EXEGETICAL PRINCIPLES IN THE INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE

I. CATHOLIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION.

1. On regarding certain books or parts of books of Holy Scripture as not historical.

Cf. Official Catholic Teachings: Bible Interpretation, tr. James J. Megivern:

II

Concerning the Narratives in the Historical Books Which

Have Only the Appearance of Being Historical

The Biblical Commission answers the following question:

Whether we may admit as a principle of sound exegesis the opinion which holds that those
books of Holy Scripture which are regarded as historical, either wholly or in part, sometimes
narrate what is not history properly so-called and objectively true, but only have the
appearance of history and are intended to convey a meaning different from the strictly literal
or historical sense of the words.

Answer: In the negative; excepting always the case—not to be easily or rashly admitted, and
then only on the supposition that it is not opposed to the teaching of the Church and subject to
her decision—that it can be proved by solid arguments that the sacred writer did not intend to
give a true and strict history, but proposed rather to set forth, under the guise and form of
history, a parable or an allegory or some meaning distinct from the strictly literal or historical
signification of the words.
June 23, 1905.

2. On evaluating the literal historical sense with respect to what it reports regarding the
foundations of the Christian religion.

Cf. The Sources of Catholic Doctrine, tr. Roy Deferrari:

30 June 1909, ‘On the Historical Character of the First Three Chapters of Genesis’.

Question 3.

Whether, in particular, the literal historical sense (sensus litteralis historicus) may be called
in question (vocari in dubium possit), where it is a question of facts narrated in these chapters
(ubi agitur de factis in eisdem capitibus enarratis) which involve the foundations of the Chris-
tian religion (quae christianae religionis fundamenta attingunt), as are, among others, the cre-
ation of all things by God at the beginning of time; the special [or, particular] creation of man;
the formation of the first woman from the first man (formatio primae mulieris ex prio homine);
the unity of the human race; the original happiness of our first parents in a state of justice,
integrity and immortality; the precept given by God to man in order to test his obedience; the
transgression of the divine precept under the persuasion of the devil in the guise of a serpent;
the fall of our first parents from the aforesaid primaeval state of innocence; and the promise
of a future Saviour?

Response: In the negative.

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3. That it was not the intention of the sacred author to teach in a scientific manner the in-
nermost constitution of visible things as well as the complete order of creation.

Cf. The Pontifical Biblical Commission:

30 June 1909, ‘On the Historical Character of the First Three Chapters of Genesis’.

Question 7.

Whether, since it was not the intention of the sacred author, when writing the first chapter of
Genesis, to teach in a scientific manner the innermost nature of visible things as well as the
complete order of creation but rather to furnish his people with a popular account, such as the
common parlance of that age allowed, one, namely, adapted to the senses and to the mental
preparation of the persons, we are strictly and always bound, when interpreting these chapters,
to seek for scientific exactitude of expression.

Answer: In the negative.

Cf. Msgr. John F. McCarthy, “A Neo-Patristic Return to the First Day of Creation”:1

EVENTS IN TIME. In 1935 Rudolph Bandas published his Biblical Questions5 to provide
answers to questions often raised by teachers of Bible history. He was reflecting Catholic exe-
getical tradition as he wrote: “The historical character of Genesis is a consequence of its inspir-
ation. For the sacred writer meant to write history, and inspiration, therefore, guarantees the
historical character of what he wrote.”6 As he came to the question of “Genesis and Science,”
he expressed a viewpoint that was becoming more and more common among Catholic theo-
logians and exegetes as he said: “The Mosaic account of the origin of the world is a popular
narrative and not a technical, scientific textbook. The purpose of the sacred writer was not to
teach the physical sciences but the truths necessary for salvation. The Bible is a book of reli-
gion, not a textbook of science. Its main purpose is, in the language of Cardinal Baronius, ‘to
teach us how to go to heaven and not how the heavens go.’”7

5. R. Bandas, Biblical Questions, vol. 1, The Old Testament (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1935),
Preface.
6. Ibid., p. 40.
7. Ibid., p. 50.

Cf. the following, taken from an Internet article no longer online:

In a five-volume strong edition of the Bible recommended by Catholic and Evangelic bishops
and appraised by the Austrian Catholic Bible Work, we read the following commentary on the
Genesis:

“As long as man’s conception of the world was rather uncritical, one was able to read
the first chapters of Genesis in view of its essential theological statement and unconcern-
edly accept its presupposed conception of the world as the natural component of the
story. This changed when one started to take scientific interest in the beginnings of the
world and mankind and hoped to be able to find an answer in the story of the Bible. A
division was inevitable and scientific discoveries had to clash with the naive ancient ori-
ental conception of the world. Creation and paradise myths, deluge stories among many

1
(www.rtforum.org/lt/lt47.html [Retrieved 1/14/09])

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 more were the foundation of religious literature in the ancient Orient. Knowing this,
Israel had to find a way to make mythological facts coincide with its own experience: The
questions that these myths were able to answer were not only of concern to Israel but
were of general interest: From where did the world emerge? From where does man come
from? From where the evil of the word, if it was created by God? What is the origin of
men’s discord, visibly expressed in the confusion of languages? These and similar
questions had to be answered by Israel as well.

Israel’s theologians provided the answers by comparing the ancient myths with their
experience of God and verifying them with their own life experience.... From their experience
of the present and from personal God experience the Biblical theologians arrived at their own
vision of the beginnings in comparison with the myths of the environment.... This opinion was
put into the story form of the time without any intention of transmitting ‘how it really was’”.
(emphasis added)

Cf. George Sim Johnston, How to Read the First Chapter of Genesis. From the September
1998 Issue of Lay Witness Magazine:1

The first chapter of Genesis remains a great stumbling block for the modern mind. The average
educated person “knows” that the creation account in Genesis is contradicted by what science
tells us about the origin of the universe and the animal kingdom. Charles Darwin himself
discarded a mild Protestant faith when he concluded that the author of Genesis was a bad
geologist. To his mind, the biblical six days of creation and Lyell’s Principles of Geology
could not both be true.
The discomfort with Genesis, moreover, has not been restricted to the educated classes.
According to the famous French worker-priest Abbe Michonneau, the apparent conflict be-
tween science and the six-day creation account promoted atheism among the poor far more
effectively than any social injustice. Darwinian evolution is a major ingredient of that
“science.” So is the “Big Bang” model of the universe, which plausibly asserts that the cosmos
is billions, and not thousands, of years old.
The confusion over this issue, which Pope John Paul II addressed in 1996 in his highly
publicized letter about evolution, boils down to the question of how to read the biblical
creation account. In his letter, John Paul simply reiterated what the Magisterium has argued
tirelessly since Leo XIII’s Providentissimus Deus (1893): The author of Genesis did not intend
to provide a scientific explanation of how God created the world. Unfortunately there are still
biblical fundamentalists, Catholic and Protestant, who do not embrace this point.
When Christ said that the mustard seed was the smallest of seeds—and it is about the
size of a speck of dust—He was not laying down a principle of botany. In fact, botanists
tell us there are smaller seeds. Our Lord was simply talking to the men of His time in
their own language, and with reference to their own experience. Similarly, the Hebrew
word for “day” used in Genesis (“yom”) can mean a 24-hour day, or a longer period. Hence
the warning of Pius XII in Divino Afflante Spiritu (1943), that the true sense of a biblical
passage is not always obvious. The sacred authors wrote in the idioms of their time and place.
As Catholics, we must believe that every word of Scripture is inspired by the Holy Spirit, a
claim the Church will not make even for her infallible pronouncements. However, we must
not imagine the biblical authors as going into a trance and taking automatic dictation in a
“pure” language untouched by historical contingency. Rather, God made full use of the
writers’ habits of mind and expression. It’s the old mystery of grace and free will.

1
(http://www.cuf.org/LayWitness/online_view.asp?lwID=448 [12/18/06]) This article is based on
George Sim Johnston’s forthcoming book, Did Darwin Get it Right? released this month by Our
Sunday Visitor.
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 A modern reader of Genesis must bear in mind the principles of biblical exegesis laid down
by St. Augustine in his great work De Genesi Ad Litteram (On the Literal Interpretation of
Genesis). Augustine taught that whenever reason established with certainty a fact about the
physical world, seemingly contrary statements in the Bible must be interpreted accordingly.
He opposed the idea of a “Christian account” of natural phenomena in opposition to what
could be known by science. He viewed such accounts as “most deplorable and harmful, and
to be avoided at any cost,” because on hearing them the non-believer “could hardly hold his
laughter on seeing, as the saying goes, the error rise sky-high.”
As early as 410 A.D., then, the greatest of the Western Church Fathers was telling us that
the Book of Genesis is not an astrophysics or geology textbook. Augustine himself was a kind
of evolutionist, speculating that God’s creation of the cosmos was an instantaneous act whose
effects unfolded over a long period. God had planted “rational seeds” in nature which event-
ually developed into the diversity of plants and animals we see today. St. Thomas Aquinas
cites this view of Augustine’s more than once in the course of the Summa Theologiae. St.
Thomas, author Etienne Gilson writes,

was well aware that the Book of Genesis was not a treatise on cosmography for the use
of scholars. It was a statement of the truth intended for the simple people whom Moses
was addressing. Thus it is sometimes possible to interpret it in a variety of ways. So it
was that when we speak of the six days of creation, we can understand by it either six
successive days, as do Ambrose, Basil, Chrysostom and Gregory, and is suggested by
the letter of the text . . . Or we can with Augustine take it to refer to the simultaneous
creation of all beings with days symbolizing the various orders of beings. This second
interpretation is at first sight less literal, but is, rationally speaking, more satisfying. It
is the one that St. Thomas adopts, although he does not exclude the other which, as he
says, can also be held.

In this century, Cardinal Bea, who helped Pius XII draft Divino Afflante Spiritu, wrote
that Genesis does not deal with the “true constitution of visible things.” It is meant to
convey truths outside the scientific order.
While they do not teach science, the early chapters of Genesis are history and not myth. But
they are not history as it would be written by a modern historian. (It is not as though there was
a camcorder in the Garden of Eden.) You might say that they are history written in mythic
language— a poetic compression of the truth, as it were. We are obliged to believe the funda-
mental truths expressed by the sacred author—for example, that our first parents, tempted by
the devil, committed a primal act of disobedience whose effects we still suffer (cf. Catechism,
no. 390). But the Catholic doctrine of original sin is entirely outside the realm of physical
science. It’s worth keeping in mind, however, Newman’s remark that the more he
contemplated humanity, the clearer it became to him that the race was “implicated in some
terrible aboriginal calamity.”
Biblical fundamentalism—and its corollary, creation science—is a distinctly Protestant
phenomenon. Although it has roots in the commentaries on Genesis written by Luther
and Calvin, its real beginning was in early 20th century America. Biblical literalism was
a defense against the onslaught of rationalist criticism launched by German scholars who
were intent on undermining Christian belief in the inerrancy of Scripture. Certain Pro-
testant denominations that were already suspicious of science took refuge in a semantic
literalism that sheltered the Bible from the invasive procedures of agnostic scholarship.
The intellectual simplicity and doctrinal clarity of this position make it attractive to some
Catholics today. This appeal is understandable. They are seeking refuge from the attacks
of heterodox theologians who seem as eager as their 19th century forebears to decon-
struct the faith.
The temptation to biblical literalism should be avoided, however. The Bible was never meant
to be read apart from the teaching authority established by Christ. Even many Catholics are

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 not aware of the “Catholic” origins of the Bible. It was not until the end of the fourth century
that the twenty-seven books which comprise the New Testament were agreed upon by two
Church councils, subject to final approval by the pope. And it was the Church that insisted,
against the protests of heretics, that the Old Testament be included in the Christian canon. The
Bible was never meant to stand alone as a separate authority. It is the Church, the Mystical
Body of Christ, that preserves the deposit of the faith, of which Scripture is an integral part.
St. Augustine, as usual, got it exactly right: “But for the authority of the Catholic Church, I
would not believe the Gospel.”
Since Leo XIII, the Magisterium has progressively discouraged the literalistic reading of
Genesis favored by Protestants. Can a Catholic nonetheless read Genesis as a scientific trea-
tise? Yes, if he wants to—but he may find himself in the dilemma of trying to force scientific
data into a biblical template which was never meant to receive it. And he will be severely
handicapped in doing apologetics in a post-Christian world. He will, in fact, be the reverse of
apostolic if he tries to explain to anyone the doctrine of creation in the terms of ancient Hebrew
cosmology.
The test of a first-rate intellect, it has been said, is the ability to hold two seemingly opposed
ideas and retain the ability to function. A brilliant 20th century Catholic apologist, Frank J.
Sheed, wrote of the creation account in his masterpiece, Theology and Sanity.1 His words are
an invitation to Catholics tempted by biblical literalism to use their reason and not engage in
overly simplistic readings of Scripture. The author of Genesis, Sheed writes,

tells us of the fact but not the process: there was an assembly of elements of the
material universe, but was it instantaneous or spread over a considerable space
and time? Was it complete in one act, or by stages? Were those elements, for in-
stance, formed into an animal body which as one generation followed another
gradually evolved—not, of course, by the ordinary laws of matter but under the
special guidance of God— to a point where it was capable of union with a spiritual
soul, which God created and infused into it? The statement in Genesis does not
seem actually to exclude this, but it certainly does not say it. Nor has the Church
formally said that it is not so.

Catholics in reality have no cause to be timid about Scripture or science. They simply need
to distinguish between two complementary but distinct orders of knowledge—theological and
scientific—and allow each its due competence. They should be extremely cautious about
mixing the two. The Magisterium learned this the hard way in the Galileo affair. A faithful
Catholic should be calmly anchored in the proposition that truth is indivisible, and the works
of God cannot contradict what He has chosen to reveal through Scripture and Tradition.
(emphasis added)

N.B. Regarding “the complete order of creation”: the ‘order’ in question may be either temp-
oral or natural; whereas ‘creation’ may mean (a) the process of creating or (b) the result of
the process. Again, one must distinguish between the ‘scientific manner” proper to modern
experimental science, and the manner which belongs to the philosophical disciplines. Like-
wise, “the complete order of creation” means one thing in the purview of astrophysics and
cosmology, and something else in sacred or natural theology.

4. That certain narratives in the first chapters of Genesis “relate in simple and figurative
language, adapted to the understanding of a less developed people, the fundamental truths
presupposed for the economy of salvation, as well as a popular description of the origin of
the human race and of the Chosen People” and therefore do contain history.

1
Theology and Sanity (London, 1947), 90. (B.A.M.)

5
Cf. Letter of the Pontifical Biblical Commission to Cardinal Suhard (tr. ed. James J.
Megivern, Official Catholic Teachings: Bible Interpretation, pp. 351-352):

Letter of the Pontifical Biblical Commission to Cardinal Suhard Concerning

the Time of Documents of the Pentateuch and Concerning the
Literary Form of the First Eleven Chapters of Genesis

January 16, 1948

2. ...To declare a priori that their narratives contain no history in the modern sense of the term
would easily convey the idea that they contain no history whatever, whereas they relate in
simple and figurative language, adapted to the understanding of a less developed people, the
fundamental truths presupposed for the economy of salvation, as well as a popular description
of the origin of the human race and of the Chosen People.

Cf. Encyclical Letter of His Holiness Pope Pius XII, Humani Generis (Concerning False
Opinions), August 12, 1950:

38. Just as in the biological and anthropological sciences, so also in the historical sciences
there are those who boldly transgress the limits and safeguards established by the Church. In
a particular way must be deplored a certain too free interpretation of the historical books of
the Old Testament. Those who favor this system, in order to defend their cause, wrongly refer
to the Letter which was sent not long ago to the Archbishop of Paris by the Pontifical
Commission on Biblical Studies. (January 16, 1948: A.A.S., vol. XL, pp. 45-48.) This Letter, in
fact, clearly points out that the first eleven chapters of Genesis, although properly speak-
ing not conforming to the historical method used by the best Greek and Latin writers or
by competent authors of our time, do nevertheless pertain to history in a true sense,
which however must be further studied and determined by exegetes; the same chapters,
(the Letter points out), in simple and metaphorical language adapted to the mentality of
a people but little cultured, both state the principal truths which are fundamental for
our salvation, and also give a popular description of the origin of the human race and
the chosen people. If, however, the ancient sacred writers have taken anything from popular
narrations (and this may be conceded), it must never be forgotten that they did so with the help
of divine inspiration, through which they were rendered immune from any error in selecting
and evaluating those documents.

39. Therefore, whatever of the popular narrations have been inserted into the Sacred Scriptures
must in no way be considered on a par with myths or other such things, which are more the
product of an extravagant imagination than of the striving for truth and simplicity which in the
Sacred Books, also of the Old Testament, is so apparent that our ancient sacred writers must
be admitted to be clearly superior to the ancient profane writers. (emphasis added)

Note how the Holy Father allows for the recognition of correspondences between the pro-
fane and the sacred traditions regarding the first principles of things (prescinding from any
theory of which way the influence originally flowed). In the exposition to follow, we shall
have frequent recourse to such points of agreement.

5. That the literal and obvious sense may be departed from “only where reason makes it
untenable or necessity requires”.

Cf. Pope Leo XIII, Providentissimus Deus (1893):

6
 The opinion of the Fathers is also of very great weight when they treat of these matters [sc.
the interpretation of Sacred Scripture] in their capacity of doctors, unofficially; not only
because they excel in their knowledge of revealed doctrine and in their acquaintance with
many things which are useful in understanding the apostolic Books, but because they are men
of eminent sanctity and of ardent zeal for the truth, on whom God has bestowed a more ample
measure of His light. Wherefore the expositor should make it his duty to follow their foot-
steps with all reverence, and to use their labours with intelligent appreciation. But he must not
on that account consider that it is forbidden when just cause exists, to push inquiry and
exposition beyond what the Fathers have done; provided he carefully observes the rule so
wisely laid down by St. Augustine—not to depart from the literal and obvious sense, except
only where reason makes it untenable or necessity requires; a rule to which it is the more
necessary to adhere strictly in these times, when the thirst for novelty and unrestrained freedom
of thought make the danger of error most real and proximate.3
3
Pope Leo XIII, Encyclical letter, Providentissimus Deus, November 18, 1893, nos. 14-15.
Translation of the Vatican website http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/.
Last accessed September 11, 2004.

N.B. For an equivalent expression of this rule from a medieval Jewish Sage, cf. Louis Jacobs,
Jewish Biblical Exegesis (New York: Behrman House, 1973), pp. 13-14:

Chapter 4: Twelfth Century: Ibn Ezra.

How should the Bible be interpreted?

The third method is the way of darkness and obscurity. …This is the method of those who
invent mysterious interpretations for all the passages in Scripture. It is their belief that the
Torah and the precepts are riddles. I shall not spend much time refuting this thoroughly
confused method. The words of the Torah are never less than straightforward. In one thing
only are these people right. This is that every precept of the Torah, whether great or small,
must be measured in the balance of the heart into which God has implanted some of his wis-
dom. Therefore if there appears something in the Torah which seems to contradict reason
or to refute the evidence of the senses then here one should seek for the solution in a fig-
urative expression. For reason is the foundation of everything. The Torah was not given to
men who cannot reason and man’s reason is the angel which mediates between him and his
God. It follows that wherever we find something in the Torah that is not contrary to reason we
must understand it in accordance with its plain meaning and accept it as saying what it seems
to say, believing that this is its true meaning. We should not grope about as the blind in the
dark grope for the wall. Why should we understand as mysteries things which are perfectly
clear as they stand? Even though there are instances where a verse has two meanings, both of
which are clear, one referring to the body and the other to the mind, such as “circumcision of
the flesh” and “uncircumcised heart,” and even though the narrative of the tree of knowledge,
for instance, can only be understood in the figurative sense, yet in these instances the figurative
meaning is evident on the surface. It may be that the meaning [13-14] is not too evident but
will become clear when the wise man opens his eyes to see more deeply into the text. For even
certain organs of a man’s body have more than one function such as the nostrils, the tongue
and the two legs. (emphasis added)

For a positive formulation of the foregoing decree of the Biblical Commission, cf. A. J.
Maas, “Hexaemeron”, The Catholic Encyclopedia (New York, 1910):

III. MEANING OF THE HEXAEMERON

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 …The legitimate character of this method of proceeding will become clear in the light of the
aforesaid decree of 30 June, 1909, issued by the Biblical Commission. After safeguarding the
literal, historical sense of the first three chapters of Genesis in as far as they bear on the facts
touching the foundations of the Christian religion – e.g., the creation of all things by God at
the beginning of time, the special creation of man, the formation of the first woman from the
first man, the unity of the human race – the commission lays down several special principles
as to the interpretation of the first part of Genesis: – <...>

(2) When the expressions themselves manifestly appear to be used improperly, either meta-
phorically or anthropomorphically, and when either reason prohibits our holding the proper
sense, or necessity compels us to set it aside, it is lawful to depart from the proper sense of the
words and phrases in the above-mentioned chapters.

FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF INTERPRETATION LAID DOWN BY ST. THOMAS

AQUINAS:

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Catena Aurea, on Matthew. 8:23–27 (ed. Newman, I, 8-9) (comp.
ca. 1265–1274):1

Glossa: Secundo etiam habet evangelica Gloss.: Secondly, the Evangelic doctrine has
doctrina sublimitatem virtutis, unde apostolus sublimity of strength; whence the Apostle
dicit quod Evangelium virtus Dei est in says, “The Gospel is the power of God to the
salutem omni credenti. Et hoc ostendit salvation of all that believe.” [Rom 1:16] The
propheta in praemissis verbis, cum dicit exalta Prophet also shows this in the foregoing
in fortitudine vocem tuam, in quo etiam words, “Lift up thy voice with might;” which
modum evangelicae doctrinae designat in further marks out the manner of evangelic
exaltatione vocis, per quam doctrinae claritas teaching, by that raising the voice which gives
datur. clearness to the doctrine.

Augustinus ad Volusianum: Modus enim Aug., ad Volus. Ep. 3: For the mode in which
ipse quo sancta Scriptura contexitur, est Holy Scripture is put together, is one acces-
omnibus accessibilis, paucissimis penetrabilis; sible to all, but thoroughly entered into by few.
ea quae aperte continet quasi amicus familiaris The things it shows openly, it does as a fam-
sine fuco ad cor loquitur indoctorum atque iliar friend without guile speaking to the heart
doctorum; ea vero quae in mysteriis occultat, of the unlearned, as the learned. The things it
nec ipsa eloquio superbo erigit, quo non audeat veils in mysteries, it does not deck out in lofty
accedere mens tardiuscula et inerudita, quasi speech, to which a slow and unlearned soul
pauper ad divitem; sed invitat omnes humili would not dare to approach, as a poor man
sermone, quos non solum manifesta pascat, would not to a rich; but in lowly phrase it
sed etiam secreta exerceat veritate, hoc tam in invites all, whom it not only feeds with plain
promptis quam in reconditis habens. Sed ne truth, but exercises in hidden knowledge; for
aperta fastidirentur, eadem rursum aperta it has matter of both. But that its plain things
desiderantur, desiderata quodammodo reno- might not be despised, these very same things
vantur, renovata suaviter intimantur. His it again withholds; being withheld they be-
salubriter et prava corriguntur et parva nutri- come as new; and thus become new they are
untur et magna oblectantur ingenia. again pleasingly expressed. Thus all tempers
have here what is meet for them; the bad are
corrected, the weak are strengthened, the
strong are gratified.

1
https://isidore.co/aquinas/CAMatthew.htm accessed (12/05/25)

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Cf. Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei. On the Power of God by Thomas Aquinas,
translated by Fr. Laurence Shap-cote, O.P. (Westminster, MD, 1952), q. 4, art. 1, c.:

Q. IV: ARTICLE I

Did the Creation of Formless Matter Precede in Duration the Creation of Things?

[Sum. Th. I, Q. lxvi, A. i; QQ lxvii, lxix]

I answer that as Augustine says (Conf. xii) this question admits of a twofold discussion,
one regards the true answer to the question itself, the other regards the sense of the text
in which Moses inspired by God tells the story of the world’s beginning.

As to the first discussion two things are to be avoided: one is the making of false state-
ments especially such as are contrary to revealed truth, the other is the assertion that
what we think to be true is an article of faith, for as Augustine says (Confess. x), when a
man thinks his false opinions to be the teaching of godliness, and dares obstinately to
dogmatise about matters of which he is ignorant, he becomes a stumbling block to others.
The reason why he says that such an one is a stumbling block is because the faith is made
ridiculous to the unbeliever when a simple-minded believer asserts as an article of faith that
which is demonstrably false, as again Augustine says in his commentary (Gen. ad lit. i). As
regards the other discussion two things also are to be avoided. One is to give to the words
of Scripture an interpretation manifestly false: since falsehood cannot underlie the divine
Scriptures which we have received from the Holy Spirit, as neither can there be error in
the faith that is taught by the Scriptures. The other is not to force such an interpretation
on Scripture as to exclude any other interpretations that are actually or possibly true:
since it, is part of the dignity of Holy Writ that under the one literal sense many others
are contained. It is thus that the sacred text not only adapts itself to man’s various intelligence,
so that each one marvels to find his thoughts expressed in the words of Holy Writ; but also is
all the more easily defended against unbelievers in that when one finds his own interpretation
of Scripture to be false he can fall back upon some other. Hence it is not inconceivable that
Moses and the other authors of the Holy Books were given to know the various truths that men
would discover in the text, and that they expressed them under one literary style, so that each
truth is the sense intended by the author.

And then even if commentators adapt certain truths to the sacred text that were not understood
by the author, without doubt the Holy Spirit understood them, since he is the principal author
of Holy Scripture. Consequently every truth that can be adapted to the sacred text without
prejudice to the literal sense, is the sense of Holy Scripture.

Having laid down these principles we must observe that commentators have given to the
opening chapter of Genesis various explanations, none of which is contrary to revealed
truth: and as far as concerns the question in point they may be divided into two groups
in respect of their twofold interpretation of the formless state of matter indicated at the
beginning of Genesis by the words, The earth was void and empty. Some understood these
words to mean that matter was formless in the sense that it actually had no form but that all
forms were in it potentially. Now matter of this kind cannot exist in nature unless it receive
formation from some form: since whatever exists in nature exists actually, and actual existence
comes to a thing from its form which is its act, so that nature does not contain a thing without
a form. Moreover, since nothing can be included in a genus that is not contained specifically
in some division of the genus, matter cannot be a being unless it be determined to some specific
mode of being, and this cannot be without a form. Consequently if formless matter be
understood in this sense it could not possibly precede its formation in point of duration, but

9
 only by priority of nature, inasmuch as that from which something is made naturally precedes
that which is made from it, even as night was created first. This was the view taken by
Augustine.

Others took the view that the formless state of matter does not denote absence of all form in
matter, but the absence of natural finish and comeliness: in which sense it is quite possible
that matter was in a formless state before it was formed. This would seem in keeping with
the wise ordering of its Maker who in producing things out of nothing did not at once bring
them from nothingness to the ultimate perfection of their nature, but at first gave them a kind
of imperfect being, and afterwards perfected them: thus showing not only that they received
their being from God so as to refute those who assert that matter is uncreated; but also that
they derive their perfection from him, so as to refute those who ascribe the formation of this
lower world to other causes. Such was the view of Basil the Great, Gregory and others who
followed them. Since, however, neither opinion is in conflict with revealed truth, and since
both are compatible with the context, while admitting that either may be held, we must now
deal with the arguments advanced on both sides. (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In II Sent., dist. 12, q. 1, art. 2, c. (tr. John F. McCarthy):

For certain things are per se the substance of the Faith, as that God is three and one, and other
things of this kind, in which no one is authorized to think otherwise. Thus the Apostle says in
Galatians 1 that if an angel of God preached diversely from what he had taught, let him be
anathema. But certain things (pertain to the faith) only incidentally (per accidens), inasmuch,
that is, as they are handed down in Scripture, which faith supposes to have been promulgated
under the dictation of the Holy Spirit. And these things can without danger remain unknown
by those who are not held to be knowledgeable about the Scriptures, for example, many items
of history. In these things even the Fathers have thought differently and have explained the
Scriptures in different ways. So, therefore, with regard to the beginning of the world, there is
something which pertains to the substance of the Faith, namely, that the world was created to
begin with. And this all the Fathers agree in saying. But how and in what order it was made
does not pertain to the Faith except per accidens, inasmuch as it is presented in Scripture, the
truth of which the Fathers retained in their varying explanations as they arrived at different
conclusions.

For Augustine maintains that at the very beginning of creation certain things were separ-
ated out by species in their own proper nature, such as the elements, the celestial bodies,
and the spiritual substances, while other things were distinguished in seminal reasons
only, such as animals, plants, and men, and that all of these latter things were later pro-
duced in their own natures in the activity by which after those six days God governs
nature created beforehand. Concerning this activity in Jn 5:17 it is stated: “My Father works
even until now, and I work.” (For Augustine) in the distinguishing of things the focus is not
on an order of time, but of nature and of teaching. Of nature, just as sound precedes song by
nature but not in time, thus things that are prior in nature are recorded earlier, as the earth is
mentioned before the animals and water before the fish, and so with the other things. And of
teaching, [there is an] order, as is evident in the teaching of geometry, for although the parts
of a figure make up the figure without any order of time, nevertheless, geometry teaches that
the construction is made by extending line after line. And this was the example of Plato, as it
is said at the beginning of the De caelo et mundo. Thus also Moses, in instructing an
unlettered people regarding the creation of the world, divided into parts the things that were
made at the same time. Ambrose, on the other hand, and other Fathers claim that an
order of time was observed in the cutting out of things, and this position is both more
common and seemingly more in keeping with the surface of the literal sense (littera). But
the former opinion (that of Augustine) is more reasonable and defends Sacred Scripture more

10
 from the derision of non-believers, a factor which Augustine, in his Letter of Genesis (bk. I,
ch. 19) teaches us is to be kept well in mind, so that the Scriptures may be expounded in such
a way that they not be mocked by nonbelievers. This opinion pleases me more. Nevertheless,
replies in support of both positions will be given to all of the objections. (emphasis added)

ST. THOMAS’ DIVISION OF WHAT PERTAINS TO THE FAITH.

1. Certain things which are per se of the substance of the faith: e.g. “that God is three
and one, which faith supposes to have been promulgated under the dictation of the
Holy Spirit”

2. Certain things which pertain to the faith per accidens, inasmuch as “they are handed
down in scripture”: e.g. “many items of history”

THE DIVISION TAKEN WITH RESPECT TO GENESIS.

1. “...with regard to the beginning of the world, there is something which pertains to the
substance of the Faith, namely, that the world was created to begin with. And this all
the Fathers agree in saying.

2. But how and in what order it was made does not pertain to the Faith except per
accidens, inasmuch as it is presented in Scripture, the truth of which the Fathers
retained in their varying explanations as they arrived at different conclusions...”

Cf. Hugh Pope, O.P., S.S.D., S.T.M., The Catholic Student’s “Aids” to the Bible. Intro-
duction to the Bible. The Divine Library of Sacred Scriptures (New York, 1913):1

Nothing can be more instructive than the way in which St. Thomas faces these complicated
questions of exegesis. When he is treating of the Creation he distinguishes two things: the sub-
stance of what belongs to faith, viz. “that the world began to be created,” and the mode and
order of this creation. This latter, he says, only belongs accidentally to faith, i.e., inasmuch as
it is told in Holy Scripture, and of this the Fathers have given various interpretations, for exam-
ple, St. Augustine, who in four different places and at four different times examines the first
three chapters of Genesis and was never satisfied with any of his explanations. St. Thomas
points out that some of the Fathers maintain that the various phases of the creation indicate
different periods of time, but that St. Augustine thinks that “Moses, since he had to instruct an
uneducated people in the story of the world’s creation, divided up events which really took
place all together.” St. Thomas allows that the former opinion is the more common, but he
says that of St. Augustine “is more reasonable and less liable to expose Holy Scripture to the
contempt of unbelievers.” Here we have very broad principles of exegesis, yet they are estab-
lished on a solid basis and no one can contemn them as rash.

ON ACCOMMODATING DIVINE TRUTH TO HUMAN UNDERSTANDING – SOME

PRIMARY DIVISIONS:

Cf. St. Augustine, Confessions XII, ch. 23-24; 31-32 (Pilkington transl.):

Chapter 23. Two Kinds of Disagreements in the Books to Be Explained.

1
(http://www.veritasbible.com/resources/articles/Introduction_to_the_Bible [1/31/11])

11
These things, therefore, being heard and perceived according to my weakness of apprehension,
which I confess unto You, O Lord, who know it, I see that two sorts of differences may arise
when by signs anything is related, even by true reporters — one concerning the truth of
the things, the other concerning the meaning of him who reports them. For in one way
we inquire, concerning the forming of the creature, what is true; but in another,
what Moses, that excellent servant of Your faith, would have wished that the reader and
hearer should understand by these words. As for the first kind, let all those depart from
me who imagine themselves to know as true what is false. And as for the other also, let
all depart from me who imagine Moses to have spoken things that are false. But let me be
united in You, O Lord, with them, and in You delight myself with them that feed on Your truth,
in the breadth of charity; and let us approach together unto the words of Your book, and in
them make search for Your will, through the will of Your servant by whose pen You have
dispensed them.

Chapter 24. Out of the Many True Things, It is Not Asserted Confidently that Moses
Understood This or That.

But which of us, amid so many truths which occur to inquirers in these words, under -
stood as they are in different ways, shall so discover that one interpretation as to
confidently say that Moses thought this, and that in that narrative he wished this to be
understood, as confidently as he says that this is true, whether he thought this thing or
the other? For behold, O my God, I Your servant, who in this book have vowed unto You
a sacrifice of confession, and beseech You that of Your mercy I may pay my vows unto You,
behold, can I, as I confidently assert that Thou in Your immutable word hast created all things,
invisible and visible, with equal confidence assert that Moses meant nothing else than this
when he wrote, In the beginning God created. the heaven and the earth. No. Because it is not
as clear to me that this was in his mind when he wrote these things, as I see it to be certain in
Your truth. For his thoughts might be set upon the very beginning of the creation when he
said, In the beginning; and he might wish it to be understood that, in this place, the heaven and
the earth were no formed and perfected nature, whether spiritual or corporeal, but each of them
newly begun, and as yet formless. Because I see, that whichsoever of these had been said, it
might have been said truly; but which of them he may have thought in these words, I do not
so perceive. Although, whether it were one of these, or some other meaning which has not
been mentioned by me, that this great man saw in his mind when he used these words, I make
no doubt but that he saw it truly, and expressed it suitably.

Chapter 25. It Behoves Interpreters, When Disagreeing Concerning Obscure Places, to Regard
God the Author of Truth, and the Rule of Charity.

Let no one now trouble me by saying, Moses thought not as you say, but as I say. For
should he ask me, Whence do you know that Moses thought this which you deduce from his
words? I ought to take it contentedly, and reply perhaps as I have before, or somewhat more
fully should he be obstinate. But when he says, Moses meant not what you say, but what I
say, and yet denies not what each of us says, and that both are true, O my God, life of
the poor, in whose bosom there is no contradiction, pour down into my heart Your soothings,
that I may patiently bear with such as say this to me; not because they are divine, and because
they have seen in the heart of Your servant what they say, but because they are proud, and
have not known the opinion of Moses, but love their own — not because it is true, but
because it is their own. Otherwise they would equally love another true opinion, as I love
what they say when they speak what is true; not because it is theirs, but because it is true, and
therefore now not theirs because true. But if they therefore love that because it is true, it is
now both theirs and mine, since it is common to all the lovers of truth. But because they

12
 contend that Moses meant not what I say, but I what they themselves say, this I neither like
nor love; because, though it were so, yet that rashness is not of knowledge, but of audacity;
and not vision, but vanity brought it forth. And therefore, O Lord, are Your judgments to be
dreaded, since Your truth is neither mine, nor his, nor another’s, but of all of us, whom Thou
publicly callest to have it in common, warning us terribly not to hold it as specially for
ourselves, lest we be deprived of it. For whosoever claims to himself as his own that which
Thou appointed to all to enjoy, and desires that to be his own which belongs to all, is forced
away from what is common to all to that which is his own — that is, from truth to falsehood.
For he that speaks a lie, speaks of his own. John 8:44….

Chapter 31. Moses is Supposed to Have Perceived Whatever of Truth Can Be Discovered
in His Words.

Thus, when one shall say, He [Moses] meant as I do, and another, Nay, but as I do, I suppose
that I am speaking more religiously when I say, Why not rather as both, if both be true?
And if there be a third truth, or a fourth, and if any one seek any truth altogether different in
those words, why may not he be believed to have seen all these, through whom one God
has tempered the Holy Scriptures to the senses of many, about to see therein things true
but different? I certainly — and I fearlessly declare it from my heart — were I to write
anything to have the highest authority, should prefer so to write, that whatever of truth any
one might apprehend concerning these matters, my words should re-echo, rather than that I
should set down one true opinion so clearly on this as that I should exclude the rest, that which
was false in which could not offend me. Therefore am I unwilling, O my God, to be so head-
strong as not to believe that from You this man [Moses] has received so much. He, surely,
when he wrote those words, perceived and thought whatever of truth we have been able
to discover, yea, and whatever we have not been able, nor yet are able, though still it may
be found in them.

Chapter 32. First, the Sense of the Writer is to Be Discovered, Then that is to Be Brought
Out Which Divine Truth Intended.

Finally, O Lord, who art God, and not flesh and blood, if man does see anything less, can any-
thing lie hidden from Your good Spirit, who shall lead me into the land of uprightness, which
You Yourself, by those words, were about to reveal to future readers, although he through
whom they were spoken, amid the many interpretations that might have been found, fixed on
but one? Which, if it be so, let that which he thought on be more exalted than the rest. But to
us, O Lord, either point out the same, or any other true one which may be pleasing unto You;
so that whether You make known to us that which You did to that man of Yours, or some other
by occasion of the same words, yet You may feed us, not error deceive us. Behold, O Lord
my God, how many things we have written concerning a few words — how many, I beseech
You! What strength of ours, what ages would suffice for all Your books after this manner?
Permit me, therefore, in these more briefly to confess unto You, and to select some one true,
certain, and good sense, that You shall inspire, although many senses offer themselves, where
many, indeed, I may; this being the faith of my confession, that if I should say that which Your
minister felt, rightly and profitably, this I should strive for; the which if I shall not attain, yet
I may say that which Your Truth willed through Its words to say unto me, which said also unto
him what It willed. (emphasis added)

About this page

Source. Translated by J.G. Pilkington. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol.
1. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and
edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/110112.htm>.

13
Cf. The Confessions of Saint Augustine translated by Edward B. Pusey, D.D. (1838), Bk. 12,
ch. 23:

For they say, “Though these things be true, yet did not Moses intend those two, when, by
revelation of the Spirit, he said, In the beginning God created heaven and earth. He did not
under the name of heaven, signify that spiritual or intellectual creature which always beholds
the face of God; nor under the name of earth, that formless matter. “What then?” “That man
of God,” say they, “meant as we say, this declared he by those words.” “What?” “By the name
of heaven and earth would he first signify,” say they, “universally and compendiously, all this
visible world; so as afterwards by the enumeration of the several days, to arrange in detail,
and, as it were, piece by piece, all those things, which it pleased the Holy Ghost thus to
enounce. For such were that rude and carnal people to which he spake, that he thought
them fit to be entrusted with the knowledge of such works of God only as were visible.”
They agree, however, that under the words earth invisible and without form, and that darksome
deep (out of which it is subsequently shown, that all these visible things which we all know,
were made and arranged during those “days”) may, not incongruously, be understood of this
formless first matter. (emphasis added)

Cf. Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 1.11 (PL 34:216–18).:

On this point there is a twofold question: The first regards the actual truth of the events
narrated; the second regards the literal meaning of the words in which Moses, who was
divinely inspired, sets out for us the beginnings of the world. As regards the first, two things
have to be avoided: (a) We must make no false assertions, least of all assertions which run
contrary to the truths of faith; (b) [paraphrasing] we must not maintain that what we feel to be
true about it is therefore a truth of faith, for it only serves to bring the faith into derision
amongst unbelievers when some simple-minded member of the faithful maintains as part of
the faith something which can be shown on the most solid grounds to be false. On the second
point, too, there are two things to be avoided: (a) We must not say that the words in which the
[31-32] Bible teaches us of the creation of things are to be understood in some sense which is
patently false; for there can be no falsehood in the Divine Scriptures delivered to us by the
Holy Spirit, any more than there can be in the faith taught us by those Scriptures; (b) nor,
again, must we try to limit the meaning of the Bible to one single interpretation, so as wholly
to exclude other interpretations which are true in themselves, and which can, due regard had
to the actual letter of the texts, be discovered in Scripture.

1
Hugh Pope, O.P., The Catholic Student’s “Aids” to the Study of the Bible, new ed., vol. II, The Old Testament
(London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1930), 31-32.

14
6. That “in Scriptures divine things are presented to us in the manner which is in common
use among men”.

Cf. Pope Pius XII, Divino Afflante Spirito, nn. 37-38:

37. Nevertheless no one, who has a correct idea of Biblical inspiration, will be surprised to
find, even in the Sacred Writers, as in other ancient authors, certain fixed ways of expounding
and narrating, certain definite idioms, especially of a kind peculiar to the Semitic tongues, so-
called approximations, and certain hyperbolical modes of expression, indeed, at times, even
paradoxical, which help to impress the ideas more deeply on the mind. For of the modes of
expression which, among ancient peoples, and especially those of the East, human language
used to express its thought, none is excluded from the Sacred Books, provided the way of
speaking adopted in no wise contradicts the holiness and truth of God, as with his customary
wisdom, the Angelic Doctor already observed in these words: ‘In Scriptures divine things are
presented to us in the manner which is in common use among men.’[30] For as the
substantial word of God became like to men in all things, ‘except sin,’ [31] so the Words of
God, expressed in human language, are made like to human speech in every respect, except
error. In this consists that ‘condescension’ of the God of providence, which St. John
Chrysostom extolled with highest praise and repeatedly declared to be found in the Sacred
Books.[32]

38. Hence the Catholic commentator, in order to comply with the present needs of Biblical
studies, in explaining the Sacred Scriptures and in demonstrating and proving its immunity
from all error, should also make a prudent use of this means, determine, that is, to what extent
the manner of expression or the literary mode adopted by the Sacred Writer may lead to a
correct and genuine interpretation; and let him be convinced that this part of his office cannot
be neglected without serious detriment to Catholic exegesis. Not infrequently — to mention
only one instance — when some persons reproachfully charge the Sacred Writers with some
historical error or inaccuracy in the recording of facts, on closer examination it turns out to
be nothing else than those customary modes of expression and narration peculiar to the
ancients, which used to be employed in the mutual dealings of social life and which in fact
were sanctioned by common usage.

30. Comment. ad Hebr. cap. 1, lectio 4.

31. Hebr. 4:15.
32. Cf. v. gr. In Gen. 1, 4 (PG 53, col. 34-35); In Gen. II, 21 (ib. col. 121); In Gen. III, 8
(emphasis added)

To the foregoing compare the teaching of the Second Vatican Council:

In Dei verbum, the Dogmatic Constitution on Revelation, the Council Fathers taught that,

Those who search out the intention of the sacred writers must, among other things, have regard
for ‘literary forms.’ For truth is proposed and expressed in a variety of ways, depending on
whether a text is history of one kind or another or whether its form is that of prophecy, poetry,
or some other type of speech. The interpreter must investigate what meaning the sacred writer
intended to express and actually expressed in particular circumstances as he used contempor-
ary literary forms in accordance with the situation of his own time and culture.8
8
Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, Dei verbum, November 18, 1965: AAS 58
(1966) 817-830, no. 12. All English citations from the texts of Vatican II are taken from Walter
M. Abbott, S.J., ed. The Documents of Vatican II (New York, 1966).

15
7. Supplement: On the literal sense and the right way to translate:

THE PONTIFICAL BIBLICAL COMMISSION

THE INTERPRETATION OF THE BIBLE IN THE CHURCH (April 15, 1993)

B. The Meaning of Inspired Scripture

1. The Literal Sense

It is not only legitimate, it is also absolutely necessary to seek to define the precise meaning
of texts as produced by their authors—what is called the “literal” meaning. St. Thomas
Aquinas had already affirmed the fundamental importance of this sense (S. Th. I, q. 1,a. 10,
ad 1). The literal sense is not to be confused with the “literalist” sense to which fundamen-
talists are attached. It is not sufficient to translate a text word for word in order to obtain its
literal sense. One must understand the text according to the literary conventions of the time.
When a text is metaphorical, its literal sense is not that which flows immediately from a word-
toword translation (e.g. “Let your loins be girt”: Lk. 12:35), but that which corresponds to the
metaphorical use of these terms (“Be ready for action”). When it is a question of a story, the
literal sense does not necessarily imply belief that the facts recounted actually took place, for
a story need not belong to the genre of history but be instead a work of imaginative fiction.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, De Rationibus Fidei Contra Saracenos (Reasons for the Faith
Against Muslim Objections). Translated by Joseph Kennedy, O.P., Part One, Prologue:1

It is, therefore, the task of the good translator, when translating material dealing with the
Catholic faith, to preserve the meaning, but to adapt the mode of expression so that it is in
harmony with the idiom of the language into which he is translating. For obviously, when
anything spoken in a literary fashion in Latin is explained in common parlance, the explan-
ation will be inept if it is simply word for word. All the more so, when anything expressed in
one language is translated merely word for word into another, it will be no surprise if
perplexity concerning the meaning of the original sometimes occurs.

Now just as one must respect the idiom of the language into which one is translating some-
thing, so the sacred author respects the capacity of the hearer to understand what exists
principally as the science of God and the blessed, and therefore as transcending the capacity
of ordinary minds.

N.B. What, then, is ‘the literal or most obvious sense’? It must always be remembered that
the literal sense is what the author intended to be understood by his words, as in the case of
metaphor, as St. Thomas Aquinas explains (for which, see further below).

8. Supplement: Rules for the Catholic Interpreter:

On the Study of Holy Scripture: Providentissimus Deus

Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII - November 18, 1893

1
http://www.diafrica.org/nigeriaop/kenny/Rationes.htm [4/21/04]

16
To Our Venerable Brethren, all Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, and Bishops of the
Catholic world in Grace and Communion with the Apostolic See.

18

<…>

b. NATURAL SCIENCES. ...There can never, indeed, be any real discrepancy between the
theologian and the physicist, as long as each confines himself within his own lines, and both
are careful, as St. Augustine warns us, ‘not to make rash assertions, or to assert what is not
known as known.’40 If dissension should arise between them, here is the rule also laid down
by St. Augustine for the theologian:

Whatever they can really demonstrate to be true of physical nature we must show to be capable
of reconciliation with our Scriptures; and whatever they assert in their treatises, which is
contrary to these Scriptures of ours, that is to Catholic faith, we must either prove it as well as
we can to be entirely false, or at all events we must, without the smallest hesitation, believe it
to be so.41

To understand how just is the rule here formulated we must remember, first, that the
sacred writers, or to speak more accurately, the Holy Spirit ‘who spoke by them, did not
intend to teach men these things (that is to say, the essential nature of the things of the
visible universe), things in no way profitable unto salvation.’42 Hence they did not seek
to penetrate the secrets of nature, but rather described and dealt with things in more or
less figurative language, or in terms which were commonly used at the time, and which
in many instances were daily used at this day, even by the most eminent men of science.
Ordinary speech primarily and properly describes what comes under the senses; and
somewhat in the same way the sacred writers—as the Angelic Doctor also reminds us—
‘went by what sensibly appeared,’43 or put down what God, speaking to men, signified, in
the way men could understand and were accustomed to.

The unshrinking defence of the Holy Scripture, however, does not require that we should
equally uphold all the opinions which each of the Fathers or the more recent interpreters have
put forth in explaining it; for it may be that, in commenting on passages where physical matters
occur, they have sometimes expressed the ideas of their own times, and thus made statements
which in these days have been abandoned as incorrect. Hence, in their interpretations, we
must carefully note what they lay down as belonging to faith, or as intimately connected
with faith—what they are unanimous in. For ‘in those things which do not come under the
obligation of faith, the saints were at liberty to hold divergent opinions, just as we ourselves
are,’44 according to the saying of St. Thomas. And in another place he says most admirably:

When philosophers are agreed upon a point, and it is not contrary to our faith, it is safer, in
my opinion, neither to lay down such a point as a dogma of faith, even though it is perhaps
so presented by the philosophers, nor to reject it as against faith, lest we thus give to the
wise of this world an occasion of despising our faith.45

The Catholic interpreter, although he should show that those facts of natural science which
investigators affirm to be now quite certain are not contrary to the Scripture rightly explained,
must, nevertheless, always bear in mind, that much which has been held and proved as certain
has afterwards been called in question and rejected. And if writers on physics travel outside
the boundaries of their own branch, and carry their erroneous teaching into the domain of
philosophy, let them be handed over to philosophers for refutation.

