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Networked Forces in Stability Operations 101st Airborne
Division 3 2 and 1 25 Stryker Brigades in Northern Iraq
1st Edition Daniel Gonzales Digital Instant Download
Author(s): Daniel Gonzales
ISBN(s): 9780833044273, 0833044273
Edition: 1
File Details: PDF, 2.24 MB
Year: 2007
Language: english
Networked Forces in
Stability Operations
101st Airborne Division,
3/2 and 1/25 Stryker Brigades
in Northern Iraq

Daniel Gonzales, John Hollywood, Jerry M. Sollinger, James McFadden,

John DeJarnette, Sarah Harting, Donald Temple

Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

NAT IONA L DE FENS E RES EA RC H I NSTITUTE

The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).
The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded
research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant
Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense
Intelligence Community under Contract DASW01-01-C-0004.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Networked forces in stability operations : 101st Airborne Division, 3/2 and 1/25 Stryker
brigades in northern Iraq / Daniel Gonzales ... [et al.].
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-8330-4303-0 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Command and control systems—United States—Evaluation—Case studies.
2. Communications, Military—Evaluation—Case studies. 3. Stryker brigade
combat teams—Evaluation—Case studies. 4. United States. Army. Airborne
Division, 101st—History—21st century. 5. United States—Armed Forces—Stability
operations—Evaluation. 6. Iraq War, 2003–—Campaigns. I. Gonzales, Daniel,
1956–

UA943.N48 2007
956.7044'342—dc22
2007041879

Public release of this report was granted by the Chief of the DoD Office of Security Review
on 17 September 2007, per DD Form 1910.

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Preface

This case study report examines the network-centric operations (NCO) capabilities
and the operations of Stryker brigades and the 101st Airborne Division that conducted
stability operations in Iraq in the 2003 to 2005 time frame. We investigate how the
NCO capabilities and other resources available to these units were utilized to conduct
stability and counterinsurgency operations and whether these capabilities resulted in
improved mission effectiveness.
The monograph should interest U.S. Army and joint task force designers, those
concerned with the development of digital battle command and communications sys-
tems, and those interested in the implications of NCO for the transformation of mili-
tary forces.
This research was sponsored by the Office of Force Transformation and con-
ducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National
Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center spon-
sored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the unified combatant
commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and
the defense Intelligence Community.
For more information on RAND’s Acquisition and Technology Policy
Center, contact the director, Philip Antón. He can be reached by email, Philip_Anton@
rand.org; by phone at 310-393-0411, ext. 7798; or by mail at RAND, 1776 Main Street,
Santa Monica, California, 90407-2138. More information about RAND is available at
www.rand.org.

iii
Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxxv
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxxvii

CHAPTER ONE
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Analytic Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Sources of Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Organization of Monograph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

CHAPTER TWO
Iraqi Operational Setting and Unit Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Characteristics of Anti-Iraqi Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Phases of the Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Unit Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Areas of Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
AO Sizes, Personnel, Funding, and Attached Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Timeline of Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
U.S. Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

v
vi Networked Forces in Stability Operations: 101st ABD, 3/2 and 1/25 SBCTs in Northern Iraq

CHAPTER THREE
Force Networking, Quality of Information, and Quality of Shared Situation
Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Networking Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Effect of Networking Systems on Quality of Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Specific Effects of Networking Systems on Quality of Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Effect of Networking Systems on Quality of Collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Quality of Shared Situation Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

CHAPTER FOUR
Tactical Stability Missions, NCO-Enabled Processes, and Tactical Mission
Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Tactical Military Operations in Stability Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
NCO-Enabled Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Speed and Agility of Command. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Responsive Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Networking with Aerial Support and Surveillance Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Robustness to Enemy Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Stability Operations Intelligence Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

CHAPTER FIVE
Mission Effectiveness in Stability Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
U.S. Strategic Objectives and MNF–I Campaign Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Assessment Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Assessment of Effectiveness—Political Progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Assessment of Effectiveness—Defeating Terrorists and Containing the Insurgency . . . . . . . 108
Summary of Mission Effectiveness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

CHAPTER SIX
Summary: Findings and Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Assessment of 101st ABD Mission Effectiveness in Stability Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Assessment of 3/2 SBCT Mission Effectiveness in Stability Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Assessment of 1/25 SBCT Mission Effectiveness in Stability Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Role of NCO Capabilities in Improving Force Effectiveness in Stability Operations . . . . . 139
Summary of Network and Intelligence Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
 Contents vii

Additional Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

APPENDIX
A. Director, Office of Force Transformation, Study Authorization Memorandum . . . 147
B. SBCT Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Used in OIF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
C. Detailed Results of the Quality of Information and Collaboration Surveys . . . . . . . 161
D. Iraqi National Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
Figures

S.1. Civilians Killed in All of Iraq and in Mosul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

S.2. U.S. Personnel Killed and Wounded in Action per Enemy Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvi
S.3. U.S. Personnel Killed and Wounded in Action per Offensive Operation . . . . . . . xvi
S.4. Key Factors Influencing 101st ABD Performance in Stability Operations . . . . xviii
S.5. Key Factors Influencing 3/2 SBCT Performance in Stability Operations . . . . . xxii
S.6. Key Factors Influencing 1/25 SBCT Performance in Stability Operations . . . . . xxv
S.7. Adaptation of Materiel and Nonmateriel NCO Force Elements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxix
1.1. NCO Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2. NCO Analysis Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1. The “Sunni Triangle” and U.S. Unit Operating Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2. Locations of Frequent U.S. Military Casualties Between May 2003 and July
2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3. 101st ABD, 3/2 SBCT, and 1/25 SBCT Organizational Structures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4. 101st ABD and 3/2 SBCT Area of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5. The 1/25 SBCT Area of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.6. Causes of Death for U.S. Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.7. U.S. Military Casualties in OIF since March 19, 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.1. 101st ABD Infantry Brigade Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2. 3/2 SBCT Communications Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3. IKSS Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.4. UAV Imagery Received by Rover III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.5. Predator Control Using Rover III and SIPRNET MIRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.6. C2/BC Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.7. Quality of Information for Cordon-and-Search and Knock-and-Raid
Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.8. Quality of Information for Convoy Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.9. Survey Results on Quality of Collaboration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

ix
x Networked Forces in Stability Operations: 101st ABD, 3/2 and 1/25 SBCTs in Northern Iraq

