THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA
Coram: Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza; Tuhaise; Chibita; Musoke; Musota;
IISC
CIVI APPEAL NO.18 OF2O2I
BUJAGALI ENERGY LTD...... .."""""APPELLANT
VERSUS
RICHARD KAzuMBA. ....... RESPONDENT
(Appeal ftom tlrc tiecision of thz Court of Appeal
i" giuil Appeal No ' 207 of 2015
-l't
of April 202'1)
before Kakuru, Kiryabtoire, ancl Madtama JlA, deliuered on
the
]udgment of Percy Night Tuhaise, fSC
This is a second appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal which
setasidetherulingofNamundi,jinHighCourtMiscellaneousApplication
No.002of2002andorderedthatthematterbereferredbacktothetrial
Court for hearing of the case.
@(
Background
The Respondent, by notice of motion filed in the High Court at Jinja
vide
MiscellaneousApplicafiottNo.002of2002,claimedthatlandbelongingto
affected persons was compulsorily acquired for purposes of the
Bujagali
r
i) The applicant on his otpn and on behalf of others fled an application for the
(1) €' (2)
enforcement of fundamentnl rights and fteedoms under article 50
of the Constihttion toithout permission of Court to bring representatitte
action. vq
The 4tn respondent trtas not in existence by 2002 zphen the application
was
ii)
committed and thus could not be bound
filed and tohen the alleged acts tpere
by the pre-incorporation contract executed on its behalf'
iii)Theorderssoughtbytheapplicantuterenotatlailableasthiscourthasno
juisdiction to grant a constituhonal declnration'
itt)The application utas made under rules that uere declarecl unconsfitutional
and the CPR could not be used to fle the application'
a) The application does not disclose a cause of action against flle'lst 6nfl )nLt
respondents.
Anglin j overruled all the obiections. She ordered that the matter be heard
on its merits, and that costs would abide the outcome' Upon the
transfer
of Anglin J, the matter was subsequently heard by Namundi J'
who gave
guidelines for the parties to file written submissions'
In his ruling delivered on 4n May, 2015, Namundi J dismissed the
application with costs to the then respondents, on grounds that it
was
improperly before court. The applicant (Richard Kafumba)' was
Cittil
aggrieved by the ruling. He appealed against it vide Court of Appeal
Appeal No. 207 of 2015, on two grounds, that:-
3
1. The learned trial Judge erred in law to hold that Miscellaneous
Application No. 002 of 2002 was improPerly before court'
2. The learned trial Judge erred in law in refusing to deal with the
merits of the application. , \ v\
On 1't April 202], the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside
the High Court decision. The same court also ordered that the suit
proceeds with the full hearing on its merits before another Judge of
the
High court without any further delay. It awarded costs of the appeal to
the appellant (Richard Kafumba).
M/S Bujagali Energy Ltd, the respondent in giuil Appeal No' 207 of 20-15 '
was aggrieved by the Judgment of the Court of Appeal, and filed this
appeal on grounds that:-
1. The learned |ustices of Appeal erred in fact and in law in finding
thatthelearnedtrialiudgewasprecludedfromdismissingthe
suit on legal matters that were raised before him in final
submissionsafterhehadtakenoverconductofthecasewhich
matters differed from the earlier obiections decided by his
predecessor |udge.
2. The learned fustices of Appeal erred in law in deciding to remit
the suit for a fresh trial after the parties had closed evidence and
madefinalsubmissionsinsteadofcarryingontheirdutytore-
evaluate the evidence as first appellate court and make a decision
on the merits.
4
3. The learned |ustices of Appeal erred in law in failing to evaluate
the correctness of the initial interlocutory decision by her
Lordship |ustice Anglin before treating it as a fetter on the Powers
of her brother, ]udge Namundi thereby resulting in a failure of---
1vl \
iustice.
