Limits Secular Ization Education
Limits Secular Ization Education
net/publication/315794748
CITATIONS READS
8 4,689
1 author:
Robert Bertrand
Joint BioEnergy Institute
19 PUBLICATIONS 454 CITATIONS
SEE PROFILE
Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:
All content following this page was uploaded by Robert Bertrand on 12 April 2017.
Abstract
Education-inspired decline of religious thought and practice among students has long been
conceived as a mechanism of secularization. How education correlates with religious
outcomes, and vice versa, have been of interest both in academia and in the public, primarily
because of the rise of the so-called “New Atheist” movement that seeks dominion within the
intellectual sphere, the rise of the number of individuals who do not identify with a religion,
and the guiding secular ethos of Western nations. Modern social research has exposed
important limitations and caveats to the secularization paradigm that call into question to
what extent, or even if, religious decline occurs during post-secondary schooling. This article
presents the inadequacies and unsubstantiated assumptions of the secularization hypothesis
through discussion of key topics of contention, namely: (1) propensities of religious to enroll
and excel in school; (2) demographic changes in educational trajectories of religious and
non-religious; (3) decline of religious service attendance among post-secondary students; (4)
the dissolution of religious plausibility structures; (5) the “liberalization” of student religious
opinion; and (6) the nature and process of religious disaffiliation during schooling. Although
the consensus of this review is that education is generally not atrophic to religious
orientation, exceptions in favor of the secularization hypothesis will also be presented.
Introduction
The hypothesis that education has a secularizing influence on student religiosity, or that
religious adherents are generally averse to educational pursuits, is a vestige of the emergence
of the social sciences in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Early social theorists such
as Auguste Comte (1798-1857), Max Weber (1864-1920), and Émile Durkheim (1858-1917)
predicted the eventual decline of religion through the prevalence of education and the
1
The Limits of Secularization through Education
triumph of the intellect (Schwadel). As Schwadel notes, “Since the beginning of modern
social thought there has been an almost unquestioned belief that education and other aspects
of modernity are detrimental to religion” (161). Consequently, Gerhard Lenski adds, the
study of religion was “from its inception . . . committed to the positivist view that religion in
the modern world is merely a survival from man’s primitive past, and doomed to disappear
in an era of science and general enlightenment” (quoted in Iannaccone: 1468). The
university, the institution responsible for generating and transmitting information, has been
conceived as a vehicle of secularization (Feldman and Newcomb; Hadaway and Roof).
Higher education has been variably characterized by social thinkers as “relatively free of
religion” (Wilson: 9), a “breeding ground for apostasy” (Caplovitz and Sherrow: 109), and
possessing a “pervasively secular ethos” (Carpenter: 265).
Support for the idea of education-inspired religious decline has lingered within the
social sciences despite waning empirical support. “Most of the voluminous literature on
religion and higher education,” Mayrl and Oeur explain, “has been normative or theoretical
in character, filled with grand claims noticeably lacking in empirical justification. However, in
recent years social scientists have begun to re-examine the role of religion in higher
education, and their efforts have begun to yield data that have challenged some longstanding
assumptions and raised important new questions” (260). The purpose of this article is to
illustrate the inadequacies and unsubstantiated assumptions of the secularization hypothesis
through discussion of topics of contention related to education-religion outcomes. These
are, namely: (1) Effects of religiosity on school enrollment and academic performance; (2)
changes in religion-education correlation trends among adherents and non-adherents in the
twentieth century; (3) the commonly observed decline of rate of religious service attendance
among young adults; (4) whether introduction of religious young adults into the diverse
campus culture encourages religious decline and disaffiliation; (5) what students believe as
compared to the general public, and whether these beliefs signify secularization of religious
thought; and (6) whether religious disaffiliation in college is primarily caused by the
educational experience. Although this article generally concludes that most forms of religious
expression are not associated with aversions to education and that education does not lead
to precipitous declines in religious expression, exceptions to this conclusion will also be
illustrated.
It is notable that although modern social research has since offered many signposts of
caution discouraging the promulgation of sweeping secularization narratives, these have been
nonetheless endorsed through the popular writings of non-religious personalities. “Is there
any evidence,” wrote Oxford biologist and atheist Richard Dawkins in his 2006 New York
Times best-seller, The God Delusion, “that . . . atheists are likely to be drawn from among the
better educated and more intelligent?” (129). In what has now become an oft-quoted passage
of his book on blogs and other online venues, Dawkins describes a meta-analysis written by
Paul Bell and published in 2002 in the non-academic Mensa Magazine. Dawkins summarizes
Bell’s findings: “Of 43 studies carried out since 1927 on the relationship between religious
belief and one’s intelligence and/or educational level, all but four found an inverse
connection. That is, the higher one’s intelligence or education level, the less one is likely to
be religious or hold ‘beliefs’ of any kind” (129). The relevance of this article is indebted not
only to social scientists interested in the controversies of the secularization paradigm but also
associations between religiosity and educational measures has also been observed using a
variety of methodological approaches (Gruber; Sawkins, Seaman and Williams; Branas-Garza
and Neuman; Brown and Taylor).
Other studies on education-religiosity outcomes among adults have not reached
favorable conclusions. For example, Hungerman, analyzing the effects of compulsory
schooling laws in Canada on religious participation, concluded that each additional year of
schooling correlated with a four percent drop in the likelihood that an individual will self-
identify as religious in later life. Surveys of women from 97 countries reveal negative
associations between female educational attainment and adherence to major local religions
(Norton and Tomal). Evidence also suggests that particular styles of religious expression
may have various influences on educational outcomes. For example, among fundamentalist
expressions of Christianity, and among Christians who profess inerrancy of religious sacred
texts, adherents are associated with lower educational accomplishments (Sherkat 2007). As
compared to national averages, conservative Protestants have below average educational
attainment rates, Jews have above average rates, and Catholics and mainline Protestants are
average (Lehrer; Darnell and Sherkat). Other religious traditions, such as Mormonism, are
not associated with any aversion to education (Merrill, Lyon and Jensen). It has been
curiously observed in one study that in Christian denominations with high average
educational attainment among its members, average rate of church attendance is low,
whereas in denominations with low average educational attainment, average attendance is
high. However, within each denomination, individuals who are more educated are also more
likely to participate in religious services often. This distinction suggests confounding
influences at play on the effects of educational achievement on rates of church attendance
(Sacerdote and Glaeser).
Generally, support for the idea of education-inspired secularization has waned in favor
of nuanced appreciation of recent data and cautious support for a charitable opinion on the
status of religious thought and expression on campus (Mayrl and Oeur). Parodying the
sentiments of early social thinkers, some researchers now regard the university as “a
breeding ground for vital religious practice and teaching” (Cherry, DeBerg, and Porterfield:
295) and that “organized religion is alive and well” in higher education (Jachik: A30). Other
researchers have opined that “religion is not the province of the poor and uninformed” and
that “[most] rates of religious belief and religious activity . . . increase with education”
(Iannaccone: 1470).
Positive Drivers of Educational Outcomes
Why would religiosity contribute to educational outcomes? One cause is the generation
of social capital. Analogous to the idea of physical and human capital (tools and training that
enhance productivity), Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam, author of Bowling Alone,
defines social capital as “features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social
trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (1995: 67). Social
networks such as family bonds, friendships, work associates, religious communities, and
political organizations, provide individuals with social resources such as information,
assistance, and moral support. These resources allow members of social networks to
overcome obstacles and achieve goals. In addition to support, members of a community are
indoctrinated with the values, norms, and standards of behavior imbued within the
community. In most examples, prosociality and other socially positive tendencies are
inculcated whilst undesirable and self-destructive behaviors are mitigated (Coleman). A
plethora of studies have concluded that social capital accrues positive outcomes in measures
such as mental and physical health, education, economic prosperity, and child welfare, and
that social capital also attenuate negative outcomes in measures such as binge drinking,
delinquency, and quitting school (Putnam 2000).
Religious participation is another source of social capital (McKune and Hoffmann;
Muller and Ellison; Glanville, Sikkink and Hernadez; Sikkink and Hernandez). Religion,
among other things, provides adherents with support networks, a means of transmitting
positive attitudes, and a venue to bridge youth with older members of the community who
may serve as mentors and role models (Taylor and Chatters; Gardner; Ellison and George).
As Regnerus explains, “religion as traditionally practiced performs several social functions: it
reinforces collectively-held values and beliefs, it provides social networks to individuals, it
encourages caring, it has enduring faith in the possibility of individual transformation, it
galvanizes and organizes moral indignation, and its practitioners are committed to the next
generation. The list goes on . . .” (2008: 5). Religion has hence been characterized as “a
major source of social cohesion” (McIntosh and Alston: 876). Additionally, religion
“promotes traditional values, facilitates interaction, breeds self-confidence, and establishes
social bonds that encourage academic competence, emotional health and intelligent decision-
making” (Regnerus 2008: 10).