17
 FOOTNOTES
40
IN GEN. OP. IMPERF. ix, 30.
41
DE GEN. AD LITT., i, 21, 41.
42
St. Augustine, Ibid. 9, 20.
43
SUMMA THEOL. p. i, q. lxxx, a. 1, ad 3.
44
IN SENT. ii, Dist. q. i, a. 3.
45
OPUSC. X. (emphasis added)

Cf. also Pius XII, Divino afflante Spiritu, n. 3, where the foregoing passage is cited.

For the proper approach to understanding the six days of creation, cf. Robert J. Schneider,
“What the Bible Teaches About Creation”, excerpted above:

Because of this pattern [evident in the six days of creation], many evangelical biblical scholars
have been drawn to some version of a “framework hypothesis”: the six days are to be seen
not as a chronological account of the steps of creation but as a framework in which the
various categories of “creature”—the word refers to both inanimate and living things—
are laid out in a logical order that in itself declares that creation in the beginning involves
the bringing of order out of chaos. (emphasis added)

To take the account in literalist fashion is exactly the same as supposing that when Scrip-
ture says that Jesus is ‘seated at the right hand of the Lord’, that that means that God has a
‘literal’ right hand, and hence a body. Hence, we may understand with respect to Six Day
Creationists and the like that it is a question not of the literal sense of Genesis 1, but of what
was long thought to be the literal sense.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, The Catechism of St. Thomas Aquinas. The Apostle’s Creed. The
Catechetical Instructions of St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated with a Commentary by Rev.
Joseph B. Collins, S.S., D.D., Ph.D. Introduction by Rev. Rudolph G. Bandas, Ph.D., S.T.D.
et M. (Baltimore, 1939), pp. 39; 40-41, The Sixth Article:

The Catechism of St. Thomas Aquinas

THE SIXTH ARTICLE: “He ascended into heaven, and sitteth at the right hand
of God, the Father Almighty.”

Besides the resurrection of Christ, we must also believe in His ascension; for He ascended into
heaven on the fortieth day. Hence, the Creed says: “He ascended into heaven.” Concerning
this we ought to observe three things, viz., that it was sublime, reasonable, and beneficial.

THE SUBLIMITY OF THE ASCENSION

It was certainly sublime that Christ ascended into heaven. This is expounded in three ways.

Firstly, He ascended above the physical heaven: “He . . . ascended above all the heavens.”[1]

Secondly, He ascended above all the spiritual heavens, i.e., spiritual natures: “Raising [Jesus]
up from the dead and setting Him on His right hand in the heavenly places. Above all
principality and power and virtue and dominion and every name that is named, not only in this
world but also in that which is to come. And He hath subjected all things under His feet.”[2]

18
 Thirdly, He ascended up to the very throne of the Father: “Lo, one like the Son of man
came with the clouds of heaven. And He came even to the Ancient of days.”[3] “And the
Lord Jesus, after He had spoken to them, was taken up into heaven and sitteth on the
right hand of God.”[4] Now, it is not to be taken in the literal sense, but figuratively, that
Christ is at the right hand of God. Inasmuch as Christ is God, He is said to sit at the right hand
of the Father, that is, in equality with the Father; and as Christ is man, He sits at the right hand
of the Father, that is, in a more preferable place.[5] The devil once feigned to do this: “I will
ascend above the height of the clouds. I will be like the Most High.”[6] But Christ alone
succeeded in this, and so it is said: “He ascended into heaven, and sitteth at the right hand of
the Father.” “The Lord said to my Lord: Sit Thou at My right hand.”[7]

ENDNOTES

1. Eph., iv. 10.

2. “Ibid.,” i. 20-22
3. Dan., vii. 13.
4. Mark, xvi. 19.
5. “In these words we observe a figure of speech, that is, the changing of a word from its
literal to a figurative meaning, something which is not infrequent in the Scriptures: for
when accommodating its language to human ideas, it attributes human affections and
human members to God, who is pure spirit and can admit of nothing corporeal. For, just
as among men, he who sits at the right hand is considered to occupy the most honored
place: so, transferring the idea to heavenly things to express the glory which Christ as
Man enjoys above all others, we say that He sits at the right hand of His Eternal Father.
Now, this does not mean actual position and figure of body, but declares the fixed and
permanent possession of royal and supreme power and glory which Christ received from
the Father” (“Roman Catechism,” Sixth Article, 3).
6. Isa., xiv. 13-14. [40-41]
7. Ps. cix. 1. (emphasis added)

9. According to John Paul II and certain contemporary commentators:

Cf. Catholic Answers. Bible on science:1

As for what I believe the Bible teaches about science, I agree with Pope John Paul II, Fr.
Stanley Jaki, and Robert Schadewald (a skeptic):
“Cosmogony and cosmology have always aroused great interest among peoples and religions.
The Bible itself speaks to us of the origin of the universe and its make-up, not in order to
provide us with a scientific treatise, but in order to state the correct relationships of man with
God and with the universe. Sacred Scripture wishes simply to declare that the world was
created by God, and in order to teach this truth it expresses itself in the terms of the cosmology
in use at the time of the writer. The Sacred Book likewise wishes to tell men that the world
was not created as the seat of the gods, as was taught by other cosmogonies and cosmologies,
but was rather created for the service of man and the glory of God. Any other teaching about
the origin and make-up of the universe is alien to the intentions of the Bible, which does not
wish to teach how heaven was made but how one goes to heaven.” (Pope John Paul II,
10/3/1981 to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, “Cosmology and Fundamental Physics”)

The important parts to notice here, according to John Paul II:

(1) the Bible is not a scientific treatise;

1
http://forums.catholic.com/showthread.php?t=260533&page=7 [10/1/09]

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(2) the main point of Genesis 1 is that God is our Creator;
(3) the Scripture uses the cosmology in use at the time of the writer (not a modern cosmology);
(4) the Bible wishes to teach us how one goes to heaven, not how the heavens were made;
(5) any other teaching about the origin and nature of the universe is alien to the intentions of
the original biblical authors.

The ancient Hebrews, like their older and more powerful neighbors, the Babylonians and the
Egyptians, were flat-earthers. The Hebrew cosmology is never actually spelled out in the Bible
but, even without knowledge of the Babylonian system upon which it is patterned, it can be
read between the lines of the Old Testament.

The Genesis creation story itself suggests the relative size and importance of the earth and the
celestial bodies by specifying their order of creation. The earth was created on the first day,
and it was “without form and void” (Gen 1:2). On the second day a vault – the “firmament”
of the King James Bible – was created to divide the waters, some being above and some below
the vault (Gen 1:6-8). Not until the fourth day were the sun, moon, and stars created, and they
were placed “in,” not “above,” the vault (Gen 1:14-17). The sizes of these bodies are not
specified, but they had to be small, as Joshua later commanded the sun to stand still “in
Gibeon” and the moon “in the Vale of Aijalon” (Josh 10:12).

The Bible repeatedly speaks of the “ends” of the earth. Sometimes the word in Hebrew is
ephes, which means “end, extreme limits, nothingness.” Other times it is qatsah or qetsev,
which means, again, “end, extremity.” Deuteronomy 13:7, for instance, uses the expression
“from one end of the earth to the other end.” The same expression, or a reference to the “end
of the earth,” occurs in Deuteronomy 28:49, 64; 33:17; 1 Samuel 2:10; Psalm 19:4; 22:27;
46:9; 48:10; 59:13; 65:5; 67:7; 98:3; 135:7; Proverbs 17:24; 30:4; Job 28:24; 37:3; Isaiah 5:26;
24:16; 40:28; 41:5; 42:10; 45:22; 48:20; 49:6; 52:10; 62:11; Jeremiah 10:13; 16:19; 25:33;
Micah 5:4. Moreover, not only does the Bible indicate that the earth is flat and has ends, but
it also teaches that the earth is square and has corners. Isaiah 11:12 says that God will “gather
the dispersed of Judah from the four corners of the earth.” Ezekiel 7:2 says that “the end is
coming on the four corners of the earth.” See also Revelation 7:1; 20:8, etc.
<Cf. Robert Schadewald:>

Other passages complete the picture. God “sits enthroned on the vaulted roof of earth, whose
inhabitants are like grasshoppers” (Isa 40:21-22; cf. 45:12; 48:13). He also “walks to and fro
on the vault of heaven” (Job 22:12-14), which vault is “hard as a mirror of cast metal” (Job
37:18; cf. 9:8). The roof of the sky has “windows” that God can open to let the waters above
fall to the surface as rain. The Bible clearly speaks of the “windows” of heaven (Gen 7:10f;
8:2; 2 Kings 7:2, 19; Isa 24:18f; Jer 51:15f; Mal 3:10); the “doors” in heaven that are “shut
up” (1 Kings 8:35; 2 Chron 6:26; 7:13; Psalm 78:23; Rev 4:1; 11:6; 19:11); heaven has “gates”
(Gen 28:17; Lev 26:19) and stories of stairs (Amos 9:6). A study of these passages will indicate
that rain and food come through heaven’s windows, etc. (Of course this is probably symbolic
or “phenomological” language as most modern biblical scholars and exegetes would conclude,
and such language is not meant to be taken literally).

The topography of the earth isn’t specified, but Daniel “saw a tree of great height at the center
of the earth....reaching with its top to the sky and visible to the earth’s farthest bounds” or “to
the end of the whole earth” (Dan 4:10-11). Such visibility would not be possible on a spherical
earth, but might be expected if the earth were flat.

Here is Fr. Stanley Jaki, O.S.B., a distinguished Hungarian physicist and Benedictine theolo-
gian, on the flat and fixed earth of the Bible:

20
 “If asked about his physical surroundings or about the physical world at large, the typical
Israelite would have given a reply very irritating to the modern mind. It is irritating to say the
least to hear that the earth is a flat disk, the sky an inverted hard bowl, and that the two form
a vast tent-like structure. Of course, other inhabitants of the ancient Near-East would have
given similar answers....To be sure, much the same would have been done by a typical ancient
Egyptian and Babylonian....The hardness of the sky, but especially the immobility of the earth,
had to appear all the more a divinely ordained physical fact as, according to the Bible, a mere
man, Joshua, could be authorized by God to stop the sun and the moon in their tracks and,
apparently, for a whole day....

Obviously, to modern eyes dazzled by space rockets cruising along ‘world lines’ set by
Einstein’s four-dimensional cosmology nothing could seem more jarring than the Bible’s
physical world, which is little more than a glorified tent. To that tent the Bible assigns the sky
as its cover and the earth as its floor, though hardly in a consistent way. In Genesis 1 the sky
is a firmament, that is, a hard metal bowl, whereas in Psalm 104 and Isaiah 45:24 it is more
like a canvas that can be stretched out.... Herein lies one of the non-trivially unscientific
aspects of the world as described in the Bible.... Well before the advent of modern science,
and indeed of heliocentrism, the contrast between that biblical world-tent and the world of
Aristotelian-Ptolemaic geocentrism had to appear enormous.” (Stanley Jaki, Bible and
Science, pages 19-25)....

Phil P[orvaznik]

Genesis: Ch. 1-11 – A Catholic Position1

I propose to lay down the central teachings of the Catholic Church on the first eleven
chapters of Genesis. I do not intend to provide an interpretation of those chapters, but I intend
to lay down the constraints, already taught as articles of faith, within which an authentic
Catholic interpretation might be developed. These first eleven chapters of the Bible prove to
be especially vexatious because they express integral and essential truths of the Catholic faith
on topics, the origin of man and the world, which apparently overlap with areas of research in
contemporary natural science. The possibility here for a dreaded conflict between faith and
reason, religion and science, seems to abound, but in all confidence that the truth is one, we
shall attempt to remove that possibility of conflict without abandoning a single integral truth
of the Catholic faith.
The Fathers of the Second Vatican Council lay down, in the Dogmatic Constitution on
Divine Revelation (Dei Verbum), the following guide to interpreting Scripture aright. In the
third chapter we read:

2. However, since God speaks in sacred Scripture through men in human fashion, the interpreter
of sacred Scripture, in order to see clearly what God wanted to communicate to us, should
carefully investigate what meaning the sacred writers really intended, and what God wanted to
manifest by means of their words. To search out the intention of the sacred writers, attention
should be given, among other things, to “literary forms.” For truth is set forth and expressed
differently in texts which are variously historical, prophetic, poetic, or of other forms of
discourse. The interpreter must investigate what meaning the sacred writer intended to express
and actually expressed in particular circumstances by using contemporary literary forms in
accordance with the situation of his own time and culture. For the correct understanding of what
the sacred author wanted to assert, due attention must be paid to the customary and characteristic
styles of feeling, speaking and narrating which prevailed at the time of the sacred writer, and to
the patterns men normally employed at the period in their everyday dealings with one another.

1
http://startthinking.homestead.com/files/Genesis_Paper.doc [6/22/04] No author given and the text is no
longer on line in 2025.

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 But, since holy Scripture must be read and interpreted in the same spirit in which [in whom] it
was written, no less serious attention must be given to the content and unity of the whole
Scripture if the meaning of the sacred texts is to be correctly worked out. The living tradition of
the whole Church must be taken into account along with the harmony which exists between
elements of the faith. It is the task of exegetes to work according to these rules toward a better
understanding and explanation of the meaning of sacred Scripture, so that through preparatory
study the judgement of the Church may mature. For all of what has been said about the way of
interpreting Scripture is subject finally to the judgement of the Church, which carries out the
divine commission and ministry of guarding and interpreting the Word of God.

Here we see a balanced approach to the interpretation of Scripture. On the one hand, the con-
ditions surrounding human authorship are acknowledged. On the other hand, it is also stressed
that one of those conditions is divine inspiration itself, and interpretation must be done in
cooperation with the same Spirit. Consequently, we must take into account human modes of
“feeling, speaking, and narrating which prevailed at the time of the sacred writer”. Further, we
are to acknowledge that humans employ various types of literary forms in their writings. Not
one of these facts inherently excludes the possibility of divine inspiration or Scriptural
inerrancy, for God can employ in his communication with man any and all literary forms, and
any and all modes of speaking, feeling, and communicating that humans regularly employ.
God is a writer of many talents, as many as the types of writers he creates. That God would
speak to men using the diverse and delicate instrument of human language manifests his
“divine condescension” toward man, and is a foreshadowing of the incarnation of Christ and
man’s concrete encounter of Eternity in history. Consequently, in order to hold to the
inspiration and inerrancy of Scripture, it is not necessary to cling to the view that every
sentence is true exactly as it stands in its proper literal signification. There is room for improper
literal senses in the sacred text. To hold to the view that every sentence of Scripture must be
true in its [rather, “as having a”] proper literal sense is bound to create difficulties where in
fact there are none. It is wholly unnecessary to maintain such a position.

On the Catholic view, to say that the Scripture is inspired is to say that it is the very speech
of God. Pope Leo XII says:

Hence, the fact that it was men whom the Holy Spirit took up as his instruments for writing does
not mean that it was these inspired instruments - but not the primary author - who might have
made an error. For, by supernatural power, He so moved and impelled them to write - He so
assisted them when writing - that the things which He ordered, and these only, they first rightly
understood, then willed faithfully to write down, and finally expressed in apt words and with
infallible truth. Otherwise, it could not be said that He was the Author of the entire Scripture.
Such has always been the persuasion of the Fathers (Prov. Deus, EB 125).

To say that Scripture is inerrant is to say that whatever it is that God intended to propose to
men through the text has indeed been proposed, that what God thus intended to propose is
true, and that the truths proposed enjoy the status of being known to be true by God, i.e. are
infallibly true.
Notice how much of a task this leaves the reader. Our task is to discover just what is
proposed by God through the text. Only that which God intended to affirm is inspired
and inerrant. The primary task of exegesis is to answer the question “what is being said here
or what did God intend to affirm?”. This task requires us to read the text in light of the spirit
in which it is written, which is nothing less than the Holy Spirit, whose thoughts pertaining
the interpretation of Scripture are reflected in Sacred Tradition and who has for its principal
voice today the Magisterium.
The Sacred Tradition of the Church permits the exegete to read Genesis ch. 1-11 in a manner
in which the many details of the stories are not pressed into the service of natural history, and
recognizes the need to acknowledge a unique literary form here. The Magisterium of the

22
twentieth century not only permits it, but suggests it to the exegete. As to the Sacred Tradition,
I quote Augustine:

It not infrequently happens that something about the earth, about the sky, about other elements
of this world, about the motion and rotation or even the magnitude and distances of the stars,
about definite eclipses of the sun and moon, about the passage of years and seasons, about the
nature of animals, of fruits, of stones, and of other such things, may be known with the greatest
certainty by reasoning or by experience, even by one who is not a Christian. It is too disgraceful
and ruinous, though, and greatly to be avoided, that he [the non-Christian] should hear a Chris-
tian speaking so idiotically on these matters, and as if in accord with Christian writings, that he
might say that he could scarcely keep from laughing when he saw how totally in error they are.
In view of this and in keeping it in mind constantly while dealing with the book of Genesis, I
have, insofar as I was able, explained in detail and set forth for consideration the meanings of
obscure passages, taking care not to affirm rashly some one meaning to the prejudice of another
and perhaps better explanation (The Literal Interpretation of Genesis 1:19-20 [A.D. 408]).

With the Scriptures it is a matter of treating about the faith. For that reason, as I have noted
repeatedly, if anyone, not understanding the mode of divine eloquence, should find something
about these matters [about the physical universe] in our books, or hear of the same from those
books, of such a kind that it seems to be at variance with the perceptions of his own rational
faculties, let him believe that these other things are in no way necessary to the admonitions or
accounts or predictions of the Scriptures. In short, it must be said that our authors knew the
truth about the nature of the skies, but it was not the intention of the Spirit of God, who
spoke through them, to teach men any-thing that would not be of use to them for their
salvation (ibid., 2:9).

Augustine is obviously familiar with the apparent tensions created by Ch. 1-11. He sees that
there is an overlap in subject matter between the studies of natural philosophers and the
accounts provided in Genesis ch. 1-11. He is careful to affirm that his interpretation of these
chapters is provisional. Augustine sets a precedent that was to be followed through the course
of the Middle Ages. All of the exegetes of Genesis ch. 1-11 added careful qualifications and
provisos to their interpretations, none claiming to be final, each seeking to improve upon his
predecessor and each seeking to make the improvements in light of new truths that had become
available in relevant auxiliary sciences, e.g. natural philosophy, metaphysics. Now, the Magis-
terium of the twentieth century not only expects the exegete to continue on with such a process,
but even suggests a direction. Pope Pius XII writes in his encyclical letter Humani Generis
that the first 11 chapters of Genesis:

in simple and metaphorical language adapted to the mentality of a people but little cultured, both
state the principal truths which are fundamental for our salvation, and also give a popular
description of the origin of the human race and the chosen people. If, however, the ancient sacred
writers have taken anything from popular narrations (and this may be conceded), it must never
be forgotten that they did so with the help of divine inspiration, through which they were
rendered immune from any error in selecting and evaluating those documents.

Obviously, there is an acknowledgement here that in the case of Genesis ch. 1-11 we are
faced with a special literary form. His use of the term “popular narrations” suggests that
we are dealing with a tradition among the Hebraic people or with a primitive history. I
prefer the term “primitive history”. These chapters record history as the nature of his-
torical recording was understood by early Hebraic authors. Actually, it contains pre-
history, pre-history as it was understood by early Hebraic authors. Furthermore, the
Holy Father’s use of the expression “simple and metaphorical language adapted to the
mentality of a people but little cultured” tells us that we should not demand from this
primitive pre-history the results that can only be achieved through the employment of
modern scientific methods and should not fault our writer for failing to provide us with
a text worthy of publication in contemporary journals of archaeology and paleontology.

23
In short, we must not bring foreign assumptions to the text, and the most foreign assump-
tion we could bring would be that in these chapters God was writing a laboratory report.

What was God doing? He was stating the “principal truths fundamental for our salvation”.
In short, although there is simple and metaphorical language employed in these chapters, these
chapters still contain truths. Consequently, it is absolutely contrary to the Catholic faith to hold
that these chapters propose nothing but myth, where the term myth is taken to be synonymous
with “false”, “imaginary tale”, or any other expression which implies that these Hebraic nar-
rations have no foundation in reality. These chapters contain a popular narration, a primitive
pre-history, stories about the origin of man and the world, but the stories are adequate to those
historical facts fundamental to our salvation. For this reason, the statement of Pius XII cited
above is, in the context of the encyclical, surrounded by a myriad of qualifications and provisos
(and here too he is continuous with Tradition on the interpretation of Genesis ch. 1-11). Some
qualifications are as follows:

39. Therefore, whatever of the popular narrations have been inserted into the Sacred Scriptures
must in no way be considered on a par with myths or other such things, which are more the
product of an extravagant imagination than of that striving for truth and simplicity which in the
Sacred Books, also of the Old Testament, is so apparent that our ancient sacred writers must be
admitted to be clearly superior to the ancient profane writers.

So it is not permitted to the Catholic exegete to dismiss Genesis ch. 1-11 as a folk story comp-
letely inadequate to reality. In even more plain language, the Holy Father writes:

the first eleven chapters of Genesis, although properly speaking not conforming to the histori-
cal method used by the best Greek and Latin writers or by competent authors of our time, do
nevertheless pertain to history in a true sense, which however must be further studied and
determined by exegetes.

So Pius XII suggests to exegetes a daring synthesis with respect to a hermeneutic of Gene-
sis ch. 1-11: the first eleven chapters of the book of Genesis employ simple and metaphor-
ical language adapted to the mentality of an uncultured people to express those truths of
history fundamental to our salvation. In short, there is a solid core of history, as it were,
buried under the language and popular mentality of the ancient Hebrew.
Perhaps an analogy will help here, and this is only a weak analogy. The popular story of
Santa Claus, as it is understood in the English-speaking North Americas today, is that he is a
jolly, old, fat man who lives at the North Pole with Mrs. Clause and his elves. The family runs
a toy cartel. On Christmas Eve his reindeer fly him around the world, and .... Now, the figure
of Santa Clause expresses certain characteristics: he is kind and generous, etc. The story is
based on a core of solid historical fact, for Saint Nicholas was a man who really lived and
expressed just those virtues, although less fabulously and extravagantly, as those attributed to
Santa Clause. Here with have a popular story with a foundation in reality, a remote foundation,
but some foundation nonetheless.
What is that core of historical fact in Genesis 1-11? The Pontifical Biblical Commission in
1909 gives the following answer, which has never been withdrawn in any way since 1909.
James Stenson says “the official document states that the literal historical meaning of the first
three chapters of Genesis could not be doubted in regard to”:

1.) the creation of all things by God at the beginning of time

2.) the special creation of man
3.) the formation of the first woman from the first man
4.) the unity of the human race
5.) the original happiness of our first parents in the state of justice, integrity, and immortality
6.) the command given by God to man to test his obedience

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7.) the transgression of the divine command at the instigation of the devil under the form of a
serpent
8.) the degradation of our first parents from that primeval state of innocence
9.) the promise of a future redeemer.

With respect to any other dimension of Genesis 1-3, the literal sense must be examined more
fully by exegetes. So 1-9 form the historical core of truths fundamental to our faith expressed
in Genesis ch. 1-3, the truths around which the ancient Hebraic authors either elaborated a
story or collected a popular tradition or recorded a primitive pre-history. The historical texts
presented in Genesis ch. 1-3, then, is in fact a historically adequate document, historically ade-
quate to at least points 1-9. It may be a bizarre looking history to the contemporary historian,
it may even look bizarre to the ancient Greek or Roman historian, it may be considered a poor
exercise in history as it is practiced today, but it is history, history as ancient Hebraic peoples
wrote history.
It is also important to note just how general 1-9 are. They make no reference whatsoever to
any detail from Genesis ch. 1-11, with the exception of a possible reference to the rib of Adam
in point 3 and a serpent in point 7. Other than that, the Catholic exegete has a great deal of
latitude to follow the evidence of science where it leads, in the confidence that all truth is one.
Furthermore, 1-9 are of such a character that they transcend current scientific method. The
only statement that I can conceive ever being falsified is 3, and 4 and 8 would go by implica-
tion. Certainly there is no a priori difficulty with 3. After all, the evolutionary naturalists expect
us to swallow the claim that all living things have a common ancestor. If that is easily
swallowed, then it is much easier to swallow the claim that all humans have a common
ancestor. In short, there is no reason to fear, a priori, these fundamental truths of the faith
coming into conflict with the discoveries of modern science. The only reason to fear anything
might be from the following sort of a posteriori consideration.

Fear: If there is uncovered apodeictic proof that humans do not have a common ancestor,
then the faith will be undermined.

Reply to the fear: What we would need, to falsify 3, is a conclusive proof, i.e. something
with significantly more evidential support than the ever-changing hypotheses of current
anthropological research. Just how much evidence would count as enough is not something I
will try to answer in the abstract, in advance of considering specific evidential details. It
suffices to say that anthropologists are hardly close to delivering.

Besides, the fear is a conditional similar to this: if Jesus did not rise from the dead, then your
faith is in vain. Such hypothetical propositions show nothing except that the Christian religion
is not an a priori truth. We can state definite, empirically verifiable conditions on which it
could be demonstrated to be a lie. I, for one, am not holding my breath for the evidence.

The constraints on an authentic interpretation of Genesis ch. 1-11 are summarized in the
Catechism as follows:

375. “The Church, interpreting the symbolism of biblical language in an authentic way, in the
light of the New Testament and Tradition, teaches that our first parents, Adam and Eve, were
constituted in an original ‘state of holiness and justice’. [Cf. Council of Trent (1546): DS 1511.]
This grace of original holiness was ‘to share in. . .divine life’. [Cf. LG 2.]”

404. “How did the sin of Adam become the sin of all his descendants? The whole human race is
in Adam ‘as one body of one man’. [St. Thomas Aquinas, De malo 4, I.] By this ‘unity of the
human race’ all men are implicated in Adam’s sin, as all are implicated in Christ’s justice. Still,
the transmission of original sin is a mystery that we cannot fully understand. But we do know
by Revelation that Adam had received original holiness and justice not for himself alone, but for

25
 all human nature. By yielding to the tempter, Adam and Eve committed a personal sin, but this
sin affected the human nature that they would then transmit in a fallen state. [Cf. Council of
Trent: DS 1511-1512.] It is a sin which will be transmitted by propagation to all mankind, that
is, by the transmission of a human nature deprived of original holiness and justice. And that is
why original sin is called ‘sin’ only in an analogical sense: it is a sin ‘contracted’ and not
‘committed’ - a state and not an act.”

416. “By his sin Adam, as the first man, lost the original holiness and justice he had received
from God, not only for himself but for all human beings. “

417. “Adam and Eve transmitted to their descendants human nature wounded by their own first
sin and hence deprived of original holiness and justice; this deprivation is called ‘original sin’.”

In these four paragraphs we see plenty of room for the position that I have outlined above.
We also see plenty of room for a stricter interpretation of Genesis ch. 1-11. The Church has
left the question of specifics and details of the stories to the exegetes. There are obvious
constraints within which exegetes must work, but those constraints run little risk of running
into a conflict with the discoveries of natural science. (emphasis added)

The foregoing contentions in sum:

Inasmuch as “the sacred author” set out “to furnish his people with a popular account, such
as the common parlance of that age allowed, one, namely, adapted to the senses and to the
mental preparation of the persons”,1 it follows that the Holy Scriptures are written in such a
way as to make use of popular and common ways of understanding with respect to “what
sensibly appeared” (Summa Theol. Ia, q. 80, art. 1, ad 3, apud Leo XIII, Providentissimus
Deus, n. 18, sec. b.).

Additional considerations:

Cf. Augustine of Hippo, The Literal Meaning of Genesis. Translated and annotated by John
Hammond Taylor, S.J. Vol. I, Books 1-6. Ancient Christian Writers. The Works of the
Fathers in Translation. No. 41 (New York, 1982), Bk. 1, ch. 29, n. 39, pp 42-43:

39. Usually, even a non-Christian knows something about the earth, the heavens, and the
other elements of this world, about the motion and orbit of the stars and even their size and
relative positions, about the predictable eclipses of the sun and moon, the cycles of the years
and the seasons, about the kinds of animals, shrubs, stones, and so forth, and this knowledge
he holds to as being certain from reason and experience. Now, it is a dis- [42-43] graceful and
dangerous thing for an infidel to hear a Christian, presumably giving the meaning of Holy
Scripture, talking nonsense on these topics; and we should take all means to prevent such an
embarrassing situation, in which people show up vast ignorance in a Christian and laugh it to
scorn. The shame is not so much that an ignorant individual is derided, but that people outside
the household of faith think our sacred writers held such opinions, and, to the great loss of
those for whose salvation we toil, the writers of our Scripture are criticized and rejected as
unlearned men. If they find a Christian mistaken in a field which they themselves know well
and hear him maintaining his foolish opinions about our books, how are they going to believe
those books in matters concerning the resurrection of the dead, the hope of eternal life, and the
kingdom of heaven, when they think their pages are full of falsehoods and on facts which they
themselves have learnt from experience and the light of reason? Reckless and incompetent

1
The Pontifical Biblical Commission. 30 June 1909, ‘On the Historical Character of the First Three Chapters
of Genesis’. Question 7.

26
 expounders of Holy Scripture bring untold trouble and sorrow on their wiser brethren when
they are caught in one of their mischievous false opinions and are taken to task by those who
are not bound by the authority of our sacred books. For then, to defend their utterly foolish
and obviously untrue statements, they will try to call upon Holy Scripture for proof and even
recite from memory many passages which they think support their position, although they
understand neither what they say nor the things about which they make assertion.67
67
1 Tim. 1.7.

Cf. John Henry Newman, The Idea of a University (1852), ch. 7. Christianity and Physical
Science (A Lecture in the School of Medicine), sec. 5:

5.

It is true that the author in question [Macauley], while saying all {439} this, and much more
to the same purpose, also makes mention of one exception to his general statement, though he
mentions it in order to put it aside. I, too, have to notice the same exception here; and you will
see at once, Gentlemen, as soon as it is named, how little it interferes really with the broad
view which I have been drawing out. It is true, then, that Revelation has in one or two instances
advanced beyond its chosen territory, which is the invisible world, in order to throw light upon
the history of the material universe. Holy Scripture, it is perfectly true, does declare a few
momentous facts, so few that they may be counted, of a physical character. It speaks of a
process of formation out of chaos which occupied six days; it speaks of the firmament; of the
sun and moon being created for the sake of the earth; of the earth being immovable; of a great
deluge; and of several other similar facts and events. It is true; nor is there any reason why we
should anticipate any difficulty in accepting these statements as they stand, whenever their
meaning and drift are authoritatively determined; for, it must be recollected, their meaning has
not yet engaged the formal attention of the Church, or received any interpretation which, as
Catholics, we are bound to accept, and in the absence of such definite interpretation, there is
perhaps some presumption in saying that it means this, and does not mean that. And this being
the case, it is not at all probable that any discoveries ever should be made by physical inquiries
incompatible at the same time with one and all of those senses which the letter admits, and
which are still open. As to certain popular interpretations of the texts in question, I shall have
something to say of them presently; here I am only concerned with the letter of the Holy
Scriptures itself, as far as it {440} bears upon the history of the heavens and the earth; and I
say that we may wait in peace and tranquillity till there is some real collision between Scripture
authoritatively interpreted, and results of science clearly ascertained, before we consider how
we are to deal with a difficulty which we have reasonable grounds for thinking will never
really occur.

27
II. ON KNOWING ‘THE INNERMOST CONSTITUTION’ OF A THING IN RELATION
TO THE USE OF METAPHOR AND THE SYMBOLIC MODE OF COMMUNICATING
TRUTH: A SUMMARY.

1. That we come to the quod quid est of a thing through its properties and accidents.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Veritate, q. 1, art. 10, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

A thing produces an awareness of itself in the soul by means of the things belonging to it
which outwardly appear, seeing that our knowledge takes its rise from sense, the per se objects
of which are sensible qualities; and so it is said in the first book of the De Anima that accidents
play a great role in knowing the quod quid est.

2. That we come to a knowledge of the quod quid est by composing and dividing.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. Ia, q. 85, art. 5, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

I reply that it must be said that the human intellect necessarily has to understand by composing
and dividing. For, since the human intellect goes out from ability into act, it has a certain
likeness to things that can be generated, which do not possess their perfection all at once, but
acquire it successively. And likewise the human intellect does not take a perfect knowledge of
the thing all at once in its first apprehension; but it first apprehends something of it, for
instance, the whatness of the thing itself, which is the first and proper object of the intellect;
and thereafter it understands the properties and accidents and habitudes standing around the
essence of the thing. And in this respect, it necessarily has to compose or divide one appre-
hension with another; And from one composition or division it proceeds to another, which is
to reason.1

3. But we can know a thing in two ways.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In Lib. Boetii de Trin., I, q. 1, art. 2, c. 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

It must be said that something is known in two ways. In one way, through its own form, as the
eye sees a stone through the species of the stone. In another way, through the form of another
thing similar to itself, as a cause is known through the likeness of its effect and a man through
the form of his own image.

N.B. For more on the likeness of an image, see further below.

4. On what makes one thing appear to be most similar to another.

According to St. Thomas Aquinas (cf. In III Sent., dist. 2, q. 1, art. 1a, obj. 3), “that appears
to be most similar to another in which the properties of the other are most represented”. And
in the Quaestiones Disputate de Veritate (q. 10, art. 7, ad 10), he says that “the rational
creature is more like God than the irrational according to the properties inhering in it”. And
in many places he explains that these properties come under the likeness of an image through
the sharing of the same form in some way.
1
N.B. The apparent disagreement between the foregoing passages may be reconciled by recognizing that the
first refers to knowing the ‘what it is’ as the term of investigation and hence perfectly, whereas the second
speaks of the quod quid est as its starting point, and so imperfectly. See my separate discussion.

28
5. The rationale of proprie loquendo.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Veritate, qu. 17, art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

That name alone can be attributed to something properly in whose signification all the things
said of that thing agree.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Veritate, qu. 4, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

But if something of those things which belong to the notion of the name be taken away, there
will no longer be a proper taking.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Veritate, qu. 1, art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

And so when ‘truth’ is said per prius et posterius [sc. according to a before and after] of many
things, it is necessary that it be said per prius of that in which the complete notion of truth is
found.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. disp. de Veritate, q. 1, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

It must be said that in those things that are said per prius et posterius of many things it is not
necessary that that first receive the predication of the common that is the cause of the others,
but that in which the complete notion of that common is first [found]; as ‘healthy’ is said per
prius of ‘animal’, in which the perfect notion of health is first found, while medicine is called
‘healthy’ as bringing about health. And so, since ‘truth’ is said per prius et posterius of many
things, it is necessary that that of which it is said per prius be that in which the complete notion
of ‘truth’ is first found.

6. What is necessary for something to be named properly and the rationale establishing
improper speech.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In II Sent., dist. 9, q. 1, art. 4, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

For some name to be said of something properly, two things are required, namely, that it have
what is signified by the name perfectly according to complete act, and that it be its last
perfection....

Hence, what is signified by a name can either be had perfectly according to complete act or
not, and it can either be its last perfection or not, both of which must be the case for some-
thing to be said properly; otherwise, the taking is improper. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I
Sent., dist. 15, qu. 4, art. 1, ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

It must be said that when something is not shared according to its own perfect act but according
to some mode it is not properly said to be had, as animals that have any mode of prudence are
not said to have prudence because they do not have the act of reason which properly is the act
of prudence, namely, choice itself. Whence they have something similar to prudence, rather
than prudence.

N.B. And from this it follows that an animal is called prudent improperly, (sc. by a
proportional metaphor).

29
6. The two ways in which something can be signified.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Quod., 7, q. 6, art. 3, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

To signify something, a man can employ either certain sounds of voice or certain feigned
likenesses.

7. The purpose of poetic fictions.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Quod., 7, q. 6, art. 3, ad 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

Poetic fictions are not ordered to something else except for the purpose of signifying.

8. The two ways in which a word outwardly pronounced is the sign of something.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In IV Sent., dist. 15, q. 4, art. 1a, ad 4 (tr. B.A.M.):

A word outwardly pronounced is the sign of something in two ways. In one way immediately,
namely, of that for which it has been principally instituted for signifying, as the name “fire”
signifies a certain element. In another way through a middle, when, namely, the very thing
that is first signified is taken as the sign of another thing, as fire signifies charity by reason of
an aptitude for signifying charity it has from a certain likeness.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 1, art. 10, ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

For by vocal sounds something is signified properly and something figuratively. Nor is the
literal sense the figure itself, but that which is figured. For when Scripture names “the arm of
God” the literal sense is not that a bodily member of this sort belongs to God, but what is
signified by this member, namely, operative power.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Super ad Galatas, c. 4, lect. 7 (tr. B.A.M.):

But something is signified by the literal sense in two ways, namely, according to proper
speech, as when I say, “the man smiles”, or according to a likeness or metaphor, as when I
say, “the meadow smiles” [pratum ridet]. And we use both ways in Sacred Scripture, as when
we say, according to the first way, that “Jesus ascends”, and when, according to the second
way, we say that “He sits at the right hand of the Father”.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In III Sent., dist. 38, q. 1, art. 3, ad 4 (tr. B.A.M.):

It must be said that the words that are written in Sacred Scripture are either the words in which
Scripture is published, or they are the words of anyone recounted as speaking in Scripture. If
in the first way, no lie comes about in them thereby since in figurative expressions the sense
of the words is not what they produce at first glance, but what the one bringing them forward
intends to produce under such a manner of speaking, as someone who says that a meadow
smiles intends to signify the flowering of the meadow under a certain likeness of the thing.

9. The genus of feigning.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Malo, q. 8, art. 3, obj. 10 (tr. B.A.M.):

30
 Feigning pertains to reason; for to feign is to represent, which belongs solely to reason, as the
Philosopher says in his Poetria.1

10. The definition of feigning and its division.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In IV Sent., dist. 4, q. 3, art. 2b, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

It must be said that there is feigning properly when someone shows something by word or
deed that is not in the thing in truth. But this happens in two ways. In one way, when from this
intention something is said or done so that something other than the truth the thing has is
shown. In another way, when something is shown that does not have the truth of the thing in
word or deed, even if it not be said or done on account of this.

11. When our feigning is no lie but some figure of the truth.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 111, art. 1. ad 1 (tr. Fr. Laurence
Shapcote, O.P., rev. B.A.M.):

As Augustine says in his book of Questions on the Gospels, not everything we feign is a lie.
But when our feigning is referred to some signification, it is no lie but some figure of the truth.
Otherwise, all the things that are said figuratively by wise and saintly men, or even by the Lord
Himself, are to be reputed lies, since, according to the customary understanding, the truth does
not consist in such sayings. Now just as things said are feigned without lying, so also are things
done in order to signify something else.

12. The feigning produced by figurative expressions.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 111, art. 1. ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

And he gives the example of figurative expressions: in them a certain thing is feigned, not that
it be asserted to exist in this way, but we propose it as the figure of another thing that we wish
to assert.

13. The two ways in which “figure” can be taken as a sign of something else.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In III Sent., dist. 16, q. 2, art. 1, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

And because the figure of anything is put down as its sign, as is clear in the case of images
which principally result according to a representation of the figure,2 from this the name of
“figure” has been carried over so that it is put down for any sign instituted for signifying
something according to a likening to something else.

1
N.B. By Aristotle’s Poetria St. Thomas means the presentation of the Philosopher’s Poetics as it is found in
Averroes’ Determinatio in Aristotelis Poetria, the Latin translation of the Commentator’s work by Herman-
nus Alemannus, published in 1256.
2
Cf. In VII Physic., lect. 5, n. 5 (tr. B.A.M.):

One must consider that among all qualities, the figure more than anything else follows on and reveals the
species of things…. And because of this it happens that an image, which is the expressed representation of a
thing, is more looked to with respect to its figure than to its color or some other thing. And because art is the
imitator of nature, and the work of art is a certain image of a natural thing, the forms of artifacts are figures or
something close to them.

31
14. Metaphors are to be taken from things manifest to sense, that is, from images formed of
sensible things.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 34, art. 2, ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

Names expressing the very perfections of the divine goodness taken according to the
determinate mode of participating in them cannot be said of God properly or even meta-
phorically because metaphors are to be taken from those things which are manifest according
to sense.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 34, q. 3, art. 1, obj. 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

Metaphorical expressions are taken from images formed of sensible things.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Quod., 7, q. 6, art. 2, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

Certain things [such as a lion or a goat] by which Christ and His members are designated in
Sacred Scripture are certain imaginary likenesses whose only purpose in being shown is that
those persons be signified.

15. The rationale of metaphorical expressions: the carrying over of a name according to some
likeness.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Veritate, qu. 10, art. 7, ad 10 (tr. B.A.M.):

Metaphorical expressions are looked to according to certain likenesses because, according to

the Philosopher (cf. Top. VI. 6, 140a 11), all things being carried over are carried over
according to some likeness.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 1, art. 9, sed contra (tr. B.A.M.):

But to hand on something under a likeness [sc. a similitude] is metaphorical.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In II Sent., d. 8, qu. 1, art. 3, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

Just as in metaphorical expressions there is no falsity because they are not brought forward to
signify the things on which the names are imposed, but rather those things in which the
likenesses of the aforesaid things are found; so also in the appearances of angels there is no
feigning, since those figures are not shown to signify the natural being of that thing, but the
properties of an angel.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Meta., lect. 3, n. 12 (tr. B.A.M.):

But poets lie, not only in this [sc. that there is envy in the divine], but in many other things, as
the common proverb runs.

16. The definition and division of likeness.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In IV Met., lect. 4, n. 573 (tr. B.A.M.):

Now anything that takes on the appearance of something else must resemble it in some way.

32
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. Ia q. 4, art. 3, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

Furthermore, things are called ‘like’ which agree in form.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. Ia, q. 93, art. 9, c. (tr. Fr. Laurence Shapcote, O.P.):

Likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality causes likeness, as the Philosopher says....
For we say that an image is like or unlike what it represents according as the representation is
perfect or imperfect.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. Ia, q. 35, art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

I reply that it must be said that likeness belongs to the notion of an image. Nevertheless, not
any likeness whatsoever suffices for the notion of an image, but rather a likeness in the species
of a thing, or at least in some sign of the species. But a sign of the species in bodily things
would seem to be shape most of all, for we observe that with respect to animals diverse
according to species, they are of diverse shapes but not of diverse colors. Whence, if the color
of something were painted on a wall, it would not be called an image unless the shape were
depicted. But neither does a likeness in species suffice by itself, nor shape, but the notion of
origin is required for an image, since, as Augustine says, one egg is not the image of another,
since it is not an expression of it. So for something truly to be an image, requires that it proceed
from another similar to it in species or at least in a sign of the species.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. Ia, q. 93, art 6, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

For an image represents according to a likeness in species, as we have said. But a trace repre-
sents by way of an effect, which represents the cause in such a way as not to attain to a likeness
of species; for impressions that are left by the motion of an animal are called traces; and like-
wise smoke is called a trace of fire; and the desolation of the earth, the trace of a hostile army.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Ver., q. 2, art. 11, ad 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

To the second it must be said that the Philosopher in the first book of the Topics 9 (cf. ch. 17,
108a 7-8, 14), lays down a twofold mode of likeness: There is one found in different genera;
and this is looked to according to a proportion or a proportionality, as when one thing stands
to another as another thing stands to another, as he says in the same place. Another mode is
found in things belonging to the same genus, as when the same thing exists in different things.
Now a likeness does not require a comparison according to a determinate habitude said in the
first mode, but only in the second; hence it is not necessary that the first mode of likeness be
removed from God with respect to the creature.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., d 34, q. 3, art. 1, ad 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

To the second it must be said that likeness is twofold: for there is a certain kind through a shar-
ing of the same form, and there is no such likeness of the bodily to the divine, as the objection
proves. There is also a certain kind by a likeness of proportionality, which consists in the same
relation of proportions, as when it is said, as eight is to four, so is six to three; and as the consul
is to the city, so is the pilot to the ship. And the transport from bodily things to the divine is
made according to such a likeness: as if God were called a fire because, just as fire stands to
this, that it make what is liquefied flow through its own heat, so God through his own goodness
pours perfections into every creature, or something of the sort.

33
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 3, n. 4 (tr. B.A.M.):

But one must say that the conceptions of the understanding are likenesses of things and
therefore the things that are in the understanding can be considered and named in two ways:
in one way, according to themselves, and in another way, according to the nature of the things
of which they are the likenesses. In this way an image of Hercules in and of itself is called and
is ‘bronze’, but as it is a likeness of Hercules is named ‘man’.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. Ia, q. 4, art. 3, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

I reply that it must be said that, since a likeness is looked to according to an agreement or
communication in form, likeness is manifold, according to the many ways of communication
in form. For certain things are called ‘like’ which communicate in the same form according to
the same notion and according to the same mode, and these things are not only called ‘like’
but ‘equal’ in their likeness, just as two things equally white are called alike in whiteness. And
this is the most perfect likeness. In another way things are called ‘like’ which communicate in
form according to the same notion, and not according to the same mode, but according to more
or less, as the less white is said to be ‘like’ the more white. And this is an imperfect likeness.
In a third way things are called ‘like’ which communicate in the same form but not according
to the same notion, as is clear in non-univocal agents. For, since every agent makes something
similar to itself inasmuch as it is an agent, but it makes each thing according to its own form,
a likeness to the form of the agent must be in the effect. If, then, the agent is contained in the
same species with its effect, there will be a likeness in form between the maker and the thing
made according to the same notion of the species, just as man generates man.

But if the agent is not contained in the same species, there will [still] be a likeness, but not
according to the same notion of the species, just as the things generated by the power of the
sun approach to some likeness to the sun, but not such that they receive the form of the sun
according to a likeness in species, but according to a likeness in genus.

If, then, there be any agents which are not contained in a genus, their effects would even
more remotely approach to a likeness of the form of the agent, yet not such that they share in
a likeness to the form of the agent according to the same notion of the species, but according
to some sort of analogy, just as being itself is common to everything. And in this way the
things that are from God are likened to Him inasmuch as they are beings, as to the first and
universal principal of their whole being.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Compendium Theologiae I, c. 43 (tr. B.A.M.):

Now certain things that proceed from other things are found not to follow after the perfect
species of those things from which they proceed. In one way, as in equivocal generations: for
a sun is not generated from the sun, but a certain animal….

In another way, what proceeds from something differs from it because of a lack of purity,
when, that is, from what is simple and pure in itself by an application to exterior matter
something is produced falling short of the first species: as a house in matter comes from a
house in the mind of an artisan; and color comes from light received in a limited body; and a
mixed thing comes from fire joined to the other elements; and a shadow comes from a ray [of
light] by the opposition of an opaque body….

In a third way what proceeds from something does not follow after its species because of a
lack of truth—that is to say, it does not truly receive its nature, but only a certain likeness of

34
 it, like an image in a mirror or sculpture, or even the likeness of a thing in the intellect or sense.
For the image of a man is not called a true man, but a likeness; nor is a stone [truly in] the
soul, as the Philosopher says, but a species of the stone.

17. A likeness assumed in metaphor does not manifest the nature of a thing.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In II Meteor., lect. 5, n. 4 (tr. B.A.M.).

Still, something said in this way [sc. by metaphor] does not suffice for knowing the nature of
a thing, since a natural thing is not manifested by a likeness assumed in a metaphor.

18. A process of arguing founded on a likeness leads to the fallacy of the consequent.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Quod., 7, qu. 6, art. 1, ad 4 (tr. B.A.M.):

Because one thing is the likeness of many things, when the sense of an utterance is founded
on a likeness one cannot proceed determinately to something belonging to the other things like
it, but there is the fallacy of the consequent. For example, because of a certain likeness the lion
signifies both Christ and the Devil, for which reason from the mere fact that something is said
about a lion in Sacred Scripture a process to neither can be made by arguing.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In II Post. Anal., lect. 26, n. 8 (tr. B.A.M.):

As one ought not to dispute by metaphors, so also one must not define by metaphors; for
example, if we were to say that man is an upside down tree. Nor in definitions must we assume
anything said metaphorically. For, since definitions are the principal and most efficacious
means in disputations, if definitions were to be given by metaphors it would follow that one
must dispute from metaphors. And this ought not to be done since a metaphor is taken
according to something like, but it is not necessary that what is like in one respect is like in
every respect.

Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 3, q. 3, art. 2, ad 4 (tr. B.A.M.):

To the fourth it must be said that in one thing diverse properties can be considered. And so it
is not unfitting that from the same thing according to its own diverse properties a substitution
be made to some contrary, as God is called a lion by reason of his generosity and courage, or
something of the sort, and the devil is called a lion because of his cruelty.

It also sometimes happens, as Dionysius says in his Letter to Titus, that the same name is
transferred in order to signify the thing participating, as well as the participation and the
principle of the participation, as if a man possessed of charity were called fire, and the charity
itself, and God infusing charity: and it is to be explained according to all this different ways.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In III Sent., dist. 11, qu. 1, art. 4, ex. (tr. B.A.M.):

But from tropic expressions there is no correct process of argumentation. The reason for this
is that they are not true simply, but only in a certain respect. And this is why Dionysius says
in his Letter to Titus that symbolic theology does not use arguments.

19. In what the fallacy of the consequent consists.

35
Cf. Ignotus Auctor, De Fallacis ad Quosdam Nobiles Artistas (On Fallacies: For the Benefit
of Some Gentlemen Students for an Arts Degree), c. 16 (tr. B.A.M.):

A consequent, as it is taken here, is what follows on the antecedent in a conditional pro-

position, as when it is said, “If Socrates is a man, he is an animal.” “Socrates is an animal” is
the consequent, but “Socrates is a man” is the antecedent. Therefore, the fallacy of the
consequent is a deception arising from the fact that the consequent is judged to be the same in
every way with the antecedent. For from this someone happens to believe that if the con-
sequent follows on the antecedent, in the same way conversely the antecedent follows on the
consequent.

From this it is clear that the fallacy of the consequent consists in two consequences, one of
which is true and the other false, as if one were to say, “If someone runs, he moves. But
Socrates moves, therefore he runs.” For this consequence, “If Socrates runs, he moves,” which
is given first, is true; but this one, to which it proceeds: “If he moves, therefore he runs,” is
false.

For an application of the foregoing teaching, cf. St. Albert the Great, In Epistolis B. Dionysii
Areopagitae Epist. VII, S. 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

Then leaving aside what he said before, he censures the poets, passing to Apollophanes in
particular.1 And he says he does not care to speak for the sake of reproving the opinion of the
many, that is, of the idolaters among the people who remain in the sayings of the poets and
serve the creature, bestowing on it the worship owed to the Creator because of a liking they
have for material things, and <because of> the passions of vices which do not prohibit the
worship of idols, but rather permit and command it. For poets are not philosophers except in
a certain respect: for the end of the poet is to persuade or dissuade someone from those things
which come before the judgment of reason by inducing terror or even the abhorrence of certain
things from certain mythical [or ‘fabulous’] things, which inspire either terror or abhorrence,
and after which one is restored to reason: just as if someone were to wish to persuade someone
not to eat honey, and were to call honey choler that someone vomited.2 And from the fact that
before one discerns through reason that what is said is false, so much abhorrence is generated
suddenly that even after the judgment of reason he would abominate it. But, on the part of
those things that can be proven in the judgment of reason, the cultivation of idols had a mode
of persuasion no different than the fictions of the poets when they used to say one turning is
in the sun and another in the stars. And so he says that idolaters remain in the sayings of the
poets because they are wont to be detained in those things which come before the judgment of
reason and not come to the judgment of reason.

20. A metaphorical expression taken according to its proper meaning constitutes the third
species of amphibole.

Cf. De Fallacis, c. 7 (tr. B.A.M.:)

1
Cf. Dionysius the Areopagite, Letter Seven, To Polycarp, a hierarch: “I am not talking here of the beliefs of
the hoi polloi who in their materialistic and impassioned way cling to the stories of the poets and who “serve
the creature rather than the creator” (Pseudo-Dionysius, the Areopagite. The Complete Works. Trans. Colm
Luibheid. Classics of Western Spirituality. New York, 1987, p. 267).
2
Cf. Soph. Ref., V.4 (167b 5-7) where Aristotle gives the following as an example of the fallacy of the
consequent: “For men often take gall for honey because a yellow color accompanies honey”.

36
 The third species of amphibole is when one speech principally signifies one thing and another
metaphorically or by way of a substitution, just as this speech, “a shore is plowed,” principally
signifies the breaking up of the shore, but by way of a substitution, the loss of one’s work.
And a paralogism is formed in this way: “whenever a shore is plowed, earth is broken up. But
when an obstinate man is taught, a shore is plowed: therefore, when an obstinate man is taught,
earth is broken up.” It does not follow by reason of the aforesaid multiplicity.1

Supplement:

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, IN II SENT. D. 8, Q.1, Art. 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

DS8QU1 AR3- AG1

videtur quod angeli assumant corpora illa It seems that angels assume those bodies in truth,
secundum veritatem, quae habent illam naturam which have that nature which appears.
quae videtur.

nuntios enim veritatis non decet aliqua fictio. For in messengers of truth any feigning is
unbecoming.

sed ostendere illud quod non est verum est But to show that which is not true is a certain
quaedam fictio. feigning.

ergo videtur quod veram naturam habeant It seems, then, that they have the true nature of
illarum rerum corpora assumpta. the things they assumed in body.

DS8QU1 AR3- AG2

praeterea, proprietates humanae non inveniuntur Furthermore, human properties are found
nisi in vero corpore humano. nowhere but in a true human body.

sed hujusmodi apparitiones fiunt, secundum But apparitions of this sort are made, according
dionysium, ut ex visibilium proprietatibus, de to Dionysius, so that from visible properties we
invisibilibus instruamur. might be instructed about the invisible ones.

ergo videtur idem quod prius. It seems, then, the same as before.

DS8QU1 AR3- RA1

ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut in To the first, therefore, it must be said that, just as
locutionibus metaphoricis non est falsitas, eo in metaphorical expressions there is no falsity
quod non proferuntur ad significandum res because they are not brought forward to signify
quibus nomina sunt imposita, sed magis illa in the things on which the names are imposed, but
quibus dictarum rerum similitudines inveniuntur; rather those things in which the likenesses of the
aforesaid things are found;

1
That is, by reason of the many things signified by a speech the same in every way.

37
 ita etiam in apparitionibus angelorum non est so also in the appearances of angels there is no
fictio, quia figurae illae non ostenduntur ad feigning, since those figures are not shown in
significandum esse naturale illius rei, sed order to signify the natural being of the thing, but
proprietates angeli. the properties of the angel.

DS8QU1 AR3- RA2

ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis verae To the second it must be said that although the
proprietates hominis non sint nisi in corpore true properties of a man are in nothing but a
naturali, tamen similitudines illarum natural body, still, the likenesses of those pro-
proprietatum in aliis esse possunt; perties can be in other things;

et tales similitudines sufficiunt ad finem and such likenesses suffice for the end of appari-
apparitionis. tion.

.
This text is of the greatest importance because St. Thomas uses the likeness of figuration
to explain the likeness of imitation. But in what are they alike? St. Thomas looks to the fact that
in both cases something is signified ‘indirectly’, yet in such a way that the vehicle of that
signification cannot be called ‘false’.

Note. The properties of angels are not signified by sensible qualities inasmuch as the
latter are likeness of the former in a sign of the species (for there can be no such agreement
in form between a separated substance and a bodily one, to which such qualities belong), but
by a likeness of proportionality (as described above).

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 34, q. 3, art. 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

DS34QU3 AR PR

deinde quaeritur de his quae translative de deo Next, it is asked about those things which are said
dicuntur; et circa hoc quaeruntur duo: of God by way of transference; and about this
two things are asked:

1 utrum aliquid de deo translative dicendum sit; 1. Whether something can be said of God by way
of transference;

2 a quibus rebus deus translative nominandus sit. 2. From what things God is to be named by way
of transference.

DS34QU3 AR1-TT

utrum aliquid debeat dici translative de deo.

Whether something should be said of God by
way of transference.
DS34QU3 AR1- AG1

ad primum sic proceditur. One proceeds to the first as follows.

videtur quod de deo nihil translative dici debeat. It seems that nothing ought to be said of God by
way of transference.

38
sicut enim dicit boetius, in divinis intellectualiter For, as Boethius says, in divine things one must
versari oportet, neque ad imaginationes deduci. be busied in an intellectual manner, and not be
led to images.

sed hujusmodi transumptivae locutiones sunt But transumptive expressions of this sort are
sumptae ex imaginationibus sensibilium. taken from images formed of sensible things.

ergo non est eis utendum in divinis. Therefore, they are not to be used in divine
things.

DS34QU3 AR1- AG2

praeterea, secundum philosophum, omnes Further, according to the Philosopher, everything

transferentes, secundum aliquam similitudinem being carried over is carried over according to
transferunt. some likeness.

sed, secundum boetium, similitudo est rerum But according to Boethius, likeness is the same
differentium eadem qualitas. quality of different things.

cum igitur qualitates rerum corporalium non Therefore, since qualities of bodily things are not
inveniantur in divinis, videtur quod nulla found in the divine, it seems that no likeness or
similitudo vel metaphora possit sumi ex rebus metaphor can be taken from sensible things, so
sensibilibus, ut aliquid de deo translative dicatur. that something be said of God by way of
transference.

DS34QU3 AR1- AG3

item, omnis doctrina est ad manifestationem Again, every doctrine—and principally Sacred
veritatis; et praecipue sacra scriptura. Scripture—exists for the manifestation of truth.

sed hujusmodi metaphorae, vel symbolicae But metaphors of this sort, or symbolic
locutiones, sunt quasi quaedam velamina expressions, are, as it were, a certain veiling of
veritatis, ut dicit dionysius. the truth, as Dionysius says.

ergo eis non videtur utendum in theologia. Therefore, they are not to be used in theology.

DS34QU3 AR1- AG4

praeterea, secundum philosophos, scientia fit per Further, according to the Philosopher, know-
assimilationem intellectus ad rem scitam. ledge comes about through the assimilation of
the intellect to the thing known.

intellectus autem noster, cum sit incorporeus et But our intellect, since it is incorporeal and
immaterialis, majorem similitudinem habet cum immaterial, has a greater likeness to divine things
rebus divinis quam cum rebus corporalibus, quae than to the bodily, which are material.
materiales sunt.

ergo magis se habet ad cognoscendum divina Therefore, it relates more to knowing the divine
quam hujusmodi corporalia; than bodily things of this sort.

et ita videtur quod per similitudinem corporalium And so it seems that the divine ought not to be
nobis divina manifestari non debeant. manifested to us by a likeness of bodily things.

39
DS34QU3 AR1- SC-1

contra est quod dicit dionysius: neque possibile But against this is what Dionysius says: Neither
est nobis aliter superlucere divinum radium, nisi is it possible otherwise for the divine ray to shine
varietate similitudinum circumvelatum. in us except it be veiled about by an interchange
of likenesses.

divinus radius autem est veritas divinorum. But the divine ray is the truth of divine things.

ergo oportet quod sub similitudinibus Therefore, the truth of the divine must be
corporalibus, nobis divinorum veritas proposed to us under the likenesses of bodily
proponatur. things.

DS34QU3 AR1- CO

respondeo dicendum, quod convenientissimum I reply that it must be said that it is most fitting
est divina nobis similitudinibus corporalibus for the divine to be indicated to us by bodily
designari, cujus ratio potest assignari likenesses, a fact for which four reasons can be
quadruplex: assigned:

prima et principalis propter materiae altitudinem, First and principally by reason of the loftiness of
quae nostri intellectus capacitatem excedit; the matter, which exceeds the capacity of our
understanding.

unde non possumus veritatem divinorum And so we cannot take hold of the truth of divine
secundum modum suum capere; et ideo oportet things according to its own mode, and so it must
quod nobis secundum modum nostrum be proposed to us according to our mode.
proponatur.

est autem nobis connaturale a sensibilibus in But it is connatural to us to come to intelligible

intelligibilia venire, et a posterioribus in priora; things from the sensible, and to the prior from the
posterior.

et ideo sub figura sensibilium intelligibilia nobis And so intelligible things are proposed to us
proponuntur, ut ex his quae novimus ad incognita under the figure of sensible things so that from
animus surgat. the things we know the soul might rise up to the
unknown.

secunda ratio est, The second reason is this:

quia cum in nobis sit duplex pars cognoscitiva, since there is a twofold knowing part in us,
scilicet intellectiva et sensitiva: providit divina namely, an intellective and a sensitive, divine
sapientia ut utraque pars, secundum quod wisdom provides that both parts, insofar as
possibile esset, in divina reduceretur; possible, be led to divine things.

et ideo figuras corporalium adhibuit, quae And so figures of bodily things that the sensitive
sensitiva parte capi possunt, quia ipsa part can take hold of have been employed, be-
intellectualia divinorum non poterat attingere. cause it could not of itself attain to the intellectual
things of the divine.

tertia ratio est, quia de deo verius cognoscimus The third reason is that, with respect to God, we
quid non est, quam quid est; more truly know what He is not than what He is.

40
unde dionysius dicit, quod in divinis And so Dionysius says that in divine things af-
affirmationes sunt incompactae, negationes firmations are loosely put together, but negations
verae; are true.

et ideo cum de omnibus quae de deo dicimus, And seeing that, with respect to all the things we
intelligendum sit quod non eodem modo sibi say about God, it must be understood that they
conveniunt sicut in creaturis inveniuntur, sed per are not found in creatures in the same way in
aliquem modum imitationis et similitudinis; which they belong to Him, but by way of some
mode of imitation and likeness;

expressius ostendebatur hujusmodi eminentia this sort of preeminence of God was expressly
dei, per ea quae sunt magis manifesta ab ipso shown through the things to be removed from
removeri. Him which are more manifest.

haec autem sunt corporalia; But these things are bodily;

et ideo convenientius fuit speciebus corporalibus and so it was fitting that divine things be signified
divina significari, ut his assuefactus humanus by bodily species so that that the human soul,
animus disceret, nihil eorum quae de deo being inured to these things, would learn to
praedicat, sibi attribuere nisi per quamdam attribute to Him none of those things it predicates
similitudinem, secundum quod creatura imitatur of God except by way of a certain likeness,
creatorem. insofar as the creature imitates the Creator.

quarta ratio est propter occultationem divinae The fourth reason is for the sake of hiding divine
veritatis: quia profunda fidei occultanda sunt et truth: because the deep things of Faith should be
infidelibus, ne irrideant, et simplicibus, ne hidden from unbelievers, lest they mock them,
errandi occasionem sumant: and from simple men, lest they take occasion to
err.

et hae omnes causae assignantur a dionysio in And all these causes are assigned by Dionysius
principio cael. hier. et in epistola ad titum. at the beginning of the Celestial Hierarchy, and
in the Epistle to Titus.

DS34QU3 AR1- RA1

ad primum igitur dicendum, quod in cognitione To the first, therefore, it must be said that there
intellectualium est duo considerare; scilicet are two things to consider in knowledge of
principium speculationis, et terminum. intellectual things, namely, the starting-point of
speculation, and the term.

principium quidem est ex sensibilibus; sed The starting-point is from sensibles, but the term
terminus est in intelligibilibus, secundum quod in is in intelligibles, insofar as in natural knowledge
cognitione naturali ex speciebus a sensu acceptis of species taken from sense we acquire universal
intentiones universales accipimus per lumen intentions through the light of the agent intellect.
intellectus agentis;

et ideo dicendum est, quod quantum ad terminum And so it must be said that, with respect to the
speculationis principium oportet ex aliquibus term of speculation, the starting-point must rise
sensibilibus speciebus in divina consurgere. up to the divine from certain sensible species.

DS34QU3 AR1- RA2

41
ad secundum dicendum, quod similitudo est To the second it must be said that likeness is
duplex: twofold:

quaedam enim est per participationem ejusdem for there is a certain kind through a sharing of the
formae; et talis similitudo non est corporalium ad same form, and there is no such likeness of the
divina, ut objectio probat. bodily to the divine, as the objection proves.

est etiam quaedam similitudo proportionalitatis, There is also a certain kind by a likeness of pro-
quae consistit in eadem habitudine portionality, which consists in the same relation
proportionum, ut cum dicitur: of proportions, as when it is said,

sicut se habet octo ad quatuor, ita sex ad tria; et as eight is to four, so is six to three; and as the
sicut se habet consul ad civitatem, ita se habet consul is to the city, so is the pilot to the ship.
gubernator ad navem;

et secundum talem similitudinem fit transumptio And the transport from bodily things to the divine
ex corporalibus in divina: is made according to such a likeness:

ut si deus dicatur ignis ex hoc quod sicut se habet as if God were called a fire because, just as fire
ignis ad hoc quod liquefacta effluere facit per stands to this, that it make what is liquefied flow
suum calorem, ita deus per suam bonitatem through its own heat, so God through his own
perfectiones in omnes creaturas diffundit, vel goodness pours perfections into every creature,
aliquid hujusmodi. or something of the sort.

DS34QU3 AR1- RA3

ad tertium dicendum, quod manifestatio veritatis To the third it must be said that the manifestation
est facienda secundum proportionem of the truth is to be made according to a propor-
recipientium; tion to the recipient,

et quia quibusdam potius manifestatio veritatis and because certain men impede the manifesta-
officeret quam prodesset, dum vel ex impietate tion of the truth rather than bring it forth, either
impugnarent, vel ex simplicitate deficerent; when they quarrel from impiety, or fall short
from simplicity—

ideo est divinorum veritas occultanda, ut dicitur therefore, the truth of the divine should be
matth. 7, 6: hidden, as is said in Matthew [7:6]:

nolite sanctum dare canibus. Do not give what is holy to dogs.

DS34QU3 AR1- RA4

ad quartum dicendum, quod est quaedam To the fourth it must be said that there is a certain
assimilatio secundum convenientiam in natura; assimilation according to a fittingness in nature;

et sic est major assimilatio intellectus nostri ad and in this way there is a greater assimilation of
divina quam ad sensibilia; sed haec non est illa our intellect to the divine than to sensibles; but
quae requiritur ad scientiam. this is not the case in those things required for
knowledge.

42
 est etiam quaedam assimilatio per There is also a certain assimilation through the
informationem, quae requiritur ad cognitionem; informing required for knowledge, just as sight is
sicut visus assimilatur colori, cujus specie assimilated to color, by whose species the pupil
informatur pupilla. is informed.

haec autem informatio non potest fieri in But this informing cannot come about in the
intellectu, secundum viam naturae, nisi per intellect following the road of nature, except by
species abstractas a sensu: a species abstracted from sense,

quia, sicut dicit philosophus, sicut se habet color because, as the Philosopher says, as color stands
ad visum, ita phantasmata ad intellectum; et ideo to sight, so stands the phantasm to the under-
constat quod hoc modo intellectus magis potest standing; and so it remains that in this way the
assimilari sensibilibus quam divinis. intellect can be assimilated more to sensibles
than to the divine.

Cf. In I Sent., d. 34, q. 3, via The Aquinas Institute:

Quaestio 3

Question 3

De his quae translative de Deo dicuntur

Those things said metaphorically of God

Deinde quaeritur de his quae translative de Deo dicuntur; et circa hoc quaeruntur duo:

Next, one asks about things said metaphorically1 of God. About this two things are asked:

primo utrum aliquid de Deo translative dicendum sit;

first, whether anything should be said metaphorically of God;

secundo a quibus rebus Deus translative nominandus sit.

second, from what things should God be metaphorically named.

Articulus 1

Article 1

1
See the note above in d. 22, q. 1, a. 2, obj. 2. Given their equivalent etymologies and the clearer meaning of
“metaphor,” we will usually translate translative as “metaphorically.” [Here is the aforementioned note:

Metaphorice (derived from the Greek μεταφορά) and transumptive (and later translative) are derived from root
words indicating “carrying” (phora, sumptio, latio) and “across” (meta, trans). In the context of this text, a
name is carried from its ordinary application onto a new object while meaning the same thing. Below, Aquinas
will tend to use transumptive and translative more frequently than metaphorice; however, given their equiva-
lent etymologies and the clearer meaning of “metaphor,” we will usually translate these words as “meta-
phorically.” (B,A,M,)]

43
Utrum aliquid debeat dici translative de Deo

Whether anything should be said metaphorically of God

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod de Deo nihil translative dici debeat.

To the first we proceed as follows.1 It seems that nothing should be said metaphorically of
God.

Sicut enim dicit Boetius, lib. 1 De Trinit., c. 2, in divinis intellectualiter versari oportet,
neque ad imaginationes deduci. Sed hujusmodi transumptivae locutiones sunt sumptae ex
imaginationibus sensibilium. Ergo non est eis utendum in divinis.

Obj. 1: For Boethius says2 that in divine things one must consider intellectually, and not be
led by images. But metaphorical expressions are drawn from the images of sensible things.
Therefore one should not use them in the divine.

Praeterea, secundum Philosophum, 6 Top., cap. 7, omnes transferentes, secundum aliquam

similitudinem transferunt. Sed, secundum Boetium, lib. 3 In Porph., cap. “De specie,”
similitudo est rerum differentium eadem qualitas. Cum igitur qualitates rerum corporalium
non inveniantur in divinis, videtur quod nulla similitudo vel metaphora possit sumi ex rebus
sensibilibus, ut aliquid de Deo translative dicatur.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher,3 all metaphors are metaphorically

extended according to a certain likeness. But according to Boethius,4 likeness is the same
quality of different realities. Therefore, since the qualities of bodily realities are not found
in the divine, it seems that no likeness or metaphor could be drawn from sensible realities
such that anything might be said metaphorically of God.

Item, omnis doctrina est ad manifestationem veritatis; et praecipue Sacra Scriptura. Sed
hujusmodi metaphorae, vel symbolicae locutiones, sunt quasi quaedam velamina veritatis,
ut dicit Dionysius, cap. 1 Cael. hier. Ergo eis non videtur utendum in theologia.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, all teaching is for the sake of manifesting the truth, especially the
teaching of Sacred Scripture. But such metaphors, or symbolic expressions, are, as it were,
veils of the truth, as Dionysius says.5 Therefore it seems one should not use them in theology.

Praeterea, secundum philosophos, scientia fit per assimilationem intellectus ad rem scitam.
Intellectus autem noster, cum sit incorporeus et immaterialis, majorem similitudinem habet
cum rebus divinis quam cum rebus corporalibus, quae materiales sunt. Ergo magis se habet
ad cognoscendum divina quam hujusmodi corporalia; et ita videtur quod per similitudinem
corporalium nobis divina manifestari non debeant.

1
Parallel texts: In I Sent., prol., a. 5; ST I.1.9; SCG III.119; Commentary on Boethius’s On the Trinity, q. 2, a.
4.
2
Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 2 (PL 64:1250).
3
Aristotle, Topics 6.7.
4
Boethius, In Porphyrii Isagogen commentorum editio secunda, bk. 3, ch. 9 (CSEL 48:228; PL 64:99).
5
Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 1, para. 3 (PG 3:122).

44
Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to the philosophers,1 knowledge occurs through the
intellect’s becoming like the reality known. Now, our intellect, since it is incorporeal and
immaterial, has a greater likeness with divine realities than with bodily realities, which are
material. Therefore it is more oriented to knowing divine things than to such bodily things,
and thus it seems that divine things should not be manifested to us through a likeness with
bodily things.

Contra est quod dicit Dionysius, 1 Caelest. hier: neque possibile est nobis aliter superlucere
divinum radium, nisi varietate similitudinum circum velatum. Divinus radius autem est
veritas divinorum. Ergo oportet quod sub similitudinibus corporalibus, nobis divinorum
veritas proponatur.

On the contrary, Dionysius says, it is not possible for the divine radiance to shine on us
otherwise than when veiled by a variety of likenesses.2 Now, the divine radiance is the truth
of divine things. Therefore it is necessary that the truth of divine things be proposed to us
under bodily likenesses.

Respondeo dicendum, quod convenientissimum est divina nobis similitudinibus

corporalibus designari, cujus ratio potest assignari quadruplex: prima et principalis propter
materiae altitudinem, quae nostri intellectus capacitatem excedit; unde non possumus
veritatem divinorum secundum modum suum capere; et ideo oportet quod nobis secundum
modum nostrum proponatur. Est autem nobis connaturale a sensibilibus in intelligibilia
venire, et a posterioribus in priora; et ideo sub figura sensibilium intelligibilia nobis
proponuntur, ut ex his quae novimus ad incognita animus surgat.

I answer that it is most fitting that divine things be designated for us by means of bodily
likenesses. The reason for this can be assigned in four ways, the first and principal of which
is on account of the height of the matter, which exceeds the capacity of our intellect. Whence
we cannot receive the truth of divine things according to its own mode, and therefore it is
necessary that it be proposed to us according to our mode. Now, it is connatural to us to
come from sensible things to intelligible things, and from posterior things to prior ones. And
therefore intelligible things are proposed to us under the shape of sensible things, so that
from the things that we have known our mind might rise up to things unknown.

Secunda ratio est, quia cum in nobis sit duplex pars cognoscitiva, scilicet intellectiva et
sensitiva: providit divina sapientia ut utraque pars, secundum quod possibile esset, in divina
reduceretur; et ideo figuras corporalium adhibuit, quae sensitiva parte capi possunt, quia ipsa
intellectualia divinorum non poterat attingere.

The second reason is that, because in us there are two cognitive parts—the intellectual and
the sensitive—the divine wisdom has provided that each part, insofar as it might be possible,
might be led back to divine things. And therefore he has brought to bear the shapes of bodily
things, which can be received by the sensitive part, since it was unable to reach the
intellectual things themselves of the divine.

1
See Aristotle, On the Soul 1.2, 404b15‒26; 1.5, 409b25‒32; Plato, Timaeus 35a‒b.
2
Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 1, para. 2 (PG 3:122).

45
Tertia ratio est, quia de Deo verius cognoscimus quid non est, quam quid est; unde
Dionysius, cap. 2 Cael. hier. dicit, quod in divinis affirmationes sunt incompactae,
negationes verae; et ideo cum de omnibus quae de Deo dicimus, intelligendum sit quod non
eodem modo sibi conveniunt sicut in creaturis inveniuntur, sed per aliquem modum
imitationis et similitudinis; expressius ostendebatur hujusmodi eminentia Dei, per ea quae
sunt magis manifesta ab ipso removeri. Haec autem sunt corporalia; et ideo convenientius
fuit speciebus corporalibus divina significari, ut his assuefactus humanus animus disceret,
nihil eorum quae de Deo praedicat sibi attribuere nisi per quamdam similitudinem,
secundum quod creatura imitatur Creatorem.

The third reason is because of God we know more truly what he is not than what he is.
Whence Dionysius says that in the divine the affirmations are incongruous, but the
negations are true.1 And therefore of everything that we say of God, one should understand
that they do not fit him in the same way as they are found in created things; rather, they are
said according to some mode of imitation and likeness. The eminence of God was more
expressly shown in this way, through the things that are more manifestly remote from him.
Now, these things are bodily, and so it was more fitting that divine things be signified by
means of bodily appearances, so that, made accustomed by such, the human mind might
learn that none of the things that it predicates of God is attributed to him except by way of
likeness, insofar as what is created imitates its Creator.

Quarta ratio est propter occultationem divinae veritatis: quia profunda fidei occultanda sunt
et infidelibus, ne irrideant, et simplicibus, ne errandi occasionem sumant: et hae omnes
causae assignantur a Dionysio in principio Caelest. hierar., ubi supra, et in Epistola 9 ad
Titum.

The fourth reason is on account of the hiddenness of the divine truth. For the depths of the
faith should be hidden both from those outside the faith, lest they laugh at them, and from
the simple, lest they derive an occasion for erring. And all of these reasons are assigned by
Dionysius at the beginning of the Heavenly Hierarchy and the Letter to Timothy.2

Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod in cognitione intellectualium est duo considerare, scilicet
principium speculationis et terminum. Principium quidem est ex sensibilibus; sed terminus
est in intelligibilibus, secundum quod in cognitione naturali ex speciebus a sensu acceptis
intentiones universales accipimus per lumen intellectus agentis; et ideo dicendum est, quod
quantum ad terminum oportet in diem intellectualem versari, sed quantum ad speculationis
principium oportet ex aliquibus sensibilibus speciebus in divina consurgere.

Reply Obj. 1: There are two things to consider in the knowledge of intellectual things: the
contemplation’s principle and its terminus. The principle is of course from sensible things,
but the terminus is in intelligible things, insofar as in natural cognition we receive universal
intentions from the appearances received from sensation, through the light of the agent
intellect. And therefore one should say that, as regards the terminus, one must turn to the
intellectual day, but as regards the principle of contemplation, one must rise up from certain
sensible appearances to the divine.

1
Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 2, para. 3 (PG 3:142).
2
Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 1, para. 2 (PG 3:122); Epistle 9, “To Titus,” para. 1 (PL 3:1103).

46
Ad secundum dicendum, quod similitudo est duplex: quaedam enim est per participationem
ejusdem formae; et talis similitudo non est corporalium ad divina, ut objectio probat. Est
etiam quaedam similitudo proportionalitatis, quae consistit in eadem habitudine
proportionum, ut cum dicitur: sicut se habet octo ad quatuor, ita sex ad tria; et sicut se habet
consul ad civitatem, ita se habet gubernator ad navem; et secundum talem similitudinem fit
transumptio ex corporalibus in divina: ut si Deus dicatur ignis ex hoc quod sicut se habet
ignis ad hoc quod liquefacta effluere facit per suum calorem, ita Deus per suam bonitatem
perfectiones in omnes creaturas diffundit, vel aliquid hujusmodi.

Reply Obj. 2: There are two sorts of likeness. For a certain likeness is through a participation
of the same form, and there is no such likeness of bodily things with divine, as the objection
proves. There is also a certain likeness of proportionality, which consists in the same relation
of proportion, as when one says, eight is related to four just as six is to three, and as the
consul stands to the city just as the pilot stands to the ship. And according to this sort of
likeness there can be a metaphorical transference from bodily things to divine, so that if God
be called a “fire” because fire stands to its melting things so that they to flow forth through
its heat, so too God, through his goodness, diffuses perfections into all created things, or
something like this.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod manifestatio veritatis est facienda secundum proportionem

recipientium; et quia quibusdam potius manifestatio veritatis noceret quam prodesset, dum
vel ex impietate impugnarent, vel ex simplicitate deficerent; ideo est divinorum veritas
occultanda, ut dicitur Matth. 7:6: nolite dare sanctum canibus.

Reply Obj. 3: The manifestation of truth should be done according to the proportion of those
receiving it. And because for some, the manifestation of truth would be harmful more than
it would be beneficial, when they might fight it, due to impiety, or they might make a
mistake, due to simplicity, therefore the truth about divine things should be hidden, as is said
in Matthew 7:6: do not give dogs what is holy.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod est quaedam assimilatio secundum convenientiam in natura; et

sic est major assimilatio intellectus nostri ad divina quam ad sensibilia; sed haec non est illa
quae requiritur ad scientiam. Est etiam quaedam assimilatio per informationem, quae
requiritur ad cognitionem: sicut visus assimilatur colori, cujus specie informatur pupilla.
Haec autem informatio non potest fieri in intellectu nostro secundum viam naturae, nisi per
species abstractas a sensu: quia, sicut dicit Philosophus, 3 De anima, sicut se habet color ad
visum, ita phantasmata ad intellectum; et ideo constat quod hoc modo intellectus magis
potest assimilari sensibilibus quam divinis.

Reply Obj. 4: There is a certain becoming-like according to an agreement in nature, and in

this way our intellect becomes more like divine things than sensible things. But this is not
the becoming-like that is required for knowledge. There is also a becoming-like through
being internally formed, which is what is required for knowing, just as sight becomes like a
color, by the species of which the pupil becomes internally formed. Now, this forming within
cannot occur in our intellect, according to the path of nature, except through species that are
abstracted from sensation. For, as the Philosopher says,1 as color stands to sight, so do

1
Aristotle, On the Soul 3.7, 431a15‒19.

47
phantasms stand to the intellect. And therefore it is certain that in this way the intellect is
more capable of becoming like sensible things than divine.

Articulus 2

Article 2

Utrum transumptio in divinis debeat fieri ex rebus vilibus

Whether metaphors for the divine should be extended from base things

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ex rebus vilibus non debeat fieri transumptio in
divina.

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that metaphors for the divine should not be
extended from base things.1

Sicut enim dictum est, omnis transumptio fit per aliquem modum similitudinis. Sed in rebus
vilibus non inveniuntur conditiones nobiles, ex quibus ad divina possit aliqua similitudo
attendi. Ergo videtur quod ex talibus rebus non debeant transumptiones in divina fieri.

Obj. 1: For, as the previous article said, every metaphorical extension arises through a certain
manner of likeness. But no noble conditions are found in base things, from which conditions
one might attend to some likeness to divine things. Therefore it seems that one should not
extend metaphors for divine things from such realities.

Si dicas, quod in rebus quantumcumque vilibus invenitur aliqua similitudo divinae bonitatis,
inquantum sunt vestigium Creatoris;

Obj. 2: You might say that in all realities, however base, there is found some likeness of the
divine goodness, insofar as they are traces of the Creator.

contra. In omni creatura invenitur similitudo vestigii vel imaginis. Si igitur hoc sufficit ad
transumptionem faciendam, videtur quod ex omnibus creaturis possit fieri transumptio in
divina: quod non invenitur.

On the contrary, in every created thing one finds the likeness of a trace or an image.
Therefore if this is enough for making a metaphorical extension, it seems that the extension
to divine things can be based on all created things—and this is not what we find.

Praeterea, expressior similitudo divinae bonitatis est in rebus incorporeis quam in rebus
sensibilibus. Ergo videtur quod nomina angelorum magis deberent in divinam
praedicationem transumi.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a more express likeness of the divine goodness is present in incorporeal
realities than in sensible realities. Therefore it seems that the names of the angels should be
extended more in divine predication.

1
Parallel text: ST I.1.9, ad 3.

48
Item, quae sunt omnino diversa, non debent eisdem figuris exprimi. Sed quaedam figurae
sunt quae inducuntur ad designandum contrarias potestates et daemones, sicut nomen
serpentis et leonis. Ergo videtur quod ad minus hujusmodi nomina in divinis transumi non
deberent.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, things that are altogether diverse should not be expressed by the same
figures. But some figures are brought in to designate contrary powers and demons, like the
names “serpent” and “lion.” Therefore it seems that at least such names should not be
extended to the divine.

Contra est quod in divinis Scripturis frequenter inveniuntur nomina etiam brutorum
animalium in divinam praedicationem transumi, ut dicitur Oseae 13:7: ero eis quasi leaena,
sicut pardus in via Assyriorum; et similiter in pluribus aliis locis. Ergo videtur quod etiam
ex vilibus rebus transumptio ad divina fieri possit.

On the contrary, in the divine Scriptures there are frequently found names even of brute
animals extended to divine predication; for example, I will be to them like a lion, like a
leopard I will lurk beside the way (Hos 13:7), and the like is found in many other passages.
Therefore it seems that metaphors for divine things can be extended even from base things.

Respondeo dicendum, quod hanc quaestionem Dionysius, 2 cap. Caelest. hierar., pertractat,
et ostendit quod etiam convenientius significantur nobis divina per creaturas viliores, quam
per nobiliores. Et primam rationem assignat, quia his magis occultantur divina, cujus
occultationis necessitas dicta est. Secundam assignat, quia ista magis a Deo removentur et
distant: et ideo cum convenientissimus modus significandi divina sit per negationem,
convenientius istis similitudinibus utimur. Tertiam assignat ex utilitate nostra quia minus
datur nobis occasio errandi in figuris rerum vilium quam in figuris rerum nobilium. Nullus
enim dubitat, Deum secundum proprietatem dici non posse aliquod vile animal; et ideo
constat quod Scriptura hujusmodi Deo secundum proprietatem non attribuit. Sed apud
aliquos simplices, qui vix aliquid praeter sensibilia suspicari possunt, de facili videretur ea
quae sunt nobilissima in corporibus, proprie Deo convenire, si de ipso dicerentur; et ideo
similitudines a rebus vilioribus sumptae, ipsa qualitate rerum retrahunt animum ab errore.
Invenitur tamen etiam in nobilioribus creaturis Deus significari in Scriptura, sicut sole, et
stella, et hujusmodi; non tamen ita frequenter.

I answer that Dionysius treats this question at length in the Heavenly Hierarchy,1 and he
shows that divine things are signified to us through baser creatures with even greater
fittingness than through nobler ones. The first reason he gives for this is that divine things
are more hidden, the need for which hiddenness was explained in the previous article. The
second reason he gives is that such things are more remote and distant from God, so because
the most fitting mode of signifying divine things is through negation, we more fittingly use
such likenesses. The third reason he bases on our utility, since we are given less occasion of
error in the figures of base things than in figures of noble things. For no one doubts that God
cannot be properly called any base animal, so it is certain that Scripture does not attribute
such things with propriety to God. But among some who are simple, who can barely
conjecture about anything beyond sensible things, it might easily seem that things that are
most noble among bodies would properly befit God, if they were to be said of him. And

1
Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 2, para. 2 (PG 3:138).

49
therefore likenesses drawn from baser realities, by that very quality of these realities, would
draw the mind away from error. Nonetheless in Scripture God is also found to be signified
in more noble creatures, like the sun, and a star, and such; yet this is not done frequently.

Ad primum igitur dicendum, secundum Dionysium, De div. nom., cap. 4, quod nihil divinae
bonitatis omnino participatione caret; et ideo ex rebus quantumcumque vilibus possunt sumi
aliquae convenientes similitudines ad divina.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Dionysius,1 nothing wholly lacks a participation in the divine
goodness; therefore from all realities, however base, can be drawn certain fitting likenesses
for divine things.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod quaedam nomina creaturarum sunt quae non nominant
tantum id quod creatum est, sed etiam defectum culpae annexum; sicut nomen diaboli
nominat naturam deformatam peccato: et ideo talibus nominibus non possumus transumptive
uti ad significandum divina.

Reply Obj. 2: There are some names of created things that name not only what is created,
but even a defect connected with fault, just as the name “devil” names a nature deformed by
sin. And therefore we cannot use such names metaphorically extended to signify the divine.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod in creaturis spiritualibus possumus duo considerare: scilicet

ipsas perfectiones divinae bonitatis secundum se acceptas; et his nominatur Deus, non
quidem symbolice, sed proprie, sicut dicitur sapiens et intelligens, et hujusmodi; unde etiam
dicitur in lib. De causis, quod Deus nominatur nomine primi causati sui, quod est
intelligentia. Vel possumus considerare ipsum modum determinatum participandi hujusmodi
perfectiones, qui modus pertinet ad determinatam naturam vel ordinem angelorum. Unde
nomina exprimentia istum modum non possunt proprie de Deo dici, nec etiam metaphorice,
quia metaphora sumenda est ex his quae sunt manifesta secundum sensum: et ideo nunquam
invenimus Deum in Scriptura nominatum Cherubim vel Seraphim vel aliquid hujusmodi,
sicut leonem, vel ursum, vel aliquid hujusmodi.

Reply Obj. 3: In spiritual creatures we can consider two things. We can consider the very
perfections of the divine goodness, taken according to their very selves; and God is named
by such—not symbolically, but properly—as when he is called “wise” and “knowing” and
such; so too in the Book of Causes it is said2 that God is named with the name of his first
effect, which is “intelligence.” Or we can consider the determinate mode itself of partici-
pating in such perfections, which mode pertains to the determinate nature or order of angels.
Whence names expressing this mode cannot be properly said of God—not even metaphor-
ically, since metaphor should be drawn from things that are manifest according to sensation.
And therefore in Scripture we never find God called a “cherubim” or “seraphim” or the like,
whereas we do find him called a “lion” or “bear” or the like.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod in una re possunt considerari diversae proprietates; et ideo non
est inconveniens quod ex eadem re, secundum diversas sui proprietates, fiat transumptio ad
aliqua contraria; sicut quod Deus dicitur leo propter liberalitatem, vel fortitudinem, vel

1
Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, paras. 1–3 (PG 3:694).
2
Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 6.

50
aliquid hujusmodi, et diabolus dicitur leo propter crudelitatem. Contingit etiam quandoque,
ut dicit Dionysius ad Titum, in Epistolis, quod idem nomen transfertur ad significandum
participantem et participationem, et participationis principium; sicut si ignis dicatur homo
habens caritatem, et ipsa caritas, et Deus caritatem infundens: et secundum omnia
diversimode exponendum est.

Reply Obj. 4: In one reality diverse properties can be considered. And therefore it is not
unfitting that from the same reality, according to its diverse properties, a metaphorical
extension can be made to contrary things. For example, God is called a “lion” on account of
his liberality or fortitude, or the like, and the devil too is called a “lion” on account of his
cruelty. It also sometimes happens, as Dionysius says in the Letter to Titus,1 that the same
name is extended to signify the one participating in something, the participation itself, and
the principle of the participation; for example, “fire” might name a man who has charity, the
charity itself, and God who infuses that charity. And one should interpret these according to
all such manners, but in diverse ways.

Reference:

Sentences Commentary

Sentences I, d. 21-48

The Commentary on the Sentences is Thomas Aquinas’s first major work. In it, Thomas comments
on the standard theological text of Peter Lombard, the Sentences, but indeed, he offers us much more
than a commentary. It is the only one of his works that is comparable to the Summa theologiae in
size and scope, and it includes topics that Thomas never treated in the Summa or anywhere else in
his opus. Moreover, the Commentary on the Senten-ces often contains explicit and in-depth accounts
of arguments or positions that Thomas refers to only implicitly or as subtext in his later works. As
such, this work is crucial to any consideration of the full thought of Thomas Aquinas.

Latina

The Latin text used in this volume is based on the Mandonnet edition.

English

The translation of this work is by Dr. Christopher Decaen.

1
Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistle 9, “To Titus,” para. 2 (PG 3:1107).

51
III. THE RATIONALE FOR DISTINGUISHING THE KINDS OF LIKENESS.

Things are called “like” which agree in form (cf. Summa Theol. Ia q. 4, art. 3, c.). But this
agreement can be considered according to something included in what a thing is or in
something outside the essence. If within the essence, there can be a likeness in genus or
species; if outside; in a property or accident.

1. Things that are alike in genus:

a) those admitting a transport because of a diversity of supposition

b) those not admitting a transport

2. a) Things that are alike in species

b) Things that are alike in a sign of the species (shape or something near to it)

3. Things that are alike in accidents other than shape

IV. THE TWO KINDS OF LIKENESS (OR LIKENING).

(1) Likeness through sharing the same form [= specific or generic form]

(2) Likeness through the same relation of proportions [= accidental form; cf. the
way in which a cause is known through the likeness of its effect]

The likeness constituting an image comes under the first kind, as does the likeness attended
to in the first three kinds of metaphor; the likeness constituting a proportional or analogous
metaphor comes under the second.

The division of likeness into two kinds: (1) that which is through sharing the same form, and
(2) that which is through the same relation of proportions (i.e. through a likeness of relation
[or of relations]). (1) is divided into (a) a likeness in form or species, (b) a likeness in genus,
and (c) a likeness according to some form of analogy.

52
V. SUPPLEMENT: ON THE USE OF SIMILITUDES IN SACRED SCRIPTURE.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Ver., q. 10. art. 7, ad 19 (tr. B.A.M.):

To the tenth it must be said that certain irrational creatures can, by some likeness, be more
likened to God than even the rational, with respect to an efficacy for causing: as is clear in a
ray of the sun, by which all things in lower things are caused and renewed. And in this way it
befits the divine goodness which causes everything, as Dionysius says. Still, according to the
properties inhering in it the rational creature is more like God than any of the irrational.
Nevertheless, that metaphorical expressions are more often carried over from irrational
creatures to God happens by reason of their unlikeness; since, as Dionysius says in chapter II
of the Celestial Hierarchy, “those things that are in lowlier creatures, are therefore more often
carried over to the divine so that every occasion for erring be taken away”. For a transport
made from nobler creatures could lead to a judgement that those things said metaphorically
were to be understood according to their proper meaning, that no one can believe about the
lowlier creatures themselves. (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. Ia, q. 1, art. 9 (tr. Alfred J. Freddoso):

Should Sacred Scripture make use of metaphors?

It seems that Sacred Scripture should not make use of metaphors:

Objection 1: That which is proper to the lowest doctrine does not seem to be suitable for the
science of sacred doctrine, which, as already noted, holds the highest place among the other
sciences. But to proceed by means of various similitudes and representations is proper to
poetics, which is the lowest among all doctrines. Therefore, using similitudes of this sort is
not appropriate for the science of sacred doctrine.

Objection 2: Sacred doctrine seems to be ordered to the manifestation of truth; thus it is that
according to Ecclesiasticus 24:31 (“They that explain me shall have life everlasting”), a reward
is promised to those who make the truth manifest. But the truth is obscured by similitudes of
the sort in question. Therefore, it is inappropriate for sacred doctrine to teach divine things by
means of similitudes drawn from corporeal things.

Objection 3: Creatures are more sublime to the extent that they are more similar to God. So if
any creatures are to be likened to God, the similes should be drawn especially from the more
sublime creatures and not from the lowliest. Yet this latter sort of simile is often found in
Sacred Scripture.

But contrary to this: Osee 12:10 says, “I have multiplied visions, and I have used similitudes
by the ministry of the prophets.” But to teach something by means of a similitude is
metaphorical. Therefore, making use of metaphors is pertinent to sacred doctrine.

I respond: It is appropriate for Sacred Scripture to teach about divine and spiritual things by
means of similitudes drawn from corporeal things. For God provides for all things in a way
that is suitable to their nature. But it is natural for man to approach intelligible things through
sensible things, since all our cognition takes its origin from the senses. Hence, it is appropriate
for Sacred Scripture to teach us spiritual things by way of metaphors drawn from corporeal
things. Dionysius makes this point in De caelesti hierarchia, chap. 1: “It is impossible for us
to be enlightened by the divine light unless it is covered by a variety of sacred veils.” In
addition, since Sacred Scripture is proposed generally to everyone (as Romans 1:14 puts it,

53
 “To the wise and to the unwise I am a debtor”), it is appropriate for spiritual things to be
proposed by means of similitudes drawn from corporeal things, in order that Scripture might
be grasped even by those who are so untutored as to be incapable of grasping what is
intelligible in itself.

Reply to objection 1: A poet uses metaphors for the sake of representation itself, since
representation is naturally delightful to man1. But, as noted above, sacred doctrine uses
metaphors out of necessity and because of their usefulness.

Reply to objection 2: As Dionysius says, the light of divine revelation is not destroyed by the
sensible figures in which it is veiled. Rather, it remains in its truth, so that it does not allow
the minds to which the revelation is made to persist in the similitudes, but instead raises them
to the cognition of intelligible things—and through these minds to which the revelation has
been made others are also instructed about those intelligible things. This is why things that in
one passage of Scripture are related by means of metaphors are expounded more explicitly in
other passages. Indeed, the very obscurity of the figures is useful for exercising more diligent
minds, and it is also useful for countering the ridicule of unbelievers of which Matthew 7:6
speaks (“Give not that which is holy to dogs”).

Reply to objection 3: As Dionysius teaches in De caelesti hierarchia, chap. 2, it is more fitting

for divine things to be transmitted in the Scriptures with figures of speech drawn from lower
bodies than with figures of speech drawn from more noble bodies—and this for three reasons.

First, in this way the mind is rendered more free from error. For it is obvious that the figures
in question are not being predicated properly of divine things, whereas there could be some
doubt about this if divine things were described by figures drawn from more noble bodies—
especially in the eyes of those who did not know how to conceive of anything more noble than
bodies.

Second, this mode of expression is more appropriate for the cognition that we have of God in
this life. For as far as God is concerned, what He is not is clearer to us than what He is. And
so similitudes drawn from things that are further removed from God produce in us the more
accurate impression that God is beyond what we say or think about Him.

Third, this mode of expression is better at hiding divine things from those who are unworthy
of them.

Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 32, q. 3, art. 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

Whether something should be said of God by way of transference.

One proceeds to the first as follows.

obj. 1. It seems that nothing ought to be said of God by way of transference. For, as Boethius
says, in divine things one must be busied in an intellectual manner, and not be led to images.
But transumptive expressions of this sort are taken from images formed of sensible things.
Therefore, they are not to be used in divine things.