4. The learned fustices of Appeal erred in law and fact in faulting
the learned trial judge for his finding that the suit before him
could only be properly determined if filed by ordinary plaint'
Representation
At the hearing of this appeal, the Appellant was represented by Counsel
Bazira Anthony holding brief for Counsel Byenkya Ebert' The
Respondent was rePresented by Counsel Galisonga Julius'
Appellant's Submissions
Learned Counsel for the Appellant, in his written submissions, informed
4 of the of
this Court that the Appellant had abandoned grounds 1' 3 and
that
the appeal, and that he would Pursue only ground 2' He maintained
ground 2 provides sufficient basis for this Court to resolve the dispute
relating to the appeal on the merits once and for all' This' in effect'
rendered ground 2 the sole ground of appeal'
of
Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted on the sole ground
appeal, that Kakuru JA (RIP), observed in his lead judgment
that the
dispute has taken almost 18 years in the courts which was unacceptable
5
and regrettable. Counsel contended that, in light of the said observation
made in the lead judgment, it is somewhat surprising that the Court of
Appeal decided to remit the case for retrial to the High Court rather than
taking the option of re-evaluating the evidence on record and delivering ,^
its own decision on the merits of the case. \' Q/\
the
Counsel, in connection with the foregoing point, referred this Court to
record and submitted that, in the High Court, the parties had supplied
affidavit evidence to support their respective cases, and had filed written
submissions for court's consideration. Counsel contended that, other than
delivering a judgment on the merits, there was nothing left for a new trial
,,hear,,;that the only effect of remitting the case to the High Court
court to
for a fresh trial would be to allow a new High Court Judge to pass
judgment on the matter; and that this would not serve the interests of
justice any more than the Court of Appeal making its own decision on the
matter since evidence by affidavit was already on record'
Counsel also submitted that no attempt was made by the first appellate
court to address the merits of the substantive case between the parties;
that this amounted to an omission by the said court which is required to
subject the evidence and submissions to fresh scrutiny, with a view
to
making its own decision on the merits. He relied on section 11 of the
and Others Vs Eric
]udicature Act; plus the cases of Father Begumisa
Tibebaga, Supreme Court Civil Appeal No 1-72O02; and Rwakashaiia
6
Azarious and Others Vs Uganda Revenue Authority, Supreme Court
Civil Appeal No.8/2009. tff
Counsel contended that in cases where the Court of Appeal has failed
in
its obligation as a first appellate court to re-evaluate evidence and make
its own decision, then the supreme Court, as a second appellate court
is
Act.
obliged to do so; that this is consistent with section 7 of the Judicature
Counsel further submitted that the leamed Justices of Appeal never
addressed themselves to the notice for affirmation filed by the present
for
Appellant in the Court of Appeal. Counsel argued that the notice
affirmation of the trial court judgment was filed by consent of all
the
parties on 14fr November, 20-1,6; and that this notice should have alerted
the learned Justices of Appeal on the need to re-evaluate the evidence
on
of
record and make their own decision, because, by nature, a notice
judge
affirmation introduces legal grounds or considerations that a trial
would not have relied on or considered in making his decision' Counsel
such
accordingly maintained that, as a consequence, due consideration of
a notice necessitates a decision of the Court of Appeal on
the merits of the
grounds set out in the notice.
In conclusion, the Appellant's counsel pointed out that the matter had
been in court for L8 years by the time of the judgment of the
Court of
Appeal;whichwouldpresentlymakeithaveabout20yearsofexistence
in the court system. He prayed that the decision of the Court of Appeal
be
setasidebythisCourtandbesubstitutedwithadecisiondismissingthe
1
suit for want of meri! and also that this Court, exercising its original
jurisdiction, be pleased to deliver judgment on the merits of the case based
on the pleadings and submissions of parties in the trial court, and that
costs in this Court and courts below be granted to the Appellant'
Respondent's Submissions
The Respondent's written submissions addressed all the initial grounds
of appeal raised by the Appellant in the appeal' However, for purposes of
this appeal where the Appellant opted to pursue only ground 2 of the
appeal, this Court will only consider the Respondent's submissions
relating to the said sole ground of appeal.
Learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted on the sole ground of
appeal that Section 11 of the ]udicature Act vests the Court of Appeal with
the Jurisdiction of the court of original jurisdiction that heard the suit
from
which the appeal arises. counsel also cited Rule 30 (1)(a) of the Judicature
(Court of Appeal) Rules SI 13-10 which states that, on any appeal from a
decision of the High Court acting in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
the court may reappraise the evidence and draw inferences of fact.
counsel submitted that the suit was filed in 2002, almost 20 years ago, and
that Arricle "126 (1) & (2) (b) of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda
enjoins court hearing cases to ensure that justice is not delayed. Counsel
argued that, considering how protracted the case has been, the foregoing
constitutional provision would have been well served if the Court of
8
Appeal had determined the suit on its merits, considering that the final
submissions had been concluded.
