr. .. Petitioners

Versus
Dr. Pradnya d/o Gopalrao Giradkar, and Ors. .. Respondents
....................
 Mr. Lancy D’Souza a/w. Mr. K. K. Jadhav and Mr. J. K. Jadhav,
Advocates for Petitioners.
 Dr. Uday Warunjikar, Advocate appointed through legal aid a/w.
Mr. Jenish Dinesh Jain, Advocate for Respondent No.1.
 Ms. Swetabja Mondal, Advocate i/by Rui Rodrigues for Respondent
No.2.
 Ms. Vaishali Nimbalkar, AGP for Respondent No.3.
...................
CORAM : MILIND N. JADHAV, J.
DATE : JULY 25, 2025
JUDGMENT:

1. Heard Mr. D’Souza, learned Advocate for Petitioners; Dr.

Warunjikar, Advocate appointed through legal aid for Respondent

No.1; Ms. Mondol, learned Advocate for Respondent No.2 and Ms.

Nimbalkar, learned AGP for Respondent No.3.

2. The present Writ Petition is filed by Petitioners to challenge

the judgment and order dated 09.04.2014 passed by the Mumbai

University and College Tribunal in Appeal No.34 of 2011.

3. By virtue of the impugned judgment, Tribunal has set aside

order of dismissal from service imposed by Petitioners on Respondent

No.1 and directed her reinstatement in alongwith further directions.

Petitioners have challenged the order on its merits.

1 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

4. If Petition fails on merits Respondent No. 1 cannot be put to

a greater loss because of the omission of Petitioners. Had Petitioners

reinstated her she would have joined service and submitted her

voluntary retirement resignation in compliance of the impugned order

itself. She was precluded from doing so by Petitioners. Though she has

not challenged the order, she was admittedly precluded from filing her

voluntary retirement resignation as directed. Therefore it is incorrect to

argue on behalf of Petitioners at the outset that she did not submit her

voluntary retirement resignation in compliance of the impugned order

which she could never had, since she was not reinstated and allowed

to join service.

5. The facts in the present case are in a narrow compass.

5.1. Briefly stated, Respondent No.1 was appointed as Lecturer in

Zoology in June – 1992 in Petitioners' College and was confirmed as

Lecturer on 20.06.1994 after completing the probation period.

5.2. Petitioners’ case against Respondent No.1 is that during

tenure of her service with them until she was terminated by Petitioners

in the year 2007 Respondent No.1 addressed several complaints and

correspondence grieving about her placement, grades and monetary

benefits due and payable to her as per her eligibility and filed

complaints to that effect before the statutory Authorities leading to

Petitioners dismissing her from service.

2 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

5.3. According to Petitioners on 03.06.2007, Respondent No.1

filed complaint for harassment against the then Principal of the College

before the Mahila Ayog, Mumbai endorsing copy thereof to the Police

Commissioner, Vice Chancellor and the Human Rights Commission.

5.4. This was followed by complaint dated 23.06.2007 to the

Chairman, Women’s Cell, Kalina University, Mumbai.

5.5. According to Petitioners above complaints were false

accusations and allegations which brought disrepute to the College and

its Principal. Hence the Governing body of the College appointed Shri

M. P. Sadekar as Enquiry Officer to enquire into the conduct of

Respondent No.1.

5.6. On 07.07.2007, Enquiry Officer issued charge-sheet to

Respondent No.1 levying charge of “moral turpitude” for having made

false and baseless allegations against the then Principal and bringing

disrepute to the College as also the Management of the College of

Petitioners.

5.7. On 11.07.2007, College received a communication from the

Maharashtra State Commission for Women (Mahila Ayog) for

submitting report on the complaint filed by Respondent No.1. Police

complaint was thereafter filed on 13.07.2007 against the then

Principal by Respondent No.1 and on 14.07.2007 statement of the

3 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

Principal was recorded by the Police.

5.8. On 20.07.2007, Respondent No.1 submitted her written

statement of defence to the charge-sheet, inter alia, contending that

the charges levelled against her were ambiguous and requested the

enquiry to be held in abeyance until her complaint before the

Maharashtra State Commission for Women was decided.

5.9. On 23.07.2007, the College Authorities filed a detailed reply

to each of the allegations made by Respondent No.1 in her complaint

to the Maharashtra State Commission for Women. On 24.07.2007,

Enquiry Officer addressed a letter to the Respondent No.1 informing

her that enquiry could not be kept in abeyance and fixed the hearing

for enquiry on 30.07.2007. Respondent No.1 informed the Enquiry

Officer that since her complaint was been enquired into by the

Maharashtra State Commission for Women, she would not attend the

enquiry on the scheduled date.

5.10. However, on 30.07.2007, enquiry was adjourned to

07.08.2007. On being intimated about the adjourned date, Respondent

No.1 once again requested the Enquiry Officer not to proceed with the

enquiry. The enquiry was thereafter adjourned to 27.08.2007. Despite

having received notice of enquiry to be held on 27.08.2007,

Respondent No.1 though reported for duty in the college at 07:00 a.m.,

did not attend the enquiry.

4 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

5.11. Once again the enquiry was postponed to 01.09.2007 and

thereafter to 10.09.2007 and finally to 26.09.2007 to give a final

opportunity to Respondent No.1 to attend the enquiry. On

29.09.2007, the Enquiry Officer after observing the conduct of

absenteeism of Respondent No.1 and she not having attended the

enquiry, declared the enquiry as concluded and on 20.10.2007 filed his

report holding Respondent No.1 guilty of the charge of “moral

turpitude”.

5.12. On 07.11.2007, Management of the College after considering

the report of Enquiry Officer and accepting findings in the report

forwarded it to Respondent No.1 and issued a Show-Cause Notice

calling for her explanation as to why she should not face the penalty of

dismissal from service in view thereof.

5.13. On 27.11.2007, Respondent No.1 informed the Petitioners

that she was not bound to give any explanation to the Show-Cause

Notice whereupon on 07.12.2007, penalty of dismissal was imposed on

Respondent No.1 and she was dismissed from service.

5.14. On 11.02.2008, Respondent No.1 approached the Grievance

Committee of the Mumbai University constituted under Section 57 of

the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 (for short ‘the said Act’) instead

of availing the statutory remedy of filing Appeal against her dismissal

order as contemplated under Section 59 of the said Act. On

5 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

10.07.2008, the Grievance Committee recommended that since there

were no serious irregularities observed qua Respondent No.1,

Respondent No.1 be given minor punishment.

