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International Perspectives on Violence Risk Assessment
American Psychology–​Law Society Series
Series Editor The Miranda Ruling: Its Past, Present,
Patricia A. Zapf and Future
Editorial Board Lawrence S. Wrightsman
Gail S. Goodman and Mary L. Pitman
Thomas Grisso Juveniles at Risk: A Plea
Craig Haney for Preventive Justice
Kirk Heilbrun Christopher Slobogin
John Monahan and Mark R. Fondacaro
Marlene Moretti The Ethics of Total Confinement
Edward P. Mulvey Bruce A. Arrigo, Heather Y. Bersot,
J. Don Read and Brian G. Sellers
N. Dickon Reppucci
Ronald Roesch International Human Rights and Mental
Gary L. Wells Disability Law
Lawrence S. Wrightsman Michael L. Perlin

Books in the Series Applying Social Science to Reduce

Violent Offending
Trial Consulting Edited by Joel Dvoskin,
Amy J. Posey Jennifer L. Skeem, Raymond W. Novaco,
and Lawrence S. Wrightsman and Kevin S. Douglas
Death by Design Children Who Resist Postseparation
Craig Haney Parental Contact
Psychological Injuries Barbara Jo Fidler, Nicholas Bala,
William J. Koch, Kevin S. Douglas, and Michael A. Saini
Tonia L. Nicholls, Trauma, Stress, and Wellbeing in
and Melanie L. O’Neill the Legal System
Emergency Department Treatment of Edited by Monica K. Miller
the Psychiatric Patient and Brian H. Bornstein
Susan Stefan Psychology, Law, and the Wellbeing
The Psychology of the Supreme Court of Children
Lawrence S. Wrightsman Edited by Monica K. Miller,
Proving the Unprovable Jared C. Chamberlain,
Christopher Slobogin and Twila Wingrove

Adolescents, Media, and the Law Murder in the Courtroom: The Cognitive
Roger J.R. Levesque Neuroscience of Extreme Violent
Behavior
Oral Arguments Before Brigitte Vallabhajosula
the Supreme Court
Lawrence S. Wrightsman Rational Suicide, Irrational
Laws: Examining Current Approaches
God in the Courtroom to Suicide in Policy and Law
Brian H. Bornstein and Monica K. Miller Susan Stefan
Expert Testimony on the Psychology International Perspectives on Violence
of Eyewitness Identification Risk Assessment
Edited by Brian L. Cutler Edited by Jay P. Singh, Stål Bjørkly,
The Psychology of Judicial and Seena Fazel
Decision-​Making
Edited by David Klein
and Gregory Mitchell
International Perspectives
on Violence Risk Assessment

Edited by

Jay P. Singh
Stål Bjørkly
Seena Fazel

1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.

© Oxford University Press 2016

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
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rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Singh, Jay P., editor. | Bjørkly, Stål, editor. | Fazel, Seena, editor.
Title: International perspectives on violence risk assessment /
edited by Jay P. Singh, Stål Bjørkly, Seena Fazel.
Description: Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, [2016] |
Series: American Psychology-Law Society series | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016018957 (print) | LCCN 2016022581 (ebook) | ISBN 9780199386291 |
ISBN 9780199386307 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Violence—Forecasting. | Violence. | Violent offenders. |
Violent crimes. | Risk assessment.
Classification: LCC RC569.5.V55 I586 2016 (print) | LCC RC569.5.V55 (ebook) |
DDC 616.85/8200112—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016018957

9╇8╇7╇6╇5╇4╇3╇2╇1

Printed by WebCom, Inc., Canada

To Martin Grann and John Chapman
Contents

Series Foreword xi
Acknowledgments xiii
About the Editors xv
Contributors xvii

Section 1: Violence Risk Assessment: The International

State of the Art

1 An Introduction to the Assessment of Violence Risk 3

Nicholas Scurich

2 Methodological Considerations in Risk Assessment Research 16

Seena Fazel and Stål Bjørkly

3 Adapting Risk Assessment Tools to New Jurisdictions 26

Vivienne de Vogel and Michiel de Vries Robbé

4 Implementation of Violence Risk Assessment Instruments in Mental

Healthcare Settings 40
Quazi Haque

5 The Process and Context of Violence Risk Assessment: Toward

Integrating Science into Clinical Practice 53
Eric B. Elbogen
vii
viii Contents

6 Violence Risk Assessment Tools: A Systematic Review of Surveys 76

Claudia C. Hurducas, Jay P. Singh, Corine de Ruiter, and John Petrila

Section 2: The International Risk Survey: Global Findings

7 The International Risk Survey: Use and Perceived Utility of Structured

Violence Risk Assessment Tools in 44 Countries 101
Jay P. Singh, Sarah L. Desmarais, Randy K. Otto, Tonia L. Nicholls,
Karen L. Petersen, and Michelle M. Pritchard