The influence of religion on academic outcomes in low-income neighborhoods is
particularly positive and is a major determinant of academic success within these
communities because religious social networks are often the only major source of social
capital (Regnerus 2008; Regnerus and Elder). Participating in a religious community
encourages normative behaviors and guides youth towards desirable social end-states, and
for this reason, religious practice has been linked with higher measures of academic success
as well as many other socially desirable behaviors (Smith 2003a; Glanville et al.; Bankston).
Meta-analysis of 650 studies have concluded that religious thought and practice contribute
beneficially to multiple behavioral and health-related outcomes concerning hypertension,
mortality, depression, suicide, promiscuity, alcohol use, drug use, delinquency, well-being,
sense of purpose, and self-esteem (Johnson et al.). This meta-analysis similarly-concluded,
based on an additional 19 studies on religion-education correlations (some of these studies
observed children), that educational outcomes are also positively correlated with religiosity
(Johnson et al.).
Other explanations for positive religion-education trends have been suggested in
literature reviews meriting mention (cf. Jeynes 2013). Religious work ethic, conceptualized by
Weber in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, is a source of motivation for success
that may encourage Protestant (and perhaps Catholic) students to work harder and achieve
better grades (Mentzer; Gerhards; Giorgi and Marsh; Mudrack). Religious involvement may
deter individuals from destructive behaviors detrimental to academic performance. These
may include decreased propensities for drug and alcohol abuse as well as delinquency
(Johnson et al. 2002). Religiously committed youth are also less likely to become pregnant
while they are teenagers (Beck, Cole, and Hammond; Jeynes 2003; Holman and Harding).
Smith (2003b) has suggested that religiosity contributes to positive psycho-social outcomes
through at least nine concomitantly operating factors: (1) moral directives; (2) spiritual
experiences; (3) role models; (4) community and leadership skills; (5) coping skills; (6)
cultural capital; (7) social capital; (8) network closure; and (9) extra-community links. These
factors likely work in synergy to promote high academic outcomes among religious students.
Negative Drivers of Educational Outcomes
The beneficial effects of accumulating social capital within religious groups could be
counter-weighed by excessive social restriction within a close-knit group. Some religious
conservatives have displayed aversions to external sources of knowledge and view familiar
information with unduly trust (Hood, Hill and Williamson). As Welch and colleagues
explain, “past research has often characterized some conservative and fundamentalist
Protestant denominations as having surrounded members with resistant sub-cultural barriers
that attempt to insulate them from the corrupting influences of the secular society” (2007:
26). Welch et al. (2004) suggest that distrust of others within conservative groups may arise
because of excessive bonding social capital – inter-group linking – and inadequate bridging
social capital – intra-group linking. This imbalance between bonding and bridging social
capital suggests that “although bonding capital may help to integrate members within such
[conservative religious] groups, it may also simultaneously serve to engender suspicion about
non-members” (Welch, Sikkink, and Loveland: 27). So-called mainline religious groups, in
contrast, have been observed to formulate both bonding capital between themselves as well
as bridging capital within the public, e.g., in the form of civic engagement (Smidt; Wuthnow;
Uslaner).
Tightly bound social networks with few bridging connections to external groups
promote distrust and the construction of worldviews replete with others and outsiders
(Simpson; Welch, Sikkind, and Loveland; Darnell and Sherkat). Such distrust has bred a
culture of aversion to public education. As Darnell and Sherkat observe, “For many
conservative Protestants, education serves to undermine both secular and divine authority by
promoting ‘humanism’ and denigrating faith. Consequently, organized movements have
sought to resacralize public education by controlling curricula and textbook selection,
reinstituting mandatory or officially-sanctioned voluntary prayer, or providing alternatives
through home schooling or fundamentalist schools” (307-8). Antagonism to public
education is frequently found in the writings and speeches of conservative Christian leaders,
who encourage young members of the community to avoid public education and for parents
to insulate their children from its corrupting influence (Darnell and Sherkat).
Particular religious opinions may also be antithetical to educational progress. For
example, adherence to biblical literalism, the belief in the scriptural inerrancy of the Bible as
written word-for-word inspired by God for literal interpretation, is strongly associated with
lower educational accomplishments (Stroope). If one believes that the truth is found in
sacred texts, one would be inclined to eschew public education because it teaches scientific
or historical lies at odds with sacred teachings. As Darnell and Sherkat argue further:
These distinctive religious beliefs could influence which educational options
adherents deem desirable or plausible. Individuals who believe that the Bible
is the inerrant source of truth may be ambivalent about secular studies, if not
hostile toward them. Thus, fundamentalist students might not “make the
grades,” they may curb their educational aspirations, and may choose
secondary curricula that limit opportunities for higher education. When kin,
peers, and other associates are beholden to these cultural convictions, these
can produce social pressures militating against secondary or post-secondary
educational pursuits. Fundamentalist parents and denominations may not
encourage children to excel in secular studies, may discourage educational
aspirations, and might direct children away from college preparatory curricula
(309).
This interpretation is supported by surveys of young adults revealing that conservative
Protestants and biblical literalists have precipitously lower educational ambitions and are less
likely to have taken college-preparatory courses (Darnell and Sherkat). Literalist beliefs have
also been found to be associated with less verbal ability, although high rates of religious
participation attenuates the effect (Sherkat 2010).
Demographic Changes in Educational Trends over Time
Topic Summary
One subject of contention is the question of potential changes in trends in the
educational accomplishments of religious and non-religious within past decades. Evidence
suggests that religious adherents have made impressive gains in educational outcomes since
the mid-twentieth century. Although the cause remains unknown, speculative answers point
to Western cultural revolutions sparking the entrance of women and minorities in
universities and high-skills work. This development could explain why early social
investigations arrived at uncharitable conclusions on religion-education relationships in the
past and presents a signpost of caution to those vying to use what is now evidently expired
data to support a secularizing effect of education.
Progress in Educational Accomplishments among Religious Adherents since Mid-Twentieth Century
A review of data relative to educational trajectories of religious and non-religious over
the previous century suggests that major changes have taken place in the demographics of
the educated population. Social scientists Rebekah Massengill and Carol MacGregor, using
U.S. General Social Survey data from 1972 to 2008, compared educational attainment trends
from the mid-twentieth century onwards for two religious and two non-religious groups,
namely: (1) Persistent affiliates – those who were raised in a religious household and
remained religious throughout adulthood; (2) Persistent “nones” – those who were not raised
in a religious household and do not possess a religious affiliation in adulthood; (3) Adult
affiliates – those who were not raised in a religious household but became religious during
adulthood; (4) Adult disaffiliates – those who were raised in a religious household but
disaffiliated from religion during adulthood. A “none” is a shorthand reference to individuals
who select “none” on surveys of religious affiliation. These groups were studied in three
birth periods: (a) pre-1940; (b) between 1940 and 1960; and (c) post-1960.
In the pre-1940 birth group, 31.6 percent of adult disaffiliates and 23.4 percent of
persistent “nones” had graduated from college, a rate considerably higher than the respective
11.1 percent and 14.2 percent of adult affiliates and persistent affiliates who acquired post-
secondary education (Table 1). But of those born between 1940 and 1960, the educational
attainment rate of the two lagging religious groups doubled from their pre-1940 values! The
average educational attainment of the non-religious groups rose modestly. Of those born
after 1960, the educational attainment rates of adult affiliates and persistent affiliates further
rose to 27.5 percent and 31.7 percent, respectively. During this time period, the percentage
of persistent “nones” who had graduated from college decreased by eight percentage points to
23.4 percent, and adult disaffiliates decreased by five points to 33.7 percent. Remarkably, while
both adult affiliates and persistent affiliates made steady educational gains throughout the
mid-twentieth century, religious “nones” and adult disaffiliates lost most or all of their
educational gains from the previous birth periods, resulting in negligible net change in
educational outcomes since the pre-1940 birth range (Massengill and MacGregor).
Table 1: Percentage of Persistent “Nones,” Adult Disaffiliates, Persistent Affiliates, and Adult
Affiliates Who have Earned a Bachelor’s Degree, by Birth Period
Group* Pre-1940 (%) 1940-1960 (%) Post-1960 (%) Net Change
Presently, persistent “nones” are the least educated of the four subgroups, and
persistent affiliates are trailing adult disaffiliates by a mere two percent difference. That
religious “nones” presently lag in educational outcomes is supported by other studies that
demonstrate that individuals who identify as mainline Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish are
more likely to complete a four-year college degree than individuals who were not raised
within a religious tradition and do not presently identify with a religion (Massengill).
Interestingly, it is also true that individuals who did not attend college presently display the
greatest measures of religious decline, and are the most likely to disaffiliate from religion
(Uecker, Regnerus and Vaaler).
Speculative Causes of the Demographic Shift
Why did religious groups make such impressive educational gains in recent decades?
Although no definitive answer exists, there are several suggestions. This shift may have
occurred because of reporting differences in how religious “nones” self-identify. As
Massengill and MacGregor suggested, such religious “nones” would have been individuals,
whom a generation ago, “would have been loosely attached to religious institutions due to
social pressures or other demands of conventionality; today, being ‘nothing in particular’
may well signify the absence of a decision to engage with religious institutions” (199). If
religious “nones,” a group associated with low education measures, habitually associated
with religious groups decades ago, this would have contaminated the educational attainment
data for affiliate groups, resulting in artificially low numbers for affiliate groups in earlier
birth periods.
