Blackwell

Companions to
Philosophy

A Companion to
the Philosophy of
Science
Edited by

W. H. NEWTON-SMITH

I] BLAC I<WE LL
Publishers
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A companion to the philosophy of science I edited by W.H. Newton-Smith.

p. cm.- (Black well companions to philosophy; 18)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN O--<i31-170243 (hb: alk. paper)
I. Science-Philosophy. I. Newton-Smith, W. II. Series.
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 List of Contributors

Peter Achinstein is Professor of London and Senior Research Fellow in

Philosophy at Johns Hopkins University, the Department of Sociology at the Uni-
Baltimore. versity of Exeter.

Yemima Ben-Menahem is in the Ronald N. Giere is Professor of Phi-

faculty of Humanities at the Hebrew losophy at the Minnesota Center for Phi-
University of Jerusalem. losophy of Science at the University of
Minnesota.
Lars Bergstrom is Professor of Prac-
tical Philosophy and Head of the De- David Gooding is Professor of History
partment of Philosophy at Stockholm and Philosophy of Science and Director
University. of the Science Studies Centre at the Uni-
versity of Bath.
Chris Brink is Professor of Mathemat-
ics and Pro Vice-Chancellor (Research) Gary Gutting is Professor of Philosophy
at the University of Wollongong, Aus- at the University of Notre Dame in
tralia, and fellow of the Royal Society of Indiana.
South Africa.
Paul Hager is Associate Professor of Edu-
Harold I. Brown is Professor of Phi-
cation at the University of Technology in
losophy at the University of Northern
Sydney, Australia.
lllinois at De Kalb.

James R. Brown is Professor of Phi- Rom Harre is Emeritus Fellow of

losophy at the University of Toronto. Linacre College of the University of
Oxford and Professor of Psychology at
Leslie Burkholder is Professor of Georgetown University.
Philosophy at the University of British
Columbia in Vancouver. Richard A. Healey is Professor of
Philosophy and Director of Graduate
Robert E. Butts (died 1997) was Pro- Studies in the Department of Philosophy
lessor of Philosophy at the University of at the University of Arizona.
Western Ontario.
Mary Hesse is Emeritus Professor of
John Dupre is Professor of Philosophy History and Philosophy of Science at
at Birkbeck College of the University of the University of Cambridge.

xi
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Christopher R. Hitchcock is Associate at the University of Noire Dame in

Professor of Philosophy at the Division Indiana.
of the Humanities and Social Sciences of
the California Institute of Technology in Cheryl Misak is Professor of Philoso-
Pasadena. phy at the University of Toronto.

Cliff Hooker is Professor of Philosophy Eleonora Montuschi is in the Depart-

at the University of Newcastle in New ment of Philosophy at the London School
South Wales. Australia. of Economics.

Christopher Hookway is Professor of Dugald Murdoch is a member of the

Philosophy at the University of Shellield. Department of Philosophy at the Uni-
versity of Stockholm.
Colin Howson is Reader in Philosophy
at the London School of Economics. William H. Newton-Smith is Fairfax
Pellow and Tutor in Philosophy at Balliol
Martin Hughes is in the Department of College. University of Oxford.
Philosophy at the University of Durham.
Thomas Nickles is Professor of Phi-
Paul Humphreys is Professor of Phi-
losophy at the University of Nevada in
losophy in the Corcoran Department of
Reno.
Philosophy at the University of Virginia.
Samir Okasha is the jacobsen Research
Muhammad Ali Khalidi is Assistant
Fellow in Philosophy at the London
Professor and Chair of the Department
School of Economics.
of Philosophy at the American Univer-
sity of Beirut.
Kathleen Okruhlik is Associate
Professor of Philosophy and Dean of the
Brendan Larvor is Lecturer in Philoso-
Paculty of Arts at the University of West-
phy in the Department of Humanities
ern Ontario.
at the University of Hertfordshire.