8 Comparing Preferences for Actuarial Versus Structured Professional

Judgment Violence Risk Assessment Measures Across Five
Continents: To What Extent Is Practice Keeping Pace
with Science? 127
Tonia L. Nicholls, Karen L. Petersen, and Michelle M. Pritchard

9 Risk Communication: An International Update 150

Kirk Heilbrun, Rebecca Newsham, and Victoria Pietruszka

10 Perceived Barriers to the Implementation of Violence Risk

Assessment Tools 166
Adrian Cree

Section 3: The International Risk Survey: Country-​Specific Findings

11 Violence Risk Assessment in Latin America 181

Jorge O. Folino, Daniella K. Villalba, and Jay P. Singh

12 Recidivism Risk Assessment in Belgium: Clinical Practice, Research,

and Legislative Aspects 192
Claire Ducro and Thierry Pham

13 Canadian Contributions to Violence Risk Assessment: Policy, Practice,

and Future Directions 202
Adam J. E. Blanchard, Kim A. Reeves, and Andrea L. Gibas

14 Violence Risk Assessment in Denmark 216

Louise Hjort Nielsen, Sarah B. van Mastrigt, and Tine Wøbbe

15 The Current Status of Sexual and Violent Recidivism and Risk

Assessment Research in Germany and Austria 231
Martin Rettenberger
 Contents ix

16 Violence Risk Assessment in Hong Kong 247

Robyn Mei Yee Ho and Chor Kwan Yan

17 The Assessment of Violence Risk: The State-​of-​the-​Art in Mexico 258

Verónica Godoy-​Cervera, Paulino Dzib, Isaac Aguilar Ortega,
Daniella K. Villalba, and Jay P. Singh

18 Risk Assessment in the Netherlands 270

Corine de Ruiter

19 Violence Risk Assessment Practices in Spain 280

Karin Arbach-​Lucioni and Antonio Andrés-​Pueyo

20 Violence Risk Assessment in Switzerland 296

Sabine Hahn

21 The Current State of Violence Risk Assessment in England

and Wales 308
Michael Doyle and Sarah-​Jayne Leonard

22 Risk Assessment in the United States 328

David DeMatteo, Stephanie Brooks Holliday, Meghann Galloway,
and Unnati Patel

23 Risk Assessment Practices for Sexual and Violent Offenders

in Israel 343
Rabeea Assy and Doron Menashe

Appendix: Structured Instruments Commonly Used in Violence

Risk Assessments 353
Stephanie Wilson, Jay P. Singh, Natascha Leech, and Tonia Nicholls

Index 373
Series Foreword

This book series is sponsored by the American Psychology–​Law Society

(APLS). APLS is an interdisciplinary organization devoted to scholarship,
practice, and public service in psychology and law. Its goals include advancing
the contributions of psychology to the understanding of law and legal institu-
tions through basic and applied research; promoting the education of psy-
chologists in matters of law and the education of legal personnel in matters of
psychology; and informing the psychological and legal communities, and the
general public of current research, educational, and service activities in the
field of psychology and law. APLS membership includes psychologists from
the academic, research, and clinical practice communities as well as members
of the legal community. Research and practice is represented in both the civil
and criminal legal arenas. APLS has chosen Oxford University Press as a stra-
tegic partner because of its commitment to scholarship, quality, and the inter-
national dissemination of ideas. These strengths will help APLS reach its goal
of educating psychology and legal professionals and the general public about
important developments in psychology and law. The focus of the book series
reflects the diversity of the field of psychology and law; we publish books on a
broad range of topics.
In the latest book in the series, International Perspectives on Violence Risk
Assessment, Jay Singh, Stål Bjørkly, and Seena Fazel have compiled a series of
23 chapters, each focusing on issues and topics relevant to violence risk assess-
ment around the world. The initial five chapters in this text set the foundation
by providing an introduction to the assessment of violence risk; an overview