4.1. Timeline for Major Operations in Northern Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

4.2. An Order-of-Magnitude Increase in Speed and Agility of Command . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3. SBCT Task Force’s Movement to Najaf. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.4. Map of Mogadishu and Initial Position of Assault Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.5. Timeline of the Battle of Mogadishu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.6. Timeline for the Tal Afar Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.1. Multi-National Forces–Iraq Campaign Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.2. Enemy Attacks—Theaterwide and in AO North . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.3. Percentage Change in Enemy Attacks During Each Unit’s Rotation . . . . . . . . . 111
5.4. Civilian KIAs for All of Iraq and for Mosul. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.5. Offensive Operations per Enemy Attack for the 101st ABD, 3/2 SBCT,
and 1/25 SBCT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.6. U.S. KIA and WIA per Enemy Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.7. U.S. KIA and WIA per Offensive Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.8. Number of IEDs and Weapons Caches Found per Enemy Attack for the
101st ABD, 3/2 SBCT, and 1/25 SBCT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.9. Influence of Network-Enabled Capabilities on Stability Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.1. Key Factors Influencing 101st ABD Performance in Stability Operations . . . . . 130
6.2. Key Factors Influencing 3/2 SBCT Performance in Stability Operations . . . . . 134
6.3. Key Factors Influencing 1/25 SBCT Performance in Stability Operations . . . . 137
6.4. Adaptation of Materiel and Nonmateriel NCO Force Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
B.1. Cover of the 1/25 SBCT’s Leaders Agility Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
C.1. Detailed Quality of Information Results for Cordon-and-Search/
Knock-and-Raid Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
C.2. Detailed Quality of Information Results for Convoy Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
C.3. Detailed Quality of Collaboration and Shared Situation Awareness
Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
D.1. Iraqi National Election System for the Constitutional Referendum. . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
D.2. Results of the Iraqi Constitutional Referendum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
Tables

S.1. U.S. Stability Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv

S.2. Summary of SBCT Networking and Battle Command Enhancements . . . . . . . xxx
2.1. Unit Areas of Operation, Resident Iraqi Populations, U.S. Troop Levels,
and Attached ING Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.1. NCO Enhancements in Northern Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2. Breakdown of Survey Responses by Rank and Unit Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3. Summary of Units’ Shared Situation Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.1. Battle of Mogadishu Total Mission Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.2. Battle of Tal Afar Total Mission Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.3. Forces Employed in the Battle of Tal Afar and Mogadishu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.1. U.S. Strategic Goals in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.2. Political Goal Assessment Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.3. Security Goal Assessment Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.4. Summary of Political Progress Assessment for 101st ABD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.5. Summary of Political Progress Assessment for 3/2 SBCT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.6. Summary of Political Progress Assessment for 1/25 SBCT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.7. Casualty Rates for the 101st ABD and 3/2 SBCT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.8. Mission Effectiveness Assessment Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.1. Summary of Networking and Battle Command Enhancements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

xi
Summary

Background

The Stryker brigade, one of the Army’s newest units, has advanced command, con-
trol, and intelligence capabilities and uses a network-centric concept of operations.
These capabilities include the full complement of Army digital communications and
battle command systems. Its networked capabilities enabled it to employ network-cen-
tric operations (NCO) capabilities down to a lower echelon than other Army units.
An important issue for the Department of Defense and the Army is whether these
improved capabilities translate into an information advantage and, if so, whether that
advantage results in greater mission effectiveness in stability operations.

Purpose and Approach

This study attempts to answer those two questions by focusing on the Stryker brigade’s
performance in stability operations. It employs the case-study methodology to examine
three units that operated in the same area in Iraq between 2003 and 2005: the 101st
Airborne Division (ABD), the 3/2 Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT), and the 1/25
SBCT. All served in Iraq’s northern provinces. The study compares the performance
of the units along a number of dimensions. The comparisons between the 101st ABD
and the Stryker brigades are especially important because, although the 101st ABD
had some advanced battle command systems, it was largely an “analog” unit, i.e., one
that communicated using analog radios and generally used voice-only, line-of-sight
communications at the tactical level. In many respects, the units of the 101st ABD
closely resemble light infantry brigades. In contrast to the 101st ABD, Stryker units
had networked digital communications networks and access to high-capacity satellite

xiii
xiv Networked Forces in Stability Operations: 101st ABD, 3/2 and 1/25 SBCTs in Northern Iraq

communications at lower echelons, which enabled them to communicate even when

units did not have line of sight between them.
We recognize the issues inherent in the methodology and in the specific com-
parisons we make. Case studies are essentially qualitative comparisons, although they
can be informed by quantitative information. Additionally, they are analogies because
in real-world operations the cases are not identical. We also recognize that the situ-
ations confronting the three units differed substantially, even though all three units
operated in the same provinces in Iraq. The 101st ABD was there shortly after major
combat operations (MCO) concluded but before the insurgency had hit full stride.
Furthermore, the two Stryker brigades did not have identical sets of equipment. The
1/25 SBCT had more enhanced communications and intelligence capabilities than
did the 3/2 SBCT. That said, we believe that the methodology can shed light on the
performance of the two types of units and on how network-centric capabilities affect
unit performance.
We use two of the four U.S. objectives for stability and reconstruction in Iraq
(see Table S.1) to assess the mission effectiveness of stability operations undertaken by
each unit.

Table S.1
U.S. Stability Objectives

Political Forge a broadly supported national concept for democratic governance

Security Defeating terrorists and containing insurgents

Civilian Deaths

Figure S.1 plots reported civilians killed in action (KIAs) by month for all of Iraq and
for Mosul. As shown, the number of civilian KIAs per month surged in June 2004 and
remained roughly flat or increased slightly thereafter throughout Iraq as a whole. The
data indicate that there has not been any sustained reduction in civilian casualties in
Iraq overall after the peaks in February and August 2005.
Before we turn to a detailed examination of each unit’s performance, we look at
trends in civilian and U.S. casualties in Iraq and in northern Iraq.
 Summary xv

Figure S.1
Civilians Killed in All of Iraq and in Mosul

250 2,500
101st ABD 3/2 SBCT 1/25 SBCT
Civilian deaths in Mosul area

200 2,000

Civlian deaths in all of Iraq

150 1,500

100 1,000

50 500

0 0
03

05
3

04

04
4

05

5
-0

-0
-0

-0

-0

-0
-0

-0

-0
-0
n-

b-

n-
b-

n-
ec

pr
ct

pr

ec

ct
ct
ug

ug
ug
Ju

Ju
Fe
Ju
Fe
O

O
O
D

A
A

D
A

A
A

101st ABD 3/2 SBCT 1/25 SBCT All of Iraq Iraqi elections
RAND MG593-S.1

Figure S.1 also plots reported civilian KIAs for Mosul and indicates when each
unit operated in Mosul and elsewhere in northern Iraq. In comparison with civilian
KIAs elsewhere in Iraq, civilian KIAs in Mosul fall off sharply after June 2005. This
pattern is consistent with reports that the 1/25 SBCT defeated a major insurgent offen-
sive in Mosul, captured key insurgent leaders, and disrupted insurgent operations.

