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the power, if we fail to secure to ourselves the means of giving them
their freedom, under proper modifications, we have an agency in
making them slaves. To me it seems that the amendment proposed,
striking out the forfeiture, will defeat the very end its advocates have
in view. Really, sir, I fear it will happen to the honorable mover of the
amendment (Mr. Bidwell) as it happened to another celebrated
asserter of African rights—I mean the renowned Knight of La
Mancha. We all recollect that while that worthy knight was, with all
the real honesty in the world, descanting on the moral fitness of
things on the eternal, unalienable, imprescriptible rights of man!—
that during all that time he was exercising himself and instructing
others on these themes—the very persons he had undertaken to
deliver—the great African Princess Micomicona, Queen of the great
African Kingdom Micomicon, with her father, her mother, her
brothers, her sisters, in short her whole family, were left in absolute
and irretrievable slavery; their fetters not knocked off, nor their
shackles lightened, nor one ray of light thrown in upon their prison.
And yet the good knight, with all possible self-complacency, astride
of his theories, was couching his lance, scouring the plain, the mirror
of philanthropic chivalry, the very cream of the milk of human
kindness!
Now, I say, sir, a little more practicable good, and a little less
theoretic impulse. Reason and legislate according to the actual state
of this description of persons. Place yourselves so as to do the best
possible for their good. They are thrown on your mercy. Do not trust
to others. You can be most certain this power will not be abused in
your own hands. Forfeit—because this is the technical word for
getting the control of them, and the only certain way of making
them secure of your humanity. But what shall be done with them?
That is a subsequent consideration. It is enough for me to know that
this House can never do any thing with them which humanity and
self-preservation do not dictate. Gentlemen will not pretend that
these Africans have more rights by nature than our children. And
yet, in every parish, poor children are bound out, without their
consent, until they are of age, and of capacity to take care of
themselves. These Africans are as helpless, ignorant, and
incompetent as such children, and the wisdom of the National
Legislature certainly can, and I have no doubt will, devise means to
make them useful members of society, without any infringement of
the rights of man.
Mr. Macon, (the Speaker.)—I still consider this a commercial
question. The laws of nations have nothing more to do with it than
the laws of the Turks or the Hindoos. We derive our powers of
legislation not from the laws of nations, but from the constitution. If
this is not a commercial question, I would thank the gentleman to
show what part of the constitution gives us any right to legislate on
this subject. It is in vain to talk of turning these creatures loose to
cut our throats.
Suppose we leave them as the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr.
Bidwell) has suggested, what will become of them? They will be
smuggled in and made slaves. All the arguments which I have yet
heard have served to confirm the opinion that a forfeiture is the only
effectual mode of prohibition; and though our sincerity has been
doubted with an if, yet I believe every member in this House is
solicitous to put a complete stop to this nefarious traffic.

Wednesday, December 31.

Importation of Slaves.