5.15. On 02.08.2008, Petitioners’ Management pointed out that

the Grievance Committee of the University had no jurisdiction since

Respondent No.1 was dismissed from service and as such directions

given by the Grievance Committee were void and non-enforceable.

5.16. Being aggrieved, Respondent No.1 filed Writ Petition No.97

of 2010 in this Court which was disposed of by order dated 18.06.2010

directing Respondent No.1 to adopt alternate efficacious remedy to

redress her grievance against the dismissal order.

5.17. On 14.07.2010, Respondent No.1 filed Statutory Appeal

No.34 of 2011 before the Mumbai University and College Tribunal

alongwith Application for condonation of delay. On Nil.09.2011, delay

was condoned and Appeal was registered. On 09.01.2012, Petitioners

filed written statement to oppose the challenge to the dismissal order.

5.18. During hearing before the Mumbai University and College

Tribunal, Respondent No.1 expressed her willingness to opt for

voluntary retirement. Since Petitioners’ College where Respondent

No.1 was employed as Lecturer was fully aided by the State

Government, the Mumbai University and College Tribunal directed

Respondent No.1 therein to implead the College as Respondent to the

6 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

Appeal proceedings filed by her.

5.19. Though the College was impleaded as party Respondent in

the Appeal proceedings, it did not file any appearance, neither it

participated in the Appeal proceedings.

5.20. On 06.02.2013, the Mumbai University and College Tribunal

passed judgment and order allowing Respondent No.1’s Appeal No.34

of 2011 and set aside the dismissal order of Respondent No.1. Being

aggrieved, Petitioners filed Writ Petition No.3312 of 2013 in this Court.

On 30.07.2013, after hearing both parties and by consent of the

parties, this Court set aside the judgment and order dated 06.02.2013

passed in Appeal No.34 of 2011 and remanded the matter back to the

Mumbai University and College Tribunal for fresh adjudication. Both

parties were thereafter heard by the Mumbai University and College

Tribunal resultantly leading to passing of the impugned judgment

dated 09.04.2014 whereby statutory Appeal No.34 of 2011 filed by

Respondent No.1 was once again allowed and order of dismissal from

service passed by Petitioners against Respondent No.1 was set aside.

Direction for her reinstatement was passed alongwith direction to

Respondent No.1 to apply for VRS Scheme within three months

thereafter and direction to Petitioner to consider the same and issue

relieving letter to her for her future employment and for getting

terminal benefits under VRS Scheme as per Rules and procedure

7 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

alongwith backwages in the revised scale and regular salary from the

date of the order upto the date of her relieving letter.

6. The above judgment and order dated 09.04.2014 passed by

the Mumbai University and College Tribunal is the subject matter of

the present Writ Petition. Admittedly Petitioners nor the College

reinstated the Respondent No.1 Petitioner chose to challenge the

impugned judgment and filed present Writ Petition on 06.05.2014.

Petition was admitted on 16.08.2016 and interim relief of stay of

impugned judgment was passed by this Court. Petition was pending

hearing and final disposal in this Court all along, but during the

interregnum on 31.05.2022 Respondent No.1 passed her retirement

age of superannuation.

7. Prima facie, there is no dispute about the aforesaid

immediate facts as they are borne out from the record. Before I advert

to the submissions made by the learned Advocates for the respective

parties, it would be worthwhile to refer to the directions contained in

the impugned judgment passed by the Mumbai University and College

Tribunal appended at page No.23 of the Writ Petition which are

relevant for consideration of this Petition due to subsequent

developments. They read as follows:-

“1) Order of dismissal dated 7.12.2007 and punishment impugned in

this Appeal is hereby quashed and set aside and Appellant shall be
deemed to have been reinstated with continuity in service from the date
of this order and for payment of salary in revised scale with direction to
make an application/representation under VRS Scheme as above within

8 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

three months and the same shall be considered by Respondent Nos.2 & 3
for issuing her relieving letter for getting employment in future
elsewhere, and for getting terminal benefits under VRS as per rules and
procedure.
2) Appellant shall be entitled to claim back wages in revised scale
form July 2010 and regular salary from the date of order till issuance of
relieving letter by Respondent Nos.2 & 3 as above.
3) Parties to file compliance report on record under intimation to the
Office of Respondent No.4.
4) Appeal is partly allowed in the above terms and disposed of with no
order as to costs.”

8. From the above, it is seen that the Mumbai University and

College Tribunal has set aside the order of dismissal dated 07.12.2007

and passed further directions that Respondent No.1 shall be deemed to

have been reinstated with continuity in service from the date of the

order for payment of salary in the revised scale with direction to

Respondent No.1 to make application/representation under VRS

Scheme within three month of her reinstatement and the said

Application under the VRS Scheme shall be considered by Petitioners

for issuing her the relieving letter for getting employment in future

elsewhere and for getting terminal benefits under VRS Scheme as per

Rules and procedure. Further direction pertained to Respondent No.1

being entitled to claim backwages in revised scale from July 2010 and

regular salary from the date of said order till issuance of relieving letter

by Petitioners.

9. Petitioners admittedly did not reinstate Respondent No. 1.

Hence none of the further directions were complied with or could be

complied with either by the Respondent No.1 or Petitioner or the

9 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

Respondent No.3, resultantly affecting the Respondent No. 1. Petition

was admitted in 2016 and the impugned order was stayed.

Respondent No. 1 in the meanwhile crossed her age of superannuation

on 31.05.2022. Hence the above intervening circumstances need

consideration for adjudicating the present Petition in the interest of

justice and the facts of this case. If justice has to be done it has to be

delivered in letter and spirit rather than consider the challenge to the

impugned judgment and adjudicate the same and as a consequence

thereof leave the Respondent No.1 to the mercy of the legal system /

vagaries of fate.

10. The reason for highlighting the operative part of the

impugned judgement and the supervening circumstances is because

the Petition has been heard finally now in July – 2025 and in the

interregnum, Dr. Warunjikar informs the Court that Respondent No.1

has crossed the age of superannuation in 2022 as she is 63 years old

today thus shattering her dreams and prospects of future service which

she could have opted for had she been reinstated and relieved as per

the impugned judgment.

11. Petitioners are duly represented by Mr. D’Souza. Dr.

Warunjikar appointed through the Legal Aid a/w Jainish Jain is

espousing the cause of Respondent No.1. Mr.Rodrigues and Ms.