U.S. Casualties Adjusted for Operational Tempo

Figures S.2 and S.3 show order-of-magnitude reductions in casualty rates for both
Stryker brigades relative to both the 101st ABD and other units in Iraq at the same
time, when operational intensity (both enemy and U.S.) factors are taken into account.
These results reflect the growing intensity of Stryker brigade operations in response
to attacks as the insurgency grew over time. Note that the 1/25 SBCT casualty rates
xvi Networked Forces in Stability Operations: 101st ABD, 3/2 and 1/25 SBCTs in Northern Iraq

Figure S.2
U.S. Personnel Killed and Wounded in Action per Enemy Attack

Killed in action Wounded in action

0.12 0.70

0.10 0.60
Average number of

0.50
0.08
personnel

0.40
0.06
0.30
0.04
0.20
0.02 0.10
0.00 0.00
101 ABD 3/2 SBCT 1/25 SBCT 101 ABD 3/2 SBCT 1/25 SBCT

Mosul area All Iraq

RAND MG593-S.2

Figure S.3
U.S. Personnel Killed and Wounded in Action per Offensive Operation

Killed in action Wounded in action

0.50 3.00

2.50
Average number of

0.40
2.00
personnel

0.30
1.50
0.20
1.00
0.10 0.50

0.00 0.00
101 ABD 3/2 SBCT 1/25 SBCT 101 ABD 3/2 SBCT 1/25 SBCT

Mosul area All Iraq

RAND MG593-S.3
 Summary xvii

(adjusted for operational tempo [OPTEMPO] and enemy attacks) are the lowest of all
units in Area of Operation (AO) North.
Our analysis of SBCT tactical defensive operations indicates the SBCT’s combined
materiel improvements (Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) and
digital communications) and nonmateriel improvements (doctrine; tactics, techniques,
and procedures [TTPs]; training) led to significant improvements in blue force quality
of information and situation awareness. In some cases, the SBCTs were able to capital-
ize on improved blue force awareness to execute a number of advanced tactics, includ-
ing accelerated planning, dynamic force retasking, self-synchronization, and swarm-
ing, which in turn led to improvements in performing tactical defensive missions. The
SBCTs displayed a robust dynamic response to enemy ambushes and attacks.
The 1/25 SBCT also used these advanced tactics, new networked intelligence
capabilities, and decentralized operations to conduct targeted raids that enabled Stryker
units to respond quickly and effectively to intelligence tips. Further, these new intel-
ligence capabilities were integrated into the tactical capabilities of 1/25 SBCT units.1
These operations would not have been possible without the SBCTs’ information and
networking capabilities embedded at the tactical level.2

Assessment of 101st ABD Mission Effectiveness

Figure S.4 summarizes the materiel and nonmateriel factors contributing to the perfor-
mance of the 101st ABD in Iraq. From a communications network technology perspec-
tive, the 101st ABD benefited from having FBCB2–Blue Force Tracking (FBCB2-BFT)
systems on some command and control (C2) vehicles and many helicopters (68 ground
systems and 88 aviation systems). The rest of its systems were the Army’s standard
issue—they relied on mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) and near-term digital radio
(NTDR) legacy equipment for communications and the All Source Analysis System
(ASAS) and other legacy systems for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

1 See the classified annexes to this monograph for further details.

2 The conclusions we reach here are similar to those identified independently in Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming
Normalcy?” The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 297, No. 4, April 2006, pp. 72–81.
Figure S.4
xviii
Key Factors Influencing 101st ABD Performance in Stability Operations

Operational Performance
Organization • Effective in patrols,
Color legend “soft raid” and
• Force structure: air mobile reconstruction
Worse division—light infantry operations
supported by helicopters • Established social
• Resources: significant networks with Iraqi
reconstruction funding; three populace and local
engineering battalions; division leaders
Better complements of chaplains, MPs, • Limited effectiveness
and intelligence analysis and in HVT ops,
HUMINT personnel counter-infiltration

Mission Effectiveness
Technology Information Process • Fairly high U.S.
• Used traditional planning cycles casualties/event
• ISR: ASAS and other legacy • Blue: significant information
systems, COTS applications on units at battalion and to conduct offensive operations • Number of attacks and
higher; limited information • Emphasis on law enforcement– civilian casualties low
• FBCB2/BFT on some C2
on units below battalion like patrols and raids but increased over time
vehicles and helicopters
• Red and Green: limited, • Worked with tribal leaders, • Substantial insurgent
• Communications: MSE
with decreasing information encouraged political dialog infiltration into Mosul
and NTDR legacy
equipment from the population • Brought Sunni groups
• Infrastructure projects
into political process,
but arrangements
degraded over time

People
External Factors
• Training: focus on MCO-like operations
• Command agility: quick change in focus • Disbanding of Iraqi
from MCO to stability operations army and
de-Baathification leads
• Commanders’ intent: focus on law to riots
enforcement–like operations and civil
reconstruction • Initial collapse of the
Mosul police
Networked Forces in Stability Operations: 101st ABD, 3/2 and 1/25 SBCTs in Northern Iraq

department (May 2003)

RAND MG593-S.4
 Summary xix

From an organizational perspective, the 101st ABD is as an air-mobile division,

comprising light infantry supported by helicopters, with about 17,000 troops total. In
comparison, the Iraqi province in which they operated most heavily, Ninawah, has a
population of about 2.5 million (with Mosul having a population of about 1.8 million),
for a total force ratio of about 6.8 soldiers per thousand residents; historically, this ratio
is at the edge of the force size needed to conduct a stability operation.3 Note that this
force ratio does not include security forces that were hired, equipped, and trained by
U.S. forces (regional police and new Iraqi Army forces). We do not include these forces
in the force presence ratio for several reasons: First, their numbers could not be accu-
rately ascertained because they changed significantly from month to month. Second,
the reliability and experience of these forces varied significantly depending upon the
unit and the time in question.
The 101st ABD also had more than $31 million in reconstruction funding avail-
able (about $12,400 per thousand residents), along with three engineering battalions
available to support reconstruction activities. The unit also had a division complement
of chaplains and military police available for liaison activities and a division comple-
ment of intelligence personnel, including tactical human intelligence (HUMINT)
teams.
Before Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the 101st ABD’s training had focused on
major combat operations. However, once those operations were over and reconstruc-
tion began, the commanders’ intent rapidly switched to a focus on civil reconstruction
and conducting law enforcement–like operations to provide security. Consequently,
even though the unit as a whole had not trained for stability operations, the command-
ers of the 101st ABD were able to reorient their soldiers to conduct stability opera-
tions relatively well, without the excessive use of combat power and without generating
large-scale animosity among the populace.
The reorientation of the 101st ABD included stability-specific processes that
emphasized law enforcement–like patrols and “soft” raids (for example, knocking on
doors rather than barging into homes), and heavy spending on reconstruction projects
performed by local contractors. In addition, there was substantial command emphasis