The House proceeded to consider the amendments reported by

the Committee of the Whole on the twenty-ninth instant, to the bill
to prohibit the importation or bringing of slaves into the United
States, or the territories thereof, after the 31st of December.
Mr. Sloan was decidedly opposed to the amendment. He was
aware that some might charge him with departing from his well-
known peaceable principles, in contending for so sanguinary a
punishment as death. But many crimes inferior to this were punished
with death, and he thought that there ought to be a proportion in
these things. Mr. S. stated the hardships of the Africans, and the
cruel circumstances attending their importation, and insisted on the
magnitude of the crime at considerable length.
After some conversation between Mr. Smilie and the Speaker, on a
point of order, Mr. Dana called for a division of the question. The
question was accordingly divided, the first being on striking out of
the bill so much as inflicts the punishment of death.
Mr. Ely was against striking out. He deemed the crime in question
as one of the most heinous kind, and one which ought to be
punished capitally. But his principal reason for advocating so severe
a punishment was, that he thought it the most effectual method of
putting a stop to the trade. The other provisions of the bill were, in
his opinion, not sufficient. If the punishment of death was inflicted,
he presumed no persons would venture to engage in the trade, and
run the risk of being punished, especially, as the traffic is one of the
most uncertain and perilous kinds. It is said, if you punish with such
severity, none will inform; but will any one venture to run the risk
under this impression? Mr. E. thought not. Besides, this is the most
humane punishment, because it will most effectually prevent the
accumulation of miseries that result from the trade. It will, also,
remove all the difficulties on the subject of forfeiture, by preventing
the introduction of slaves.
Mr. Tallmadge said he considered the question before the House to
be, whether we should strike out that part of the section which
attaches the crime of felony to this nefarious traffic, and, of course,
annexes to it the punishment of death. He trusted the House would
not consent to strike out that clause of the bill, the retention of
which should receive his hearty support.
Since I have had the honor of a seat in this House, I can scarcely
recollect an instance in which the members seem so generally to
agree in the principles of a bill, and yet differ so widely as to its
details. There seems to be great unanimity respecting the atrocity of
the crime, but a wide difference of opinion as to the measures
necessary to prevent it. To me, it is matter of surprise as well as of
regret, that gentlemen, who appear so ardently engaged to prevent
the introduction of slaves into our country, should not be willing to
unite with us in providing for it an adequate punishment. The evils
which may be expected to result from this commerce, if persisted in,
will fall on the Southern States; and the Eastern and Middle States
are accused of carrying it on. If this be the fact, and gentlemen are
sincere in their declarations, why will they not unite with us to mete
out that punishment which, on their own statements, will fall
exclusively on those who are concerned in this execrable traffic from
the Northern States?
Mr. Mosely.—The only objection which has been made against this
section of the bill, as it was originally introduced, is, that the severity
of the penalty as there prescribed, would probably prevent the law
from being carried into execution.
I entirely agree in the justice of the general remark, that it is the
certainty, more than the severity, of the punishment, which tends to
prevent the commission of crimes; that when the penalty is
excessive or disproportioned to the offence, it will naturally create a
repugnance to the law, and render its execution odious.
But I would ask, in the first place, what punishment can be
considered as too severe to be inflicted on this inhuman and
murderous traffic? Viewed in all its consequences, there is hardly to
be found, I apprehend, in the whole catalogue of crimes, one
attended with more accumulated guilt. I have, indeed, sir, heard no
gentleman suggest any thing in palliation of this offence, or deny
that it is justly deserving of death. Why, then, are we to presume
that the law would not be enforced? The gentlemen from the South
assure us that they, and the people whom they represent, are
sincerely solicitous to prevent the further importation of slaves into
this country, and they will cheerfully and cordially co-operate in the
most effectual measures for that purpose. Will they, then, from
motives of tenderness to the persons employed in importing them,
be unwilling to subject those persons to the punishment they justly
merit?
 Sir, there is one circumstance worthy of attention, which I think
must obviate every objection of this sort. Who are the people
engaged in this business? We have been repeatedly told, and told
with an air of some triumph, by gentlemen from the South, that it is
not their citizens; that they have no concern in this nefarious traffic;
that it is the people from the Northern States who import these
negroes into the Southern States, and thereby seduce their citizens
to become their purchasers. If this be the fact, are we to believe
that they will entertain any particular feelings of partiality or passion
towards this class of people, or that they will not feel a just degree
of indignation towards them, and be disposed to subject them to the
most exemplary punishment? And as it respects the great body of
the people in the Northern States, at least, I will presume to say, of
the State which I have the honor to represent, should any of their
citizens be convicted upon this law, so far from charging their
Southern brethren with cruelty or severity in hanging them, they
would acknowledge the favor with gratitude. When we consider the
character of the persons engaged in this traffic, that they are the
most hardened and abandoned of the human species, and that it is
extremely lucrative, can we suppose that any penalty short of death
will deter them from it? I shall be very glad if even this will have the
effect.
Mr. Lloyd.—Though this traffic is sanctioned by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, I regard it with hatred and
abhorrence, and conceive it to be of the highest importance that we
take means to put a complete stop to its further continuance. But, in
my opinion, the punishment of death is not best calculated to
accomplish this object. Besides, it is not proportional to the crime.
This subject has not, I conceive, been fairly argued. Very few of the
negroes brought into this country are kidnapped and stolen away.
Look at the condition of the people of Africa. Three-fourths of those
brought into this country are slaves originally, either by descent or
conquest. It is a fact that slavery prevails extensively in Africa. Those
taken in conquest are disposed of and sent abroad on account of the