Mondal appear for the College and Ms. Nimbalkar appears for the

State – Joint Director of Higher Education. Learned Advocates have all

10 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

addressed the Court on feasibility of implementation of the directions

contained in the impugned judgment as on today considering the fact

that Respondent No.1 has crossed her retirement age. Keeping this

aspect in mind, the Petition is decided on its merits. Ms. Nimbalkar

appears for the State – Joint Director of Higher Education.

12. Mr. D’Souza, learned Advocate appears for the Petitioners /

Educational Institution – College and has made following submissions:-

12.1. He would submit that Mumbai University and College

Tribunal (for short ‘the Tribunal’) failed to appreciate the fact that any

enquiry pending before the Maharashtra State Women Commission

(for short ‘the State Commission’) would hold no bar against

Petitioners for holding a domestic enquiry during pendency of any such

proceedings before the State Commission and therefore any reference

to pendency of proceedings before the State Commission cannot come

in the way of the statutory enquiry proceeded with by Petitioners

against Respondent No.1.

12.2. He would submit that the Tribunal failed to consider that

Respondent No.1 was unable to prima facie substantiate her

allegations and insinuations against the then Principal of the College

and Management in her pleadings and proceedings and therefore she

was not entitled to any relief whatsoever as awarded by the Tribunal

and deserved the punishment of dismissal.

11 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

12.3. He would submit that the Tribunal failed to consider the fact

that despite repeated opportunities given to Respondent No.1 to attend

enquiry proceedings before the Enquiry Officer which were duly

acknowledged by her, despite which she did not choose to remain

present or participate in the enquiry proceedings and therefore, the

final order of reinstatement was completely contrary to the conduct of

Respondent No.1. He would submit that even though Respondent

No.1 duly attended the College on all dates when the enquiry before

the Enquiry Officer was fixed, she did not choose to remain present for

the enquiry in order to substantiate her allegations in the complaint

and therefore in that view of the matter, her complaint ought not to

have been considered at all by the Tribunal.

12.4. He would submit that regarding allegations of pending dues

of Respondent No.1, Petitioners pointed out that the delay in payment

of her arrears was due to delay in receipt of the same from the Office

of Joint Director of Education and she was duly informed about the

same and therefore the said allegation cannot be held against

Petitioners.

12.5. He would submit that though it was case of Respondent No.1

that enquiry should proceed only after her complaint filed with the

State Commission was investigated by the said Commission, the

Petitioners filed a detailed reply to the allegations in the complaint

12 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

before the State Commission. However the Commission did not

investigate further into the complaint neither any enquiry was held by

the State Commission with respect to the complaint. Hence according

to her, she ought to have attended the enquiry before the Enquiry

Officer.

12.6. He would submit that prima facie reading of the scandalous

and defamatory allegations made by Respondent No.1 against the then

Principal of the College, it would clearly lead to damaging the

reputation of the Principal as also the Management of the College and

therefore such an act of Respondent No.1 was not in consonance with

the code of conduct of a teacher and was derogatory in nature to the

status and dignity of the status of the teacher.

12.7. He would submit that charge against Respondent No.1 was

extremely serious in the nature of amounting to moral turpitude and

bringing disrepute to the institution which imparts education to scores

of students and which was a reputable educational institution.

12.8. He would therefore persuade the Court to consider the

defence of the College and accordingly set aside the impugned

judgment and order.

13. PER CONTRA, Dr. Warunjikar, learned appointed Advocate

through the legal aid to espouse the cause of Respondent No.1 has

made the following submissions:-

13 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

13.1. He would submit that Respondent No.1 did not encounter

any difficulty with respect to the Management or the Principal until

2002. He would submit that every Lecturer working in the College

after completion of the period of eight years was entitled to be placed

in the Senior scale and thereafter on completion of further eight years

of service in the Selection grade. Similarly all those Lecturers holding

M.Phil degree were entitled to the benefit of one additional increment.

He would submit that these were statutory rights accruable to every

teacher. He would submit that in order to approve placement of a

Lecturer in the Senior scale and thereafter to the Selection grade,

procedure of assessment is prescribed including conducting enquiry of

the candidate by the Assessment Committee and there was also

requirement of completion of three refresher courses. He would

submit that Respondent No.1 admittedly completed the three refresher

courses and was due for promotion, but post 2002, she was denied

promotion by the Petitioners without any reason whatsoever.

13.2. He would submit that the then Principal one Dr. Hande took

charge as Principal of the College in 2002-2003 and since that time

every attempt was made by him to harass and humiliate the

Respondent No.1 and deny her the legitimate benefit in service. He

would submit that after a series of issues and incidents Respondent

No.1 had no alternative left than to file a written complaint about the

then Principal’s conduct with the State Commission as also approach

14 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

the Grievance Committee of the University for redressal of her

grievances and seeking justice.

13.3. He would submit that seeking statutory entitlement and

benefit which is due and required to be conferred upon Respondent

No.1 cannot be attributed and equated to the charge rather much

serious charge of moral turpitude which has been alleged by the

Petitioners. He would submit that the said charge of moral turpitude is

not only grievous but completely disproportionate to the admitted facts

in the present case. He would submit that filing of Complaint with the

State Commission did not go down well with the Petitioner and they

responded with the alleged charge of moral turpitude as a

counterblast.

13.4. He would submit that all that Respondent No.1 demanded

from the Management of Petitioners was her entitlement and nothing

more stricly in accordance with law. He would submit that the same

was denied to her by Petitioners and she was discriminated upon hence

when her repeated requests fell on deaf ears she had no option but to

file the written complaint. He would submit that the Grievance

Committee of the University itself held that punishment meted out to

Respondent No.1 was illegal and disproportionate as against the

charge of moral turpitude levelled by the College against her.

13.5. He would submit that after completion of her first eight

15 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

years of service there was total reluctance on the part of Petitioners to

confer Senior scale grade and thereafter selection grade to Respondent

No.1. He would submit that recommendation of the Grievance

Committee of the University were approved by the Chancellor of the

University and vide letter dated 31.03.2005 Petitioners were directed

to comply with the directions contained therein which have not been

complied with till date. He would submit that despite specific

directions issued by the Grievance Committee of the University to

Petitioners by letter dated 04.12.2006, the said directions were also

not implemented and Respondent No.1 was denied timely promotion

and other benefits.