xi
xii Series Foreword

of methodological considerations in risk assessment research; a review of con-

siderations regarding adapting risk assessment tools to new jurisdictions; a
discussion regarding implementation of violence risk assessment instruments
in mental healthcare settings; and an overview of the process and context of
violence risk assessment, and the integration of science into clinical prac-
tice. The next five chapters in the text discuss the use of risk assessment tools
around the world, including a systematic review of surveys, discussion of the
International Risk Survey regarding the use and perceived utility of structured
violence risk assessment tools, a comparison of actuarial and structured pro-
fessional judgment risk assessment measures, an international update on risk
communication, and a discussion of perceived barriers to the implementation
of risk assessment tools. The remaining 13 chapters each describe the state
of violence risk assessment in a particular country or region, including Latin
America, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany and Austria, Hong Kong,
Mexico, The Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, England and Wales, the United
States, and Israel. The result is a text that provides a truly international per-
spective on violence risk assessment research and practice.
International Perspectives on Violence Risk Assessment presents a compre-
hensive and detailed analysis of issues most relevant to improving the state
of violence risk assessment around the world. Scholars, researchers, poli-
cymakers, and practitioners will undoubtedly find this text to be a valuable
resource that provides multiple perspectives on the current state of violence
risk assessment.

Patricia A. Zapf
Series Editor
Acknowledgments

The editors gratefully acknowledge Jacqueline Genzman and Magdalena

Nowotna for their assistance with the copyediting and formatting of this
text. Dr. Fazel was funded by a Wellcome Trust senior research fellowship
in clinical science (095806). The American Psychology–​Law Society and the
University of South Florida are thanked for their funding of the International
Risk Survey, as are all respondents.

xiii
About the Editors

Jay P. Singh, PhD, is Founder of the Global Institute of Forensic Research

(www.gifrinc.com) and Professor of Epidemiology and Violence Risk
Assessment at Molde University College in Norway. Professor Singh serves
as Clinical Associate in the Department of Psychiatry and Senior Research
Fellow at the Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania.
His research focuses on the rapid dissemination of evidence-​based assessment
and treatment practices in the areas of mental health, corrections, and crim-
inal law.
Stål Bjørkly, PsyD, is Professor of Health Sciences and Social Care at Molde
University College in Norway. Professor Bjørkly serves as Specialist Clinical
Psychologist at Helse Sør-​Øst in Oslo and maintains a private practice in
Molde. His research focuses on the assessment and management of institu-
tional and community violence, the relationship between psychosis and vio-
lence, and screening for violence risk in civil psychiatric settings.
Seena Fazel, BSc(Hons), MBChB, MD, FRCPsych, is Professor of Forensic
Psychiatry at the University of Oxford in the U.K. Wellcome Trust Senior
Research Fellow and Honorary Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist, Professor
Fazel’s research focuses on violence risk assessment, the relationship between
mental illness and violent crime, and the mental health of prisoners.

xv
Contributors

Antonio Andrés-​Pueyo, PhD

Group of Advanced Studies on Violence
Universitat de Barcelona, Spain
Department of Personality, Psychological Assessment and Treatment
University of Barcelona, Spain

Karin Arbach-​Lucioni, PhD

Group of Advanced Studies on Violence
Universitat de Barcelona, Spain
National Council of Scientific and Technological Research
Barcelona, Spain
School of Psychology
National University of Cordoba
Cordoba, Argentina

Rabeea Assy, PhD

Faculty of Law
University of Haifa
Haifa, Israel

xvii
xviii Contributors

Stål Bjørkly, PsyD

Faculty of Health and Social Sciences
Molde University College
Molde, Norway
Centre for Research and Education in Forensic Psychiatry
Oslo University Hospital
Oslo, Norway

Adam J. E. Blanchard, MA
Department of Psychology
Simon Fraser University
Burnaby, BC, Canada

Adrian Cree, MBBS

Partnerships in Care
Institute of Psychiatry
King’s College London
London, UK

David DeMatteo, JD, PhD

Department of Psychology
Drexel University
Philadelphia, PA, USA

Corine de Ruiter, PhD

Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience
Maastricht University
Maastricht, The Netherlands

Sarah L. Desmarais, PhD

Department of Psychology
North Carolina State University
Raleigh, NC, USA

Vivienne de Vogel, PhD

Van der Hoeven Kliniek
De Forensische Zorgspecialisten
Utrecht, The Netherlands

Michiel de Vries Robbé, PhD

Van der Hoeven Kliniek
De Forensische Zorgspecialisten
Utrecht, The Netherlands
 Contributors xix

Michael Doyle, PhD

Centre for Mental Health and Risk
University of Manchester and South West Yorkshire Partnership NHS
Foundation Trust
Manchester, UK

Claire Ducro, PhD

Centre de Recherche en Défense Sociale
Tournai, Belgium
Equipe DEEP
SCALab UMR
Lille, France

Paulino Dzib, PhD

Department of Psychology
Universidad Autónoma de Yucatán
Mérida, Mexico

Eric B. Elbogen, PhD

Department of Psychiatry
University of North Carolina School of Medicine
Chapel Hill, NC, USA