vindictive spirit of those people. Such is their thirst for revenge, that
this is absolutely necessary for the safety of the conqueror. Of
course, all the arguments urged on the ground of the slaves being
kidnapped and carried away from a state of freedom, are fallacious.
Mr. Olin.—I would ask gentlemen if they would not as soon be
willing to be brought to the halter as to be made slaves for life? If
they would, and I trust they would, man-stealing is a crime as bad
as murder, and ought to be punished as heavy. I was at first against
the punishment of death; but I own that gentlemen have convinced
me by their arguments, and I am now the other way. I am
persuaded that gentlemen will think there is nothing dishonorable in
this changing one’s mind.
Mr. Early.—I formerly thought that the decision on this question
was not a matter of any great importance; but as it seems now to be
considered as a prelude to an attack on subsequent parts of the bill,
it appears to me now important that the subject be well understood
and rightly decided.
What are you told? You are now told that a forfeiture is
unnecessary, and that to inflict the punishment of death is the only
way to stop this trade. I consider this as an old attack revived in a
new form. I hope the House will pardon me for undertaking to
assign reasons for the bill as reported.
I should like to know how the fear of death will operate on a man
who is bound with his slaves to a country where he knows the
punishment will not be enforced. He will be bound to a country
where the people see slaves every hour of their lives; where there is
no such abhorrence of the crime of importing them, and where no
man dare inform. My word for it, I pledge it to-day, and I wish it
may be recollected; no man in the Southern section of the Union will
dare inform. It would cost him more than his life is worth. No man
would risk it when it led to the punishment of death, when it was
not for an offence which nature revolts at. They do not consider it as
a crime.
 The gentleman (Mr. Smilie) has said that, in the Southern States,
slavery is felt and acknowledged to be a great evil, and that
therefore we will execute a severe law to prevent an increase of this
evil. Permit me to tell the gentleman of a small distinction in this
case. A large majority of the people in the Southern States do not
consider slavery as a crime. They do not believe it immoral to hold
human flesh in bondage. Many deprecate slavery as an evil; as a
political evil; but not as a crime. Reflecting men apprehend, at some
future day, evils, incalculable evils, from it; but it is a fact that few,
very few, consider it as a crime.
It is best to be candid on this subject. If they considered the
holding of men in slavery as a crime, they would necessarily accuse
themselves, a thing which human nature revolts at. I will tell the
truth. A large majority of people in the Southern States do not
consider slavery as even an evil. Let the gentleman go and travel in
that quarter of the Union; let him go from neighborhood to
neighborhood, and he will find that this is the fact.
Mr. Holland.—In the Southern States slavery is generally
considered as a political evil, and in that point of view nearly all are
disposed to stop the trade for the future. But have capital
punishments been usually inflicted on offences merely political? I
believe not. Fine and imprisonment are the common punishments in
such cases. The people of the South do not generally consider
slavery as a moral offence. The importer might say to the informer
that he had done no worse, nor even so bad as he. It is true that I
have these slaves from Africa; but I have transported them from one
master to another. I am not guilty of holding human beings in
bondage. But you are. You have hundreds on your plantations in this
miserable condition. By your purchases you tempt traders to
increase the evil. You and your ancestors have introduced this
calamity into the country, and you are continuing, you are
augmenting it. The importer might hold the same language to the
jury and the judge who try him. He might tell them that they were
even more guilty than he. Under such circumstances the law
inflicting death would not be executed. But if you punish by fine and
imprisonment only, you will find the people of the South willing and
ready to execute the law.
Mr. Dwight.—We are all happily agreed in the great object of the
bill—the prevention of the importation of slaves into the United
States. Unfortunately, we are not so well agreed in the means to
effect this object. It is not, however, at all strange that men should
differ about the best mode to accomplish so important a purpose;
and especially men in the circumstances in which we are placed.
Those of us who come from the Northern and Eastern States, where
slavery exists not at all, or but in a slight degree, would naturally
view this subject in a very different light from gentlemen who
represent the Southern States, where slavery always has existed,
and that to a great extent. As great a degree of unanimity as is
possible is of much importance, both for the purpose of effectually
preventing this inhuman traffic, and for the honor and reputation of
our country.
The gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Early) has informed us
repeatedly that a law making this a capital offence cannot be
executed in the Southern States; that the importation of slaves has
so long been familiar to them, that a great majority of the people
consider it not as an aggravated crime, and a large portion of them
as no crime at all; that if we make such an offence capital; if we
make the consequence of importing a cargo of slaves to be the loss
of life, no man will ever be prosecuted for it, because no man will
dare inform. All the gentlemen, sir, from the Southern States, who
have spoken on this subject, have told us that they earnestly wish
effectually to prevent the slave trade in future. I am disposed to
credit them fully. Indeed, I cannot conceive that they should not
sincerely and fervently wish to prevent a traffic, which, if persisted
in, must in all human probability, first or last, bring upon them and
their families the most tremendous calamities. If, then, they view the
subject in this light, if they are sincere in making these declarations,
there is not only no danger that the law will not be executed, but
they will unite to a man to execute the law; the whole community
will inform; a regard to their own lives, and the lives of their
posterity, will drive them to it. And if, sir, in the rigid execution of this
statute, its penalties fall upon men from the Eastern States, who are
profligate enough to engage in this inhuman trade, I most heartily
concur with my colleague in saying, let the law have its full force, let
it fall with all its force upon the offender; let him die.
The question being taken by yeas and nays, on striking out so
much of the first section as inflicts the punishment of death on
owners and masters of vessels employed in the slave trade, it was
carried—yeas 63, nays 53, as follows:

Yeas.—Willis Alston, jun., John Archer, Joseph Barker, Burwell

Bassett, Silas Betton, John Boyle, William A. Burwell, William Butler,
George W. Campbell, Martin Chittenden, John Claiborne, Joseph
Clay, George Clinton, jun., John Clopton, Orchard Cook, Ezra Darby,
John Dawson, William Dickson, Peter Early, James Elliot, Caleb Ellis,
Ebenezer Elmer, James Fisk, Isaiah L. Green, William Helms, James
Holland, David Holmes, John G. Jackson, Walter Jones, Thomas
Kenan, Nehemiah Knight, Edward Lloyd, Patrick Magruder, Robert
Marion, William McCreery, David Meriwether, Nicholas R. Moore,
Thomas Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Gurdon S. Mumford, Thomas
Newton, jun., John Randolph, John Rhea of Tennessee, Jacob
Richards, Peter Sailly, Thomas Sanford, Martin G. Schuneman,
Dennis Smelt, John Smith, Samuel Smith, Henry Southard, Richard
Stanford, Joseph Stanton, Samuel Taggart, Samuel Tenney, Uri Tracy,
Abram Trigg, Daniel C. Verplanck, Robert Whitehill, Eliphalet Wickes,
Nathan Williams, Joseph Winston, and Thomas Wynns.
Nays.—Evan Alexander, Isaac Anderson, David Bard, George M.
Bedinger, Barnabas Bidwell, John Blake, jun., Thomas Blount, James
M. Broom, Robert Brown, Levi Casey, John Chandler, Matthew Clay,
Frederick Conrad, Leonard Covington, Richard Cutts, Samuel W.
Dana, John Davenport, junior, Theodore Dwight, Elias Earle, William
Ely, John W. Eppes, William Findlay, John Fowler, Edwin Gray,
Andrew Gregg, Silas Halsey, Seth Hastings, David Hough, John
Lambert, Duncan McFarland, Josiah Masters, John Morrow, Jonathan
O. Mosely, Jeremiah Nelson, Gideon Olin, John Porter, John Pugh,
John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Russell, Thomas Sammons,
Ebenezer Seaver, James Sloan, John Smilie, Benjamin Tallmadge,
David Thomas, Thomas W. Thompson, Philip Van Cortlandt, Joseph
B. Varnum, Peleg Wadsworth, John Whitehill, David R. Williams,
Marmaduke Williams, and Alexander Wilson.

The question on inserting, in lieu of what was stricken out, a

clause prescribing imprisonment for not more than ten, nor less than
five years, was carried without a division.
The amendments to the second and third sections were read and
agreed to, when, after several unsuccessful attempts to adjourn, the
further consideration of the subject was postponed till Friday—ayes
71—to which day the House adjourned.

Monday, January 5, 1807.

Another member, to wit, Matthew Walton, from Kentucky,
appeared, and took his seat in the House.

Wednesday, January 7.

Salt Duty.

Mr. J. Randolph, from the Committee of Ways and Means, to whom

was referred, on the third ultimo, so much of the President’s
Message as relates “to a suppression of the duties on salt, to a
continuation of the Mediterranean fund, and to the state of our
revenues,” presented a bill repealing the acts laying duties on salt,
and continuing in force, for a further time, the first section of the
act, entitled “An act further to protect the commerce and seamen of
the United States against the Barbary Powers;” which was read
twice, and committed to a Committee of the Whole on Friday next.
 Friday, January 9.
Another member, to wit, Matthew Lyon, from Kentucky, appeared,
and took his seat in the House.

Monday, January 12.

Duties on Salt.

Mr. J. Randolph moved that the House resolve itself into a

Committee of the Whole on the bill for “repealing the acts laying
duties on salt, and continuing in force the first section of an act,
entitled an act further to protect the commerce and seamen of the
United States against the Barbary Powers.”[45]

Tuesday, January 20.

Suspension of the Anti-slavery of the Ordinance of ’87 in

Indiana.

The Speaker laid before the House a letter from William Henry
Harrison, Governor of the Indiana Territory, enclosing certain
resolutions passed by the Legislative Council and House of
Representatives of the said Territory, relative to a suspension, for a
certain period, of the sixth article of compact between the United
States and the Territories and States north-west of the river Ohio,
made on the thirteenth of July, one thousand seven hundred and
eighty-seven; which were read, as follows:

Resolved, unanimously, by the Legislative Council and House of

Representatives of the Indiana Territory, That a suspension of the
sixth article of compact between the United States and the
Territories and States north-west of the river Ohio, passed the 13th
day of July, 1787, for the term of ten years, would be highly
advantageous to the said Territory, and meet the approbation of at
least nine-tenths of the good citizens of the same.
Resolved, unanimously, That the abstract question of liberty and
slavery is not considered as involved in a suspension of the said
article, inasmuch as the number of slaves in the United States would
not be augmented by the measure.
Resolved, unanimously, That the suspension of the said article
would be equally advantageous to the Territory, to the States from
whence the negroes would be brought, and to the negroes
themselves.
To the Territory, because of its situation with regard to the other
States; it must be settled by emigrants from those in which slavery is
tolerated, or for many years remain in its present situation, its
citizens deprived of the greater part of their political rights, and,
indeed, of all those which distinguish the American from the citizens
and subjects of other governments.
The States which are overburdened with negroes would be
benefited by their citizens having an opportunity of disposing of the
negroes which they cannot comfortably support, or of removing with
them to a country abounding with all the necessaries of life; and the
negro himself would exchange a scanty pittance of the coarsest food
for a plentiful and nourishing diet, and a situation which admits not
the most distant prospect of emancipation, for one which presents
no considerable obstacle to his wishes.
Resolved, unanimously, That the citizens of this part of the former
North-western Territory consider themselves as having claims upon
the indulgence of Congress in regard to a suspension of the said
article, because at the time of the adoption of the ordinance of 1787
slavery was tolerated, and slaves generally possessed by the citizens
then inhabiting the country, amounting to at least one-half the
present population of Indiana, and because the said ordinance was
passed in Congress when the said citizens were not represented in
that body, without their being consulted, and without their
knowledge and approbation.
Resolved, unanimously, That, from the situation, soil, climate, and
productions of the Territory, it is not believed that the number of
slaves would ever bear such proportion to the white population, as
to endanger the internal peace and prosperity of the country.
Resolved, unanimously, That copies of these resolutions be
delivered to the Governor of this Territory, to be by him forwarded to
the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the United States, with a request that they will
lay the same before the Senate and House of Representatives, over
which they respectively preside.
Resolved, unanimously, That a copy of these resolutions be
delivered to the delegate to Congress from this Territory, and that he
be, and he hereby is, instructed to use his best endeavors to obtain
a suspension of the said article.