3 James Quinlivan conducted a historical analysis of the force ratios required to conduct stability operations.
He found that, historically, ratios of one to four soldiers per thousand residents were sufficient strictly for routine
policing (such as in post–World War II Germany); ratios of four to ten per thousand could be adequate, but at the
cost of carrying out harshly punitive actions; and ratios of ten or more per thousand were the norm for stability
operations. (See “Force Requirements in Stability Operations” Parameters, Winter 1995, pp. 59–69.)
Other documents randomly have
different content
instruction is more precious than pure gold. The touchstone by
which he tests the quality of instruction, so as to distinguish genuine
teaching from its counterfeit, rote teaching, is thinking. The
schoolmaster who teaches by rote is satisfied if the pupils repeat his
words or those of the book; the true teacher sees to it that the
pupils think the thoughts which the words convey.
Thring, who, next to Arnold, was perhaps the Thring’s practice.
greatest teacher England ever had, laid much
stress upon thinking. Sometimes he would startle a dull lad, in the
midst of an exercise, by asking, “What have you got sticking up
between your shoulders?” “My head,” was the reply. “How does it
differ from a turnip?” And by questioning he would elicit the answer,
“The head thinks; the turnip does not.”
So important is thinking in all teaching that at Views of others.
the World’s Educational Congress, in 1893, one
educator after another rose in his place to emphasize the maxim,
“Make the pupils think.” One of the most advanced of the reformers
shouted in almost frantic tones, “Yes, make even the very babies
think.” After the wise men had returned to their homes, a Chicago
periodical raised the query, “How can you stop a pupil from
thinking?” And the conclusion it announced was that neither the
teacher behind the desk nor the tyrant upon his throne can stop a
pupil from thinking. Evidently, if that which sticks up between a boy’s
shoulders is a head and not a turnip, if the pupil is rational and not
an imbecile or an idiot, he does some thinking for himself; and the
maxim, “Make the pupils think,” requires further analysis before it
can be helpful in the art of teaching.
We who teach are very apt to overestimate Thinking for one’s
thinking in our own line of work and to undervalue self. Relying on
thinking outside of the school. There is, perhaps, others.
as much good thought in a lady’s bonnet as in the
solution of a quadratic equation. A sewing-machine embodies as
much genuine thought as the demonstration of a geometrical
theorem. The construction of a locomotive or a railway bridge
displays as much effective thinking as Hegel’s “Philosophy of
History,” or Kant’s “Critique of the Pure Reason.” Most men think very
well in doing their own kind of work; in many other spheres of
activity they must let other people think for them. When the
professor of astronomy discusses a problem connected with his
science, he thinks for himself; but when he buys a piece of land, he
gets a lawyer to think for him in the examination of the title and the
preparation of the deed. The lawyer thinks for himself in the court-
house; but when he goes home to dine, he expects his wife, or the
cook, to have done the thinking for him in the preparation of the
dinner. Grover Cleveland had the reputation of thinking for himself:
many a politician found out that this reputation was founded on fact;
but when the ex-President is sick, or has the toothache, he is willing
to let a physician or a dentist think for him. In like manner, a pupil
may think very well upon the play-ground; but if the teacher, whose
very name indicates the function of guiding, fails to guide the pupil
aright, the latter may become a mere parrot in the class-room.
What, then, is involved in making a pupil think?
The difficulty in answering this question is Thinking defined.
increased by the diversity of meanings of the word
thinking. The teacher who is not clear in his use of the term may
employ exercises calculated to develop one kind of mental activity,
and then accuse the pupils of dulness because they do not show
facility in some other intellectual process. When a text-book on
mental science defines the intellect as the power by which we think,
the term thinking is used to designate every form of intellectual
activity. The Century Dictionary defines thinking as an exercise of the
cognitive faculties in any way not involving outward observation, or
the passive reception of ideas from other minds. The logician defines
thinking as the process of comparing two ideas through their relation
to a third. Many exercises of the school are supposed to cultivate
thinking in the last sense of the word, when in reality they cultivate
thinking only in the widest acceptation of the term.
The writer saw a normal school principal conduct A faulty exercise.
an exercise in thinking, as the latter called it.
Turning to one of the pupils, he said, “Charley, will you please think
of something?” As soon as the boy raised his hand the principal
asked, “Does it belong to the animal, the vegetable, or the mineral
kingdom?” Then turning to the other members of the class, he said,
“Who of you can think of the vegetable in Charley’s mind?” The
names of at least forty different vegetables were given and spelled
and written upon the black-board. At last a pupil succeeded in
naming what was in Charley’s mind. Then there was a look of
triumph upon the faces of the principal and the class, as much as to
say, “Isn’t that splendid thinking?” At least one person felt like
burying his face in his hands for very shame; for here was
resurrected from the dead an old exercise of philanthropinism which
was buried more than a hundred years ago. What should one call
that kind of mental activity? Guessing. That is all it is. The exercise
tended to beget a habit very difficult to break up after it has been
formed.
Far better was an exercise which the writer A better plan.
witnessed in a graded school. The teacher had
called the class in the second reader. As soon as all the pupils were
seated she said, “You may read the first paragraph.” Instead of
reading orally, the class became so quiet that one might have heard
a pin drop. After most of the hands were raised she called upon one
pupil to tell what the paragraph said. The second paragraph was
read and the substance of it stated in the pupil’s own words. An
omission was supplied by another pupil; an incorrect phrase was
modified by giving the correct words for conveying the thought. In
the course of the lesson it became necessary to clarify the ideas of
some. This was accomplished by a few pertinent questions which
made the pupils think for themselves. After the entire lesson had
been read in this way she dismissed the class without assigning a
lesson. Every member of the class went to his seat, took out his
slate, and began to write out the lesson in his own language. The
interest and pleasure depicted on their faces showed that it was not
a task but a joy to express thought by the pencil. The teacher had
given them something to think about; she had taught them to
express their thoughts in spoken and written language; her
questions had stimulated their thinking, and when, later in the day,
the lesson in oral reading was given, the vocal utterance showed
that every pupil understood what he was reading. There was no
parrot-like utterance of vocables, but an expression of thought based
upon a thorough understanding and appreciation of what was read.
The silent reading was an exercise in thought-getting and thought-
begetting, the language lesson upon the slate was an exercise in
active thinking through written words, and the oral expression
furnished a test by which the teacher could ascertain what she had
accomplished in getting her pupils to think.
The first thing necessary in making the pupil A suggestive
think is best shown by relating another incident. reply.
The catalogue of a well-known school announced
that the teachers were aiming to get their pupils to read Latin at
sight and to think in more tongues than one. A captious
superintendent wrote to the principal, saying, “I envy you. How do
you do it? We would be satisfied if we could make pupils think in
English.” The reply was equally sharp and suggestive: “You ask how
we make pupils think. I answer, By giving them something to think
about. If you ask how we make them think in more tongues than
one, I answer, By giving them, in addition to the materials of
thought, the instruments of thought as found in two or more
languages.”
The first step in training a pupil to think is to The first essential.
furnish him proper materials of thought, to develop
in his mind the concepts which lie at the basis of a branch of study,
and which must be analyzed, compared, and combined in new forms
during the prosecution of that study. Just as little as a boy can draw
fish from an empty pond, so little can he draw ideas, thoughts, and
conclusions from an empty head. If the fundamental ideas are not
carefully developed when the study of a new science is begun, all
subsequent thinking on the part of the pupil is necessarily hazy,
uncertain, unsatisfactory. How can a pupil compare two ideas or
concepts and join them in a correct judgment if there is nothing in
his mind except the technical terms by which the scientist denotes
these ideas? The idea of number lies at the basis of arithmetic. How
often are beginners expected to think in figures without having a
clear idea of what figures denote! What teacher has not seen
children wrestling with fractions who had no idea of a fraction save
that of two figures, one above the other, with a line between them!
How many of our arithmetics are full of problems involving business
transactions of which the pupil cannot possibly have an adequate
idea! Not having clear ideas of the things to be compared, how can
the learner form clear and accurate judgments and conclusions?
So essential to correct thinking is the Proper thought-
development of the concepts and ideas which lie at material.
the basis of each science, that we may designate
the giving to the pupil of something to think about as the first and
most important step in the solution of the educational problem
before us. In other words, the furnishing of the proper materials of