Seena Fazel, MD
Department of Psychiatry
University of Oxford
Oxford, UK

Jorge O. Folino, MD, PhD

Department of Psychiatry
National University of La Plata
La Plata, Argentina

Meghann Galloway, MS
Department of Psychology
Drexel University
Philadelphia, PA, USA

Andrea L. Gibas, PhD

Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences
Whitby, ON, Canada
xx Contributors

Verónica Godoy-​Cervera, MSc

Department of Psychology
Universidad Autónoma de Yucatán
Mérida, Mexico

Sabine Hahn, PhD, CNS, RN

Division of Health
Bern University of Applied Sciences
Bern, Switzerland

Quazi Haque, MBBS, FRCPsych, LLM

Partnerships in Care
Institute of Psychiatry
London, UK

Kirk Heilbrun, PhD

Department of Psychology
Drexel University
Philadelphia, PA, USA

Robyn Mei Yee Ho, MBBS, MRCPsych, FHKCPsych,

FHKAM(Psychiatry)
Psych Plus Mental Health Centre
Hong Kong, PRC

Stephanie Brooks Holliday, PhD

War-​Related Illness and Injury Study Center
DC VA Medical Center
Washington, DC, USA

Claudia C. Hurducas, MSc

Department of Research and Development
Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
Bracknell, UK

Natascha Leech, MA
BC Mental Health and Substance Use Services
Forensic Psychiatric Services Commission
Vancouver, Canada

Sarah-​Jayne Leonard, MSc

Centre for Mental Health and Risk
University of Manchester
Manchester, UK
 Contributors xxi

Doron Menashe, JD
Faculty of Law
University of Haifa
Haifa, Israel

Rebecca Newsham, MA
Department of Psychology
Drexel University
Philadelphia, PA, USA

Tonia L. Nicholls, PhD

University of British Columbia
Faculty of Medicine
Department of Psychiatry
Vancouver, Canada
BC Mental Health and Substance Use Services
Forensic Psychiatric Services Commission
Vanouver, Canada

Louise Hjort Nielsen, MSc

Department of Psychology
University of Southern Denmark
Odense, Denmark

Isaac Aguilar Ortega, PhD

Department of Psychology
Universidad Autónoma de Yucatán
Mérida, Mexico

Randy K. Otto, PhD

Department of Mental Health Law and Policy
University of South Florida
Tampa, FL, USA

Unnati Patel, BS
Department of Psychology
Drexel University
Philadelphia, PA, USA

Karen L. Petersen, BEd

University of British Columbia
Faculty of Medicine
Department of Experimental Medicine
Vancouver, Canada
xxii Contributors

John Petrila, JD
Department of Health and Policy Management
University of South Florida
Tampa, FL, USA

Thierry Pham, PhD

Centre de Recherche en Défense Sociale
Tournai, Belgium
Service de Psychologie Légale
Université Mons
Mons, Belgium

Victoria Pietruszka, BA
Department of Psychology
Drexel University
Philadelphia, PA, USA

Michelle M. Pritchard, MPH1

University of British Columbia
Faculty of Medicine
Department of Psychiatry
Vancouver, Canada

Kim A. Reeves, MA
Department of Psychology
Simon Fraser University
Burnaby, BC, Canada
Alberta Health Services
Edmonton, AB, Canada

Martin Rettenberger, PhD

Centre for Criminology
Wiesbaden, Germany
Department of Psychology
Johannes Gutenberg-​University Mainz
Mainz, Germany

Nicholas Scurich, JD, PhD

Department of Psychology & Social Behavior
Department of Criminology, Law & Society
University of California, Irvine
Irvine, CA, USA
 Contributors xxiii

Jay P. Singh, PhD

Global Institute of Forensic Research
Reston, VA, USA
Institute of Health Sciences
Molde University College
Molde, Norway
Department of Psychiatry
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA, USA

Sarah B. van Mastrigt, PhD

Department of Psychology and Behavioural Sciences
University of Aarhus
Aarhus, Denmark

Daniella K. Villalba, PhD

Graduate School of Public and International Affairs
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA, USA

Stephanie Wilson, MSc

University of Nottingham
Nottingham, UK

Tine Wøbbe, PhD

Mental Health Centre Sct. Hans
Roskilde, Denmark

Chor Kwan Yan, BSc, MSc, RN(Psychiatry)

Psych Plus Mental Health Centre
Hong Kong, PRC
International Perspectives on Violence Risk Assessment
Section 1
VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT:
THE INTERNATIONAL STATE OF THE ART
1
An Introduction to the Assessment
of Violence Risk