The resolutions were referred to Mr. Parke, Mr. Masters, Mr. Rhea of
Tennessee, Mr. Sanford, Mr. Alston, Mr. Jeremiah Morrow, and Mr.
Trigg, to examine and report their opinion thereupon to the House.

Monday, January 26.

Another new member, to wit, William W. Bibb, from Georgia,
returned to serve as a member for the said State, in the place of
Thomas Spalding, who has resigned his seat, appeared, produced
his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

Suspension of the Habeas Corpus.

A message was received from the Senate, by Mr. Samuel Smith, as

follows:
 Mr. Speaker: I am directed by the Senate of the United States to
deliver to this House a confidential message, in writing.

The House being cleared of all persons except the members and
the Clerk, Mr. Smith delivered to the Speaker the following
communication in writing:

Gentlemen of the House of Representatives:

The Senate have passed a bill suspending for three months the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, in certain cases, which they
think expedient to communicate to you in confidence, and to request
your concurrence therein, as speedily as the emergency of the case
shall in your judgment require.

Mr. Smith, also, delivered in the bill referred to in the said

communication, and then withdrew.
The bill was read as follows:

A Bill suspending the writ of Habeas Corpus for three months, in

certain cases.
Be it enacted, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America, in Congress assembled, That in all cases,
where any person or persons, charged on oath with treason,
misprision of treason, or other high crime or misdemeanor,
endangering the peace, safety, or neutrality of the United States,
have been or shall be arrested or imprisoned, by virtue of any
warrant or authority of the President of the United States, or from
the Chief Executive Magistrate of any State or Territorial
Government, or from any person acting under the direction or
authority of the President of the United States, the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus shall be, and the same hereby is suspended,
for and during the term of three months from and after the passage
of this act, and no longer.
 Mr. P. R. Thompson moved that the message and the bill received
from the Senate ought not to be kept secret, and that the doors be
opened.
Mr. Burwell and Mr. Smilie spoke in support of the motion.
Mr. Early thought that a previous order should be taken to remove
the injunction of secrecy. To open the doors and admit strangers to
hear the debate, and yet continue the injunction of secrecy on
members, would present a singular spectacle.
Mr. J. Randolph said they could not be bound to secrecy except by
their own vote. If there was any charm by which they could be
bound, except their own act, he wished it might be dissolved.
Mr. G. W. Campbell hoped the usual course would be pursued; read
the bill a second time, and then refer it to a Committee of the
Whole.
Mr. Alston thought the question, whether the bill should pass to a
second reading, first in order.
The Speaker decided that the motion to open the doors was in
order, and the question on that motion must first be taken.
The yeas and nays being demanded by one-fifth of the members
present, they were ordered to be taken.
The question then was put on the motion, That the message and
bill received from the Senate ought not to be kept secret, and that
the doors be now opened; and resolved in the affirmative—yeas
123, nays 3.
Mr. Eppes moved that the bill be rejected.[46] This motion was
afterwards withdrawn to give place to another motion, but with the
idea of renewing it again.
Mr. Burwell said he was unacquainted with the particular reasons
which had induced the Senate to pass this bill. None had been
assigned when the bill was communicated, and no additional
documents presented. He could, therefore, only be governed by that
information which the House had received; and he believed that it
would justify the motion before the House. The President, in his
Message of the 22d, says, “on the whole, the fugitives from Ohio
and their associates from Cumberland, or other places in that
quarter, cannot threaten serious danger to the city of New Orleans.”
If that be the case, upon what ground shall we suspend the writ of
habeas corpus? Can any person imagine the United States are in
danger, after this declaration of the President, who unquestionably
possesses more correct information than any other person can be
supposed to have. In another part of the Message, we are informed
—

“That the persons arrested at New Orleans have been embarked

for some of the Atlantic ports, probably on the consideration that an
impartial trial could not be expected during the present agitations of
New Orleans, and that that city was not as yet a safe place of
confinement. As soon as these persons shall arrive, they will be
delivered to the custody of the law, and left to such course of trial,
both as to place and process, as its functionaries may direct; the
presence of the highest judicial authorities to be assembled at this
place within a few days, the means of pursuing a sounder course of
proceedings here than elsewhere, and the Executive means, should
the judges have occasion to use them, render it equally desirable,
for the criminals as for the public, that being already removed from
the place where they were apprehended, the first regular arrest
should take place here, and the course of proceedings receive here
its proper direction.”