Counsel, in his submissions, also agreed with the Appellant that the
learned Justices of Appeal erred when they remitted the case back
to the
High Court for trial after it had heard submissions of the parties on
the
merits of the case. Counsel contended that the Court of Appeal ought to
have exercised its duty as a first appellate court and re-evaluated the
evidence and made its decision'
Counsel prayed that this Court allows the sole ground of appeal and
invokes its powers under Article 126 (1) & (2) (b) of Constitution of
the
RepublicofUganda,andSectionToftheJudicatureAct'todecidethesuit
on its merits.
Resolution of the ApPeal
Rule
This Court is alive to its role as a second appellate cour! as set out in
30 (1) of the ]udicature(Supreme Court Rules) Directions SI 13 - 11' This
being a second appeal, this Court is not required to re-evaluate the
findings of fact of the trial court, unless the first appellate court failed to
do so, even if it would not have itself come to the same conclusion. This
Court will only interfere where it considers that there was no evidence to
support the finding of fact, this being a question of law' On a second
appeal, it is sufficient to decide whether the first appellate court' in
The
approaching its task, applied or failed to apply such principles' See
9
Executive Director National Environment Management
Authority
No'
(NEMA) Vs Solid State Limited, Supreme Court Criminal Appeal
15 of 2015 and Kifamunte Henry Vs Uganda, Supreme Court
Criminal
AppealNo.l0 of 7997. ...M
of Appeal erred
The sole ground of this appeal is that the leamed Justices
had
in law in deciding to remit the suit for a fresh trial after the parties
closed evidence and made final submissions, instead of carrying on their
duty to re-evaluate the evidence as first appellate court and make
a
decision on the merits.
The gist of the submissions from each side, is that the
leamed Justices of
Appeal did not re-evaluate the evidence in Miscellaneous Application No'
court' the
002p.002; that they therefore erred when as a first appellate
learnedJusticesofAppealdidnotdeterminethemeritsofthecaseas
ordered
required by Section 11 of the Judicature Act; that instead' they
thatthematterbereferredbacktothetrialcourtforhearing'
is that
The essence of this appeal therefore, in my considered opinion'
sincetheCourtofAppealdidnot,asafirstappellatecourt'determine
Miscellaneous ApplicationNo. 002/2002 on the merits' then the Supreme
7 of the
Court, as a second appellate court, should' pursuant to Section
2023) proceed to do so' as the trial
Judicature Act (cap 16 Revised Edition
court should have.
Section 7 of the Judicature Act provides as follows:-:-
10
"For the purposes of lrcaing and determining an appeal' tlrc Supreme
Court shall hntte all tlrc powers, autlnity and iurisdiction ttested under
any tuitten lmo in tlu court frotr the exercise of tlu original iuisdiction
of which the appeal oiginally emanated." v@'i
Before delving into the issue of the propriety of this Court hearing the
matter on its merits as a trial court, it is important to first determine
whether the leamed Justices of Appeal erred when' instead of
determining Miscellaneous Application No. 00212.002 on the merits as a first
appellate court, they remitted it back to the trial court for trial on the
merits.
The record shows that Namundi J, dismissed Miscellaneous Application No.
0022002 for being improperly before court' The reasons for the dismissal
were that upon perusal of the pleadings and submissions of both parties,
he found that the matters raised in the application which included fraud
cannot be determined in an application by notice of motion; that the
applicant ought to have proceeded under Section 19 of the Civil
Procedure Act by way of ordinary sui! that the application ought to have
been brought as a representative suit and not as an action under Article
50 of the Constitution; that the remedies sought by the applicant under
Article 50 are not available to the applicant because they are limited in
nature; and that the applicant in his submissions raised issues which were
not contained in his Pleadings.