thought is the first step in teaching others to think. The force and
the validity of this proposition are easily seen if we reflect upon the
essential oneness of the manifold diversities of thinking as they
appear at school and in subsequent years.
It is universally conceded that education should Thinking in the
be a preparation for life. The thinking at school professions.
should be an adumbration of the thinking beyond
the school. The possession of enough data, or thought-materials, for
reaching trustworthy conclusions, which is the indispensable
requisite of successful thinking at school, is likewise a necessary
requisite of successful thinking in practical life. It behooves us to
inquire into the nature and foundation of the thinking of men in the
professions, and in other vocations, for the purpose of gaining
further light upon the problem before us. Let us, then, inquire into
the nature and foundation of the thinking of men eminent in a
profession or prominent in some other vocation. The professional
man may have less native ability, less general knowledge, less
culture and education, less mental power than the client whom he
advises or the patient for whom he prescribes; and yet his
inferences and conclusions are accepted as more trustworthy than
those of men outside of the given profession, because he has a
knowledge of facts and data which they do not possess. If he be a
physician, special training and professional experience have taught
him how to observe the symptoms of different diseases; how to
eliminate sources of doubt and error; how to reach a correct
diagnosis of difficult cases, and how to apply the proper remedies. If
he be a lawyer, he has been taught how to examine court records;
how to detect and guard against flaws in legal documents; how to
find and interpret the law in specific cases; how to protect the life
and property of his client. The judge on the bench is learned in the
law, though he may be ignorant of science, literature, agriculture,
commerce, and manufactures. He is aided in arriving at correct
conclusions by thought-materials which are not in the possession of
laymen.
How does the thinking of an expert differ from The thinking of
that of other men? Not so much in the processes of experts.
thought as in the data upon which he reasons. An
Teaching not a
ordinary witness may testify as to matters of fact; trade.
the expert is supposed to possess extensive
knowledge and superior discrimination in a particular branch of
learning or practice; hence he may be a witness in matters as to
which ordinary observers cannot form just conclusions, and he is
held liable for negligence in case he injures another from want of
proper qualifications or proper use of the thought-materials
necessary to form trustworthy conclusions. From this point of view
we can see new force and beauty in the remark of Fitch that
teaching is the noblest of the professions, but the sorriest of trades.
The aim of a trade is to make something that will sell; its ultimate
aim is money, a livelihood. Teaching and the other professions,
although they cannot be sundered from money-making, have a
nobler aim. This arises out of the thought-materials with which they
deal. If a teacher’s mind does not busy itself with these, he sinks to
the level of a tradesman. A very keen observer said of the head of a
large boarding-school, that he had learned his trade from the
principal of a large normal school under whom he had been trained.
The remark, if true, was severe, but significant. It was an intimation
that the substance of the thinking of these two men was business
rather than education; that their conversation about the quality of
the beef and mutton served, about the loaves of bread, the pounds
of butter, and the bushels of potatoes consumed each week,
indicated that they were thinking more of the stomach and the purse
than of the things of the mind; that their aim was a large attendance
and a large cash-balance at the end of the year rather than the
mental growth and professional preparation of their students. Their
thinking was efficient and trustworthy in the domain in which it was
exercised. It partook of the nature of trade-thinking, and lacked
professional quality because it did not concern itself with problems
of mental growth and moral training, with the proper sequence of
studies, with the educational value of different kinds of knowledge,
and with the best methods of economizing the time and effort of
their students.
In several aspects teaching is like a trade. Every Mysteries.
art has its mysteries, with which those who
practise it must be familiar if they would succeed. Teaching is no
exception; and if the annual institute or the school of pedagogy fails
to clarify these mysteries by putting the teachers in possession of
materials for thought and of methods of applying knowledge to
beget thinking which are not within the ken of the average parent
and the general public, then failure must be written over the
outcome. A mystery is a lesson to be learned. A scrutiny of the
mysteries which characterize every trade and every art will serve not
merely to emphasize the necessity for furnishing proper thought-
materials, but will be helpful also in paving the way for the
consideration of another essential in training pupils to think. Let us
view them in the concrete.
A machinist, who was also a skilled mechanic, Examples.
was compelled by circumstances to quit his trade
and to accept a position as janitor. One day the pipe leading from
the sink to the sewer was clogged. The teacher, in conjunction with
a carpenter, worked a long time to fix it, but in vain. The janitor was
called, who in a few moments overcame the difficulty by the
application of a principle in natural philosophy on which the teacher
could have talked learnedly, although he knew not how to apply it in
the given case. The janitor related how the foreman in a foundry
was baffled in the effort to bore a hole through a piece of iron until a
workman, trained under a foreign master, suggested the purchase of
two things at a drug-store by means of which the hole was easily
bored. When the druggist asked about the use that was to be made
of these chemicals, he was told that the use was one of the
mysteries of the machinist’s trade.
Next, the carpenter fixed the mortise lock of a door which needed
attention, and the others lauded the skill with which he handled his
tools and applied his knowledge. Before the three separated, the
janitor’s son came with a word which he could not find in his lexicon.
With the aid of chalk and black-board and grammar, the teacher
showed how to dig out the roots of a Greek verb and what beautiful
changes occur in its conjugation. The turn had come for the
tradesmen to admire the mysterious skill and power of the teacher.
In applying the principle of natural philosophy, the janitor made
skilful use of one or two tools which the teacher and the carpenter
had never seen. He could express thought through the tools of his
own handicraft, in ways that they could not. Each one of the three
men knew the tools and the mysteries of his own vocation. During
the entire scene there was not a logical flaw in the thinking of any
one of them. Probably there was little difference in their native
ability; certainly none in the fundamental nature of their thought-
processes. The practical difference resulted from the data at their
command and from the tools they were using to express the
thoughts peculiar to their several vocations.
The power to use tools, instruments, and Man, the tool-
machinery lifts man above the brute creation. user.
There is labor-saving machinery in thinking as well
Instruments of
as in manual labor. The more perfect the tools with thought the
which we work the greater the results we can second essential.
achieve without waste of effort. In thinking as well
as in working we must use the best tools in order to attain the
greatest facility and efficiency. Yonder are two wheat-fields. In one
of them a giant is wielding the sickle of our forefathers; in the other
a youth, not yet out of his teens, is at work. At the close of the day
the work of the giant will not bear comparison with that of the lad,
because the latter was sitting upon a self-binder. They had the same
material to work upon, yet, in spite of his superior strength, the
giant could not cope with his weaker though better-equipped
competitor. In like manner, the youth who has mastered the
algebraic equation, or the symbols and formulas of chemistry, is in
many respects the superior of a much brighter man who is not in
possession of these tools or instruments of thought. A boy of
average capacity who goes through a good high school thereby
acquires certain fundamental ideas and the accompanying
instruments of thought by which he is enabled to solve problems
entirely beyond the power of a much brighter boy who never studies
beyond the grammar grade.
The instruments of thought are generally spoken Confusion in
of as symbols, whilst the materials of thought are thought and
the things for which the symbols stand. In thinking, practice.
the mind may employ the ideas which correspond
to the things in the external world; or it may employ the symbols by
which science indicates things that have been definitely fixed or
quantified. Failure to distinguish the sign from the thing signified,
the symbol from its reality, leads to confusion in thought and to the
most disastrous results in mental development. Loss of appetite for
knowledge must inevitably result from methods of teaching by which
the pupil is expected to learn the sounds of the letters from their
names, or musical sounds from the notation on the staff, or the
ideas of number from the arabic notation, or a knowledge of flowers
from the technical terms of a text-book, or a knowledge of chemical
elements and substances from the definitions, descriptions, and
formulas of a scientific treatise. The symbol is indispensable in
advanced thinking; but to expect the learner to get the fundamental
ideas of a science from words, symbols, and definitions is evidence
that the teacher does not understand the nature of thinking. It may,
therefore, be helpful to set forth clearly the important distinction
between thinking in things and thinking in symbols; to point out
their relative value in mental development; and to fix their place in a
rational system of education.
 II
THINKING IN THINGS AND IN SYMBOLS