The President evidently holds out the idea, that the correct and
proper mode of proceeding can be had under the existing laws of
the United States. These persons may be transferred from the
military to the civil authority, and be proceeded against according to
law. Those, therefore, who fear the escape of the traitors already
apprehended, and would, by this measure, obviate the difficulty,
must perceive that consequence would not ensue. Mr. B. said he
should consider the suspension of the habeas corpus as holding out
an idea of danger and alarm, which was highly improper, inasmuch
as it did not exist. It is true, this conspiracy was once formidable,
extensive, and threatening; but it has been dissipated by the
vigilance of Government. He would ask gentlemen, if they seriously
believed the danger sufficiently great to justify the suspension of this
most important right of the citizen, to proclaim the country in peril,
and to adopt a measure so pregnant with mischief, by which the
innocent and guilty will be involved in one common destruction? He
said this was not the first instance of the kind since the formation of
the Federal Government; there had been already two insurrections in
the United States, both of which had defied the authority of
Congress, and menaced the Union with dissolution. Notwithstanding
one of them justified the calling out of fifteen thousand men, and
the expenditure of one million of dollars, he had not heard of a
proposition to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. What, then, will
be said of us, if now, when the danger is over, firm in the
attachment of the people to the Union, with ample resources to
encounter any difficulties which may occur, we resort to a measure
so harsh in its nature, oppressive in its operation, and ruinous as a
precedent? While, in former times, it was thought unsafe to suspend
this most important and valuable part of the constitution, he would
ask, whether the necessity at the present time could be considered
greater? With regard to those persons who may be implicated in the
conspiracy, if the writ of habeas corpus be not suspended, what will
be the consequence? When apprehended, they will be brought
before a court of justice, who will decide whether there is any
evidence that will justify their commitment for further prosecution.
From the communication of the Executive, it appeared there was
sufficient evidence to authorize their commitment. Several months
would elapse before their final trial, which would give time to collect
evidence, and if this shall be sufficient, they would not fail to receive
the punishment merited by their crimes and inflicted by the laws of
their country.
 Mr. B. said he could conceive no injury that would result on this
score; and, indeed, if some persons should elude justice, it would
not endanger society so materially as to come within the terms of
the constitution. He observed, it appeared to him the
commencement of an insurrection was the only time when the writ
of habeas corpus ought to be suspended; when the seizure of the
ringleaders, by dismaying the inferior agents, would enable the
Government, without the effusion of blood, to suppress it. But it was
manifest that, at this moment, every thing intended by the
conspirators was effected, or they were in the hands of the civil
authority; there was, therefore, no good reason to take this
precautionary step with that view; while on the one hand, it would
unavoidably produce unnecessary alarm, and much inconvenience to
the citizens of the United States. Nothing but the most imperious
necessity would excuse us in confining to the Executive, or any
person under him, the power of seizing and confining a citizen, upon
bare suspicion, for three months, without responsibility, for the
abuse of such unlimited discretion. Mr. B. said he could judge from
what he had already seen, that men, who are perfectly innocent,
would be doomed to feel the severity of confinement, and undergo
the infamy of the dungeon. What reparation can be made to those
who shall thus suffer? The people of the United States would have
just reason to reproach their representatives with wantonly
sacrificing their dearest interests, when, from the facts presented to
this House, it seems the country was perfectly safe, and the
conspiracy nearly annihilated. Under these circumstances, there can
be no apology for suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and violating the constitution, which declares “the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of
invasion or rebellion, the public safety may require it.”
Mr. B. said he hoped he had shown that, admitting the two cases
specified in the constitution existed, they were not accompanied
with such symptoms of calamity as rendered the passage of the bill
expedient.
 What, in another point of light, would be the effect of passing
such a law? Would it not establish a dangerous precedent? A corrupt
and vicious Administration, under the sanction and example of this
law, might harass and destroy the best men of the country. It would
only be necessary to excite artificial commotions, circulate
exaggerated rumors of danger, and then follows the repetition of this
law, by which every obnoxious person, however honest, is
surrendered to the vindictive resentment of the Government. It will
not be a sufficient answer, that this power will not be abused by the
President of the United States. He, Mr. B. believed, would not abuse
it, but it would be impossible to restrain all those who are under
him. Besides, he would not consent to advocate a principle bad, in
itself, because it will not, probably, be abused. For these reasons, Mr.
B. said, he should vote to reject the bill.
Mr. Elliot said that he regretted the motion to reject the bill had
been made, because, considering the subject of very great
importance, he thought it most proper that it should take the usual
course of business, that the bill should be read a second time, and
referred to a Committee of the Whole, for the purposes of
deliberation and discussion.
Called upon, however, said Mr. E., to answer to the question, Shall
the bill be rejected? I must answer that question in the affirmative,
as I should deem it my duty to advocate its rejection in any form
which it might assume, and in any stage of its progress; and I deem
it equally my duty, on the present occasion, to express my
sentiments upon the subject. It is, indeed, difficult for me,
consistently with the sincere and high respect which I entertain for
the source from whence this measure originated, to express, in
decorous terms, the hostility which I feel to the proposition. I am
therefore disposed to consider it as an original proposition here; as a
motion in this body to suspend, for a limited time, the privileges
attached to the writ of habeas corpus. And, in this point of view, I
am prepared to say that it is the most extraordinary proposition that
has ever been presented for our consideration and adoption. Sir,
what is the language of our constitution upon this subject? “The
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except
when, in cases of invasion or rebellion, the public safety shall require
it.” Have we a right to suspend it in any and every case of invasion
and rebellion? So far from it, that we are under a constitutional
interdiction to act, unless the existing invasion or rebellion, in our
sober judgment, threatens the first principles of the national
compact, and the constitution itself. In other words, we can only act
in this case with a view to national self-preservation. We can
suspend the writ of habeas corpus only in a case of extreme
emergency; that alone is salus populi which will justify this lex
suprema. And is this a crisis of such awful moment? Is it necessary,
at this time, to constitute a dictatorship, to save the people from
themselves, and to take care that the Republic shall receive no
detriment? What is the proposition? To create a single Dictator, as in
ancient Rome, in whom all power shall be vested for a time? No; to
create one great Dictator, and a multitude, an army of subaltern and
petty despots; to invest, not only the President of the United States,
but the Governors of States and Territories, and, indeed, all persons
deriving civil or military authority from the supreme Executive, with
unlimited and irresponsible power over the personal liberty of your
citizens. Is this one of those great crises that require a suspension, a
temporary prostration of the constitution itself? Does the stately
superstructure of our Republic thus tremble to its centre, and totter
towards its fall? Common sense must give a negative answer to
these questions. What are the facts? Is it, indeed, a case of
rebellion? We are officially informed that rebellion has reared its
hydra front in the peaceful valleys of the West. But we are also
informed by the Executive that treason has no prospect of success;
that “the fugitives from the Ohio, and their associates from
Cumberland, cannot threaten serious danger even to the city of New
Orleans.” Not a single city, still less a Territory or a State, is
considered in danger; and the Executive, not only possesses all the
information which has been communicated to us, but much more,
for we are informed that the communication has been made under
the reservation contained in the resolution requesting it, and of
course all the facts in the knowledge of the Executive, which are
decided to be improper for disclosure at this time, have been kept
back. And the Executive, possessing all this information, assures us
that the public safety is not endangered. Can we, under these
circumstances, consent to the investiture of dictatorial powers in that
department of the Government which thus assures us that all is
safe? It would be contrary to the spirit of the constitution.
But we shall be told that the constitution has contemplated cases
of this kind, and, in reference to them, invested us with unlimited
discretion. When any gentleman shall advance such a position, we,
who advocate the rejection of the bill, will meet him upon that
ground, and put the point at issue. We contend that the framers of
the constitution never contemplated the exercise of such a power,
under circumstances like the present; and that the constitution itself,
instead of authorizing, has prohibited such discretion, unless in an
extreme case. And can any member lay his hand upon his heart and
say, that the present is a case of that description? He who cannot do
this must, with us, consider the proposed measure as
unconstitutional.
Let us pay a little attention to the nature and character of the writ
of habeas corpus. It has its origin in Great Britain, and is there
considered in two great points of view, as it respects the monarch,
and as it respects the subject. As it respects the monarch, it is one
of the jura prerogativa, a writ of prerogative; but it is not considered
as calculated to increase the power of the king, or the splendor of
the throne; in its origin and true character it is viewed as a
prerogative, exercised by the king, or those authorities to whom his
judicial powers are supposed to be delegated, only for the purpose
of securing the constitutional rights of the subject, and restraining
the invasion of those rights. As it respects the subject, it is a writ of
right, and is emphatically called, by English writers, a writ of liberty.
By the provisions of the famous statute of Charles II., which has
even been called a second magna charta, its privileges are
guarantied to all British subjects at all times. An eminent English
author, and the most popular writer upon subjects of legal science,
considers its suspension as the suspension of liberty itself; declares
that the measure ought never to be resorted to but in cases of
extreme emergency; and says that the nation then parts with its
freedom for a short and limited time, only to resume and secure it
for ever. Hence, he compares the suspension of the habeas corpus
act in Great Britain to the dictatorship of the Roman Republic.
But objectionable as the bill upon the table is in point of principle,
it is, if possible, still more objectionable in point of detail. It invests
with the power of violating the first principles of civil and political
liberty, not only the supreme Executive, and the Executives of
individual States and Territories, but all civil and military officers who
may derive any authority whatever from the Chief Magistrate. And it
extends the operation of the suspension of the privileges of the
habeas corpus, not only to persons guilty or suspected of treason, or
misprision of treason, but, to those who may be accused of any
other crime or misdemeanor, tending to endanger the “peace, safety,
or neutrality,” of the United States! What a vast and almost illimitable
field of power is here opened, in which Executive discretion may
wander at large and uncontrolled! A vast and dangerous scene of
power, indeed! It gives the power of dispensing with the ordinary
operation of the laws to a host of those little great men, who are
attached to every Government under heaven. I wish not to reflect
upon any of those subordinate officers who may be employed by the
Government of my country.
But no one will doubt that, in times of alarm and danger, many
men will be clothed with the functions of office, who are
incompetent to the discreet exercise of such boundless discretion. I
can never wish to see such persons invested with the means of
aiming at the heads of their private enemies, or other innocent and
unoffending citizens, the thunderbolts of public indignation, or
scorching them with the lightning of public suspicion. Says the poet:

“Could great men thunder, Jove would ne’er be quiet,

For every petty pelting officer
Would use his heaven for thunder.”
 Let us again ask for evidence of the necessity of this measure?
Certainly none can be produced, for we are informed, from the first
authority, that if the present be not a time of profound peace, it is
far from being a period of public danger. The leader of this petty
rebellion has been called the modern Catiline. Undoubtedly, he
possesses many of the qualities which a celebrated ancient historian
ascribes to the Catiline of Rome: his genius, his address, his activity,
his profligacy; but he is destitute of his means and resources. He
wants that power of doing mischief which the Roman conspirator
possessed. So far is he from being able to make war upon his
country, that he cannot take possession of a single city. He is rapidly
hastening to the same fate, although he may not meet it in the
same manner. Already is he “damn’d to everlasting fame,” or rather,
damned to everlasting infamy. Already is he a fugitive. Already a
price is set upon his head. In the papers of this morning, we see
that the Governor of Orleans has offered a reward for his
apprehension. We cannot but detest the traitor, but we can have no
fears of the consequences of the treason.
Mr. E. concluded, by expressing a hope that the bill would meet a
decided vote of rejection.
Mr. Eppes.—When I feel a decided hostility to a principle, it is not
material to me in what form I meet it. Decidedly opposed to the
principle of this bill, I shall vote against it in all its stages, and
cannot but hope that the motion of my colleague to reject it will
prevail. By this bill, we are called upon to exercise one of the most
important powers vested in Congress by the Constitution of the
United States. A power which suspends the personal rights of your
citizens, which places their liberty wholly under the will, not of the
Executive Magistrate only, but of his inferior officers. Of the
importance of this power, of the caution which ought to be employed
in its exercise, the words of the constitution afford irresistible
evidence. The words of the constitution are: “The privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases
of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.” The
wording of this clause of the constitution deserves peculiar attention.
It is not in every case of invasion, nor in every case of rebellion, that
the exercise of this power by Congress can be justified under the
words of the constitution. The words of the constitution confine the
exercise of this power exclusively to cases of rebellion or invasion,
where the public safety requires it. In carrying into effect most of
the important powers of Congress, something is left for the exercise
of its discretion. We raise armies when, in our opinion, armies are
necessary. We may call forth the militia to suppress insurrection or
repel invasion, when we consider this measure necessary. But we
can only suspend the privilege of the habeas corpus, “when, in cases
of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it.” Well, indeed,
may this caution have been used as to the exercise of this important
power. It is in a free country the most tremendous power which can
be placed in the hands of a legislative body. It suspends, at once,
the chartered rights of the community, and places even those who
pass the act under military despotism. The constitution, however,
having vested this power in Congress, and a branch of the
Legislature having thought its exercise necessary, it remains for us to
inquire whether the present situation of our country authorizes, on
our part, a resort to this extraordinary measure.
The inquiry is confined within very narrow limits. The power can
only be exercised under the constitution, “when, in cases of rebellion
or invasion, the public safety may require it.” Our country is not
invaded. We have only, therefore, to inquire whether there exists in
this country a rebellion, and whether the public safety requires a
suspension of the habeas corpus. Of the existence of the rebellion or
combination against the authority of the United States there can be
no doubt, as we have on our table a detailed account of its origin
and progress. I shall confine my observations solely to the latter
part; whether the public safety requires a suspension of the habeas
corpus for its suppression. In the communication now on our table,
from the Executive, we have been informed that the militia of Ohio,
Kentucky, and Tennessee, and of the Mississippi and Orleans
Territories, have been ordered out. That General Wilkinson was at
Orleans, on the 10th of December, with his troops from the Sabine,
which from other information we know to consist of one thousand
effective men. These are resources of the nation now in active
operation. What is the force of the conspirators? By the same
documents, we are informed that “some boats, accounts vary from
five to double or treble that number, and persons, differently
estimated from one to three hundred, had passed the falls of the
Ohio to rendezvous at the mouth of Cumberland river, with others
expected down that river.” From the same document it appears that
the force which comes down Cumberland river amounts to two
boats, in one of which is Aaron Burr. From this statement, it appears
that the largest calculation as to the actual force of the conspirators,
is three hundred. But when we know the propensity of human
nature to magnify accounts of this kind, we may fairly infer that the
whole force does not exceed one hundred and fifty men. To oppose
which, we have one thousand regular troops, and the militia of Ohio,
Kentucky, and Tennessee, and of the Mississippi and Orleans
Territories. Is there a man present who believes, on this statement,
that the public safety requires a suspension of the habeas corpus?
This Government has now been in operation thirty years; during this
whole period, our political charter, whatever it may have sustained,
has never been suspended. Never, under this Government, has
personal liberty been held at the will of a single individual. Shall we,
in the full tide of prosperity, possessed of the confidence of the
nation, with a revenue of fifteen millions of dollars, and six hundred
thousand freemen, able and ready to bear arms in defence of their
country, believe its safety endangered by a collection of men which
the militia of any one county in our country would be amply
sufficient to subdue? Shall we, sir, suspend the chartered rights of
the community for the suppression of a few desperadoes; of a small
banditti already surrounded by your troops; pressed from above by
your militia; met below by your regulars, and without a chance of
escape, but by abandoning their boats, and seeking safety in the
woods? I consider the means at present in operation amply sufficient
for the suppression of this combination. If additional means were
necessary, I should be willing to vote as many additional bayonets as
shall be necessary for every traitor. I cannot, however, bring myself
to believe that this country is placed in such a dreadful situation as
to authorize me to suspend the personal rights of the citizen, and to
give him, in lieu of a free constitution, the Executive will for his
charter. I consider the provision in the constitution for suspending
the habeas corpus as designed only for occasions of great national
danger. Like the power of creating a Dictator in ancient Rome, it
prostrates the rights of your citizens and endangers public liberty.
Like that it may, on some very extraordinary occasions, prove
salutary, but like that, it ought never to be resorted to but in cases
of absolute necessity; or, to use the emphatic language of the
constitution, “when the public safety requires it.” Believing that the
public safety is not endangered, and that the discussion of this
question is calculated to alarm the public mind at a time when no
real danger exists, I shall vote for the rejection of the bill in its
present stage.
Mr. Varnum said if he was of opinion with the gentlemen from
Vermont and Virginia, he should vote for the rejection of this bill; but
he entertained a different opinion, and, unless he heard something
to change it, he should vote differently from them. He did not
believe the constitution restricted the power of the Government to
suspend the privilege of the habeas corpus in cases where the
country was shaken to its centre. There were no expressions in it to
justify this inference. Its terms are: “The privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except when, in cases of
invasion or rebellion, the public safety shall require it.” Will
gentlemen deny that there exists in the United States at present a
rebellion? I presume not, said Mr. V., it is too notorious to admit of
doubt. Will they deny that the conspiracy has been formed with
deliberation, and has existed for a long time? Is it not evident that it
has become very extensive? If, then, this is the case, and the head
of the conspiracy has said that he is aided by a foreign power; if this
is true, are we justified in considering the country in a perfect state
of safety, until it is brought to a close? I conceive not. I consider the
country, in a degree, in a state of insecurity; and if so, the power is
vested in the Congress of the United States, under the constitution,
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. I am also apprehensive that
we shall not be able to trace the conspiracy to its source without
such a suspension. We have had an instance in which the head of
the conspiracy has been brought before a court of justice, and
where nothing has been brought against him. It is not my wish to
insinuate that any court or public functionary is contemplated by this
conspiracy; yet it is possible that this may be the case, and the very
existence of the country may depend on tracing it to its source. I am
not disposed to advocate sanguinary punishments, but I think they
ought to be exemplary in regard to the chiefs of the conspiracy; for
which purpose we ought to adopt those measures which will lead to
a full discovery of those concerned in it. I am sensible that the
Government of the United States has not hitherto resorted to this
measure; but I know a particular State of the Union who did
consider the measure necessary, in the case of an insurrection which
occurred within her limits; and I think it very doubtful whether that
insurrection would have so happily closed, if it had not been for her
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Have we had any
insurrection or rebellion in the United States like this? We have had
one insurrection in Massachusetts, but whence did it arise? Not from
a design to subvert the Government, but from the burden of taxes;
taxes which, perhaps, exceeded those laid in any country since the
formation of society. I do not mean, by these observations, by any
means to justify that insurrection, and, I believe, from the
circumstances with which I am acquainted, that the insurrection
which took place in Pennsylvania did not go to the subversion of the
Government. But let us look at this conspiracy. While the nation,
from one extreme to the other, enjoys a degree of prosperity and
happiness unparalleled in any other nation, and not a single
individual within our limits has any reason to complain of oppression,
an insurrection is fomented, subversive of the Government and
destructive of the rights of the people. It appears to me that this
insurrection is the most aggravating of all insurrections which history