11
The learned trial Judge concluded, as reflected on page 346 of the record
of appeal, that:-
,,For I decline to deal with the meits of this Application.
the reasons 11fispe,
It is improperly before this Court and it is dismissed uith costs to the
Respondents as against the Applicant." \-AC
The foregoing extract of the ruling clearly shows that the trial court did
not hear the matter on merits'
The record shows that the appeal that was filed in the Court of Appeal
arose from the trial court's dismissal of the matter on a technicality that
the matter was improperly before the trial court. Indeed, the appellant
(Richard Kafumba, who is the Respondent in this appeal), in Cittil Appeal
No. 207/ 2015 which he filed in the Court of Appeal, indicated that he was
aggrieved that the merits of the case were not considered by the learned
trial Judge. He accordingly prayed that the file be remitted back to the
High Court in Jinja, for trial on its merits. The Court of Appeal found in
his favour. It set aside the decision of Namundi J, and ordered that
Miscellaneous Application No' 002,t2'002, without any further delay'
proceeds with a full hearing on its merits before another Judge of the High
Court
The power of the Court of Appeal and supreme Court, as appellate courts,
to re-appraise evidence where a court below fails to properly evaluate the
t2
evidence on record, is derived from Rules 30 (1) of the said courts'
respective Rules of Court. -dDi
It has already been established that the trial court has never heard
Miscellwrcous Applicntion No. 02/2002 on its merits. In my considered
opinion, it would only be on the basis that the matter was heard on the
merits by the trial court that the Court of Appeal, sitting as a first appellate
court, would be duty bound to re-appraise the evidence and give its
decision in the matter.
In the circumstances of this appeal, where the trial court declined to
determine the matter on its merits, the contention by the parties to this
appeal that the Court of Appeal erred by not giving its own independent
decision of Miscellaneous Application No. 02/2002 would, in my considered
opinion, and with respec! be misplaced and erroneous. There is no way
the first appellate court would have re-evaluated the evidence adduced in
Miscellaneous Application No. 02/2002 to make its own independent
analysis when the trial court itsetf did not evaluate such evidence in the
first place, but rather dismissed the matter for being improperly before it.
The Appellanfls prayer, as reflected in his submissions, is that this Court
exercising its original jurisdiction, be pleased to deliver iudgment on the
merits of the case based on the pleadings, the evidence on record, and the
submissions of parties in the trial court, and that costs in this Court and
courts below be granted to the Appellant. The Respondent, through his
counsel similarly prayed in his submissions that this Court allows the sole
13
(2) (b) of
ground of appeal and invokes its powers under Article 126 (1) &
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, and Section 7 of the Judicature
Act, to decide Miscellaneous Application No' 02/2002on its merits' l'gf
In the circumstances of this appeal where it is clear that Miscellaneous
Application No. 002/2002 has never been heard on its merits' it is my
well-
considered opinion that this Court, being the last appellate court,
should
the court
not be the court to determine the matter on the merits as if it was
of first instance.would, with respec! differ from the Appellant's
I
jurisdiction
counsel,s submissions that this Court is a court with original
to hear Miscellaneous Apptication No' 02/2002 on its merits'
Inmyconsideredopinion,acourtbeingvestedwithpowers'authority
and jurisdiction of another court (in the instant case, the court
with
not
original jurisdiction), of which the appeal originally emanated does
necessarilymeanthatthatcourtenjoysorhasoriginaljurisdictionto
determine a case. As a matter of fact, the only original
jurisdiction this
Court enjoys is that of hearing and determining Presidential election
58
petitions under Article 104 of the Constitution of Uganda' and Section
of the Presidential Elections Act 2000 (No' 17 of 2000)' As such'
the
powers, authority or jurisdiction vested in this Court' as if it was
a court
Act'
with original jurisdiction, as envisaged in Section 7 of the Judicature
is for the purposes of hearing and determining an appeal
emanating from
with original jurisdiction, or a court of first instance'
a decision of a court
Regarding the Court of Appeal, such power is envisaged in Section
l1 of
t4
the same Act, which on basis of the same reasoning, would not nece ssarily
render that court to be a court of first instance or a court with o riginal
jurisdiction regarding the initial suit or matter from which the uPP"t r^
r\4v\
before it arose.