Jarrett Leplin is Professor of Philoso- Philip Percival is a member of the

phy at the University of Chicago. Faculty of Philosophy at the University
of Glasgow.
Peter Lipton is Professor and Head of
the Department of History and Philoso- John Preston is Senior Lecturer in the
phy of Science at the University of Department of Philosophy at the Univer-
Cambridge. sity of Reading.

James W. McAIIister is a member of Christopher Ray is Academic Senior

the Paculty of Philosophy at the Univer- Master at King's College School.
sity of Leiden. London.

Ernan McMullin is John Cardinal John Rogers is Professor of Philosophy

O'Hara Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Keele.

xii
 !.1ST OF CONTIU IHITORS

Richard Rorty is University Professor Frederick Suppe is Professor of Phi-

of Humanities at the University of losophy and Chair of the History and
Virginia. Philosophy of Science Program at the
University of Maryland.
Alex Rosenberg is Professor of Phi-
losophy at the University of Georgia. Paul Thompson is Professor of Philo-
sophy and Principal of the University of
WesleyC. Salmon is University Professor Toronto at Scarborough.
of Philosophy, Professor of History and
Philosophy of Science. and Fellow of the Mary Tiles is Professor of Philosophy
Center for Philosophy of Science at the at the University of Hawaii at Manoa,
University of Pittsburgh. and President Honolulu.
of the International Union of History and
Philosophy of Science. Division of I,ogic, J. D. Trout is Associate Professor of
Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. Philosophy and Adjunct Associate Pro-
fessor of the Parmly Hearing Institute at
Loyola University in Chicago.
Geoffrey Scarre is in the Department of
Philosophy at the lJ niversity of Durham.
John Watkins (died 1999) was Profes-
sor of Philosophy at the London School
William Seager is Professor of Phi-
of Economics.
losophy at Scarborough College in the
University of Toronto. Richard S. Westfall (died 1 996) was
Professor of History and Philosophy
Dudley Shapere is Z. Smith Reynolds of Science at . Indiana University in
Professor of Philosophy and History of
Bloomington.
Science at Wake Forest University in
Winston-Salem, North Carolina. John Wettersten is in the Faculty of
Social Sciences of Heuchelheim Univer-
Lawrence Sklar is Professor of Phi- sity, Germany.
losophy at the University of Michigan.
Gereon Wolters is Professor of Philoso-
Elliott Sober is Hans Reichenbach Pro- phy at the University of Konstanz.
fessor of Philosophy and Vilas Research
Professor in the Department of Philoso- Andrew Woodfield is in the Depart-
phy at the University of Wisconsin, ment of Philosophy, Centre for Theories
Madison. of Language and Learning, at the Uni-
versity of Bristol.
Tom Sorell is Professor in the Depart-
ment of Philosophy at the University of John Worrall is Professor of Philosophy
Essex. at the London School of Economics.

xiii
 20

Feminist Accounts of Science

KATHLEEN OKRUHLIK

Feminist accounts of science expose the ways in which the various sciences exhibit
androcentric bias in their theories, practices, and presuppositions. Some, but not all, of
these accounts also raise questions about the extent to which our understanding of
what it is to be rational. objective, and scientific is itself gender-laden. The analyses are
wide-ranging and diverse, reflecting a broad range of commitments within philosophy
of science and within feminist theory. It is a mistake to treat feminist critiques of sci-
ence as constituting a monolithic body of literature, since doing so leads to caricature
and to the inevitable repression of crucial issues. Moreover, one of the chief lessons to
be gleaned from the accumulating research in this area is that the role played by
gender in science is exceedingly complex and variable. Popular presentations and
oflhand references that down play this complexity and variability misrepresent feminist
research, and contribute to maintaining the unfortunate gulf between it and most
"mainstream" philosophy of science.
Not all of the vast literature on "gender and science" can be touched on here.
Related bodies of literature that will not be dealt with include equity studies, efforts to
reform science education, research on women scientists, and the literature on women
and technology. The focus instead is on scholarship that addresses directly questions
relating to the content, methodology, and epistemology of science.
Feminist critiques of science, even in this somewhat restricted sense, are very widely
dispersed, due to their diverse origins. Some arise from within the sciences themselves,
in response to particular instantiations of androcentric theory and practice. Particu-
larly in the biological and social sciences, feminist researchers have dramatically and
effectively presented case studies that show how the omission or misrepresentation of
women and gender has led to work that is deeply flawed and demonstrably unbal-
anced. Much of this work is to be found in journals and anthologies specific to the
disciplines in question.
Other feminist analyses are more general in their orientation. They represent exten-
sions of feminist epistemological projects and sometimes extensions of other genres
of science criticism. including contextualist, sociological. and relativist approaches.
Despite some similarities to other forms of science criticism, feminist critiques are dis-
tinguished by their emphasis on the power differences that are embodied in gender
relations and the way in which these power relations are reflected in the processes and
products of science. In order to provide a reasonable overview of the field, examples of
both first-order, discipline-specitic research and second-order, epistemological reflec-
tions will be cited.