gives us an account of. There is not the least oppression or the least
pressure of circumstances, to induce any individual to rise up against
the Government of this country; and it consequently betrays the
greatest turpitude of mind in those who either lead or unite in it. For
these reasons, I think it ought to be traced to its source, and I think
it very doubtful whether this can be effected without, in the first
instance, suspending the habeas corpus. Will gentlemen say that any
innocent man will have a finger laid upon him, should this law pass?
No; there is no probability of it; it is scarcely possible. But, even if it
be possible, if the public good requires the suspension of the
privilege, every man attached to the Government and to the liberty
he enjoys, will be surely willing to submit to this inconvenience for a
time, in order to secure the public happiness. The suspension only
applies to particular crimes, the liberties of the people will not
therefore be touched. I do think a great responsibility will rest on
this branch of the Legislature, in case they refuse to pass this act.
Suppose the head of this conspiracy shall be taken in a district of
country where no evidence exists of the crime charged to him, and
he shall consequently be set at liberty by the tribunals of justice;
where will the responsibility rest, but upon this branch of the
Legislature? It is too great for me, as an individual member, to bear.
I shall, therefore, vote for this bill, under the impression that it will
not have the injurious effects that some gentlemen seem to
apprehend; and that it will only more effectually consign the guilty
into the hands of justice.
Mr. R. Nelson.—As the motion to reject the bill meets my most
hearty approbation, and as I consider it involving a great national
question, I cannot reconcile it to my duty to give a silent vote on it. I
shall, however, in order to avoid an unnecessary consumption of the
time of the House, offer my remarks in as concise a compass as
possible. I shall first consider the nature of the writ of habeas
corpus; afterwards examine its effects, not only on the individual,
but on the community at large; taking into view the mode of
proceeding under it, to show, as I conceive, that no danger can
ensue, on the refusal to pass this bill.
What is a writ of habeas corpus? It is a writ directing a certain
person in custody to be brought before a tribunal of justice, to
inquire into the legality of his confinement. If the judge is of opinion
that the confinement is illegal, the person will of course be
discharged; if, on the contrary, from the evidence, he shall be of
opinion that there is sufficient grounds to suspect that he is guilty of
offence, he will not be discharged. Now, to me, it appears that this is
a proper and necessary power to be vested in our judges, and that a
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is, in all cases, improper. If
a man is taken up, and is denied an examination before a judge or a
court, he may, although innocent in this case, continue to suffer
confinement. This, in my opinion, is dangerous to the liberty of the
citizen. He may be taken up on vague suspicion, and may not have
his case examined for months, or even for years. Would not this
bear hard upon the rights of the citizen?
Let us turn over a leaf, and see how the Government stands. If
the person accused is legally committed, or if it shall be proved that
he has committed any offence, the judge will say that he shall not
be released. If he has committed an offence, there can be no
grounds for this suspicion, because, without such suspension, he will
not be discharged, because it does not follow that, inasmuch as a
man has a right to demand that he be brought before a judge by a
writ of habeas corpus, he shall therefore be discharged. He is only
bound to examine him, and if he finds there is strong reason to
believe he has committed a crime, he may remand him to
confinement.
This is a writ of right, which ought to exist under all governments
on earth. What right? The right of being examined by the tribunals
of his country, to determine whether there is any ground for the
deprivation of his liberty. Is this a right which ought to be suspended
merely to gratify the apprehensions of gentlemen? I think not. The
framers of the constitution have said: “the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except when, in cases of
invasion or rebellion, the public safety shall require it.” Well, but,
says the gentleman from Massachusetts, can any one deny that this
is a rebellion? It may perhaps be, but I think it does not deserve the
name of a rebellion; it is a little, petty, trifling, contemptible thing,
led on by a desperate man, at the head of a few desperate
followers: a thing which might have been dangerous, if the virtue of
the people had not arrested and destroyed it. But admit that it is a
rebellion; will every rebellion justify a suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus? The constitution says: “the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except when, in cases of
invasion or rebellion, the public safety shall require it.” Does, then,
the public safety require this suspension? Does the constitution
justify it? And, under present circumstances, confining a man in
prison without a cause. There is no danger, the enemy is not at our
door; there is no invasion; and yet we are called upon to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus. This precedent, let me tell gentlemen,
may be a ruinous, may be a most damnable precedent—a precedent
which, hereafter, may be most flagrantly abused. The Executive may
wish to make use of more energetic measures than the established
laws of the land enable him to do; he will resort to this as a
precedent, and this important privilege will be suspended at the
smallest appearance of danger. The effect will be, that whenever a
man is at the head of our affairs, who wishes to oppress or wreak
his vengeance on those who are opposed to him, he will fly to this
as a precedent; it will truly be a precedent fraught with the greatest
danger; a precedent which ought not to be set, except in a case of
the greatest necessity; indeed, I can hardly contemplate a case in
which, in my opinion, it can be necessary.
In my opinion, this is a measure which ought never to be
proposed, unless when the country is so corrupt that we cannot
even trust the judges themselves. This, I consider the cause of the
frequent suspension of this privilege in England. Whenever the
whole mass of society becomes contaminated, and the officers of
the judicial court are so far corrupted as to countenance rebellion,
and release rebels from their confinement, it may be then time to
say, they shall no longer remain in your hands; we will take them
from you. But I apprehend there is no such danger here, and I
repeat it, we are at once creating one of the most dangerous
precedents, and passing one of the most unjust acts that was ever
proposed.
 Mr. Sloan.—At the same time that I express my purpose to vote on
the same side with the gentleman from Maryland, I shall take the
liberty of assigning very different reasons for my vote from those
offered by him. The gentleman from Virginia has mentioned two
preceding insurrections, which he considers of much greater
magnitude than this. I am of a different opinion. Compared to this, I
consider them as only a drop to the bucket. For a moment, let me
ask the attention of gentlemen to those insurrections, or as I think
they might, with more correctness, be termed, oppositions to
Government. In consequence of certain citizens thinking themselves
aggrieved by certain acts, in which they have been, in some
measure, justified by their subsequent repeal, a handful of people
raised in opposition to their execution. What analogy do those
oppositions bear to this rebellion? I consider the late or present
conspiracy to be of greater magnitude than any we know of in
history. Under what authority has it been created? Under that of a
man of great abilities and experience, who states that he expects
encouragement from foreign nations. I do not pretend to say that
this is a fact; but what has he done? Has he not drawn resources
from every part of the Union? I, therefore, consider it of great
magnitude, and it is certainly excited against the best government
on earth, under which the people enjoy the greatest happiness. I
shall, however, vote against the bill, under the belief that we may
confidently rely on the love and affection of the people for their
Government, to which we are already probably indebted for its
suppression. Had this measure been brought forward a month or six
weeks ago, I should have voted for it.
Mr. Bidwell said, although he was not satisfied of the necessity of
passing this bill, he was not prepared to reject it, in its present
stage. As it had received the sanction of the Senate, he was
disposed to treat it as a subject worthy of discussion and
deliberation, by referring it in the usual course, to a Committee of
the whole House. Before the passing of any bill of this nature, the
House ought to have satisfactory proof that a rebellion in fact
existed, (for there was no pretence of an invasion,) and that the
public safety required a suspension of the privilege of habeas
corpus. By the terms of the constitution, both of these pre-requisites
must concur, to authorize the measure. The first inquiry would
naturally turn upon the existence of a rebellion. On that point he had
no doubt. To constitute a rebellion, in the sense of the constitution,
he did not think it necessary that a battle should have been fought,
or even a single gun fired. If troops were enlisted, assembled,
organized, and armed, for the purpose of effecting a treasonable
object, it amounted to actual rebellion. Such was the existing state
of things. The public notoriety of the fact was, perhaps, sufficient
evidence for the Legislature to act upon, if necessary; but they had
also the official statement of the President to that effect. He had,
therefore, no doubt of the existence of a rebellion, and that, too, of
a more wanton and malignant character than any insurrection which
had heretofore been raised against our Government; for it had not
been occasioned by any grievances, real or imaginary, but must have
originated in motives of personal ambition, or some more unworthy
passion.
An existing rebellion, however, even of this aggravated description,
was not alone sufficient to justify a suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus. To bring it within constitutional justification, it must be
required by the public safety. That was a matter of opinion, rather
than of fact. He was convinced that the proposed suspension was
not requisite for the purpose of suppressing the conspiracy; for by
the vigilance and energy of our Executive Government, seconded
and supported by the exertions of particular States and Territories,
and the army, this deep laid conspiracy was already in a good
measure suppressed, and he trusted the means now in operation
would complete the suppression. A suspension of the habeas corpus
could not be necessary, except for the detection and conviction of
the conspirators. A thorough investigation ought undoubtedly to be
made. If any persons concerned in the conspiracy were arrested in
situations which precluded an immediate production of such
evidence as would warrant their confinement, justice would require
that they should be detained until the proper evidence could be
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