Thus, on basis of the foregoing, the court which has original jurisdiction
(court of first instance) to hear and determine Miscellaneous Application No'
02/2002 is the High Court where the matter was filed' This Court' as a
second appellate court, would only invoke section 7 of the
judicature Act
if the court of first instance had determined the matter on the merits, and
the first appellate court, in determining the appeal arising therefrom, had
failed in its duty to re-appraise the adduced evidence at trial stage as to
come to an indePendent decision.
It is also deducible from the grounds of appeal at the Court of Appeal that
the issue before that court was not in respect of the merits of Miscellaneous
ApplicationNo.002/2002.Inthatappeal,theappellantfaultedthehial
court's ruling that Miscellnneous Ayrplication No' 002/2002 was improperly
before court. His consequent prayer lhat Miscellaneous Application No.
0022002beremittedbacktoHighCourtJinja,fortrialonitsmeritswas
indeed granted bY that court.
The record of appeal shows, at pages "16 & "17, that the Court of Appeal
found as follows:-
15
t "Wthere a party raises issues of fact that are not pleaded by way of
eaidence or during submissions, the Court toould simply ignore them'
Where a party prays for damages that are not pleaded, proaed or
applicable, the Court may decline to azpard them. lt does not dismiss
lato. r@r
suit on that account on a preliminary part (sic) of
lll. A party may proceed under Article 50 of tlrc Constitution alorc or with
others. The parties to a suit under Article 50 may or may not be
aggrieaed. A party has a choice to proceed by Article 50 or by a
representatiue suit.They are not exclusiae.
for enforcement of ights. ln this case thc
IV Article 50 is parties brought a
suit to protect their ight to the land under Article 126 from being
compulsory acquired toithout pior prompt and adequate compensation'
Proceeding by zoay of ffidaoit eaidence does not exclude oral eaidence
by toay of cross examination or othenttise. A fnding that fraud utas not
prooed is determined after the hcaing and not hefore.
vl. Remedies auailable to a pttlty seeking redress unrler Article 50 are for all
intents and purposes the same as those aaailable to any litigant
proceeding under Cioil Procedure Rules on any other'
vll. A party has a chance to proceed under Article 50 by plaint or by notice
of motion.
v1u. The defnition of a suit includes notice of motion. A suit therefore can
be commenced by notice of motion anel that tpould not ttitiate it in
anyTl)ay.
16
lx. Lastly (sic) learned tial ludge erred uthen lu dismissed the suit on
account of procedural impropriety, a matter that hnd nlrendy been
determined by anotlur ludge in tlrc same suit."
The learned Justices of Appeal, based on their findings as extracted above,
found that the reasons set out in the Ruling of Namundi J, had no basis at
law, and they consequently set it aside. The learned Justices of Appeal,
went on, at pages "19 & 20 of the record of appeal, to analyze the
circumstances of the two rulings emanating from the trial court regarding
Miscellaneous Application N o. 002p002, that-
" .. .Be that as it may, the question of procedural impropiety had been fully
canoassed by parties and resoloed in its finality by the same Court by Lady
Justice Flaoia Anglin. None of the parties appealed the decision. lt was
binding on the Court. The Court had become functus oficio in respect of
that specifc quesfion. See:- Goodman Agencies Ltdtts Attorney Ceneral I
Another, Consfitutional Court Constitutional Petition No. 03 of 2008. lt
had no juisdiction to re-open it. By doing so Justice Namundi sat on appeal
in respect of a decision of his sister ludge Lady Justice Anglin. Not only did
he sit in appeal on her Ruling, he effectioely set it aside and substituted it
toith his outn. He had no power to do so.
There is only one High Court of Ugnnda. Tlrc personnlity of the indittidunl
ludges does not matter. One Judge of the High Court cannot ret'erse l)ary,
or set aside a decision of another in the same case in the same proceedings,
t7
except in an application for reoieto brought under Order 46 of tlrc Cittil
Procedure Rules S.l 71--1.
@.i
It is common practice that is absolutely for one suit fle to motte from
legal
one Judge to another. Wuneoer that happens, the next Judge simply
continues from tohere the lnst one had stopped. The proceedings are nll
rleemerl to be before one Court. T'he High Court.