134
 FEMI:-.:IST Al'COliNTS OF SCIENCE

Some of the most powerful and accessible feminist critiques are in the form of case
studies demonstrating the ways in which gender-related biases have affected the con-
tent of the biological and social sciences. A good introduction to this genre is Myths
of Gender: Biological Theories about Women and Men ( 19 8 5) by Anne Fausto-Sterling.
Although the author was trained as a scientist rather than a philosopher, the book
is philosophically sensitive, and consistently addresses questions of methodology and
occasionally epistemology. Fausto-Sterling examines attempts to provide biological
explanations of alleged cognitive differences between the sexes, genetic accounts of
behavior, and hormonal explanations of aggression as well as other phenomena. She
also discusses evolutionary accounts that purport to "explain" why it is natural for
women to function in socially subordinate roles. why men are smarter and more
aggressive than women, why women are destined to be homebodies, and why men
rape. Evidence for each claim is examined: experimental designs are scrutinized: and
methodological issues are raised. Fausto-Sterling draws attention consistently to the
ways in which some evidence is ignored, some questions not asked, some hypotheses
never considered, and some experimental controls never instituted. She points to the
tenacity of biological explanations for women's socially inferior role, often in the light
of extremely recalcitrant evidence. A good example is her treatment of hypotheses
about spatial ability in women and men. It has been suggested that spatial ability is
X-linked, and therefore exhibited more frequently in males than in females: that high
levels of prenatal androgen increase intelligence: that low levels of estrogen lead to
superior male ability at "restructuring" tasks. Some have held that female brains are
more lateralized than male brains, and that more lateralization interferes with spatial
functions. Others have argued that female brains are less lateralized than male brains,
and that less lateralization interferes with spatial ability. Some have attempted to save
the hypothesis of X-linked spatial ability by suggesting that the sex-linked spatial gene
can be expressed only in the presence of testosterone. Others have argued that males
are smarter because they have more uric acid than females.
None of these hypotheses is well supported by the evidence, and most seem to be
clearly refuted. Yet. for many researchers, the one element of the theoretical net-
work that they are unwilling to surrender in the face of recalcitrant evidence is the
assumption that there must be predominantly biological reasons for inferior intellectual
achievement in women.
Another useful and accessible text in the same genre is The Politics of Women's
Biology (1990), by Ruth Hubbard, who has migrated from research in photobiology to
feminist critiques of science. One of the chapters is a version of her influential article
"Have only men evolved?," in which she examines some of the biases and blind spots
of evolutionary theory. She cites passages from The Origin of Species in which Darwin
attributes evolutionary development in human beings almost exclusively to male
activity. In defending women and children. capturing wild animals, and making
weapons, men have constantly had to draw on their higher cognitive faculties. Since
these faculties are constantly being tested and selected for, men have become superior
in intelligence to women. Darwin concludes that it is indeed fortunate that fathers
pass on their brains to their daughters, because "otherwise it is probable that man
would have become as superior in mental endowment to woman. as the peacock is in
ornamental plumage to the peahen."