Nicholas Scurich

The Assessment of Violence Risk

At a capital sentencing hearing in Texas, a prosecutor posed the following
question to a seasoned psychiatrist: “Doctor … do you have an opinion
within reasonable psychiatric certainty whether or not there is a probability
that the defendant … will commit criminal acts of violence that would con-
stitute a continuing threat to society?”
The psychiatrist responded, “Yes, he most certainly would.”
The prosecutor pressed further: “Would you state whether or not, Doctor,
you have an opinion within reasonable psychiatric certainty as to the degree
of that probability that you have just expressed to this jury?”
“Well, yes, sir, I would put it at one hundred percent and absolute” (Texas v.
Barefoot, 1978, p. 2131).
This particular testimony had several profound implications. In the first
place, the defendant, Thomas Barefoot, was sentenced to death on its basis.
The testimony raised questions about whether experts should be permitted
to respond to hypothetical questions (Appelbaum, 1984), because this par-
ticular psychiatrist had never actually interviewed Barefoot. It also raised
questions about whether seemingly clairvoyant testimony about future vio-
lent behavior is a legitimate basis on which to sentence an individual to death
(Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989; Ewing, 1982; Grisso & Appelbaum, 1992).
This begged the question, of course, whether psychiatrists—​or social scien-
tists, more generally—​could, in fact, predict future violent behavior with any
degree of reliability.