1
On this matter, see my separate treatment.

54
 obj. 2. Further, according to the Philosopher, everything being carried over is carried over
according to some likeness.1 But according to Boethius, likeness is the same quality of different
things. Therefore, since qualities of bodily things are not found in the divine, it seems that no
likeness or metaphor can be taken from sensible things, so that something be said of God by
way of transference.

obj. 3. Again, every doctrine—and principally Sacred Scripture—exists for the manifes-
tation of truth. But metaphors of this sort, or symbolic expressions, are, as it were, a certain
veiling of the truth, as Dionysius says. Therefore, they are not to be used in theology.

obj. 4. Further, according to the Philosopher, knowledge comes about through the
assimilation of the intellect to the thing known. But our intellect, since it is incorporeal and
immaterial, has a greater likeness to divine things than to the bodily, which are material.
Therefore, it relates more to knowing the divine than bodily things of this sort. And so it seems
that the divine ought not to be manifested to us by a likeness of bodily things.

s.c. But against this is what Dionysius says: Neither is it possible otherwise for the divine
ray to shine in us except it be veiled about by an interchange of likenesses. But the divine ray
is the truth of divine things. Therefore, the truth of the divine must be proposed to us under
the likenesses of bodily things.

c. I reply that it must be said that it is most fitting for the divine to be indicated to us by
bodily likenesses, a fact for which four reasons can be assigned:

First and principally by reason of the loftiness of the matter, which exceeds the capacity of
our understanding. And so we cannot take hold of the truth of divine things according to its
own mode, and so it must be proposed to us according to our mode. But it is connatural to us
to come to intelligible things from the sensible, and to the prior from the posterior. And so
intelligible things are proposed to us under the figure of sensible things so that from the things
we know the soul might rise up to the unknown.

The second reason is this: since there is a twofold knowing part in us, namely, an intellective
and a sensitive, divine wisdom provides that both parts, insofar as possible, be led to divine
things. And so figures of bodily things that the sensitive part can take hold of have been
employed, because it could not of itself attain to the intellectual things of the divine.

The third reason is that, with respect to God, we more truly know what He is not than what
He is. And so Dionysius says that in divine things affirmations are loosely put together, but
negations are true. And seeing that, with respect to all the things we say about God, it must
be understood that they are not found in creatures in the same way in which they belong to
Him, but by way of some mode of imitation and likeness; this sort of preeminence of God was
expressly shown through the things to be removed from Him which are more manifest. But
these things are bodily; and so it was fitting that divine things be signified by bodily species
so that that the human soul, being inured to these things, would learn to attribute to Him none
of those things it predicates of God except by way of a certain likeness, insofar as the creature
imitates the Creator.

The fourth reason is for the sake of hiding divine truth: because the deep things of Faith
should be hidden from unbelievers, lest they mock them, and from simple men, lest they take

1
Cf. Aristotle, Top. VI. 6 (140a 11): “For all those carrying over [sc. a name, metapherontes] carry it over
[metapherousin] according to some likeness [or resemblance, homoioteta].”

55
 occasion to err. And all these causes are assigned by Dionysius at the beginning of the Celestial
Hierarchy, and in the Epistle to Titus.

ad 1. To the first, therefore, it must be said that there are two things to consider in know-
ledge of intellectual things, namely, the starting-point of speculation, and the term. The
starting-point is from sensibles, but the term is in intelligibles, insofar as in natural knowledge
of species taken from sense we acquire universal intentions through the light of the agent
intellect. And so it must be said that, with respect to the term of speculation, the starting-point
must rise up to the divine from certain sensible species.

ad 2. To the second it must be said that likeness is twofold: for there is a certain kind through
a sharing of the same form, and there is no such likeness of the bodily to the divine, as the
objection proves. There is also a certain kind by a likeness of proportionality, which consists
in the same relation of proportions, as when it is said, as eight is to four, so is six to three; and
as the consul is to the city, so is the pilot to the ship. And the transport from bodily things to
the divine is made according to such a likeness: as if God were called a fire because, just as
fire stands to this, that it make what is liquefied flow through its own heat, so God through his
own goodness pours perfections into every creature, or something of the sort.

ad 3. To the third it must be said that the manifestation of the truth is to be made according
to a proportion to the recipient, and because certain men impede the manifestation of the truth
rather than bring it forth, either when they quarrel from impiety, or fall short from simplicity—
therefore, the truth of the divine should be hidden, as is said in Matthew [7:6]: Do not give
what is holy to dogs.

ad 4. To the fourth it must be said that there is a certain assimilation according to a fittingness
in nature; and in this way there is a greater assimilation of our intellect to the divine than to
sensibles; but this is not the case in those things required for knowledge. There is also a certain
assimilation through the informing required for knowledge, just as sight is assimilated to color,
by whose species the pupil is informed. But this informing cannot come about in the intellect
following the road of nature, except by a species abstracted from sense, because, as the Philo-
sopher says, as color stands to sight, so stands the phantasm to the understanding; and so it
remains that in this way the intellect can be assimilated more to sensibles than to the divine.

Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. q. 1, art. 5, obj. 3, ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

obj. 3. Further, there ought not be one mode of sciences that have the greatest difference.
But the poetic, which contains the least amount of truth, to the highest degree differs from this
science, which is the most true. Therefore, since that [science] proceeds by metaphorical
expressions, the mode of this science ought not to be such.

ad 3. Poetic science1 is about things which, because of a defect of truth, cannot be grasped
by reason. So it is that reason must be seduced, as it were, by certain likenesses. Theology,
however, is about those things which are above reason, and so the symbolic mode is common
to both, since neither is proportioned to reason.

Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, qu. 101, art. 2, ad 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

Just as poetic things cannot be grasped by reason because of a defect of truth that is in them,
so, too, human reason cannot perfectly grasp divine things because of their exceeding truth.

1
That is, the knowledge one gets from works of the poetic art.

56
 And so on both sides there is need of representation by sensible figures.

On what it means for a doctrine to have a “defect of truth”, cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, In
I Post. Anal., lect. 6, nn. 4-6 (tr. B.A.M.):

There is one process of reason leading to necessity in which there can be no defect of truth.
And by a process of reason of this sort the certitude of science is acquired. But there is another
process of reason in which truth is concluded for the most part, yet not having necessity. But
there is a third process of reason in which reason falls short of the truth because of a defect in
some principle that was to be observed in the reasoning.
Now the part of logic to which the first process is reserved is called the judicative part, from
the fact that judgement is made with the certitude of science. And because a certain judgement
of effects cannot be had except by resolving to first principles, this part, therefore, is called
Analytic, i.e. resolving.
But the certitude of judgement which is had through resolution comes either from the very
form of the syllogism alone, and to this the book of the Prior Analytics is ordered, which is
about the syllogism simply; or this comes from the matter, because per se and necessary
propositions are taken, and to this the book of the Posterior Analytics is ordered, which is
about the demonstrative syllogism.
But to the second process of reason, which is called inventive, is reserved the other part of
logic. For discovery is not always had with certitude. For this reason judgement is required
about these things which have been discovered, that certitude be had.
Now just as in natural things, in those which act for the most part a certain gradation is
noticed (since, to the extent that a power is stronger, to that extent it more rarely falls short of
its effect), so that in the process of reason which is not in every way with certitude a certain
gradation is found insofar as a certitude more or less perfect is approached.
For through a process of this sort sometimes even if science does not result, it nevertheless
produces belief or opinion because of the probability of the propositions from which it
proceeds, since reason wholly inclines to one part of a contradiction although with fear of the
other, and to this topics, or dialectic, is ordered. For the dialectical syllogism consists in
probable things, which Aristotle treats in the book of the Topics.
But sometimes belief or opinion does not come about completely, but a certain suspicion
because it is not wholly inclined to one part of a contradiction, although it be more inclined to
this [part] than that. And rhetoric is ordered to this.1
But sometimes by a merely fanciful supposition it inclines to some2 part of a contradiction
because of some representation, the way in which there comes to be disgust in a man for some
food if it be represented to him under the likeness of something disgusting. And poetics is
ordered to this; for it belongs to the poet to lead to something virtuous through some suitable
representation.

Now all these things pertain to rational philosophy: for to lead from one thing into another
belongs to reason. But the part of logic called sophistic observes the third process of reason,
about which Aristotle treats in the book of Elenchi.

1
“And,” St. Thomas might have added, “this is the subject which Aristotle treats in the book of the Rhetoric.”
A similar addition could be made to his remarks on poetics, which follow.
2
That is, to “this or that part” since, as one may gather from the example that follows, someone’s reason could
just as easily incline to the other part of a contradiction if the same food happened to be represented him under
the likeness of something appetizing rather than disgusting.

57
VI. ON THE FOURFOLD SENSE OF SACRED SCRIPTURE.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. Ia, q. 1, art. 10 (tr. Fr. Laurence Shapcote, O.P.):

Article 10: Whether in Holy Scripture a word may have several senses?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article:

Objection 1: It seems that in Holy Writ a word cannot have several senses, historical or
literal, allegorical, tropological or moral, and anagogical. For many different senses in one text
produce confusion and deception and destroy all force of argument. Hence no argument, but
only fallacies, can be deduced from a multiplicity of propositions. But Holy Writ ought to be
able to state the truth without any fallacy. Therefore in it there cannot be several senses to a
word.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Util. Cred. iii) that “the Old Testament has a
fourfold division as to history, etiology, analogy and allegory.” Now these four seem
altogether different from the four divisions mentioned in the first objection. Therefore it does
not seem fitting to explain the same word of Holy Writ according to the four different senses
mentioned above.

Objection 3: Further, besides these senses, there is the parabolical, which is not one of these
four.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xx, 1): “Holy Writ by the manner of its speech
transcends every science, because in one and the same sentence, while it describes a fact, it
reveals a mystery.”

I answer that, The author of Holy Writ is God, in whose power it is to signify His meaning,
not by words only (as man also can do), but also by things themselves. So, whereas in every
other science things are signified by words, this science has the property, that the things
signified by the words have themselves also a signification. Therefore that first signification
whereby words signify things belongs to the first sense, the historical or literal. That
signification whereby things signified by words have themselves also a signification is called
the spiritual sense, which is based on the literal, and presupposes it. Now this spiritual sense
has a threefold division. For as the Apostle says (Heb. 10:1) the Old Law is a figure of the
New Law, and Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) “the New Law itself is a figure of future glory.”
Again, in the New Law, whatever our Head has done is a type of what we ought to do.
Therefore, so far as the things of the Old Law signify the things of the New Law, there is the
allegorical sense; so far as the things done in Christ, or so far as the things which signify Christ,
are types of what we ought to do, there is the moral sense. But so far as they signify what
relates to eternal glory, there is the anagogical sense. Since the literal sense is that which the
author intends, and since the author of Holy Writ is God, Who by one act comprehends all
things by His intellect, it is not unfitting, as Augustine says (Confess. xii), if, even according
to the literal sense, one word in Holy Writ should have several senses.

Reply to Objection 1: The multiplicity of these senses does not produce equivocation or any
other kind of multiplicity, seeing that these senses are not multiplied because one word
signifies several things, but because the things signified by the words can be themselves types
of other things. Thus in Holy Writ no confusion results, for all the senses are founded on one—
the literal—from which alone can any argument be drawn, and not from those intended in
allegory, as Augustine says (Epis. 48). Nevertheless, nothing of Holy Scripture perishes on

58
 account of this, since nothing necessary to faith is contained under the spiritual sense which is
not elsewhere put forward by the Scripture in its literal sense.

Reply to Objection 2: These three—history, etiology, analogy—are grouped under the literal
sense. For it is called history, as Augustine expounds (Epis. 48), whenever anything is simply
related; it is called etiology when its cause is assigned, as when Our Lord gave the reason why
Moses allowed the putting away of wives—namely, on account of the hardness of men’s
hearts; it is called analogy whenever the truth of one text of Scripture is shown not to contradict
the truth of another. Of these four, allegory alone stands for the three spiritual senses. Thus
Hugh of St. Victor (Sacram. iv, 4 Prolog.) includes the anagogical under the allegorical sense,
laying down three senses only—the historical, the allegorical, and the tropological.

Reply to Objection 3: The parabolical sense is contained in the literal, for by words things
are signified properly and figuratively. Nor is the figure itself, but that which is figured, the
literal sense. When Scripture speaks of God’s arm, the literal sense is not that God has such a
member, but only what is signified by this member, namely operative power. Hence it is plain
that nothing false can ever underlie the literal sense of Holy Writ.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Super ad Galatas, cp. 4, lect. 7 (tr. B.A.M.):

He says, therefore, These things which are written about the two sons, etc. are said
through an allegory—that is, through another understanding. For allegory is a trope or
manner of speaking by which one thing is said and another is understood. Whence allegory is
said from allos, which is “other” and goge, “a leading”, as if to say, “leading to another
understanding”.
But it must be noted that allegory is sometimes taken for a mystical understanding of any
sort, sometimes for only one of the four which are the historical, the mystical, and the
anagogical, which are the four senses of Sacred Scripture, and yet they differ with respect to
signification. For there is a twofold signification. One is through sounds of voice; another is
through the things signified by the sounds of voice. And this is particularly the case in Sacred
Scripture and not in the others; forasmuch as God is its author, in whose power it is not only
to accommodate vocal sounds for the purpose of designating [something] (which even man is
able to do), but also the things themselves. And so in the other sciences handed on by man
which cannot be accommodated for signifying except by words alone, they signify solely by
sounds of voice. But this is proper in this science, that the very things signified by vocal sounds
signify something else through them, and so this science can have many senses. For that
signification by which vocal sounds signify something pertains to the literal or historical
sense; but that signification by which the things signified by the vocal sounds in turn signify
other things, pertains to the mystical sense.
But something can be signified by the literal sense in two ways, namely, according to proper
speech, as when I say, “the man smiles;” or according to a likeness or metaphor, as when I
say, “the meadow smiles.” And we use both ways in Sacred Scripture, as when we say
according to the first way that “Jesus ascends,” and when we say according to the second that
“He sits at the right hand of the Father.” And so under the literal sense is included the parabolic
or metaphoric.
But the mystical or spiritual sense is divided into three. For in the first place, as the Apostle
says, the Old Law is a figure of the New Law. And so, insofar as those things which belong to
the Old Law signify the things of the New, there is the allegorical sense.
Again, according to Dionysius in the book About the Celestial Hierarchy, the New Law is
the figure of future glory. And so insofar as those things which are in the New Law and in
Christ signify the things in the fatherland, there is the anagogic sense.
Again, in the New Law those things which are done in the Head are examples of the things
we ought to do, because whatever things are written are written for our doctrine. And so insofar

59
 as those things in the New Law done in Christ, and in those things which signify Christ, are
signs of the things we ought to do, there is the moral sense. And all of these are clear in an
example. For when I make this statement, “Let there be light,” according to the letter about
bodily light, it pertains to the literal sense. If “Let there be light” is understood to mean that
Christ is born in the Church, it pertains to the allegorical sense. But if “Let there be light”
is said so that (one understands that) through Christ we are led into glory, it pertains
to the anagogic sense. If, however, “Let there be light” is said so that [one understands that]
through Christ we are enlightened in understanding and inflamed in affection, it pertains to
the moral sense.

Cf. Quodlibet VII, Q. 6 On the senses of Sacred Scripture via The Aquinas Institute:

De sacra Scriptura

On Sacred Scripture

Quaestio 6

Question 6
De sensibus sacrae Scripturae

On the senses of Sacred Scripture

Deinde quaeritur de sensibus Sacrae Scripturae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria:

Then there were questions about the senses of Sacred Scripture. And about this there were
three questions:

primo, utrum praeter sensum litteralem in verbis Sacrae Scripturae lateant alii sensus
spirituales;

first, whether besides the literal sense there lie hidden in the words of Sacred Scripture other
spiritual senses;

secundo, de numero sensuum Sacrae Scripturae;

second, concerning the number of senses of Sacred Scripture;

tertio, utrum isti sensus inveniantur in aliis scripturis.

third, whether those senses are found in other writings.

Articulus 1

Article 1

Utrum praeter sensum litteralem in verbis sacrae scripturae lateant alii sensus spirituals

60
 Whether besides the literal sense there lie hidden in the words of Sacred Scripture other
spiritual senses

Ad primum sic proceditur.

Videtur quod in eisdem verbis Sacrae Scripturae non lateant plures sensus.

To the first we proceed thus.

It seems that in the same words of Sacred Scripture there do not lie hidden many senses.

Quia dictionibus semel sumptis non est utendum aequivoce vel multipliciter; sed pluralitas
sensuum facit multiplicitatem locutionis; ergo in eadem locutione Sacrae Scripturae non
possunt plures sensus latere.

Obj. 1: Because sayings employed once must not be used equivocally1 or in manifold ways.
But a plurality of senses makes a multiplication of speech. Therefore, in the same speech of
Sacred Scripture there cannot lie hidden many senses.

Praeterea. Sacra Scriptura ordinata est ad illuminandum intellectum, Psalmus: declaratio

sermonum tuorum etc.; sed multiplicitas sensuum obnubilat intellectum; ergo non debent in
Sacra Scriptura multi sensus esse.

Obj. 2: Sacred Scripture is ordered to illuminating the understanding, as the Psalm says: the
declaration of your speeches (Ps 119 [118]:130). But a multiplicity of senses obscures
understanding. Therefore, there should not be many senses in Sacred Scripture.

Praeterea. Id quod potest esse occasio erroris debet in Sacra Scriptura vitari; sed ponere alios
sensus praeter litteralem in Scriptura potest esse occasio erroris, quia quilibet posset
exponere Scripturam secundum hoc quod ipse vellet ad confirmationem suae opinionis; ergo
non debent esse plures sensus in Sacra Scriptura.

Obj. 3: That which can be an occasion of error should be avoided in Sacred Scripture. But
to posit in Scripture other senses besides the literal can be an occasion of error, because
someone could expound Scripture according to his wish in order to confirm his opinion.
Therefore, there should not be many senses in Sacred Scripture.

Praeterea. Augustinus dicit, II Super Genesim ad litteram, quod maior est Sacrae Scripturae
auctoritas quam omnis humani ingenii perspicacitas; ergo ille sensus qui non habet
auctoritatem ad aliquid confirmandum non est conveniens sensus Sacrae Scripturae; sed
nullus sensus praeter litteralem habet robur ad aliquid confirmandum, ut patet per Dionysium
in epistola ad Titum: dicit enim quod symbolica theologia, id est quae ex similitudinibus
procedit, non est argumentativa; ergo Sacra Scriptura alios sensus praeter litteralem non
habet.

1
Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, tract. 10, ch. 1, q. 3, 3.1:121; Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 11,
P. 2, dub. 2, 4:265.

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Obj. 4: Augustine says, in the second book of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis,
that greater is the authority of Sacred Scripture than every perspicacity of human gen-
ius.1 Therefore, a sense which does not have authority to confirm something is not a fitting
sense of Sacred Scripture. But no sense besides the literal has strength to confirm something,
as is clear through Dionysius in his epistle to Titus: for he says that symbolic theology, which
proceeds from likenesses, is not argumentative.2 Therefore, Sacred Scripture does not have
other senses besides the literal.

Praeterea. Quicumque sensus ex verbis alicuius Scripturae trahitur quem auctor non intendit,
non est sensus proprius, sed rivalis; sed auctor per unam Scripturam non potest intelligere
nisi unum, quia non contingit simul plura intelligere, secundum Philosophum; ergo non
possunt esse plures sensus proprii Sacrae Scripturae.

Obj. 5: Any sense drawn from the words of some Scripture which the author does not intend
is not a proper sense, but a rival. But the author can only understand one thing through one
Scripture, because to understand many things simultaneously does not happen, according to
the Philosopher.3 Therefore, there cannot be many proper senses of Sacred Scripture.

Sed contra est quod dicitur Danielis XII: pertransibunt plurimi et multiplex erit scientia.

On the contrary (1): It is said in Daniel 12:4: many shall pass through and knowledge shall
be manifold.

Praeterea. Hieronymus dicit in prologo Bibliae, loquens de Apocalypsi: in verbis singulis

multiplices latent intelligentiae.

Furthermore (2): Jerome says in the prologue of the Bible, speaking about the Apocalypse: in
each of the words manifold understandings lie hidden.4

Responsio. Dicendum quod Sacra Scriptura ad hoc divinitus tradita est ut per eam nobis
veritas manifestetur necessaria ad salutem; manifestatio autem vel expressio alicuius
veritatis potest fieri dupliciter, rebus et verbis, in quantum scilicet verba significant res et
una res potest esse figura alterius; auctor autem Sacrae Scripturae, scilicet Spiritus Sanctus,
non solum est auctor verborum, sed etiam est auctor rerum, unde non solum verba potest
accomodare ad aliquid significandum, sed etiam res potest disponere in figuram alterius; et
secundum hoc in Sacra Scriptura manifestatur veritas dupliciter: uno modo, secundum quod
res significantur per verba, et in hoc consistit sensus litteralis; alio modo, secundum quod
res sunt figurae aliarum rerum, et in hoc consistit sensus spiritualis. Et sic Sacrae Scripturae
plures sensus competunt.

I answer that Sacred Scripture has been handed over from heaven so that through it the truth
necessary for salvation might be manifested to us. Yet the manifestation or expression of
some truth can happen in two ways: by things and by words, namely, inasmuch as words

1
Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2.5, para. 9 (CSEL 28:39; PL 34:267).
2
Pseudo-Dionysius, Letter 9, “To Titus” (PG 3:1106–7); cf. Aquinas, In I Sent., prol., a. 5; 11.1.1, ad 1; In III
Sent. 11.1.4, exp. text.
3
Aristotle, Topics 2.10, 114b34–35.
4
Jerome, Epistle 53, Ad Paulinum, para. 8 (PL 22:549).

62
signify things and one thing can be a figure of another. Yet the author of Scripture, namely,
the Holy Spirit, is not only the author of words but also of things. Hence not only can he
accommodate words to signify something, but also he can arrange things to be the figure of
something else. And according to this, truth is manifested in two ways in Sacred Scripture:
one way is how things are signified through words, and in this consists the literal sense;
another way is how things are figures of other things, and the spiritual sense consists in this.
And thus, many senses apply to Sacred Scripture.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod varietas sensuum quorum unus ex alio non procedit facit
multiplicitatem locutionis; sed sensus spiritualis semper fundatur super litteralem et procedit
ex eo, unde ex hoc quod Sacra Scriptura exponitur litteraliter et spiritualiter, non est in ipsa
aliqua multiplicitas.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that a variety of senses where one does not proceed from
another makes a multiplication of speech. But the spiritual sense is always founded upon the
literal and proceeds from it. Hence, since Sacred Scripture is expounded literally and
spiritually, there is not any multiplicity in it.

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro De doctrina Christiana, utiliter
est a Deo dispositum ut veritas in Sacra Scriptura cum aliqua difficultate manifestetur: est
enim hoc utile ad tollendum fastidium, quia ad ea quae sunt difficilia maior surgit attentio,
quae taedium tollit. Similiter ex hoc tollitur superbiendi occasio, dum homo difficulter
veritatem Scripturae capere potest. Similiter per hoc veritas fidei ab irrisione infidelium
defenditur; unde Dominus, Matthaei VII: nolite sanctum dare canibus; et Dionysius
Timotheum monebat ut sancta ab immundis incontaminata servaret. Et ita patet quod expedit
veritatem fidei sub diversis sensibus in Sacra Scriptura tradi.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that, as Augustine says in the book On Christian Doctrine, it
is profitably disposed by God for truth in Sacred Scripture to be manifested with some
difficulty: for this is useful for destroying tedium, since to those things which are difficult
there rises a greater attention, which destroys tedium. Similarly, the occasion of pride is
destroyed1 when a man can seize the truth of Scripture only with difficulty. Similarly, the
truth of the faith is defended in this way from the derision of infidels. Hence the Lord
says: do not give what is holy to dogs (Matt 7:6), and Dionysius admonished Timothy that
he should preserve holy things uncontaminated from the unclean.2 And thus, it is clear that
it is expedient that the truth of the faith should be handed over under diverse senses in Sacred
Scripture.

Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana, nihil est quod
occulte in aliquo loco Sacrae Scripturae tradatur, quod non alibi manifeste exponatur. Unde
spiritualis expositio semper debet habere fulcimentum ab aliqua litterali expositione Sacrae
Scripturae, et ita vitatur omnis erroris occasio.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that, as Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine, there is
nothing which is handed over secretly in some place of Sacred Scripture which elsewhere is

1
Cf. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 2.6, para. 7 (CCSL 32:35; PL 34:38).
2
Pseudo-Dionysius, Letter 9, “To Titus” (PG 3:1106–7).

63
not expounded manifestly. Hence a spiritual exposition should always have a support from
some literal exposition of Sacred Scripture, and thus every occasion of error is avoided.

Ad quartum dicendum quod non est propter defectum auctoritatis quod ex sensu spirituali
non potest trahi efficax argumentum, sed est ex ipsa natura similitudinis in qua fundatur
spiritualis sensus: una enim res pluribus similis esse potest, unde non potest ab illa re, quando
in Scriptura proponitur, procedi ad aliquam illarum determinate, sed est fallacia
consequentis. Verbi gratia: leo propter aliquam similitudinem significat et Christum et
diabolum, unde per hoc quod aliquid de leone dicitur in Sacra Scriptura ad neutrum potest
fieri processus argumentando.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that it is not on account of a defect of authority that an
efficacious argument cannot be handed over from the spiritual sense, but it is from the very
nature of likeness on which the spiritual sense is founded. For one thing can be like many.
Hence from that thing, when it is proposed in Scripture, one cannot proceed to any of those
likenesses determinately, but it is the fallacy of the consequent. For example: a lion on
account of some likeness signifies both Christ and the devil. Hence just because something
is said about a lion in Sacred Scripture, an advance to neither (Christ nor the devil) can be
made by argumentation.

Ad quintum dicendum quod auctor principalis Sacrae Scripturae est Spiritus Sanctus, qui in
uno verbo Sacrae Scripturae intellexit multo plura quam per expositores Sacrae Scripturae
discernantur. Non est etiam inconveniens quod homo qui fuit auctor instrumentalis Sacrae
Scripturae in uno verbo plura intelligeret, quia prophetae, ut Hieronymus dicit super Osee,
ita loquebantur de factis presentibus quod etiam intenderent futura significare; unde non est
impossibile simul plura intelligere in quantum unum est figura alterius.

Reply Obj. 5: It must be said that the principal author of Sacred Scripture is the Holy Spirit,
who has understood in one word of Sacred Scripture many more things than are discerned
through the expositors of Sacred Scripture. It is not even unfitting for a man who was an
instrumental author of Sacred Scripture to understand many things in one word. For the
prophets, as Jerome says in his commentary on Hosea, so spoke concerning present deeds
that they intended also to signify future ones. Hence it is not impossible to understand many
things simultaneously inasmuch as one is a figure of another.

Articulus 2

Article 2

De numero sensuum Sacrae Scripturae

On the number of senses of Sacred Scripture

Ad secundum sic proceditur.

Videtur quod non debeant distingui quatuor sensus Sacrae Scripturae, scilicet historicus vel
litteralis, allegoricus, moralis et anagogicus.

To the second we proceed thus.

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It seems that there should not be distinguished four senses of Sacred Scripture, namely,
historical or literal, allegorical, moral, and anagogical.

Sicut enim in Sacra Scriptura aliqua figurate dicuntur de Christo, ita etiam aliqua figurate
dicuntur de aliis hominibus, sicut Danielis VIII per hircum caprarum significatur rex
Graecorum; sed huiusmodi figurate locutiones non faciunt aliquem sensum praeter litteralem
in Sacra Scriptura; ergo nec allegoricus sensus, per quem exponuntur de Christo ea quae in
figura ipsius praecesserunt, debet alius sensus ab historico poni.

Obj. 1: For just as in Sacred Scripture some things are said figuratively concerning Christ,
so also some things are said figuratively concerning other men, such as when in Daniel 8:5
the king of the Greeks is signified through a he-goat. But figurative sayings of this sort do
not constitute some sense beyond the literal in Sacred Scripture. Therefore, neither should
an allegorical sense, whereby things which preceded in figure are interpreted to be about
Christ, be posited as a sense different from the historical.

Praeterea. Una persona est capitis et membrorum; sed sensus allegoricus videtur pertinere
ad caput Ecclesiae, scilicet Christum, sensus autem moralis videtur pertinere ad membra
eius, scilicet fideles; ergo sensus moralis non debet ab allegorico distingui.

Obj. 2: Of the head and members there is one person. But the allegorical sense seems to
pertain to the head of the Church, namely, Christ, yet the moral sense seems to pertain to her
members, namely, the faithful. Therefore, the moral sense should not be distinguished from
the allegorical.

Praeterea. Moralis sensus est qui ad morum instructionem pertinet; sed Sacra Scriptura
secundum litteralem sensum in pluribus locis mores instruit; ergo moralis sensus non debet
distingui a litterali.

Obj. 3: The moral sense is that which pertains to the instruction of morals. But Sacred
Scripture according to the literal sense instructs in morals in many places. Therefore, the
moral sense should not be distinguished from the literal.

Praeterea. Sicut Christus est caput Ecclesiae militantis, ita est caput Ecclesiae triumphantis,
nec est alius et alius Christus; ergo nec sensus anagogicus, per quem aliquid exponitur de
Ecclesia triumphante, debet esse alius ab allegorico, quo exponitur de Christo et Ecclesia
militante.

Obj. 4: Just as Christ is head of the Church militant, so he is head of the Church triumphant;
nor are these different Christs. Therefore, neither should the anagogical sense, through which
something is expounded concerning the Church triumphant, be other than the allegorical, by
which it is expounded concerning Christ and the Church militant.

Praeterea. Si isti quatuor sensus essent de necessitate Sacrae Scripturae, quaelibet pars
Sacrae Scripturae deberet hos quatuor sensus habere; sed hoc falsum est: ut enim Augustinus
dicit super Genesim, in quibusdam sensus litteralis quaerendus est solus; ergo hi quatuor
sensus non sunt de necessitate expositionis Sacrae Scripturae.

65
Obj. 5: If those four senses were to belong to Sacred Scripture necessarily, every part of
Sacred Scripture would need to have those four senses. But this is false: for as Augustine
says in his commentary on Genesis, in certain things the literal sense alone must be
sought.1 Therefore, these four senses do not belong to the exposition of Sacred Scripture
necessarily.

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in principio Super Genesim ad litteram: in libris
omnibus sanctis oportet intueri quae ibi aeterna intimentur, quae facta narrentur, quae
futura praenuntientur, quae agenda praecipiantur; primum autem pertinet ad sensum
anagogicum, secundum ad historicum, tertium ad allegoricum, quartum ad moralem; ergo
quatuor sunt sensus Sacrae Scripturae.

On the contrary (1): Augustine says in the beginning of On the Literal Meaning of
Genesis: in all the sacred books it is necessary to consider what things there are related as
eternal, what are narrated as having been done, what are foretold as future, what are
commanded as having to be done.2 Yet the first pertains to the anagogical sense, the second
to the historical, the third to the allegorical, the fourth to the moral. Therefore, the senses of
Sacred Scripture are four.

Praeterea. Beda dicit in principio Genesis: quatuor sunt sensus Sacrae Scripturae: historia,
quae res gestas loquitur, allegoria, in qua aliud ex alio intelligitur, tropologia, id est moralis
locutio, in qua de moribus ordinandis tractatur, anagogia, per quam de summis et
caelestibus tractaturi ad superiora ducimur.

Furthermore (2): Bede says on the beginning of Genesis: the senses of Sacred Scripture are
four: history, which speaks of events accomplished; allegory, in which one thing is
understood from another; tropology, that is, moral speech, in which it is treated concerning
the ordering of morals; anagoge, through which we who are to treat concerning the highest
and celestial things are led to higher things.3

Responsio. Dicendum quod distinctio horum quatuor sensuum hoc modo accipi debet. Sicut
enim dictum est, Sacra Scriptura veritatem quam tradit dupliciter manifestat, per verba et per
rerum figuras; manifestatio autem quae est per verba facit sensum historicum sive litteralem,
unde totum illud ad sensum litteralem pertinet quod ex ipsa significatione verborum recte
accipi potest; sed sensus spiritualis, ut dictum est, consistit in hoc quod quaedam res per
figuram aliarum rerum exprimuntur, et quia visibilia solent esse figurae invisibilium, ut
Dionysius dicit, inde est quod sensus iste, qui ex figuris accipitur, spiritualis vocatur.

I answer that the distinction of these four senses should be understood in this way. For as
has been said, Sacred Scripture manifests the truth which it hands over in a twofold way:
through words and through the figures of things.4 Yet the manifestation through words
makes the historical or literal sense, hence the whole of that pertains to the literal sense which
can be understood rightly from the signification itself of the words. But the spiritual sense,
1
Cf. Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 8.1 (CSEL 28:229; PL 34:371–73); 8.4 (CSEL
28:236; PL 34:375–76).
2
Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 1.1 (CSEL 28:3; PL 34:247).
3
Glossa ordinaria, at Prothemata glossa ordinariae, 1:1 (PL 113:63); Bede, On the Tabernacle 1 (CCSL 119
A:25; PL 91:410).
4
Above: q. 6, a. 1, resp.

66
as has been said,1 consists in that certain things are expressed through the figure of other
things. And because visible things tend to be figures of invisible, as Dionysius says,2 hence
it is that the sense which is understood from figures is called spiritual.

Veritas autem quam Sacra Scriptura per figuras rerum tradit, ad duo ordinatur, scilicet ad
recte credendum et ad recte operandum. Si ad recte operandum, sic est sensus moralis, qui
alio nomine tropologicus dicitur. Si autem ad recte credendum, oportet distinguere
secundum ordinem credibilium; ut enim Dionysius dicit IV capitulo Ecclesiasticae
hierarchiae, status Ecclesiae medius est inter statum synagogae et statum Ecclesiae
triumphantis: Vetus enim Testamentum figura fuit Novi, Vetus simul et Novum figura sunt
caelestium. Sensus ergo spiritualis ordinatus ad recte credendum potest fundari in illo modo
figurationis quo Vetus Testamentum figurat Novum, et sic est sensus allegoricus vel typicus,
secundum quem ea quae in Veteri Testamento contigerunt exponuntur de Christo et Ecclesia;
vel potest fundari in illo modo figurationis quo Novum simul et Vetus significant Ecclesiam
triumphantem, et sic est sensus anagogicus.

Yet the truth which Sacred Scripture hands over through the figures of things is ordered to
two things, namely, to believing rightly and to working rightly. If to working rightly, thus it
is the moral sense, which by another name is called tropological. Yet if it is to believing
rightly, it is necessary to distinguish according to the order of things to be believed. For as
Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy,3 the state of the Church
is a middle between the state of the synagogue and the state of the Church triumphant: for
the Old Testament was a figure of the New, and Old and New simultaneously are a figure of
heavenly things. Therefore, the spiritual sense ordered to believing rightly can be founded
upon that mode of figuring by which the Old Testament figures the New, and thus it is the
allegorical or typical sense, according to which those things which occurred in the Old
Testament are expounded concerning Christ and the Church. Or it can be founded upon that
mode of figuring by which New and Old simultaneously signify the Church triumphant, and
thus it is the anagogical sense.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hircus vel alia huiusmodi per quae aliae personae a Christo
in Scriptura designantur, non fuerunt res aliquae, sed similitudines imaginariae ad hoc solum
ostensae ut illae personae significarentur; unde illa significatio qua per illas similitudines
personae illae aut regna designantur, non pertinet nisi ad historicum sensum. Sed ad
Christum significandum etiam illa quae in rei veritate contigerunt ordinantur sicut umbrae
ad veritatem; et ideo talis significatio qua per huiusmodi res Christus aut eius membra
significantur, facit alium sensum praeter historicum, scilicet allegoricum. Sicubi vero
inveniatur quod Christus significetur per huiusmodi imaginarias similitudines, talis
significatio non excedit sensum litteralem; sicut Christus significatur per lapidem qui excisus
est de monte sine manibus, Danielis II.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the he-goat or other things of this sort through which
persons other than Christ are designated in Scripture were not any things, but imaginary
likenesses shown only to signify those persons. Hence that signification by which those
persons or kingdoms are designated through those likenesses does not pertain to any but the

1
Above: q. 6, a. 1, resp.
2
Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy 1.3 (PG 3:122).
3
Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 4.1–3 (PG 3:471–78); 5.1–3 (PG 3:499–503).

67
historical sense. But even those which occurred in the truth of the thing are ordered to
signifying Christ as shadows to the truth. And for this reason, such a signification by which
Christ or his members are signified through things of this sort, makes another sense beyond
the historical, namely, the allegorical. Whereas if anywhere it is found that Christ is signified
through imaginary likenesses of this sort, such a signification does not exceed the literal
sense, just as Christ is signified through the stone which was cut off from the mountain
without hands (Dan 2:45).

Ad secundum dicendum quod sensus allegoricus non solum pertinet ad Christum ratione
capitis, sed etiam ratione membrorum, sicut quod per duodecim lapides electos de Iordane,
Iosue VII, significantur duodecim apostoli; sed moralis sensus pertinet ad membra Christi
quantum ad proprios eorum actus et non secundum quod considerantur ut membra.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the allegorical sense not only pertains to Christ by the
character of head, but also by the character of members, just as that the twelve stones chosen
from the Jordan, in Joshua 4:3, signify the twelve Apostles. But the moral sense pertains to
the members of Christ as much as to their proper acts and not according as they are
considered as members.

Ad tertium dicendum quod moralis sensus non dicitur omnis sensus per quem mores
instruuntur, sed per quem instructio morum sumitur ex similitudine aliquarum rerum
gestarum: sic enim moralis sensus est pars sensus spiritualis. Unde patet quod nunquam est
idem sensus moralis et litteralis.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that the moral sense is not called every sense through which
there is instruction in morals, but through which the instruction of morals is assumed from
the likeness of some events accomplished: for thus the moral sense is part of the spiritual
sense. Hence it is clear that the moral and the literal sense are never the same.

Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut sensus allegoricus pertinet ad Christum secundum quod
est caput Ecclesiae militantis iustificans eam et gratiam infundens, ita et sensus anagogicus
pertinet ad eum secundum quod est caput Ecclesiae triumphantis glorificans eam.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said, just as the allegorical sense pertains to Christ according as he
is head of the Church militant justifying her and infusing grace, so also the anagogical sense
pertains to him according as he is head of the Church triumphant glorifying her.

Ad quintum dicendum quod quatuor isti sensus non attribuuntur Sacrae Scripturae quia in
qualibet parte eius sit istis quatuor sensibus exponenda, sed quandoque istis quatuor,
quandoque tribus, quandoque duobus, quandoque uno tantum. In Sacra enim Scriptura
praecipue ex prioribus posteriora figurantur; et ideo, quando in Sacra Scriptura secundum
sensum litteralem dicitur aliquid de priori, potest spiritualiter exponi de posterioribus, sed
non convertitur. Inter omnia autem quae in Sacra Scriptura narrantur, prima sunt illa quae
ad Vetus Testamentum pertinent, et ideo ea quae secundum litteralem sensum ad facta
Veteris Testamenti spectant, possunt quatuor sensibus exponi. Secunda vero sunt illa quae
pertinent ad statum praesentis Ecclesiae, in quibus illa sunt priora quae ad caput pertinent
respectu eorum quae pertinent ad membra, quia ipsum corpus verum Christi et ea quae in eo
sunt gesta sunt figura corporis mystici et eorum quae in ipso geruntur; ex ipso etiam Christo
exemplum vivendi sumere debemus; in ipso etiam futura gloria nobis praemonstrata est.
68
Reply Obj. 5: It must be said that those four senses are not attributed to Sacred Scripture
because every part must be expounded by those four senses, but rather sometimes by those
four, sometimes by three, sometimes by two, sometimes by one only. For in Sacred
Scripture, later things especially are figured from prior ones. And for this reason, when in
Sacred Scripture something is said according to the literal sense that concerns a prior thing,
it can be expounded spiritually concerning later things, but not conversely. Yet amongst all
those things which are narrated in Sacred Scripture, the first are those which pertain to the
Old Testament, and for this reason, those things which according to the literal sense look to
the deeds of the Old Testament can be expounded by the four senses. Whereas the second
are those which pertain to the state of the present Church, in which those which pertain to
the head are prior in respect of those which pertain to the members, because the true body
of Christ itself, and those things which are in it, have been borne by figure of the mystical
body and of those which are borne in it. From Christ himself we ought also to assume an
example of living; in him also future glory is foreshadowed for us.

Unde ea quae ad litteram de ipso Christo capite dicuntur possunt exponi et allegorice
referendo ad corpus eius mysticum, et moraliter referendo ad actus nostros qui secundum
ipsum debent informari, et anagogice in quantum in ipso Christo est nobis iter gloriae
demonstratum. Sed quando secundum litteralem sensum dicitur aliquid de Ecclesia, non
potest exponi allegorice, nisi forte ea quae dicuntur de primitiva Ecclesia exponantur
quantum ad futurum statum Ecclesiae praesentis; possunt tamen exponi moraliter et
anagogice. Ea vero quae moraliter dicuntur secundum sensum litteralem non consueverunt
exponi nisi anagogice. Illa vero quae secundum sensum litteralem pertinent ad statum
gloriae, nullo alio sensu consueverunt exponi, eo quod ipsa non sunt figura aliorum, sed ab
omnibus aliis figurata.

Hence those things which according to the letter are told concerning Christ the head can be
expounded allegorically as referring to his mystical body, and morally as referring to our
acts which ought to be informed according to him, and anagogically inasmuch as the path of
glory has been demonstrated for us in Christ himself. But when according to the literal sense
something is said concerning the Church, it cannot be expounded allegorically, unless
perhaps that those things said about the primitive Church should be expounded as much as
to the future state of the present Church. Nevertheless, they can be expounded morally and
anagogically. Whereas those things which are said morally according to the literal sense are
only accustomed to be expounded anagogically. Whereas those which according to the literal
sense pertain to the state of glory are accustomed to be expounded by no other sense, since
they themselves are not a figure of other things, but are figured by all other things.

Articulus 3

Article 3

Utrum isti sensus inveniantur in aliis scripturis

Whether those senses are found in other writings

Ad tertium sic proceditur.

Videtur quod etiam in aliis scripturis praedicti sensus distingui debeant.

69
To the third we proceed thus.

It seems that the above-mentioned senses should be distinguished in other writings also.

Sensus enim spirituales in Sacra Scriptura accipiuntur ex quibusdam similitudinibus; sed in

aliis scientiis proceditur etiam ex quibusdam similitudinibus; ergo in scripturis aliarum
scientiarum possunt spirituales sensus inveniri.

Obj. 1: For the spiritual senses in Sacred Scripture are taken from certain likenesses. But in
other sciences we also proceed from certain likenesses. Therefore, the spiritual senses can
be found in the writings of other sciences.

Praeterea. Poeticae artis est veritatem rerum aliquibus similitudinibus fictis designare; ergo
videtur quod etiam in dictis poetarum spirituales sensus inveniantur et non solum in Sacra
Scriptura.

Obj. 2: It belongs to the poetic art to designate the truth of things by any made-up
likenesses.1 Therefore, it seems that also in the sayings of poets the spiritual senses may be
found and not only in Sacred Scripture.

Praeterea. Philosophus dicit quod qui dicit unum, quodam modo multa dicit; ergo videtur
quod in aliis scientiis in uno sensu possint multa designari, et sic non sola Scriptura Sacra
hos sensus spirituales habet.

Obj. 3: The Philosopher says that he who says one thing, in a certain way says
many.2 Therefore, it seems that in other sciences one can designate many things in one sense,
and thus not only Sacred Scripture has those spiritual senses.

Sed contra est quod dicit Gregorius XX Moralium: Sacra Scriptura omnes scientias atque
doctrinas ipso etiam locutionis suae more transcendit, quia uno eodemque sermone dum
narrat testum, prodit mysterium.

On the contrary: Gregory in the twentieth book of the Morals on the Book of
Job says: Sacred Scripture transcends all sciences and doctrines even by the very custom of
its speaking, because by one and the same speech while it narrates of witnesses, it produces
a mystery.3

Responsio. Dicendum quod spiritualis sensus Sacrae Scripturae accipitur ex hoc quod res
cursum suum peragentes aliquid aliud significant, quod per spiritualem accipitur sensum.
Sic autem ordinare res in cursu suo ut ex eis talis significatio accipi possit, est eius solius qui
sua providentia res gubernat, qui solus Deus est. Sicuti enim homo potest adhibere ad aliquid
significandum aliquas voces vel aliquas similitudines fictas, ita Deus adhibet ad
significationem aliquorum ipsum cursum rerum suae providentiae subiectarum. Significare
autem aliquid per verba vel per similitudines fictas ad significandum tantum ordinatas, non
facit nisi sensum litteralem, ut ex dictis patet. Unde in nulla scientia humana industria

1
Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, bk. 1, lect. 1.
2
Cf. Albert the Great, Summa de quatuor coequevis, tr. 4, q. 35; Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.12, 1037b8–27.
3
Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 20.1, 1 (CCSL 143A:1003; PL 76:135).

70
inventa proprie loquendo potest inveniri nisi litteralis sensus, sed solum in illa Scriptura
cuius, Spiritus Sanctus est actor, homo vero instrumentum tantum, secundum illud
Psalmiste: lingua mea calamus scribae etc.

I answer that the spiritual senses of Sacred Scripture are understood from this: that the things
running their course signify something else, which is understood through a spiritual sense.
Yet to order things in their course that from them such a signification can be understood
belongs to him alone who by his providence governs things, who alone is God. For just as
man can present some voices or some made-up likenesses to signify something, so God
presents the course itself of things subject to his providence to signify something. Yet to
signify something through words or through made-up likenesses ordered only to signifying
does not constitute anything but a literal sense, as is clear from what has been said. 1 Hence
in no human science discovered by human industry, properly speaking, can there be found
any sense but the literal, but only in that Scripture of which the Holy Spirit is author, whereas
man is only an instrument, according to that line of the Psalmist: my tongue the reed-pen of
a scribe (Ps 45:1 [44:2]).

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in aliis scientiis proceditur ex similitudinibus

argumentando, non quod verbis quibus una res significatur, significetur et alia res.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that in other sciences we proceed from likenesses by
argumentation, not that something else also is signified by the words which signify one thing.

Ad secundum dicendum quod fictiones poeticae non sunt ad aliud ordinatae nisi ad
significandum; unde talis significatio non supergreditur modum litteralis sensus.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that poetic fictions are not ordered to anything else except to
signifying. Hence such signification does not pass beyond the mode of the literal sense.

Ad tertium dicendum quod qui dicit unum quodam modo dicit multa, scilicet in potentia,
secundum quod conclusiones sunt potentia in principiis: ex uno enim principio multae
conclusiones sequuntur; et non quod in aliis scientiis per modum significationis quod dicitur
de una re simul de aliis intelligatur ut significatum, licet inde trahi possit per
argumentationem.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that he who says one thing says in a certain way many things,
namely, in potency, according as conclusions are potencies in principles: for from one
principle many conclusions follow. And it is not that in other sciences through the mode of
signification what is said concerning one thing simultaneously is understood concerning
others as its signification, although granted it can be drawn thence through argumentation.

Reference:

Disputed Questions

Quodlibet VII

1
Above: q. 6, a. 2, ad 1.

71
 Latina

The Latin text is based on the Leonine edition (1996), transcribed and edited by The Aquinas
Institute. The orthography has been adapted to standard ecclesiastical Latin.

English

Translation prepared by Urban Hannon for The Aquinas Institute.

N.B. For an excellent discussion of this doctrine by a contemporary Catholic biblical scholar,
cf. Michael M. Waldstein, “Analogia Verbi: The Truth of Scripture in Rudolf Bultmann and
Raymond Brown,” Letter & Spirit: A Journal of Catholic Biblical Theology 6 (2010): 93–
140. See especially the section From Brown’s Literal Sense to Aquinas’s Spiritual Sense,
pp. 126 ff.