The rote system, like other systems of its age, made

more of forms and symbols than of the things
symbolized. To repeat the words correctly was
everything, to understand the meaning nothing; and
thus the spirit was sacrificed to the letter.
Herbert Spencer.
Words are men’s daughters, but God’s sons are
things.
Johnson.
For words are wise men’s counters,—they do but
reckon by them,—but they are the money of fools.
Hobbes.
It is only by the help of language (or some other
equivalent set of signs) that we can think in the strict
sense of the word; that is to say, consider things under
their general or common aspects.
Sully.

II
THINKING IN THINGS AND IN SYMBOLS

Within half a mile of the Susquehanna River a Lesson in

teacher was asking the class, “Of what is the geography.
earth’s surface composed?” “Of land and water,”
was the reply. In answer to a question by the superintendent
concerning the earth’s surface, one boy declared Two kinds of
that he had never seen the earth. He had been thinking.
acquiring words without the corresponding ideas.
Turning to another boy, this official said, “Will you please show me
water?” With a gleam of satisfaction on his face, the lad raised his
atlas, pointed to the blue coloring around the map of North America,
and said, “That is water.” “Will you please drink it?” The expression
on the faces of teacher and pupils indicated that all felt as if some
one had committed a blunder. Where did the blunder lie? Had the
teacher taught what should not be learned? Surely, every child
should learn how water is indicated on a map. Did the boy use
language wrong in idiom? By no means; for, as every student who
has handled a lexicon well knows, many words have both a literal
and a tropical, or figurative, meaning. If, pointing to an object, the
teacher says, “This is a desk,” he uses the word is in its literal sense.
On the other hand, if he points to a division on the map of the
United States, and says, “This is Pennsylvania,” he does not mean
that the colored surface to which he is pointing is the real State of
Pennsylvania (if it were, a political boss could pocket it, and carry it
the rest of his days without further trouble). What is meant is, that a
given space on the map indicates or represents Pennsylvania, the
word is being used, in the latter instance, in a figurative sense.
Whether the word is, in the expression, “This is my body,” should be
understood in a literal or in a figurative sense has been discussed for
ages in the Christian church. In the answer of the boy we strike a
distinction in thought that lies at the basis of good teaching in all
grades of schools, from the kindergarten to the university,—namely,
the distinction between thinking in things and thinking in symbols. In
one sense of the word, all thinking is symbolic; for the percepts,
concepts, and images of external objects which the mind employs in
the thinking process are symbolic of the things for which they stand.
But in advanced thinking, and especially in scientific investigations,
objective symbols, such as words, signs, letters, equations, formulas,
technical terms and expressions, are utilized to facilitate the thinking
process. Take the age questions in mental arithmetic that have been
prematurely inflicted upon so many pupils in the public schools. So
long as the mind consciously carries A’s age and the wife’s age,
using the clumsy instruments of arithmetical analysis, the thinking is
difficult indeed. As soon as x is made the symbol of A’s age, and y
the symbol of the wife’s age, so that the conditions of the problem
can be thrown into algebraic equations, the difficulty vanishes. In
the algebraic solution the mind drops all thought of A’s age and the
wife’s age while manipulating the signs and symbols of the equation,
and restores the meaning of the symbols only when their value in
figures has been found. The algebraic solution is a genuine specimen
of thinking in symbols, and illustrates the labor-saving machinery
which the human mind employs, more or less, in all the most
difficult scientific investigations.
What is a symbol? It is a mark, sign, or visible Symbol defined.
representation of an idea. The mathematician uses
the symbol to represent quantities, operations, and relations. The
chemist uses the symbol to indicate elements and their groupings or
combinations. The theologian applies the term symbol to creeds and
abstract statements of doctrine. The grips, countersigns, and
passwords of a secret society may be spoken of as symbols of the
ideas, aims, and principles of the organization. Often the symbol is
chosen on account of some supposed resemblance between it and
that for which it stands, as when black is made the symbol of
mourning, white of purity, the oak of strength, and the sword of
slaughter. “A symbol,” says Kate Douglass Wiggin, “may be
considered to be a sensuous object which suggests an idea, or it
may be defined as the sign or representation of something moral or
intellectual by the images or properties of natural things, as we
commonly say, for instance, that the lion is the symbol of courage,
the dove the symbol of gentleness. It need not be an object any
more than an action or an event, for the emerging of the butterfly
from the chrysalis may be a symbol of the resurrection of the body,
or the silver lining of the cloud typify the joy that shines through
adversity.” Frequently the symbol is chosen arbitrarily, or because it
is the first letter of the word which denotes the quality, substance,
thing, or idea for which the symbol stands. Generally the symbol is a
visible representation, but it may also address the other senses,
notably the ear and the sense of touch. The Standard Dictionary
excludes the portrait from the extent or scope of the symbol, and
confines it to the representation of that which is not capable of
portraiture, as an idea, state, quality, or action. It is well to bear this
limitation in mind during the present discussion.
A few illustrations will serve to fix the sense of Examples.
the word symbol. In some parts of America the
tramps have a system of symbols of their own, a given mark on the
front gate indicating a good place to ask for a meal, another
indicating a cross dog in the rear yard. That which the tramp fears or
likes is not the mark which he sees, but a very real thing which that
mark suggests to his mind. A number of the apostles were fishermen
by trade. The fish became a very significant symbol in the days of
early Christianity. The letters in the Greek name for fish are the
initial letters of the expression, Jesus Christ, God’s Son, Saviour. It is
one of many instances showing how the human mind delights in
heaping symbol upon symbol to conceal precious meanings from the
uninitiated.
What was the mental condition of the lad spoken Symbols for water.
of at the beginning of this chapter? The boy knew
the real thing long before he knew the first symbol for water.
Without doubt he had tasted it, played in it against his mother’s will,
been washed in it against his own will, for months before he learned
the first symbol for water used in common by him and others, which
was probably the spoken word. Up to that time he thought of water
in some mental picture or image which had been formed upon the
eye and then upon mind somewhat as the picture is formed through
the art of the photographer. Up to the time that he learned the
spoken word for water this liquid suggested mental pictures which
constituted a thinking in things[1] rather than in symbols, using the
latter term according to the limitation set by the Standard Dictionary.
On entering school he was taught to read; he added to the ear-
symbol the eye-symbol,—that is, the written or printed word, which
he may have associated at first with the real thing, or with the
spoken word; of course, very soon with both, if correct methods of
