SAIF-UR-REHMAN---Appellant Versus ADDITIONAL
DISTRICT JUDGE, TOBA TEK SINGH and 2 others---
Respondents
Citation: 2018 SCMR 1885
Result: Appeal Dismissed
Court: Supreme Court of Pakistan
Date of Decision: 17.4.2018.
Judges: Mian Saqib Nisar, C.J., Sh. Azmat Saeed and Ijaz-ul-Ahsan, JJ
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 14-L of 2013
Case Summary
Introduction: This case involves a Civil Appeal challenging
the Order dated 27.03.2012, which partly accepted a
Constitutional Petition (Writ Petition No. 4144 of 2010) filed
by the Appellant. The dispute arises from a dissolved
marriage where the Respondent sought the return of dowry
articles, and the Appellant contested the amount awarded.
Facts of the Case: The Appellant and Respondent No.3
were previously married, and the matrimonial relationship
ended with the dissolution of marriage. Subsequently,
Respondent No.3 filed a Suit for the Dissolution of Marriage
and a Suit for Return of Dowry Articles. The Family Court
decreed the Suit for Dowry Articles at Rs.25,000/-. On
appeal, the amount was enhanced to Rs.4,00,000/%, which
was further reduced to Rs.3,00,000/- by the High Court.
Law Points Involved:
1. Interpretation of Section 14(2) of the Family
Courts Act, 1964: The primary legal issue revolves
around the interpretation of Section 14(2) of the Family
Courts Act, 1964, which limits the right of appeal. The
contention is whether this limitation applies only to
husbands or includes wives dissatisfied with the
quantum or denial of relief.
2. Purposive Interpretation and Gender Sensitivity:
The judgment emphasizes a purposive interpretation of
the Family Courts Act, 1964, considering its beneficial
nature and gender sensitivity. It underscores the
inclusion of women Judges and the overall tone
favoring the expeditious settlement of disputes related
to marriage and family affairs.
Judicial Analysis: The court rejects the Appellant's
argument that the appeal by Respondent No.3 was without
jurisdiction due to the initial decree being below the
statutory limit. It interprets Section 14(2) to curtail the right
of appeal for husbands in specific cases but not for wives
dissatisfied with dower or dowry decrees. The court aligns
with a previous judgment (Tayyaba Yunus v. Muhammad
Ehsan) confirming the wife's right to appeal in case of
dismissed dower suits.
Conclusion: The Court dismisses the appeal, affirming the
validity of Respondent No.3's appeal and the jurisdiction of
the First Appellate Court. It clarifies that the right of appeal
for wives in dowry or dower cases remains intact,
contrasting it with the limitation imposed on husbands
under Section 14(2) of the Family Courts Act, 1964.
Legal References:
• Section 14(2) of the Family Courts Act, 1964.
• Tayyaba Yunus v. Muhammad Ehsan (2010 SCMR 1403).
• Abid Hussain v. Additional District Judge, Alipur (2006
SCMR 100).
• Ghulam Rasool v. Senior Civil Judge (2008 CLC 775).
• Saeeda Alia v. Syed Ghulam Mursalin Naqvi (2004 MLD
306).
• Mst. Neelam Nosheen v. Raja Muhammad Khaqaan
(2002 MLD 784).
JUDGMENT
SH. AZMAT SAEED, J.---This Civil Appeal by leave
of the Court is directed against the Order dated 27.3.2012,
whereby a Constitutional Petition i.e. Writ Petition No. 4144
of 2010, filed by the present Appellant, was partly accepted.
2. The brief facts necessary for adjudication of the lis
at hand are that the Appellant and Respondent No.3 were
married but unfortunately, the matrimonial relationship
between the parties collapsed, whereafter, Respondent No.3
filed a Suit for Dissolution of Marriage as well as the Suit
for Return of Dowry Articles. The former Suit was decreed
vide judgment and decree dated 01.02.2008 and the
marriage dissolved. No challenge was thrown to it and such
decree attained finality.
3. The Suit for Dowry Articles was also decreed by the
learned Family Court for an amount of Rs.25,000/- vide
judgment and decree dated 29.09.2009. Respondent No.3
filed an appeal before the learned First Appellate Court,
which was allowed vide judgment and decree dated
27.01.2010 and the decretal amount was enhanced to Rs.
4,00,000/-. In the above backdrop, the present Appellant
invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of the learned Lahore
High Court, Lahore by filing Writ Petition No.4144 of 2010.