Supplement: On ‘fire’ as the most important metaphor for God according to Duane H.
Berquist

Cf. Michael Augros, Notes from the Berquist Seminars (1992-93) (duane.1):1

FIRST PHILOSOPHY <…>

2) 11/4/92 Fire is the most important metaphor for God. Fire has light (understanding), heat
(love), and the ability to move and change things (power). The sun illumines the earth before
it heats it, just as God illumines the mind by faith before moving it by love. The substance
of fire is as the Father from which two things proceed: the light it gives off as the Word, and
the heat it gives off as the Holy Spirit. The Son proceeds from the Father and the Holy Spirit
from the Father through the Son, as the sun enlightens the earth before it warms it. Thus the
burning bush is a symbol of the incarnation: the fire does not consume the bush; the human
nature remains intact and distinct even once taken up by the divine nature. (The bush comes
up out of the earth, as the human body is made of dust and to dust it shall return.) Existence,
substance, and operation are the same in God, but we understand and treat them differently
and separately because we understand them from creatures (thus St Thomas has one treatise
for the substance and another for the operation of God in the Summa). Fire has an aspect
that represents this: it is active and subtle, as God is pure act and perfectly simple. Heraclitus
said “fire is the beginning of all things”, and to the extent that one understands the propriety
of fire as a metaphorical name for God, this is true. The name must be a metaphor, however
(and not a proper name, not even analogous), since “water” is also said of God. One Psalm
in each of the three groups of fifty is about thirsting for God (water is the source of life, and
God is the source not only of our natural life but also of our supernatural life in grace.

1
The following notes were taken in the 1992-93 seminars at Dr. Duane Berquist’s home. The text read for
those seminars was St. Thomas’s commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima. Dates indicate the dates of the seminars
in which the notes were taken, and numbers followed by n (e.g. n 15) indicate relevant paragraph numbers in
St. Thomas’s commentary.

72
THAT VISIBLE THINGS MAKE KNOWN THE INVISIBLE THINGS OF GOD.

Cf. Dionysius the Areopagite, Ep. IX, To Titus, Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete Works, tr.
Colm Luibheid, pp. 283-4:

[1105D] But there is a further point to understand. Theological tradition has a dual aspect, the
ineffable and mysterious on the one hand, the open and the more evident on the other. The one
resorts to symbolism and involves initiation. The other is philosophic and employs the method
of demonstration. (Further, the inexpressible is bound up with what can be articulated.) The
one uses persuasion and imposes the truthfulness of what is asserted. The other acts and, by
means of a mystery which cannot be taught, it puts souls firmly in the presence of God. This
is why the sacred initiators of our tradition, together with those of the tradition of the Law,
resorted freely to symbolism appropriate to God, [1108A] regarding the sacraments of the
most holy mysteries. Indeed we see the blessed angels using riddles to introduce the divine
mysteries.1 Jesus himself speaks of God by means of parables, and passes on to us the mystery
of his divine activity by using the symbolism of a table. It was right not only that the Holy of
Holies should be kept free from the contamination of the mob, but also that human life which
is undivided but also divided should receive in an appropriate way the enlightenment of divine
knowledge.2 And so [283-284] the impassive element of the soul is attuned to the simple and
interior visions of those images which have the shape of the divine. On the other hand the
passionate element of the soul, as befits its nature, honors and rises up toward the most divine
realities by way of the carefully combined elements of the representations. These symbolic
veils are akin [1108B] [to that part of the soul], as seen by the example of those who, having
been taught the things of God in a way which is clear and unveiled, go on then to picture in
themselves some image guiding them to a conception of the theological teaching which they
have listened to.

2. As Paul said and as true reason has said, the ordered arrangement of the whole visible
realm makes known the invisible things of God.3 By the same token, scripture writers in their
consideration of a theme look at it sometimes in a social and legal perspective and sometimes
purely and without any mixture of anything else. They look at it sometimes at the human and
intermediate level, sometimes in a transcendent mode and in the context of perfection.
Sometimes they rely on the laws governing visible things, sometimes on rules which govern
invisible things, and all things depending on what suits the sacred writings, minds, and souls.
Whether one looks at the question in its entirety or in individual detail theirs is not a discourse
totally in the bare historical domain but one which has to do with life-giving perfection….
1
Zec 3:4.
2
The double rationale for biblical and liturgical symbols, namely, secrecy and accommo-
dation, is more fully stated in EH 1 377Q 1-5. See also CH 2 140 AB 7-18, 145 A 8-10, and
above 1105C 3645.
3
Rom 1:20.
§

73
 II

Concerning the Narratives in the Historical Books Which

Have Only the Appearance of Being Historical

The Biblical Commission answers the following question:

Whether we may admit as a principle of sound exegesis the opinion which holds that
those books of Holy Scripture which are regarded as historical, either wholly or in part,
sometimes narrate what is not history properly so-called and objectively true, but only have
the appearance of history and are intended to convey a meaning different from the strictly
literal or historical sense of the word.

Answer: In the negative; excepting always the case—not to be easily or rashly

admitted, and then only on the supposition that it is not opposed to the teaching of the Church
and subject to her decision—that it can be proved by solid arguments that the sacred writer
did not intend to give a true and strict history, but proposed rather to set forth, under the
guise and form of history, a parable or an allegory or some meaning distinct from the strictly
literal or historical signification of the words.

June 23, 1905.

(tr. ed. James J. Megivern, Official Catholic Teachings: Bible Interpretation, p. 229)

Comparison of translations.

(tr. Official Catholic Teachings: Bible (Walter Drum, “Tobias”, The Catholic
Interpretation, p. 229) Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV, 1912)

Whether we may admit as a principle of sound QUESTION: “Is it possible to admit as a

exegesis the opinion which holds that those principle of sound exegesis (biblical inter-
books of Holy Scripture which are regarded as pretation) that books of Sacred Scripture that
historical, either wholly or in part, sometimes are regarded as historical, at times do not relate,
narrate what is not history properly so-called either wholly or in part, history properly so-
and objectively true, but only have the called and objectively true, but present only the
appearance of history and are intended to appearance of history with the purpose of
convey a meaning different from the strictly expressing some meaning differing from the
literal or historical sense of the word. strictly literal or historical sense of the words?”

Answer: In the negative; excepting always the ANSWER: “In the negative, except in a case
case—not to be easily or rashly admitted, and neither easily nor rashly to be admitted, in
then only on the supposition that it is not which, the mind of the Church not being
opposed to the teaching of the Church and contrary and without prejudice to its judgment,
subject to her decision—that it can be proved by it is proved by solid arguments that the sacred
solid arguments that the sacred writer did not Writer intended not to recount true history,
intend to give a true and strict history, but properly so-called, but under the guise and form
proposed rather to set forth, under the guise and of history to set forth a parable, an allegory, or
form of history, a parable or an allegory or some some meaning distinct from the strictly literal or
meaning distinct from the strictly literal or historical signification of the words.”
historical signification of the words.

74
23 June 1905

Among other things the Commission in 1905 denied that

“those books of Sacred Scripture which are regarded as historical, either wholly or in part,
sometimes narrate what is not history properly so-called and objectively true, but only have
the appearance of history and are intended to convey a meaning different from the strictly
literal or historical sense of the words” (EB 161).

To the best of my knowledge the Church has never made an official decree concerning
specifically the matter of Noah and the Flood. However on June 23, 1905 the Pontifical
Biblical Commission made an official decree regarding Scriptural narratives that are
historical only in form or appearance. The decree is in the form of Question and Answer, as
follows:

QUESTION: “Is it possible to admit as a principle of sound exegesis (biblical interpretation)

that books of Sacred Scripture that are regarded as historical, at times do not relate, either
wholly or in part, history properly so-called and objectively true, but present only the
appearance of history with the purpose of expressing some meaning differing from the
strictly literal or historical sense of the words?”

ANSWER: “In the negative, except in a case neither easily nor rashly to be admitted, in
which, the mind of the Church not being contrary and without prejudice to its judgment, it
is proved by solid arguments that the sacred Writer intended not to recount true history,
properly so-called, but under the guise and form of history to set forth a parable, an allegory,
or some meaning distinct from the strictly literal or historical signification of the words.”
(from Cardinal Taguchi, no edition or translator listed)

The Commission was asked:

Is it possible to admit as a principle of sound exegesis that books of Sacred Scripture which are
regarded as historical at times do not relate. either wholly or in part history properly so-called and
objectively true, but present only ‘the appearance of history with the purpose of expressing some
meaning differing from the strictly literal or historical sense of the words.’

The Commission answered:

In the negative. Except in the case, neither easily nor rashly to be admitted in which, the mind of the
Church not being contrary and without prejudice to its judgment, it is proved by solid arguments that
. . . under the guise and form of history, a parable, an allegory. etc. is set forth.
(from Edith Black, no edition or translator listed)

This almost unanimity among Catholic exegetes is quite in keeping with the decision of the
Biblical Commission (23 June, 1905). By this Decree Catholics are forbidden to hold that a
book of the Holy Writ, which has generally been looked upon as historical, is either entirely
or in part not history properly so called, unless it be proven by solid arguments that the sacred
writer did not intend to write history; and the solidity of the arguments against the historicity
of an historical book of the Bible we are not to admit either readily or rashly. (Walter Drum,
“Tobias”, The Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV, 1912)

75
According to Fr. William G. Most, “Basic Scripture”:

In others words, such people neglect the lesson of literary genres. They do not ask what is
the genre of Genesis 1-3. It is actually an ancient story, made up to serve as a vehicle for
teaching some things that really happened, chiefly: God made all things, in some special
way, He made the first pair (we leave room for possible theistic evolution, one that sees the
need of God’s intervention every time higher being appears), that He gave them some
command (we do not know if it was about a fruit tree - that may be stage dressing in the
story, something not asserted), that they violated His orders and fell from favor (= lost grace
and so did not have it to pass on to their children)….

On June 23, 1905, the Biblical Commission gave a reply:

“Can that be accepted as a principle of sound interpretation which holds that some books of
Scripture that are considered as historical – partly or totally – do not at times, give history
strictly and objectively so called, but instead, have just the appearance of history, so as to
convey something other than a strict literal or historical sense of the words?” The reply was:
“No, except in the case in which when the sense of the Church does not oppose it, and subject
to the judgment of the Church, it is proved by solid arguments that under the appearance and
form of history, the sacred author intended to give a parable, an allegory, or a sense differing
from the properly literal or historical sense of the words.”

<…>

b) Historical nature of the first chapters of Genesis: We already cited Pius XII saying that in
some way the first eleven chapters pertain to history, even though not a history of the type
written by the great Greek and Roman writers, or by modern writers. We take this to mean
that the literary genre is such that by the vehicle of a story, things that really happened
substantially are conveyed. (William G. Most)

A. J. Maas, The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. VII, s.v. “Hexaemeron”, II. The Source of
the Hexaemeron. (3) Hebrew Folk-Lore.

Finally the Biblical Commission in a decree issued 30 June, 1909, denies the exis-
tence of any solid foundation for the various exegetical systems devised and defended with
a show of science to exclude the literal, historical sense of the first three chapters of Genesis;
in particular, it forbids the teaching of the view that the said three chapters of Genesis
contain, not accounts of things which have really happened, but either fables derived from
mythologies and the cosmogonies of ancient peoples, and by the sacred author expurgated
of all error of polytheism and adapted to monotheistic doctrine, or allegories and symbols
destitute of any foundation of objective reality and proposed under the form of history to
inculcate historical and philosophical truths, or legends partly historical and partly fictitious
freely composed for the instruction and edification of minds. The commission bases its pro-
hibition on the character and historical form of the Book of Genesis, the special nexus of the
first three chapters with one another and with those that follow, the almost unanimous opin-
ion of the Fathers, and the traditional sense which, transmitted by the people of Israel, the
Church has ever held.

§
76
According to Official Catholic Teachings: Bible Interpretation, tr. James J. Megivern.

VI

On the Historical Character of the First Three Chapters of Genesis

The Biblical Commission answers the following questions:

1. False Exegesis—Whether the various exegetical systems, which have been elabor-
ated and defended by the aid of a science falsely so-called, for the purpose of excluding the
literal historical sense of the first three chapters of Genesis, are based upon solid arguments.

Answer: In the negative.

2. Historical Character of the Three Chapters—Whether we may, in spite of the

character and historic form of the book of Genesis, of the close connection of the first three
chapters with one another and with those which follow, of the manifold testimony of the
Scriptures both of the Old and the New Testament, of the almost unanimous opinion of the
Fathers, and of the traditional view which—transmitted also by the Jewish people—has
always been held by the Church, teach that the three aforesaid chapters do not contain the
narrative of things which actually happened, a narrative which corresponds to objective
reality and historic truth; and whether we may teach that these chapters contain fables
derived from mythologies and cosmologies belonging to older nations, but purified of all
polytheistic error and accommodated to monotheistic teaching by the sacred author; or that
they contain allegories and symbols destitute of any foundation in objective reality but pre-
sented under the garb of history for the purpose of inculcating religious and philosophical
truth; or, finally, that they contain legends partly historical and partly fictitious, freely
handled for the instruction and edification of souls.

Answer: In the negative to each part.

3. Historical Character of Certain Parts—Whether, in particular, we may call in

question the literal and historical meaning where there is a questions of facts narrated in
these chapters which touch the fundamental teachings of the Christian religion, as for
example, the creation of all things which was accomplished by God at the beginning of time,
the special creation of man, the formation of the first woman from man, the unity of the
human race, the original happiness of our first parents in a state of justice, integrity, and
immortality, the divine command laid upon man to prove his obedience, the transgression of
that divine command at the instigation of the devil under the form of a serpent, the fall of
our first parents from their primitive state of innocence, and the promise of a future Re-
deemer.

Answer: In the negative.

4. Interpretation—Whether, in interpreting those passages of these chapters which

the Fathers and Doctors have interpreted in divers ways without leaving us anything definite
or certain, anyone may, subject to the decision of the Church and following the analogy of
faith, follow and defend that opinion at which he has prudently arrived.

77
 Answer: In the affirmative.

5. Literal Sense—Whether all and each of the parts, namely, the single words and
phrases, in these chapters must always and of necessity be interpreted in a proper literal
sense, so that it is never lawful to deviate from it, even when expressions are manifestly used
figuratively, that is, metaphorically or anthropomorphically, and when reason forbid us to
hold, or necessarily impels us to depart from, the proper literal sense.

Answer: In the negative.

6. Allegory and Prophecy—Whether, granting always the literal and historical sense,
the allegorical and prophetical interpretation of certain passages of these chapters—an
interpretation justified by the example of the fathers and the Church—may be prudently
applied.

Answer: In the affirmative.

7. Yom—Whether the word Yom (day), which is used in the first chapter of Genesis
to describe and distinguish the six days, may be taken either in its strict sense as the natural
day, or in a less strict sense as signifying a certain space of time; and whether free discussion
on this question is permitted to interpreters.

Answer: In the affirmative.

June 30, 1909.

§

78
Selected excerpts.

On 30 June 1909 the Biblical Commission replied “in the negative” to the following
questions:

Whether we may, in spite of the character and historic form of the book of Genesis, of the close
connection of the first three chapters with one another and with those which follow, of the manifold
testimony of the Scriptures both of the Old and the New Testament, of the almost unanimous opinion
of the Fathers, and of the traditional view which – transmitted also by the Jewish people – has always
been held by the Church, teach that the three aforesaid chapters do not contain the narrative of things
which actually happened, a narrative which corresponds to objective reality and historic truth; and
whether we may teach that these chapters contain fables derived from mythologies and cosmologies
belonging to older nations, but purified of all polytheistic error and accommodated to monotheistic
teaching by the sacred author; or that they contain allegories and symbols destitute of any foundation
in objective reality but presented under the garb of history for the purpose of inculcating religious
and philosophical truth; or, finally, that they contain legends partly historical and partly fictitious,
freely handled for the instruction and edification of souls. Answer: in the negative to each part. 24

24. Response of the Biblical Commission, 30 June 1909, “On the Historical Character of the
First Three Chapters of Genesis” (DS no. 3513). Eng. trans. in Rome and the Study of
Scripture, pp. 122-123.

The main point of this document that interests us is the third question addressed by
the Commission:

Whether, in particular, the literal historical sense (sensus litteralis historicus) may be called in
question (vocari in dubium possit), where it is a question of facts narrated in these chapters (ubi
agitur de factis in eisdem capitibus enarratis) which involve the foundations of the Christian religion
(quae christianae religionis fundamenta attingunt), as are, among others, the creation of all things
by God at the beginning of time; the special [or, particular] creation of man; the formation of the first
woman from the first man (formatio primae mulieris ex primo homine); the unity of the human race;
the original happiness of our first parents in a state of justice, integrity and immortality; the precept
given by God to man in order to test his obedience; the transgression of the divine precept under the
persuasion of the devil in the guise of a serpent; the fall of our first parents from the aforesaid
primaeval state of innocence; and the promise of a future Saviour?

Response: In the negative (Negative).30

30. DS 3514 (= D 2123), emphasis added.

He is here quoting from a response of the Biblical Commission dated 16 January

1948, which is a clarification of three official responses given by the same Commission on
23 June 1905, 27 June 1906, and 30 June 1909 respectively. The relative statement in the
response of 1948 reads as follows:

2. The question of the literary forms of the first eleven chapters of Genesis is far more obscure and
complex. ... To declare a priori that their narratives contain no history in the modern sense of the
term would easily convey the idea that they contain no history whatever, whereas they relate in
simple and figurative language, adapted to the understanding of a less developed people, the
fundamental truths presupposed for the economy of salvation, as well as a popular description of the
origin of the human race and of the Chosen People. 22

79
22. Response of the Biblical Commission, 16 January 1948 (DS no. 3864). Eng. trans. in
Rome and the Study of Scripture, pp. 152-153.

On 30 June 1909 the Biblical Commission replied in the negative to the following
question:

Whether, since it was not the intention of the sacred author, when writing the first chapter of
Genesis, to teach in a scientific manner the innermost nature of visible things as well as the complete
order of creation but rather to furnish his people with a popular account, such as the common parlance
of that age allowed, one, namely, adapted to the senses and to the mental preparation of the persons,
we are strictly and always bound, when interpreting these chapters to seek for scientific exactitude
of expression. Answer: In the negative. 34

34. DS, 3518. Cf. Eng. trans. in Rome and the Study of Scripture, p. 124.

On the same day and attached to the same response there was another reply of the
Biblical Commission concerning the word yôm in Genesis 1:

Whether the word yôm (day), which is used in the first chapter of Genesis to describe and
distinguish the six days, may be taken either in its proper sense as the natural day, or in an improper
sense as signifying a certain space of time; and whether free debate on this question is permitted
among exegetes. Answer: In the affirmative. 35

35. DS, 3519. Cf. Eng. trans. in Rome and the Study of Scripture, p. 124.

Consider the following decree of the PBC on the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch:

Whether it may be granted, without prejudice to the Mosaic authenticity of the Pentateuch, that
Moses employed sources in the production of his work, i.e., written documents or oral traditions,
from which, to suit his special purpose and under the influence of divine inspiration, he selected
some things and inserted them in his work, either literally or in substance, summarized or amplified.
Answer: In the affirmative.8

8. Enchiridion Biblicum no. 183, cf. A.A.S., 39 (1906) 377.

Consider the following PBC decree on the unity of authorship of the book of the prophet
Isaiah:

Whether the philological argument, one derived from the language and the style, and employed to
impugn the identity of the author of the book of Isaiah, is to be considered weighty enough to compel
a man of judgment, versed in the principles of criticism and well acquainted with Hebrew, to
acknowledge in the same book a plurality of authors. Answer: In the negative.9

9. Enchiridion Biblicum no. 279, cf. A.A.S., 41 (1908) 613.

Decisions of the Bible Commission (30-6-1909)

The first three chapters of genesis contain narratives of real events, no myths, no mere
allegories or symbols of religious truths, no legends. (dogma 2122)

80
In regard to those facts, which touch the foundations of the Christian religion, the literal
historical sense is to be adhered to. Such facts are the creation of all things by God in the
beginning of time, and the special creation of humanity. (dogma 2123)

Between 1905 and 1915 the Pontifical Biblical Commission emitted fifty-nine authoritative
replies regarding certain doubts raised by historical critics. Among other things the Commis-
sion in 1905 denied that “those books of Sacred Scripture which are regarded as historical,
either wholly or in part, sometimes narrate what is not history properly so-called and object-
tively true, but only have the appearance of history and are intended to convey a meaning
different from the strictly literal or historical sense of the words” (EB 161). In 1909 it ex-
cluded that “the various exegetical systems which have been elaborated and defended by the
aid of pseudo-science to exclude the literal historical sense of the first three chapters of Gene-
sis are based upon solid arguments” (EB 324). And also in 1909 it denied that “the three
aforesaid chapters . . . contain [purified] fables derived from mythologies and cosmologies
belonging to older nations . . . ; or that they contain allegories and symbols destitute of any
foundation in objective reality but presented under the garb of history to inculcate religious
and philosophical truth; or, finally, that they contain legends partly historical and partly
fictitious, freely handled for the instruction and edification of souls” (EB 325).

Finally the Biblical Commission in a decree issued 30 June, 1909, denies the exis-
tence of any solid foundation for the various exegetical systems devised and defended with
a show of science to exclude the literal, historical sense of the first three chapters of Genesis;
in particular, it forbids the teaching of the view that the said three chapters of Genesis
contain, not accounts of things which have really happened, but either fables derived from
mythologies and the cosmogonies of ancient peoples, and by the sacred author expurgated
of all error of polytheism and adapted to monotheistic doctrine, or allegories and symbols
destitute of any foundation of objective reality and proposed under the form of history to
inculcate historical and philosophical truths, or legends partly historical and partly fictitious
freely composed for the instruction and edification of minds. The commission bases its
prohibition on the character and historical form of the Book of Genesis, the special nexus of
the first three chapters with one another and with those that follow, the almost unanimous
opinion of the Fathers, and the traditional sense which, transmitted by the people of Israel,
the Church has ever held.

<…>

The legitimate character of this method of proceeding will become clear in the light of the
aforesaid decree of 30 June, 1909, issued by the Biblical Commission. After safeguarding
the literal, historical sense of the first three chapters of Genesis in as far as they bear on the
facts touching the foundations of the Christian religion – e.g., the creation of all things by
God at the beginning of time, the special creation of man, the formation of the first woman
from the first man, the unity of the human race – the commission lays down several special
principles as to the interpretation of the first part of Genesis: – (1) Where the Fathers and
Doctors differ in their interpretation, without handing down anything as certain and defined,
it is lawful, saving the judgment of the Church and preserving the analogy of faith, for
everybody to follow and defend his own prudently adopted opinion.

(2) When the expressions themselves manifestly appear to be used improperly, either
metaphorically or anthropomorphically, and when either reason prohibits our holding the
81
proper sense, or necessity compels us to set it aside, it is lawful to depart from the proper
sense of the words and phrases in the above-mentioned chapters. (3) In the light of the
example of the holy Fathers and of the Church herself, presupposing the literal and historical
sense, the allegorical and prophetical interpretation of some parts of the said chapters may
be wisely and usefully employed. (4) In interpreting the first chapter of Genesis we need not
always look for the precision of scientific language, since the sacred writer did not intend to
teach in a scientific manner the intimate constitution of visible things and the complete order
of creation, but to give his people a proper notion according to the common mode of
expression of the time. (5) In the denomination and distinction of the six days mentioned in
the first chapter of Genesis the word yôm (day) can be taken either in its proper sense, as a
natural day, or in an improper sense, for a period of time, and discussion on this point among
exegetes is legitimate.

The question was stated:

“Whether the various exegetical systems which have been proposed to exclude the literal
historical sense of the three first chapters of the Book of Genesis, and have been defended
by the pretense of science, are sustained by a solid foundation?”

The PBC’s answer was: “Reply: In the negative.” In other words, the PBC was not about to
let the theories of science dictate the interpretation of Genesis.

To be fair, the PBC balanced Query 1 by its offering Query 5:

“Whether all and everything, namely, words and phrases which occur in the aforementioned
chapters, are always and necessarily to be accepted in a special sense, so that there may be
no deviation from this, even when the expressions themselves manifestly appear to have
been taken improperly, or metaphorically or anthropomorphically, and either reason pro-
hibits holding the proper sense, or necessity forces its abandonment?”

The PBC answered: “Reply: In the negative.”

Query 8 stated:

“Whether in that designation and distinction of six days, with which the account of the first
chapter of Genesis deals, the word ‘days’ can be assumed either in its proper sense as a
natural day, or in the improper sense of a certain space of time; and whether with regard to
such a question there can be free disagreement among exegetes?

The PBC’s answer was: “Reply: In the affirmative.”

Here is the actual wording of Roy Defarri’s translation:

“Question 1: Whether the various exegetical systems which have been proposed to exclude
the literal historical sense of the first three chapters of the Book of Genesis...are sustained
by a solid foundation? - Reply: In the negative.”

82
“Question 2: Whether...it can be taught that the three aforesaid chapters of Genesis do not
contain the stories of events which really happened, that is, which correspond with objective
reality and historical truth...? - Reply: In the negative...”

“Question 3: Whether in particular the literal and historical sense can be called into
question...the transgression of the divine command through the devil’s persuasion under the
guise of a serpent...? - Reply: In the negative.”

Notice here that the Commission speaks directly against the type of interpretation that Mark
Shea proposed and to which I objected. According to the Commission, which Mr.
McElhinney says is “authoritative,” they forbid calling into question the literal and historical
truth of “the devil’s persuasion under the guise of a serpent.”

Let’s see what else the Commission said. I will skip Question 4, since it does not speak to
literal interpretation.

‘Question 5: Whether all and everything, namely, words and phrases which occur in the
aforementioned chapters, are always and necessarily to be accepted in a special sense, so
that there may be no deviation from this, even when the expressions themselves manifestly
appear to have been taken improperly, or metaphorically or anthropomorphically, and either
reason prohibits holding the proper sense, or necessity forces its abandonment? - Reply: In
the negative.”

This may sound confusing, but the question proposed is that, if Genesis 1-3 is obviously
speaking with a metaphor or anthropomorphism, must we always interpret it literally? The
answer from the Commission is no.1 Contrary to what Mr. McElhinney is asserting against
me, I have no problem with this judgment of the Commission, for not everything in Genesis
1-3 can be taken in the literal sense. Having said that, however, we must note two very
important things:

(1) In Question 3 the Commission denied to Mark Shea the very thing I denied to him, that
is, interpreting the devil speaking in the guise of a serpent to Eve as a “mythical” or non
literal event.

(2) The kinds of things the Commission allows to be interpreted in the metaphorical or
anthropomorphic sense are very limited. In fact, the only things we know for certain that are
metaphorical or anthropomorphic are the passages that speak about God “resting” and
“working.”

Let’s go on to Question 6 of the 1909 Biblical Commission:

“Question 6: Whether, presupposing the literal and historical sense, the allegorical and pro-
phetical interpretation of some passages of the same chapters...can be wisely and profitably
applied? - Reply: In the affirmative.”

1
Nevertheless, metaphor is part of the literal meaning, as St. Thomas elsewhere explains. (B.A.M.)

83
He is here quoting from a response of the Biblical Commission dated 16 January 1948, which
is a clarification of three official responses given by the same Commission on 23 June 1905,
27 June 1906, and 30 June 1909 respectively. The relative statement in the response of 1948
reads as follows:

2. The question of the literary forms of the first eleven chapters of Genesis is far more obscure and
complex. ...To declare a priori that their narratives contain no history in the modern sense of the term
would easily convey the idea that they contain no history whatever, whereas they relate in simple
and figurative language, adapted to the understanding of a less developed people, the fundamental
truths presupposed for the economy of salvation, as well as a popular description of the origin of the
human race and of the Chosen People.22

22. Response of the Biblical Commission, 16 January 1948 (DS no. 3864). Eng. trans. in
Rome and the Study of Scripture, pp. 152-153.

By leaving out the first part of the sentence he quotes, which is, “To declare a priori
that their narratives contain no history in the modern sense of the term would easily convey
the idea that they contain no history whatever,” Vawter is able to quote the Commission in
a text and meaning opposite to what the Commission actually said, and to declare on the
authority of the Commission both that the first eleven chapters of Genesis do not narrate
history “in our sense of the word,” and that the first three chapters of Genesis “are neither
revelation nor historical tradition,” even though the Biblical Commission had excluded this
idea in the very same sentence he quotes. This manner of interpreting a clear and simple
modern source engenders little confidence in his ability to interpret ancient sources, let alone
a source that the Biblical Commission calls “obscure and complex.”

84
 Letter of the Pontifical Biblical Commission to Cardinal Suhard Concerning
the Time of Documents of the Pentateuch and Concerning the
Literary Form of the First Eleven Chapters of Genesis
January 16, 1948

<…>

2. The question of the literary forms of the first eleven chapters of Genesis is far
more obscure and complex. These literary forms correspond to none of our classical cate-
gories and cannot be judged in the light of Greco-Latin or modern literary styles. One can,
therefore, neither deny nor affirm their historicity, taken as a whole, without unduly
attributing to them the canons of a literary style within which it is impossible to classify
them. If one agrees not to recognize in these chapters history in the classical and modern
sense, [it must be admitted that they “do pertain to history in a true sense” (Pope Pius XII,
Humani Generis)]1 one must, however, admit that the actual scientific data do not allow of
giving all the problems they set a positive solution. The first duty here incumbent upon
scientific exegesis consists before all in the attentive study of all the literary, scientific,
historical, cultural and religious problems connected with these chapters; one should then
examine closely the literary processes of the early Oriental peoples, their psychology, their
way of expressing themselves and their very notion of historical truth; in a word, one should
collate without [351-352] prejudice all the subject-matter of the paleontological and
historical, epigraphic and literary sciences. Only thus can we hope to look more clearly into
the true nature of certain narratives in the first Chapters of Genesis. To declare a priori that
their narratives contain no history in the modern sense of the term would easily convey the
idea that they contain no history whatever, whereas they relate in simple and figurative
language, adapted to the understanding of a less developed people, the fundamental truths
presupposed for the economy of salvation, as well as a popular description of the origin of
the human race and of the Chosen People. Meanwhile we must practice that patience which
is living prudence and wisdom. This is what the Holy Father likewise inculcates in the
Encyclical already quoted: “No one,” he says, “will be surprised, if all the difficulties are
not yet solved and overcome. . . . We should not lose courage on this account; nor should
we forget that in the human sciences the same happens as in the natural world; that is to say,
new beginnings grow little by little and fruits are gathered only after many labors. . . . Hence
there are grounds for hope that those (difficulties) also will by constant effort be at last made
clear, which now seem most complicated and difficult” (ibid., p. 318; English Edition, pp.
21-22).

(tr. ed. James J. Megivern, Official Catholic Teachings: Bible Interpretation, pp. 351-352)

Pius XII in the Encyclical Humani generis, in 1950 wrote (DS 3898) that, “the first
chapters of Genesis, even though they do not strictly match the pattern of historical writing
used by the great Greek and Roman writers of history, or of historians of our times, yet in a
certain true sense – which needs further study – do pertain to the genre of history.”

1
If one compares this sentence with the corresponding passage in Humani Generis, one will see that a statement
similar to that taken from that Encyclical is required to complete the sense. (B.A.M.)

85
ENCYCLICAL LETTER of HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS XII, HUMANI GENERIS
(Concerning False Opinions), August 12, 1950.

38. Just as in the biological and anthropological sciences, so also in the historical sciences
there are those who boldly transgress the limits and safeguards established by the Church.
In a particular way must be deplored a certain too free interpretation of the historical books
of the Old Testament. Those who favor this system, in order to defend their cause, wrongly
refer to the Letter which was sent not long ago to the Archbishop of Paris by the Pontifical
Commission on Biblical Studies. (January 16, 1948: A.A.S., vol. XL, pp. 45-48.) This Letter, in
fact, clearly points out that the first eleven chapters of Genesis, although properly speaking
not conforming to the historical method used by the best Greek and Latin writers or by
competent authors of our time, do nevertheless pertain to history in a true sense, which
however must be further studied and determined by exegetes; the same chapters, (the Letter
points out), in simple and metaphorical language adapted to the mentality of a people but
little cultured, both state the principal truths which are fundamental for our salvation, and
also give a popular description of the origin of the human race and the chosen people. If,
however, the ancient sacred writers have taken anything from popular narrations (and this
may be conceded), it must never be forgotten that they did so with the help of divine
inspiration, through which they were rendered immune from any error in selecting and
evaluating those documents.

39. Therefore, whatever of the popular narrations have been inserted into the
Sacred Scriptures must in no way be considered on a par with myths or other such things,
which are more the product of an extravagant imagination than of the striving for truth and
simplicity which in the Sacred Books, also of the Old Testament, is so apparent that our
ancient sacred writers must be admitted to be clearly superior to the ancient profane
writers.

Comparison of Texts.

(PBC, Letter to Cardinal Suhard) (Pope Pius XII, Humani Generis)

These literary forms correspond to none of our 38. …This Letter, in fact, clearly points out that
classical categories and cannot be judged in the the first eleven chapters of Genesis, although
light of Greco-Latin or modern literary styles. properly speaking not conforming to the
historical method used by the best Greek and
Latin writers or by competent authors of our
time,

do nevertheless pertain to history in a true sense,

which however must be further studied and
determined by exegetes;

…whereas they relate in simple and figurative the same chapters, (the Letter points out), in
language, adapted to the understanding of a less simple and metaphorical language adapted to
developed people, the mentality of a people but little cultured,

the fundamental truths presupposed for the both state the principal truths which are funda-
economy of salvation, as well as a popular mental for our salvation, and also give a popular

86
description of the origin of the human race and description of the origin of the human race and
of the Chosen People. the chosen people.

If, however, the ancient sacred writers have

taken anything from popular narrations (and
this may be conceded), it must never be for-
gotten that they did so with the help of divine
inspiration, through which they were rendered
immune from any error in selecting and evalu-
ating those documents.

39. Therefore, whatever of the popular narra-

tions have been inserted into the Sac-
red Scriptures must in no way be considered on
a par with myths or other such things, which are
more the product of an extravagant imagination
than of the striving for truth and simplicity
which in the Sacred Books, also of the Old Tes-
tament, is so apparent that our ancient sacred
writers must be admitted to be clearly superior
to the ancient profane writers.

87
The Pontifical Biblical Commission. “The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church”.

B. The Meaning of Inspired Scripture

1. The Literal Sense

It is not only legitimate, it is also absolutely necessary to seek to define the precise meaning
of texts as produced by their authors--what is called the “literal” meaning. St. Thomas
Aquinas had already affirmed the fundamental importance of this sense (S. Th. I, q. 1,a. 10,
ad 1).

The literal sense is not to be confused with the “literalist” sense to which fundamentalists
are attached. It is not sufficient to translate a text word for word in order to obtain its literal
sense. One must understand the text according to the literary conventions of the time. When
a text is metaphorical, its literal sense is not that which flows immediately from a word-to-
word translation (e.g. “Let your loins be girt”: Lk. 12:35), but that which corresponds to the
metaphorical use of these terms (“Be ready for action”). When it is a question of a story, the
literal sense does not necessarily imply belief that the facts recounted actually took place,
for a story need not belong to the genre of history but be instead a work of imaginative
fiction.

*****

“The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church”

Presented by the Pontifical Biblical Commission
to Pope John Paul II on April 23, 1993
(as published in Origins, January 6, 1994)

*****

The Commission offers this distinction: the genre of history, which relates what has
actually taken place, versus a work of imaginative fiction, which must relate what has not
actually taken place.

88
The Catholic Encyclopedia Vol. VII, s.v. “Hexaemeron”.1

Finally the Biblical Commission in a decree issued 30 June, 1909, denies the exis-
tence of any solid foundation for the various exegetical systems devised and defended with
a show of science to exclude the literal, historical sense of the first three chapters of Genesis;
in particular, it forbids the teaching of the view that the said three chapters of Genesis
contain, not accounts of things which have really happened, but either fables derived from
mythologies and the cosmogonies of ancient peoples, and by the sacred author expurgated
of all error of polytheism and adapted to monotheistic doctrine, or allegories and symbols
destitute of any foundation of objective reality and proposed under the form of history to
inculcate historical and philosophical truths, or legends partly historical and partly fictitious
freely composed for the instruction and edification of minds. The commission bases its
prohibition on the character and historical form of the Book of Genesis, the special nexus of
the first three chapters with one another and with those that follow, the almost unanimous
opinion of the Fathers, and the traditional sense which, transmitted by the people of Israel,
the Church has ever held.

<…>

The legitimate character of this method of proceeding will become clear in the light of the
aforesaid decree of 30 June, 1909, issued by the Biblical Commission. After safeguarding
the literal, historical sense of the first three chapters of Genesis in as far as they bear on the
facts touching the foundations of the Christian religion – e.g., the creation of all things by
God at the beginning of time, the special creation of man, the formation of the first woman
from the first man, the unity of the human race – the commission lays down several special
principles as to the interpretation of the first part of Genesis: -- (1) Where the Fathers and
Doctors differ in their interpretation, without handing down anything as certain and defined,
it is lawful, saving the judgment of the Church and preserving the analogy of faith, for
everybody to follow and defend his own prudently adopted opinion. (2) When the
expressions themselves manifestly appear to be used improperly, either metaphorically or
anthropomorphically, and when either reason prohibits our holding the proper sense, or
necessity compels us to set it aside, it is lawful to depart from the proper sense of the words
and phrases in the above-mentioned chapters. (3) In the light of the example of the holy
Fathers and of the Church herself, presupposing the literal and historical sense, the
allegorical and prophetical interpretation of some parts of the said chapters may be wisely
and usefully employed. (4) In interpreting the first chapter of Genesis we need not always
look for the precision of scientific language, since the sacred writer did not intend to teach
in a scientific manner the intimate constitution of visible things and the complete order of
creation, but to give his people a proper notion according to the common mode of expression
of the time. (5) In the denomination and distinction of the six days mentioned in the first
chapter of Genesis the word yôm (day) can be taken either in its proper sense, as a natural
day, or in an improper sense, for a period of time, and discussion on this point among
exegetes is legitimate.

A.J. MAAS

1
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07310a.htm [6/17/04]

89
On June 30, 1909, the Commission made several key decisions regarding the creation
account given in the first three chapters of Genesis. We will review three of these.

First, the Commission rejected the notion that the first three chapters of Genesis contain
either myths or fables, allegories meant to explain higher things, or legends only true in part,
and simultaneously affirmed that these chapters contain objective reality and historical truth.

Second, the Commission rejected the notion that the literal and historical sense of Genesis
could be called into question when the narration pertains to the foundations of the Christian
religion. The Commission identified some issues which may not be called into question: “for
example, among others, the creation of all things wrought by God in the beginning of time;
the special creation of man; the formation of the first woman from the first man; the oneness
of the human race; the original happiness of our first parents in the state of justice, integrity,
and immortality; the command given to man by God to prove his obedience; the
transgression of the divine command through the devil’s persuasion under the guise of the
serpent; the casting out of our first parents out of that first state of innocence; and also the
promise of a future restorer.”

Third, on the question of whether the earth was created in six days or not, the Commission
affirmed that the word dies (day) can be taken either in its proper sense as a natural day, or
in the improper sense of a certain space of time; and that there can be free disagreement
among exegetes on this question.

90
The Pontifical Biblical Commission

As has already been mentioned, the Pontifical Biblical Commission was formally established
by Pope Leo XIII in 1902, and in 1907, in Praestantia Sacrae Scripturae, Pope Pius X
declared its decisions to be binding. These, in condensed and summarized form, are the
decisions, which were issued by the Commission.6

1) On the Tacit Quotations Contained in Holy Scripture, 1905. The Commission stated that
we cannot assume that in Scripture there are statements from an uninspired author which the
sacred writer does not mean to approve or make his own, unless the sacred writer makes it
clear that he is doing so.

2) On Narratives in the Historical Books, 1905. We cannot hold books regarded as historical
as not historical, the Commission said, or as conveying a meaning other than their literal or
historical sense, unless it can be proved that the writer meant to speak in parable or allegory,
or meant to convey some meaning other than historical.

3) On the Mosaic Authorship of the Pentateuch, 1906. There is not sufficient evidence to
impugn the substantially Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, the Commission said, or to
justify the claim that the Pentateuch was compiled from sources for the most part after the
time of Moses. This does not necessarily mean that Moses wrote all that is in the books, or
dictated all that is in them. It is possible that he may have entrusted the writing of his thoughts
to other persons and approved such writing to be made public under his name. It is possible
that Moses may have used existing documents or oral traditions in his work; and there may
have been, over the centuries, some modifications or additions or even some faulty readings
on the part of copyists.

4) On the Author and the Historical Truth of the Fourth Gospel, 1907. There is sufficient
evidence that John the Apostle wrote the Fourth Gospel, the Commission stated, to uphold
this opinion against adverse critics. We may not say that the discourses of Our Lord that are
reported therein are not really the words of Jesus but theological compositions of the authors.

5) On the Character of the Book of Isaias and its Author, 1908. The Commission ruled that
the prophecies in this book may not be regarded as having been written after the event, and
it upheld the reality of predictive prophecy. It said further that there was not sufficient
evidence to justify the thesis of a dual or plural authorship of Isaias.

6) On the Historical Character of the First Three Chapters of Genesis, 1909. The
Commission ruled that we cannot exclude the literal, historical sense; that we cannot regard
these books as legend or symbol; that we cannot deny the reality of man’s creation in an
original state of justice and integrity, his fall at the instigation of the devil, and the promise
of a future Redeemer. It is recognized, the Commission said, that in some passages these
chapters speak in a figurative rather than a literal sense, and also, that there are allegorical
and prophetical interpretations, as are justified by the example of the Fathers of the Church.
We are not bound to look for scientific exactitude in these chapters. There may be free
discussion, for example, as to whether the word yom means an actual day, or a certain space
of time.

91
7) On the Author, Time of Composition, and Character of the Psalms, 1910. The
Commission said that we need not consider David as the sole author of the psalms, but that
it cannot be denied he was author of many; and we cannot deny the Davidic origin of those
expressly attributed to him in the inscriptions affixed to them. Some of the psalms have
probably been slightly remolded or modified. We may not say that some of the psalms, on
the basis of internal evidence, were written after the time of Esdras and Nehemias. Some of
the psalms are without question prophetic and Messianic.

8) On the Author, Date of Composition, and Historical Truth of the Gospel According to St.
Matthew, 1911. Matthew, the Commission said, is in truth the author of the Gospel published
under his name. The Gospel was originally written in Hebrew, sometime before the
destruction of Jerusalem. We cannot accept the idea that the book was merely a collection
of sayings compiled by an anonymous author. While the book was first written in Hebrew,
the Greek is regarded as canonical, and is to be regarded as historically true, including the
infancy narratives, and passages relating to the primacy of Peter (16:17-19) and to the
Apostles’ profession of faith in the divinity of Christ (14:33).

9) On the Author, Time of Composition, and Historical Truth of the Gospels According to
St. Mark and St. Luke, 1912. The Commission upheld the authorship of these books by Mark
and Luke, their historicity, and their having been written before the destruction of Jerusalem.
It cannot prudently be called into question, the Commission said, that Mark wrote according
to the preaching of Peter, or that Luke followed the preaching of Paul. Both of them told
what they had learned from “eminently trustworthy witnesses.”

10) On the Synoptic Question, or the Mutual Relations Between the First Three Gospels,
1912. It is lawful, the Commission said, for exegetes to discuss varying opinions about
similarities and dissimilarities in the first three Gospels, and about hypotheses of oral or
written tradition, or the dependence of one on another; but they are not to freely advocate
unproven theories.

11) On the Author, Time of Composition, and Historical Character of Acts, 1913. Luke, the
Commission said, is certainly to be regarded as the author of Acts, and complete historical
authority may be claimed for him.

12) On the Authenticity, Integrity, and Time of Composition of the Pastoral Epistles, 1913.
The Commission affirmed that Paul may be accepted as the author of these epistles, which
were written between the time of Paul’s liberation from his first imprisonment and his death.

13) On the Author and the Manner and Circumstances of Composition of the Epistle to the
Hebrews, 1914. We may not hesitate, the Commission said, in counting this book among the
epistles of Paul, because of its harmony of doctrine and principles, cautions and counsels,
and close correspondence in words and phrases with the writings known to be those of Paul,
and because of its acceptance as such by the Church; but it need not be regarded as certain
that Paul planned it and composed it in its entirety, or that he put it in the form in which it
now stands.

14) On the Parousia or the Second Coming of Our Lord Jesus Christ, 1915. The Catholic
exegete cannot assert, said the Commission that the Apostles, in this matter, express merely
their own human views into which error may enter. On the contrary, we may affirm that
92
Paul, in his writings, said nothing that is not in harmony with the ignorance of the time of
the Parousia, which Christ said to be men’s portion. Paul does not imply affirmation of an
imminent Parousia.

15) On the False Interpretation of Two Texts, 1933. Matthew 16:26, “What does it profit a
man if he gain the whole world and suffer the loss of his own soul?” and Luke 9:25, which
is parallel to it, the Commission said, must be understood to refer to man’s soul; to his soul’s
eternal salvation; and not to the temporal life of man.

16) Letter to the Archbishops and Bishops of Italy, 1941. Against charges of error in biblical
study and interpretation, the Commission reaffirmed the principles that had been laid down
for biblical study. It defended the literal sense of Scripture, the value of textual criticism, the
study of ancient languages, and so on.

17) On the Use of Versions of Sacred Scripture in the Vernacular, 1943. Versions of
Scripture translated into the vernacular from the Vulgate or from the ancient texts might be
read and used by the faithful, the Commission said, provided they had been approved by the
competent ecclesiastical authority.

18) Response of the Biblical Commission to Cardinal Suhard, 1948. This was a letter issued
in response to an inquiry by Cardinal Suhard, concerning the sources of the Pentateuch and
the historicity of the first eleven chapters of Genesis. The Biblical Commission saw no need,
the letter said, for further decrees on these subjects. The decisions that had been made did
not preclude proper study of the problems. The Commission had already said that it may be
affirmed that Moses made use of written documents or oral traditions in composing his work,
and that modifications or additions have doubtless been made after the time of Moses.
Further study on this subject would doubtless confirm the great part played by Moses “both
as author and as lawgiver.”

The literary style of the first 11 chapters of Genesis, the Commission said, corresponds to
none of our classical categories, and so cannot be judged in that light. To say they are not
history in the modern sense might easily be taken to mean that they contain no history at all;
whereas they do relate, in simple and figurative language, “the fundamental truths
presupposed for the economy of salvation, as well as the popular description of the origin of
the human race and of the Chosen People.”

93
 The Replies of the Pontifical Biblical
Commission
On questions of Sacred Scripture
Translated by E. F. Sutcliffe, S.J.

Abbreviations:

ASS: Acta Sedis Sanctae; AAS: Acta Apostolicae Sedis; EB: Enchiridion Biblicum;
Dz: Denzinger

Pope Pius X, Motu Proprio Praestantia Scripturae, 18 Nov. 1907 (ASS [1907] 724ff;
EB nn. 278f; Dz 2113f): “We now declare and expressly enjoin that all Without exception
are bound by an obligation of conscience to submit to the decisions of the Pontifical Biblical
Commission, whether already issued or to be issued hereafter, exactly as to the decrees of
the Sacred Congregations which are on matters of doctrine and approved by the Pope; nor
can anyone who by word or writing attacks the said decrees avoid the note both of
disobedience and of rashness or be therefore without grave fault.”

On the Mosaic Authorship of the Pentateuch

June 27, 1906 (ASS 39 [1906-07] 377f; EB 174ff; Dz 1997ff)

I: Are the arguments gathered by critics to impugn the Mosaic authorship of the sacred
hooks designated by the name of the Pentateuch of such weight in spite of the cumulative
evidence of many passages of both Testaments, the unbroken unanimity of the Jewish
people, and furthermore of the constant tradition of the Church besides the internal
indications furnished by the text itself, as to justify the statement that these books are not of
Mosaic authorship but were put together from sources mostly of post-Mosaic date?

Answer: In the negative.

II: Does the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch necessarily imply a production of the
whole work of such a character as to impose the belief that each and every word was written
by Moses’ own hand or was by him dictated to secretaries ; or is it a legitimate hypothesis
that he conceived the work himself under the guidance of divine inspiration and then
entrusted the writing of it to one or more persons, with the understanding that they
reproduced his thoughts with fidelity and neither wrote nor omitted anything contrary to his
will, and that finally the work composed after this fashion was approved by Moses, its
principal and inspired author, and was published under his name?

Answer: In the negative to the first and in the affirmative to the second part.

94
 III: Without prejudice to the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, may it be granted
that in the composition of his work Moses used sources, written documents namely or oral
traditions, from which in accordance with the special aim he entertained and under the
guidance of divine inspiration he borrowed material and inserted it in his work either word
for word or in substance, either abbreviated or amplified?

Answer: In the affirmative.

IV: Subject to the Mosaic authorship and the integrity of the Pentateuch being
substantially safeguarded, may it be admitted that in the protracted course of centuries
certain modifications befell it, such as : additions made after the death of Moses by an
inspired writer, or glosses and explanations inserted in the text, certain words and forms
changed from archaic into more recent speech, finally incorrect readings due to the fault of
scribes which may be the subject of inquiry and judgement according to the laws of textual
criticism?

Answer In the affirmative, saving the judgement of the Church.

Concerning the Historical Character of the First Three Chapters of Genesis

June 30, 1909 (AAS 1 [1909] 567ff; EB 332ff; Dz 2121ff)

I: Do the various exegetical systems excogitated and defended under the guise of
science to exclude the literal historical sense of the first three chapters of Genesis rest on a
solid foundation?

Answer: In the negative.

II: Notwithstanding the historical character and form of Genesis, the special
connection of the first three chapters with one another and with the following chapters, the
manifold testimonies of the Scriptures both of the Old and of the New Testaments, the almost
unanimous opinion of the holy Fathers and the traditional view which the people of Israel
also has handed on and the Church has always held, may it be taught that: the aforesaid three
chapters of Genesis Contain not accounts of actual events, accounts, that is, which
correspond to objective reality and historical truth, but, either fables derived from the
mythologies and cosmogonies of ancient peoples and accommodated by the sacred writer to
monotheistic doctrine after the expurgation of any polytheistic error; or allegories and
symbols without any foundation in objective reality proposed under the form of history to
inculcate religious and philosophical truths; or finally legends in part historical and in part
fictitious freely composed with a view to instruction and edification?

Answer: In the negative to both parts.

III: In particular may the literal historical sense be called in doubt in the case of facts
narrated in the same chapters which touch the foundations of the Christian religion: as are,
among others, the creation of all things by God in the beginning of time; the special creation
of man; the formation of the first woman from the first man; the unity of the human race; the
original felicity of our first parents in the state of justice, integrity, and immortality; the

95
command given by God to man to test his obedience; the transgression of the divine
command at the instigation of the devil under the form of a serpent; the degradation of our
first parents from that primeval state of innocence; and the promise of a future Redeemer?

Answer: In the negative.

IV: In the interpretation of those passages in these chapters which the Fathers and
Doctors understood in different manners without proposing anything certain and definite, is
it lawful, without prejudice to the judgement of the Church and with attention to the analogy
of faith, to follow and defend the opinion that commends itself to each one?

Answer: In the affirmative.

V: Must each and every word and phrase occurring in the aforesaid chapters always
and necessarily be understood in its literal sense, so that it is never lawful to deviate from it,
even when it appears obvious that the diction is employed in an applied sense, either
metaphorical or anthropomorphical, and either reason forbids the retention or necessity
imposes the abandonment of the literal sense?

Answer: In the negative.

VI: Provided that the literal and historical sense is presupposed, may certain passages
in the same chapters, in the light of the example of the holy Fathers and of the Church itself,
be wisely and profitably interpreted in an allegorical and prophetic sense?

Answer: In the affirmative.

VII: As it was not the mind of the sacred author in the composition of the first chapter
of Genesis to give scientific teaching about the internal Constitution of visible things and the
entire order of creation, but rather to communicate to his people a popular notion in accord
with the current speech of the time and suited to the understanding and capacity of men,
must the exactness of scientific language be always meticulously sought for in the
interpretation of these matters?

Answer: In the negative.

VIII : In the designation and distinction of the six days mentioned in the first chapter
of Genesis may the word Yom (day) be taken either in the literal sense for the natural day or
in an applied sense for a certain space of time, and may this question be the subject of free
discussion among exegetes?

Answer: In the affirmative.

Concerning the Authors and Date of the Psalms

May 1, 1910 (AAS II [1910] 354f; EB 340ff; Dz 2129ff)

96
 I: Have the titles Psalms of David, Hymns of David, Book of the Psalms of David,
Davidic Psalter, employed in ancient collections and in the Councils themselves to designate
the book of 150 psalms of the Old Testament; and also the opinion of a number of Fathers
and Doctors, who held that all the psalms of the Psalter without exception were to be ascribed
to David alone, such weight that David should be held to be the only author of the whole
Psalter?

Answer: In the negative.

II: Does the agreement of the Hebrew text with the Greek Alexandrine text and other
ancient versions give ground for a valid argument that the titles of the psalms prefixed to the
Hebrew text are more ancient than the Septuagint version ; and consequently, if not from the
very authors of the psalms, at least derive from an ancient Jewish tradition?

Answer: In the affirmative.

III: Can the aforesaid titles of the psalms, witnesses of Jewish tradition, be prudently
called in doubt when there is no serious reason against their being genuine?

Answer: In the negative.

IV: In view of the not infrequent testimonies of sacred Scripture to the natural talent,
helped by a special gift of the Holy Ghost, which David had for the composition of religious
songs, of his arrangements for the liturgical chant of the psalms, of the attribution of psalms
to him both in the Old Testament and in the New as well as in the superscriptions prefixed
of old to the psalms; in view, moreover, of the agreement of the Jews, of the Fathers and
Doctors of the Church, can it be prudently denied that David was the principal author of the
songs of the Psalter, or on the contrary, affirmed that only a few songs are to be assigned to
the royal psalmist?

Answer: In the negative to both parts.

V: In particular is it right to deny the Davidic origin of those psalms which are
explicitly cited under David’s name in the Old or New Testament, among which are to be
mentioned more especially psalm 2 Quare fremuerunt gentes; psalm 15 Conserva me,
Domine; psalm 17 Diligam te, Domine, fortitudo mea; psalm 31 Beati quorum remissae sunt
iniquitates; psalm 68 Salvum me fac, Deus; psalm 509 Dixit Dominus Domino meo?

Answer: In the negative.

VI: May the opinion of those be admitted who hold that among the psalms of the
Psalter there are some, either of David’s or of other authors, which on account of liturgical
and musical reasons, the negligence of scribes, or other causes unknown have been divided
into several or united into one; also that there are other psalms, like the Miserere mei, Deus,
which for the purpose of being better adapted to historical circumstances or solemnities of
the Jewish people, were subjected to some slight rehandling or modification by the omission
or addition of one or two verses, without prejudice however to the inspiration of the whole
sacred text?

97
 Answer: In the affirmative to both parts.

VII: Is it possible to maintain as probable the opinion of those more recent writers
who, relying on purely internal indications or an incorrect interpretation of the sacred text,
have attempted to show that not a few psalms were composed after the times of Esdras and
Nehemias and even in the Maccabean age?

Answer: In the negative.

VIII: On the authority of the manifold witness of the sacred books of the New
Testament and the unanimous agreement of the Fathers in harmony with the
acknowledgement of Jewish writers, is it necessary to admit a number of prophetic and
Messianic psalms, which foretold the future Saviour’s coming, kingdom, priesthood,
passion, death, and resurrection; and consequently is it necessary to reject altogether the
opinion of those who pervert the prophetic and Messianic character of the psalms and limit
these oracles about Christ merely to the foretelling of the future lot of the chosen people?

Answer: In the affirmative to both parts.

Concerning the Character and Author of the Book of Isaias

June 29, 1908 (ASS 41 [1908] 613f; EB 287ff; Dz 2115 ff)

I: May it be taught that the predictions read in the Book of Isaias-and throughout the
Scriptures- are not predictions properly so called, but either narrations put together after the
event, or, if anything has to be acknowledged as foretold before the event, that the prophet
foretold it not in accordance with a supernatural revelation of God who foreknows future
events, but by conjectures formed felicitously and shrewdly by natural sharpness of mind on
the basis of previous experience?

Answer: In the negative.

II: Can the opinion that Isaias and the other prophets did not put forth predictions
except about events that were to happen in the immediate future or after no long space of
time, be reconciled with the predictions, in particular Messianic and eschatological, certainly
put forth by the same prophets concerning the distant future, and also with the common
opinion of the holy Fathers who unanimously assert that the prophets also made prophecies
that were to be fulfilled after many centuries?

Answer: In the negative.

III: May it be admitted that the prophets, not only as correctors of human depravity
and preachers of the divine word for the benefit of their hearers, but also as foretellers of
future events, must consistently have addressed, not future, but present contemporary hearers
in such a manner that they could be clearly understood by them; and that in consequence the
second part of the Book of Isaias (chapters 40-66), in which the prophet addresses and
consoles, not the Jewish contemporaries of Isaias, but as if living among them, the Jews

98
mourning in the Babylonian exile, could not have Isaias, long since dead, for its author, but
must be ascribed to some unknown prophet living among the exiles?

Answer: In the negative.

IV: Should the philological argument drawn from language and style to impugn
identity of authorship throughout the Book of Isaias be deemed of such force as to compel a
man of sound judgement with competent knowledge of Hebrew and of the art of criticism to
recognize several authors in the same book?

Answer: In the negative.

V: Do there exist arguments which even when taken together avail to demonstrate that
the Book of Isaias must be attributed not to Isaias himself alone, but to two or even several
authors?

Answer: In the negative.

Concerning the Author, the Date, and the Historical Truth of the Gospel
according to Matthew

June 19, 1911 (AAS 3 [1911] 294ff; EB 401ff; Dz 2148 ff)

I: Having regard to the universal and unwavering agreement of the Church ever since
the first centuries, an agreement clearly attested by the express witness of the Fathers, by the
titles of the Gospel manuscripts, the most ancient versions of the sacred books and the lists
handed on by the holy Fathers, by ecclesiastical writers, by Popes and Councils, and finally
by the liturgical use of the Church in the East and in the West, may and should it be affirmed
as certain that Matthew, the Apostle of Christ, was in fact the author of the Gospel current
under his name?

Answer: In the affirmative.

II: Should the verdict of tradition be considered to give adequate support to the
statement that Matthew wrote before the other Evangelists and wrote the first Gospel in the
native language then used by the Jews of Palestine for whom the work was intended?

Answer: In the affirmative to both parts.

III: Can the composition of this original text be postponed till after the time of the
destruction of Jerusalem, so that the prophecies it contains about that destruction were
written after the event ; or should the oft-quoted text of Irenaeus (Ads. Haer. Lib. 3, cap. 1,
n. 2), of uncertain and controverted interpretation, be considered to have such weight as to
impose the rejection of the opinion more in harmony with tradition according to which the
composition of the Gospel was completed even before the arrival of Paul in Rome?

Answer: In the negative to both parts.

99
 IV: Can even probable arguments be given in support of that opinion of certain recent
writers according to which Matthew did not write a Gospel properly and strictly so-called,
such as has been handed down to us, but merely a collection of the sayings or discourses of
Christ which were drawn on by another anonymous author, whom they make the editor of
the Gospel itself?

Answer: In the negative.

V: Can the fact that all the Fathers and ecclesiastical Writers and even the Church itself
from its very cradle have used as canonical only the Greek text of the Gospel known under
the name of Matthew, not even those being excepted who explicitly taught that the Apostle
Matthew wrote in his native tongue, provide certain proof that the Greek Gospel is identical
in substance with the Gospel written by that Apostle in his native tongue?

Answer: In the affirmative.

VI: Do the facts that the aim of the author of the first Gospel is chiefly dogmatic and
apologetic, namely, to prove to the Jews that Jesus was the Messias foretold by the prophets
and born of the lineage of David, and that moreover in the arrangement of the facts and
discourses which he narrates and reports, he does not always follow chronological order,
justify the deduction that they ought not to be accepted as true? Or may it also be affirmed
that the accounts of the deeds and discourses of Christ, which are read in that Gospel,
underwent a certain alteration and adaptation under the influence of the prophecies of the
Old Testament and the more mature condition of the Church and are consequently not in
conformity with historical truth?

Answer: In the negative to both parts.

VII: In particular ought it to be held that there is no solid foundation to the opinions of
those who call in doubt the historical authenticity of the first two chapters, in which an
account is given of the genealogy and infancy of Christ, as also of certain passages of great
dogmatic importance, such as are those which concern the primacy of Peter (16:17-19), the
form of baptism entrusted to the Apostles together with the mission of preaching everywhere
(28:19f), the Apostles’ profession of faith in the divinity of Christ (14:33), and other similar
matters which are found in a special form in Matthew?

Answer: In the affirmative.

Concerning the Authors, Dates, and Historical Truth of the Gospels according to
Mark and Luke

June 26, 1912 (AAS 4 [1912] 463ff; EB 4O8ff; Dz 2155ff)

I: Does the clear verdict of tradition showing extraordinary unanimity from the
beginnings of the Church and confirmed by manifold evidence, namely the explicit
attestations of the holy Fathers and ecclesiastical writers, the quotations and allusions
occurring in their writings, the use made by ancient heretics, the versions of the books of the
New Testament, almost all the manuscripts including the most ancient, and also internal

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reasons drawn from the text of the sacred books impose the definite affirmation that Mark,
the disciple and interpreter of Peter, and Luke, the doctor, the assistant and companion of
Paul, were really the authors of the Gospels that are attributed to them respectively?

Answer: In the affirmative.

II: Are the reasons by which certain critics strive to prove that the last twelve verses
of the Gospel of Mark (16:9-20) were not written by Mark himself but were added by another
hand, of such a character as to justify the statement that they are not to be accepted as inspired
and canonical? Or do they prove at least that Mark was not the author of the said verses?

Answer: In the negative to both parts.

III: Similarly is it lawful to doubt the inspiration and canonicity of Luke’s accounts of
the infancy of Christ (chapters 1 and 2); or of the apparition of the Angel strengthening Jesus
and the sweat of blood (22:43f)? Or can it at any rate be shown by solid reasons-a view
preferred by ancient heretics and favoured also by certain modern critics-that the said
accounts do not belong to the genuine Gospel of Luke?

Answer: In the negative to both parts.

IV: Can and should those very few and altogether exceptional documents in which the
Canticle Magnificat is attributed not to our Blessed Lady but to Elizabeth, in any way prevail
against the unanimous testimony of almost all manuscripts both of the original Greek text
and of the versions, and against the interpretation which is clearly demanded no less by the
context than by the mind of our Lady herself and the constant tradition of the Church?

Answer: In the negative.

V: As regards the chronological order of the Gospels is it right to depart from the
opinion supported by the very ancient and constant testimony of tradition, which avers that
after Matthew, who before all the others wrote his Gospel in his native tongue, Mark was
the second in order, and Luke the third to write? Or on the other hand is opposition to be
found between this opinion and that which asserts the second and third Gospels to have been
written before the Greek version of the first Gospel?

Answer: In the negative to both parts.

VI: Is it lawful to postpone the date of composition of the Gospels of Mark and Luke
till after the destruction of the city of Jerusalem? Or, on the ground that our Lord’s prophecy
concerning the destruction of that city appears more detailed in Luke, can it be maintained
that his Gospel at least was written after the siege had begun?

Answer: In the negative to both parts.

VII: Should it be affirmed that the Gospel of Luke preceded the Acts of the Apostles;
and as this book, written by the same Luke (Acts 1:1f), was finished at the close of the

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Apostle’s imprisonment at Rome (Acts 28:30f), that his Gospel was not composed after this
time?

Answer: In the affirmative.

VIII: In view both of the witness of tradition and the internal evidence concerning the
sources used by each Evangelist in writing his Gospel, is it prudent to doubt the opinion that
Mark wrote in accordance with the preaching of Peter and Luke in accordance with that of
Paul, and also that these Evangelists had, besides, other trustworthy sources, whether oral or
written?

Answer: In the negative.

IX: Do the words and deeds which are reported by Mark accurately and almost in
verbal agreement with Peter’s preaching, and are faithfully set forth by Luke who had
“diligently attained to all things from the beginning” through the help of entirely trustworthy
witnesses “who from the beginning were eye-witnesses and ministers of the word” (Luke
1:2f) rightly claim for themselves as historical that entire belief that the Church has always
placed in them? Or on the contrary ought the same facts and deeds to be regarded as in part
at least destitute of historical truth, either on the ground that the writers were not eye-
witnesses or that in the ease of both Evangelists defects of order and disagreement in the
succession of events are not seldom detected, or that, as they came on the scene and wrote
rather late, they could not help recording ideas foreign to the mind of Christ and the Apostles
or events already more or less distorted by popular imagination, or finally, that they indulged
in preconceived dogmatic ideas, each one in accordance with his own aim?

Answer: In the affirmative to the first part, in the negative to the second.

On the Synoptic Problem or the Mutual Relations of the First Three Gospels

June 26, 1912 (AAS 4 [1912] 465; EB 117f; Dz 2164ff)

I: Provided all is safeguarded that according to previous decisions must be

safeguarded, especially concerning the authenticity and integrity of the three Gospels of
Matthew, Mark, and Luke, the substantial identity of the Greek Gospel of Matthew with its
original text, and the chronological order in which they were written, in order to explain their
mutual similarities and dissimilarities, is it lawful for exegetes, given the many different and
contradictory opinions proposed by writers, to discuss the question freely and to have
recourse to the hypotheses of tradition, whether written or oral, or also of the dependence of
one Gospel on another or on others that preceded it?

Answer: In the affirmative.

II: Ought those to be considered faithful to the above prescriptions, who without the
support of any traditional evidence or historical argument readily embrace what is commonly
called the two-document hypothesis’, the purpose of which is to explain the composition of
the Greek Gospel of Matthew and the Gospel of Luke chiefly by their dependence on the

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Gospel of Mark and a so-called collection of the discourses of our Lord; and are they
consequently free to advocate it?

Answer: In the negative to both parts.

Concerning the Author and Historical Truth of the Fourth Gospel

May 29, 1907 (ASS 40 [1907] 383f; EB 180ff; Dz 2110)

I: Does the constant, universal, and solemn tradition of the Church dating back to the
second century and witnessed to principally : (a) by the holy Fathers, by ecclesiastical
writers, and even by heretics, whose testimonies and allusions must have been derived from
the disciples or first successors of the Apostles and so be linked with the very origin of the
book; (b) by the name of the author of the fourth Gospel having been at all times and places
in the canon and lists of the sacred books; (c) by the most ancient manuscripts of those books
and the various versions; (d) by public liturgical use in the whole world from the very
beginnings of the Church; prove that John the Apostle and no other is to be acknowledged
as the author of the fourth Gospel, and that by an historical argument so firmly established
(without reference to theological considerations) that the reasons adduced by critics to the
contrary in no way weaken this tradition?

Answer: In the affirmative.

II: Should, further, internal reasons derived from the text of the fourth Gospel
considered by itself, from the witness of the writer and the manifest relationship of the
Gospel itself to the first Epistle of John the Apostle, be judged to confirm the tradition that
unhesitatingly attributes the fourth Gospel to the same Apostle? And can the difficulties
which arise from a comparison of the same Gospel with the other three, in view of the
differences of time, aim, and hearers, for whom or against whom the author wrote, be given
reasonable solutions, as has been done by the holy Fathers and Catholic exegetes in various
works?

Answer: In the affirmative to both parts.

III: Notwithstanding the practice which has flourished consistently in the whole
Church from the earliest times, of arguing from the fourth Gospel as from a strictly historical
document, and in consideration no less of the special character of the same Gospel and the
manifest intention of the author to illustrate and vindicate the divinity of Christ from the very
acts and discourses of our Lord, may it be said that the facts narrated in the fourth Gospel
were invented wholly or in part, as allegories or doctrinal symbols and that the discourses of
our Lord are not properly and truly the discourses of our Lord himself but the theological
compositions of the writer though placed in the mouth of our Lord?

Answer: In the negative.

Concerning the Author, the Date, and the Historical Truth of the Acts of the
Apostles

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 June 12, 1913 (AAS 5 [1913] 291f; EB 419ff; Dz 2166ff)

I: In view especially of the tradition of the whole Church dating back to the earliest
ecclesiastical writers, and in consideration of the internal characteristics of the book of Acts
whether considered in itself or in its relation to the third Gospel, and especially of the mutual
affinity and connection of both prologues (Luke 1:1-4; Acts 1:1f), should it be held as certain
that the volume with the title Actus Apostolorum or Praxeis Apostolon had the Evangelist
Luke for its author?

Answer : In the affirmative.

II: Can critical reasons derived from language and style, from the character of the
narrative, and from the unity of aim and teaching, demonstrate that the Acts of the Apostles
should be attributed to only one author; and that consequently there is no foundation at all
for the opinion of recent writers according to which Luke was not the only author of the
book but different authors are recognized in the said book?

Answer: In the affirmative to both parts.

III: In particular, do those sections, so noticeable in the Acts, in which the use of the
third person is abandoned and the first person plural introduced (We passages), weaken the
unity of composition and the authenticity; or, historically and philosophically considered,
should they rather be said to confirm it?

Answer: In the negative to the first part ; in the affirmative to the second.

IV: Does the fact that the book hardly mentions the two years of Paul’s first
imprisonment at Rome and ends abruptly, warrant the inference that the author wrote a
second but lost work or intended to write one, and consequently can the date of the
composition of the Acts be postponed till long after the said captivity? Or rather is it
legitimately and rightly to be maintained that Luke finished the book towards the close of
the first imprisonment of the Apostle Paul at Rome?

Answer: In the negative to the first part; in the affirmative to the second.

V: If consideration be given both to the frequent and easy intercourse that without
doubt Luke had with the first and chief founders of the Church in Palestine and with Paul,
the Apostle of the Gentiles, whom he helped in his preaching of the Gospel and accompanied
on his journeys, and to his habitual industry and diligence in seeking witnesses and in
personal observation of events, and finally to the frequently obvious and remarkable
agreement of the Acts with Paul’s own Epistles and with the more exact historical records,
should it be held for certain that Luke had at his disposal entirely trustworthy sources and
used them carefully, honestly, and faithfully, so that he rightly claims for himself full
authority as an historian?

Answer: In the affirmative.

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 VI: Are the difficulties commonly raised both from the supernatural facts narrated by
Luke, and from the report of certain discourses, which on account of their brevity are thought
to be invented and adapted to circumstances, and from certain passages in at least apparent
disagreement with history, whether profane or biblical, and finally from certain narrations
in apparent conflict either with the author of Acts himself or with other sacred authors, of
such a nature as to throw doubt on or at least in some measure to diminish the historical
authority of Acts?

Answer: In the negative.

Concerning the Author, the Integrity, and the Date of the Pastoral Epistles of St
Paul

June 12, 1913 (AAS 5 [1913] 292f; EB 425ff; Dz 2172ff)

I: In view of the tradition of the Church universally and firmly maintained from the
beginning, as is witnessed in many ways by ancient ecclesiastical records, should it be held
as certain that the Pastoral Epistles, the two, namely, to Timothy and another to Titus,
notwithstanding the effrontery of certain heretics, who without giving any reason expunged
them from the number of Pauline Epistles as being opposed to their tenets, were written by
the Apostle Paul himself and were always listed among the genuine and canonical Epistles?
Answer: In the affirmative.

II: Can the so-called fragmentary hypothesis introduced and propounded in different
ways by certain recent critics, who without any plausible reason and even at variance among
themselves, maintain that the Pastoral Epistles were put together by unknown authors at a
later date out of fragments of the Epistles or out of lost Pauline Epistles with notable
additions, cause even any slight weakening of the clear and unshaken testimony of tradition?

Answer: In the negative.

III: Do the difficulties commonly alleged on many grounds, either on account of the
style and language of the author, or of the errors, especially of the Gnostics, described as
already then current, or of the presupposition that the ecclesiastical hierarchy was in an
already developed state, and other similar arguments to the contrary, in any way weaken the
opinion that holds the genuineness of the Pastoral Epistles to be established and certain?

Answer: In the negative.

IV: As the opinion that the Apostle Paul was twice imprisoned at Rome should be
considered certain on account no less of historical reasons than of ecclesiastical tradition in
harmony with the testimonies of the holy Fathers both in East and West, and also on account
of the evidence readily available both in the abrupt conclusion of the Acts and in the Pauline
Epistles written at Rome and especially in the second to Timothy; can it be safely stated that
the Pastoral Epistles were written in the interval between the liberation of the Apostle from
the first imprisonment and his death?

Answer: In the affirmative.

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 Concerning the Author and Manner of Composition of the Epistle to the Hebrews

June 24, 1914 (AAS 6 [1914] 417f; EB 429ff; Dz 2176ff)

I: Are the doubts about the divine inspiration and Pauline origin of the Epistle to the
Hebrews which influenced certain minds in the West in the first centuries, chiefly because
of its abuse by heretics, of such importance that, bearing in mind the unbroken, unanimous,
and unwavering affirmation of the eastern Fathers supported after the fourth century by the
entire assent of the whole western Church, due weight also being given to the acts of the
Popes and sacred Councils, especially that of Trent, and to the constant usage of the universal
Church, it is lawful to hesitate about reckoning it definitively not only among the canonical
Epistles-which has been defined as a matter of faith -but also among the genuine Epistles of
the Apostle Paul?

Answer: In the negative.

II: Can the arguments commonly based either on the unusual absence of Paul’s name
and the omission of the customary introduction and salutation in the Epistle to the Hebrews-
or on the purity of its Greek, the elegance and perfection of its diction and style-or on the
character of its quotations and arguments from the Old Testament-or on certain differences
alleged to exist between the doctrine of this and the other Pauline Epistles, in any way
invalidate its Pauline origin? Or rather do the perfect unanimity in teaching and thought, the
resemblance of the admonitions and exhortations, and the agreement in phrase and even in
words pointed out also by some non-Catholics, which are seen to exist between it and the
other writings of the Apostle of the Gentiles, clearly indicate and confirm the same Pauline
origin?

Answer: In the negative to the first part; in the affirmative to the second.

III: Should the Apostle Paul be considered the author of this Epistle after such manner
that he must necessarily be said, not only to have conceived and expressed it all under the
inspiration of the Holy Ghost, but also to have given it the form that it actually has?

Answer: In the negative, saving the further judgement of the Church.

Concerning the Parousia or Second Coming of our Lord Jesus Christ in the
Epistles of the Apostle St Paul

June 18, 1915 (AAS 7 [1915] 357f; EB 432ff; Dz 2179ff)

I: In order to meet the difficulties occurring in the Epistles of St Paul and other
Apostles in passages which treat of the “Parousia”, as it is called, or second coming of our
Lord Jesus Christ, is it allowed to a Catholic exegete to assert that, though the Apostles under
the inspiration of the Holy Ghost teach nothing erroneous, they none the less express their
own human opinions which may rest on error or misconception?

Answer In the negative.

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 II: In view of the correct concept of the apostolic office and the undoubted fidelity of
St Paul to the teaching of the Master ; in view also of the Catholic doctrine concerning the
inspiration and inerrancy of Holy Scripture according to which whatever a sacred Writer
asserts, declares, suggests, should be held to be asserted, declared, suggested by the Holy
Ghost and after a careful examination on their own merits of the passages in the Epistles of
St Paul which are in complete harmony with our Lord’s own manner of speaking, should it
be asserted that the Apostle Paul said nothing whatever in his writings which is not in
complete harmony with that ignorance of the time of the Parousia which Christ himself
proclaimed to belong to men?

Answer: In the affirmative.

III: After consideration of the Greek phrase hemeis hoi zontes hoi perileipomenoi; and
after careful examination of the exposition of the Fathers, above all of St John Chrysostom,
who was completely at home both in his native language and in the Pauline Epistles, is it
lawful to reject as far-fetched and destitute of any solid foundation the interpretation
traditional in the Catholic schools (and retained even by the Reformers of the sixteenth
century) that explains the words of St Paul in 1 Thessalonians 4:15-17, without in any way
involving the assertion that the Parousia was so near that the Apostle counted himself and
his readers among the faithful who will be left alive and go to meet Christ?

Answer: In the negative.

Concerning the False Interpretation of Two Biblical Texts

July 1, 1933 (AAS 25 [1933] 344; Dz 2272-3)

I: Is it right for a Catholic, especially after the authentic interpretation given by the Princes
of the Apostles (Acts 2:24-33; 13:35-37) to interpret the words of Psalm 15:10f: “Thou wilt
not leave my soul in hell, nor wilt thou give thy holy one to see corruption. Thou hast made
known to me the ways of life”, as if the sacred author did not speak of the resurrection of
our Lord Jesus Christ?

Answer: In the negative.

II: Is it licit to assert that the words of Jesus Christ, which are read in St Matthew
16:26: “What doth it profit a man, if he gain the whole world and suffer the loss of his own
soul?” and similarly those in St Luke 9:25: “What is a man advantaged, if he gain the whole
world and lose himself and cast away himself?” in the literal sense do not regard the eternal
salvation of the soul, but only man’s temporal life, notwithstanding the tenor of the words
themselves and their context besides the unanimous interpretation of Catholics?

Answer: In the negative.

On Implicit Quotations in Holy Scripture

February 13, 1905 (ASS 37 [1904-05] 666; EB 153; Dz 1979)

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 To secure a directive norm for students of Holy Scripture the following question was
proposed to the Pontifical Biblical Commission, namely:

To solve difficulties occurring in certain texts of Holy Scripture that appear to relate
historical facts, may a Catholic exegete assert that the passage in question is a tacit or implicit
quotation of a document written by a non-inspired author, all of whose assertions the inspired
author does not mean to approve or make his own, and that these assertions cannot therefore
be held immune from error?

Answer: In the negative, except in a case where without prejudice to the mind and
judgement of the Church, it is proved by solid arguments: (1) that the sacred Writer does in
fact cite the sayings or documents of another, and (2) neither approves nor makes the same
his own, so that he is legitimately regarded as not speaking in his own name.

On Narratives Historical only in Appearance in Books of Holy Scripture

Historical in Form

June 23, 1905 (ASS 38 [1905-06] 124f; EB 154; Dz 1980)

Is it possible to admit as a principle of sound exegesis that books of sacred Scripture

which are regarded as historical, at times do not relate, either wholly or in part, history
properly so-called and objectively true, but present only the appearance of history with the
purpose of expressing some meaning differing from the strictly literal or historical sense of
the words?

Answer: In the negative, except in a case neither easily nor rashly to be admitted, in
which the mind of the Church not being contrary and without prejudice to its judgement, it
is proved by solid arguments that the sacred Writer intended not to recount true history,
properly so-called, but under the guise and form of history to set forth a parable, an allegory,
or some meaning distinct from the strictly literal or historical signification of the words.

Concerning the Addition of Variant Readings in Editions of the Vulgate Version

of the Old and New Testament

November 17, I921 (AAS 14 [1922] 27; EB 509)

In the Preface to the Reader of the Clementine edition of the Vulgate version of the
Sacred Scriptures it is said: “Further in this edition there is nothing not canonical. no parallel
passages in the margin (the addition of which in that position is not prohibited in the future),
no notes, no variant readings, finally no prefaces. But as the Apostolic See does not condemn
the industry of those who have inserted in other editions parallel passages, variant readings,
the prefaces of St Jerome, and similar matter, so neither does it forbid that with the use of
different type such helps should be added in the future for the advantage and utility of
students in this same Vatican edition; with the exception, however, that Variant readings
may not be noted in the margin of the text”.

But as some are of opinion that these last words forbid the addition of variant readings
not only in the margin at the side but also at the foot of the text, the question has been put to

108
the Pontifical Biblical Commission: Is it lawful in editions of the Vulgate version both of
the New and the Old Testaments to add variant readings and other similar helps for students
at the foot of the text?

After examination of the matter, the Pontifical Biblical Commission replied: In the
affirmative.

Concerning the Use of Translations of Holy Scripture in Churches

April 30, 1934 (AAS 26 [1934] 315)

The following question was proposed by his Excellency the Bishop of

S’Hertogenbosch [otherwise called Bois-le-Duc] in the name also of their Excellencies the
other Bishops of the ecclesiastical province of Holland:

Can it be allowed to read to the people in Church the liturgical passages of the Epistles
and Gospels in a translation not from “the ancient Vulgate Latin version”, but from the
original texts whether Greek or Hebrew?

The Pontifical Biblical Commission decided that the following answer should be
given: In the negative; a translation should be publicly read to the Faithful made from the
text approved by the Church for the sacred liturgy.

Concerning Translations of Holy Scripture in Modern Languages

August 22, 1943 (AAS 35 [1943] 270; CR 23 [1943] 524)

To answer a question proposed to it concerning the use and authority of biblical

translations in modern languages, especially those made from the original texts, and to give
further clarification to its decree Concerning the Use of Translations of Holy Scripture in
Churches of April 30, 1934, the Pontifical Biblical Commission has considered it opportune
to publish and commend the following norms:

Since Pope Leo XIII, of happy memory, in the Encyclical Providentissimus Deus (Acta
Leonis XIII, Vol. 13, p 342; EB 91), for the more intimate knowledge and more fruitful
explanation of the divine word recommended the use of the original texts of the Bible and
since that recommendation, which clearly was not made for the exclusive advantage of
exegetes and theologians, has seemed and seems almost to advise that the same texts, of
course under the vigilant care of the competent ecclesiastical authorities, should be translated
in accordance with the approved principles of sacred and indeed of profane science into the
vernacular languages known to the mass of the people;

Since, moreover, it is from the Vulgate translation, which alone and exclusively among
the Latin versions then in circulation the oecumenical Council of Trent declared authoritative
(Conc. Trid., sess. IV, decr. De editione et usu Ss. Librorum; EB 46) that the biblical
passages in the liturgical books of the Latin Church to be read publicly at the holy Sacrifice
of the Mass and the Divine Office have for the most part been taken ; presupposing the
observance of whatever should be observed:

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 1° Translations of Holy Scripture in modern languages whether made from the Vulgate
or from the original texts, provided they have been published with the permission of the
competent ecclesiastical authority in accordance with canon 1391, may be duly used and
read by the faithful for their private devotion; moreover, if any translation, after a diligent
examination both of the text and of the notes by men eminent in biblical and theological
knowledge, is found to be more faithful and suitable, it may, if so desired, be especially
recommended by the Bishops, either individually or in provincial or national meetings, to
the faithful committed to their care.

2° The vernacular translation of the biblical passages which priests celebrating Mass
are to read to the people, as custom or occasion demands, after the reading of the liturgical
text, should, in accordance with the reply of the Pontifical Biblical Commission (Acta Ap.
Sedis, 1934, p. 315), agree with the Latin liturgical text, though it remains permissible, if
judged expedient, to give suitable explanation of the said translation by the help of the
original text or of another clearer translation.

Concerning the Work of R. D Frederic Schmidtke entitled Die Einwanderung

Israels in Kanaan

February 27, 1934 (AAS 26 [1934] 130f)

As the question has been addressed to this Pontifical Biblical Commission what is to
be thought of the work entitled Die Einwassderung Israels in Kanaan, published at Breslau
in the year 1933 by R. D. Frederic Schmidtke, it has decided that the following answer should
be given:

R. D. Frederic Schmidtke, Professor Extraordinary of the Old Testament in the

Theological Faculty of the University of Breslau in the volume mentioned above:
in his treatment of the Pentateuch follows the opinions of rationalistic criticism to the
complete neglect of the decree of the Pontifical Biblical Commission of June 27, 1906;
moreover, in the history of the Old Testament, without any attention to the decree of the
same Pontifical Biblical Commission of June 23, 1905, he introduces a type of literature
consisting of popular traditions mingling falsehood with truth; contrary to the clear evidence
of the sacred books he makes, among others, the assertions that the stories about the
Patriarchs, at least in large part, give the history, not of individual men, but of tribes; that
Jacob was not the son of Isaac, but represents some Aramean tribe; that the whole people of
Israel did not enter Egypt but a part only, in particular the tribe of Joseph; also, doing
violence to the sacred text, he explains many miracles of the Old Testament as purely natural
events.

The author, consequently, at least implicitly, denies the dogma of biblical inspiration
and inerrancy; he entirely neglects the norms of Catholic hermeneutics he contradicts the
Catholic doctrine most clearly set forth in the Encyclicals Providentissimus Deus of Leo
XIII and Spiritus Paraclitus of Benedict XV.

Hence the aforesaid work deserves reprobation on various grounds and should be kept
out of Catholic schools.

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 The Pontifical Commission, moreover, takes this occasion to warn Catholic commen-
tators to obey with due reverence the dogmatic Constitution of the Vatican Council, renew-
ing the Decree of the sacred Council of Trent, by which it was solemnly ordained “that in
matters of faith and morals, appertaining to the building up of Christian doctrine, that is to
be held as the true sense of sacred Scripture which was, and is, held by our holy mother the
Church, to whom it belongs to judge of the true sense and interpretation of the holy Scrip-
tures, and therefore no one may interpret holy Scripture contrary to this sense or also against
the unanimous consent of the Fathers”.

Letter to Cardinal Suhard [on the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, and on the
historical character of Gen 1-11]

(AAS 40 [1948] 45-8)

The Holy Father graciously entrusted to the Pontifical Biblical Commission the
examination of two questions recently submitted to His Holiness concerning the sources of
the Pentateuch and the historicity of the first eleven chapters of Genesis. As the result of
their deliberations His Holiness deigned to approve the following reply. on 16 January 1948.

The Pontifical Biblical Commission. desires to promote biblical studies by assuring to

them the most complete liberty within the limits of the traditional teaching of the Church.
This liberty has been proclaimed in explicit terms by the present Pope in his Encyclical
Divino afflante Spiritu: “The Catholic exegete. ought not by any manner of means to debar
himself from taking in hand, and that repeatedly, the difficult questions which have found
no solution up to the present time. in an attempt to find a well-founded explanation in perfect
harmony with the doctrine of the Church, in particular with that of biblical inerrancy, and at
the same time capable of fully satisfying the certain conclusions of the secular sciences. The
labours of these worthy workers in the vineyard of the Lord deserve to be judged not only
with equity and justice, but with perfect charity; and this is a point which all others sons of
the Church should bear in mind. It is their duty to avoid that most imprudent zeal which
considers it an obligation to attack or suspect whatever is new”, AAS (1943) 319.

If this recommendation of the Pope’s is borne in mind in the interpretation of the three
official replies given formerly by the Biblical Commission in connection with the above-
mentioned questions, namely June 23, 1905, on narratives in the historical books of Holy
Scripture which have only the appearance of history (EB 154), June 27, 1906, on the Mosaic
authenticity of the Pentateuch (EB 174-7), and June 30, 1909, on the historical character of
the first three chapters of Genesis (EB 332-9), it will be agreed that these replies are in no
way a hindrance to further truly scientific examination of these problems in accordance with
the results acquired in these last forty years.

As regards the composition of the Pentateuch, in the above-mentioned decree of June

27, 1906, the Biblical Commission recognized already that it could be affirmed that Moses
“in order to compose his work made use of written documents or of oral traditions” and that
post-Mosaic modifications and additions could also be admitted (EB 176-7). No one today
doubts the existence of these sources or rejects a gradual increase of Mosaic laws due to the
social and religious conditions of later times, a process manifest also in the historical
narratives. However, even among non-Catholic exegetes very diverse opinions are held
today concerning the character and the number of these documents, their names and dates.

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There are even authors in different countries, who for purely critical and historical reasons
quite unconnected with any religious purpose resolutely reject the theories most in favour
up to the present, and seek the explanation of certain editorial peculiarities of the Pentateuch,
not so much in the alleged diversity of documents as in the special psychology, the peculiar
mental and literary processes of the ancient Orientals which are better known today, or again
in the different literary forms which are required by the diversity of subject-matter. Hence
we invite Catholic scholars to study these problems with an open mind in the light of sane
criticism and of the results of other sciences which have their part in these matters, and such
study will without doubt establish the large share and the profound influence of Moses as
author and as legislator.

The question of the literary forms of the first eleven chapters of Genesis is far more
obscure and complex. These literary forms do not correspond to any of our classical
categories and cannot be judged in the light of the Greco-Latin or modern literary types. It
is therefore impossible to deny or to affirm their historicity as a whole without unduly
applying to them norms of a literary type under which they cannot be classed. If it is agreed
not to see in these chapters history in the classical and modern sense, it must be admitted
also that known scientific facts do not allow a positive solution of all the problems which
they present. The first duty in this matter incumbent on scientific exegesis consists in the
careful study of all the problems literary, scientific, historical, cultural, and religious
connected with these chapters; in the next place is required a close examination of the literary
methods of the ancient oriental peoples, their psychology, their manner of expressing
themselves and even their notion of historical truth the requisite, in a word, is to assemble
without preformed judgements all the material of the palaeontological and historical,
epigraphical and literary sciences. It is only in this way that there is hope of attaining a
clearer view of the true nature of certain narratives in the first chapters of Genesis. To declare
a priori that these narratives do not contain history in the modern sense of the word might
easily be understood to mean that they do not contain history in any sense, whereas they
relate in simple and figurative language, adapted to the understanding f mankind at a lower
stage of development, the fundamental truths underlying the divine scheme of salvation, as
well as a popular description of the origins of the human race and of the chosen people. In
the meantime it is necessary to practise patience which is part of prudence and the wisdom
of life. This also is inculcated by the Holy Father in the Encyclical already quoted: “No one”,
he says, “should be surprised that all the difficulties have not yet been clarified or solved.
But that is no reason for losing courage or forgetting that in the branches of human study it
cannot be otherwise than in nature, where beginnings grow little by little, where the produce
of the soil is not gathered except after prolonged labour. There is ground, therefore, for
hoping that (these difficulties) which today appear most complicated and arduous, will
eventually, thanks to constant effort, admit of complete clarification” (AAS [1943] 318).

112
 PONTIFICAL BIBLICAL COMMISSION

Documents issued by the Commission

Note: The documents of the Pontifical Biblical Commission are presented in chronological order.

Each text is given with its original title in Latin or another language, followed by an English explanation of
its contents, and the date of publication in parentheses.

The next line provides bibliographical references in Acta Apostolicae Sedis or another source.

1. Le peuple juif et ses Saintes Écritures dans la Bible chrétienne, Il popolo ebraico
e le sue Sacre Scritture nella Bibbia cristiana (May 24, 2001)
[Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2001]
[French, Italian]

2. L’interprétation de la Bible dans l’Eglise, The interpretation of the Bible in the

Church (April 15, 1993)
[Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1993]
[Italian]

3. Unité et diversité dans l’église, Unità e diversità nella chiesa (April 11, 1988)
[Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1988]

4. De sacra Scriptura et christologia, Bibbia e cristologia (1984)

[Libreria Editrice Vaticana]

5. Ratio periclitandae doctrinae ad academicos gradus candidatorum, Piano

d’esame per i gradi accademici in sacra Scrittura (December 7, 1974)
[AAS 67 (1975) 153-158]

6. De historica evangeliorum veritate, La verità storica dei vangeli (April 21st,

1964)
[AAS 56 (1964) 712-718]

7. De consociationibus biblicis et de conventibus eiusdem generis, Associazioni

bibliche e convegni biblici (December 15, 1955)
[AAS 48 (1956) 61-64]

8. De libro «Die Psalmen» Bernardi Bonkamp, Sul libro «Die Psalmen» di

Bernard Bonkamp (June 9, 1953)
[AAS 45 (1953) 432]

9. De Scriptura sacra recte docenda, Insegnamenti della Sacra Scrittura nei

seminari e nei collegi (May 13, 1950)
[AAS 42 (1950) 495-505]

10. Des sources du Pentateuque et de l’historicité de Genèse 1-11,Sulle fonti del

Pentateuco e sul valore storico di Gen 1-11 (January 16, 1948)
[AAS 40 (1948) 45-48]

113
11. De usu novi Psalterii latini extra horas canonicas, Il nuovo Salterio latino fuori
dalle ore canoniche (October 22nd, 1947)
[AAS 39 (1947) 508]

12. De versionibus Sacrae Scripturae in linguas vernaculas, Le versioni della Sacra

Scrittura nelle lingue vive (August 22nd, 1943)
[AAS 35 (1943) 270]

13. De experimentis ad Prolytatum, Sugli esami per la Licenza (July 6, 1942)

[AAS 34(1942) 232]

14. Un opuscolo anonimo denigratorio, Un opuscolo anonimo denigratorio (August

20, 1941)
[AAS 33 (1941) 465-472]

15. De experimentis ad lauream, Gli esami per il dottorato (July 16, 1939)
[AAS 31 (1939) 320]

16. De usu versionum Sacrae Scripturae in ecclesiis, Sull’uso delle versioni della
Sacra Scrittura nelle chiese (April 30, 1934)
[AAS 35 (1943) 270]

17. Opus cui titulus«Die Einwanderung Israels in Kanaan» reprobatur, Condanna

dell’opera «Die Einwanderung Israels in Kanaan» (February 27, 1934)
[AAS 26 (1934) 130]

18. De falsa duorum textuum biblicorum interpretatione, Sulla falsa interpretazione

di due testi biblici (July 1st, 1933)
[AAS 25 (1933) 344]

19. De additione variarum lectionum in versione Vulgatae tam Novi quam Veteris
Testamenti, L’aggiunta di lezioni varianti nelle edizioni della Vulgata
(November 17, 1921)
[AAS 14 (1922) 27]

20. De parousia in epistolis Pauli Apostoli, La parusia nelle lettere di S. Paolo (June
18, 1915)
[AAS 7 (1915) 357-358]

21. De epistola ad Hebraeos, Sulla lettera agli Ebrei (June 24, 1914)
[AAS 6 (1914) 417-418]

22. Quaestiones de epistolis pastoralibus Pauli apostoli, Sulle lettere pastorali

dell’apostolo Paolo (June 12, 1913)
[AAS 5 (1913) 292-293]

23. Quaestiones de libro Actuum Apostolorum, Sul libro degli Atti degli Apostoli
(June 12, 1913)
[AAS 5 (1913) 291-292]

24. De quaestione synoptica, Sulla questione sinottica (June 26, 1912)

[AAS 4 (1912) 465]

114
 25. Quaestiones de evangeliis secundum Marcum et secundum Lucam, Sui vangeli
secondo Marco e secondo Luca (June 26, 1912)
[AAS 4 (1912) 463-465]

26. Quaestiones de evangelio secundum Matthaeum, Sul vangelo secondo Matteo

(June 19, 1911)
[AAS 3 (1911) 294-296]

27. De examinibus coram Pontificia Commissione Biblica subeundis, Esami per i

gradi accademici davanti alla Pontificia Commissione Biblica (May 24, 1911)
[AAS 3 (1911) 47-50]

28. De auctoribus et de tempore compositionis Psalmorum, Autori e tempo di

composizione dei Salmi (May 1st, 1910)
[AAS 2 (1910) 354]

29. De charactere historico trium priorum capitum Geneseos, Sul carattere storico
dei tre primi capitoli della Genesi (June 30, 1909)
[AAS 1 (1909) 567-569]

30. De organo officiali Pontificiae Commissionis de re biblica, L’organo ufficiale

della Pontificia Commissione Biblica (February 15, 1909)
[AAS 1 (1909) 241]

31. De libri Isaiae indole et auctore, Indole e autore del libro di Isaia (June 28,
1908)
[ASS 41 (1908) 613]

32. De quarto evangelio, Autore e verità storica del quarto vangelo (May 29, 1907)
[ASS 40 (1907) 383]

33. De mosaica authentia Pentateuchi, Sull’autenticità mosaica del Pentateuco

(June 27, 1906)
[ASS 39 (1906) 377]

34. De narrationibus specietenus tantum historicis, Narrazioni solo apparentemente

storiche (June 23, 1905)
[ASS 38 (1905-06) 124]

35. Circa citationes implicitas in S. Scriptura contentas, Sulle citazioni implicite

contenute nella S. Scrittura (February 13, 1905)
[ASS 37 (1904-05) 666]

PONTIFICAL BIBLICAL COMMISSION

Documents issued by the Commission

Note: The documents of the Pontifical Biblical Commission are presented in chronological order.

115
Each text is given with its original title in Latin or another language, followed by an English explanation of
its contents, and the date of publication in parentheses.

The next line provides bibliographical references in Acta Apostolicae Sedis or another source.

1. Circa citationes implicitas in S. Scriptura contentas, On implied citations

contained in Sacred Scripture (February 13, 1905)
[ASS 37 (1904-05) 666]
[Italian, Latin]
2. De narrationibus specietenus tantum historicis, Concerning only apparently
historical narratives (June 23, 1905)
[ASS 38 (1905-06) 124]
[Italian, Latin]
3. De mosaica authentia Pentateuchi, On the authenticity of the Mosaic
authorship of the Pentateuch (June 27, 1906)
[ASS 39 (1906) 377]
[Italian, Latin]
4. De quarto evangelio, On the authorship and historical truth of the fourth
Gospel (May 29, 1907)
[ASS 40 (1907) 383]
[Italian, Latin]
5. De libri Isaiae indole et auctore, On the nature and authorship of the book of
Isaiah (June 28, 1908)
[ASS 41 (1908) 613]
[Italian, Latin]
6. De organo officiali Pontificiae Commissionis de re biblica, Regarding the
official body of the Pontifical Biblical Commission (February 15, 1909)
[AAS 1 (1909) 241]
[Italian, Latin]
7. De charactere historico trium priorum capitum Geneseos, Concerning the
historical nature of the first three chapters of Genesis (June 30, 1909)
[AAS 1 (1909) 567-569]
[Italian, Latin]
8. De auctoribus et de tempore compositionis Psalmorum, Regarding the
authorship and times of the composition of the Psalms (May 1st, 1910)
[AAS 2 (1910) 354]
[Italian, Latin]
9. De examinibus coram Pontificia Commissione Biblica subeundis, Regarding the
evaluation of candidates for academic titles in Sacred Scripture (May 24, 1911)
[AAS 3 (1911) 47-50]
[Latin]
10. Quaestiones de evangelio secundum Matthaeum, On the Gospel according to
Matthew (June 19, 1911)
[AAS 3 (1911) 294-296]
[Italian, Latin]
11. Quaestiones de evangeliis secundum Marcum et secundum Lucam, On the
Gospels according to Mark and Luke (June 26, 1912)
[AAS 4 (1912) 463-465]
[Italian, Latin]

116
12. De quaestione synoptica, Concerning the synoptic question (June 26, 1912)
[AAS 4 (1912) 465]
[Italian, Latin]
13. Quaestiones de libro Actuum Apostolorum, Questions regarding the Acts of the
Apostles (June 12, 1913)
[AAS 5 (1913) 291-292]
[Italian, Latin]
14. Quaestiones de epistolis pastoralibus Pauli apostoli, Questions regarding the
pastoral Letters of the Apostle Paul (June 12, 1913)
[AAS 5 (1913) 292-293]
[Italian, Latin]
15. De epistola ad Hebraeos, On the Letter to the Hebrews (June 24, 1914)
[AAS 6 (1914) 417-418]
[Italian, Latin]
16. De parousia in epistolis Pauli Apostoli, The parousia in the Letters of Saint
Paul (June 18, 1915)
[AAS 7 (1915) 357-358]
[Italian, Latin]
17. De additione variarum lectionum in versione Vulgatae tam Novi quam Veteris
Testamenti, The addition of variants in editions of the Vulgate (November 17,
1921)
[AAS 14 (1922) 27]
[Italian, Latin]
18. De falsa duorum textuum biblicorum interpretatione, On the false interpretation
of two biblical texts (July 1st, 1933)
[AAS 25 (1933) 344]
[Italian, Latin]
19. Opus cui titulus «Die Einwanderung Israels in Kanaan» reprobatur,
Condemnation of the work «Die Einwanderung Israels in Kanaan» (February
27, 1934)
[AAS 26 (1934) 130]
[Italian, Latin]
20. De usu versionum Sacrae Scripturae in ecclesiis, Concerning the use of the
various versions of Sacred Scripture in the Church (April 30, 1934)
[AAS 35 (1943) 270]
[Italian, Latin]
21. De experimentis ad lauream, Regarding doctoral exams before the Pontifical
Biblical Commission (July 16, 1939)
[AAS 31 (1939) 320]
[Italian, Latin]
22. Un opuscolo anonimo denigratorio, Regarding an anonymously written
denigratory work (August 20, 1941)
[AAS 33 (1941) 465-472]
[Italian]
23. De experimentis ad Prolytatum, Regarding licentiate exams before the
Pontifical Biblical Commission (July 6, 1942)
[AAS 34(1942) 232]
[Italian, Latin]
24. De versionibus Sacrae Scripturae in linguas vernaculas, Concerning the various
versions of Sacred Scripture in the vernacular (August 22nd, 1943)
[AAS 35 (1943) 270]
[Italian, Latin]

117
25. De usu novi Psalterii latini extra horas canonicas, The use of the new Latin
psalter beyond the canonical hours (October 22nd, 1947)
[AAS 39 (1947) 508]
[Italian, Latin]
26. Des sources du Pentateuque et de l’historicité de Genèse 1-11, Regarding the
sources of the Pentateuch and the historical value of Genesis 1-11 (January 16,
1948)
[AAS 40 (1948) 45-48]
[French, Italian]
27. De Scriptura sacra recte docenda, Concerning the teaching of Sacred Scripture
in seminaries and religious houses of study (May 13, 1950)
[AAS 42 (1950) 495-505]
[Italian, Latin]
28. De libro «Die Psalmen» Bernardi Bonkamp, Regarding Bernard Bonkamp’s
book «Die Psalmen» (June 9, 1953)
[AAS 45 (1953) 432]
[Italian, Latin]
29. De consociationibus biblicis et de conventibus eiusdem generis, Biblical
associations and conferences (December 15, 1955)
[AAS 48 (1956) 61-64]
[Italian, Latin]
30. De historica evangeliorum veritate, The historicity of the Gospels (April 21st,
1964)
[AAS 56 (1964) 712-718]
[Italian, Latin]
31. Ratio periclitandae doctrinae ad academicos gradus candidatorum, The method
of testing candidates for study in Sacred Scripture a (December 7, 1974)
[AAS 67 (1975) 153-158]
[Italian, Latin]
32. De sacra Scriptura et christologia, On Sacred Scripture and Christology (1984)
[Libreria Editrice Vaticana]
[Hungarian, Italian, Latin]
33. Unité et diversité dans l’Église, Unity and diversity in the Church (April 11,
1988)
[Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1988]
[French, Italian]
34. L’interprétation de la Bible dans l’Église, The Interpretation of the Bible in the
Church (April 15, 1993)
[Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City 1993]
[German, Italian, Portuguese, Swahili, Ukrainian]
35. Le peuple juif et ses Saintes Écritures dans la Bible chrétienne, The Jewish People
and Their Sacred Scriptures in the Christian Bible (May 24, 2001)
[Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City 2001]
[English, French, German, Italian, Spanish]
36. The Bible and Morality. Biblical Roots of Christian Conduct (May 11, 2008)
[Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City 2008]
[English, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish]

37. Ispirazione e verità della Sacra Scrittura (22 febbraio 2014)

[Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2014]
[Italian]

118
 Catholic Church Documents related to Biblical Studies
compiled by Prof. Felix Just, S.J. - Loyola Marymount University

Documents of the Second Vatican Council:

• Vatican II: Dei Verbum (‘Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation’ - November

18, 1965)
o another copy available from cin.org
o see also my Outline of Dei Verbum, also compared to the Catechism of the
Catholic Church

Documents of the Pontifical Biblical Commission:

• ‘The Jewish People and Their Sacred Scriptures in the Christian Bible’ (May 24,
2001) - NEW, from the Vatican Website
• ‘The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church‘ (April 23, 1993) - UPDATED - now
smaller files for easier download
o Print copy available in Origins 23.29 (Jan. 6, 1994) 497-524.
o A large, single file version of ‘The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church‘,
from the EWTN Website
o See also ‘Interpreting the Bible: Three Views‘ - analyses of this PBC
document, from ‘First Things’ Magazine
• ‘Instruction on the Historical Truth of the Gospels‘ (April 21, 1964)
o See also J. Fitzmyer, ‘The Biblical Commission’s Instruction on the
Historical Truth of the Gospels,’ TS 25 (1964) 386-408.
o A different English translation is also available in CBQ 26 (1964) 299-312.

Excerpts from the Catechism of the Catholic Church (October 11, 1992 - from
the Christus Rex website):

• §§ 51-73 on ‘The Revelation of God‘ or from the Vatican Site

• §§ 74-100 on ‘The Transmission of Divine Revelation‘ or from the Vatican Site
• §§ 101-141 on ‘Sacred Scripture‘ or from the Vatican Site

Papal Encyclicals (all available at the Vatican Website):

• Pope Pius XII: Encyclical Divino Afflante Spiritu (‘On the Most Opportune Way to
Promote Biblical Studies’ - September 30, 1943) - another copy from cin.org
• Pope Benedict XV: Encyclical Spiritus Paraclitus (‘On St. Jerome’ - September 15,
1920)
• Pope Pius X: Encyclical Pascendi Dominici Gregis (‘On the Doctrines of the
Modernists’ - July 3, 1907) - another copy at cin.org
• Pope Leo XIII: Encyclical Providentissimus Deus (‘On the Study of Holy Scripture’
- November 18, 1893)

Neo-Vulgate Bible:

119
 • Nova Vulgata Bibliorum Sacrorum Editio - the entire text (in Latin, of course) is
available online at the Vatican website
o also at the Domus Ecclesiae website
• Pope John Paul II: Scripturarum Thesaurus (April 25, 1979) - the ‘Apostolic
Constitution’ promulgating the Neo-Vulgate edition of the Holy Bible (Latin Text
from the Vatican Website)
o English Translation available from EWTN website

Other Documents:

• Liturgiam authenticam (Fifth Instruction ‘for the Right Implementation of the

Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy of the Second Vatican Council’; from the
Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments (March 28,
2001)
o Latin Text; English Translation; Vatican Press Release
o Responses from the Catholic Biblical Association of America: Letter to the
U.S. Bishops; Presentation by Fr. Richard Clifford, S.J.
• Pope John Paul II: ‘Truth Cannot Contradict Truth’ - an ‘Address’ to the Pontifical
Academy of Sciences (October 22, 1996).
• ‘Toward Your Happiness: Catholicism and Fundamentalism: A Contrast’ - A
Pastoral Letter to Catholics in Mississippi and Alabama (June 29, 1989).
• ‘A Pastoral Statement for Catholics on Biblical Fundamentalism’, from the U.S.
bishops Ad Hoc Committee on Biblical Fundamentalism (Washington: USCCB,
1987). - another copy here

Printed Collections of Church Documents (some out-of-print by now, but still

available in good libraries):

• Enchiridion Biblicum: documenta ecclesiastica Sacram Scripturam spectantia. 4th

edition. Naples & Rome, 1961.
• Rome and the Study of Scripture: a collection of papal enactments on the study of
Holy Scripture together with the decision of the Biblical Commission. 7th edition. St.
Meinrad, IN: 1962.
• Denzinger, Heinrich, and Adolf Schönmetzer. Enchiridion symbolorum. 35th
edition. Barcelona: Herder, 1973.
• Megivern, James J. Official Catholic Teachings: Biblical Interpretation.
Wilmington, NC: Consortium Books, 1978.
• see also the excellent survey article by Raymond E. Brown, S.S., and Thomas
Aquinas Collins, O.P., ‘Church Pronouncements,’ in: The New Jerome Biblical
Commentary (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990) 1166-74.
• NEW: Béchard, S.J., Dean P., ed. The Scripture Documents: An Anthology of
Official Catholic Teachings. Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 2002.

Most of the above documents are also available on a CD-ROM entitled ‘Welcome to the
Catholic Church,’ by Harmony Media, Inc.

120
 DID WOMAN EVOLVE FROM THE BEASTS?
A DEFENCE OF TRADITIONAL CATHOLIC DOCTRINE - PART I

by Brian W. Harrison, O.S., M.A., S.T.D

Associate Professor of Theology,
Pontifical Catholic University of Puerto Rico

III. 6 We come now to the final magisterial intervention to be considered in this part of our
study, namely, the Pontifical Biblical Commission’s Responsum of June 30, 1909, on the
interpretation of Genesis, chapters 1 to 3. The main point of this document that interests us
is the third question addressed by the Commission:

Whether, in particular, the literal historical sense (sensus litteralis historicus) may be called in
question (vocari in dubium possit), where it is a question of facts narrated in these chapters (ubi
agitur de factis in eisdem capitibus enarratis) which involve the foundations of the Christian
religion (quae christianae religionis fundamenta attingunt), as are, among others, the creation
of all things by God at the beginning of time; the special [or, particular] creation of man; the
formation of the first woman from the first man (formatio primae mulieris ex primo homine); the
unity of the human race; the original happiness of our first parents in a state of justice, integrity
and immortality; the precept given by God to man in order to test his obedience; the
transgression of the divine precept under the persuasion of the devil in the guise of a serpent;
the fall of our first parents from the aforesaid primaeval state of innocence; and the promise
of a future Saviour?

Response: In the negative (Negative).30

It was precisely as a result of taking the six Latin words emphasised above in isolation, as if
the PBC intended them to be a sufficient statement of orthodoxy, that some theologians
developed the undoubtedly ‘creative’, but sadly ill-founded, hypothesis that Adam and Eve
may have been mutant twin embryos.31 For homo, in itself, can mean a human being of any
age, and the PBC formula does not directly specify any details as to how this “formatio ... ex
primo homine” took place. But in fact, the Commission’s decision does exclude the said
hypothesis quite clearly, although indirectly, by virtue of the opening lines of the question
which it answers in the negative. The PBC does not say here that Catholics are forbidden to
call into question “the formation of the first woman from the first man”. Rather, it says they
are forbidden to call in question “the literal, historical sense” of the Genesis text which
narrates that “formation”. And since nobody could possibly claim that “the literal, historical
sense” of Genesis 2: 21-22, where Adam plainly appears as a sleeping adult, is compatible
with a scenario of tiny pre-born mutants undergoing monozygotic fission, that scenario is
certainly ruled out. A fortiori, of course, any purely ‘symbolic’ or metaphorical kind of
“formatio ... ex primo homine” is ruled out by this PBC “Response”.

30. DS 3514 (= D 2123), emphasis added.

31. As far as the present writer can discover, the first Catholic who suggested that Adam and
Eve may have been twins was J. Paquier, in his book La Création et l’Evolution, la
Révélation et la Science (Paris: Gabalda, 1932), p. 132. Paquier is cited to this effect by J.
Gross (“The Problem of Origins in Recent Theology”) in the post-war sequel to Messenger’s
Evolution and Theology. Cf. E. C. Messenger (ed.), Theology and Evolution (London &
Glasgow: Sands & Co., 1950), p. 144.

121
 Homily 12 October 2003
By Fr. Hathaway FSSP
Mater Dei Latin Mass Community

Eighteenth Sunday after Pentecost

On Creation: What a Catholic Must Believe

Previously, we spoke on the First Person of the Blessed Trinity, “God, the Father Almighty,
Creator of heaven and earth.” In this article of the creed we profess our belief in the Creator.
Although not directly implied in the creed, it will nevertheless profit us to consider what
Catholics have to believe concerning creation itself... which is our topic today.

There are many theories regarding creation. Some teach the pre-existence of matter i.e., big-
bang and stellar formation theories; some teach that life originated as minute spores
transported through space on meteorites (Cosmozoic Theory) or that nucleic acids (DNA
and RNA) miraculously formed to begin an evolutionary process of life (Biopoesis Theory);
and there are scientists who say man himself is the result of natural processes. What’s a
Catholic to believe?

The first 3 chapters of the book of Genesis contain the bulk of our answer. The Church has
defended this deposit from scholars intent upon a too naturalistic interpretation.

To preserve scripture against false opinions, Pope Leo XIII instituted the Pontifical Biblical
Commission by his Apostolic Letter, Vigilantiae in 1902. Later, Pope St. Pius X decreed
that “All are bound in conscience to submit to the decisions of the Biblical Commission
which have been given in the past and which will be given in the future.” (Motu Propio
Praestantia Sacrae Scripturae, 1907). Since Vatican II the Commission’s decrees no-longer
require our assent.

On June 30, 1909, the Commission made several key decisions regarding the creation
account given in the first three chapters of Genesis. We will review three of these.

First, the Commission rejected the notion that the first three chapters of Genesis contain
either myths or fables, allegories meant to explain higher things, or legends only true in part
and simultaneously affirmed that these chapters contain objective reality and historical truth.

Second, the Commission rejected the notion that the literal and historical sense of Genesis
could be called into question when the narration pertains to the foundations of the Christian
religion. The Commission identified some issues which may not be called into question: “for
example, among others, the creation of all things wrought by God in the beginning of time;
the special creation of man; the formation of the first woman from the first man; the oneness
of the human race; the original happiness of our first parents in the state of justice, integrity,
and immortality; the command given to man by God to prove his obedience; the
transgression of the divine command through the devil’s persuasion under the guise of the
serpent; the casting out of our first parents out of that first state of innocence; and also the
promise of a future restorer.”

122
Third, on the question of whether the earth was created in six days or not, the Commission
affirmed that the word dies (day) can be taken either in its proper sense as a natural day, or
in the improper sense of a certain space of time; and that there can be free disagreement
among exegetes on this question.

These decisions clearly manifest Catholic parameters concerning the book of Genesis and
creation. Genesis contains real and objective history; it requires literal belief on issues
pertaining to the foundations of our Faith; there may be free disagreement on questions of
time frame. We will review the nine specific examples given by the Commission which
demand our assent.

1. The creation of all things wrought by God in the beginning of time. We must believe that
a Divine Being is the ultimate cause for the universe. God “creates” in the strict sense which
is to say, God brings forth from nothing and this act simultaneously begins time.

2. The special creation of man. We must believe that God uniquely created man with a
rational soul. Whether directly from the slime of the earth or indirectly through a succession
of other organic bodies is not a concern. We must believe that at one point God infused into
some matter a rational soul making the first man.

3. The formation of the first woman from the first man. We must believe that God
miraculously formed Eve from Adam. As we read in Genesis, “the Lord God cast a deep
sleep upon Adam and when he was fast asleep, He took one of his ribs and filled up flesh
for it.” (Gn 2:21)

4. The oneness of the human race. We must believe that every man born into this world
shares the same first parents namely, Adam and Eve. The Church condemns polygenism, the
false doctrine that mankind has several first parents. For if such were true not all mankind
would be stained with original sin and, thereby, not all mankind would need redemption.
(see Rm 5:12)

5. The original happiness of our first parents. Adam and Eve were perfectly happy in their
pristine condition. They were created in a state of justice having intimate friendship of God;
a state of integrity, they had perfect control over their passions; a state of immortality, they
could not die. The privileges of our first parents makes it difficult to find a reason for their
disobedience... a question the Church studies under the title: the mystery of iniquity.

6. The command given to man by God to prove his obedience. We must believe God tested
Adam to prove his obedience. The meaning of “Thou shall not eat of the tree of knowledge”
awaits a full explanation, but it is enough to know Adam was tested by God for his obedience
and his response would affect all mankind.

7. The transgression of the divine command through the devil’s persuasion under the guise
of a serpent. We must believe that the devil exists and that Adam failed his test through
demonic persuasion. In persuading Adam to sin, the devil takes possession of an organic life
form recognizable as a serpent... perhaps even as a dragon as read in other scriptures.

8. The casting out of our first parents out of that first state of innocence. We must believe

123
that by his sin, Adam and Eve, the purest human persons outside our Blessed Lady, lost
God’s intimate friendship and became subject to concupiscence, suffering, and death.

9. The promise of a future restorer. We must believe that God promised to send someone to
restore the friendship He had with mankind in the beginning. This promise is recorded in
Genesis 3:15 wherein God tells the serpent, “I will put enmities between thee and the woman,
and thy seed and her seed: she shall crush thy head, and thou shalt lie in wait for her
heal.” This woman may be taken as our Lady or the Church either of which has the upper
hand, “she shall crush thy head;” however, the seed of this woman must expect some
suffering, “thou shalt lie in wait for her heal.”

These are some key positions we must hold concerning the book of Genesis and creation.
Catholics are given freedom on the issue of when these things may have happened. Common
evolutionary theory teaches that the universe formed 10-20 billion years ago, life began 4.5
billion years ago, and man arose 10 million years ago. A Catholic may believe this timing
or he may equally hold that the universe was created in 6 days and is 6,000 years old... and
this I believe.

This page was added

Oct. 16, 2003

(http://web2.airmail.net/carlsch/MaterDei/Homilies/homily031012.htm [6/23/04])

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THE REJECTION OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE PBC: SOME WITNESSES.

With respect to the Pontifical Biblical Commission and the Magisterial teachings which
followed after its decrees, one finds Catholic exegetes of a liberalizing tendency who raise
objections to it, and who try to find ways to undermine its authority. In this regard, consider
the article: Remnants of Modernism in a Postmodern Age: The Pontifical Biblical
Commissions Centennial, by Dean Bechard, S.J..1 I will leave it to the reader to judge the
quality, worth. And objectivity of such reasonings.

For another witness of the same approach, consider the following published on the Catholic
Community Forum:2

Biblical Commission of 1909

Catholic Online Forum Discussion Area: The ASK FATHER Question Box: The Archive: Scripture: Biblical
Commision of 1909

By marko Daoud (Marko) on Monday, May 22, 2000 - 9:17 pm: Edit Post

Fr,

I face a really big problem trying to understand a decision giving by the biblical commission of 1909. Here is
an excerpt:

Decisions of the Bible Commission (30-6-1909)

The first three chapters of genesis contain narratives of real events, no myths, no mere allegories or symbols
of religious truths, no legends(dogma 2122)

In regard to those facts, which touch the foundations of the Christian religion, the literal historical sense is to
be adhered to. Such facts are the creation of all things by God in the beginning of time, and the special creation
of humanity.(dogma 2123)

I do not understand the term Dogma. Do they mean a dogma of the church - where it is unchangeable?

I recall having read the posts of Fr Auman and Sotelo on evolution and father Sotelo, you said:

However, the decree of 1909 in its entirety, along with other turn of the century decrees from the Pontifical
Biblical Commission, are no longer binding on Catholic exegetes or the faithful.

Which is impossible for a dogma.

I’m in total confusion, is it a dogma or not?

thank you, gby, marko.

By Fr. Richard G. Jaworski (Fr_jaworski) on Wednesday, May 24, 2000 - 7:26 am: Edit Post

Dear Marko:

1
From America, The Jesuit Review, issue February 04, 2002
2
http://oldforum.catholic.org/discussion/messages/41/7295.html?959178394 [6/22/04]

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I can understand your difficulty. The numbers that appear in your message as “(dogma 2122)” and
“(dogma 2123)” are the numbers accompanying the various paragraphs in a very famous collection
of Church documents and were inserted for ease of reference. This Enchiridion (manual, or
handbook) by Denzinger and Schönmetzer has formed the basis for all modern collections of Church
documents. Sometimes other books or articles refer to the individual paragraphs in this work by DS
2122 or DS 2123. The numbers you have come from the older, pre-1962, editions. The new numbers
would be DS 3513 and DS 3514, respectively. In the actual PBC (Pontifical Biblical Commission)
document from 1909, how-ever, these paragraphs are simply numbered “Question 2” and “Question
3”. The confusing part is that your book has called these “dogma 2122” and “dogma 2123”. It
shouldn’t have used the word “dogma”. For, you are correct in that an actual dogma cannot change.

The PBC published its decisions with the intention of guiding Catholic Biblical Studies. These early
PBC decisions were not dogmatic. They were phrased as responses to various questions. (Although
the article I quote below calls them “decrees”, Scripture scholar Fr. Joseph Fitzmyer, S.J. says they
should not even be called decrees.)

I’ll quote from an article in The New Jerome Biblical Commentary on “Church Pronounce-ments”
(Quoting saves me the time of rewriting ):

In what follows we shall present a quick summary of ecclesiastical statements pertaining to the Bible.
Some background is necessary for the evaluation of these statements; for, although all demand
respect and understanding, not all these statements require equal adherence. Obviously, decrees of
the ecumenical councils are more binding than papal encyclicals. In particular, there was a certain
temporal character to the binding force of the decrees of the Pontifical Biblical Commission (PBC),
for these were prudential decisions on practical problems. They required obedience when issued but
were subject to subsequent revision and are in no way to be considered infallible. [...]

Many now have little more than historic interest, being implicitly revoked by later decrees, by DAS
[the encyclical Divino Afflante Spiritu], and by Vatican II. They must be evaluated according to the
1955 clarification issued in Latin and German by A. Miller and by A Kleinhans, secretary and
assistant secretary of the PBC [...] Miller says: “As long as these [early PBC] decrees propose views
that are neither immediately nor mediately connected with truths of faith and morals, the interpreter
of Sacred Scripture can pursue his scientific investigations with full liberty and accept the results of
these investigations, provided always that he respects the teaching authority of the church.”

Ultraconservatives have attempted to salvage the authority of the early PBC decrees by citing the
opinion of J. E. Steinmueller [...] that this clarification was unauthorized and invalid because he heard
that Miller and Kleinhans were rebuked by the Holy Office over it (but spared by the intervention of
Cardinal Tisserant). An undocumented recollection published much later scarcely constitutes proof,
esp. [especially] since there was Roman gossip in the other direction as well: Pius XII offered to re-
voke the PBC decrees officially, but A. Bea persuaded him that the Miller-Kleinhans clarification
was sufficient. The clear fact is that the clarification was never withdrawn and Rome has acted
consistently in its spirit, never correcting the hundreds of Catholic scholars who have used the “full
liberty” to contradict almost every one of the early PBC decrees.

God bless you,

Fr. Rick

N.B. For an able defense of the opposed view, cf. the following:

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 ORGAN OF THE ROMAN THEOLOGICAL FORUM

Editor: Msgr. John F. McCarthy, J.C.D., S.T.D.

Associate Editor: Rev. Brian W. Harrison, O.S., M.A., S.T.D. Pro manuscripto
Please address all correspondence to:
LIVING TRADITION
Oblates of Wisdom
P.O. Box 109
Eastman, Wisconsin 54626
U.S.A.
Distributed several times a year to interested members. Not to be republished without permission.

No. Roman Theological Forum | Article Index | Study Program

July
94 2001

REDISCOVERING THE DECREES OF THE

PONTIFICAL BIBLICAL COMMISSION1

by Sean Kopczynski

[Editor’s Note. The following article represents the typical situation of a Catholic student
attending classes in a graduate school of theology and finding himself being presented with novel
and even shocking ideas of biblical interpretation taken from that confused and often misleading
area of thought known as Catholic biblical scholarship. Usually the student does not have the time
or the ability to search into the background of these disconcerting affirmations to see where they
came from and to test the solidity of their foundation. Father Sean Kopczynski, a missionary of the
Congregation of the Fathers of Mercy ordained a priest on June 10, 2000, had been a student
occasionally in this situation. In the instance discussed below he did take the time to study into a
question regarding the decrees of the Pontifical Biblical Commission. How his research turned out
is the subject of the following article. He now preaches parish missions, novenas, and retreats.]

When I was studying for the priesthood, I was told that according to modern biblical
scholars the 1911-1912 Pontifical Biblical Commission (PBC) decrees were no longer
binding. I was also told that an abrogation regarding the decrees had been around since the
1950’s. My interest about the matter heightened when writing a paper on the Synoptic Gos-
pel Question. Who wrote first — Matthew, Mark or Luke? I soon discovered that ‘who wrote
first?’ simply cannot be determined based on internal evidence alone.1 In order to build a case
for who wrote first, second and third, I searched for authoritative external evidence, which led
me to the 1911-1912 decrees of the PBC. The only difficulty however was that, if these decrees
had truly been abrogated, they could not be used as authoritative evidence. I decided to find
the abrogation and see for myself what authority, if any, these decrees still had in the
eyes of the Church.

My search led me to the opinions of Thomas Aquinas Collins, O.P. and Raymond Brown,
S.S., found in the Jerome Biblical Commentary. According to them, “many of these decrees
[of the Pontifical Biblical Commission] now have little more than historic interest, being im-
plicitly revoked by later decrees, by Divino Afflante Spiritu, and by Vatican II. The early
decrees must be evaluated according to the 1955 clarification issued in Latin and in

1
http://www.rtforum.org/lt/lt94.html [6/22/04]

127
German by A. Miller and by A. Kleinhaus, secretary and assistant secretary of the
PBC.”2 They go on to say that the clarification was printed in the German biblical periodical:
Benediktinische Monatshcrift, the referenced article entitled “Das Neue Biblische Handbuch”
(i.e., “The New Enchiridion Biblicum”). This article was later printed in other biblical journals
such as The Catholic Biblical Quarterly, 18, 1956, 24-25. Three things about this statement
left me wondering. First, I was no longer looking for a decree of abrogation but a
clarification of some sort. Second, could a previous teaching of the Church be implicitly
revoked? Third, what authority could this clarification have if it was only printed in
biblical journals?

Turning my attention first to the clarification and its authority, I found the relevant excerpts
of the article mentioned by Collins and Brown in the appendix of Rome and the Study of
Scripture: A Collection of Papal Enactments on the Study of Holy Scripture together with the
Decisions of the Biblical Commission, 7th ed., 1964. The editors of this book made it clear
that the article had only the initials “A.M.” to indicate the author. They said: “The review is
signed A.M., but there seems to be no doubt this is the Very Reverend Athanasius Miller,
O.S.B., secretary of the Pontifical Biblical Commission.” The excerpt reads as follows:

DECREES OF THE BIBLICAL COMMISSION: A RECENT CLARIFICATION

Inasmuch as it is a collection of documents which show how Sacred Scripture has always been the primary
source and foundation of the truths of Catholic faith and of their progress and development, the Enchiridion
renders great service first of all to the history of dogmas. It reflects clearly, moreover, the fierce battle that
the Church at all times has had to fight, though with varying degrees of intensity, to maintain the purity and
truth of the Word of God. Especially in this respect the decrees of the Pontifical Biblical Commission have
great significance. However, as long as these decrees propose views which are neither immediately nor
mediately connected with truths of faith and morals, it goes without saying that the scholar may pursue his
research, provided always that he defers to the supreme teaching authority of the Church.

Today we can hardly picture to ourselves the position of Catholic scholars at the turn of the century, or the
dangers that threatened Catholic teaching on Scripture and its inspiration on the part of liberal and
rationalistic criticism, which like a torrent tried to sweep away the sacred barriers of tradition. At present
the battle is considerably less fierce; not a few controversies have been peacefully settled and many problems
emerge in an entirely new light, so that it is easy enough for us to smile at the narrowness and constraint
which prevailed fifty years ago.

Finally, the Enchiridion has notable apologetic value, because it bears witness to the Church’s untiring
vigilance and her perennial solicitude for the Scriptures. She is alert to defend their sacred character and to
watch over their correct interpretation. Encyclicals like Providentissimus Deus and Divino Afflante Spiritu
show how she exerts herself to promote in every way possible the solid and fruitful study of Scripture. These
Encyclicals present with admirable clarity the basic principles of Catholic interpretation which hold for all
times and effectively close the door to subjective and arbitrary expositions. Thus they point out the way to
an interpretation and use of Scripture calculated to nourish the life of souls and of the Church as well as to
utilize fully the gains made by modern research.

This same article had been printed in The Catholic Biblical Quarterly and commented upon
by Edward F. Siegman, C.PP.S. Father Siegman, very much in favor of the “clarification,”
points out that

[t]o date it [the clarification] has not appeared in the Acta Apostolicæ Sedis and hence escaped the immediate
attention of many scholars. It should not, perhaps, be called official in the strict sense ... because the writer
is identified only by the initials ‘A.M.’ ... though there seems to be no doubt that the reviewer is the Very
Reverend Athanasius Miller, O.S.B. Certainly we have here the mind of the Biblical Commission. 3

As of 2001, this clarification has not appeared in the Acta Apostolicæ Sedis (A.A.S.). Clearly,
this article must be identified for what it truly is — mere opinion and dangerous to the
faith. There are at least five reasons for this conclusion.

128
First of all, as Fr. Siegman pointed out, how can an article printed in various non-
authoritative biblical journals, signed only with the initials A.M., be a clarification on a
ruling of the Magisterium? There was no undersigned Pontiff, Cardinal or Bishop. What is
the author’s full name and title? Can this be the proper way to make a clarification of such
profound and broad significance? If the Very Rev. Athanasius Miller wanted to make such a
clarification binding or authoritative he would have had to enter it into the A.A.S. It is there
that such decrees or clarifications become binding. When the very same Athanasius Miller
published an instruction of the Biblical Commission in 1955, the instruction was both
undersigned by Pope Pius XII and entered in the A.A.S. What is printed in this article signed
by “A.M.,” therefore, is nothing more than the personal opinion of whoever A.M. is.

Second, A.M. said that “the Enchiridion [Biblicum] renders great service first of all to the
history of dogmas” (emphasis added). On the contrary, the primary purpose of the Enchirid-
ion Biblicum has always been to preserve and maintain the integrity of Sacred Scripture. It is
nothing else but a handbook (enchiridion is Greek for “in hand, close at hand”) containing
those essential extracts of all major definitions and declarations on faith and morals having to
do with the Holy Bible. The Enchiridion Biblicum renders service “to the history of dogmas”
only in as much as it shows at what times in history and in what areas of belief the Church
was forced to come forward to preserve the deposit of the faith, but such service is secondary
to its primary purpose. Furthermore, the Enchiridion Biblicum has always stood as a reminder
of the Church’s unchanging teaching, because it merely presents what the Magisterium has
taught on matters of faith and morals throughout the years. The Church has never retracted
or revoked what she has taught on faith and morals. Thus the ancient saying: “Rome has
spoken; the case is closed.” To reduce parts of the Enchiridion Biblicum to having “little
more than historic interest,” therefore, is an attack on the whole Enchiridion Biblicum,
which is an attack on the teaching authority of the Church herself. This article, therefore,
is at least potentially dangerous to the faith.

Third, A.M. said that the PBC decrees have “notable apologetic value, because [they bear]
witness to the Church’s untiring vigilance and her perennial solicitude for the Scriptures”
(emphasis added). On the contrary, this “apologetic value” must extend beyond its ability
merely to show “the Church’s untiring vigilance” to actually be used to defend the
Scriptures against all impurities. In this regard, the PBC findings have a place alongside
Providentissi-mus Deus and Divino Afflante Spiritu in that they too “present with admirable
clarity the basic principles of Catholic interpretation which hold for all times and effectively
close the door to subjective and arbitrary expositions,” using A.M.’s own words. Rather than
clarifying the Church’s teaching, A.M.’s “clarification” seeks to undercut “the Church’s
untiring vigilance and her perennial solicitude for the Scriptures,” and on that account
this article should be rejected as dangerous to the faith.

Fourth, A.M. said that “as long as these decrees propose views which are neither immediately
nor mediately connected with truths of faith and morals, it goes without saying that the scholar
may pursue his research, provided always that he defers to the supreme teaching authority of
the Church.” On the contrary, consider the weight of authority given to the PBC decrees by
Pope St. Pius X, who wrote:

We find it necessary to declare and prescribe, as We do now declare and expressly prescribe, that all are
bound in conscience to submit to the decisions of the Biblical Commission, which have been given in the past
and which shall be given in the future, in the same way as to the Decrees which appertain to doctrine, issued
by the Sacred Congregations and approved by the Sovereign Pontiff. Nor can they escape the stigma both
of disobedience and temerity nor be free from grave guilt as often as they impugn these decisions either in
word or writing; and this, over and above the scandal which they give and the sins of which they may be the
cause before God by making other statements on these matters which are very frequently both rash and
false.4

129
Pope St. Pius X made the rulings of the Commission a part of the Magisterium, the
supreme teaching authority of the Church. This extension of the Magisterium was later
removed after the Second Vatican Council. Cardinal Ratzinger writes: “The Pontifical Biblical
Commission, in its new form after the Second Vatican Council, is not an organ of the teaching
office, but rather a commission of scholars ...”5 In other words, Pope St. Pius X made the
Commission an organ and that organ taught us, publishing its decrees in the A.A.S. Its
promulgated decrees were and remain to this day ordinary Magisterial teaching. But
after Vatican II the PBC no longer enjoyed this authority.

Pope St. Pius X also mentions that the decrees of the PBC are “Decrees which appertain to
doctrine” which clearly contradicts A.M.’s statement that some of the PBC decrees “are
neither immediately nor mediately connected with truths of faith and morals.” Once again,
this article by A.M. shows itself as being dangerous and contradictory to the teachings of the
Church.

Fifth, A.M. said that the Enchiridion Biblicum “reflects clearly ... the fierce battle that the
Church at all times has had to fight, though with varying degrees of intensity, to maintain the
purity and truth of the Word of God.” A.M. goes on to say, “At present the battle is con-
siderably less fierce ...” On the contrary, the “fierce battle” seems to have almost completely
ended after A.M.’s “clarification” was spread abroad. The Magisterium endeavored a few
more times in the 1950s and early 1960s to halt the spread of bad scholarship, but all her
attempts were unsuccessful. One of these attempts was written by the Very Rev. Athanasius
Miller himself with the permission of Pope Pius XII in 1955. An excerpt of this instruction
reads as follows:

[I]t is to be regretted that these activities [meetings of various biblical associations] are not carried out in
every area in full accord with the norms just laid down, and that there is the danger at times that such
meetings, whether they be arranged by biblical associations or by other people, not only fail to be of sufficient
value for all those who take part, but even reach the point of being for some people more in the line of
“destruction” than of “edification” (cf. II Cor. 10:8). The speakers, we are told, are not always those men
who are well versed in the matters of which they treat; some of them are entirely too ready to follow less
reliable authors, or rashly and boldly accept and spread doubtful or false opinions, to recommend books or
periodicals of doubtful value or reading matter either lacking ecclesiastical approval or laboring under
positive disapproval—and all this at times in the hearing of people not at all prepared to weigh such things
and pass judgment on them. We have even heard it to have happened that speakers paid little heed to those
norms on which the Sovereign Pontiff now happily reigning again gravely insisted in his encyclical letter
Humani generis, that they boldly set forth theories condemned by the Magisterium of the Church, or even
went so far as to propose in place of the literal sense duly brought out under the Church’s watchful eye,
some new sense which they call “symbolic” and “spiritual,” by which difficulties inherent in the literal sense
were supposed to vanish. There is no one who cannot realize how incalculably dangerous all these things are
when proposed to hearers not thoroughly skilled in biblical matters.6

From this excerpt, one wonders if the Very Rev. Athanasius Miller is truly the “A.M.” of the
1955 clarification. Following this instruction, which never seems to have been properly put
into effect, all we have from the Magisterium about “the fierce battle” is a monitum of the
Holy Office under Pope John XXIII issued to biblical scholars warning them “always [to] keep
in mind the teaching of the holy Fathers and the mind and Magisterium of the Church.
Otherwise, the consciences of the faithful will be disturbed and harm will come to the truths
of the Faith.”7 There was a fierce battle, but after 1955, few were found fighting on the
Church’s side.

As a sign the battle is over, consider the fact that many, if not most, priests trained since the
1960s and seminarians today do not even know what the PBC decrees are. As a result, when
taught various theories in the seminary which run contrary to the decrees, these men never
knew that the Church holds them to be problematic and even harmful to the faith. As a prime

130
example let us take a brief look at the evolutionary theories applied to the Sacred Scriptures
that are very popular today, being openly taught and embraced in our seminaries. It is inter-
esting to note that, in the 1950s, when A.M.’s “clarification” came out, evolutionary theory
was the “in-thing.” These evolutionary ideas were even being applied to the development of
the Bible. For the Catholic scholar, however, the only road block to applying these theories to
the Bible was the decrees of the PBC!

As a particular example, consider the authorship of the Pentateuch—the first five books of the
Bible. Today it is held almost universally that Moses could not possibly have written the
Pentateuch for various reasons such as his death reported in the last chapter of Deuteronomy.
They argue, “how can Moses have written a book that recounts his own death?” Rejecting
Mosaic authorship, modern scholars studied in the seminaries today, prefer to infer author-
ship from internal evidence alone. For example, in regard to the Pentateuch they identify at
least three or more authors based upon style and content. Then they propose various theories
to explain how we got the first five books of the Bible. One very popular modern theory, the
Documentary Hypothesis, is evolutionary in nature and holds that the Pentateuch was not
written by one author, but by three or four authors or traditions which modern scholars call J,
E, P, and D. These stand for “Yahwist” (“J” is from the German form), “Elohist” (for E and
P) and “Deuteronomic” (for D). These three or four authors or traditions sometimes had
different stories and sometimes had conflicting versions of the same story. Eventually some-
one put all the different stories together while preserving their originality as much as possi-
ble. As a result, the final product is a patchwork of conflicting traditions, often contradictory,
now hopelessly mixed and confused together by the final editor. In other words, the Penta-
teuch evolved over time from who knows how many contributing authors to reach finally the
books we have today. The PBC decrees address this problem by narrowing down the
possibilities. Consider the following decree of the PBC on the Mosaic authorship of the
Pentateuch:

Whether it may be granted, without prejudice to the Mosaic authenticity of the Pentateuch, that Moses
employed sources in the production of his work, i.e., written documents or oral traditions, from which, to
suit his special purpose and under the influence of divine inspiration, he selected some things and inserted
them in his work, either literally or in substance, summarized or amplified. Answer: In the affirmative.8

In other words, the Pentateuch could have various sources but it has only one human author—
Moses. Joshua or someone else could easily have added the last chapter recounting Moses’
death.

The same style of evolutionary theory is applied to various other books of the Bible such as
Isaiah, the Psalms and even the Gospels. For example, today many hold that Isaiah has up to
two or three authors due to various internal evidences such as style and language. Consider
the following PBC decree on the unity of authorship of the book of the prophet Isaiah:

Whether the philological argument, one derived from the language and the style, and employed to impugn
the identity of the author of the book of Isaiah, is to be considered weighty enough to compel a man of
judgment, versed in the principles of criticism and well acquainted with Hebrew, to acknowledge in the same
book a plurality of authors. Answer: In the negative. 9

In other words, there is just not enough internal information to prove that Isaiah is composed
from various authors later united under one book by an editor. St. Thomas Aquinas wrote great
theological works like the Summa Theologiæ and various songs and prayers like Lauda Sion.
Do we doubt his authorship of both? No, because we have external evidence to the contrary.
Yet, if we were only to consider internal evidence, we would surely doubt their unity of
authorship and lean toward multiple authors. In a similar way, just because Isaiah has prose

131
and poetry in the same book does not constitute a strong enough argument for two or more
authors. This is the teaching of the Church.

To show the tendentious effect of A.M.’s “clarification,” consider the following statement of
Fredrick Gast, O.C.D. regarding the Synoptic Question:

In loyalty to the 1911 and 1912 decrees of the Pontifical Biblical Commission, Catholics have tended to
support this solution to the Synoptic Problem [Mt-Mk-Lk]; but now that complete freedom with regard to
such decrees has been granted, the limitations of such a solution are being honestly recognized [here Gast
refers the reader to Collins and Brown which is quoted above].10

Clearly, these examples show that the battle was lost after the publication of A.M.’s
“clarification” in 1955.

Giving these scholars the benefit of the doubt, I found the so-called “implicit” revocations in
Divino Afflante Spiritu and Dei Verbum mentioned by Collins and Brown.11

Pius XII: Divino Afflante Spiritu:

46. But this state of things [difficulties not yet solved] is no reason why the Catholic commentator, inspired
by an active and ardent love of his subject and sincerely devoted to Holy Mother Church, should in any way
be deterred from grappling again and again with these difficult problems, hitherto unsolved, not only that
he may refute the objections of the adversaries, but also may attempt to find a satisfactory solution which
will be in full accord with the doctrine of the Church, in particular with the traditional teaching regarding
the inerrancy of Sacred Scripture, and which will at the same time satisfy the indubitable conclusion of
profane sciences.

47. There remain therefore many things, and of the greatest importance, in the discussion and exposition of
which the skill and genius of Catholic commentators may and ought to be freely exercised, so that each may
contribute his part to the advantage of all, to the continued progress of sacred doctrine and to the defense
and honor of the Church.

48. This true liberty of the children of God, which adheres faithfully to the teaching of the Church and
accepts and uses gratefully the contributions of profane science, this liberty, upheld and sustained in every
way by the confidence of all, is the condition and source of all lasting fruit and of all solid progress in Catholic
doctrine ... .

Vatican II: Dei Verbum

23. Catholic exegetes, then, and other students of sacred theology, working diligently together and using
appropriate means, should devote their energies, under the watchful care of the sacred teaching office of the
Church, to an exploration and exposition of the divine writings. ... The sacred synod encourages the sons of
the Church and biblical scholars to continue energetically, following the mind of the Church, with the work
they have so well begun, with constant renewal of vigor.

Pope Pius XII certainly encouraged further Scripture studies but always within the bounds of
the Church’s teaching. The PBC decrees were included in the body of Church teaching as of
his promulgating Divino Afflante Spiritu. If this document implicitly revoked these decrees,
why does A.M.’s “clarification” not make this point, namely that it is clarifying what has
already been made known in Divino Afflante Spiritu? Since Pius XII did not allude to the PBC
findings as being abrogated in any way, they must remain in force and be held by all the
faithful.

In writing these paragraphs, instead of implicitly revoking earlier decrees, Pius XII was
responding to Catholic scholars’ lack of response to the Modernist Crisis which was once
again starting to affect the Church. This time, however, the Modernism was not coming from
inside the Church so much as it was from various Protestant sources outside. Rationalistic

132
Protestant biblical scholarship such as historical critical methods and source theories were
gaining ground in the world of theology. These popular and novel ideas constituted an attack
on Sacred Scripture. Since the Catholic Church is the custodian and preserver of the deposit
of the faith, which includes the written Word of God, Pius XII called scholars to engage in the
battle to “refute the objections of the adversaries” and “repel attacks against the divinely
inspired books.”12 Rather than denying the PBC rulings and seeing them as a hindrance, the
Catholic scholars really should have used them as guides and spent their efforts to explain why
what they decree makes good sense. Would not such efforts constitute the “continued progress
of sacred doctrine and ... the defense and honor of the Church” that Pius XII mentioned? Sadly,
however, the scholars went modern and embraced the rationalistic Protestant scholarship.
Consider the following from the Jerome Biblical Commentary under the title “Emergence of
Catholic Critical Scholarship”:

Over-all, modern Catholic NT scholarship has consisted in a judicious selecting and combining of acceptable
elements in Protestant scholarship; it is not yet following its own new paths. It has succeeded in convincing
more intelligent Catholics that the ultraconservative biblical positions of the past are no longer tenable. 13

Using the words of A.M., our scholars — instead of promoting “in every way possible the
solid and fruitful study of Scripture” and “effectively clos[ing] the door to subjective and
arbitrary expositions” of the Modernists — helped to “sweep away the sacred barriers of
tradition.”

After Pius XII, the Second Vatican Council repeated the teachings of Divino Afflante Spiritu
and even emphasized twice in a short space the need of keeping with the mind of the Church.
Thus, the Council, while encouraging Scripture studies, also reminded scholars that all studies
must be kept within the proper limits and that “appropriate means” be used. In fine, the Council
taught that “the Catholic scholar must master the technical details of Sacred Scripture and also
test the yield of that research against the witness of the whole of Sacred Scripture, the teachings
of the Fathers, the Councils, the liturgies (East and West) and the lives of the saints.” 14 The
new scientific methods, such as historical criticism, could be examined and used, but they
must always be employed in keeping with the entire deposit of the faith.

Contrary to what Collins and Brown have said, there does not seem to be any implicit
revocation of the PBC decrees in these two documents (i.e., Divino Afflante Spiritu and
Dei Verbum). The best explicit revocation to be found is just an article published by
someone calling himself A.M. in a non-authoritative German biblical journal. This means
that there was no abrogation, no clarification, no implicit revocation. There was only a poorly
penned journal article signed by the mysterious author “A.M.,” expressing at best a personal
opinion and at worst a dangerous attack on the teachings of the Church. Consequently, the
PBC decrees must still be valid and relevant and in full effect. What other conclusion is
possible?

To turn ordinary Magisterial teachings into being of “little more than historic interest” is a
grave error and by no means a “clarification.” When such things come our way, we have to
take our pick between the “true liberty of the children of God, which adheres faithfully to the
teaching of the Church,” as Pope Pius XII said, or the “complete freedom with regard to such
decrees” as held by writers like Collins, Brown and Gast.

By adhering faithfully to the teaching of the Church, I now had enough information to com-
plete my paper on the Synoptic Question. In my paper on ‘who wrote first?’ I employed the
PBC decrees and other authoritative external evidence from the Fathers and Tradition.
Happily, I was able to argue for Matthew first followed by Mark and then Luke. This approach

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 and solution soothed my conscience, strengthened my faith, and made me smile at the
narrowness of using only internal arguments.