135
KATHLEEN OKRUHLIK

Hubbard also presents examples of gender bias in more recent evolutionary biology,
exemplifying the sort of circular argument that is often used to "prove" that behaviors
and social roles are biologically determined. A sexist stereotype derived from twentieth-
century gender relations among human beings is imported (without independent
evidence) into the animal world, and then the animal "evidence" is cited to justify the
human gender relations. The circularity is particularly breathtaking when it involves
creatures as different from us as algae. Yet even strands of algae are identified as male
or female according to whether they are active or passive. One and the same strand of
algae is identified as masculine when it takes the active role in sexual relations. femi-
nine when it assumes the passive role. There is no independent evidence for these
attributions. Yet they are then cited as part of the evidence for the claim that through-
out the animal world, it is males who are active and engage in goal-directed behavior.
The influence of Darwin's androcentric bias has not been limited to evolutionary
biology, because that theory functions as an auxiliary hypothesis in many other dis-
ciplines, especially in the social sciences. Anthropology is a good example. If one holds
the view that man-the-hunter is chiefly responsible for human evolutionary develop-
ment, one interprets fossil evidence in light of the changing behavior of males. Helen
Longino and Ruth Doell, for example, in a 1983 article entitled "Body, bias. and behav-
iour: a comparative analysis of reasoning in two areas of biological science," trace the
ways in which the androcentric account attributes the development of tool use
to male hunting behavior. Longino and Doell point out that some recent research
attributes up to 80 percent of the subsistence diet of "hunter-gatherer" societies to
female gatherers. lf that is the background theory informing one's interpretation of
the evidence, then quite a different account of the same fossil evidence emerges.
The gynecentric story explains the development of tool use as a function of female
behavior, portraying women as innovators who contributed more to the development
of human intelligence and flexibility than did males. lt emphasizes the importance of
tools made from organic materials such as sticks and reeds, which are said to have
been developed by women to defend against predators while gathering, as well as for
carrying, digging, and food preparation. These tools are supposed to antedate the stone
tools attributed to male hunters.
What matters here is not that the gynecentric hypothesis be true, but rather, that it
makes obvious the extent to which the standard interpretation of the anthropological
evidence has been colored by androcentric assumptions. It highlights the distance that
sometimes exists between evidence and hypothesis and the difficulty of bridging that
distance with independently corroborated auxiliaries.
Donna Haraway, in a series of articles and, more recently, in her book Primate
Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science (1989), has suggested
that in primatology (at least) that distance cannot be bridged, and that what we are
faced with is in fact a variety of irreducible narratives about our origins. These nar-
ratives were fashioned to serve a variety of political needs, and choices among them
are based on similar considerations. Primatology is "politics by other means."
During the same period that these case studies were developed, other authors were
looking at the scientific revolution itself for manifestations of gender ideology. One of
the most influential and widely cited works of this type is The Death of Nature: Women,
Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution (1980) by Carolyn Merchant. Merchant links the
136
 FEMINIST ACCOUNTS OF SCIENCE

mechanization of the world picture to the demise of an older, feminine-nurturant vision