13.6. He would submit that in July – 2005, Respondent No.1 got

sanction for Faculty Improvement Programme (for short ‘FIP Scheme’)

from UGC whereby she could complete her research work on a

prestigious project of wildlife studies at Tadoba Park, Chandrapur. He

would submit that in order to obtain sanction from UGC, her

Application was required to be routed and endorsed through the

College Principal. He would submit that since the Principal was

annoyed because of the complaint filed by Respondent No.1 before the

University Grievance Committee, he did not forward the Application

despite her repeated requests made to him. He would submit that

when Petitioners held interview for placement on 10.03.2006, during

the course of said interview, Respondent No.1 was humiliated by

16 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

members of the Selection Committee on her approaching the

Grievance Committee of the University with her complaint. He would

submit that though Respondent No.1’s Ph.D registration was granted

by Respondent No.1, her Application for FIP Scheme Fellowship to the

UGC was not forwarded by the then Principal by adopting a vindictive

attitude despite Respondent No.1 repeatedly approaching the Principal

and the Management with a fervent request to forward her FIP Scheme

Fellowship application by letters dated 09.07.2004, 17.08.2004 and

23.08.2004.

13.7. He would submit that since no steps were taken by the

Petitioners to forward her Application for FIP Scheme Fellowship to

the UGC, Respondent No.1 was constrained to file complaint with the

Grievance Committee on 01.09.2004. He would submit that

Respondent No.1 suffered extensively at the hands of Petitioners in as

much as despite Petitioners giving assurance letters dated 16.12.2004

and 20.12.2004 to Respondent No.1, as a matter of fact under the X th

UGC grant, Respondent No.1 was entitled for FIP Scheme for 24

months and as the said UGC plan was supposed to end on 31.03.2007,

Respondent No.1 repeatedly requested Petitioners to endorse and

submit her Application as early as possible but the then Principal of the

College did not take any steps in submitting the Application resultantly

leading to complete frustration of the entire research work of

Respondent No.1.

17 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

13.8. He would submit that Respondent No.1 approached

Petitioners by letters dated 15.01.2005 and 24.01.2005 only after

which Petitioners through the Principal of the College after much delay

forwarded the Application to the UGC and FIP Scheme was sanctioned

belatedly by UGC in favour of Respondent No.1 from July – 2005 for a

period of 21 months. He would submit that the result of the aforesaid

delay was that Respondent No.1 lost benefit of X th UGC Scheme for

ten months i.e. from July – 2004 to March – 2005 due to withholding

of the Respondent No.1’s Application by Petitioners.

13.9. He would submit that Respondent No.1 faced the above loss

because there was no facility for extension of the same as per UGC

Rules. He would submit that Respondent No.1 filed five written

Applications dated 13.02.2006 (two Applications), 23.01.2007,

10.03.2007 and 21.03.2007 seeking extensions from the Petitioners for

the UGC Scheme but the same were outrightly rejected by Petitioners

by letter dated 29.03.2007 which compelled Respondent No.1 to rejoin

her duty on 02.04.2007. He would submit that after she rejoined the

College on 02.04.2007 by Application dated 03.04.2007 Respondent

No.1 requested the Petitioners to recommend her case for extension

since her field work was not completed. However the same was not

done by the Petitioners resultantly leading to Respondent No.1 filing

the complaint before the Grievance Committee in April – 2007 once

again.

18 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

13.10. He would submit that copy of the complaint was also

submitted to the Management on 16.04.2007 wherein it was

categorically substantiated and pointed out that the aforesaid

repetitive vindictive actions of the College Principal resultantly

frustrated the rights of the Respondent No.1 and therefore she had no

option than to file the complaint with the Maharashtra State

Commission for Women.

13.11. He would submit that in the aforesaid scenario, the academic

and mental fatigue and loss incurred by Respondent No.1 was such

that in view of her joining her duty on 02.04.2007 in the College, UGC

refused to grant extension to her on the ground that she had joined her

duty and left the field work incomplete. He would submit that the

College had granted Senior scale promotion to Respondent No.1 and

she realized her arrears of salary of Senior grade but benefit of

Selection grade was not granted to her due to the high handed action

of the then Principal against whom she had filed complaints.

13.12. He would submit that the overall reaction of the aforesaid

actions resultantly led the Petitioners to institute the enquiry against

Respondent No.1, resultantly leading to passing of the impugned

judgement and order which was also once again not implemented by

Petitioners due to their highhanded action without having any regard

to Court's orders.

19 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

13.13. He would submit that charge of moral turpitude is a very

serious charge and it is completely disproportionate to the complaints

which have been filed by the Respondent No.1 which are substantiated

on the basis of relevant record.

13.14. He would submit that Respondent No.1 has filed substantial

documentary evidence in the form of Annexure - 1 to Annexure – 65

which are part of the record before the Tribunal which have been

taken cognizance of at the time of passing of the impugned judgment

and have been discussed extensively in its judgment by the Tribunal.

He would therefore submit that here is a case before the Court of

Respondent No.1 having substantiated her entire case on the basis of

cogent documentary evidence which cannot be faulted with and which

is prima facie admitted on the basis of correspondence between the

parties whereas on the other side Petitioners have come to the Court

with absolutely no evidence whatsoever to substantiate their

allegations of Respondent No.1 having been alleged of the charge of

moral turpitude.

13.15. He would therefore submit that the impugned judgement

passed by the Tribunal deserves to be upheld but considering the fact

that Petitioners have not reinstated the Respondent No. 1 and now

that she has retired and passed her age of superannuation, appropriate

directions are required to be passed by the Court to give Respondent

20 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

No. 1 absolute and entire benefit in accordance with law. He would

submit that due to non-reinstatement by Petitioners all further

directions in the impugned judgement have been rendered infructuous

thus depriving the Respondent No. 1 of her legitimate right of seeking

future employment as stated in the judgment unitl her retirement.