Economic pressures in recent decades have placed great impetus upon the working-age
population for pursuing post-secondary education (Lazerson). In 1966, more than 80
percent of college students listed “developing a meaningful philosophy of life” as an
educational goal. By 1996, the percentage dropped to 47 percent, whereas the prevalence of
the goal of “being very well-off financially” nearly doubled (Astin). Anecdotally, then
Harvard law professor Elizabeth Warren candidly remarked that although the majority of
Americans once believed that one can obtain middle-class status with a high school diploma
and a positive work ethic, in the present day, “twice as many people in America believe that
the moon landings were faked (and filmed in California) than there are people who believe
that you can make it into the middle class in America without a college diploma.” Regardless
of religious affiliation, all adults need and seek financial security, and skills acquired through
college improve job prospects. Economic pressure may have incentivized lagging affiliate
groups to seek university education whereas such pressure was not significantly present in
earlier decades.
It is also plausible that the rise of educational attainment rates among religious affiliates
occurred due to the entrance of women and minorities into the high-skills job market and
due to the reprieve of sexism and racism against women and minorities via the successes of
the civil rights and women’s rights movements. It is well documented that Blacks (Taylor,
Mattis, and Chatters; Taylor, Chatters, and Jackson; Levin, Taylor, and Chatters; Johnson,
Matre, and Armbrecht) and women (Miller and Stark; Walter and Davie; Levin and Taylor;
Francis and Wilcox) are more religious than Whites and men. Although the reason why this
is so remains speculative, it is unlikely to be due to socioeconomic status as religious
participation has been found to be either positively associated with or have no net correlate
with income or other measures of economic success (Stark 1972; Mueller and Johnson;
Nelsen and Nelsen; Alston and McIntosh; Schwadel, McCarthy, and Nelsen; Wilcox,
Cherlin, Uecker, and Messel). The unprecedented enrollment of Black and female students
into post-secondary institutions would have consequently increased the percentage of the
educated population who self-identify as religious. Rises in educational attainment among
affiliate groups in recent decades could also be caused by an equilibrating representation of
women and minorities in higher education.
A Note on Over-Reliance on Expired Data
This demographic shift is important to acknowledge because contamination of data
reviews of religion-education relationships with expired data may lead to erroneous
conclusions. Case in point, the meta-analysis published by Johnson and colleagues (2002)
that concluded that education was instead positively associated with religious measures
among adults and children relied on studies only as old as 1983. A second meta-analysis
concluding positive effects among Black and Hispanic children relied on 15 studies, of which
all but one were published in 1985 or more recently (Jeynes 2002). In contrast, the amateur
meta-analysis published by Bell in Mensa Magazine, popularized in Dawkins suggesting
negative trends between religiosity and education, relied on data as old as 1927, a difference
from the aforementioned studies of 56 and 58 years, respectively. This difference signifies
the passing of approximately two generations. It is likely that the inconsistency arose because
the amateur meta-analysis conducted by Bell failed to account for inter-generational cohort
effects such as those discovered by Massengill and Macgregor.
The Decline of Rate of Church Attendance
Topic Summary
It has been well documented that post-secondary students have lower rates of church
attendance as compared to the general population. But does this signify genuine religious
decline towards eventual secularization? Data suggests that although students do not attend
church as often as before they entered post-secondary studies, they nonetheless retain a
sense of attachment to their religious beliefs and very few report disaffiliation from religion.
Evidence further suggests that rising educational accomplishments attenuates the rate of
religious decline. Most concerning to the secularization paradigm, young adults in general
show declines in church attendance at rates comparable to decline among students,
suggesting that attendance decline is occurring for reasons other than the educational
experience. Social theorists have speculated that the cause of decline, common to students
and non-students, is related to the experience of emerging adulthood. Most adults report
greater measures of religious participation in later life-course, suggesting that church decline
among most students is temporary.
Student Decline in Rate of Church Attendance
Students display precipitous declines in rates of church attendance during post-
secondary studies. For example, surveys show that 81 percent of incoming freshmen
students frequently or occasionally attend religious services (HERI). By the end of their first
year, only 57 percent of students report similarly (Bryant, Choi, and Yasuno). Uecker and
colleagues observed that approximately two-thirds of college students reduce their rate of
attendance while attending college. A longitudinal study of over 3000 senior students at 118
colleges also observed that senior students report less church attendance than at the
beginning of their freshman year (Saenz and Barrena).
As religious service attendance is one of the most common measures of commitment to
religion, declines in service attendance could be interpreted as evidence of the secularizing
effect of education. Two lines of evidence dispute this interpretation, presented below.
First Argument: Attendance Decline is also Observed among non-College Educated
It has been observed for some time that the majority of young adults in general report
declines in religious service attendance, not only young adults in post-secondary studies
(Hardie, Pearce, and Denton; Willits and Crider; Dillon; Hoge, Johnson, and Luidens).
Additionally, it appears that educational attainment may attenuate, not enhance, the rate of
decline of religious measures. Data reported by Uecker and colleagues are enlightening.
Measuring rate of decline in religious service attendance, rate of decline in importance of
religion to the student, and rate of disaffiliation from religion, the authors instead found that
young adults who did not attend higher education were found to be the most likely to report
the greatest decline in religious measures. For example, among those who did not attend
college, decline in measure of religious service attendance was estimated at 76.2 percent, a
considerably higher rate than the 59.2 percent rate of decline among those earning a
bachelor’s degree (Table 2). Intermediate educational attainment, such as enrollment in two
year-programs, or those who attended college but earned no degree, generally reported
intermediate rates of decline for these religious measures. These results suggest that rather
than encouraging religious decline, rising educational accomplishments may instead attenuate
decline.
As Schwadel suggests, that education may instead slow the rate of religious decline is
reasonable to observe because education “impart[s] vital civic skills that are essential
prerequisites for many forms of organizational participation, including some forms of
religious participation” (166). If religious decline occurs across the spectrum of young adults,
and education attenuates decline, then one must logically conclude that religious decline
among college students is occurring for reasons other than education.
Table 2: Percentage of Young Adults Who Experience Religious Decline, by Educational
Attainment
Educational Attainment* Decline in Decline in Disaffiliated
Religious Service Importance of from Religion
Attendance (%) Religion (%) (%)
But what of educated professionals? An example used to argue for a secularizing effect
of education is the low religiosity of scientists (cf. Dawkins). It has been well documented
that the majority of American scientists doubt or do not believe in the existence of God
(Larson and Witham). Of a recent estimate, according to a 2009 Pew Research Center poll,
while 95 percent of the American general public believe in God or a universal spirit or higher
power, only 51 percent of scientists believe similarly (Pew). That scientists are less religious
than the general public is so well recognized that some social researchers interested in
studying atheists and other religious “nones” have used scientists as survey participants for
ease and economy of research (cf. Ecklund, Park, and Veliz). If scientists, who have spent a
great amount of time in university, first as a student and in some cases as an instructor, are
disproportionately non-religious, does this not prove that education secularizes?
Research conducted by Ecklund and Scheitle on the religious trajectories of scientists
suggests otherwise. Rather than observe a secularization effect, the authors instead observed
that most religious individuals who enter scientific careers continue to remain religious
throughout their schooling and research. And among non-religious scientists, the majority
reported that these individuals were raised in homes where religion was not an important
part of daily life or were not brought up in a religion at all. Ecklund and Scheitle presented
some of their findings through example:
Consider two sociologists who are male, in the 18 to 35 range, born in the
United States, have no children, and are currently married. One was raised
some form of Protestant and religion was “very important” while growing
up. The other was raised as a religious “none” and religion was “not at all
important” while growing up. The former has a predicted probability of 14
percent for saying that he does not believe in God. This compares to a 54
percent chance of the latter saying he does not believe (302).
It appears from the findings of Ecklund and Scheitle that religious disaffiliation during
scientific training and subsequent career is not the principle cause for the under-
representation of religious individuals among scientists. As the authors concluded, at least
“part of the difference in religiosity between scientists and the general population is likely
due simply to religious upbringing rather than scientific training or institutional pressures to
be irreligious” (302) and that “the idea that scientists simply drop their religious identities
upon professional training . . . is not strongly supported by these data” (303).
More scientists are non-religious likely because more non-religious individuals pursue
careers in science. More scientists are non-religious because there may exist modes of bias
that subtly discriminate against religious individuals who seek to enter and advance scientific
careers, many forms of which have parallels already accepted by social researchers
accounting for the under-representation of women among the ranks of scientists (Bertrand).
It is notable that other lines of professional work are incongruent with the interpretation that
education leading to professional careers precipitates religious decline. For example,
American physicians, another group of educated professionals, self-identify as religious at a
rate on par or greater than the American general public (Curlin et al.). It is similarly likely
that many doctors identity as religious simply because many religious individuals choose to
pursue medicine and not due to conversion experiences during training.
Second Argument: Incongruence between Church Decline and other Religious Measures
The second line of evidence conflicting with the interpretation that decline in religious
service attendance during college signifies secularization is the seemingly incongruent data
between religious thought and religious practice as reported by students. One would expect
that decline or increase in rate of religious service attendance would rise and fall
correspondingly with stated importance of religion. This is not the case. Although the
majority of students who earned a bachelor’s degree reported declines in service attendance
(59.2%), only a small minority reported declines in stated importance of religion (15.0%) and
a likely overlapping number of students also reported complete disaffiliation from religion
(15.0%) (Uecker et al.). This discrepancy between religious participation and other religious
measures is present among all college students surveyed as well as among college dropouts
and non-attendees (Table 2). This discrepancy has also been reported in other studies: Arnett
and Jensen reported that although half of students stated that it was “not at all important” to
attend religious services, only 18 percent of students stated that that religion was “not at all
important” to them. Incongruence between measures of religious practice and attitudes
towards religion becomes even more striking when observations of increases in positive
attitudes towards religion are considered. Lee observed that although a minority of college
students (13.7%) reported that their religious convictions weakened during their college
years, three times as many students (37.9%) reported that their personal convictions grew
stronger during their college experience! These findings are supported by Lefkowitz, who
observed a net decrease in religious service attendance during the college experience with a
concomitant net increase in positive attitudes towards religion.
Why do most young adults reduce church attendance? And why would students on
average report attendance declines with net positive changes in religious attitudes? Evidence
suggests that rates of religious practice (e.g., church attendance) is not constant throughout
the life-course but fluctuates with temporary positive and negative changes influenced by life
events. These may include, among other events, marriage, child-rearing, divorce, departure
from home, death of spouse, and decline of health (Ingersoll-Dayton, Krause, and Morgan;
Stolzenberg, Blair-Loy and Waite; Sherkat 1998; Bahr).
Changes in religious practice are further influenced by underlying factors such as quality
of religious upbringing and personality types (McCullough et al.). For example, it is well
known that the experience of parenthood encourages religious participation among
newfound parents (Thornton, Axinn, and Hill; Ploch and Hastings; Sandomirsky and
Wilson; Wilson and Sandomirsky; Ingersoll-Dayton et al.; Roozen, McKinney, and
Thompson). Most religions are “deeply entwined with values and attitudes that encourage
marriage and parenthood” and “offer institutionalized moral support for love, intimacy, and
childbearing in the context of religiously sanctioned marriage” (Stolzenberg et al.: 84). The
church is where children develop a personal identity, acquire religious training, are taught
positive values, meet friends, and experience the vibrancy and love of a supportive
community of believers (Stolzenberg et al.; Bao et al.; Edgell). For newfound parents who
drifted from the routine of church during their earlier years, the introduction of children
provides a powerful impetus for parents to tap into this social resource by returning to active
church life. Case in point, in a study of the religious trajectories of Presbyterians, the most
significant reason why lapsed members became active again in the church in later life was
“Had children, thought about family life and religious education” (27%), a number even
greater than other causes including unmet spiritual needs (24%) and conversion experiences
(8%) (Hoge et al.). It is hence important to recognize that rate of religious exercise does not
precisely correspond with the salience of religion to an individual because rates of religious
practice fluctuates throughout the life-course.
The experience of becoming an adult also influences church participation. Arnett and
Jensen, Regnerus and Uecker, and Uecker et al. have argued that declines in religious service
attendance among college students is not secularization but the consequence of their
expanding social experience. The term “emerging adult” necessitates an introduction into
our lexicon because of the expanding length of time between adolescence and full-fledged
adulthood in modern society as compared to earlier generations. As Arnett and Jensen argue,
because the average age at marriage and parenthood have steadily risen in recent decades,
and both are often postponed for post-secondary education and for early career
development, the “late teens and early 20s are no longer a period of intensive preparation for
and entry into stable and enduring adult roles but are more typically a period of exploring
various life possibilities while postponing role transitions into the middle and late 20s” (452).
Case in point, when college students are asked whether they think they have reached
adulthood, only 27 percent of college students responded “yes,” 10 percent responded “no,”
and the majority of students (63 percent) stated “in some respects yes, in some respects no”
(Arnett).
During these formative years, such emerging adults are experiencing ever greater
personal autonomy, defining personal identities and ideologies, meeting new people,
experiencing new things: in summary, they are becoming familiarized with the freedoms and
responsibilities of adult life without fully committing to adulthood. With romantic partners,
paying rent, a part- or full-time job, upcoming exams, and the late-night orientation of
college social life, the cumulative effect of all these newfound responsibilities and freedoms
for young adults, according to social researchers, is that religious participation is subtly and
passively “crowded out” (Uecker et al: 1686) and rendered “low on the list of most young
adults’ priorities” (Regnerus and Uecker: 6). How young adults express their religious
identity is oriented away from external commitments such as church participation and
towards internal devotions such as religious thought, reflection, and meditation (Small and
Bowman; Bryant et al.). Though communal religious participation suffers, students are
developing an adult spirituality.
In contrast to the hypothesis presented by authors above, Clydesdale has instead argued
that little such internal reflection occurs. Instead, in order to integrate within the cultural
mainstream, students choose to put their religious identities into an “identity lockbox,” only
to be opened in later years. Both interpretations are consistent with participation patterns
over the life-course: Studies of patterns of church attendance over the last fifty years have
found that 46 percent (!) of Americans stopped going to church for a period of two years or
more within their lifetime. Of this 46 percent, four-fifths resumed active religious practice at
a later time in life (Roozen). In summary, the decline of church attendance among most (but
not all) emerging adults, including college students, is not a sign of secularization, but is a
reversible by-product of the normative transition to adulthood (Arnett and Jensen).
The Erosion of Religious Plausibility Structures
Topic Summary
Although the university has been speculated to dissolve student religious orientations
through the disenchantment of the world via scientific and historical learning, it has also
been speculated that the removal of an emerging adult from family and religious community
to a culturally and religiously heterogeneous environment would have the effect of
weakening the so-called “plausibility structures” (Berger) undergirding the plausibility of
their faith. Can students retain an individual religious identity in a pluralistic campus?
Evidence suggests that the challenge of the modern campus may instead energize students
through “siege mentality” to prepare themselves intellectually and emotionally for potential
challenges, consequently allowing students to “hone and renew one’s faith” and become
more intellectually and emotionally resolute in their convictions as a result. This need not
happen alone: religious devotions are strongest when shared with other religious peers.
Evangelical Christians in particular have been observed to form what Smith (1998) calls
“subcultural identities” that allow Evangelical groups to persist not despite pluralism, but
because of it. It appears that the hypothesis that the erosion of religious plausibility
structures will lead to loss of religious salience among students has been over-stated.
Erosion of Religious Plausibility Structures
The cultural and religious diversity of the university environment could be suggested to
encourage secularization because the religious orientations of individuals are mutually
supported by the shared beliefs of those around them and are conversely weakened if others
believe differently. This argument could be formalized in the context of “plausibility
structures” (Berger), the social and cultural frameworks by which beliefs are made plausible.
Speaking on Christian plausibility, Berger writes that “the reality of the Christian world
depends upon the presence of social structures within which this reality is taken for granted
and within which successive generations of individuals are socialized in such a way that this
will be real to them” (46). Plainly, beliefs are validated as “true” if other people also believe
them. Removing religious emerging adults from their religious social structures at home and
church and placing them within the religiously diverse university endangers the plausibility
structures undergirding their beliefs. In theory, this would encourage the dissolution of their
religious orientation. For this reason, private religious schools have been established in many
Western countries, and some religious parents elect to send their children to these schools in
order to keep their children within the faith and to insulate their children from secularizing
influences.
Responses to Pluralism
Evidence suggests that student’s religious commitment may not be eroded within the
religiously diverse campus environment as speculated by Berger. Hammon and Hunter,
through their study of Evangelical college students at Evangelical and public campuses, have
observed peculiar trends relating to student religious commitment. At such Evangelical
Christian colleges there is a modest erosion of religious commitment over time. Contrary to
expectation, among Christian students attending public institutions, religious commitment
for the majority of these students increases during their educational experience! The authors
referred to this phenomenon as “the challenge of the secular campus”: students who enter
public universities know that their beliefs are likely to be challenged, and that they are
expected to explain, defend, and evangelize those beliefs to others. Such a “siege mentality”
thereby encourages religious students to prepare themselves mentally and intellectually for
the challenge. As the authors recounted a lesson learned from an Evangelical leader: “As one
young adult evangelical leader told us, the assaults on the faith of evangelical students at a
secular campus force these students to “know their Bible” and “extract the rational basis for
their beliefs.” In contrast with students on Evangelical campuses, most of whom (our
informant says) are “naïve” Christians who were “sent” to those schools by parents or
pastors, evangelicals on the secular campus “chose” to be challenged. “They elect to ‘go out
on a limb’ and do so knowingly” (Hammon and Hunter: 231).
We must remind ourselves that students are not merely objects to be acted upon, but
are agents of influence as well. They seek to “find their own” and to find their place in the
cultural mosaic of the campus. Religious diversity provides students an opportunity to
evangelize, to challenge, and be challenged. This process allows students to “hone and renew
one’s own faith” (Hammon and Hunter: 232), to “sharpen the blade” of their beliefs, and
consequently, become more intellectually prepared and emotionally resolute for the
challenges awaiting them. Precisely due to the similarity of beliefs at religious colleges, most
students at these institutions seldom experience these same challenges, and their beliefs
atrophies.
That campus diversity may not disrupt student religious commitment, and perhaps
reinforce it, is also supported by other studies. Lee, using longitudinal data from an
American cohort of 1994 freshmen, found that “diversity-related experiences” were not
correlated with weaker religious measures. Experiences including “had roommate of
different ethnicity,” attended “ethnic studies course,” attended “women’s studies course,”
and had “ethnic interaction,” had no discernable effect on influencing the religious
trajectories of students. One diversity variable, attended “cultural diversity workshop,” was
instead found to be positively associated with faith commitment (Lee). The interpretation of
Hammon and Hunter is also supported by the observations of Hill who observed that
students attending Catholic and mainline Protestant institutions reduce religious
participation at a faster rate than students attending Evangelical institutions and non-
religious public colleges, presumably because “the religious and ethnic pluralism that
activates minority religious identity at nonreligious public institutions is also less likely to be
present on Catholic and mainline Protestant college campuses” (2009: 515). Hill (2011)
further argues that the general familiarity and acceptance of diversity in immigrant countries
such as the United States may have had the effect of desensitizing students to diversity,
mitigating the consequences of loss of religious plausibility structures to student religious
identity. Such students appear simultaneously well adapted to perform well in school:
Evangelical Christians in particular possess an above average educational attainment rate as
compared to the general public, and are distinct from other Protestant groups such as
Fundamentalists and Pentecostals who lag in educational outcomes (Beyerlein).
Students need not face the challenges of the campus alone. Much evidence supports the
influence of religious peers for encouraging or continuing high rates of religious practice and
for accepting traditional religious beliefs (Roberts, Koch, and Johnson; Gunnoe and Moore;
Barry et al.). It is also true that religious adherents form social networks that serve to re-
enforce collective religious identity (Stark and Bainbridge 1980). In the study of Evangelical
Christians in the context of its survival within modern society, Christian Smith has argued
that such evangelical groups form what he has termed “identities” that sustain a distinct
collective identity by drawing boundaries between themselves and the wider public. This is
not a strategy of isolation, for Evangelicals appear to be “quite engaged with the people,
institutions, and the concerns of the pluralistic, modern world” (1998: 75). Tension with out-
groups re-enforces the collective identity and the appeal of the subculture to its members.
Hence, pluralism re-enforces the collective identity and permits these groups to thrive
because of it. “In a pluralistic society,” Smith concludes, “those religious groups will be
relatively stronger which better possess and employ the cultural tools needed to create both
clear distinction from and significant engagement and tension with other relevant out-
groups, short of becoming genuinely countercultural” (1998: 118). Christian fundamentalists
lag in education because they create well-defined insulating communities without bridging
connections, whereas liberal Christians succeed at building liberal connections while losing
the centrality of their group identity. Evangelicals strike a balance, being “fully committed to
maintaining and promoting confidently traditional, orthodox Protestant theology and belief,
while at the same time becoming confidently and proactively engaged in the intellectual,
cultural, social, and political life of the nation” (Smith 1998: 10).
In summary, it appears that students are able to use the pluralism of the campus to
bolster their own religious commitments, either in the form of siege mentality or collectively
with friends through forming subcultural identities. These observations suggest that
shedding plausibility structures may not have such the deleterious effect on student religious
orientations as once envisioned. This is not to suggest that students do not experience
changes with respect to what they come to believe, e.g., on matters concerning biblical
interpretation or whether “Truth” can be found in other religions. This aspect of the
influence of the educational experience, and the relevance of these changes to secularization,
will be discussed in the following section.
Changes in Religious Ideas among Post-Secondary Students
Topic Summary
Are student religious beliefs changed by the educational experience? Evidence suggests
that although most students do retain their core religious identity, they do experience a
“liberalization” of religious beliefs, coming to endorse pluralistic views on other faiths and
turning away from literalist interpretations of sacred texts. Although such changes could be
interpreted as signifying “progressive” or “piecemeal” secularization, these can also be
interpreted merely as “refinements” or “edits” to theologies that students come to adopt
whilst retaining the core original narrative of their beliefs. The crux of the discussion is not
to determine whether changes in student theological opinion occurs during schooling, but
whether these changes, if they do occur, signify secularization. Two arguments will be
presented suggesting they do not.
What do Students Believe?
Several illuminating trends have been observed suggesting a liberalization of student
beliefs. For example, there is a negative correlation between educational attainment and
belief in the absolute inerrancy of sacred texts. In the case of Christianity, Christian college
students are more likely to switch to metaphorical or allegorical interpretations of particular
biblical passages in lieu of the literal (Darnell and Sherkat; Sherkat and Darnell; Glass and
Jacobs; McFarland, Wright, and Weakliem; Schwadel). Students also express relatively greater
levels of uncertainty regarding the veracity of some religious truth-claims as compared to
members of the general public (Sherkat 2008). For example, students are more likely to
admit that their beliefs could be wrong and are less likely to claim inerrancy in their religious
views. Hill (2011), on studying the impact of higher education on several measures of
student religious beliefs, noted:
although college does not appear to substantially alter the religious beliefs of
most emerging adults, findings do reveal a modest increase in skepticism
toward super-empirical religious beliefs among college students and
graduates compared to those who have never attended any form of post-
secondary education . . . Apart from changes in super-empirical belief,
the Christian intellectual tradition. Although students are probably not intimately familiar
with the teachings of Abelard or Augustine, students may be instructed through education to
caution themselves in matters of religion in the same way that they would be taught to
approach any subject. For example, students are likely to learn that the history of humanity is
littered with false proclamations, morally repugnant attitudes, and misguided opinions. If
students are more likely to state that their religious views could be wrong, is it because they
have lost the grounding of their faiths or is it simply because they, like Augustine, have
realized the folly of certainty? And if students eschew literalist interpretations of particular
biblical passages, e.g., concerning Creation, is it because the significance of Creation has
been lost upon them, or is it because they are using historical and scientific information to
inform their religious opinions in order to become wiser adherents, lest they become, as
Augustine cautioned, “reckless and incompetent expounders of Holy Scripture”? And if
university students express that truth can be found in other religious traditions, is it because
the salience of their faith has been obscured and relativized, or is it simply because, like
Nicholas of Cusa, through the educational experience they have come to realize the
commonalities within the global religious community? And if they question, as Abelard
questioned, is it because they are losing the faith or because they are seeking it?
It is evident that at least some educated religious adherents have made efforts to refine
their religious opinions in order to make them rationally and factually sound. For example,
interviews with religious scientists have revealed that, rather than segregate religious outlooks
from scientific perspectives, scientists seek to integrate these belief systems together in order
to form a coherent and unified system for interpreting the world (Ecklund; Ecklund, Park,
and Sorrell). Means of reconciling religious and scientific epistemologies through informed
opinion has been frequently endorsed in the writings of some religious scientists (cf. Miller;
Collins; Polkinghorne; Giberson and Collins; Lennox). Moreover, considering the spectrum
of theological opinions held throughout the various denominations of Christianity, if a
student experiences cognitive dissonance through education, it seems likely that students
would reform their opinion in order to align with mainline opinion rather than disaffiliate
entirely because mainline Christian denominations “commonly promote beliefs that are in
accord with scientific knowledge and worldviews, [possess] diverse social networks, a
pluralist perspective, and other attributes associated with increased education” (Schwadel:
165-66).
In summary, changes witnessed within college could be interpreted as refinements of
existing religious thought rather than the disassembly of religious view. Whether students are
merely refining their faith rather than losing it is a serious possibility that ought to be
investigated further before sweeping conclusions be made concerning the significance of
these changes to the course of secularization.
Argument Two: Has the Core Narrative been Lost?
Differences in opinion among a community of believers is the rule, not the exception.
Deviations from a collective norm should not therefore be interpreted prima facie as a sign of
secularization without other substantiation. Although many of the most prevalent religions
are doctrinaire in substance, what members within a community of believers actually affirm
in terms of specific religious ideas is extremely diverse. Case in point, although the numerous
Christian denominations differ on matters of theology and ideology, all of them are properly
recognized as Christian groups. Contrary to what is popularly assumed, cross-cultural and
ethnographic work has revealed that among members of both ancient societies as well as
peoples of indigenous (pre-industrial and traditional) societies there was and is considerable
heterogeneity in the types and degrees of belief, including what religious ideas people upheld
or devalued, how important they considered these beliefs in the conduct of their day to day
lives, or whether they even believed at all (Johnson 2012). The same is true of medieval
European society: although stereotyped as uniformly religious, similar historical work has
instead showed that medieval society was remarkably diverse on matters of religious practice
and opinion, including the presence of individuals properly recognized as non-religious
(Stark 1999). Given that heterogeneity is the norm, not the exception, one ought to
recognize that different in religion is not equivalent to departure from religion. One must
ascertain by other means whether students are truly losing the faith.
When do we know when students are falling away from the faith? Examining ideas
mutually exclusive between religion and non-religion is a reliable litmus test of secularization.
Christianity, to discuss the most prominent Western religion, is endowed with cosmogonical
narratives, sacred histories, meanings of life, and ideas concerning human nature and
humanity. These ideas include, for example, the idea that humans were created by God with
intent, exist in a morally fallen state, are ultimately destined to be in communion with God,
are infinitely valuable in the eyes of God, exist as a fraternal community of believers under
God, commit transgressions against a divinely established moral order, and may seek
reconciliation from God for these transgressions. These narratives, histories, meanings, and
philosophies are clearly contrasted by many dichotomous ideas upheld by secular humanists,
atheists, and some but not all non-religious: God is imaginary, and we were not created with
intent or ultimate purpose. Humans do not exist in a morally depressed state. Morality, and
the value we assign to life, have no other-worldly bearing, but is a behavior often explained
in terms of evolutionary psychology or social contracts. Hence, “sin” is an illogical concept
as there is no ultimate moral order, although moral transgressions do occur whenever
humans have been unjustifiably harmed.
This exclusivity of worldviews is but a part of a larger panorama of debate in Western
society comprised of opposing intellectual tribes of religious and non-religious philosophers,
theologians, scientists, and other thinkers (cf. Lewis; Dawkins; Martin; Day; Steele; Myers;
Barker; Eagleton; Sheiman). Such writings suggest that the conceptual divide between
religious and non-religious worldviews is not porous or easily interchangeable, but is sharply
divided with specific philosophical commitments, and one may only cross that divide with a
deliberate, extensive, and sustained reshaping of one’s entire philosophical framework.
Supporting such an interpretation are the accounts of religious apostates, who describe their
exodus from religion not in terms of a sudden transformation based on a single idea, but as a
gradual process (Wright, Giovanelli, Dolan and Edwards); in other language, as a “slow
progression” (Smith 2011: 233) or a “process of discovery” (LeDrew: 433). Although the
religious orientations of students are often shifted by worldly influences towards a
liberalization of beliefs as documented above, this seldom leads to apostasy or complete
abandonment of core religious principles (Reimer). This suggests that the process of
secularization requires far more than the mere minute refinements of theological thinking
witnessed in most college students.
Given this polarization, one cannot help but view the theological differences between
religious college students and the general public as insignificant to the course of
secularization. I admit that no evidence is presented demonstrating that most students are
not throwing away the undergirding narrative themes of religious sacred histories. But I
would also contend that few would be bold enough to suggest, for example, that most
students who discard a literalist interpretation of Creation are also discarding the
undergirding cosmogonical theme that humanity was created with intent or that there is an
ultimate purpose to being in this world.
Perhaps a more reasonable interpretation of the significance of changes in student
religious ideas is offered by Pascarella and Terenzini, who suggest that student religious
beliefs “may not so much increase or decrease as become re-examined, refined, and
incorporated in subtle ways with other beliefs and philosophical dispositions” (534). And as
Regnerus and Uecker have opined on this matter: “Graduating seniors may well be more
politically moderate or liberal than incoming freshmen, and may tolerate a wider range of
lifestyle choices than when they began. And students who do engage intellectually are more
likely to accommodate “progressive” ideas into their belief systems rather than to
deconstruct their entire worldview. Such is often the result of social interaction within a
more heterogeneous university environment. But this is hardly a secularizing effect. Seldom
are beliefs so radically altered that students walk away from college believing the Bible is
merely a book a fables. Instead, new perspectives may “edit” their belief system, but seldom
is the original narrative lost” (5). I contend, in summary, that proponents of the
secularization hypothesis ought to also ask whether the “original narrative” has been lost,
lest they make too sweeping a conclusion on the significance of the liberalization of student
religious beliefs.
Causes of Religious Disaffiliation among Students
Topic Summary
This final point of contention examines the root causes of disaffiliation among
emerging adults who leave religion during post-secondary schooling. Evidence suggests the
presence of at least a minority of apostates who leave for so-called active reasons: deliberate
and sustained moral or intellectual exploration that led these individuals to the conclusion
that their religious worldviews were incoherent and abandoned them as untenable. However,
evidence also suggests that the majority of apostates leave for so-called passive reasons such
as apathy, boredom, moving away from family, et cetera. Those wishing to defend the
secularization paradigm of higher education must reconcile the fact that most student
disaffiliations occur for reasons outside of the classroom.
Why do Students Disaffiliate from Religion?
Why do some students disaffiliate from religion? And are these reasons pertinent to the
spirit of enquiry, learning, and exploration characteristic of education? The secularization
narrative suggests that among those students who disaffiliate, their apostasy was caused
primarily through epistemological dissonance: Through their education they acquire
knowledge and experiences that lead these emerging adults to challenge their beliefs and
eventually abandon them as untenable. Whether accidental or through a deliberate search for
truth, these students make the conscious decision to learn and explore, eventually leading,
however painful this transformation may be, to the abandonment of their religious
worldviews. Is there merit in this narrative of apostasy?
Unfortunately, there is a paucity of studies available on the process of religious
defection, limiting the scope of discussion available on this subject. Some evidence, however,
does exist suggesting that at least some religious apostates do experience such a
transformation consistent with this secularization narrative.
Active Disaffiliation
Interviews with ex-Christians are enlightening because it gives apostates their own voice
to explain why they left religion. Analysis of unsolicited written online testimonies provided
by ex-Christians reveals three common themes: (1) theological or intellectual concerns; (2)
frustrations with God; and (3) frustrations with other Christians (Wright et al.). First, many
ex-Christians object to the concept of Hell on both moral and intellectual grounds, asking
why a loving God would send people to Hell, or why God would send a beloved family
member to Hell. The problem of evil and suffering in this world was another prevalent
concern. Lest these objections be interpreted as a way of easing emotional pain, the study
authors caution that “narrative writers focused on issues of moral right and wrong rather
than cost-benefits” and that “they write as ‘truth-seekers’ more than ‘benefit-optimizers,’
taking perhaps a more philosophical approach, rather than economic, to religion” (8). Other
individuals focused on their personal dissatisfaction with God, lamenting unanswered
prayers and confusion. Remarkably, the majority of ex-Christians (84%) cited frustration
with other Christians, and particularly on matters of hypocrisy, as a motivating factor for
leaving their religion. Such written testimonies reveal that disaffiliation, at least among these
individuals, were motivated by intellectual and moral drivers. Such a transformation could be
characterized as an “active” departure from religion: Intentional intellectual and moral
reflection that eventually led them away from their religious views.
Passive Disaffiliation
However insightful these narratives, it must be cautioned that studies such as these
select a unique subset of apostates, in this case, voluntary and unprompted writers of online
deconversion testimonies who are sufficiently confident and intellectually resolute in their
decision to leave religion and discuss their experiences in a public forum. Most non-religious
are not so intellectually resolute, may not be as involved in moral or intellectual self-
reflection, may not care to share their perspectives, or are afraid to speak in public forums.
Although these unprompted online stories speak of at least a fraction of apostates that have
made a conscious decision to leave religion, over-reliance on these testimonies to understand
religious disaffiliation would disguise the fact that the majority of religious decline is in fact
due to passive processes that do not involve significant conscious self-reflection and are not
centralized around intellectual or moral exploration.
Hoge and colleagues, for example, observed through survey that the two greatest
reasons why lapsed Presbyterians left the church were “left home, moved, away from family”
(32%) and “too busy, lack of interest, lazy” (31%). Only 13 percent of former Presbyterians
stated that “doubted, questioned, lost faith” was the principle motivating factor, and only
three percent stated that “church had too much hypocrisy” was the main motivating factor
(Hoge et al.). Although this study examined the religious patterns of only one religious
denomination, one cannot help but contrast this figure of three percent with the 84 percent
of unprompted vocal ex-Christians studied by Wright and colleagues who observed that
hypocrisy was a significant motivating cause of disaffiliation. Such disparate figures suggest
there are significant social differences between such active disaffiliates and other religious
fallouts, and that relying on testimonies of openly vocal apostates in order to characterize the
nature and process of disaffiliation risks fallacy of hasty generalization. Among Mormon
apostates, the reasons were again revealed through survey to be predominantly passive:
Compatibility issues with lifestyle choices, competing interests that distracted them from
participation, a lack of sense of belonging, leaving home or changing cities, problems with
work schedule, et cetera (Albrecht, Cornwall, and Cunningham). Moreover, most Mormon
apostates claimed that they “were never truly ‘in’ the faith” and that only one in five stated
they were ever a “fervent follower” (Bahr and Albrecht: 194). Bahr and Albrecht
characterized this pattern of apostasy as “drift . . . a gradual, often inadvertent, disaffiliation”
(194). Regnerus and Uecker, in their study of the causes of religious defection, further
support this sentiment: “Half of all American teenagers who disaffiliate from their religion
do so for passive reasons; they simply lost interest, stopped going to church, or were
altogether incapable of articulating a reason . . . Religious decline is seldom a cognitive
decision” (5).
Other passive causes of religious decline include family needs such as having the
husband and wife attend the same church, unmet social needs such as the feeling of
belonging and acceptance, and unmet spiritual needs such as wanting to rid themselves of
guilt or bad habits (Bahr and Albrecht). Yet other plausible causes may include
dissatisfaction with how the church or community is meeting their needs, boredom, apathy,
disagreements with the evolving nature of the church (e.g., traditional Catholic parishioners
objecting to the Second Vatican Council), disagreements and infighting with other church
members, and many other reasons.
Although detailed discussion on the following is beyond the intended scope of this
article, underlying psychological drivers may contribute to religious drift. Declines in
religiosity often correlate with the rise of social behaviors contra-normative to most religious
groups. These include, for instance, measures of binge drinking, pre-marital sex, drug use,
and co-habitation in lieu of marriage (Uecker et al.). A causal source of disaffiliation in the
context of contra-normative tendencies may be gleamed through the lens of cognitive
dissonance resolution theory (Festinger) as well as problem behavior theory (Jessor and
Jessor 1977). Several studies have found that religious salience may be influenced by
adoption of behaviors that deviate from religious norms (cf. Desmond, Kikuchi, and Budd.;
Ulmer, Desmond, and Jand.; Thornton et al.; Jessor and Jessor 1975). This again illustrates
the power and prevalence of passive causes of disaffiliation.
In summary, although it is true that some students who leave religion do so through
intellectual and moral exploration, of which religious departure could have been encouraged
by the educational experience, available data instead show that the majority of disaffiliates
occur for passive reasons that have little to do with learning or moral and intellectual
exploration. Proponents of the hypothesis that education secularizes must reconcile the fact
that disaffiliation during college is most frequently attributable to causes outside of the
classroom.
Summary
In addition to presenting recent findings on the individual effects of education on
religious orientation, and vice versa, I have also sought to resolve several contentious topics
in order to settle confusions, present limitations to the secularization hypothesis, and expose
unsubstantiated assumptions. Evidence suggests that religion is positively correlated with
educational measures among children and that religious children display greater measures of
academic success and behaviors fortuitous for learning. Most forms of religious expression
are also amiable to educational measures among adults, though conservative fundamentalist
expressions as well as adherence to some theological opinions such as biblical inerrancy do
have detrimental effects on educational accomplishments. Positive drivers include religion as
a source of social capital, a source of motivation, a deterrent to destructive behaviors, and a
source of meaning and identity. Negative drivers include tendencies of social isolation and
distrust and preferential treatment of religious schemas regarding the truth-claims of sacred
texts over scientific or historical knowledge.
Evidence also suggests that significant positive changes in the educational trajectories of
religious groups have occurred within this past century, possibly due to an evolving political
and economic climate. Although college students do display declines in church attendance,
this is also true among non-college students, and hence, decline cannot be attributed to
education. Although university presents students with diverse experiences threatening
religious plausibility structures, evidence suggests that religious and cultural heterogeneity
may paradoxically strengthen student religious commitment by fostering a siege mentality
that encourages students to prepare themselves emotionally and intellectually for the
challenges awaiting them. Religious students tend to find their own on campus in order to
re-enforce collectively held religious identities. Evangelicals in particular are adept at forming
subcultural identities that allow Evangelical Christians to thrive amidst religious pluralism.
Although students do display a liberalization of beliefs during college, leaning towards
ideas of alternative interpretations of sacred texts or inclusivity of religious truth-claims, this
development may not signify decline of religious salience but merely refinements in
theological thinking spurred by the educational experience. Because heterogeneity in belief
among groups of religious is the historical and social norm, difference should not be
automatically interpreted as departure from religion. There is little to suggest that students
have abandoned the original narrative that best defines the rift between religion and non-
religion. Although a minority of apostates do identity intellectual or moral reflection as the
means of their departure from religion, consistent with the expectation of the secularization
hypothesis, the majority of disaffiliation events occur because of passive reasons such as
work pre-occupations or moving away from home, suggesting that most students who leave
religion occur for reasons unrelated to the educational experience.
Acknowledgements
The author thanks anonymous reviewers for constructive commentary. The author
received no financial support for the research, authorship, and publication of this article.
Bibliography
Albrecht, S. L., M. Cornwall, and P. H. Cunningham
1988 “Religious Leave-Taking: Disengagement and Disaffiliation among
Mormons.” Pp. 62-80 in Falling from the Faith: Causes and Consequences of
Religious Apostasy, Edited by D. G. Bromely. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Alston J. P., and W. A. McIntosh
1979 “An Assessment of the Determinants of Religious Participation.” The
Sociological Quarterly 20: 49-62.
Alwin, D. F.
1988 “From Obedience to Autonomy: Changes in Traits Desired in Children,
1924-1978.” Public Opinion Quarterly 52: 33-52.
Arnett, J. J., and L. A. Jensen
2002 “A Congregation of One: Individualized Religious Beliefs among Emerging
Adults.” Journal of Adolescent Research 17: 451-67.
Arnett, J. J.
1997 “Young People’s Conceptions of the Transition to Adulthood.” Youth and
Society 29: 3-23.
Astin, A. W.
1998 “The Changing American College Student: Thirty-Year Trends, 1966-1996.”
Review of Higher Education 21: 115-35.
Bahr, H. M., and S. L. Albrecht
1989 “Strangers Once More: Patterns of Disaffiliation from Mormonism.” Journal
for the Scientific Study of Religion 28: 180-200.
Bahr, H. M.
1970 “Aging and Religious Disaffiliation.” Social Forces 49: 59-71.
Bankston, C. L.
1996 “Academic Achievement of Vietnamese American Adolescents: A
Community Perspective.” Sociological Spectrum 16: 109-127.
Bao, W-N., L. B. Whitbeck, D. R. Hoyt, and R. D. Conger
1999 “Perceived Parental Acceptance as a Moderator of Religious Transmission
among Adolescent Boys and Girls.” Journal of Marriage and the Family 61: 362-
74.
Barker, D.
2008 Godless: How an Evangelical Preacher became one of America’s Leading Atheists.
Berkeley: Ulysses.
Barry, C. M., L. Nelson, S. Davarya, and S. Urry
2010 “Religiosity and Spirituality during the Transition to Adulthood.” International
Journal of Behavioral Development 34: 311-24.
Beck, S. H., B. S. Cole, and J. A. Hammond
1991 “Religious Heritage and Premarital Sex: Evidence from a National Sample of
Adults.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 30: 173-80.
Bell, P.
2002 “Would You Believe It?” Mensa Magazine (England), February.
Berger, P. L.
1967 The Sacred Canopy. New York: Doubleday.
Bertrand, R. L.
2013 “Rethinking Religious Under-Representation in Science.” European Journal of
Science and Theology 9: 143-52.
Beyerlein, K.
2004 “Specifying the Impact of Conservative Protestantism on Educational
Attainment.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 43: 505-18.
Branas-Garza, P., and S. Neuman
2004 “Analyzing Religiosity within an Economic Framework: The Case of Spanish
Catholics.” Review of Economics of the Household 2: 5-22.
Brown, D. R., and L. E. Gary
1991 “Religious Socialization and Educational Attainment among African
Americans: An Empirical Assessment.” Journal of Negro Education 60: 411-26.
Brown, S., and K. Taylor
2007 “Religion and Education: Evidence from the National Child Development
Study.” Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 63: 439-60.
Bruce, S.
2002 God is Dead: Secularization in the West. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
2011 Secularization: In Defense of an Unfashionable Theory. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Gruber, J.
2005 “Religious Market Structure, Religious Participation, and Outcomes: Is
Religion Good for You?” The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 5:
Article 5.
Gunnoe, M. L., and K. A. Moore
2002 “Predictors of Religiosity among Youth aged 17-22: A Longitudinal Study of
the National Survey of Children.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 41:
613-22.
Hadaway, C., and W. Roof
1988 “Apostasy in American Churches: Evidence from National Survey Data.” Pp.
29-46 in Falling from the Faith: Causes and Consequences of Religious Apostasy.
Edited by D. Bromley. Newbury Park: Sage.
Hadden, J. K.
1987 “Toward Desacralizing Secularization Theory.” Social Forces 65: 587-611.
Hammon, P. E., and J. D. Hunter
1984 “On Maintaining Plausibility: The Worldview of Evangelical College
Students.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 23: 221-38.
Hardie, J. H., L. D. Pearce, and M. L. Denton
2013 “The Dynamics and Correlates of Religious Service Attendance in
Adolescence.” Youth and Society [E-pub ahead of print]
HERI: Higher Education Research Institute.
2004 The Spiritual Life of College Students: A National Study of College Students’ Search for
Meaning and Purpose. Los Angeles: HERI.
Hill, J. P.
2009 “Higher Education as Moral Community: Institutional Influences on
Religious Participation during College.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion
48: 515-34.
2011 “Faith and Understanding: Specifying the Impact of Higher Education on
Religious Belief.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 50: 533-51.
Hoge, D. R., B. Johnson, and D. A. Luidens
1993 “Determinants of Church Involvement of Young Adults who grew up in
Presbyterian Churches.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 32: 242-55.
Holman, T. B., and J. R. Harding
1996 “The Teaching of non-Marital Sexual Abstinence and Members’ Sexual
Attitudes and Behaviors: The Case of the Latter-Day Saints.” Review of
Religious Research 38: 51-60.
Mentzer, M. S.
1988 “Religion and Achievement Motivation in the United States: A Structural
Analysis.” Sociological Focus 21: 307-16.
Merrill, R. M., J. L. Lyon, and W. J. Jensen
2003 “Lack of a Secularizing Influence of Education on Religious Activity and
Parity among Mormons.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 42: 113-24.
Miller, A. S., and R. Stark
2002 “Gender and Religiousness: Can Socialization Explanations be Saved?”
American Journal of Sociology 107: 1399-1423.
Miller, K. R.
1999 Finding Darwin’s God: A Scientist’s Search for Common Ground between God and
Evolution. New York: HarperCollins.
Mooney, M.
2010 “Religion, College Grades, and Satisfaction among Students at Elite Colleges
and Universities.” Sociology of Religion 71: 197-215.
Mudrack, P. E.
1992 “‘Work’ or ‘Leisure’? The Protestant Work Ethic and Participation in an
Employee Fitness Program.” Journal of Organization Behavior 13: 81-8.
Mueller, C. W., and W. T. Johnson
1975 “Socioeconomic Status and Religious Participation.” American Sociological
Review 40: 785-800.
Muller, C., and C. G. Ellison
2001 “Religious Involvement, Social Capital, and Adolescents’ Academic Progress:
Evidence from the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988.”
Sociological Focus 34: 155-83.
Myers, D. G.
2008 A Friendly Letter to Skeptics and Atheists: Musings on why God is Good and Faith
isn’t Evil. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Neal, D.
1998 “What have we Learned about the Benefits of Private Schooling?” Federal
Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review 4: 79–86.
Nelsen, H. M., and A. K. Nelsen
1975 Black Church in the Sixties. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.
Reimer, S.
2010 “Higher Education and Theological Liberalism: Revisiting the Old Issue.”
Sociology of Religion 71: 393-408.
Roberts, A. E., J. R. Koch, and D. P. Johnson
2001 “Religious Reference Groups and the Persistence of Normative Behavior: An
Empirical Test.” Sociological Spectrum 21: 81-98.
Roof, W. C.
1993 A Generation of Seekers. New York: HarperCollins.
Roozen, D. A., W. McKinney, and W. Thompson
1990 “The Big Chill Generation Warms to Worship: A Research Note.” Review of
Religious Research. 31: 314-22.
Roozen, D. A.
1980 “Church Dropouts: Changing Patterns of Disengagement and Re-Entry.”
Review of Religious Research 21: 427-50.
Sacerdote, B., and E. Glaeser
2001 Education and Religion. National Bureau of Economic Research: Working
Paper 8080.
Saenz, V. B., and D. S. Barrera
2007 Findings from the 2005 College Student Survey (CSS): National Aggregates. Los
Angeles: Higher Education Research Institute.
Sandomirsky, S., and J. Wilson
1990 “Processes of Disaffiliation: Religious Mobility among Men and Women.”
Social Forces 68: 1211-29.
Sawkins, J., P. Seaman, and H. Williams
1997 “Church Attendance in Great Britain: An Ordered Logit Approach.” Applied
Economics 29: 125-34.
Schwadel, P.
2011 “The Effects of Education on Americans’ Religious Practices, beliefs, and
Affiliations.” Review of Religious Research 53: 161-82.
Schwadel, P., J. D. McCarthy, and H. M. Nelsen
2009 “The Continuing Relevance of Family Income for Religious Participation:
U.S. White Catholic Church Attendance in the late 20th Century.” Social Forces
87: 1997-2030.
Sheiman, B.
2009 An Atheist Defends Religion: Why Humanity is Better Off with Religion Than Without
It. New York: Penguin.
Sherkat, D. E.
1998 “Counterculture or Continuity: Competing Influences on Baby Boomers’
Religious Orientations and Participation.” Social Forces 76: 1087-115.
2007 Religion and Higher Education: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly. Social Science
Research Council.
2008 “Beyond Belief: Atheism, Agnosticism, and Theistic Certainty in the United
States.” Sociological Spectrum 28: 538-59.
2010 “Religion and Verbal Ability.” Social Science Research 39: 2-13.
Sherkat, D. E., and A. Darnell
1999 “The Effect of Parents’ Fundamentalism on Children’s Educational
Attainment: Examining Differences by Gender and Children’s
Fundamentalism.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 38: 23-35.
Shiner, L.
1965 “Toward a Theology of Secularization.” The Journal of Religion. 45: 279-295.
Sikkink, D., and E. I. Hernandez
2003 Religion Matters: Predicting Schooling Success among Latino Youth. Institute for
Latino Studies, University of Notre Dame.
Simpson, B.
2006 “The Poverty of Trust in the Southern United States.” Social Forces 84: 1625-
38.
Small, J. L., and N. A. Bowman
2012 “Religious Affiliation and College Student Development: A Literature
Review and Synthesis.” Religion and Education 39: 64-75.
Smidt, C. E.
1999 “Religion and Civic Engagement: A Comparative Analysis.” Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 565: 176-192.
Smith, C.
1998 American Evangelicalism: Embattled and Thriving. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
2003a “Religious Participation and Network Closure among American
Adolescents.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 42: 259-67.
2003b “Theorizing Religious Effects among American Adolescents.” Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion 42: 17-30.
Smith, J. M.
2011 “Becoming an Atheist in America: Constructing Identity and Meaning from
the Rejection of Theism.” Sociology of Religion 72: 215-37.
Stark, R., and W. S. Bainbridge
1980 “Networks of Faith: Interpersonal Bonds and Recruitment to Sects and
Cults.” American Journal of Sociology 85: 1376-95.
1985 The Future of Religion: Secularization, Revival, and Cult Formation. California:
University of California Press.
Stark, R.
1999 “Secularization, RIP.” Sociology of Religion 60: 249-73.
1972 “The Economics of Piety: Religious Commitment and Social Class.” Pp. 483-
503 in Issues in Social Inequality. Edited by G. W. Thielbar, and S. D. Feldman.
Boston: Little, Brown.
Steele, D. R.
2008 Atheism Explained: From Folly to Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court.
Stolzenberg, R. M., M. Blair-Loy, and L. J. Waite
1995 “Religious Participation in Early Adulthood: Age and Family Life Cycle
Effects on Church Membership.” American Sociological Review 60: 84-103.
Stroope, S.
2011 “Education and Religion: Individual, Congregational, and Cross-Level
Interaction Effects on Biblical Literalism.” Social Science Research 40: 1478-93.
Taylor, J. H.
1982 The Literal Meaning of Genesis Volume 1. (St. Augustine). Mahwah: Paulist.
Taylor, R. J., L. M. Chatters, and J. S. Jackson
2007 “Religious and Spiritual Involvement Among older African Americans,
Caribbean Blacks, and Non-Hispanic Whites: Findings from the National
Survey of American Life.” Journal of Gerontology, Series B: Psychological Sciences
and Social Sciences 62: S238-S50.
Taylor, R. J., and L. M. Chatters
1988 “Church Members as a Source of Informal Social Support.” Review of Religious
Research 30: 193-203.
Wilcox, W. B.
2002 “Religion, Convention, and Paternal Involvement.” Journal of Marriage and the
Family 64: 780-92.
Wilcox, W. B., A. J. Cherlin, J. E. Uecker, and M. Messel
2012 “No Money, No Honey, No Church: The Deinstitutionalization of Religious
Life among the White Working Class.” Pp. 227-50 in Religion, Work and
Inequality. Research in the Sociology of Work, Volume 23. Edited by L. A.
Keister, J. McCarthy, and R. Finke. Bingley: Emerald Group.
Willits, F. K., and D. M. Crider
1989 “Church Attendance and Traditional Religious Beliefs in Adolescence and
Young Adulthood: A Panel Study.” Review of Religious Research 31: 68-81.
Wilson, J., and S. Sandomirsky
1991 “Religious Affiliation and the Family.” Sociological Forum 6: 289-309.
Wilson, J. F.
2000 “Introduction.” Pp. 3-7 in The Sacred and the Secular University. Edited by J. H.
Roberts, and J. Turner. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wright, B. R. E., D. Giovanelli, E. G. Dolan, and M. E. Edwards
2011 “Explaining Deconversion from Christianity: A Study of Online Narratives.”
Journal of Religion and Society 13: 1-17.
Wuthnow, R.
2002 “Religious Involvement and Status Bridging Social Capital.” Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion 41: 669-84.
Yamane, D.
1997 “Secularization on Trial: In Defense of a Neosecularization Paradigm.”
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 36: 109-122.
Zern, D. S.
1989 “Some Connections between Increasing Religiousness and Academic
Accomplishment in a College Population.” Adolescence 24: 141-54.