of the Earth as a loving provider. This older vision embodied, according to Merchant.
a system of values that promoted harmonious cooperation with the environment and
a holistic approach to understanding nature. She argues that the replacement of this
view by the mechanical world view has had disastrous effects for the environment and
for women. Merchant also argues that the metaphors employed by Francis Bacon and
others at this time reveal that the new philosophy implicitly embodied the view of a
male knower who manipulates, dominates, and exploits the object of his knowledge.
In a series of essays written during the late 19 70s and early 19 80s and collected
in a volume called Reflections on Gender and Science (198 5), Evelyn Fox Ke!ler also
examines the events of the scientific revolution (and other topics). She argues that the
seventeenth century witnessed a contest between masculine and feminine principles:
head versus heart, puritied versus erotic stances toward knowledge, attitudes of
domination of the object versus merging with the object of knowledge. The victory
of masculine over feminine forces has meant, according to Keller. that even today a
"masculine" cognitive stance is required of all working scientists: one that emphasizes
autonomy, separation, and distance between subject and object. The defeat of femi-
nine principles in the seventeenth century meant the banishment of "sympathetic
understanding" from the methodology of science. In making this argument, Keller
draws heavily upon psychoanalytic theory, especially object relations theory, to ex-
plain how concepts of objectivity and masculinity have become intimately connected
and mutually reinforcing. The theory, very roughly speaking, is that since the primary
caregiver for very young children is almost invariably the mother, little girls and little
boys are differently positioned with respect to the project of self-definition. Because
little girls share the sex of the caregiver, they do not have to break so abruptly with
her in order to establish a suitable gender identity and sense of self. The connection
with the mother, the strong sense of relatedness and interdependence, can survive
relatively unscathed. The little boy, however, if he is to establish a suitable masculine
identity, must detine himself in opposition to his mother - by separating from her,
establishing distance, drawing boundaries between himself and her. In this way, he
asserts his autonomy. Keller (as well as some other feminist epistemologists) maintains
that this separation, distancing, delineation of boundaries, and emphasis on autonomy
is central not only to our concepts of masculinity, but also to our notions of objectivity
and scientific rationality. A circular process of definition is set up, so that it is not
simply that our notions of rationality are masculine, but also that the prestige of
science a!Tects our concepts of masculinity. It is important to note that if arguments of
this sort are successful, they would apply not just to the biological and social sciences,
with their gendered ontologies, but to all the sciences, including physics.
A more recent historical treatment of the scientific revolution is Londa Schiebinger's
excellent book Tile Mind Has No Sex? Women in the Origins of Modern Science (1989).
In light of these case studies (and hundreds of others like them), a number of
questions arise. Chief among them is: What ought to be concluded about the nature
of science? One approach is simply to maintain that insofar as these episodes do in fact
exhibit androcentric bias, to that extent they fail to be scientific. Gender bias is not
characteristic of science on this account. but only of bad science. Another response is
to acknowledge that science-as-usual (and not just bad science) is gender-laden, and

137
KATH LEEN OKRll H Ll K

then to consider the consequences of this acknowledgment.1n fact. the stances adopted
by feminist critics have been sufficiently various and the volume of literature sufl1-
ciently large that considerable effort was expended during the 1980s in an effort to
develop typologies of feminist critiques of science. Most influential was a taxonomy
developed by Sandra Harding in her very important book The Science Question in
Feminism ( 1986). Harding's taxonomic categories are feminist empiricism. feminist
standpoint epistemology, and feminist postmodernism.
Very roughly speaking, feminist empiricists believe that gender bias in the sciences
reflects a failure to live up to their own epistemological ideals, and that a more rigor-
ous and thoroughgoing application of scientific methodology would eliminate this bias,
thus producing better science. The epistemic commitments and methodologies of sci-
ence are not called into question by feminist empiricists, and the underlying assump-
tion is that the sex of the knower would be irrelevant if science were done properly.
It is this assumption that is repudiated by feminist standpoint theorists. They argue
that the standpoint of the know er is epistemically relevant, and that a kind of epistemic
privilege is available to women (or to feminists, depending on the account). Just as
Hegel's slave could know things the master did not, so women (or feminists) are in a
position not only to effectively criticize masculinist science, but also to produce a femi-
nist successor science that is epistemically superior to what went before. Two kinds
of standpoint theory that have been particularly influential are varieties informed by
Marxism and object relations theory respectively. It is important to note that although
feminist empiricist and feminist standpoint theorists disagree about the adequacy of
current conceptions of scientific method and the relevance of the standpoint of the
knower, they both espouse "successor science projects" in the sense that both strive for
epistemic progress, for better science. This goal is not shared by feminist postmodernism,
which eschews the very idea of a successor science and aims instead for "a permanent
multiplicity of partial narratives."
An interesting characteristic of this taxonomy of feminist critiques is that the three
categories are presented in a way that sometimes suggests that they represent suc-
cessive stages in feminist inquiry. each stage being developed in response to tensions
and inadequacies in the preceding stage. So Harding herself. a leading developer and
proponent of feminist standpoint epistemology, appeared in 1986 to be moving toward
a postmodern position in response to criticisms of standpoint theory. Although these
criticisms have been numerous and diverse, the one that most affected Harding (and
many other feminist theorists) was the insistence that there is no single feminist stand-
point. Just as the standpoint of women differs from that of men, so the standpoint of
women of calor differs from that of white women, the standpoint of poor women from
that of rich women. the standpoint of lesbians from that of heterosexual women, and
so on. Fractured identities lead to fractured standpoints and. so it might seem, to
the permanent multiplicity of partial narratives espoused by postmodernists. Feminist
standpoint epistemology appeared to presuppose a kind of gender essentialism that
was found to be no longer supportable. Although flarding insisted that all three types
of feminist critique serve useful purposes, she seemed to suggest in 1986 that feminist
postmodernism was the most sophisticated and theoretically adequate of the three.
This is the position she partially disavows in Whose Science? Whose Knowledw? ( 1991 ).
Postmodern approaches have been unwelcome in some feminist circles for a variety of