14. Ms. Nimbalkar, learned AGP would submit that the issue

revolving around the impugned judgement pertains to omissions and

actions between the private parties concerned. She would submit that

considering the fact that Respondent No.1 has now passed her age of

retirement in service, this Court shall consider the fact that if the

impugned judgement is upheld and if this Hon’ble Court is inclined to

give any benefit to her beyond the date of the impugned judgement,

then the said benefit be directed to be paid by the Petitioners and not

by the State Government even though the post on which Respondent

No.1 was appointed was a sanctioned post. This she would

vehemently submit is in view of the Petitioners not having reinstated

the Respondent No. 1 as directed by the Tribunal leading to frustration

of the further directions in the impugned judgment. She would submit

that the State Government therefore cannot be foisted with liability of

payment of backwages to Respondent No.1 if the impugned judgement

is upheld and if any further directions are given in view of the

impugned judgment’s directions being frustrated and the Respondent

No.1 attaining the retirement age. She would submit that this is so

21 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

because the impugned judgement categorically restricts relief of

payment of wages to Respondent No.1 only upto the year 2014 and

not thereafter but certainly subject to compliance of the other

directions contained therein. In support of her submissions, she has

referred to and relied upon the following two decisions in support of

her above submissions:-

(i) Educational Society, Tumsar and Ors. Vs. State of

Maharashtra and Ors.1 and
(ii) Rajapur Shikshan Prasarak Mandal Ratnagiri Vs. State
of Maharashtra and Ors.2.

15. I have heard Mr. D’Souza, learned Advocate for Petitioners;

Dr. Warunjikar, Advocate appointed through legal aid for Respondent

No.1; Ms. Mondol, learned Advocate for Respondent No.2 and Ms.

Nimbalkar, learned AGP for Respondent No.3 and with their able

assistance perused the records of the case. Submissions made by them

have received due consideration of this Court.

16. In the present case admittedly the post on which Respondent

No. 1 was appointed is a sanctioned post. College is fully aided by the

Government. There is no dispute about the same. The order passed by

Tribunal is prima facie clear and unambiguous. The said order can be

deciphered and broken down into two parts. Part I directs

reinstatement of Respondent No. 1 subject to which Part II of the order

1 (2016) 3 SCC 512.
2 Writ Petition No.757 of 2016 decided on 18.04.2018.

22 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

kicks in. Part II of the order is omnibus and requires Respondent No 1

to giver her resignation under VRS within a period of two months from

the date of her reinstatement followed by further consequential

directions as stated therein. When the said order is read, it is clear

that unless and until Respondent No. 1 is reinstated by Petitioners

there is no question of Respondent No. 1 being in a position to give her

resignation under the VRS as directed. Though it is vehemently

argued by Mr. D'Souza that Respondent No. 1 did not give her

resignation despite the directions in the impugned order, it is seen that

she could not have given her resignation unless being reinstated by

Petitioners. Once Petitioners admittedly failed to reinstate Respondent

No. 1, all further directions were frustrated.

17. The question before the Court is whether Respondent No.1

could be put to loss if the Petition fails, because of the omission of the

Petitioners to act in the first instance. This question can be answered

in the affirmative if the Petition fails. Petitioners chose not to reinstate

her and hence have challenged the impugned judgement. Respondent

No.1 has not challenged the impugned order, rather it was her stand in

the previous round of litigation before the Tribunal that she will opt to

resign. Therefore in the present facts she was precluded from resigning

despite the order of Tribunal. Therefore it is incorrect for Petitioners to

argue before me that she never submitted her VRS resignation.

23 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

18. The submissions on facts made by learned Advocates at the

Bar have been noted herein above. On the merits of the case qua

challenge to the impugned judgment, it is seen that the Grievance

Committee of the University itself held that the punishment meted out

to Respondent No. 1 was not only illegal but completely

disproportionate as against the allegation of moral turpitude levelled

against her. While recording the submissions made by Dr. Warunjikar

as also the facts which are alluded to hereinabove, it is prima facie

seen that Respondent No. 1 was denied co-operation by the then

Principal of the Petitioners College which led her to filing the

complaints. It is seen from the record that such co-operation was not

only in respect of one singular incident with which she was aggrieved

but with respect to multiple issues during the tenure of the then

Principal which affected the Respondent No.1. First and foremost

denial of non-conferment of Senior scale grade and Selection grade to

Respondent No. 1 by Petitioners is prima facie writ large on the face of

record despite there being a specific direction to Petitioners by the

University in its letter dated 31.03.2005. Petitioners however did not

comply with the said directions. Thus denial of timely promotion and

all consequential benefits go along with Senior scale grade and

Selection grade and not giving timely benefit would undoubtedly have

its impact on Respondent No. 1 leading to she seeking redressal. That

apart in July 2005 it is seen that Respondent No. 1 was unable to

24 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

complete her research work under the Fellowship Improvement

Programme - FIP Scheme and could not take benefit of the entire

tenure of the said scheme due to delay on the part of the Principal in

forwarding and endorsing her Application through the proper channel

despite her repeated requests and without any reason. The only

reason ascribed for the delay as lamented by her was because of her

complaint filed against the then Principal before the University

Grievance Committee as he was annoyed. It is seen that her

Application was not endorsed, signed and forwarded despite her

repeated requests made to him which is borne out from her written

applications.

19. It is seen that Respondent No. 1 addressed specific letters

dated 09.07.2004, 17.08.2004 and 23.08.2004 making requests to

forward her Application for the FIP Scheme, still the same was not

done by the Principal and Petitioners. Resultantly Respondent No. 1

lost out on substantial time to the extent of 10 months between July

2004 to March 2005 due to the delay in forwarding her Application by

Petitioners. Even after completion of her FIP programme, it is seen that

Respondent No. 1 filed 5 back to back written Applications 13.02.2006

(two Applications), 23.01.2007, 10.03.2007 and 21.03.2007 seeking

extension from the Petitioners for the UGC Scheme but the same was

outrightly rejected by Petitioners by letter dated 29.03.2007 which

compelled Respondent No.1 to rejoin her duty in the Petitioner College

25 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

on 02.07.2007. It is seen that as a result of Respondent No. 1 rejoining

her duty in College and not securing extension from Petitioners to

complete her research work, UGC refused to grant any extension to her

on this very ground that she had joined her duty in College and there

was a break in the field work. That apart one of the other principal

grievance of Respondent No. 1 was about she having been denied

benefit of Selection grade and arrears of her salary for which she filed

the Complaint. When Respondent No. 1 was subjected to the aforesaid

difficulties which are clearly borne out from the record on the basis of

the documentary evidence placed before the Tribunal during the

tenure of then Principal, it was legitimate on her part to have filed her

grievances in the form of Complaint before the Competent Authority.