After hearing the parties, vide impugned Order dated
27.03.2012, the Writ Petition filed by the present Appellant
was partly accepted and the amount in lieu of dowry articles
was reduced to Rs.3,00,000/-.
4. The Appellant invoked the jurisdiction of this Court
by filing Civil. Petition bearing No.781-L of 2012, in which
Leave to Appeal was granted vide Order dated 01.01.2013.
The said Order is reproduced herein below for ease of
reference:
"States, that the judgment and decree of the Family Court
pertaining to the return of dowry articles was to the tune of
Rs.25,000/- (rupees twenty five thousand), thus as per the
provisions of section 14(2)(b) of the West Pakistan Family
Courts Act, 1964, no appeal was competent before the
learned Additional District Judge, therefore, the appellate
judgment which has been partly affirmed by the learned
High Court is without jurisdiction. Besides, the list of dowry
articles had not been proved by the respondent in terms of
the law and there are many contradictions in those which
are apparent on the face of the record. Leave is granted to
consider the above."
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties
and examined the available record.
6. The learned Appellate Court, after examining the
evidence available on the record, returned a finding that
Respondent No.3 was entitled to return of dowry articles
and in lieu thereof she was entitled to a sum of Rs.
4,00,000/-. The learned High Court, after examining the
evidence, more particularly, the statement of Respondent
No.3 as PW-1 concurred with the findings of the learned
First Appellate Court that the said Respondent was entitled
to the value of the dowry articles but the quantum thereof
was reduced from Rs.4,00,000/- to Rs.3,00,000/-. The
findings of the learned High Court appeared to be based on
a fair and reasonable appreciation of the evidence. No
misreading or non-reading of evidence has been pointed out
at the bar. The reasoning does not appear to be perverse.
Thus, no ground for interference, in this behalf, is made out.
7. The only other question, which floated to the surface
and was asserted by the learned counsel for the Appellant is
that the learned Family Court had granted a decree for a
sum of Rs.25,000/- upon the claim of dowry, hence, in view
of section 14(2) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 (Act of
1964), no appeal was maintainable against the said
judgment and decree being less than the amount mentioned
in the aforesaid provisions of law; hence, the judgment and
decree of the learned First Appellate Court was wholly
without jurisdiction. Consequently, the impugned Order of
the learned High Court partly affirming the same was also
liable to be set aside. Leave in the instant case has been
granted to consider the aforesaid aspect of the matter.
8. The aforesaid contentions of the learned counsel for
the Appellant have been controverted by the learned
counsel for Respondent No.3. It has been contended that
the embargo placed on the right of appeal being pressed
into service by the learned counsel for the Appellant applies
to the husband only and not to a wife, dissatisfied with the
quantum or denial of relief.
9. It is section 14 of the Act of 1964, more particularly,
subsection (2) thereof, which is required to be interpreted in
order to adjudicate upon the divergent contentions, in this
behalf, canvassed by the learned counsel for the parties at
the bar.
10. Before proceeding further, it may be appropriate to
contextualize the Family Courts Act, 1964 in general and
section 14(2), in particular. Out of the general canvass of
the forum and procedure for adjudication of the claims and
disputes, a jurisdiction has been carved out through the
enactment of the Family Courts Act, 1964, creating a special
forum i.e. the Family Court for adjudication of the family
disputes in accordance with the special procedure as set
forth in the aforesaid Act of 1964 and the Rules framed
thereunder i.e. The West Pakistan Family Courts Rules,
1965. The purpose of this exercise is evident from the
preamble of the Act of 1964 i.e. "expeditious settlement and.
disposal of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs".
The nature of disputes which can be brought before the
Family Court for adjudication have been set forth and
enumerated in Part I of the Schedule referred to in section 5
of the Act of 1964. It is now settled law that a purposive
rather than a literal approach to interpretation is to be
adopted while interpreting Statutes. An interpretation
which advances the purpose of the Act is to be preferred
rather than an interpretation which defeats its objects.
Reference, in this behalf, may be made to the judgments
reported as Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of
Finance and others v. M/s. Noori Trading Corporation
(Private) Limited and 14 others (1992 SCMR 710) and
Hudabiya Engineering (Pvt.) Limited v. Pakistan through
Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan and
6 others (PLD 1998 Lahore 90).