1 38
 I'EMJNIST ACCOUNTS OF SCIENCE

reasons. Perhaps chief among these is the belief that both feminist theory and feminist
action require a fairly robust notion of objectivity. One wants to be able to say, for
example, that masculinist accounts of female roles are false and ought to be replaced
by accounts that are objectively better, not simply that there are many narratives
available for a variety of purposes. Similarly, Harding argues in her most recent book,
we must recognize that although science is politics by other means, it also generates
reliable information about the empirical world. It has both progressive and regressive
tendencies. An adequate feminist epistemology will have to take into account not just
the political dimensions of science, but also its empirical successes: it will have to
develop strategies for promoting the progressive tendencies of science while blocking
its regressive tendencies. At the same time, it must never lose sight of the crucial
point that the observer and the observed are in the same causal plane. The challenge
for feminist epistemology is to articulate how it is that scientific knowledge is, in every
respect, socially situated, without denying its considerable empirical success. One of
the chief strategies employed by Harding to achieve this end is the reconceptualization
of the relationship between the natural and the social sciences. Instead of seeing the
social sciences as derivative from, and potentially reducible to, physics, she urges us to
treat physics as a social science.
Rather than repudiate the notion of objectivity altogether, Harding criticizes the
traditional conception for being too weak and calls for its replacement with the notion
of strong objectivity. Although she recognizes and accepts descriptive relativism (it is true
that different people have different belief systems), she rejects judgmental relativism
as being simply the flip side of weak objectivity. The strong objectivity that Harding
embraces extends the notion of scientific research to include systematic examination
of cultural agendas and other powerful background beliefs that inform the scientific
enterprise itself. It is in this context that the social sciences become paradigmatic;
physics is just one human social activity among many others, and is amenable to
investigation in the same way as other social activities.
Strong objectivity requires that we not only take into account the standpoint
of the knower, but that we constantly question and analyze the assumptions that
inform the standpoint that confers epistemic privilege. Harding's brush with post-
modern feminism has left its mark. In fact, she describes her current position as a
"postmodernist standpoint approach," where "postmodernist" (with lower-case p)
describes any approach that fundamentally challenges the assumptions of Enlighten-
ment epistemology, rather than a specific set of views about epistemology. She ac-
knowledges that feminist standpoint theories tend to stress gender differences at the
expense of ignoring other important differences, and she acknowledges that such
theories contain an essentializing tendency. But, Harding argues, the logic of the stand-
point approaches also contains the resources to combat these very same tendencies.
To ground claims in women's lives is to ground them in differences "within women,"
as well as between women and men. And the same kinds of considerations that
compelled us to theorize from the perspective of women's lives will also compel us to
see the importance of theories created from the perspective of poor people, people of
color, and others not represented in the current knowledge establishment. When we
center the lives of lesbians, for example, we learn things we would not have learned
otherwise.