In this background the action of Respondent No. 1 of filing Complaints

for securing her legitimate entitlement and dues with respect to her

work and job with the Petitioners cannot be equated by any stretch of

imagination with the serious charge of moral turpitude. In a singular

line by levelling the allegation of “moral turpitude” for the above

actions Petitioners have stated that they suffered a loss of reputation

and therefore invoked the severest charge of “moral turpitude” against

Respondent No. 1 and dismissed her from service. There is not a single

pleading on record on behalf of Petitioners which gives explanation for

the delays caused by which Respondent No.1 was aggrieved.

20. The charge of moral turpitude is often invoked in the context

26 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

of criminal law and prima facie indicates an element of dishonesty or

moral depravity in the conduct which is alleged. If by the simple

standard the charge of moral turpitude is to be applied to the actions

of Respondent No. 1, then by no stretch of imagination can it be said

that her actions were dishonest or unjust. Neither the action of

Respondent No. 1 in the aforementioned facts can be equated with a

severe crime like theft, fraud, forgery which are often cited as

examples of crime involving moral turpitude. Filing a Complaint with

the Grievance Committee of the University or filing the Complaint

against the Institution for redressal of rights in the Tribunal or before

the Mahila Ayog cannot be equated as to contend having very serious

consequences on the Institution. Complaints if filed have to be met

with and adjudicated. The action of Respondent No. 1 of filing the

aforesaid complaints for her entitlement nowhere comes close to the

charge of moral turpitude so as to signify the level of she or her actions

being described as wicked, deviant behavior constituting an immoral,

unethical, or unjust departure from ordinary social standards such that

it would shock a community and cause loss of reputation to the

Petitioners. It is undoubtedly true that Respondent No. 1 filed

complaints but it needs to be seen that those complaints were directed

against the Authorities for her legitimate entitlement and concerns

which were directly in proportion with her job duty with the

Petitioners. It needs to be mentioned that Respondent No. 1 is a highly

27 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

educated intellectual lady having high educational qualifications and

with such background if she is deprived of her legitimate right of

achieving further distinction or accolades qua the Faculty Improvement

Programme through her research work under the UGC grant or her

Senior grade or Selection grade and / or her arrears and if she

complains about the delay which is detrimental to her prospects and if

the same is deprived to her, her filing of complaints of harassment in

my opinion cannot be equated with a charge of moral turpitude against

her. Hence the Petition in my opinion has to fail.

21. In that view of the matter, what is significant to note is the

fact that even though the Tribunal may have passed the impugned

order giving the twin directions as deciphered by this Court as part I

and part II herein above, what was important for the Petitioners was to

have reinstated Respondent No. 1 for her to have an honourable exit.

If Respondent No. 1 was not reinstated at all there is no question of

any expectancy of her resignation under the VRS as delineated in the

order of Tribunal. Respondent No. 1’s reinstatement not having been

done virtually gives a completely different dimension to the

adjudication of the present case especially now since she has passed

her retirement age.

22. Petitioners have filed the present Petition to challenge the

order of Tribunal. For the reasons mentioned herein above, I am not

28 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

inclined to accept the Petitioners case of disturbing the order passed by

the Tribunal but the peculiar facts and circumstances in the present

case require interference of this Court especially because the

Petitioners have not complied with the order of reinstatement so as to

enable the Respondent No. 1 to file her VRS Application. Though the

Petition was filed in the year 2014 by Petitioners, the order dated

02.05.2016 states that Respondent shall not take any coercive steps

against the Petitioners based on the impugned order till the next date.

Thereafter Petition was admitted on 16.08.2016 and interim order was

passed in terms of prayer clause (b). Thus the impugned order was

stayed only on 16.08.2016 by this Court at the time of admitting the

Petition. Petition is heard today and is decided. After the stay granted

by this Court on 16.08.2016 it was naturally not expected from

Petitioners to have reinstated Respondent No. 1 but from the date of

the impugned judgment dated 09.04.2014 upto 16.08.2016,

admittedly there was no stay of the impugned order by this Court.

This factum will also have to be considered by the Court since it is

prayed for by Dr. Warunjikar that Respondent No. 1 has in the

interregnum during the pendency of the Petition retired rather attained

the age of superannuation sometime in the year 2022. He would

submit that in view of Respondent No. 1 not having been reinstated,

there was no question of she giving her resignation letter under VRS.

Dr. Warunjikar may be right in his submissions but on and form

29 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

16.08.2016, the impugned judgment & order of tribunal has been

stayed by this Court. Between 2014 and 2016, Petitioners did not take

any efforts to stay of the said order rather record of the Court prima

facie shows that attempts were made by the parties to reconcile their

dispute but no amicable settlement could be arrived at between the

parties.

23. In this case it is an admitted position that the Respondent

No. 1 was working against a sanctioned post and was a permanent

employee. There is no ambiguity about the same. If the post is

sanctioned by the State Government and the Education Department

and if the said employee is terminated and subsequently the

termination is set aside and he is reinstated, then the liability of

payment of his salary and wages is that of the State Government.

Learned Advocate for Respondent No.1 and the AGP have drawn my

attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of

Educational Society, Tumsar (first supra). In that case the facts were

that the services of the Respondent No.1 were terminated by the

Institution which was a fully aided institution to the extent of 100% by

the State of Maharashtra. Such aid includes the element of salaries that

are payable to the teacher and other staff employed by the School

alongwith all statutory benefits. The termination order was challenged

by the Respondent No.1 therein before the School Tribunal and it was

set aside with a direction to reinstate the Respondent No.1 and with a

30 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

direction of payment of wages. Thereafter the order of the School

Tribunal was upheld by the High Court as the Institution and

Respondent No. 4 entered into a settlement and the Institution agreed

to abide by the terms of the settlement. The direction of the School

Tribunal attained finality and the Respondent No.1 was to be paid

back wages. The issue before the Supreme Court was that who is to

ultimately bear the financial burden, whether the institution is

supposed to pay the back wages out of its own pocket or is it to be paid

by the State Government from the grant which is granted to the school.

Though in the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court, it was

ultimately decided and directed that the Supreme Court will not

interfere with the decision of the High Court which was arrived at after

a compromise between the parties, while arriving at that decision, the

Supreme Court made certain crucial observations and rendered certain

findings which come to the aid of Respondent No. 1’s case herein.