11. The second aspect of the Family Courts Act, 1964
and the Rules framed thereunder as amended from time to
time would reveal its gender sensitivity. A glance at Section
3 of the Act of 1964 reveals that women Judges are
specifically catered for. The residence of the wife can be a
determining factor for conferring territorial jurisdiction, in
certain Suits as is evident from the provisions of Rule 6 of
the West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965. There can be
no escape from the fact that the tone and tenor of the
Family Courts Act, 1964 and the Rules framed thereunder
are beneficial in nature. It is an equally settled law that
beneficial provisions in a Statute must be interpreted
liberally in a manner so that the benefit conferred is
advanced rather than frustrated or subverted. Reference, in
this behalf, may be made to the judgments of this Court
reported as Lahore Development Authority through D.G.,
Lahore and another v. Abdul Shafique and others (PLD 2000
SC 207) and Pakistan Engineering Co. Limited, Lahore
through Managing Director v. Fazal Beg and 2 others (1992
SCMR 2166).
12. Section 14(2) of the Family Courts Act, 1964, must
necessarily be approached and interpreted in the above
backdrop and in accordance with the aforesaid principles
i.e. the purposive object thereof achieved and being
beneficial in nature, the benefits so conferred are
actualized.
13. Subsection (1) of section 14 of the Act of 1964,
confers a right of appeal. However, by virtue of subsection
(2) of section 14 of the Act of 1964, this right of appeal has
been curtailed. The obvious purpose of curtailing the right
of appeal is to avoid the benefits of any decree which may
have been passed being tied up in an appeal before a higher
forum. It has also been noticed that in only three
eventualities that even the right of first appeal has been
curtailed. In all three eventualities, the decree would be for
the benefit of the wife for dissolution of marriage under
Clause (a), for dower or dowry under Clause (b) and for
maintenance under Clause (c). The last may also be for the
benefit of a minor. Thus, the only logical and reasonable
interpretation, which is in accordance with the purposive of
the Act and in line with the beneficial nature thereof would
be that a judgment-debtor of a decree envisages in Clauses
(a), (b) and (c) of subsection (2) of section 14 of the Act of
1964, would not have a right of appeal so that the disputes
mentioned therein are resolved expeditiously and the
benefits conferred through such decree reach the decree-
holder without being frustrated. However, the said provision
cannot be interpreted so as to exclude a right of appeal to a
wife whose claim of dower or dowry has been partially or
entirely declined. For such an interpretation, would defeat
the purpose and object of the Act of 1964 and frustrate its
beneficial nature.
14. This Court while interpreting section 14(2) of the Act
of 1964, in its judgment reported as Tayyaba Yunus v.
Muhammad Ehsan and others (2010 SCMR 1403) held that
where a Suit for dower has been dismissed, the wife has a
right of appeal under section 14(2) of the above-said Act of
1964.
15. In a case pertaining to dissolution of marriage, this
Court in the judgment reported as Abid Hussain v.
Additional District Judge, Alipur, District Muzaffargarh and
another (2006 SCMR 100) held as follows:
"The object behind non-provision of appeal in case of
dissolution of marriage is to protect women, an under
privileged and generally oppressed section of our society
from prolonged and costly litigation. It aims to put a clog on
the right of husband."
16. Thus, the only possible purposive beneficial and
rational interpretation of section 14(2) of the Act of 1964, is
that the right of appeal of a husband against whom a decree
has been passed is curtailed, if the amount awarded is less
than the amount, which is mentioned in the said provision.
However, in no event the right of the wife to file an appeal is
extinguished if she is dissatisfied with any decree in a Suit
for dower or dowry.
17. The aforesaid view incidentally has also been
consistently enunciated by the learned Lahore High Court in
the judgments reported as Ghulam Rasool v. Senior Civil
Judge and 4 others (2008 CLC 775), Saeeda Alia v. Syed
Ghulam Mursalin Naqvi and another (2004 MLD 306) and
Mst. Neelam Nosheen and others v. Raja Muhammad
Khaqaan and others (2002 MLD 784).
18. In this view of the matter, there is no denial of fact
that the appeal of Respondent No.3 was validly filed and the
learned First Appellate Court was vested with the
jurisdiction to adjudicate thereupon and such jurisdiction
was not barred under section 14(2) of the Act of 1964. In
view of the above, this Civil Appeal is totally devoid of merit
and is liable to be dismissed.
19. Thee are the reasons of our short Order of even date,
which is reproduced herein below:
"For reasons to be recorded later, this appeal is
dismissed."