139
KATHLEEN OKRlJHLIK

The difficulty, of course, is to come up with an integrated theory; for this is clearly
what Harding wants, particularly an account that successfully integrates gender, class,
and race. And it is at this point that one may wonder in just what sense Harding's new
position is correctly characterized as a standpoint theory after all. For we have now
a multiplicity of standpoints, from which we must fashion an integrated theoretical
account, one that strives toward strong objectivity. The standpoints are now just
starting points; and no one of them possesses any ultimate epistemological privilege.
So the sorting out, the adjudicating, the integrating of theories arising from radically
different standpoints will have to proceed along lines not dictated by any one of these
standpoints. In any event, it is clear that the vigor with which feminist epistemological
projects are being pursued has caused the boundary of the old taxonomy (however
useful it was) to give way. Harding's work has not only reflected, but also precipitated,
much of the fast-moving debate in this arena.
Another prominent theorist whose views have recently undergone something of a
shift is Evelyn Fox Keller, whose earlier work was sketched above. In Secrets of Life,
Secrets of Death (1992), she relates that, although she stands by her earlier work, she
finds it strategically impossible to proceed with her psychodynamic explorations of
scientific postures. She also wishes to shift her focus away from the question of how
science represents nature to an examination of the force and efficacy of its represen-
tations, not just with respect to gender, but more generally. In this transition, she
has been largely influenced by such "interventionists" as Ian Hacking and Nancy
Cartwright. Keller wishes now to focus on the constitutive role of language, studying
the way in which it both reflects and guides the development of scientific models
and methods. In doing so, she hopes to be able to shed some light on the logical and
empirical constraints that make scientific claims so compelling. She is not tempted to
join certain other science studies types in dethroning science; instead, she feels the
need to explain its special efficacy, particularly in the case of physics.
In addition to Harding and Keller, the third prominent figure whose views deserve
special mention is Helen Longino, author of Science as Social Knowledge: Values and
Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry (1990). Longino's goal in this book is to develop an
analysis of scientific knowledge that reconciles the objectivity of science with the
role of contextual values in its social and cultural construction. Whereas constitutive
values are generated from an understanding of the goals of science, and determine
what constitutes acceptable scientific method and practice, contextual values belong to
the larger social and cultural environment within which science is done. The task
which Longino sets herself is to show how contextual values can play an important
role even in "good" science, without thereby undermining the objectivity of the scien-
tific enterprise. She calls her view "contextual empiricism," because it is empiricist in
treating experience as the basis of scientific knowledge claims, and contextual in its
insistence upon the relevance of contextual values to the construction of knowledge.
Longino stakes out her own position by contrasting it with the positions of positiv-
ists and holists. Although she agrees with the positivists that data can be specified
independently of the hypotheses and theories for which they have evidential relevance,
she takes issue with the positivist understanding of the nature of that evidential rela-
tionship. The crucial link in the argument is Longino's stress on the role played by
background assumptions and beliefs in mediating the relationship between hypotheses