teaching were followed. Next, he was taught the map-symbol. The
blunder which the teacher on the banks of the Susquehanna had
committed consisted not in teaching how water is indicated on a
map, but in not pointing to the majestic river near the school-house,
and associating the water in its channel with the representations of
water on a map. If the boy studied Latin or Greek, he was taught
new symbols for water in the corresponding words of these
languages. If he studied chemistry, he early learned the composition
of water, and was thenceforth taught to write it H₂O, a symbol
enshrining a new truth and lifting him to higher planes of thought by
giving him a new instrument as well as new materials of thought.
Half the errors in teaching arise from the fact Sources of error.
that the teacher does not constantly bear in mind
the distinction between the symbol and the thing Elementary
instruction.
for which the symbol stands, thus giving rise to
confusion in the mind of the learner. A class was
bounding the different States of the Union. At the close of the
recitation the superintendent suggested that the class bound the
school-house. It was bounded on the north by the roof, on the south
by the cellar, on the east and west by walls. The geography classes
of an entire city were caught in that way. Either the pupils had not
been taught, or else they had forgotten the difference between the
real directions and the ordinary representation of them on the
surface of a wall map. Sometimes the confusion exists in the mind of
the teacher as well as in the minds of the pupils. Then he expects
them to learn one thing while he teaches them another. By the
methods formerly in vogue the pupil was expected to learn the
sounds of the letters from their names; the pronunciation of the
word from the names of the letters which compose it; the names,
forms, and sounds of letters from the word taught as a whole; the
musical sounds from the notation on a musical staff; the ideas of
number, of fractions, from the corresponding symbols; the units of
denominate numbers and of the metric system from the names used
in the tables of weights and measures; the flowers of the field from
the nomenclature of the botany; the substances and experiments in
chemistry from the descriptions and pictures of a text-book. Such
teaching has given rise to endless lectures, editorials, and
discussions upon the use of the concrete in teaching, upon the value
of thinking in things, upon the importance of object-lessons,
laboratory methods, and the like.
But there is another side to the question. There More advanced
comes a time in the development of the pupil when instruction.
he must rise above the sticks and shoe-pegs and
blocks of the elementary arithmetic, and learn to think in the
symbols of the Arabic notation. Later he must learn to think in the
more comprehensive symbols of the algebraic notation. He must
learn to think the abstract and general concepts of science, and, in
thinking these, to use the devices, technical terms, and other
symbols which the scientists have invented to facilitate their
thinking.
Hear a parable. A teacher sat down to dinner. A parable.
The waiter handed him the bill of fare. The
proprietor followed the waiter to the kitchen, directed him to cut out
the names of the eatables which had been ordered, and to carry
these names on plates to the dining-room. “It is not these words,”
exclaimed the guest, “that I desire to eat, but the things in the
kitchen for which these words stand.” “Isn’t that what you
pedagogues are doing all the time, expecting children to make an
intellectual meal on words such as are found in the columns of the
spelling-book and attached on maps to the black dots which you call
cities? My boy gravely informs me that every State capital has its
ring, because on his map there is always a ring around the dot called
the capital of a country.” The teacher was forced to admit that there
is, alas! too much truth in the allegation. In the afternoon he took
revenge. Knowing that the proprietor had a thousand-dollar draft to
be cashed, he arranged with the banker to have it paid in silver coin.
When the landlord saw the growing heap of coin, he exclaimed, “If I
must be paid in silver, can you not give me silver certificates?” “Did
you not intimate to me,” said the teacher, tapping him on the
shoulder, “that it is the real things we want, and not words and
symbols which stand for realities?” The landlord was obliged to
admit that in the larger transactions of the mercantile world it saves
time and is far more convenient to use checks, drafts, and other
symbols for money than it would be to use the actual cash. In
elementary transactions, like the purchase of a necktie, it is better to
use the cash, to think and deal in real money, but when it comes to
the distribution of five and one-half million dollars among the school
districts of Pennsylvania, it is better to draw warrants upon the State
Treasurer, to use checks and drafts, and to think in figures, than it
would be to count so much coin, and send the appropriation in that
form all over a great commonwealth.
The parable hardly needs an interpretation. Its Its interpretation.
lesson points in two directions. On the one hand, it
shows in the true light every species of rote teaching, of parrot-like
repetition of definitions, statements, and lists of words which give a
show of knowledge without the substance. It puts the seal of
condemnation on most forms of pure memory work. It sounds the
note of warning to all teachers who are trying to improve the
memory by concert recitations. The boy whose class was taught to
define a point as position without length, breadth, or thickness, and
who, when asked to recite alone, gave the definition, “A point has a
physician without strength, health, or sickness,” is but one of many
specimens of class-teaching condemned by the parable. It says in
unmistakable terms that all elementary instruction must start in the
concrete, taking up the objects or things to be known, and resolutely
refusing to begin with statements and definitions which to the
children are a mere jargon of words.
On the other hand, the parable indicates how too Making
long-continued use of the concrete may arrest blockheads.
development, and hinder the learner from reaching
the stages of advanced thinking. It hints that the too constant use of
blocks, however valuable at first, ultimately begets blockheads,
instead of intelligences capable of the higher life of thought and
reflection. A rational system of pedagogy involves proper attention
to the materials of thought and proper care in furnishing the
instruments by which advanced thinking is made easy and effective.
In one respect the parable does not set forth the whole truth. It
makes no account of differences in thinking due to heredity and
mental training. The differences in native ability are, however, not as
great as is generally supposed (unless the feeble-minded enter into
the comparison); the differences due to correct training, or the
neglect of it, are far more striking. The work expected of the pupil
should, of course, tally with his capacity; otherwise it will force him
to resort to pernicious helps, beget in him wrong habits of study, rob
him of the sense of mastery and the joy of intellectual achievement,
and destroy his self-reliance, his power of initiative, and his ability to
grapple with difficult problems and perplexing questions. The power
to think grows by judicious exercise. Here better than anywhere else
in the whole domain of school work can we distinguish the genuine
coin from its counterfeit, and discriminate between true skill and
quackery, between the artist and the artisan. It is at this point that
most help can be given to young teachers by a good course of
lectures on learning to think and on the difficult art of stimulating
others to think.
 III
THE MATERIALS OF THOUGHT

A vast abundance of objects must lie before us ere

we can think upon them.
Goethe.
The young have a strong appetite for reality, and the
teacher who does not make use of that appetite is not
wise.
J. S. Blackie.
The child’s restless observation, instead of being
ignored or checked, should be diligently ministered to,
and made as accurate as possible.
Herbert Spencer.

What do you read, my lord?

Words, words, words.
Hamlet.

You have an exchequer of words, and I think no

other treasure.
Two Gentlemen of Verona.

III
THE MATERIALS OF THOUGHT

The hotel man was right in his criticism of Words without

teachers who expect their pupils to make an thoughts.
intellectual meal on mere words. For three hundred years
educational reformers have been hurling their epithets against this
abuse. Has it been banished from the schools? By no means. It
crops out anew with every generation of teachers and in every grade
of instruction from the kindergarten to the university. During the
years in which a child acquires several languages without difficulty, if
it hears them spoken, the mind is eager for words and often
appropriates them regardless of their meaning. The child learns
rhymes and phrases for the sake of the jingle that is in them, and
cares very little for clearly defined ideas and thoughts. So strong and
retentive is the memory for words that the child finds it easier to
learn by heart entire sentences than to think the thoughts therein
expressed. Like a willing and obedient slave, the verbal memory can
be made to do the work of the other mental powers. The merest
glimpse at a picture may recall all the sentences on the same page,
so that the pupil can repeat them with the book closed or the back
turned towards the reading chart. The recollection of what the ear
has heard may thus relieve the eye of its function in seeing words,
degrade the child to the level of a parrot, and thereby greatly hinder
progress in learning to read. Very frequently the memory is required
to perform work belonging to the reflective powers, because the
learner is thereby saved the trouble of comprehending the lesson
and expressing its substance in his own language. Moreover, the
accurate statement of a truth is apt to be accepted as evidence of
knowledge and correct thinking. The average examination tests very
little more than the memory. If the answers are given in the
language of the text-book or the teacher, the examiner seldom
supplements the written work by an oral examination. Thus there is
a constant tendency on the part of teachers and pupils to rest
satisfied with correct forms of statement; and the pernicious custom
of feeding the mind on mere words is encouraged and perpetuated.
Exposed in plain terms, this abuse of words is condemned by
everybody; yet it is as easy at this point to slide into the wrong
practice as it is to fall into the sins forbidden by the decalogue. Like
Proteus, this abuse assumes diverse and unexpected forms; instance
after instance is needed to put young teachers on their guard and to
expose its pernicious effect upon methods of instruction and habits
of study. To cry “words, words, nothing but words,” will not suffice to
correct the evil, for words must be used in the best kind of
instruction. Line upon line, precept upon precept, example after
example is needed to expose the folly of learning words without
corresponding ideas, of teaching symbols apart from the things for
which they stand. No apology is needed for citing laughable and
flagrant instances in point; ridicule sometimes avails where good
counsel fails.
A superintendent who advocates spelling-bees Spelling.
and magnifies correct orthography out of all
proportion to its real value startled a class in the high school by
asking for the spelling of a word of five syllables. Not receiving an
immediate answer, he referred to the Greek. This made the spelling
easy for at least one pupil. A year later he accosted this pupil,
saying, “You are the only person that ever spelled
psychopannychism for me.” “What does it mean?” was the question
flashed back at him in return for his compliment. He could not tell,
because he did not know. For years he had worried teachers and
pupils with the spelling of a word whose meaning he had failed to fix
accurately in his own mind.[2] What more effective method could be
devised for destroying correct habits of thinking?
There is a time in the life of the child when it is Eyesight.
hungry for new words. The habit of seeing words
accurately and learning their spelling at first sight is then easily
acquired, provided there is no defect in the pupil’s eyes. In cases of
defective eyesight the first step towards the solution of the spelling
problem, as well as the first condition in teaching the pupil to think
accurately, is to send him to a skilled oculist (not to a so-called
graduate optician or doctor of refraction, who must make his living
out of the spectacles he sells, and whose limited training does not
enable him to make a correct diagnosis in critical cases). Correct
vision will assist the pupil not merely in learning the exact form of
the words which he uses in writing, but also in forming correct ideas
of the things with which the mind deals in the thought-processes.
Although great stress should be laid upon the orthography of such
words in common use as are frequently misspelled,—daily drill upon
lists of these should not be omitted at school while the child’s word-
hunger lasts,—yet it is vastly more important to acquire an adequate
knowledge of the ideas, concepts, and relations for which the words
stand. To spend time upon the spelling of words which only the
specialist uses, and which are easily learned in connection with the
specialty by a student possessing correct mental habits, is a form of
waste that cannot be too severely condemned. It is far better to
spend time in building concepts of things met with in real life.
The meaning of very many words is, of course, learned from the
connection in which they occur. This, however, is not true of
sesquipedalian words like the one mentioned above, nor of the
technical terms by which science designates the things that have
been accurately defined or quantified.
Technical terms are used to denote the ideas Fundamental
which lie at the basis of science. These ideas.
fundamental ideas are appropriately called basal
concepts. Since basal concepts cannot be transferred from the
teacher’s mind to the pupils’ minds by merely teaching the
corresponding technical terms, they must be developed by
appropriate lessons. If this be neglected, there may be juggling with
words and a show of knowledge; but close, accurate thinking is
impossible. This seems to be so self-evident that one would hardly
expect to meet violations of such a simple rule in the art of teaching.
And yet it is related of the professor of physics in one of our largest
universities that he began his course of lectures in this wise: “A
rearrangement of the courses of study deprived you of the usual
instruction in elementary physics. That is your misfortune, and not
my fault.” Thereupon, he began his lectures on advanced physics as
if the preparation of his class to think the concepts at the foundation
of his science could be ignored without detriment to the progress of
the student, as if confused minds and unsatisfactory thinking were
not the inevitable outcome of juggling with technical terms apart
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