There was alrendy a decision on record that the suit proceeds and be
detemrined on merit. That order coukl only haoe been set aside on appeal
or reltietrt. Issues for determination ought to hatte been adiudicated upon by
Namundi, I as there tuas already an order on record directing tlmt the Court
to proceed toith the full luaing. This u'as not donc " ""
some of the findings of the Court of Appeal, as extracted above, may bear
no relevance to the appeal before this Court, especially since the
Appellant abandoned those grounds of appeal under which such findings
would have been covered. I will therefore not venture into those matters
that do not form the basis of the appeal before this Court, especially where
such matters had initially been raised in the appeal, but were later
abandoned by the APPellant.
The important factor deducible from the findings of the Court of Appeal,
as a first appellate court, however, is that the said court fully addressed
the issue in the appeal before it, that is, the issue of the learned trial
No. 002/2002 on
Judge,s declining to determine Miscellaneous Application
the merits and dismissing it on a technicality that the suit was improperly
18
before it. To that extent, the leamed Justices of Appeal rightly re-
evaluated the evidence on record pertaining to the High Court's dismissal
of Miscellaneous Application No.002/2002 and came to the right conclusion.,-
v\Qr
Regarding the delay in this matter as alluded to by both sides, the
Appellant relied on Article 126 (2) @) of the Constitution of the Republic
of Uganda, which states that, in adjudicating cases of both a civil and
criminal nature, the courts shall, subject to the law, apply certain
principles, including that justice shall not be delayed.
It is not disputed, as is deduced from the record, that this case has taken
more than 20 years in the court system. Be that as it may, there is no
substantive decision by the lower courts on the merits of the case, which
would be a basis on which this Court would invoke the powers vested in
it under Section 7 of the Judicature Act to adjudicate upon as if it was the
court of first instance.
The proper procedure in the instant case, in my considered opinion, given
its circumstances, would be that, the trial court having handled the
preliminary objections and directed the parties to file written submissions
on basis of the affidavit evidence already on record, the trial court should
have proceeded to determine the matter on its merits, since the pleadings,
the evidence in form of affidavits, and the submissions were already on
record. In the eventuality of any matter arising at the stage of judgment
writing which would require the parties to be heard, the option to recall
such parties to be heard on the matter, even at the stage of judgment
19
writing, in the interests of natural justice, would always be open, as was
held by this Court in IVI/S Fangmin Vs Belex Tours & Travels Ltd,
Supreme Court Civil Appeal No. 05 of 2013, consolidated with Crane
Bank Ltd Vs Belex Tours & Travels Ltd, Supreme Court Civil Appeal
No. 1 of 2014; and Uganda Vs Haji Eriasa Namunyu & 5 Others,
Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 2020. Since none of the
foregoing was done, High Court Miscellaneous ATrplication No. 002/2002 is
still pending hearing and determination on its merits by the High Cour!
which is the court of first instance. '{A/\
The record in the instant case shows that the Court of Appeal, after
regretting the delay, ordered that Miscellnneous Application No.02/2002be
heard on its merits in the High Court without delay. Instead of pursuing
the expeditious handling of the application, the Appellant chose to file
this appeal, praying for the same order it appealed against, that the case
be determined on its merits. In my well-considered opinion, the Appellant
has wasted time which should have been utilized to pursue the orders of
the Court of Appeal with a view to having the matter heard on the merits
by the High Court.
Thus, based on the reasons given above, ground 2 of this appeal, which is
the sole ground of appeal, would fail.
In the result I would dismiss this appeal and uphold the orders of the
Court of Appeal. Since the Respondent acquiesced to the sole ground of
appeal, no order is made as to costs.
20
Dated at Kampala this...... ?I.fr....o^, * .......2025
.*.....
Percy Night Tuhaise
Justice of the Supreme Court
21
5 THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT I(AMPALA
ICORAM: TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA; TUHAISE; CHIBITA; MUSOKE; MUSOTA;
JJSC.]
10 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 18 OF 2O2L
BETWEEN
BUJAGALI ENERGY LIMITED :::::::::::::::::::::::::: : APPELLANT
15
AND
RICHARD I{AFUMBA ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: : RE]SPONDENT
[Appeal aising from the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Uganda in Ciuil
20 Appeal No.207 of 2015 before (Kakuru, Kiryabuire and Madrama, JJA) dated l"t
ApnI, 2021 at Kampala.l
JUDGMENT OF TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA, JSC.