140
 FEMINIST ACCOUNTS OF SCIENCE

and evidence. Given appropriately differing background beliefs. the same state of
affairs can be taken as evidence for differing and even conflicting hypotheses. So two
parties can rationally infer different conclusions from the same evidence. Furthermore,
these mediating background assumptions will often introduce contextual values which
cannot be eliminated without introducing constraints far too restrictive for the analysis
of evidential relations in the actual practice of science.
The position does not deteriorate into holism, according to Longino, and there is
no need to embrace incommensurability, because, however difficult it may be to ferret
out background assumptions, they are articulable. And once articulated, they can be
subjected to criticism. The critical function of scientific inquiry is heavily emphasized.
because it is central to the argument that a form of scientific objectivity can be de-
fended even when we recognize that contextual values permeate scientific inference.
Longino's strategy in outlining a modified account of objectivity is to treat scientific
inquiry as a set of necessarily social practices, rather than as the disembodied applica-
tion of a set of rules, or even as the mere sum of individual practices. Objectivity
becomes on this account a characteristic of the community's practice of science, rather
than a product of abstract methodology or a property of individual practice. One of
the chief requirements of the community is that it attempts to articulate background
assumptions and subject them to criticism. Because these background assumptions
will typically incorporate nonempirical elements (including contextual values), it is
essential that the critical function of the scientific community exhibit a conceptual as
well as an empirical dimension.
What gives this book particular value, however, is Longino's ability to flesh out her
argument by drawing on extensive case studies developed by herself and other femi-
nist critics of science. These case studies give texture and substance to the foregoing
rather abstract analysis. They don't simply illustrate the position; they constitute the
best argument in its favor. They also begin to bridge the regrettable gap between
"mainstream" philosophy of science and the feminist literature.
The case studies are chiefly meant to show how contextual values can affect the
description of data, local background assumptions in a specific area of inquiry, and the
global assumptions that set up a framework of inquiry. Two of the chief case studies
involve, respectively, human evolutionary studies and behavioral endocrinology. The
former is a further development of some of Longino's earlier work with Doell sketched
above. Throughout her discussion, Longino is at pains to insist that she is not dismiss-
ing evolutionary theory or behavioral neuroendocrinology as "bad science" (in the sense
of silly, sloppy, or fraudulent science). Instead, she is attempting to show how even
"good" science may be permeated by contextual values.
In light of this, what should be the attitude of feminists toward science? What hap-
pens to the notion of a "feminist science"? Longino believes that if we focus on science
as practice rather than content, "we can reach the idea of feminist science through
that of doing science as a feminist" (1990, p. 188). This requires us to deliberately use
background assumptions appropriately at variance with those of mainstream science.
If, however. appositional science is to be successful. it must always be local; and it must
be respectful of some of the standards of the specific scientific community in ques-
tion. Wholesale replacement of existing science by a "feminist paradigm" is not on the
agenda proposed here.

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KATHLEEN OKRllHLIK

The selection ofHarding, Keller, and Longino to represent the second-order epistemo-
logical analyses of feminist research on science is not entirely arbitrary. Not only are
they individually important. but collectively they represent a good part of the very
wide range of feminist analyses of science.

References and further reading

Fausto-Sterling, A. 198 5: Myths of Gender: Biological Theories about Women and Men (New York:
Basic Books).
Haraway, D. 1989: Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature i11 the World of Modem Science (New
York: Routledge).
Harding, S. 1986: The Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
- - 1991: Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? (lthaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
Hubbard. R. 1990: The Politics of Women's Biology (New Brunswick, NJ and London: Rutgers
University Press).
Keller. E. F. 1985: Reflections on Gender and Science (New Haven and London: Yale University
Press).
--1992: Secrets of Life, Secrets ofDeatlz (London and New York: Routledge).
Longino, H. 1990: Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry (Princeton:
Princeton University Press).
Longino, H.. and Doell. R. 1983: Body, bias, and behaviour: a comparative analysis of reasoning
in two areas of biological science. (This article and many others that are now considered
classics first appeared in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society between 1975 and
1987. They are conveniently collected in an anthology entitled Sex and Scientific Inquiry, ed.
S. Harding and J. F. O'Barr (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).)
Merchant, C. 1980: The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution (San
Francisco: Harper & Row).
Okruhlik, K. l 9 9 2: Birth of a new physics of death of nature? In Women and Reason, ed. E. Harvey
and K. Okruhlik (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press).
- - 1994: Gender and the biological sciences. Biology and Society. Canadian Journal of Phi-
losophy. Suppl. vol. 20, 21-42. Repr. in Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues. ed. M. Curd
and J. Cover (New York: Norton), 192-208.
Schiebinger, L. 1989: The Mind Has No Sex? Women in the Origins of Modem Science (Cambridge.
MA: Harvard University Press).
Wylie, A.. Okruhlik. K.. Morton, S., and Thielen-Wilson, L. 1990: Philosophical feminism: a
bibliographic guide to critiques of science. Resources for Feminist Research, 19(2), 2-36.

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