Those findings are returned in paragraph No. 11 of that decision and

are reproduced verbatim herein below:-

“11. We have considered the aforesaid submissions of the

learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the
statutory provisions. It cannot be denied that as per the normal
principle, whenever a terminated employee of an aided school
challenges the termination and termination is held to be illegal
by a competent judicial forum/court and order is passed for
payment of back wages, etc., the Government is supposed to bear
the said burden. The reason for the same is that such back wages
or any other payment are in the nature of salary for the
intervening period or other compensation in lieu thereof which is
to be paid to the employee who would have earn these benefits
had he remained in service. In that eventuality, obviously, the

31 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

Government/Education Department would have paid those

benefits in terms of financial aid provided to such a school.
However, if there is a specific provision contained in any statute
which contains contrary position, then such provision would
prevail upon the aforesaid general rule. Likewise, if there is any
administrative order which is contrary to the aforesaid general
rule, the said administrative order shall prevail as in that
situation, it would be treated that the aid is given subject to the
conditions contained in such administrative order.”

24. It is held by the Supreme Court that whenever the

terminated employee of the aided school challenges termination and

the said termination is held to be illegal by the competent judicial

forum / Court and order is passed for payment of backwages, etc., the

Government is supposed to bear the said burden. It is clarified by the

Supreme Court that such backwages or any other payment are in the

nature of salary for the intervening period or other compensation in

lieu thereof which is to be paid to the employee who would have

earned these benefits had he remained in service. Thus, it is clear that

had Respondent No. 1 being reinstated, she would have submitted her

resignation and got her benefits from the Government and she could

have considered her future prospects until retirement. Respondent

No.1’s benefits would have come from the State Government and not

from the Management considering that Petitioners’ institution before

me is a fully aided Institution. Therefore it cannot be argued by the

State Government that liability of salary and back wages is that of the

Institution.

25. In the above facts, it cannot lie in the mouth of the

32 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

State Government to state that they shall not pay the backwages and

dues to Respondent No. 1 and the liability is that of the Petitioners’

Institution since they did not reinstate her. State Government can

invoke appropriate action against the Petitioners as available to it in

law. However in the peculiar facts of the present case, it is seen that

since Petitioners did not reinstate Respondent No.1, she could not file

her VRS resignation. Hence after clearing all dues of the Respondent

No.1, if the State Government desires to recover any amount from the

Petitioners due to the Petitioners omissions, liberty can be given to the

State Government to recover the same in accordance with law.

Respondent No.1 cannot be allowed to suffer the ignominy of the

system any further.

26. In the above background, I am required to adjudicate and

determine the present case. For the reasons which are mentioned

herein above insofar as the impugned judgment & order passed by the

Tribunal is concerned, I am of the opinion that the said judgment

cannot be faulted with principally but subject to it being moulded

appropriately in view of the peculiar facts of this case. However benefit

under the said judgment is required to be given to Respondent No. 1

and that benefit can only be given if the said order is moulded

appropriately especially in view of the subsequent events discussed

above. Having upheld the judgment and order of the Tribunal to the

above extent and having arrived at a finding that Petitioners did not

33 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

carry out their obligation under the said order despite the Petition

remained pending in this Court for a period of two years until stay was

granted in terms of prayer clause (b) on 16.08.2016, Respondent No.1

cannot be made to suffer the consequences. In the meanwhile she has

attained superannuation age on 31.05.2022. I am therefore inclined to

accept the submission made by Dr. Warunjikar to extend the benefit of

the order in view of non-reinstatement of Respondent No. 1 upto the

date of her superannuation. In that view of the matter, the Writ

Petition is disposed of by giving the following directions:-

(i) Impugned judgment and order dated 09.04.2014

passed by the Presiding Officer, Mumbai University and

College Tribunal, Mumbai in Appeal No. 34 of 2011 is

upheld and confirmed to the extent of reinstatement of

Respondent No.1 subject to modification and further

directions contained hereinunder;

(ii) In view of Respondent No. 1 having passed her

retirement age on 31.05.2022, Petitioners are directed

to notionally reinstate Respondent No. 1 within a

period of one week from the date of passing of this

order and she shall notionally be continued to be shown

as Petitioners’ employee upto 31.05.2022;

(iii) The direction of Respondent No.1 filing her VRS

34 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

resignation as directed in the impugned judgment and

order of the Tribunal i.e. 09.04.2014 is redundant,

infructuous and therefore quashed and set aside;

(iv) It is directed that the period of service of Respondent

No. 1 will be reckoned from the date of her joining till

31.05.2022 i.e. the date of her retirement and she will

be entitled to and eligible to all service benefits till

31.05.2022 and she shall be deemed to be retired from

service on 31.05.2022.

(v) The Petitioners shall prepare the complete service book

of Respondent No.1 upto the date of her deemed

retirement i.e. 31.05.2022 and forward the proposal to

the concerned authorities i.e. Respondent No.3 herein

along with a chart showing Respondent No.1’s wages

and allowances that she would have drawn had she

continued in service upto 31.05.2022, alongwith her

updated service book and all other relevant documents

and all service benefits, retirement benefits, other

benefits etc. due and payable to Respondent No.1

within a period of four weeks from today for seeking

scrutiny and requisite sanction from the Respondent No.

3;

35 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

(vi) All concerned Competent Authorities and the

Respondent No. 3 are directed to scrutinize the said

proposal received from Petitioners and they shall

sanction the said proposal within a period of four weeks

of receipt of the same from the Petitioners under

intimation to Respondent No.1;

(vii) Respondent No. 3 - Joint Director of Higher Education

is thereafter directed to clear all retirement dues and

admissible arrears of wages as directed by this order

within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of

sanction to the proposal from the Competent Authority

in the Respondent No. 1’s bank account under advice to

her;

(viii)The State Government - Respondent No. 3 i.e. Joint

Director of Higher Education is directed to pay simple

interest @ 7% p.a. on the entire amount of arrears due

and payable from 01.06.2022 till the date of payment

received by Respondent No.1 on the entire arrears

amount receivable by Respondent No.1;

(ix) The Respondent No. 3 - Joint Director of Higher

Education is directed to pay the aforesaid entire

outstanding amount of arrears due and payable to

36 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

Respondent No. 1 for and on behalf of the Joint

Director of Higher Education and the Education

Department within a period of four weeks as directed

hereinabove positively without any delay whatsoever.

The said amount shall be deposited in the bank account

of the Respondent No. 1. Bank details of Respondent

No.1 are already there with the Petitioners and the

State Government. If not, the same shall be conveyed

by Respondent No.1 to Petitioners and Respondent

No.3;

(x) Recovery of the amount paid by the State Government

to Respondent No.1 if so desired shall be effected

against the yearly grant due and payable to Petitioners’

Institution in future or if the State Government desires

to recover the dues and backwages which have been

directed to be paid to Respondent No.1 by this order

from the Petitioners’ Institution, liberty to do so is given

to the State Government strictly in accordance with law,

but under no circumstances the State Government shall

not deposit the full amount of dues and backwages as

per the proposal submitted by Petitioners calculated till

the date of payment in the bank account of the

Respondent No. 1 as directed by this order.

37 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

(xi) Petition is disposed of in the above terms.

27. In view of the above, to the extent of the above directions,

the impugned judgement dated 09.04.2014 stands modified and rest of

the judgement is upheld and confirmed.

28. Though the State Government is not a direct party before the

School Tribunal, it is infact represented by the Respondent No.3 being

the Joint Director of Higher Education of the State Government.

Hence, under the directions and observations of the Supreme Court in

the case of Educational Society, Tumsar and Ors (first supra), it is the

primary liability of the State Government to pay the entire and full

backwages of the Respondent No. 1, which shall be done by the State

Government as directed in this judgment.

29. In a very recent decision delivered on 14.07.2025 of the

Supreme Court in the case of Vikram Bhalchandra Ghongade Vs. The

Headmistress, Girls High School and Junior College, Anji (Mothi), Tah.

And Distt. Wardha and Ors.3 the Supreme Court has in paragraph No.7

observed as under:-

“7. It must be observed that a teacher in an aided school for

all practical purposes is akin to a post under the State
Government. Pertinent is the fact that the posts in aided schools
are either sanctioned by the Government or approved in
accordance with the Rules and pay and allowances are also paid
by the Government. The aided school teachers are also entitled
to some of the conditions of service as are applicable to
Government teachers, with entitlement of pension, provident
fund and gratuity as applicable, in accordance with the Rules

3 2025 INSC 824

38 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

brought out under Article 309 of the Constitution of India.

Though strictly speaking the teachers may not be holding a post
under the State Government, it is akin to a post under the State
Government, at least for the monetary benefits of pay and
allowances, while in service, as also pension and other benefits
on retirement.”

30. The Supreme Court has further in paragraph No.9 observed

that a person entering service though has a normal expectation on

attaining the age of superannuation but there are vagaries of fate

which would make it otherwise. The Petitioner in the present case has

been a victim of the vagaries of fate as is evident in the facts and

circumstances of the present case which is seen from the omission of

the Petitioner and the unfortunate timeline in the present case.

31. The amplitude of this Court of superintendence under Article

227 of the Constitution of India while considering the impugned orders

passed in such proceedings is very wide and this Court has the power

to even vary and mould the directions contained in the orders passed

by the Court below in the interest of justice. Hence it is the primary

liability and duty of the State Government to comply with the

directions given by the Court in the first instance in case of aided posts.

32. In the present case it is seen that Respondent No.1 has been

at the mercy of the system and Petitioners and in that view of the

matter, the State Government duly represented by the Joint Director of

Higher Education cannot take advantage of the same. Prima facie, it is

an admitted position that Petitioners failed to honour and adhere to

39 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

the directions contained in the impugned order regarding

reinstatement of Respondent No. 1. In the first instance that itself was

a massive failure on the part of Petitioners since it completely

frustrated not only the order of the Tribunal but also jeopardised the

future prospects of Respondent No.1. I say this because the

consequential actions directed in the Tribunal's order were clearly

contingent upon the Petitioners reinstating the Respondent No. 1. For

no fault of Respondent No. 1, she not having been reinstated led to the

inevitable consequences. Resultantly Respondent No. 1 could not plan

her future prospects which was specifically observed as a reason by the

Tribunal in the impugned order had she been relieved in 2014 itself.

As a consequence of this, Respondent No. 1 has consequently passed

her superannuation age while waiting for the present Petition to be

heard and decided. All this was only because Petitioners challenged

the impugned order passed by the Tribunal and obtained a stay

thereon in the year 2016 after almost more than 2 years. As a

consequence of the aforesaid facts which are admitted facts on record

Respondent No. 1 suffered immensely and therefore considering that

this Court has come to the conclusion that from all counts Respondent

No. 1 has been wronged, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal

deserves to be upheld but moulded and modified to the extent of the

directions contained in this judgement as delineated herein above.

Hence the aforesaid directions in paragraph No.26 have been passed

40 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

by this Court.

33. It is seen that the Supreme Court in the opening remark in

its judgment dated 30.10.2023 in the case of Pradeep Mehra Vs.

Harijivan J. Jethwa (since deceased thr. lrs.) and Ors. 4 has observed as

follows in paragraph No. 1:-

“1. This appeal before us shows how the execution proceedings

under order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’), are being delayed, and the
process is being abused in the execution proceedings, to the peril
of the helpless decree holder.
As long back as in 1872 (when the CPC of 1859 was in
operation), it was observed by the Privy Council that, “the
difficulties of a litigant in India begin when he has obtained a
decree” 5. The situation, we are afraid, is no better even today.”

34. I dare say, the situation is no better even after 154 years

after the aforesaid judgment of the Privy Council delivered in 1872 and

if the observations made therein are considered.

35. The Writ Petition stands disposed of with the above

directions.

36. This Court appreciates the aid and assistance rendered by Dr.

Warunjikar and Mr. Jenish Jain, learned Advocates appointed through

Legal Aid to represent and espouse the cause of Respondent No.1.

Their fees shall be released by the Legal Aid Department on production

of a server copy of this order and due compliance as per law.

4 2023 INSC 958

5 Raj Durbhunga Vs. Maharajha Coomar Ramaput Sing, 1872 SCC Online PC 16 : (1871-72) 14 Moo IA 605 at
page 612

41 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::

 49.WP.5424.2014.doc

37. All parties shall act on a server copy of this judgement.

[ MILIND N. JADHAV, J. ]

38. After this judgment is pronounced in Court learned AGP

appearing on behalf of Respondent No.3 – Joint Director of Higher

Education seeks stay of this judgement to enable the State to challenge

the same. Considering her request, the judgement is stayed for a

period of 4 weeks from today.

[ MILIND N. JADHAV, J. ]

Digitally signed
HARSHADA by HARSHADA
HANUMANT
HANUMANT SAWANT
SAWANT Date: 2025.07.25
14:58:59 +0530

42 of 42

::: Uploaded on - 25/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 26/07/2025 08:16:33 :::