ENDNOTES

1. For proof see Davies and Allison, International Critical Commentary, Vol. I, p. 99.
2. Thomas Aquinas Collins, O.P. and Raymond Brown, S.S., “Church Pronouncements,” Jerome
Biblical Commentary, [72:25], p. 629.
3. Edward F. Siegman, C.PP.S. The Catholic Biblical Quarterly, 18, 1956, p. 23.
4. Motu Proprio of St. Pius X, Præstantia Sacræ Scripturæ, EB 271.
5. Preface to The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church, Pontifical Biblical Commission, 1993.
6. Enchiridion Biblicum, no. 625 [cf. Rome and the Study of Scripture, 7th ed., 1964, pp 169-170]. Cf.
A.A.S., 48 (1956) 61-64.
7. Monitum of the Holy Office issued June 20, 1961.
8. Enchiridion Biblicum no. 183, cf. A.A.S., 39 (1906) 377.
9. Enchiridion Biblicum no. 279, cf. A.A.S., 41 (1908) 613.
10. Fredrick Gast, O.C.D., “Synoptic Problem,” Jerome Biblical Commentary, [40:14], p. 5 (my
emphasis).
11. Thomas Aquinas Collins, O.P. and Raymond Brown, S.S., “Church Pronouncements,” Jerome
Biblical Commentary, [72:16,22-23], pp. 627-9.
12. Pius XII, Divine Afflante Spiritu, nos. 46 and 6.
13. John S. Kselman, S.S., “Modern New Testament Criticism,” Jerome Biblical Commentary,
[41:71], p. 19.
14. Our Sunday Visitor’s Catholic Encyclopedia, Rev. Peter M.J. Stravinskas, ed., p 318
(under heading Divino Afflante Spiritu). (with the exception of the bolded paragraphs quoted
in smaller type, all remaining emphasis is my own)
Go to: Roman Theological Forum | Living Tradition Index | Previous Issue | Next Issue

Cf. also Msgr. John F. McCarthy, Pontifical Biblical Commission: Yesterday And
Today:1

The Pontifical Biblical Commission was established by Pope Leo XIII on October 30, 1902,
in order that the text of Sacred Scripture “will find here and from every quarter the most
thorough interpretation which is demanded by our times and be shielded, not only from every
breath of error, but also from every temerarious opinion” (Enchiridion Biblicum 139). The
members of the Commission were given as a goal “that Catholics should not admit the
malignant principle of granting more than is due to the opinion of heterodox writers, and of
thinking that the true understanding of the Scriptures should be sought first of all in the
researches which the erudition of unbelievers has arrived at” (EB 141). At the same time the
Pope allowed that “there may arise an occasion when the Catholic interpreter may find some
assistance in authors outside the Church, especially in matters of criticism, but here there is
need of prudence and discernment” (EB 142).

The approach to the text of Sacred Scripture known as historical criticism began as far back
as 1678, when Richard Simon, a Catholic priest, published a “critical history” of the Old
Testament (placed on the Index of Prohibited Books in 1682). This critical approach was taken
up and fostered throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by liberal Protestant
exegetes. In the late nineteenth century the assumption was firmly in place among these liberal
scholars that the early chapters of the Book of Genesis were little more than a concatenation
of myths and legends, and the search was under way for the history behind the fiction. By
1895 Hermann Gunkel had initiated the method known in English as “form-criticism”
(Formgeschichte, literally, “form-history”), which he institutionalized in 1901 with his

1
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monumental critique of the Book of Genesis. The theory behind the method was that the Book
of Genesis is made up of “literary forms,” that is, forms of creative religious fiction, whose
understanding requires finding how each of them arose and developed. In 1897 the Dominican
scholar Father Mane-Joseph Lagrange, founder of the Ecole Biblique of Jerusalem, in an
address to Catholic intellectuals in Fribourg, Switzerland, proposed the acceptance of the
historical-critical method by Catholic exegetes, and in 1903 he published a book on historical
criticism of the Old Testament1 in which he attempted to show “how the historical-critical
method could be used in biblical interpretation without any detriment to Christian faith and
Catholic life.”2 From then on a certain fascination for the historical-critical method began to
take hold among Catholic biblical scholars.

Between 1905 and 1915 the Pontifical Biblical Commission emitted fifty-nine authoritative
replies regarding certain doubts raised by historical critics. Among other things the Commis-
sion in 1905 denied that “those books of Sacred Scripture which are regarded as historical,
either wholly or in part, sometimes narrate what is not history properly so-called and
objectively true, but only have the appearance of history and are intended to convey a meaning
different from the strictly literal or historical sense of the words” (EB 161). In 1909 it excluded
that “the various exegetical systems which have been elaborated and defended by the aid of
pseudo-science to exclude the literal historical sense of the first three chapters of Genesis are
based upon solid arguments” (EB 324). And also in 1909 it denied that “the three aforesaid
chapters . . . contain [purified] fables derived from mythologies and cosmologies belonging to
older nations . . . ; or that they contain allegories and symbols destitute of any foundation in
objective reality but presented under the garb of history to inculcate religious and philo-
sophical truth; or, finally, that they contain legends partly historical and partly fictitious, freely
handled for the instruction and edification of souls” (EB 325).

These and other responses of the PBC “became the source of a long and at times bitter
controversy whose final resolution would require [historical-critical] Catholic exegetes to
exercise the very best of their skills in interpreting the meaning and authority of ecclesiastical
documents.”3 The PBC was perceived to be striving to refute and suppress the work of a
growing number of Catholic historical critics “whose use of new scientific methods of
exegesis often occasioned critiques of the Church's traditional teaching about the inspired and
inerrant character of the biblical texts and the circumstances of their composition.”4

Modernism arose as a spin-off from the historical criticism of the 1890s. Like every other form
of rationalism, it begins from the assumption that, since there are no real nature-miracles, true
prophecies, divine inspiration, or divine interventions of any kind, “modern scientific man”
must regard any such things reported in the Bible as fictitious. But modernism goes on to
assume that all religious ideas arise from a religious instinct active in the subjective
imagination of pre-scientific man, some of which eventually get formulated into dogmas.
Hence, it becomes the task of “modern scientific man” to purge religious faith of these fanciful
ideas.

Shortly after the First World War, Rudolf Bultmann, a thoroughgoing modernist who was on
his way to becoming the most influential Scripture scholar of the twentieth century, initiated,
in conjunction with Martin Dibelius and two other Protestant historical critics, the “form-
criticism of the New Testament.” Bultmann's History of the Synoptic Tradition, first published
in German in 1921, seemed to provide highly systematic scientific arguments that deprived
the Synoptic Gospels of virtually all historical truth, leaving Jesus of Nazareth as a deluded
Jew who did live and preach in Palestine and was crucified there, but who never worked any
miracles or rose from the dead except in the imagination of his followers. Beginning from the
assumption that the Synoptic Gospels are works of religious fantasy made up of small units
that the form-critic can distinguish and whose origin in the Christian imagination he can trace,

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Bultmann analyzed the text into different form-critical literary forms, such as legends, miracle-
stories, I-sayings of Jesus, controversy dialogues, biographical apophthegms, wisdom-
sayings, prophetic sayings, and the Myth of Christ.

Bultmann's vaunted shredding of the Synoptic Gospels seems to have overawed the Catholic
historical critics of the time. A period of silence about this work ensued for a quarter of a
century. Then, shortly after the Second World War, articles and books about Rudolf Bultmann
written by Catholics began to appear. Some of these writers attacked the existentialist
presuppositions of Bultmann's theology, while others presented examples of Bultmann's
exegetical method and conclusions with virtually no critique except merely to point out at the
end that some of Bultmann's conclusions were unacceptable to Catholic teaching. It is a certain
fascination with the seemingly scientific nature of Bultmann's arguments, coupled with a
pronounced inability to refute them, that characterizes more than anything else these post-War
writings.

The publication of Pius XII's encyclical Divino Afflante Spiritu in 1943, according to historical
critics, “initiated a dramatic shift in the Catholic Church's estimation of biblical studies” and
“gave a clear endorsement of the methods of historical criticism, the legitimacy of which the
Church, up until this time, had been reluctant to accept.”5 Actually, there seems to have been
no endorsement of the methods of historical criticism in Divino Afflante Spiritu. The
encyclical endorsed present-day methods of sound historical research, but it did not endorse
the form-criticism founded by Hermann Gunkel, Martin Dibelius and Rudolf Bultmann, as it
was being followed at the time by many Catholic historical-critical scholars. Pope Pius XII
took occasion, in the publication in 1950 of his encyclical Humani Generis, to point out that
some Catholic biblical scholars were wrongly interpreting what he had said in Divino Afflante
Spiritu about the historical approach to Sacred Scripture and were trying to reduce the
immunity from error of the Bible to a “divine sense” that they were claiming lies below the
alleged errors of the “human sense” (EB 612-614). Hence, it is clear that Divino Afflante
Spiritu did not endorse the historical-critical method, but it did, nevertheless, extend a greater
atmosphere of freedom for Catholic biblical scholars to conduct and publish their research,
and the encyclical did say that the biblical writers used “kinds of speech” different from those
used in our time, although the literary genres into which Divino Afflante Spiritu divides these
forms of expression are the same as those defined by the Fathers of the Church, the legal, the
historical, and the poetic (EB 558-559), rather than the novel forms used by form-critics.

About twenty-one years later, the PBC, in its instruction of 1964 On the Historical Truth of
the Gospels, endorsed a certain emphasis upon the development of the Gospel tradition in
three stages: the experiencing by the Apostles of the words and deeds of Jesus; the Apostolic
preaching and testimony after the death and resurrection of Jesus and the descent of the Holy
Spirit; and the written composition of the Gospels from material contained in the Apostolic
preaching. But in this instruction the PBC did not endorse the form-critical method initiated
by Gunkel, Dibelius and Bultmann. What it said rather was the following: “It is permitted to
the interpreter where appropriate to look into whatever sound elements there may be in the
form-critical method [methodo historiae formarum, literally, “form-history method”] in order
to make use of a fuller understanding of the Gospels. But let him do so cautiously, because
often mixed into this method there are unacceptable philosophical and theological principles,
which frequently spoil both the method and its literary conclusions. For some advocates of
this method, swayed by rationalistic presuppositions, refuse to acknowledge the existence of
the supernatural order and the intervention of a personal God in the world, effected by means
of revelation properly so called, (and) the possibility and existence of miracles and prophecies.
Others proceed from a false notion of faith, as though faith were not concerned with historical
truth and, indeed, were not compatible with it. Others deny in advance, as it were, the historical
value and character of the documents of revelation. And others, finally, disparaging the

136
authority of the Apostles as witnesses of Christ and their role and influence in the pristine
community, exaggerate the creative power of this community. All of these things are not only
opposed to Catholic doctrine but also lack scientific basis and are removed from the correct
principles of historical method” (EB 647).

The historical critics eventually won the long and at times bitter fight for the ear of the hier-
archy over the contested Replies of the Pontifical Biblical Commission, and the reason for this
victory seems to have been a tactical error in the approach of the traditional Catholic exegetes
who opposed them. Many of these traditional exegetes were able scholars, but they pitched
their arguments against the historical critics more in terms of the questionable orthodoxy of
the presuppositions and logical results of the form-critical method than by analyzing in detail
and refuting the technical procedures of the method itself. On the other hand, Catholic
historical critics were using the form-critical method usually without adverting to its
questionable presuppositions and often without drawing the seemingly obvious implications
of their reasonings that might be construed as undermining belief in the historical truth of the
inspired text. This lack of focus in the debate is what made the controversy so bitter at times.

By the time of the Second Vatican Council many members of the hierarchy were expressing
the desire that the PBC be reformed. It was, in fact, restructured by Pope Paul VI in 1971 to
the effect that it became no longer an organ of the teaching Church, but rather “a commission
of scholars who, in their scientific and ecclesial responsibility as believing exegetes, take
positions on important problems of scriptural interpretation and know that for this task they
enjoy the confidence of the teaching office.”6 The PBC now tends to be composed mainly, if
not exclusively, of historical critics.

In 1993 the reconstituted PBC published a document entitled The Interpretation of the Bible
in the Church.7 In this document the PBC fully endorsed the historical-critical method as “the
indispensable method for the scientific study of the meaning of ancient texts.”8 Nevertheless,
as the Commission pointed out in the Introduction to this document, “at the very time when
the most prevalent scientific method — the 9 historical-critical method' — is freely practiced
in exegesis, it is itself brought into question, to some extent through the rise of 'alternative
approaches and methods,'“ but also “ through the criticisms of many members of the faithful,
who judge the method deficient from the point of view of faith,” some of whom maintain that
“nothing is gained by submitting biblical texts to the demands of scientific method,” and who
insist that “the result of scientific exegesis is only to provoke perplexity and doubt upon
numerous points which hitherto had been accepted without difficulty.”

Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, ex officio President of the PBC, in his Preface to the 1993 docu-
ment, said that he believed that it would be “very helpful for the important questions about the
right way of understanding Holy Scripture” and that it “takes up the paths of the encyclicals
of 1893 and 1943 and advances them in a fruitful way.” But he also spoke in this same Preface
about “new attempts to recover patristic exegesis and to include renewed forms of a spiritual
interpretation of Scripture.” In fact, already in an article published in 19899 Cardinal Ratzinger
had called for “a better synthesis between historical and theological methods, between criti-
cism and dogma” and for self-criticism by exegetes of the historical-critical method. He said
that errors made in biblical exegesis over the preceding century “have virtually become aca-
demic dogmas,” especially due to the influence of Martin Dibelius and Rudolf Bultmann,
whose “basic methodological approaches continue even today to determine the methods and
procedures of modern exegesis,”10 and he saw the urgent need to challenge the fundamental
ideas of this method.11 The Cardinal pointed out that Bultmann the exegete “represents a back-
ground consensus of the scientific exegesis dominant today,” even though Bultmann's
exegetical conclusions “are not the result of historical findings, but emerge from a framework
of systematic presuppositions.” And so the Cardinal called for “a new and thorough reflection

137
on exegetical method,” for which task “(t)he great outlines of patristic and medieval thought
must also be brought into the discussion.”12

An updated recovery of patristic exegesis is emerging in the form of the neopatristic method
of interpretation of Sacred Scripture.13 The neopatristic method is based upon the method of
the Fathers of the Church updated to include more recent discoveries and techniques of sound
historical science. It employs the framework of the Four Senses of Sacred Scripture as recom-
mended by the Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC 115-119), combining faith and dogma
with new exegetical techniques in what is hoped to become a better approach to Sacred Scrip-
ture than what is offered today by historical criticism. It criticizes the historical-critical method
in order to discard false assumptions and techniques and to find new answers in the process.
It takes up at last the challenges still unanswered in the form-critical works of Gunkel,
Dibelius, Bultmann, and others through a systematic analysis of their reasoning and the over-
turning of their false conclusions. It begins from better definitions of historical science and
historical method. If a sufficient number of scholars will take up and develop the neopatristic
method, there is hope that the twenty-first century will be, not only the century of a return to
the biblical insights of the Fathers of the Church and of Catholic exegetical tradition, but also
the century of advance to a more scientific and satisfying form of biblical interpretation than
that which is afforded today by the method of historical criticism.

Msgr. John F. McCarthy is a priest of the Diocese of Helena, Montana, on loan as

pastor to St. Wenceslaus Parish in Eastman, Wisconsin. He is the Founder and Director
General of the Society of the Oblates of Wisdom. He taught Canon Law at the Lateran
University in Rome, and was an official for many years at the Congregation for the
Oriental Churches in the Roman Curia. He is the author of the Science of Historical
Theology (1976) and many articles in the newsletter “Living Tradition “ (available on
the Internet at www.rtforum.org).

Notes

1 M-J. Lagrange, La methode historique surtout a propos de l'Ancien Testament (Paris, 1903).
This work appeared in English two years later under the title Historical Criticism and the Old
Testament (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1905). In this celebrated work, Father Lagrange
followed the method of Hermann Gunkel uncritically in that he did not undertake the
preliminary task of determining from an analytical point of view what is history, and,
therefore, what exactly is historical method. In this regard it is interesting to note that, in the
title of the English translation of Father Lagrange's work, the translator dropped the expression
“historical method.”
2 J.A. Fitzmyer, The Biblical Commission's Document “The Interpretation of the Bible in the
Church” (Pontifical Biblical Institute: Rome, 1995), p.154.
3 Dean Bechard, “Remnants of Modernism in a Postmodern Age,” in America, February 4,
2002, p. 16.
4 Bechard, p. 17.
5 Bechard, pp. 18-19.
6 Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Preface to the PBC document, The Interpretation of the Bible in
the Church.
7 Pontifical Biblical Commission, The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church (Libreria
Editrice Vaticana, 1993).
8 PBC, The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church, opening words of chapter 1.
9 J. Card. Ratzinger, “Biblical Interpretation in Crisis: On the Question of the Foundations
and Approaches of Exegesis Today,” in R. J. Neuhaus, ed., Biblical Interpretation in Cri-
sis (William B. Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, 1989), pp. 1-23 (originally delivered as an Erasmus
Lecture at St. Peter's Lutheran Church in New York City on 27 January 1988).

138
 10 Ratzinger, Biblical Interpretation in Crisis, p. 9.
11 Ratzinger, ibid., pp. 10-16.
12 Ratzinger, ibid., pp. 21-23,
13 For examples of the use of the neopatristic method, see the archive of Living Tradi-
tion articles on the Web site of the Roman Theological Forum at [no link given].

© Homiletic & Pastoral Review / Ignatius Press

This item 4679 digitally provided courtesy of CatholicCulture.org

§
An additional witness taken from an Internet article:

The Pontifical Biblical Commission.

…In his enthusiastic acceptance of historical criticism on the one hand and his acute awareness
of its historical pollution with the sediment of various and sundry dogmatisms on the other,
[Jesuit theologian Henri] de Lubac sounds very much like the Pontifical Biblical Commission.
In its 1964 “Instruction Concerning the Historical Truth of the Gospels,” the Commission
urges Catholic exegetes to avail themselves of the legitimate insights which form criticism can
provide into the understanding of the gospels while at the same time warning them to be wary

because quite inadmissible philosophical and theological principles have often come to be
mixed with this method, which not uncommonly have vitiated the method itself as well as the
conclusions in the literary area. For some proponents of this method have been led astray by
the prejudiced views of rationalism. They refuse to admit the existence of a supernatural order
and the intervention of a personal God in the world through strict revelation, and the possibility
and existence of miracles and prophecies. . . . All such views are not only opposed to Catholic
doctrine, but are also devoid of scientific basis and alien to the correct principles of historical
method.61
61
PBC, “Historical Truth,” 1 (BI, 393).

…Thus, for quotes from and a summary of the pamphlet we are forced to rely on the Pontifical
Biblical Commission’s (hereafter PBC) “Letter to the Italian Hierarchy” (20 August 1941),
Acta Apostolicae Sedis 33 (1941): 465-472. [For an English translation, see Biblical
Interpretation, ed. by James J. Megivern (Wilmington, N.C.: Consortium, 1978). 304-313.

139
 APPENDIX

THE SIX DAYS OF CREATION

By THE REV. E. F. SUTCLIFFE S.J., M.A.

It will be as well at the start to explain the scope of this pamphlet. The purpose of the writer
is not to give a history of the various explanations proposed by many authors through the ages;
nor to discuss current theories of the source whence the account is thought to be derived.
Neither is it his purpose to prove the doctrine of creation out of nothing from the first chapter
of Genesis, though some reflections on this subject will find their place naturally in the course
of the argument. The scope of the pamphlet is to essay a reasoned exposition of the
interpretation which seems not only correct but also the most simple and natural.

The Doctrine of Inerrancy

In approaching this problem it is essential to bear in mind one or two principles of funda-
mental importance for its correct solution. In the first place it is clear from Catholic princi-
ples that no interpretation can be right which conflicts with the doctrine of the inerrancy of the
Bible as the Word of God. At the same time we know that this doctrine does not imply that all
the truths enunciated in the Bible are set forth with all possible clearness. On the contrary
many parts of Scripture are wrapped in an obscurity that is remarked on by the Fathers in many
pages of their writings. And, as regards the first chapter of Genesis, unless there were some
obscurity as to the mind of the sacred writer, there would have been no opportunity for the
many divergent explanations proposed in the past.

We know too that the doctrine of inerrancy does not teach that the inspired writers necessarily
conformed their statements about the physical universe to the actual facts behind appearances.
The same, it need hardly be said, is also true of our daily intercourse. No one accuses us of
inaccuracy or error because we speak of the rising and setting of the sun or of there being a
heavy fall of dew. And our common phrases about the world in which we live are not
considered erroneous, because they reflect reality as it appears to our senses, although an
intimate study of those appearances demonstrates that the actual truth is something very
different from what it appears to be. Now the sacred books are written in the language of men,
and without detriment to their inerrancy can use the manner of speaking current among men.

This is, of course, the teaching of Leo XIII in his famous Encyclical on the prosecution of
Biblical studies. Readers of the Providentissimus Deus will remember that the Pope uses three
expressions that illustrate our present point. He says that the sacred writers at times describe
the facts of Nature either in metaphorical language or in the terms current in their own times,
just as men do today, even those most learned in the natural sciences. He then goes on to point
out that just as the ordinary manner of speaking gives expression to what strikes the senses, so
also the inspired writers, in the words of St Thomas Aquinas, “follow sensible appearances.”
Finally, Pope Leo puts it another way, saying that as Almighty God in the Bible is addressing
men, He has conveyed His meaning to them according to the manner of speaking common
among men and so in language within their comprehension (“ . . . quare eos . . res ipsas
aliquando describere et tractare aut quodam translationis modo aut sicut communis sermo per
ea ferebat tempora, hodieque de multis fert rebus in quotidiana vita ipsos inter homines
scientissimos. Vulgari autem sermone cum ea primo pro prieque efferantur, quae cadant sub
sensus, non dissimiliter scriptor sacer (monuitque et Doctor Angelicus) ‘ea secutus est, quae
sensibiliter apparent’ (Summa Theol., I, q. 70, art. 1, ad 3), seu quae Deus ipse homines
alloquens, ad eorum captum significavit humano more,” Denzinger-Bannwart, ed. 15, n,
1947).

140
An important consequence of this is that we must not look in passages of the Bible which
speak of the physical world for a description which corresponds exactly with the facts as they
are revealed by scientific research. All we have a right to expect is that the world will be
described according to appearances and in the language current at the time when the passage
in question was written. Of course, Almighty God could have revealed in the Scriptures the
hidden secrets of Nature as He has revealed many of the hidden things of God, but such
revelations would not have helped men to work out their salvation. This was understood by St
Augustine, who says that the sacred writers, or more exactly speaking, “the Spirit of God, who
spoke through them, had no will to teach these matters (i.e. the intimate constitution of the
physical world) to men, as they would not have been means for promoting their salvation”.
This sentence of the great theologian is made his own by Pope Leo XIII in the Encyclical
already quoted (“. . . scriptores sacros seu verius ‘Spiritum Dei, qui per ipsos loquebatur,
noluisse ista (videlicet intimam adspectabilium rerum constitutionem docere homines, nulli
saluti profutura,” De Gen. ad litt. L. 2, c. 9, n. 20 (Migne, Patr. Lat., 34, 270). Cf. Denzinger,
loc. cit.).

Three also of the answers of the Biblical Commission which afford guidance in the study of
this first chapter, are of special importance for our present purpose. These are the replies to
the first, third, and seventh dubia contained in the decree of June 30th, 1909. In the seventh,
which refers to chapter i. exclusively, we are told that exact scientific terminology is not
always to be looked for. The reason given is that it was not the mind of the sacred author to
teach the inward constitution of visible things or to give a complete and scientific exposition
of the order of creation, but rather to give the Hebrew race an account designed for the people,
couched in language current at the time, and accommodated to the perceptions and Intelligence
of the mass of men. By the answer to the first question we are taught that there is no solid
foundation to the various systems excogitated to exclude the literal historical meaning of the
first three chapters of Genesis. As is clear from the seventh dubium referred to above, the
emphasis here is on the historical sense as opposed to the meaning of expressions referring to
matters of physical science. The number of facts to which this answer refers is much larger in
the second and third chapters than in the first. This is shown both by an examination of the
chapters themselves and by the question and answer which compose the third dubium. In this
quite a list is given of facts drawn from the second and third chapters the literal historical
meaning of which may not be called in question; but from the first chapter there is only one,
namely, the creation of all things by God in the beginning of time.

The reader will, I hope, pardon this rather long exposition of principles on account of their
essential application to the interpretation of the Hexaemeron. Briefly, two very important
truths should be borne in mind. First, that God has not revealed in the Bible the hidden secrets
of nature, or what is the same thing, has not revealed the truths of physical science. Second,
that there is nothing against inerrancy in descriptions that reflect the appearances of the
physical world and follow the manners of speech current in the society in which the inspired
writers lived. Now it is clear that man could arrive at a knowledge of the manner in which the
world was formed only by revelation or by scientific study. The former source of knowledge
is not to be looked for here, as we have already heard from St Augustine and Pope Leo XIII;
and as regards the second there is need of no demonstration to show that in the centuries before
the Christian era men had not arrived at the conclusions about the gradual formation of the
earth and the stars reached by modern research in the fields of geology, palaeontology, and
astronomy. Assuming, therefore, the truth of these modern theories, we may say, even before
studying the Hexaemeron of Genesis, that we shall not find them there. This is an argument—
and I think a valid one—against any concordistic theory, any theory, that is, which attempts
to show that in the first chapter of Genesis we have in equivalent terms the same doctrine of
the formation of the world that is set forth by modern science. The subsequent development
of the argument will show that even the universe as we know it in its present stage of

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development is not viewed in the same light in Genesis c. 1 and by modern science, the
fundamental difference being that the Hexaemeron treats the universe as being geocentric.

The Account of the Creation

We may now turn to the account of the creation presented in the opening chapter of Genesis,
to which book it forms a fitting prologue. The following section begins with words the modern
equivalent of which is “This is the History of the World,” c. 2, v. 4, the history of the world
being for an historian the history of mankind. This prologue opens with the succinct and terse
statement that God created the universe: “In the beginning God created the heavens and the
earth.” The Hebrew text here has the definite article with both words, though it is omitted in
the Douay. The first point to notice is that the expression “the heavens and the earth” is the
Hebrew equivalent of our word “the universe” to which no single word corresponds in that
language. It is not, I think, necessary to labour this point, which may be verified by reference
to a concordance of the Hebrew Bible. It will be sufficient here to quote the standard Hebrew-
English Lexicon, that, namely, of Brown, Driver, and Briggs, p. 1030, who find this use of the
expression in our verse and elsewhere, but especially in Deuteronomy, Jeremias, the second
part of Isaias, and the Psalms. God, therefore, made (the word bara here used certainly means
at least made) all that there is, in the beginning, when things first began to be, in the beginning
of time. Therefore, before God made the universe there was nothing, which is another way of
saying that God created the world. That this is the sense in which Hebrew tradition understood
the passage is shown by the words of the mother of the seven Maccabean martyrs: “I beseech
thee, my son, look upon heaven and earth and all that is in them; and consider that God made
them out of nothing” (2 Macc. vii. 28).

After this general enunciation of the fact of the creation of all things follows in verse 2 a
description of the earth as it first was, which must be supplemented from v. 9. The earth is
covered with waters, and over the waters of the abyss reigns darkness. The conception is
geocentric. The firmament of heaven and the heavenly bodies are not made till the second day
and the fourth day respectively. The earth is first made; all else is an elaboration and
preparation of the earth in its complete setting to make it a suitable dwelling-place for man.
The earth on the first day is said to have been “void and empty” under its covering of waters.
These words are the Douay rendering of the Vulgate version of the Hebrew words tohu ubohu.
What is their meaning? The earth is solid enough to support the mass of the incumbent waters.
It is not formless in the sense of being a gaseous mass. Moreover, in Psalm 103 (Hebrew 104),
in which the praises of the Almighty are sung for the power, magnificence, and wisdom
displayed in the works of creation, after verse 5

Who hast founded the earth upon its own bases;

It shall not be moved for ever and ever,
the psalmist continues in the next verse

The deep like a garment is its clothing;

Above the mountains stand the waters.

The first half of this verse refers to the state of the earth after its creation, covered, that is, with
the waters of the abyss. The second half contains a statement not explicitly found in Genesis,
but evidence of the sense in which the inspired psalmist understood the narrative of the earlier
book. For him the description of the earth as tohu ubohu did not mean that the earth was
formless in the sense that it had as yet no definite contours. On the contrary the mountains
were already there. The implication of his words is that from the beginning the earth was
shaped as man has known it in historical times. But it was covered with waters, and therefore
had as yet no plants and still more no animals, and there was as yet no man. Without plants

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and without animals the earth is fitly described as void and empty, or better, waste and empty.
It was empty because there were no animals to roam over its surface. It was uninhabited. But
the absence of plants affected it in a different way to the absence of animals. These latter live
on it and move about on its surface. But trees and plants are rooted in it. They give colour,
variety, and even form and shape to its surface. Without them the earth is fitly said to be waste
(The meaning of tohu ubohu, “waste and empty,” is confirmed by the use of the expression in
Jeremias iv. 23. The Douay there has: “I beheld the earth, and lo it was void and nothing.”
The sense would be better rendered by “waste and empty,” the latter word, again, being taken
in the sense of “uninhabited” or “deserted.” This is borne out by the description, given vv. 25
and following:

I beheld, and lo there was no man,

And all the birds of the air were gone.
I looked, and behold
Carmel was a wilderness,
And all its cities were destroyed.

This fact that the plants are considered as almost a part of the earth explains what otherwise is
a difficulty in the description of the Hexaemeron. In the first three days the earth and the
firmament are created and prepared; in the second three they are peopled with living or at least
moving bodies. On the first day after the creation of the earth covered with waters, light is
created and separated from darkness. On the second day the firmament is made, and is the
means of separating the upper waters, those namely above it, from the lower waters, those
namely on the surface of the earth; for the earth still remained covered with waters. On the
third day the waters still on the face of the earth are gathered into one place, with the result
that the surface of the earth appears for the first time, and grass, plants, and trees are created.
The picture we now have is that of the dry earth covered with vegetation, surrounded by
waters, surmounted by the dome of the firmament, and enjoying alternate periods of darkness
and of light. But there are no animals on the earth, no fish or whales in the ocean, no birds in
the air, no stars or luminaries in the firmament of heaven. It is the work of the second three
days to people the regions created and separated from one another in the first three days. So
on the fourth day are created the sun, moon, and stars. Notice that as these are not fixed but
move in the firmament, they are not treated as part of it, but as its “furniture” (Gen. ii. i; so the
Douay. The Vulgate has militia; the Revised Version Host). On the fifth day are created the
great whales and all that lives and moves in the ocean, and the birds to fly over the earth under
the firmament of heaven. On the sixth and last day the earth is peopled first with animals, both
domestic and wild, and with reptiles.

All is now prepared and furnished. The home of man is ready; and God Almighty crowns His
work of creation by putting into execution His supreme design of creating man in His own
image and likeness. The plants and trees, it will have been noticed, were created on the third
day, within the period, that is, devoted to the creation and preparation of the different realms
or habitats; and it has caused surprise that they were not created on one of the three last days
consecrated to the creation of living creatures. The explanation is that the second triduum was
reserved, not for the creation of life, but of the various kinds of living and moving beings. The
vegetable creation, being stationary and rooted in the soil, is regarded as the complement of
the earth; and its creation is, therefore, a necessary part of the preparation of the earth for the
reception of its inhabitants, the animals and man (Since writing the above I have noticed that
Father E. Power, S.J., writing in Biblica 7 (1926) 184 on Psalm 148 says: “Next come the
lifeless objects of the earth which rise up into the air: ‘Mountains and all hills, fruit-bearing
trees and all cedars.’”).

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This preparation of the earth for the production and maintenance of living creatures is
attributed in verse 2 to the Spirit of God, which on the first day immediately after the creation
is described as brooding over the waters. The Douay version has: “The Spirit of God moved
over the waters”; but the verb has the sense of brooding over, as a hen covers its eggs. This is
remarked by St Jerome in his commentary, although in his translation from the Hebrew he has
ferebatur. This is probably one of those cases where the holy Doctor used a word long familiar
to the faithful rather than substitute one that would have sounded strange to their
unaccustomed ears, although in itself a more accurate translation of the Hebrew. Although the
text states that the Spirit of God was brooding over the waters, it must not be supposed that
the vivifying action of the spirit was confined to the waters. The waters were lying over the
face of the earth, and so in brooding over the waters the Spirit of God was brooding over all
that had been created, over the earth as well as over the waters.

Two Periods in the First Day

It is important to notice that the work of the first day comprised the creation of the earth,
covered as it was with the waters of the abyss, and secondly the production of light. The first
day, therefore, had two periods. The first period, the beginning of which was marked by the
creation of the earth and waters, was a period of darkness, for “darkness was upon the face of
the deep,” v. 2. Then followed the divine decree by which light was made, so that after the
period of darkness came a period of light. These two periods together make up the first day.
Hence we read after the account of the creation of light: “And there was evening and there
was morning, one day,” v. 5. To our notions it seems strange that evening should precede
morning, as we consider day to begin with morning and end with evening; but the matter is
easily explained from the text. The world began in darkness, and light was only created later.
Sic: With this is in perfect agreement the Jewish custom of reckoning their days from sunset
to sunset, according to which method of computation evening precedes morning. Some writers
have concluded that this Jewish custom was based on the narrative of Genesis, but if our
general argument is well-founded, the contrary was the case, and the manner of speaking in
Genesis was based on the prevailing Hebrew practice.

Some writers have failed to realize the true extent of the work of the first day of creation,
which in their opinion comprised only the creation of light. In support of this interpretation it
is alleged that the six days of creation run from morning to morning, and therefore the first
period of darkness is excluded from the first day. It is clear, however, that this reason supposes
the truth of what it is alleged to prove, namely, that the reckoning of the days begins with the
creation of light. The text clearly indicates the contrary, saying that there was evening first
and then morning, one day. It is asserted secondly that the work of each day begins with the
announcement of the divine edict of creation. This again assumes the truth of what is to be
proved. The fact is that the work of each of the last five days is introduced by the narration of
the divine Fiat, but this does not prove that it is necessarily so with regard to the first day.
What has already been said in exposition of the text appears adequate to prove the contrary;
for unless the creation of the world in darkness is the first work of the first day, there is no
explanation of the evening of the first day, “There was evening and there was morning, one
day.” It is in this sense the text is understood in the Sunday hymn for Matins:

Primo die, quo Trinitas

Beata mundum condidit.

Moreover, the fact that Almighty God is described as resting on the seventh day from all the
work He had done, Gen. c. ii, v. i, implies that He had performed all the work of creation on
the first six days. It is not credible that the creation of the earth itself, the greatest work of all
from the point of view of the writer, should be excluded from the work from which God is

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said to have rested. Finally, for superabundance of proof, it is stated explicitly in Exodus, c.
xx, v. “In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and the sea, and all things that are in them,
and rested on the seventh day.” One can only suppose that the work of the first day was made
to begin with the creation of light, either on the presupposition that day cannot begin without
light, or possibly under the subconscious influence of the desire to find in the text some period
of indefinite duration before the beginning of the day to which could be conveniently assigned
a long and gradual evolution of primitive matter in accordance with some attempt to establish
harmony between the facts, as said to be demonstrated by modern science on the one hand,
and the narrative of Genesis on the other.

Before proceeding to ask in what sense the inspired writer intended his narrative to be taken,
it is still necessary to discuss the use by the sacred writer of two different words to designate
the divine productive activity of the six days. These two words are bara and ‘asah, which St
Jerome translates in the Vulgate account of creation respectively, creare (always) and facere
(generally). From the use of these two words some have wished to deduce a difference in the
nature of the divine activities in question. The word bara in its simple form, or qal, as it is
called, is never used of any except divine activity; but it does not always denote creation out
of nothing. Thus man as a whole composed of soul and body was not created directly out of
nothing, as his body was formed of the slime of the earth, Gen. ii, v. 7; yet in c. i, v. 27, the
word bara is thrice used of his creation. This is still clearer from the use of the word in Isaias
c.xliii, v. 15: “I am the Lord, your Holy One, the creator of Israel, your King.” The word ‘asah,
on the other hand, is the ordinary expression for “make,” and is used indifferently of men and
of God. But just as the sense of creation out of nothing is not conveyed by bara apart from its
context, so the word ‘asah, like its English counterpart “make,” can be used, when the context
warrants it, to signify the particular idea of creation out of nothing. Thus in c. ii, v. 4: “These
are the generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were created (bara), in the day that
the Lord God made (‘asah) the heaven and the earth.” Again in v. 21: “God created the great
whales, and every living and moving creature, which the waters brought forth, according to
their kinds.” Here the word used is bara; whereas of terrestrial animals the word used is ‘asah:
“God made the beasts of the earth according to their kinds, and cattle, and everything that
creepeth on the earth after its kind,” v. 25. No one, I think, will wish to establish a difference
between the manner of creation of the living things of the waters and of the earth. These
examples show how precarious would be any argument based on the use of the one word rather
than the other.
The Work of some of the Days

Let us now turn to consider the work of some of the days to see in what sense the author
intended his words. The sun, moon, and stars were made on the fourth day: “God made two
great lights . . . (the sun and the moon) . . . and the stars,” v. 16. The sun and moon are both
spoken of as great lights in comparison to the stars. As the moon is vastly smaller in reality
than the stars, it is clear that the sacred writer does not wish to speak of the actual facts of the
physical world, but only of appearances, and according to the current usage of men. Again,
the earth is spoken of as created before the sun, the earth on the first day and the sun on the
fourth. But if what science teaches is correct, the earth was thrown off from the sun as a molten
mass, and caught up in the orbit of the parent body; and the sun must have existed before the
earth. The sun is conceived as a body as large as it appears to the eye to be, and placed on the
under-surface of the firmament of heaven to rule the day. This is shown by the verse quoted
above, where the size of the sun and moon is spoken of according to their apparent relation to
the size of the stars. Moreover, light was created on the first day, and the sun, from which the
light of the earth comes, was created only on the fourth day. Again, the writer is not pretending
to set down the realities of nature. It cannot be maintained that there is reference here to some
light that existed in the remote past before the creation or formation of the sun, partly because

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the existence of such light could only have been known through revelation, and we have seen
that we must not look in Scripture for revelations from Almighty God concerning the secrets
of nature, and partly because the text clearly indicates the contrary. For the initial period of
darkness with the first period of light which followed, together constitute the first day, made
up in the Bible phrase of evening and of morning. But the length of the days is regulated by
the revolution of the earth on its axis, and the light of the day is the light of the sun. According
to verse 5 it is the presence or absence of light which distinguishes day from night. It has long
been known that this light is derived from the sun, but this simple truth is not so obvious as
we today are inclined to think. There are many days when the sky is clouded and the sun
invisible, yet light is not lacking. Consequently early man, before he realised the dependence
of light on the sun, thought light to have an independent existence. “Scientific” thought was
in this stage when the Hexaemeron was written, and there was consequently no difficulty to
the contemporary mind that the first three days should have their period of light although the
sun had not yet been created. Similarly to us it seems obvious that darkness is merely the
absence of light, but this has not always been obvious. Early man thought of darkness as
something positive and not merely as a negation or absence of something (In his treatise
Concerning Colours Aristotle gives an argument to show that “darkness is not a colour but the
deprivation of light.” edit. Bekker, 791 b 2).

Thus we read in Isaias 45, 7, “I form the light and create darkness” and in Job 38, 19, “Where
is the way where light dwelleth and where is the place of darkness?” Each apparently was
imagined to spread over the earth and then to retire to its “dwelling” until the time of its next
appearance. The trees and plants, as we have seen, were made on the third day before the
creation of the sun on the fourth day. This again goes to show that the narrative is not intended
to correspond with reality, as it is difficult to conceive how the vegetable world could flourish
without the light and warmth of the sun.

Lastly, the description of the firmament of heaven as a solid vault shows that the narrative
cannot be taken literally. According to the Douay Version: “God made a firmament, and
divided the waters that were under the firmament, from those that were above the firmament,”
v. 7. This translation follows the Vulgate in using the word “were” in the past tense. In the
Hebrew there is no verb; and the sense demands the present. It was only after the creation of
the firmament that there could be waters above it. From a comparison of other texts we see
that the Hebrews imagined the firmament as a solid dome fixed over the earth, on the underside
of which were placed the sun, moon, and stars, and on the upper side of which were the upper
waters. By means of apertures these upper waters could descend on the earth, when God
wished to refresh it with rain, Gen. ii. 5. This is a very natural way of representing things and
keeps closely to appearances. According to Gen. c. i, v. 8, another name for this firmament is
heaven, though, be it noted, the word “heaven” has in the Bible other meanings also. Let me
illustrate by some quotations. Thus Eliu in Job c. xxxvii. v. 18, speaks of “the heavens, which
are most strong, as if they were of molten brass.” In Psalm cxlviii, vv. 4 f., the psalmist sings:

Praise Him, ye heaven of heavens;

And let all the waters that are above the heavens
Praise the name of the Lord.

The sources from which the waters of the great Flood were derived, are thus described, Gen.
c. vii, v. II: “All the fountains of the great deep were broken up, and the flood gates of heaven
were opened; and the rain fell upon the earth forty days and forty nights.” These flood gates
are what have been described above as apertures in the firmament. The Revised Version has
“the windows of heaven.” So also in c. viii, v. 2: “The fountains of the deep and the flood
gates of heaven were shut up, and the rain from heaven was restrained.” When in Malachy
God promises rain and therewith abundance, the promise is to “Open the flood gates of heaven,

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and pour out a blessing even to abundance,” Mal. c. iii, v. 10. Cf. Isai. xxiv. 18; 4 Kings vii.
2, 19. There can, I think, be no doubt in the light of these texts that the account here given
represents the conceptions current among the Hebrews and reflected in their manner of
expressing themselves. There is nothing astonishing in the adoption of such conceptions, as
they faithfully reflect the appearances that strike our senses, and as this account of the universe
was defended by several of the Fathers as giving a correct description of the facts of nature,
as may be seen from the pages of a Lapide.

How to understand the First Chapter

If the above paragraphs have given an accurate interpretation of the texts, it follows that the
first chapter of Genesis cannot be understood in its literal sense to give an account of the
universe or of its origin that mirrors the actual facts of nature underlying the phenomena, and
that it cannot, without violence, be so interpreted as to bring it into line with the ascertained
truths of the physical sciences. It remains to show that the author has manifested his mind by
showing that he had no intention of describing the ultimate facts of nature. This he has done
in two ways. First, by the artificial and artistic scheme that he follows, which I now briefly
recall to mind. It will be remembered that on its first creation, the earth was covered with
waters, and above the waters reigned darkness. There were thus three layers or divisions,
darkness, waters, earth. In this order, being from above, he describes the preparation of the
earth for the reception of its living inhabitants. First, light is created, and light is separated
from darkness. Secondly, the firmament is created, and thereby the upper waters are separated
from the lower waters on the earth. Thirdly, the dry land is made to appear by the separation
of the lower waters from the earth and their gathering into one place. Then, on the same third
day, almost as part of the earth in which they are rooted, are produced grass, plants, and trees.
The universe of heaven and earth being now prepared for the reception of its moving and
living inhabitants, there follows the account of the work of a second triduum, in which the
same order is again followed. First, the firmament is provided with the celestial bodies, which
move about upon its face. Then the waters are peopled with whales and fishes, and the air with
birds. And thirdly, comes the population of the dry land, namely, the animals and man. This
schematic order is an indication that the writer is giving a word-painting artificial and artistic.

A second striking indication is provided by the information that on the fourth day lights were
made “in the firmament of heaven to divide the day and night,” v. 14. But we have already
been told that on the first day God “divided the light from the darkness; and He called the light
Day, and the darkness Night,” vv. 4 and 5. Moreover, the writer tells us that lights, or
luminaries, were made in the firmament of heaven to be “for days and years,” v. 14. These
lights were made on the fourth day; yet there had preceded three days without these heavenly
bodies to mark off the days. What is this but to tell us that he is not intending to depict things
as they really happened, but in a graphic and striking way to bring home to his readers that the
whole universe, heaven and earth, and all that is in them, was created and prepared by the
power and wisdom of God. That is the all-important lesson he wishes to inculcate. There is
but one God, and He is the Author and Creator of all things. What does it matter to salvation
whether plants or sea animals were first formed? Such things the inspired writer has no mind
to teach us, and has manifested the fact. He does wish to teach that the heavenly bodies are
created for the good of man, that they are not divine, that being created by God for the sake of
man, they can exercise no fatal or malign influence on his destiny. He does wish to teach that
there are not two eternal principles, one of good and one of evil, the former creator of the soul
of man and of the spiritual world; the latter creator of the material universe. He does wish to
teach that matter is not intrinsically evil, created as it is by the hand of God. He does wish to
teach that there is one and one only God, not a multitude of deities, as the pagan nations around
fondly imagined.
The First Chapter is Historical

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It is extremely important to notice that fundamentally the first chapter of Genesis is historical.
It records and teaches the opening fact in the history of the world, namely, that it was created
by God, a Being external to and anterior to the universe He created. But the drama of creation
as displayed before our eyes in six successive scenes of as many days the writer has intimated
to be only an artificial and artistic way of inculcating with greater emphasis than is possible in
a single sentence the sublime truth he wishes to imprint on the minds of his readers that God
is the Author and Creator of All. Hence if it is necessary to give a label to the above
interpretation of the Hexaemeron, it should be called historico-artistic or historico-logical.
Readers of modern manuals treating of our subject will understand this providing of a name
or label.

The reader may be reminded that there is nothing new in the view that the six days were not
meant by the inspired writer to signify six successive periods of time corresponding objective-
ly to successive divine acts. Not only Origen (Migne, Patr. Gr. 11, 376 ff.), but also St Athan-
asius (ibid. 26, 276), and St Augustine (Migne, Patr. Lat. 34, 231), have expressed the view
that all things were created by God at one and the same time. Moreover, no objection can be
urged against the above exposition on the ground that the institution of the Sabbath rest is re-
ferred to the fact that God performed the work of creation on six days and rested on the
seventh. In the first place, just as God is only improperly said to have “worked” on the six
days, so Christ by a similar use of language saying that : “My Father worketh until now,” John
v. 17, may, if the words are unduly pressed, be taken to imply that the Father “worked” also
on the seventh day. But the truth is that, as indicated above, the sacred author implies that his
days are only schematic. Nonetheless they formed a suitable object-lesson for the chosen
people in the observance of the Sabbath-rest.

POSTSCRIPT.—This article was in the hands of the printers before the appearance of Dr.
Messenger’s able book, Evolution and Theology, which was published on November 16th,
1931. I am glad to be able to quote some of his remarks, p. 13: “A consideration of (Gen. c.
1), especially in its context, will show us that the universe, the origin of which is thus attributed
to God, is the universe as it existed when Moses wrote. The things then in existence—the sun
which then shone, the plants and animals then in existence—had all been created by God.
There is no intention to speak of geological epochs or astronomical phases which indeed were
then unknown.” With these sentences I find myself in entire agreement. Indeed, the point of
view here expressed by Dr. Messenger seems to me the only one which allows a correct under-
standing of the chapter as a whole. And from the above statement it appears to be a necessary
conclusion that just as Moses was not concerned with the geological and astronomical
processes to which the formation of the earth and the stars, as he knew them, was due, neither
was he concerned with the biological processes to which animal life, as he knew it, may have
been due. On the origin of irrational creatures, apart from the general truth that like all the
universe they owed their being to God the Creator, he was free, according to the teaching of
Leo XIII, to speak as men of his day spoke. Whether spontaneous generation is a fact or not,
or possible or not, is a scientific question, just as is the geocentric theory of the universe. Hence
I submit that Dr. Messenger’s statement on p. 16: “Scripture really teaches spontaneous gener-
ation,” is not justified by the expressions of Gen. c. i. Those expressions may justify the con-
clusion that the contemporaries of Moses believed in spontaneous generation, but not that it is
the teaching of Scripture. In the words of St Augustine, already quoted, and adopted by Leo
XIII, “The Spirit of God . . . had no will to teach these matters to men, as they would not have
been means for promoting their salvation.” If the view set out in this pamphlet is the correct
one, it has the immense advantage that it sets us altogether free from the conclusions of
physical science in the interpretation of Scripture. We shall not have to revise our exegesis in
the light of more recent discoveries; and whatever discoveries may be made, they can never
be in conflict with the Bible. This aloofness from the progress of purely human knowledge is
surely in accord with the dignity of Holy Scripture.

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the six days of creation.pdf

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The Six Days of Creation

Sutcliffe, Rev. E. F.

(Book #ID 21581)

London: Catholic Truth Society 1945. 1945.

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EXEGETICAL PRINCIPLES IN THE INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE

(c) 2011; 2025 Bart A. Mazzetti

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