3
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
 Doomed rivals 313 drive evolution in adaptive directions.
Their claim is simply that a lot of evolutionary change (as a
molecular geneticist sees evolutionary change) is not adaptive.
Dover makes no such modest claims for his theory. He thinks that he
can explain all of evolution without natural selection, although he
generously concedes that there may be some truth in natural
selection as well! Throughout this book, our first recourse when
considering such matters has been to the example of the eye,
although it has, of course, been only a representative of the large
set of organs that are too complex and well designed to have come
about by chance. Only natural selection, I have repeatedly argued,
even comes close to offering a plausible explanation for the human
eye and comparable organs of extreme perfection and complexity.
Fortunately, Dover has explicitly risen to the challenge, and has
offered his own explanation of the evolution of the eye. Assume, he
says, that 1,000 steps of evolution are needed to evolve the eye
from nothing. This means that a sequence of 1,000 genetic changes
were needed to transform a bare patch of skin into an eye. This
seems to me to be an acceptable assumption for the sake of
argument. In the terms of Biomorph Land, it means that the bare-
skin animal is 1,000 genetic steps distant from the eyed animal.
Now, how do we account for the fact that just the right set of 1,000
steps were taken to result in the eye as we know it? Natural
selection's explanation is well known. Reducing it to its simplest
form, at each one of the 1,000 steps, mutation offered a number of
alternatives, only one of which was favoured because it aided
survival. The 1,000 steps of evolution represent 1,000 successive
choice points, at each of which most of the alternatives led to death.
The adaptive complexity of the modern eye is the end-product of
1,000 successful unconscious 'choices'. The species has followed a
particular path through the labyrinth of all possibilities. There were
1,000 branch-points along the path, and at each one the survivors
were the ones that happened to take the turning that led to
improved eyesight. The wayside is littered with the dead bodies of
the failures who took the wrong turning at each one of the 1,000
successive choice points. The eye that we know is the end-product
of a sequence of 1,000 successful selective 'choices'. That was (one
way of expressing) natural selection's explanation of the evolution of
the eye in 1,000 steps. Now, what of Dover's explanation? Basically,
he argues that it wouldn't have mattered which choice the lineage
took at each step: it would retrospectively have found a use for the
organ that resulted. Each step that the lineage took, according to
him, was a random step. At Step 1, for example, a random mutation
spread through the species. Since the newly evolved charac 
 314 The Blind Watchmaker teristic was functionally random,
it didn't aid the animals' survival. So the species searched the world
for a new place or new way of life in which they could use this new
random feature that had been imposed upon their bodies. Having
found a piece of environment that suited the random part of their
bodies, they lived there for a while, until a new random mutation
arose and spread through the species. Now the species had to scour
the world for a new place or way of life where they could live with
their new random bit. When they found it, Step 2 was completed.
Now the Step 3 random mutation spread through the species, and
so on for 1,000 steps, at the end of which the eye as we know it had
been formed. Dover points out that the human eye happens to use
what we call 'visible' light rather than infrared. But if random
processes had happened to impose an infrared sensitive eye upon
us, we would, doubtless, have made the most of it, and found a way
of life that exploited infrared rays to the full. At first glance this idea
has a certain seductive plausibility, but only at a very brief first
glance. The seductiveness comes from the neatly symmetrical way in
which natural selection is turned on its head. Natural selection, in its
most simple form, assumes that the environment is imposed upon
the species, and those genetic variants best fitted to that
environment survive. The environment is imposed, and the species
evolves to fit it. Dover's theory turns this on its head. It is the nature
of the species that is 'imposed', in this case by the vicissitudes of
mutation, and other internal genetic forces in which he has a special
interest. The species then locates that member of the set of all
environments that best fits its imposed nature. But the
seductiveness of the symmetry is superficial indeed. The wondrous
cloud-cuckooism of Dover's idea is displayed in all its glory the
moment we begin to think in terms of numbers. The essence of his
scheme is that, at each of the 1,000 steps, it didn't matter which
way the species turned. Each new innovation that the species came
up with was functionally random, and the species then found an
environment to suit it. The implication is that the species would have
found a suitable environment, no matter which branch it had taken
at every fork in the way. Now just think how many possible
environments this lets us in for postulating. There were 1,000
branch points. If each branch point was a mere bifurcation (as
opposed to a 3-way or 18-way branch, a conservative assumption),
the total number of livable environments that must, in principle,
exist, in order to allow Dover's scheme to work, is 2 to the power
1,000 (the first branch gives two pathways; then each of those
branches into two, making four in all; then each of these branches,
giving 8; then 16, 32, 64, . . . all the way
 Doomed rivals 315 to 21,000). This number may be written
as a 1 with 301 noughts after it. It is far far greater than the total
number of atoms in the entire universe. Dover's alleged rival to
natural selection could never work, not just never in a million years
but never in a million times longer than the universe has existed,
never in a million universes each lasting a million times as long
again. Notice that this conclusion is not materially affected if we
change Dover's initial assumption that 1,000 steps would be needed
to make an eye. If we reduce it to only 100 steps, which is probably
an underestimate, we still conclude that the set of possible livable
environments that must be waiting in the wings, as it were, to cope
with whatever random steps the lineage might take, is more than a
million million million million million. This is a smaller number than
the previous one, but it still means that the vast majority of Dover's
'environments' waiting in the wings would each have to be made of
less than a single atom. It is worth explaining why the theory of
natural selection is not susceptible to a symmetrical destruction by a
version of the 'largenumbers argument'. In Chapter 3 we thought of
all real and conceivable animals as sitting in a gigantic hyperspace.
We are doing a similar thing here, but simplifying it by considering
evolutionary branch points as 2-way, rather than 18-way branches.
So the set of all possible animals that might have evolved in 1,000
evolutionary steps are perched on a gigantic tree, which branches
and branches so that the total number of final twigs is 1 followed by
301 noughts. Any actual evolutionary history can be represented as
a particular pathway through this hypothetical tree. Of all
conceivable evolutionary pathways, only a minority actually ever
happened. We can think of most of this 'tree of all possible animals'
as hidden in the darkness of non-existence. Here and there, a few
trajectories through the darkened tree are illuminated. These are the
evolutionary pathways that actually happened, and, numerous as
these illuminated branches are, they are still an infinitesimal minority
of the set of all branches. Natural selection is a process that is
capable of picking its way through the tree of all conceivable
animals, and finding just that minority of pathways that are viable.
The theory of natural selection cannot be attacked by the kind of
large-numbers argument with which I attacked Dover's theory,
because it is of the essence of the theory of natural selection that it
is continually cutting down most of the branches of the tree. That is
precisely what natural selection does. It picks its way, step by step,
through the tree of all conceivable animals, avoiding the almost
infinitely large majority of sterile branches - animals with eyes
 316 The Blind Watchmaker in the soles of their feet, etc. -
which the Dover theory is obliged, by the nature of its peculiar
inverted logic, to countenance. We have dealt with all the alleged
alternatives to the theory of natural selection except the oldest one.
This is the theory that life was created, or its evolution master-
minded, by a conscious designer. It would obviously be unfairly easy
to demolish some particular version of this theory such as the one
(or it may be two) spelled out in Genesis. Nearly all peoples have
developed their own creation myth, and the Genesis story is just the
one that happened to have been adopted by one particular tribe of
Middle Eastern herders. It has no more special status than the belief
of a particular West African tribe that the world was created from
the excrement of ants. All these myths have in common that they
depend upon the deliberate intentions of some kind of supernatural
being. At first sight there is an important distinction to be made
between what might be called 'instantaneous creation' and 'guided
evolution'. Modern theologians of any sophistication have given up
believing in instantaneous creation. The evidence for some sort of
evolution has become too overwhelming. But many theologians who
call themselves evolutionists, for instance the Bishop of Birmingham
quoted in Chapter 2, smuggle God in by the back door: they allow
him some sort of supervisory role over the course that evolution has
taken, either influencing key moments in evolutionary history
(especially, of course, human evolutionary history), or even meddling
more comprehensively in the day-to-day events that add up to
evolutionary change. We cannot disprove beliefs like these,
especially if it is assumed that God took care that his interventions
always closely mimicked what would be expected from evolution by
natural selection. All that we can say about such beliefs is, firstly,
that they are superfluous and, secondly, that they assume the
existence of the main thing we want to explain, namely organized
complexity. The one thing that makes evolution such a neat theory is
that it explains how organized complexity can arise out of primeval
simplicity. If we want to postulate a deity capable of engineering all
the organized complexity in the world, either instantaneously or by
guiding evolution, that deity must already have been vastly complex
in the first place. The creationist, whether a naive Bible-thumper or
an educated bishop, simply postulates an already existing being of
prodigious intelligence and complexity. If we are going to allow
ourselves the luxury of postulating organized complexity without
offering an explanation, we might as well make a job of it and simply
postulate the existence of life as we know it! In short, divine
creation, whether
 Doomed rivals 317 instantaneous or in the form of guided
evolution, joins the list of other theories we have considered in this
chapter. All give some superficial appearance of being alternatives to
Darwinism, whose merits might be tested by an appeal to evidence.
All turn out, on closer inspection, not to be rivals of Darwinism at all.
The theory of evolution by cumulative natural selection is the only
theory we know of that is in principle capable of explaining the
existence of organized complexity. Even if the evidence did not
favour it, it would still be the best theory available! In fact the
evidence does favour it. But that is another story. Let us hear the
conclusion of the whole matter. The essence of life is statistical
improbability on a colossal scale. Whatever is the explanation for life,
therefore, it cannot be chance. The true explanation for the
existence of life must embody the very antithesis of chance. The
antithesis of chance is nonrandom survival, properly understood.
Nonrandom survival, improperly understood, is not the antithesis of
chance, it is chance itself. There is a continuum connecting these
two extremes, and it is the continuum from single-step selection to
cumulative selection. Single-step selection is just another way of
saying pure chance. This is what I mean by nonrandom survival
improperly understood. Cumulative selection, by slow and gradual
degrees, is the explanation, the only workable explanation that has
ever been proposed, for the existence of life's complex design. The
whole book has been dominated by the idea of chance, by the
astronomically long odds against the spontaneous arising of order,
complexity and apparent design. We have sought a way of taming
chance, of drawing its fangs. 'Untamed chance', pure, naked chance,
means ordered design springing into existence from nothing, in a
single leap. It would be untamed chance if once there was no eye,
and then, suddenly, in the twinkling of a generation, an eye
appeared, fully fashioned, perfect and whole. This is possible, but
the odds against it will keep us busy writing noughts till the end of
time. The same applies to the odds against the spontaneous
existence of any fully fashioned, perfect and whole beings, including
- I see no way of avoiding the conclusion - deities. To 'tame' chance
means to break down the very improbable into less improbable small
components arranged in series. No matter how improbable it is that
an X could have arisen from a Y in a single step, it is always possible
to conceive of a series of infinitesimally graded intermediates
between them. However improbable a large-scale change may be,
smaller changes are less improbable. And provided we postulate a
sufficiently large series of sufficiently finely graded intermediates, we
shall be able to derive anything from anything else,
 318 The Blind Watchmaker without invoking astronomical
improbabilities. We are allowed to do this only if there has been
sufficient time to fit all the intermediates in. And also only if there is
a mechanism for guiding each step in some particular direction,
otherwise the sequence of steps will career off in an endless random
walk. It is the contention of the Darwinian world-view that both
these provisos are met, and that slow, gradual, cumulative natural
selection is the ultimate explanation for our existence. If there are
versions of the evolution theory that deny slow gradualism, and deny
the central role of natural selection, they may be true in particular
cases. But they cannot be the whole truth, for they deny the very
heart of the evolution theory, which gives it the power to dissolve
astronomical improbabilities and explain prodigies of apparent
miracle.
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 Index and key to Bibliography This book is meant to be
read from cover to cover. It is not a work of reference. Many items in
the index will mean something only to people that have already read
the book and want to find a particular place again. In such a book,
footnotes are an irritating distraction. The following index, in
addition to performing the normal function of an index, is intended
to replace footnotes by acting as a key to the bibliography. The
numbers in brackets refer to the numbered books or articles in the
bibliography. Other numbers refer to pages in the book. Where an
indexed word recurs on a consecutive series of pages, normally only
the first page, or the page where a definition will be found, is given.
Acquired characteristics, inheritance of, 290,299,(22) Adaptation, 9,
178, 288, (19, 89) Addressing, memory and genes, 1 1 7 Aesop,
191,(21) Altruism, 267, (20, 52) Ambulance Effect, 29 Amniotes,
258, (92) Amoeba, 116,249 Amplifier analogy, 251 Anderson, D. M.,
157,(2) Andersson, M., 213, (3) Angel wings, 309 Anteaters, 105
Antennapaedia, 230 Ants, 106-9, (90) in Panama, 108,195
Archaeopteryx, 262 Archives, DNA, 122 fidelity of, 123 Argument
from Design, 4, 6, (71) from Personal Incredulity, 38, (63) Argyll,
Duke of, 248, (73) Arms race, 178,(21,23) between sexes, 178,185,
(85) cyclical, 213 economic end to, 190 Asdic, 23 Asimov, I., 44-5,
(5) Atkins, P.W., 14,(8) Australian fauna, 100, (78) Australopithecus,
228,231 Bacteria, 116,130,176 Baghdad, walk to, 40 Bateson, W.,
305, (quoted in 22) Bats, 21-37, (38,77) conference of, 35 detector,
25 diversity of, 23 Doppler sensitivity of, 31 ear muscles, 27
economics, 25 frequency modulated cries, 29 327
 328 Index lack of angel wings, 309 problems of, 26, 28, 32,
{ 1 9) subjective experience of, 33 Bear, polar, 38, (63) Beaver, 135,
(21) Bee-flower, 61,63 Beetle, bombardier, 86-7, (28) Bennet, G., 39,
(quoted in 63) Bestsellers, 219 Biblical Creation, 251, (quoted in 10)
Biochemical pathway, 171 Biomorphs, 55, 234, 311 Birds,
echolocation by, 95 Birmingham, Bishop of, 37—41, 316, (63)
Blacksmith, 290 Blueprint, theory of embryology, 294 Boeing 747,
random assembly, 7, 234, 248 (43) Brain, evolution of, 188, 215,
228, (46) Caims-Smith, A. G., 148-65, (13, 14) Calluses, 298 Cake,
analogy for development, 297 Carrier frequency, 28 Cataract, 81
Catastrophism, 241 Cheetah, 180 Chemists, 144 Chess, 65
Chimpanzee, 118,263 Chirp radar, 28 Choice discrepancy, 208
Cicadas, periodical, 99-100,(21) Clade, 259,279 Cladism, 258, 276-9,
(75) transformed, 279, 281 Classification, 255-84, (60, 75, 81)
arbitrariness of non-biological, 257 cladistic, 258, 276, (75)
molecular, 269, 274, (37, 72) numerical, 279,(81) 'traditional', 276,
(60) uniqueness of biological, 258, 269 Clay, 150,(13,14) 'power',
153 Clouds, 45, 49 Coadaptation, 169 Coelacanth, 246, (80)
Coincidence, 159, 274 Colour, hypothesis of bat sensation, 35
Combination lock, 7 Compact disc, 112,152 Complexity as
heterogeneity of form, 6 as statistical improbability, 7 but not with
hindsight, 7-8 Computer, explanation of, 12 biomorphs, 50 chess-
playing, 65 disc analogy, 173 games, 62 model, 63 typing
Shakespeare, 47 underestimated, 63, 158 value of, 74 Constant
speedism, 245, 263 Constraints on evolution, 308, (58) Constructive
evolution, 169 Continental drift, 100, (39) Convergence,
evolutionary, 94, (92) by RNA in test-tubes, 133, (27) Copernicus,
252 Costs and benefits, 26,190 Cott, H.B., 188,(16) Covenant, Ark of
the, 109 Creationism, 230, 24 1 , 25 1 , 283, 3 1 6, (10,48,66,76)
smuggled into evolution, 248, 3 1 6 Creator, 14,141,316 Cromwell,
O., 228 Crystal, 150 Cuckoo, 40 Cultural evolution, 216 Cumulative
selection, 45 DC8, stretched, 234, (22) DNA, information technology,
1 1 1-36, (1,57,88) as ROM, 117 computer disc analogy, 1 73
conservatism, 124 origin, 140, 157 selfish, 116,(20,21) Dam beaver,
136,(21) clay, 154 Darwin, C., 3, 305, (11,18,32) and Argument from
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