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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 8TH DAY OF JULY, 2025

BEFORE

THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM

REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO. 1340 OF 2025 (RES)

BETWEEN:

1. MR. SURESH BABU C.

S/O CHINNASWAMY
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS
R/AT NO.484, GROUND FLOOR
8TH MAIN, SADANANDANAGAR
INDIRANAGAR POST
NGEF LAYOUT, BENGALURU-560 038.
...APPELLANT

(BY SRI. NAVEED AHMED, ADVOCATE FOR

SRI. NOORMOHAMMED, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. MR. V. VARADARAJAN
AGED ABOUT 94 YEARS

2. SMT. VANI PRAKASH

D/O MR. V. VARADARAJAN
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS

RESPONDENTS NO.1 AND 2

ARE RESIDING AT NO.485
8TH MAIN, SADANANDANAGAR
INDIRANAGAR POST
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NGEF LAYOUT
BENGALURU-560 038.
…RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI G. KRISHNA MURTHY, SENIOR COUNSEL

FOR SRI. JAYSHAM JAYASIMHA RAO, ADVOCATE
FOR C/R1 AND 2.)

THIS APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 OF THE CIVIL

PROCEDRUE CODE, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT
AND DECREE PASSED ON COUNTER CLAIM BY THE X
ADDITONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALORE IN
O.S. NO.6726 OF 2024, PASSED ON 18.03.2025 AND ALLOW
THE APPEAL, WITH COST THROUGHOUT, IN THE INTEREST OF
JUSTICE AND EQUTIY.

THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR

ORDERS ON 17.06.2025, THIS DAY ORDER WAS PRONOUNCED
THEREIN, AS UNDER:

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR

MAGADUM

C.A.V. JUDGMENT

The captioned first appeal is filed by the tenant

assailing the order passed in ejectment suit.

2. The present appellant filed a suit for injunction

simplicitor in O.S.6726/2024 by specifically alleging that he

is a tenant under the respondents and the respondents

have let out the suit schedule property under lease deed
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dated 1.3.2013. Appellant further alleged that respondents

despite aware of the fact that his son is studying in 9th

Standard in Bishop Cotton Boys School, are high handedly

demanding the appellant to vacate the premises on or

before 30.9.2024.

3. On receipt of summons, respondents filed

written statement and by way of counter claim sought for

ejectment. Appellant as a defendant filed written statement

to the counter claim admitting jural relationship and also

the quit notice issued by respondent No.1 on 1.10.2024.

4. Trial Court based on rival pleadings formulated

the following issues:

"1) Whether the tenancy of the plaintiff over the suit

schedule premises is determined by efflux of time?

2) Whether the tenancy of the plaintiff over the suit

schedule premises is terminated by defendant No.1
through the quit notice dated 01.10.2024?
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3) Whether in a suit for a bare injunction filed by the

plaintiff, defendant is entitled to seek the relief of
ejectment of the plaintiff/tenant by filing a counter claim?

4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of

injunction sought in the suit?

5) Whether the defendant is entitled for the relief of

ejectment of the plaintiff sought in the counter claim?

6) What order or decree?"

5. The trial Court answered issue No.2 in the

affirmative holding that the tenancy is terminated by

respondent No.1 through quit notice dated 1.10.2024.

While answering issue No.3 in the affirmative, trial Court

held that in a bare suit for injunction filed by

appellant/tenant, respondents/landlords are entitled to seek

relief of ejectment by filing a counter claim. Accordingly,

appellant's suit for injunction is dismissed and respondent's

counter claim for ejectment is decreed.

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6. In the present appeal, appellant has challenged

the decree rendered on counter claim and there is no

challenge to the decree passed in injunction suit wherein

the appellant's suit seeking relief of injunction is dismissed.

7. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and

learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondents.

8. The following points would arise for

consideration:

(i) Whether the trial Court was justified in

proceeding to pass a decree for ejectment without
permitting the appellant to lead evidence, and if so,
whether such procedure suffers from any legal
infirmity vitiating the decree?

(ii) Whether a counter-claim seeking the

relief of ejectment is maintainable at the instance
of the landlord in a suit instituted by the tenant
seeking a decree of permanent injunction
simplicitor?
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FINDING ON POINT No.(i):

9. The appellant instituted the suit seeking a decree

of permanent injunction against the respondents, asserting

that the respondents/landlords were making unlawful

attempts to dispossess him from the suit premises without

recourse to the due process of law. However, a detailed

scrutiny of the pleadings and the judgment of the trial

Court discloses that the appellant has categorically

admitted material facts which go to the root of the dispute.

Specifically, the appellant has unequivocally admitted the

jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the

parties, the expiry of the lease on 28.02.2014, and receipt

of the statutory notice issued under Section 106 of the

Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy. These

foundational admissions made by the appellant clearly

establish that the tenancy had come to an end in

accordance with law.

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10. In light of these admitted facts, the trial Court

was fully justified in shifting the focus from the issue of

alleged unlawful dispossession to the larger question of

whether the appellant had any lawful right to continue in

possession of the suit premises. The trial Court has rightly

concluded that once the tenancy stands terminated through

the issuance of a valid and admitted quit notice, the

tenant’s legal right to remain in possession ceases, and

consequently, the protection under a suit for bare injunction

is no longer tenable.

11. The grievance of the appellant that he was

denied an opportunity to lead evidence deserves to be

rejected in the factual context of the case. The

respondents/landlords, upon entering appearance, filed a

detailed counter-claim seeking the relief of possession on

the basis of termination of tenancy. Once the counter-claim

was entertained, the lis between the parties was no longer

confined to the limited scope of prohibitory injunction. The

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moment a landlord files a counter-claim seeking ejectment

preceded by a statutory notice under Section 106 of the

Transfer of Property Act, the very foundation of the tenant’s

suit for injunction alleging unlawful dispossession collapses.

The cause of action for an injunction simplicitor becomes

infructuous, as the issue shifts from apprehended

dispossession to determination of lawful entitlement to

possession.

12. In the backdrop of appellant’s admissions which

went unrebutted, and the legal effect of termination of

tenancy, the trial Court rightly held that no further evidence

was necessary to examine the appellant’s claim. The Trial

Court’s approach in treating the matter as one governed by

admitted facts and proceeding to adjudicate the counter-

claim accordingly does not disclose any procedural illegality

or irregularity. The appellant’s failure to contest the

termination of tenancy or assert any subsisting right to

possession further weakens the claim for injunction.

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Accordingly, point No.(i) is answered in the negative.

FINDING ON POINT No.(ii)

13. It is a well-established proposition of law that in

a suit for permanent injunction instituted by a tenant,

wherein the relationship of landlord and tenant is either

admitted or otherwise established through pleadings or

evidence, the landlord is not precluded from asserting his

right to seek recovery of possession by way of a counter-

claim. The maintainability of such a counter-claim is firmly

rooted in the statutory scheme of Order VIII Rule 6A of the

Code of Civil Procedure, which permits a defendant to set

up any right or claim against the plaintiff, independent of

whether it arises out of the same cause of action as the

suit.

14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has authoritatively

affirmed this legal position in the landmark

judgment Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya v. Anil

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Panjwani1, wherein it was held that when a tenant

approaches the Court with a suit for bare injunction without

disputing the title or the tenancy, the landlord is entitled to

assert his claim for possession in the same proceedings,

including through a counter-claim, provided the conditions

under Order VIII Rule 6A CPC are fulfilled. The Apex Court

further clarified that such a counter-claim is procedurally

valid and legally sustainable, as it arises out of the same

tenancy relationship which forms the substratum of the suit

filed by the tenant.

15. The legislative intent behind incorporating the

provision for counter-claims under Order VIII Rule 6A

CPC is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and to enable

Courts to adjudicate all interrelated disputes between the

parties in a consolidated manner. This procedural

mechanism serves the larger object of judicial economy and

expeditious disposal of cases. When a tenant approaches

1
(2003) 7 SCC 350
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the Court invoking its equitable jurisdiction for a decree of

injunction to protect possession, it would be both illogical

and legally unwarranted to compel the landlord to initiate a

separate suit for eviction, especially when the issue of

possession and the right to occupy the premises arises from

the very same tenancy arrangement that is the subject of

the tenant’s injunction suit.

16. Once the tenant admits the jural relationship and

does not dispute the termination of tenancy, the landlord is

well within his rights to utilize the platform of the tenant’s

suit to seek recovery of possession by filing a counter-

claim. The jurisdiction of the Court to entertain and

adjudicate such a counter-claim is not ousted merely

because the original suit was instituted by the tenant for

injunction simplicitor. Rather, the existence of the tenancy,

its termination, and the continuing possession of the tenant

together constitute a common thread tying both claims,

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thereby satisfying the test of commonality of cause of

action under Rule 6A.

Accordingly, Point No.(ii) is answered in the

affirmative.

17. Though learned counsel for the appellant made

an earnest attempt to persuade this Court to grant a period

of one year to vacate and hand over peaceful possession of

the suit premises, such a plea cannot be acceded to in the

peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case. It was

specifically brought to the notice of this Court by the

learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent

No.1/landlord that the said respondent is aged about

94 years and is suffering from cancer, a condition which

requires peace, dignity, and stability in his remaining years.

In view of his critical health condition and advanced age,

the respondents have categorically expressed their

unwillingness to grant any further indulgence or

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accommodation to the appellant by way of settlement or

otherwise.

18. The counsel for the respondents, while opposing

the appellant's plea for time, also brought to the attention

of this Court certain pertinent facts from the record. It was

submitted that the appellant is currently employed abroad

and that the suit was originally filed on the premise that his

minor son was studying in 9th Standard at Bishop Cotton

School. However, the present request for extension of time

is now premised on the son studying in 10th Standard. This

shifting ground reveals an inconsistent and evasive stand

on part of the appellant and appears to be a tactic intended

to delay compliance with the decree of ejectment.

19. In a matter where the landlord has established

lawful termination of tenancy, and especially where a

counter-claim for possession has been upheld after due

adjudication, this Court cannot grant discretionary relief in

equity when the respondents themselves have explicitly

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declined any such concession. The appellant, having failed

to establish any subsisting legal right to remain in

possession, cannot invoke the appellate jurisdiction of this

Court to prolong his unauthorised occupation, particularly in

the face of the landlord’s deteriorating health and advanced

age.

20. In light of the foregoing discussion and on a

comprehensive appreciation of the material on record, this

Court finds no justifiable ground to interfere with the well-

reasoned findings recorded by the learned trial Court. The

findings of the trial Court are based on clear admissions,

sound appreciation of legal principles, and a correct

understanding of the law governing landlord-tenant

relationships, particularly in the context of termination of

tenancy and maintainability of counter-claims.

21. The role of the appellate Court is not to re-

appreciate evidence or to substitute its own discretion in

the absence of any perversity or material irregularity in the

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findings of the trial Court. In the present case, no such

error or illegality is demonstrated. On the contrary, the trial

Court has proceeded strictly in accordance with law and has

rightly decreed the counter-claim for possession in favour of

the landlords.

22. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered

opinion that the appeal is devoid of any merits and is liable

to be dismissed.

The appeal stands dismissed.

Sd/-
(SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM)
JUDGE

ALB