I have had the benef-rt of reading in draft the judgment of my
learned sister, Percy Night Tuhaise, JSC.
25 I concur with her judgment and the reasoning therein. I also concur
with the orders she has proposed.
As the rest of the members on the Coram agree, this appeal is
hereby dismissed without costs.
30 Dated at Kampala this 77 rh day of d['" 2025.
'.<-
\r"-.&
PROF. LILLIAN TIBATEMWA-TKIRIKUBINZA
JUSTICE OF THE SUPRIME COURT.
1
THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
IN THE SUPREME COI]RT OF UGANDA
AT KAMPAI.A
(CORAM: TIBATEIVTWAEKIRIKTIBINZA TUHAISE, CHIBITA
MUSOKE, MUSOTAJU.SC.)
CwIL APPEAL NO: l8 OF 2021
BTryAGALI ENERGY LTD APPELI-ANT
VERSUS
RICHARD KAFUMBA RESPONDENT
lAppal frun the derisiott of fie but of Appal in Auil Appal No. 207 of 20tJ bcforc Kakuru,
Kirybwirc nd Madruna IIA" dad f April,202il
ruDGMENT OFCHIBru{.. TSC
I have ltatl the bcltclit ol leit<littlg in <lrali tlrc ju<lgrnent ol rny leiurrc<l sistcr Hon.
.fustit'e Pcrcy Niglrt 'l-uhaisc,.JSC, in thc alxxe appcal.
I aglce with her t.hat this al4real shoul<l be <lisrnisse<1. I also ag'r'cc with the oxlels she
has pr'olxrsctl.
tl.
Datcrl at Klrrnpal;r this .. I rlay ol 2025
orr. .f ustit c \likeClri )lta
ruSTICE OFTHE STIPREME COI.]RT
m!fl,'t hlltt L!-a/ uL{ * 7trL tt-qs,,
-/g $ L'I lfr* n$ 1" {" 0&s-
K, SC
THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 18 OF 2O2I
BU]AGALI ENERGY LTD: ::::::::::::::::;::::iI:::::::::::: :APPELLANT
VERSUS
RICHARD KAFUMBA RESPONDENT
(Appeal from the decision ofthe Court ofAppeal (Kakuru, Kiryabwire and Madrama, JJA)
li
in Civil Appeal No. 207 of 2015 dated April, 2021)
CORAM: HON. LADY ]USTICE PROF. LILLIAN TIBATEMWA -
EKIRIKUBINZA, JSC
HON. LADY JUSTICE PERCY NIGHT TUHAISE, JSC
HON. MR. JUSTICE MIKE J. CHIBITA, JSC
HON. LADY JUSTICE ELIZABETH MUSOKE, JSC
HON. MR, ]USTICE STEPHEN MUSOTA, JSC
JUDGMENT OF ELIZABETH MUSOKE, JSC
I have had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by my learned
sister Tuhalse, JSC. For the reasons which she gives, I, too, would dismiss
the appeal but make no order as to costs.
Dated at Kampala this day of..... 2MJo&f
Elizabeth Musoke
lustice of the Supreme Court
THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT I(AMPALA
CTVIL APPEAL NO. 18 OF 2O2I
[CORAM: TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA; TUHNSE; CHIBITA;
MUSOKE & MUSOTA; JJSCI
BUJAGALI ENERGY LTD ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: : APPELLANT
VERSUS
RICHARD I(AFUMBA :::::::::::::::::::::::::: :: ::::::::: : RISPONDENT
(Appeal from the decision of the Coun of Appeal tn Ciuil Appeal No. 2O7 of2O15 before
Kakuru, Kiryabtuire and Madrama, JJA deliuered on the 1't of Apfl 2021)
JUDGMENT OF STEPHEN MUSOTA, JSC
I agree with the analysis, judgement and orders made by my sister
Percy Trrhaise, JSC that ground 2 of this appeal, which is the sole
ground of Appeal, would fail.
I would order that the appeal be dismissed with no order as to costs
since the Respondent acquiesced to the sole ground ofappeal.
Dated this 2{ day of Q[tu*, 7ov5-w
n",4'
@ q-1,
Stephen Musota
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT