ASSESSMENT OF THE RESPONSE TO

ILLICIT WEAPONS
TRAFFICKING
In the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea

Global Maritime
Crime Programme
ASSESSMENT OF THE RESPONSE TO

ILLICIT WEAPONS
TRAFFICKING
In the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea
 Assessment of the response to illicit weapons trafficking
in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea

Acknowledgements
This report was prepared by the UNODC Global Programme on Criminal Network Disruption and the Global Maritime
Crime Programme (Border Management Branch).

Coordination and content overview

Michael Osman
Monika Roszkowska

Research, analysis and drafting

Wolf-Christian Paes

Mapping

Riccardo Pravettoni
Murat Yildiz

Graphic design and layout

Federica Martinelli

This report was made possible thanks to the generous financial contribution of the United States of America.

DISCLAIMER
This publication has not been formally edited. The content of this publication does not necessarily reflect the views
or policies of UNODC or contributory organizations including other United Nations entities, nor does it imply any
endorsement.

4
 Contents

Contents
Introduction5 Consider strengthening cooperation in the
area of anti-proliferation  22

Trafficking pattern for arms, ammunition, Consider creating a national focal point
and related items  7 to coordinate measurres  23

Maritime trafficking in the Arabian Sea to Yemen 8 Consider taking steps towards Security
Sector Reform  23
Maritime trafficking in the Red Sea to Yemen 9

Trafficking across the land border with Oman 10 Theoretical Framework and Methodology  24

Smuggling of weapons from Yemen to other

countries11 Key Informant interviews  24

Primary data collection instruments

Challenges for more effective anti-trafficking (semi-structured interviews)  25
operations  13
Geographic focus in the field research  25

Coordination challenges  13 Data Analysis  25

Technical challenges for Yemeni security

actors  17 References  26

Capacity-building challenges for Yemeni

security actors  18

Legal obstacles for the prosecution

of smugglers  19

Organizational challenges  20

Conclusion  21

Recommendations  22

Consider increasing cooperation and

information-sharing  22

Consider increasing the monitoring of

Houthi-controlled ports  22

Consider increasing support to the security

forces in Yemen  22

Consider taking measures to allow for the

prosecution of smugglers  22

5
 Assessment of the response to illicit weapons trafficking
in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea

6
 Introduction

Introduction

The Republic of Yemen has been embroiled in a violent authority of Yemen’s internationally recognized govern-
conflict since September 2014 when Houthi forces took ment.3 Meanwhile in the coastal province of Hadramawt,
military control of the capital city Sana’a and displaced militants of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
the government of interim President Abdrabuh Man- exploited the political vacuum and seized control of the
sour Hadi. According to the United Nations Develop- local capital of Mukalla in April 2015, which they held for
ment Programme (UNDP), Yemen’s protracted conflict more than one year before being forced out by military
has claimed at least 377.000 lives,1 most of them civil- forces backed by the United Arab Emirates.4 While the
ians, and plunged Yemen, already the poorest country Coalition reversed some of the Houthi advances, the
of the Arabian Peninsula, into a complex humanitarian Houthis managed to consolidate their positions in the
catastrophe. mountainous north of the country.

The Houthis, who call themselves Ansar Allah (Partisans The period from 2016/2017 onwards, saw a significant
of God), originally were a revivalist Zaidi Shia religious increase in the military capabilities of the Houthis, which
movement formed in the Sa’dah governorate in the included the launch of ballistic missiles and uncrewed
1990s under the leadership of prominent cleric Hussein aerial vehicles (UAVs)5 against targets in Saudi Arabia, as
al-Houthi. Critical of Yemen’s long-term President Ali well as the deployment of anti-ship missiles and water-
Abdullah Saleh (in office from 1990 to 2012), an order for borne improvised explosive devices (WBIED)6 against
the arrest of their leader led to a low-level insurgency ships flying the flag of Coalition states in the Red Sea.
resulting in the killing of Hussein al-Houthi by govern- While these attacks have done relatively little material
ment forces in September 2004. Following his death, damage, they allowed the Houthis to some extent to
the political leadership of the movement passed on to counterbalance the superiority of the Coalition forces
his brother Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. The Houthis report- and to project power beyond the immediate battlefield.7
edly formed close political and military ties with the
Islamic Republic of Iran and the Lebanese movement In December 2018, fearing a further deterioration of the
Hezbollah and continued to challenge Saleh, exploiting humanitarian situation in light of Coalition advances
the frustration of large parts of the Yemeni population towards the important harbour city of Hodeida, which
with his government. They succeeded in capturing parts accounts for approximately 70 percent of Yemen’s
of the mountainous north of the country before a popu- imports (including humanitarian aid), the international
lar uprising linked to the Arab Spring swept the old community urged the conflict parties to agree the UN-
regime from power in February 2011.2 In the wake of this mediated “Stockholm Agreement”. The agreement led
regime change, which brought Hadi to power, the Hou- to a local ceasefire and the establishment by the Secu-
this increased their presence in Sana’a and formed alli- rity Council of a small UN mission to monitor party com-
ances with other groups, while simultaneously clashing pliance (UNMHA – the United Nations Mission to support
with tribesmen loyal to other political movements, in the Hudaydah Agreement). However, since the agree-
particular those of the Sunni Islamist Al-Islah party (“The
Yemeni Congregation of Reform Party”), a Yemeni affili- 3 Knights, M. (2023) 25 Days to Aden: The Unknown Story of Arabian
ate of the Muslim brotherhood. Elite Forces at War. Profile Editions. London.
4 For background information on AQAP in Yemen, see: Johnson, G.
Following the ouster of President Hadi and his subse- (2014) Last Refuge: Yemen, Al-Qaeda, and America’s War in Arabia.
Norton & Company. New York City.
quent flight to Aden, the Houthis consolidated their
5 Houthi UAVs are typically small, artisanally produced aircraft, which
dominance over large parts of northern Yemen and sig- are capable of transporting explosives autonomously over a range of up
nificantly strengthened their military power through to 1,500 kilometres using pre-set GPS coordinates. They are designed
absorbing parts of the country’s armed forces. In March as ‘suicide weapons’, i.e., they explode on impact or in the air above
the target. See: Conflict Armament Research (2020) Evolution of UAVs
2015, fearing a further deterioration of the security situ- Employed by the Houthi Forces in Yemen. London.
ation, a group of nine Arab countries led by the Kingdom 6 Houthi WBIEDs are small boats converted to operate autonomously,
of Saudi Arabia deployed military forces as part of Oper- typically using pre-set GPS coordinates, against maritime targets. The
ation “Decisive Storm” with the aim to restore the Houthis have used different versions over the years, all of which depend
on electronic components smuggled from abroad. For a detailed analysis
of an early WBIED, see: Conflict Armament Research (2017) Anatomy
1 Hanna, T.; Bohl, D. and Moyer, J. (2021) Assessing the Impact of War of a ‘Drone Boat’ – A water-borne improvised explosive device (WBIED)
in Yemen: Pathways for Recovery. United Nations Development Pro- constructed in Yemen. London.
gramme. Sana’a. 7 United Nations (2019) Letter dated 25 January 2019 from the Panel
2 For an in-depth discussion of this period, see: Brandt, M. (2017) Tribes of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council.
and Politics in Yemen. A History of the Houthi Conflict. Oxford Univer- S/2019/83. United Nations. New York, in particular paragraphs 45 to
sity Press. Oxford. 46, as well as paragraphs 76 to 94.

7
 Assessment of the response to illicit weapons trafficking
in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea

ment entered into force, compliance has been incom- sion by the United States of America and allied Member
plete, particularly with respect to the anticipated full States to deploy a naval mission in the Red Sea to pro-
redeployment of military forces by the Houthis from the tect international shipping ended the period of relative
ports and the city of Hodeida. 8 The agreement was calm and brought the conflict in Yemen back into the
widely seen as a watershed moment in Yemen’s civil war. international spotlight.14 The subsequent launch of
In 2019, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced a strikes onto targets inside Houthi-controlled areas in
withdrawal of most of their military forces9 and Saudi Yemen by the United States and United Kingdom as part
Arabia sought direct talks with the Houthis. The reduc- of a campaign to counter the attacks on civilian ship-
tion of material support by the Coalition reportedly con- ping has added further complexity to the situation.
tributed to tensions between the different Yemeni parties
opposed to the Houthis and in August 2019 fighting
broke out between soldiers loyal to the Southern Transi-
tional Council, a separatist political movement and pro-
Hadi forces, over control of Aden.10 While this crisis was
resolved through the Saudi-brokered “Riyadh Agree-
ment” and later through the formation of the “Presiden-
tial Leadership Council”, the fault lines between the
different factions weakened the anti-Houthi camp.11

Meanwhile a truce was agreed between the Houthis and

the internationally-recognized government in April 2022
and while it formally lapsed after eight months, the Hou-
this have largely refrained from cross border attacks and
the Coalition has not resumed its aerial attacks in Yemen,
while humanitarian concessions made by the govern-
ment side, such as the operation of limited commercial
flights from Sana’a and the improved access for com-
mercial ships to Houthi-controlled ports have remained
in place.12 Negotiations to advance the peaceful settle-
ment of the wider conflict have demonstrated limited
progress to date. The Houthis appear to have used the
lull in the fighting to increase their military arsenals,
displaying large numbers of sophisticated weapon sys-
tems in a series of military parades in Sana’a and Hodeida
on the anniversaries of their “revolution” and amongst
other holidays in September 2022 and 2023.13 Following
the outbreak of the Gaza conflict in October 2023, these
weapons were used to launch attacks on Israeli territory
and on commercial ships, posing a threat to the vital
shipping lines between Suez and the Bab al-Mandab.
The continued threats and targeting of civilian vessels in
the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and the subsequent deci-

8 https://www.mei.edu/publications/yemens-peace-process-hodeida-
agreement-never-was
9 Middle East Institute, 2019, Yemen’s peace process: The Hodeida
Agreement that never was? https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSK-
BN1X923J/
10 Al Jazeera, 2019, Battle for Aden: Who is fighting who and how things
got here, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/8/29/battle-for-aden-
who-is-fighting-who-and-how-things-got-here
11 Ali-Khan, V. (2023) Yemen’s Troubled Presidential Leadership Council.
Crisis Group Commentary. Brussels.
12 International Crisis Group, 2022, How Huthi-Saudi Negotiations Will Make
or Break Yemen, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-
and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/b089-how-huthi-saudi-negotiations-will-make-
or-break-yemen
13 Memri TV, 2023, Houthis Showcase Large Arsenal Of Missiles, Drones
At Sana'a Military Parade https://www.memri.org/tv/houthis-showcase- 14 Interviews with representatives of the United States and the United
large-arsenal-missiles-drones-military-parade Kingdom in October and November 2023.

8
 Trafficking patterns
for arms, ammunition, and related items

Trafficking patterns for arms, ammunition,

and related items
Map. 1 Maritime arms seizures in 2022 and 2023

Following the Houthi takeover of Sana’a in September (UAV), WBIED and missile systems, is complemented by
2014, their forces merged with parts of the Yemeni transfers from abroad, which range from small arms and
Armed Forces, significantly increasing their capabilities lights weapons to ballistic and cruise missile with the
as well as their access to more sophisticated equip- latter being smuggled in components and re-assembled
ment, including helicopters and aircraft. However, aerial in Yemen. In addition, the Houthis rely on the import of
attacks by the Coalition destroyed many of their larger components for their indigenous weapon systems, in
weapon systems and the Houthis adapted by engaging particular engines, servo actuators and electronics, as
their enemies in guerilla warfare using their knowledge well as on chemicals smuggled from abroad to manu-
of Yemen’s rugged terrain. Over time, the pre-war stocks facture explosives and missile fuel.
of arms and ammunition were depleted, and the Houthis
started to manufacture their own weapons, often show- In order to stop the flow of arms, the UN Security Coun-
ing great ingenuity.15 This “cottage industry” churning cil imposed a comprehensive arms embargo on the
out increasingly sophisticated Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Houthis and their allies in April 2015, which remains in
effect at the time of writing.16 Given that the airports in
15 The first generation of Houthi WBIEDs used a repurposed warhead Houthi-controlled areas were closed for all but humani-
from a P-15 Termit (Styx) anti-ship missile as the main explosive charge. tarian flights between the start of Operation “Decisive
Other examples include the development of several generations of impro-
vised explosive devices (IED) by the Houthis to replenish the dwindling
stocks of landmines inherited from the previous regime, see: Project 16 Security Council (2015). Resolution 2216 (2015). United Nations.
Masam (2023) Houthi IED Update. Aden. New York.

9
 Assessment of the response to illicit weapons trafficking
in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea

Storm” in March 2015 and the truce in April 2022, and Maritime trafficking in the Arabian Sea
that Yemen’s land borders are under the control of the to Yemen
internationally recognized government, attempts to
enforce the sanctions focused on the maritime domain. Given the presence of Coalition warships close to the
The two major ports on the Red Sea under the control Houthi shorelines in the Southern Red Sea, the main
of the Houthis – Hodeida and Salif – were blocked by focus of maritime smuggling has been on the Arabian
Coalition warships after the start of the intervention. Sea. Between September 2015 and January 2023, a total
The UN responded by creating the United Nations Veri- of sixteen seagoing vessels carrying weapons, ammuni-
fication and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM) tion as well as components for sophisticated weapon
at the request of the Government of Yemen to ensure system, such as cruise missiles and UAV were inter-
compliance with Security Council Resolution 2216 dicted by warships from the United States, Saudi Arabia,
(2015). The mechanism inspects commercial ships France, and Australia.19 With one exception,20 the vessels
going to these ports in Djibouti, to ensure that suffi- were different types of dhows, in particular the large,
cient foods and fuel reaches the population in the seagoing Jelbut-type, and the smaller Shu’ai, which is
Houthi-controlled areas without weapons being smug- mostly used for fishing and coastal trade. Most of the
gled. 17 As a result, maritime smuggling operations crew members on those vessels hailed from Yemen, in
shifted, at least until 2023, from large ships to smaller particular from the Red Sea coast, while two crews were
traditional vessels, so called dhows,18 which continue to predominantly Somali and in one case Iranian and Paki-
operate in large numbers in the Red Sea and the Gulf of stani. Table 1 presents an overview of the quantities of
Aden. arms and ammunition seized.

Table 1 Arms and ammunition seized in the Arabian Sea between 2015 and 2023

SALW * ATGMs * * Ammunition

2015 0 75 0

2016 5,927 9 0

2017 0 0 0

2018 2,522 0 0

2019 0 171 476,000

2020 5,508 21 0

2021 8,625 50 220,000

2022 1,406 0 1,106,406

2023 5,265 30 578,400

Total 29,253 365 2,380,806

Source: Calculations based on the reporting of the Panels of Experts on Yemen and Somalia (2015 – 2023).
*SALW: Small Arms and Light Weapons **ATGMs: Anti-Tank Guided Missiles

17 United Nations Verification & Inspection Mechanism for Yemen web- 19 Calculations based on the analysis of the resports of the Panels of Experts
site, https://www.vimye.org/ on Yemen and Somalia. This number does not include the three, much
18 The term dhow refers to traditional sailing boats made out of wood, which smaller, speedboats interdicted by the United Kingdom in the Northern
have dominated the trade between the Gulf, the Indian Subcontinent, and Gulf of Oman (see section section on trafficking across the land border
the Horn of Africa for centuries. Today they are usually powered by diesel with Oman).
engines and range in size from five to 35 metres. While rare in the larger 20 The exception was the seizure of the fishing trawler Marwan-1, which
ports, they continue to be used for fishing and for transporting cargoes to was seized by the US Navy in December 2022 with a cargo of 6,690
smaller ports with limited infrastructure. The most common types used for M122-K proximity fuses, 870 boxes of PG-7 strip propellant, as well
arms smuggling are the large Jelbut-types commonly seen in Iranian waters as 25,000 rounds of 12.7x99mm calibre and 1,080,000 rounds of
and the smaller Shu’ai dhows which are often used in Yemen. 7.62x54mm ammunition.

10
 Trafficking patterns
for arms, ammunition, and related items

Within the Arabian Sea, the Panel of Experts identified Maritime trafficking in the Red Sea to
two main trafficking routes, both of which involve trans- Yemen
shipment from larger Jelbut dhows to the smaller Shu’ai.
These transfers either take place off the coast of Soma- While the ports of Hodeidah and Salef have remained
lia, or, at least in two cases in 2019 and 2020, in the under the control of the Houthi forces since 2015, the
vicinity of the Sawdah Islands in the Gulf of Oman.21 Coalition naval presence in the Red Sea combined with
Following the transfer, the illicit cargo is then moved to the UNVIM inspection regime has historically been an
secluded beaches on the Southern coast of Yemen, in effective deterrence for larger-scale smuggling of weap-
earlier years primarily to the governorates of Shabwah ons into Yemen through the Red Sea.24
and Hadramawt, and more recently to Mahra, where
they are then smuggled across the desert to Houthi- However, while there is little evidence that weapons
controlled areas of the country.22 were smuggled through the Red Sea to the Houthis
between 2015 and 2022, one commodity which was fre-
The Panel of Experts has also indicated that the smug- quently seized in large quantities were chemicals, most
gling is facilitated by a network of individuals affiliated often in bags labelled “urea fertilizer”.25 Urea is a fertilizer
with the Houthis, which is responsible for recruiting crew with a high nitrogen content, whose comparatively low
members and for overland transport across the territory price makes it a popular choice in agriculture in develop-
controlled by the internationally recognized government ing countries. Urea can also be used to manufacture urea
of Yemen, as well as for the provision of passports and nitrate, a high explosive which has been used in impro-
financial resources.23 vised explosive devices, however so far, there has been
no evidence that urea nitrate has been used by the Hou-
this to manufacture IEDs26 and as a result, in practice, the
Picture 1 Assault rifles and ammunition seized by ban has not been strongly enforced.27
the U.S. Navy in December 2021
In 2022, following an investigation by the Panel of Experts
on Yemen, new evidence came to light indicating that
the same network of Houthi operatives which has coor-
dinated the maritime smuggling of arms and ammunition
was also responsible for the smuggling of the “urea ferti-
lizer”. In January and November 2022, the US Navy
seized two Jelbut dhows carrying chemicals and while
the cargo was disposed without further analysis in the
first case, the second cargo was more thoroughly inves-
tigated, showing that about one third of the bags did not
contain urea, but rather ammonium perchlorate, a
chemical used as an oxidizer in the manufacturing of
solid missile fuels. According to the testimony of the
crew members, the urea was destined for the port of
Oboch, where it was transhipped to smaller dhows des-
tined for the Houthi-controlled ports on the Red Sea.28

Since October 2023 there have been reports in the

Yemeni media suggesting that ships carrying weapons,
as well as parts for missiles and UAVs were discharged
at the ports of Hodeidah and Salef.29 Citing anonymous
sources in the ports, the reports claimed that the ves-
sels in question were “big ships” rather than the dhows,
U.S. Naval Forces Central Command

24 Interviews with international subject matter experts between October

and December 2023.
25 Interviews with representatives of the Yemen Coast Guard in Aden in
21 United Nations (2021) Letter dated 22 January 2021 from the Panel October 2023.
of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council.
S/2021/79. United Nations. New York, in particular paragraphs 73 and 74 26 Interviews with IED experts in Aden in October 2023.
22 Interviews by the Panel of Experts with Yemeni security officials, as well 27 Interviews with subject matter experts in October and November 2023.
as members of the detained dhow crews, in Aden, Hadrawmawt and 28 United Nations (2023) Letter dated 21 February 2023 from the Panel
Mahra between 2020 and 2023. of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council.
23 United Nations (2023) Letter dated 21 February 2023 from the Panel S/2023/130. United Nations. New York, in particular paragraphs 48 and
of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council. 49, as well as annex 16.
S/2023/130. United Nations. New York, in particular paragraph 41. 29 https://livehod.com/2023/11/10/ ‫ا‬-‫من‬-‫كبيرة‬-‫كميات‬-‫يدخلون‬-‫الحوثيون‬-‫ مصادر‬/

11
 Assessment of the response to illicit weapons trafficking
in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea

which have dominated the smuggling in the past. As so Picture 2 Anti-tank guided missiles concealed in a
often in these cases, it has been difficult to verify the generator at Shahn border crossing
veracity of those reports, as there appears to be no
material evidence (such as satellite or other images) for
their existence. However, several observers have noted
since October 2023 that AIS signals show the presence
of ships in those ports which have not been cleared by
UNVIM.30 The United Nations Mission to support the
Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA), which currently con-
ducts limited patrols to the ports, stated that their
teams had not observed the presence of those ships
during the course of their mandate implementation.31

Trafficking across the land border with

Oman
Since the beginning of the war in Yemen, the focus of
anti-proliferation efforts has been on the maritime
domain. Given that the airports in Houthi-held areas had
been closed for all but limited humanitarian flights until
May 202232 and that the land border between Yemen
and Saudi Arabia is heavily militarized, the only border
which is open for the travel of ordinary Yemeni citizens
is the one with Oman. Along that border, only two cross-
ing points exist (of which only one, the Shahn land port,
is open to commercial trucks) and to reach them from
Houthi-held territory, one needs to travel for hundreds Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen
of kilometres along roads controlled by security forces
of the internationally recognized government. However, from Yemen.33 It is also likely that the cargo of three
several seizures in 2022 and in 2023 show that weapons speedboats seized by the UK Navy in the Gulf of Oman
and other related items are smuggled across the border in January and February 2022,34 as well as in February
to the Houthi forces. 2023, which included various components for cruise
and ballistic missiles, as well as anti-tank guided
The most significant seizure occurred in March 2022 missiles,35 were also destined for overland smuggling
when Yemeni customs officers inspected a truck coming across the Shahn border crossing.
from Oman. Concealed inside of four large fake electric
generators, which were purpose-built for smuggling, In other cases, dual-use items, i.e., parts, which have
were 52 sophisticated anti-tank guided missiles of a both civilian and military applications, have been smug-
type commonly seized from dhows in the Arabian Sea. gled across this border as well. They include engines,
The missiles were detected when the truck was x-rayed servo motors and electronics, which are used by the
at the Shahn border crossing. Subsequent investiga- Houthis to manufacture UAVs and other weapons. In this
tions showed that the driver was working for a shipping case, the components are imported legally by busi-
and warehousing company in Sana’a and that he had nesses based in Oman and then transferred to Yemen
picked up the “generators” as well as 4,000 crates of using commercial trucking services. Reports of dual use
milk from the warehouse at the Mazyunah Free Zone, items being sourced via this route date back to as early
which is located directly across the border crossing as January 2019, when Coalition forces seized a truck

30 Interviews with different subject matter experts between October and 33 United Nations (2023) Letter dated 21 February 2023 from the Panel
December 2023. of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council.
31 Interviews with UN sources in October and November 2023 noted that S/2023/130. United Nations. New York, in particular paragraphs 54 to
the Security Council mandate for the Mission operating in Yemen does 56, as well as annex 19.
not include the monitoring of the arms embargo. The Mission conducts 34 United Nations (2023) Letter dated 21 February 2023 from the Panel
scheduled, weekly visits to the port areas, when approved, accompanied of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council.
by Houthi personnel. S/2023/130. United Nations. New York, in particular paragraphs 50 to
32 Commercial flights between Sana’a and Amman in Jordan resumed in 52, as well as annex 18.
May 2022 and have since served as a vital lifeline for Yemenis living in 35 United Nations (2023) Letter dated 18 May 2023 from the Permanent
Houthi-controlled areas. So far, there has been no indication that those Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
flights have been used to smuggle components for the Houthi weapons Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the
program. President of the Security Council. S/2023/362. United Nations. New York.

12
 Trafficking patterns
for arms, ammunition, and related items

Picture 3 Dhow intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard Smuggling of weapons from Yemen to
with a cargo of weapons in January 2024 other countries
While the smuggling of weapons to Yemen and in par-
ticular to the Houthis has been at the centre of attention
since 2015, the fact that arms are also smuggled out of
the country in significant quantities is sometimes
neglected. This is surprising given that Yemen has tradi-
tionally played an important role as hub for illicit weap-
ons smuggling, in particular for the Horn of Africa and
has an active domestic and largely unregulated market
for small arms and light weapons, which includes both
brick-and-mortar shops in most major towns, as well as
sales by private arms dealers on social media platforms
such as Facebook and Telegram.38 Traditionally, this
market has supplied weapons to private individuals
rather than to organized groups. Gun ownership in
Yemen has traditionally been very high, with some esti-
mates claiming that the country ranks second only to
the United States of America in terms of the number of
firearms per resident.39 This strong domestic demand,
which predates the current conflict, is driven by a com-
plex set of factors, which includes societal norms (gun
ownership is associated with prestige) as well as the
more practical need to defend one's community in the
absence of strong state institutions.40 Given the thriving
domestic market, some of the weapons have also been
Source: U.S. Naval Forces Central Command supplied to other countries in the sub-region.

with three tons of parts, including UAV engines, which Given the close trading relationship between communi-
had originally been shipped to Muscat.36 Similar trans- ties on the Southern coast of Yemen and the Northern
fers have continued until at least December 2022, when coast of Somalia, the Gulf of Aden remains one of the
with 100 UAV engines concealed under communication key transit corridors for weapons. Arms are shipped in
equipment was seized by Yemeni customs.37 both directions – large quantities of mostly new weap-
ons, are transferred from large vessels off the Somali
The smuggling of dual-use items presents a number of coast to smaller boats going towards Hadramawt and
specific challenges for anti-proliferation efforts – one Mahra, ultimately reaching the Houthis after being
aspect is related to capacity-building: whereas customs smuggled across the desert by criminal networks.41
officers and members of the security forces, for exam- Simultaneously, smaller, and more mixed cargoes of
ple at roadblocks, are usually able to identify weapons mostly used weapons are being smuggled from Yemeni
quite easily, this is not the case for dual-use items, ports such as Mukalla and Al-Shihr on small dhows
whose identification often requires significant training. towards Somalia, often to Berbera port in Bossaso,42 as
Another aspect is regulatory – items such as engines or well as to beaches in Galmudug, and more rarely, to
electronic components for Houthi weapon systems are
not considered restricted under the legislation of most
countries, i.e., they can be freely imported. This makes
38 Interviews with subject matter experts between October and December 2023.
it easy for business entities to import them and then to
39 According to the Small Arms Survey, in 2018 there were 52.8 firearms
arrange their onwards transfer to Yemen and it is not in per 100 residents in Yemen, which would have been second only to the
all cases clear whether they are aware that the parts will United States of America, which wass estimated to have 120.5 fire-
be used for the manufacturing of weapons, or that they arms per 100 residents. This would equate 14.9 million firearms in pri-
vate possession in Yemen. See: https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/
are destined for the Houthis. default/files/resources/SAS-Infographics-global-firearms-holdings.pdf
40 See: Living with Weapons: Small Arms in Yemen, in: Small Arms Survey
36 United Nations (2020) Letter dated 27 January 2020 from the Panel (2003): Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied. Oxford Univer-
of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council. sity Press. Oxford.
S/2020/326. United Nations. New York, in particular paragraph 61 and 41 Interviews with subject matter experts between October and December
annex 18. 2023.
37 United Nations (2023) Letter dated 2 November 2023 from the Panel 42 Bahadur, J. (2020) Snapping back against Iran - The case of the Al Bari
of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council. 2 and the UN arms embargo. Global Initiative Against Transnational
S/2023/833. United Nations. New York, in particular paragraphs 91 to 93. Organized Crime. Geneva.

13
 Assessment of the response to illicit weapons trafficking
in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea

Picture 4 UNODC training activities for the Yemen Coast Guard

Source: UNODC

locations further South.43 Unlike in the case of weapons In addition to the ongoing smuggling of weapons
for the Houthis, those exports appear to be purely com- across the Gulf of Aden, in recent years also the traf-
mercial in nature, even though at least some of the ficking in the Red Sea appears to have increased. While
weapons ultimately end up with armed groups such as the Yemeni Coast Guard operating from Mocha had
Al-Shabab and the Islamic State. 44 Independent previously seized small fishing boats carrying cargoes
researchers have established that the arms dealers in of a few pistols or a few hundred rounds of ammunition,
Yemen and Somalia often communicate via mobile it seems that increasingly larger cargoes of weapons
phone and commonly use the hawala remittances to are shipped from Houthi-controlled areas of the West
make and receive international payments.45 Given that Coast towards Sudan. In September 2022, the Suda-
individuals and dhows based in the same ports have nese government announced that the country’s navy
also featured in the better documented cases of tran- had seized a dhow coming from Yemen with a cargo of
shipment of arms to Yemen, it is highly likely that at 90 assault rifles, several hundred boxes of SALW ammu-
least some of them are involved in both proliferation nition, as well as detonating cords and fuses. A second
patterns.46 seizure of arms destined for Sudan occurred in Decem-
ber 2023 when the Yemeni Coast Guard intercepted
two skiffs carrying weapons and ammunition.47 Given
43 Hiraal Institute (2022) Al Shabab’s Arsenal – From Taxes to Terror. the situation in Sudan since April 2023, it seems likely
Mogadishu. that the smuggling of arms from Yemen to Sudan may
44 Interviews with subject matter experts between October and December continue in the near future.
2023.
45 Bahadur, J. (2020) Following the money – The use of the hawala remit-
tance system in the Yemen-Somalia arms trade. Global Initiative Against 47 Off icial facebook page of the Yemeni Coast Guard, https://
Transnational Organized Crime. Geneva. www.facebook.com/story.php?story_f bid=675415378100988
46 Ibid. &id=100068975957245 (last accessed on 15 February 2024)

14
 Challenges for more
effective anti-trafficking operations

Challenges for more effective anti-trafficking

operations

The Houthis have been subject to a comprehensive arms for information sharing consists of an informal, monthly
embargo imposed by the Security Council since April 2015, online call bringing together EUNAVFOR ATALANTA,
which covers all manner of weapons and components, as CMF, UNODC and the two Panels of Experts on Yemen
well as the provision of military training.48 All Member and Somalia.52 While this is a useful forum, its nature
States of the United Nations have the obligation to enforce does not allow the sharing of classified information.
this sanctions regime and the Council has also called on
different occasions on donors to support the measures Within the region, the crucial actors include the Yemeni
increasing regional cooperation as well as capacity-build- security forces, especially the Yemeni Coast Guard, as
ing efforts in the area of anti-trafficking measures.49 How- well as the security forces of immediate neighbors, in
ever, despite this strong legal basis, a number of practical particular Saudi Arabia, Oman, Somalia and Djibouti. All
obstacles contribute to the challenges of enforcing the of these nations have an important role to play as they are
embargo. This section will provide a detailed overview either, in the case of Saudi Arabia, an important player
over those issues, wherever possible, differentiating supporting the anti-Houthi forces in Yemen, or because,
between the international, regional, and national level. weapons and related items are smuggled across their
territory to the Houthis (see trafficking patterns for arms,
ammunition, and related items above). However, effective
Coordination challenges coordination between the partners requires strengthening
for a number of reasons: (a) there is no institutionalized
Most attempts at smuggling are detected by interna- cooperation mechanism between the countries of the
tional maritime forces outside of the territorial waters of region, requests for information usually have to be sent
Member States, while some shipments were also seized through diplomatic channels and are, more often than
by Yemeni security forces, in particular by the Yemen not, unsuccessful;53 (b) the stark differences in economic
Coast Guard, as well as by the customs service at the development may make cooperation on eye level (rather
border with Oman. On the international side, the actors than patron-client relationships) difficult;54 and (c) differ-
include various international maritime forces, including ent interpretation of the scope of sanctions regimes, for
the US Navy and the UK Royal Navy, as well as two inter- example, whether dual-use items or chemicals fall under
national naval forces, the European Union Naval Force - it, have led to different levels of enforcement between
Operation ATALANTA (EUNAVFOR ATALANTA) and the partners.55 Currently, the only institutionalized mecha-
Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), all of which have their nism for cross-border law enforcement cooperation is
own command structures and mandates, which differ INTERPOL of which all states of the region are members,
significantly when it comes to the suppression of smug- but according to interviews conducted for this report,
gling efforts. While most of the forces are also members there have been few, if any, successes in using this chan-
of CMF, which would make their headquarter in Bahrain nel to arrest smugglers or share information through
an obvious choice for coordinating efforts, CMF repre- these channels.56 In addition, it seems that in some cases,
sentatives have stated repeatedly that the CMF nations for example in Yemen, the INTERPOL National Central
which have seized weapons in recent years (USA, UK, Bureau, intended to be the liaison between the organiza-
and France) have done so in their national capacity, tion and the member state’s law enforcement authorities,
while other nations focus on anti-piracy operations.50 may have limited contact to the security forces, which
The same is true for EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, whose area significantly limits its effectiveness.57
of operation was extended to include the Red Sea in late
2022. National restrictions do not allow most EUNAVFOR
52 Interview with representatives of EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, CMF and
warships to seize weapons, so their role is limited to the Panel of Experts on Somalia in October and November 2023.
collection of information.51 Another existing mechanism 53 Interviews conducted with different representatives of security forces in
Aden in October 2023.
48 United Nations (2015) Resolution 2216. S/RES/2216 (2015). United 54 Representatives of Yemeni security services have frequently expressed their
Nations. New York, in particular paragraphs 14 to 17. frustration to author, that they are, at best, involved in auxiliary roles in
49 Most recently in the resolution adopted on 10 January 2024 regarding anti-proliferation operations led by the Coalition or by the US Navy.
the Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea, see: United Nations (2024) 55 Interviews conducted with stakeholders in Riyadh in October 2022 and
Resolution 2722. S/RES/2722 (2024). United Nations. New York, in in Aden in October 2022.
particular paragraphs 5 to 8. 56 Interviews conducted with stakeholders in Aden in October 2022.
50 Interview with CMF representatives in November 2023. 57 Interviews conducted with stakeholders in Aden in October 2023 and in
51 Interview with EUNAVFOR representative in October 2023. Addis Ababa in November 2023.

15
 Assessment of the response to illicit weapons trafficking
in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea

International Maritime Forces active in the UK Royal Navy, which on three occasions in
the Arabian Sea 2022 and 2023 intercepted fast boats moving
with weapons and related components from the
Islamic Republic of Iran towards the coast of
The most active international maritime force in Oman (see trafficking across the land border
this area is the US Navy, which maintains a head- with Oman). Dubbed “Operation Kipion”, the UK
quarter (U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, navy has a focus on maintaining the freedom of
NAVCENT) in Bahrain, commanding a significant navigation in the Persian Gulf and usually con-
naval force, the US Fifth Fleet, which includes a sists of a Type 23 frigate, three minehunters and
number of warships, including aircraft carriers, various support elements, including helicopters,
as well as both crewed and uncrewed reconnais- with a headquarter in Bahrain.4 The Royal Navy
sance aircraft. The forces’ area of responsibility cooperates closely with the US Navy in their anti-
includes the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Ara- smuggling operations, indicating a high-level of
bian Sea, as well as parts of the Indian Ocean.1 intelligence sharing and operational coordina-
However, while the US Navy was responsible for tion, while also being a member of CMF. Informa-
more seizures of weapons than all other actors tion sharing with other partners in the region may
combined, the Fifth Fleet has a large geographic be more limited. Geographically, until October
area to cover, as well as multiple other roles, 2023, the UK’s naval focus was on the Strait of
which means that the numbers of assets availa- Hormuz and the Northern Gulf of Oman, which is
ble for anti-trafficking efforts is limited. Following reflected also in the location of the interdicts.
the start of Houthi attacks on Israel and later on However, as a member of “Operation Prosperity
civilian ships in the Red Sea, the number of US Guardian”, the UK has committed to maintaining
warships north of the Bab-al-Mandab increased, a naval presence also in the Red Sea and has
but their focus so far has been on kinetic action been actively supporting aerial attacks on Houthi
against Houthi missiles and UAVs, as well as on positions in Yemen, raising the possibility of a
Houthi sites inside of Yemen, rather than on anti- stronger role in anti-smuggling operations in
smuggling efforts.2 The US Navy has been taking those waters in the future.5
a robust approach to anti-smuggling operations,
frequently sinking Yemeni smuggling dhows, and The third significant naval actor in the area of
handing their crew members over to the Yemeni anti-trafficking has been the Coalition, in particu-
authorities. On the operational level, the US Navy, lar the Royal Saudi Navy, which was responsible
as well as the Yemeni Coast Guard, are part of the for two seizures of dhows in 2020 (see section on
Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), a multina- maritime Trafficking in the Arabian Sea to Yemen),
tional coalition of naval forces, which maintain a including one close to the coast of Somalia,
headquarter in the same facility as NAVCENT in which indicates a relatively large area of respon-
Bahrain, which allows for some degree of infor- sibility, as well as a degree of information sharing
mation sharing, but which is far away from an with other international stakeholders. In addition,
integrated command structure.3 Saudi Arabia, as well as other Coalition countries
such as Egypt, maintains warships in the South-
The second international maritime force with a ern Red Sea, which traditionally focused on pro-
track record of arms interdictions in the region is tecting vital Saudi shipping against Houthi

1 U.S. Naval Forces Central Command website https://www.cusnc.navy.mil 4 UK Royal Navy website https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news and latest
2 Interview with subject matter experts in November 2023. activity/operations/red sea and gulf/operation kipio
3 Interview with representatives of CMF in November 2023 5 Interview with subject matter experts in November 2023.

16
 International Maritime Forces
active in the Arabian Sea

attacks and on controlling the approaches to the the Arabian Sea, but national caveats imposed on
Houthi-controlled ports of Hodeidah and Salef. their forces mean that most warships are not
The Coalition’s naval presence combined with authorized to engage smuggling vessels, which
the UNVIM inspection regime, which covers all limits its ability to deter the proliferation of arms
shipping with the exception of purely humanitar- and related items.8 Similar caveats are also in
ian cargoes and dhows under 100 tons, has his- place for most of the Member States contribut-
torically been an effective deterrence for ing warships to the CMF in Bahrain. Bringing
larger-scale smuggling of weapons in the Red together 41 countries, the main focus of CMF has
Sea, forcing the smugglers to use the longer and been the suppression of piracy, as well as the
more expensive overland route through the fight against the smuggling of narcotics.9 While
desert from the coast of Mahra and Hadramawt. CMF nations, such as France and Australia, have
It seems that following the ceasefire between the also interdicted dhows carrying arms and ammu-
Coalition and the Houthis in April 2022, which nition, they have done so in their national capac-
also included an agreement to ease restrictions ity, rather than under the CMF “flag”.10
on shipping to Hodeidah and Salef, the Coalition
has significantly reduced its naval presence in
the waters around Yemen.6 While the requirement
for ships to be inspected by UNVIM in Djibouti
remains in place, there are unconfirmed indica-
tions that this requirement is ignored by some
ships (see maritime Trafficking in the Red Sea to
Yemen). At the time of writing, it is unclear
whether some of the other international maritime
forces active in the area are willing and capable
of enforcing the inspection regime in the future,
which would be of crucial importance for stop-
ping the smuggling of weapons and related items
directly to the Houthis.

In addition to the naval forces mentioned above,

the European Union has maintained a naval force
in the Northwestern Indian Ocean since 2008.
Dubbed “Operation Atalanta”, the mission is
mostly concerned with deterring piracy off the
coast of Somalia,7 however in recent years, its
area of responsibility was expanded to include
the Red Sea. In addition to warships from France,
Italy and Spain, the mission also has limited
capabilities for aerial reconnaissance using mili-
tary aircraft based in Djibouti. EUNAVFOR ATAL-
ANTA collects information on arms smuggling in

6 Interviews with different subject matter experts in October and 8 Interview with subject matter expert in October 2023
November 2023. 9 Combined Maritime Forces website https://combinedmaritimeforces.com
7 EU Naval Force Operation ATALANTA website, https://eunavfor.eu 10 Interview with subject matter experts in November 2023.

17
 Assessment of the response to illicit weapons trafficking
in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea

Picture 5 Regional high-level conference organized by UNODC in Addis Ababa in November 2023

Source: UNODC

Another, more recent initiative aims to establish a regional strengthening. 60 While these challenges are by no
maritime domain awareness center, which would bring means unique to Yemen, the issue is further compli-
together Yemen, Somalia, Djibouti and Ethiopia, and cated by the political fragmentation. Following the suc-
which potentially could also coordinate anti-proliferation cessful Houthi takeover of political power at the central
efforts.58 The initiative, which is supported by UNODC, level in 2014/2015 and the subsequent defection of
held a first high-level meeting in Addis Ababa in Novem- large parts of the armed forces to their side, the Coali-
ber 2023, but is still in its infancy. tion attempted to re-build security institutions in areas
outside of Houthi control through the formation of alli-
On the national level, within Yemen, coordination chal- ances with local leaders. Weapons, training and in par-
lenges remain between the different agencies involved ticular financial support by Saudi Arabia and the UAE in
in anti-proliferation efforts, including the Yemeni Coast their respective zones of influence, significantly contrib-
Guard, Customs, National Security, the Police, and the uted to the successes of the fledgling militias on the
Yemen Armed Forces.59 While there have been success- battlefield between 2015 and 2018. However, it also left
ful cases of inter-agency cooperation in this area, for a legacy of weak central control. Even though the crea-
example during the investigation of the smuggling of tion of the Presidential Leadership Council in April 2022
the anti-tank guided missiles at Shahn in March 2022 brought most of the anti-Houthi factions together, weak-
(see section on trafficking across the land border with nesses related to effective internal coordination and
Oman), those were conducted in the form of ad hoc cooperation between different stakeholders remain.61
committees reporting to the Ministry of the Interior and
the local governor. Interviews conducted for the report
with representatives of different security services have
60 Interviews with representatives of the security services in Mahra gov-
shown that information sharing and coordination ernorate in March 2022. Following his visit, the author was repeatedly
between the different stakeholders, as well as the over- contacted by members of the local security forces with information
all coordination on an inter-ministerial level requires about suspected smuggling activities, asking him to pass them on to
international maritime forces, illustrating the need for the establishment
of more formal communication channels.
58 Interview with senior UNODC staff in Addis Ababa in November 2023. 61 Interviews with various international experts on Yemen between 2018
59 Interviews with stakeholders in Aden in October 2023. and 2023.

18
 Challenges for more
effective anti-trafficking operations

Technical challenges for Yemeni Picture 6 Patrol vessel repaired by UNODC for the
security actors Yemen Coast Guard

In addition to the lack of coordination and information-

sharing, both horizontally, for example between differ-
ent agencies, and vertically, for example between
headquarters and units positioned further away from
the temporary capital Aden, a key challenge for the
effective enforcement of arms related sanctions is the
lack of suitable equipment.62 This is partially the result of
the eight years of civil war, which has led to the loss of
critical infrastructure and assets, and partially the result
of the lack of investment by the cash-strapped interna-
tionally recognized government. The Yemen Coast
Guard is tasked with patrolling more than 2,000 kilome-
tres of coastline, and prior to 2015, the force had 75
patrol boats, many of them donated by the United States
of America, operating from 13 operational bases in the
Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. While most of those boats
were only able to operate in coastal waters, two larger
vessels, the Sana’a and the Aden, were able to deploy on
the high seas, significantly expanding the range of oper-
ation. The YCG also had access to coastal radar systems
and communication equipment, allowing them to per-
form their role effectively.63 The war had a devastating
effect on the force, fighting in Aden, YCG’s headquarter, Source: UNODC
destroyed many facilities, including the radar and com-
munication infrastructure, severely limiting marine only been provided by UNDP and UNODC, and has also
domain awareness. The patrol boat Sana’a sank in March mostly focused on the headquarter level, the Gulf of
2017 with the loss of two crew members after hitting a Aden district and to a more limited extent the Red Sea,
sea mine, while its sister ship Aden has been suffering reflecting the limitations of available funding, as well as
from engine problems, likely as the result of poor main- the lack of a permanent UN footprint in Mahra governo-
tenance, and has largely been port-bound. At the time rate. However, the current efforts are not sufficient for
of writing, at the end of 2023, YCG had seven main YCG to return to pre-conflict levels of readiness.
operational bases (four on the Red Sea, two in the Gulf
of Aden district and only one in the Arabian Sea district) The limited scope of this assessment did not allow for an
with a total of 56 operational short-range patrol boats.64 in-depth analysis of the capabilities of the other security
Most of the vessels (40 out of 56) are operating in the forces which have a role in anti-proliferation efforts, not
Red Sea, which might explain why Houthi smuggling least because in the absence of support from the UN or
efforts were mostly focused on the Arabian Sea. other international actors, access to key decision
makers is more limited. For example, further field
This is also illustrative of the imbalanced nature of inter- research would be required to assess the facilities at
national support – material support provided by donors Aden port used to inspect incoming containers and the
may not necessarily target the areas which are the focus capabilities of the police forces. However, two positive
of Houthi smuggling operations. Critical areas, such as examples of where technical capabilities are available at
Shabwa governorate and the island of Soccotra, both of a higher-than-expected level, should also be mentioned.
which are smuggling hotspots, are not currently cov- During a visit to the Shahn border crossing in March
ered by any operational YCG patrol boats due to a lack 2022, the author, during his tenure with the Panel of
of available resources and international support. Beyond Experts, was able to observe the clearance procedure
the support of the Coalition, which has largely come to for trucks bringing commercial cargoes from Oman.
an end with the withdrawal of most Coalition forces Here, the customs services are using a vehicle x-ray
between 2019 and 2022, material support to YCG has system to scan incoming trucks and their cargo, which
allowed them to detect the anti-tank guided missiles
hidden inside of fake generators (see section on traffick-
62 Interview with representatives of different security services in Aden in
October 2023. ing across the land border with Oman). This example
63 Information received from YCG in September 2023. shows that given the right kind of equipment and train-
64 Interviews with representatives of YCG and other stakeholders in Aden ing, Yemeni security forces can play an important role in
in October 2023.

19
 Assessment of the response to illicit weapons trafficking
in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea

foiling smuggling attempts. The other example is the Capacity-building challenges for Yemeni
establishment of a national forensic laboratory which is security actors
jointly operated by the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry
of the Interior and the Office of the Prosecutor General. As in the case of the material challenges described in the
The laboratory was opened in July 2023 in Aden and has previous section, the conflict also has taken its toll on the
the necessary advanced equipment to test chemicals, human capacity of the Yemeni security forces to address
match fingerprints and perform ballistic analysis.65 the challenge of the smuggling of weapons.67 On the one
Between June and September 2023, it already received hand, a significant number of senior members of the pre-
more than 300 requests for analysis, mostly for seized 2015 Yemeni security forces changed over to the side of
narcotics, but in principle, the staff would also be capa- the Houthis during the days of the “revolution”, while
ble of testing explosives, for example, from improvised others have left the country, have retired,68 or even have
explosive devices used by the Houthis and other groups, lost their lives during the fighting. This has made the re-
a capability which previously had not existed in Yemen building of the Yemeni security forces an urgent need,
since the start of the conflict.66 but so far, this has not been a priority for international
partners. It seems that, at least initially, the coordination
between the Coalition and their Yemeni allies needed to
Picture 7 Ballistic testing equipment at the Na- be strengthened, even though the internationally recog-
tional Forensic Center in Aden nized government itself is a member of the Coalition and
maintains a presence at its headquarters in Riyadh.69
There has been little emphasis on the transfer of special-
ized skills. To illustrate this point, while members of
Yemeni security forces have no problem identifying arms
and ammunition, this is not the case for the smuggling of
dual use items, required for the construction of more
sophisticated weapon systems (see section on traffick-
ing across the land border with Oman). Consequently,
these items have been smuggled for years concealed as
commercial cargo overland through nominally govern-
ment-controlled territory. Another example would be
smuggling of chemicals disguised as urea fertilizer (see
section on maritime trafficking in the Red Sea to Yemen),
which often is also transferred across government terri-
tory. While the establishment of the forensic laboratory
in Aden means that there are national capacities to con-
duct chemical analysis, it seems unlikely that most of
frontline officers at a checkpoint or in a port would have
the necessary skills to know what to look for, while their
level of awareness and ability to coordinate with the
laboratory is unknown.70 The most glaring, and in theory,
easiest to address, capacity gap, is the awareness about
Houthi smuggling patterns. Even though there is a wealth
of information on this subject available in the public
domain, interviews conducted for this study show that
Yemeni investigators usually have only a limited aware-
ness of the modus operandi of Houthi smuggling net-
works, knowledge that would be essential for their work.71

Source: UNODC 67 Interviews with representatives of different Yemeni security services in

Aden in October 2023.
68 The loss of expertise due to retirement is an ongoing concern in Yemen,
for example, the newly established national forensic laboratory is staffed
by specialist who were trained abroad during the time of the independ-
ent South Yemen and who are close to, or even beyond, retirement age.
Training younger people to eventually replace them is a pressing concern.
69 Numerous interviews with members of the Yemeni security forces
65 Interviews with employees of the laboratory as well as with representa- between 2018 and 2023..
tives of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior, and the Office 70 Interviews with representatives of the security forces in Aden in October
of the Prosecutor General in Aden in October 2023. 2023.
66 Interviews with IED experts from different international organizations 71 Interviews with representatives of the security forces in Aden in October
in Aden in October 2023. 2023.

20
 Challenges for more
effective anti-trafficking operations

Picture 8 UNODC training activities for the Yemen to trainings held in third countries, which significantly
Coast Guard increases the cost due to the logistical challenges.74
Others, such as the majority of the non-governmental
organizations present in Yemen, avoid capacity building
in the area of law enforcement altogether.

Legal obstacles for the prosecution of

smugglers
Another issue which would need to be addressed in
order to allow for more effective anti-proliferation efforts
are legal obstacles for the prosecution of individuals
suspected of having been involved in smuggling opera-
tions in Yemeni courts of law. This is of importance as
international maritime forces have been concerned
under which jurisdiction the crew of smuggling vessels
should be tried. This is driven by the experience of
Source: UNODC attempting to bring Somali pirates caught by interna-
tional warships in the 2000s in the Indian Ocean to jus-
This could be due to the fact that international actors don’t tice. In that case, suspected pirates sometimes
necessarily collaborate closely with Yemeni counterparts successfully applied for asylum after arriving on the ter-
in their investigations, and that at least some of the publicly ritory of the prosecuting state, for example in the Neth-
available information exists only in English or is hidden in erlands in 2009, in Germany in 2012 and in Denmark in
lengthy official documents. This lack of capacity is one 2023, and remained there after serving their sentences.75
factor responsible for the difficulties in successfully pros- Combined with the difficulty of providing sufficient evi-
ecuting arms smugglers in Yemeni courts, as the special- dence of illegal acts on sea, most Western nations active
ized prosecutors do not have the expertise to try cases in the Arabian Sea (for example, Australia, France and the
of this nature (see section on legal obstacles for the United Kingdom) have therefore adopted a catch-and-
prosecution of smugglers). release policy for cases of maritime smuggling, which in
essence means the vessels and crews are released, and
Since 2020, the number of international partners involved only the cargo is destroyed or detained.76 However, this
in the provision of capacity-building in Yemen has “pragmatic approach” has considerable downsides, as
increased, but still remains relatively small compared there is little deterrence in those cases, and because
with the number of organizations engaged, for example, information collection from the crew members is difficult
in humanitarian action. Efforts are led by the UN, and in on a warship. In addition, the cargo can be replaced
the field of law enforcement by UNODC, which has a without causing any significant disruption to the net-
strong relationship with the Yemen Coast Guard in Aden, work. As mentioned before, the US Navy has adopted a
where it has been conducting trainings on different more hardline course vis-à-vis Yemeni arms smugglers in
aspects of maritime law enforcement. More recently, the recent years, handing over crew members to the Yemeni
organization has also started working with customs and Coast Guard (see section on maritime trafficking in the
the Aden port authority. Other, more specialized organi- Arabian Sea to Yemen). While there has been likely at
zations, such as Conflict Armament Research, have car- least a short-term impact on the smuggling of arms to
ried out training for example on the identification of IED the Houthis, US officials have stated repeatedly that in
components.72 Beyond the UN and some non-govern- order to continue this policy, the suspects need to be
mental organizations, the number of international part- prosecuted by the Yemeni authorities in accordance with
ners willing and able to conduct training inside of Yemen international legal norms.77 Successful prosecutions
remains relatively small. Some parties, such as the US would also increase the probability that other nations
Navy or EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, who have publicly might also adopt the approach of the US and hand over
expressed an interest in collaborating more closely with arrested smugglers to the Yemeni authorities.
Yemeni forces, are constrained by the security situation,
which does not allow for the deployment of their respec-
tive staff to Yemen.73 As a result, usually training activities 74 Interviews with representatives of different international organizations
in Aden in October 2023.
are limited to inviting officers from Yemeni security forces
75 Larsen, J. (2023) What shall we do with the suspected pirates? Why piracy
prosecutions do not always work. Danish Institute for International Stud-
72 Interview with a representative of Conflict Armament Research in October 2023. ies (DIIS). Copenhagen.
73 Interviews with representatives of the US State Department and from 76 Interview with representative of CMF in November 2023.
EUNAVFOR ATALANTA in October 2023. 77 Interviews with different US officials in 2022 and 2023.

21
 Assessment of the response to illicit weapons trafficking
in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea

Interviews conducted for this report with the Prosecutor irregular. This exposes government employees to a
General, as well as with the Ministry of Justice and the higher risk of corruption and impacts morale. For exam-
Ministry of Interior in Aden in October 2023 have shown ple, the monthly salary of an enlisted man in the Yemeni
that there are a number of legal and procedural obsta- Coast Guard in 2023 ranged from 60,000 to 90,000
cles for a prosecution in Yemen. One key aspect here Yemeni Riyal (45 to 85 US$), while officers of the same
appears to be access to evidence, in particular to the forces ranged between 90,000 and 140,000 Yemeni
seized weapons, as well as to the electronic items, such Riyal (85 to 100 USD). The payment was usually between
as GPS receivers, mobile and satellite phones, which two and four months late, so that the government is
were recovered by US forces from the smuggling dhows. constantly in arrears.83 While it was not possibly to ana-
These items have not been handed over to the Yemeni lyze this in detail for this report, it is very likely that other
authorities,78 and, at least at the time of writing, Yemeni security forces, for example the police or the customs
officials have also not been able to inspect them in third service, have similar salaries. In order to motivate their
countries.79 It is not entirely clear why the seized weapons staff, YCG in addition sometimes pays additional cash
are not handed over, initially this may have been due to incentives for their participation in “missions”, but those
concerns that the arms might end up in the wrong hands. never exceed two US$ per day.84 Similar incentives have
Another aspect, which might be an issue for a successful also been reported from other security forces, including
prosecution is that the Yemeni authorities do not have those directly involved in battle with the Houthis, and at
access to the crews of the warships which conducted the least in the past those were often paid by the Coalition,
seizures, nor do they have videotapes or any other material but it is not clear whether this is still the case in light of
evidence which puts the suspects on the same dhow as the their withdrawal from Yemen.85 The source of the funds
weapons. According to interviews conducted with officials for the payment of the incentives in the case of the YCG
of the prosecution service, unless the suspects confess to is not clear, however, interviews conducted by the Panel
participating in smuggling, on this basis it is almost impos- of Experts with YCG representatives in Hadramawt in
sible to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they are October 2020 revealed that they were paid from
guilty.80 Coordination issues between Yemen and exter- extrabudgetary sources, i.e., often from fees and fines
nal partners regarding these cases,81 as well as the lack levied, for example from fishermen, in order to make up
of investigators with training on naval and arms-related the funding shortfall.
crimes in Yemen, also add to the difficulty of this pro-
cess. In addition, many of the detained crew members The low salaries, as well as their irregular payment, and
have been transferred to the Houthi side as part of peri- the reliance on other funding sources for the incentives,
odic prisoners’ exchanges, effectively protecting them obviously has an impact on morale within the security
from prosecution.82 forces. Senior officers and political leaders have stated
that they are afraid that this might weaken their forces.86
When it comes to anti-proliferation efforts, however,
Organizational challenges there is also the very real challenge of corruption. Front-
line officers, for example, in the customs services, or
One aspect, which is often overlooked in the analysis of soldiers at one of the many checkpoints along the coun-
why anti-proliferation efforts involving Yemeni security try’s roads, can be incentivized to look the other way
forces, are challenging, has to do with the incentive when a shipment of arms or ammunition needs to be
structure for government employees. As mentioned cleared. It is impossible to assess how prevalent corrup-
previously, the internationally recognized government tion at this level is. In the context of the irregular pay-
has been cash-strapped ever since the start of the con- ment of low salaries, the relatively low number of seizures
flict, and periodically had to be propped-up by loans, in on the land borders and along the main roads leading
particular from Saudi Arabia, in order to avoid bank- from Oman to Houthi-controlled areas could be linked to
ruptcy. Consequently, the payment of government sala- the risk of corruption. This might possibly explain why
ries, already often not very high, has been highly although there are indications of smuggling through the
land border, at Shahn border crossing point, despite all
78 In at least one recent case, a single assault rifles, which had been deacti- commercial trucks undergoing both a vehicle x-ray scan
vated by the US forces, was handed over to the Yemeni authorities along and a manual inspection, comparatively few illicit car-
with a dhow crew. However, according to interviews with the Office of
the Prosecutor General in Aden in October 2023, this does not satisfy goes are seized, illustrating limitations which cannot be
the Yemeni requirements. fixed through training or improved equipment.
79 Interview with the Office of the Prosecutor General in Aden in October 2023.
80 Interviews with the Office of the Prosecutor General in Aden in October 2023.
81 It seems that the information exchange has been exclusively on the work-
ing level, i.e., between the commander of the warship and the Yemeni 83 Interview with subject matter expert in Aden in October 2023.
Coast Guard, neither of which understand the evidentiary requirements
of the Yemeni justice system. 84 Interview with subject matter expert in Aden in October 2023.
82 Interviews with the Office of the Prosecutor General as representatives 85 Interviews with subject matter experts between October and December 2023.
of the YCG in Aden in October 2023. 86 Interviews with security officials conducted in Aden in October 2023.

22
 Conclusion

Conclusion
In terms of the obstacles to a more efficient Member
State enforcement of the sanctions against the Houthis,
the lack of coordination between the multitude of actors
involved in patrolling the Arabian Sea, combined with the
relative weakness of state structures in both Yemen and
Somalia, are important factors. In addition, at the regional
level the consistent and coordinated enforcement of the
sanctions regime is required for effective cross-border
investigations. The outlook for the smuggling of weap-
ons appears to be extremely murky at the time of writing.
When this report was commissioned in summer 2023,
Yemen had enjoyed a period of relative calm which
started with the truce a year earlier. There had been no
new arms seizures and concerns were increasingly shift-
ing from arms supplies to the Houthis towards the risk of
proliferation from Yemen towards the volatile Horn of
Africa region. However, as the research progressed, the
situation changed drastically following the Houthis’ pur-
ported attacks on Israel and commercial and military
vessels in the Red Sea, ultimately leading to the com-
mencement of Operation Prosperity Guardian, the mari-
time operation led by the United States of America and
United Kingdom providing protection for civilian com-
mercial shipping transiting the Red Sea. In January 2024,
the UN Security Council passed a resolution demanding
an immediate cessation of Houthi attacks on merchant
and commercial vessels. This was followed by the mili-
tary response led by the United States of America under
Operation Poseidon Archer against targets in Houthi-
controlled areas of Yemen the same month. The EU also
subsequently launched a naval defensive operation in
February – the EU Naval Force Operation Aspides. As the
Houthis have to some degree expended their arsenal of
advanced missiles and UAVs in those attacks, this will
also likely lead to an increase of smuggling in order to
rebuild stocks of these weapons. It remains to be seen
whether the increased focus on Yemen will lead to more
seizures, and whether international forces involved in
the interdiction of smuggling will once again take a
more active role in the patrolling of the approaches to
the Houthi-controlled ports in the Red Sea.

23
 Assessment of the response to illicit weapons trafficking
in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea

Recommendations security forces to address the challenge of arms smug-

gling, and also potentially increase the bargaining posi-
tion of international partners with regard to encouraging
the internationally recognized government to imple-
The following section consists of recommendations on ment reforms, for example with regard to the payment
how to improve the effectiveness of anti-proliferation of salaries (see recommendation below). In addition to
efforts in the Red Sea and in the Arabian Sea, as well as training, there is also a need for coastal detection sys-
on the territory of Yemen. tems and for coastal patrol vessels with a range of more
than 200 nautical miles.
Consider increasing cooperation and information-
sharing Consider taking measures to allow for the prose-
cution of smugglers
As previously discussed, the multitude of national and
international actors involved in different capacities and The successful prosecution of smugglers caught by
with different mandates, presents challenges for coop- international naval forces remains one of the priorities
eration and information-sharing. One way to overcome of the international community. In order to allow for the
this would be to create a clearing house for sanctions- Yemeni justice system to prosecute them in accordance
related information, which could independently track with international law, international forces should take
developments and maintain a database of suspicious measures to facilitate this process. For example, the
vessels. Having a permanently staffed clearing house, crew of the warship which intercepts a smuggling vessel
would also allow to overcome some of the challenges should document the process, for instance on video,
emanating from the frequent changes in personnel at and share this with the Yemeni authorities when handing
the headquarters of the various actors. over the smugglers, in accordance with relevant human
rights standards. Members of the crew of the warship,
Consider increasing the monitoring of Houthi-con- such as the captain or the head of the boarding party,
trolled ports should also be made available as witnesses, for exam-
ple, by giving a video testimony. When the seized items
The Red Sea ports of Hodeida and Salef remain the only cannot be handed over to the Yemeni authorities, repre-
direct access for the Houthis to the sea for the tranship- sentatives of the office of the prosecutor’s office could
ment of major cargo or imported goods. As discussed be allowed to inspect them in a third country and receive
above, there are some indications that, following the a briefing on the circumstances of the seizure. In addi-
truce in 2022, the patrolling of the approaches to the tion, there is a clear need to provide specialized training
ports by naval forces for the purposes of monitoring to the staff of the prosecutor’s office to allow them to try
potential smuggling operations has decreased, allowing cases of arms smuggling.
vessels to berth without first having been inspected by
UNVIM in Djibouti. In order to maintain an effective Consider strengthening cooperation in the area of
deterrence for smugglers, naval forces need to maintain anti-proliferation
a presence in those waters and monitor traffic.
Yemen’s neighbors, both on the Arabian Peninsula, and
Consider increasing support to the security forces across the sea in the Horn of Africa, play an important
in Yemen role in anti-proliferation efforts. However, as shown in
previous sections of this report, in practical terms coop-
Security forces of the internationally recognized gov- eration and information sharing is extremely limited.
ernment, in particular the Yemen Coast Guard, but also This could be addressed through the creation of a
the customs service, land border guards, the police and regional mechanism, for example, in the context of the
prosecutors’ office, play an important role in enforcing envisioned regional maritime domain awareness center,
the sanctions regime against the Houthis. However, which would have direct links to the relevant agencies
despite several resolutions of the Security Council of the participating states. Another aspect, which could
asking Member States to support them,87 in practice help with forming a cohesive approach would be to
only the United States of America and the European conduct joint capacity-building activities involving
Union have provided a modest level of capacity-build- actors from different regional states, for example under
ing and material support through UNODC and UNDP in the umbrella of UNODC. However, in order to be suc-
the past. More support for this sector, for example cessful, such an approach would also require a shared
through a dedicated multi-donor fund, could play an understanding of what constitutes arms smuggling, for
important role in strengthening the capacity of the example, when it comes to whether dual use items such
as engines and electronics are included, as well as the
87 The most recent example is resolution 2722 (2024) adopted by the Secu- necessary political will and resources to take effective
rity Council on 10 January 2024. measures to combat smuggling.

24
 Recommendations

Consider creating a national focal point to coordi-

nate measures

Coordination and information-sharing is not only a chal-

lenge among states and international organizations, but
also among agencies of the internationally recognized
government of Yemen. One step to address this would
be for the government to establish a coordination mech-
anism for the activities of the different agencies and for
coordination with international partners. It should be
noted that, given the financial situation of the govern-
ment, international partners would likely have to assist
its creation materially, i.e., through the provision of
equipment, as well as with capacity building. This could
be done through UN agencies, which are already active
in this sector in Yemen.

Consider taking steps towards Security Sector

Reform

The reform of the security services in Yemen, including

the regular payment of salaries, would be an important
step in addressing challenges related to morale and cor-
ruption. A thorough analysis of this issue is beyond the
scope of this report and for the government, the reform
of the security forces in the middle of an ongoing con-
flict is likely difficult to implement. It appears that, in
addition to the general shortage of funds in the govern-
ment coffers, the uncontrolled growth of the forces
since the start of the conflict is also a factor. In some
cases, it seems that the payroll deliberately inflated by
the salaries of “ghost soldiers”. So, addressing the issue
of payroll verification, for example through the introduc-
tion of electronic payment systems, could over time not
only help in addressing corruption, but also allow the
government to pay salaries more regularly. However,
this process would also likely require international tech-
nical support. Such an effort could be lead for example
by the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

25
 Assessment of the response to illicit weapons trafficking
in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

Table 2 Arms and ammunition seized in the Arabian Sea between 2015 and 2023

Institution In-person Remote Total

UN sources 2 8 10

International Government and Military Experts, including

0 9 9
EUNAVFOR, CMF and 5th U.S. Fleet

International Non-Governmental Experts, including Conflict

1 2 3
Armament Research and Project Masam88

Government of Yemen – Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence,

4 0 4
Interior and Justice in Aden

Prosecutor General and Forensic Department in Aden 2 0 2

Yemen Coast Guard, Customs and Aden Port Authority 3 0 3

Total 12 19 31

Source: Author’s calculations based predominantly on the reporting of the Panels of Experts on Yemen and Somalia.

This report aims to identify the challenges hampering a Given that criminal networks operating in the Arabian
more effective response to the trafficking of weapons, Sea and in the Red Sea engage in the trafficking of vari-
ammunition and related items in the Arabian Sea and in ous weapons, including small arms and light weapons
the Red Sea as well as to assess the needs of the differ- and anti-tank guided missiles, the scope of the report
ent partners involved. The report first looks at the con- includes weapons not covered by the Firearms Protocol
text, the networks affiliated with the Houthi forces, the to provide a comprehensive analysis of the challenges
smuggling across the land border with Oman, and the faced by national authorities and international partners.
smuggling of weapons from Yemen to the countries of
the Horn of Africa, and then analyses the national and
regional capabilities and the different issues which Key informant interviews
should be addressed to enable a more effective response,
including coordination between the various partners. In addition to the literature review and the data analysis
discussed in the previous section, the second key instru-
For this purpose, this study has analyzed the available ment to verify existing and collecting additional data is
data from numerous international organizations, in par- through a series of key informant interviews which were
ticular the Panels of Experts on Yemen and Somalia, as conducted either in person – primarily during the field
well as other open sources. A complete list of refer- research in Yemen – or remotely using tools such as Micro-
ences can be found below. soft Teams or Zoom. The interviews took place in Septem-
ber – December 2023. The participants for the key
The report was produced in the framework of the Proto- informant interviews were selected because of their cur-
col against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in rent or past institutional affiliation, or because they have
Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition published data regarding the trafficking of weapons. Table
(Firearms Protocol), which aims at promoting and 2 provides an overview over the interview participants.
strengthening international cooperation and developing
cohesive mechanisms to prevent, combat and eradicate 88 Project Masam is the largest humanitarian demining organization in the
the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, Government-held areas of Yemen. They are also analyzing the flow of
components for improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to Yemen which are
their parts and components and ammunition (firearms). included in the scope of this study.

26
 Theoretical Framework
and Methodology

It should be noted that in particular the in-person inter- Data analysis

views with Yemeni government stakeholders in practice
included additional participants but given the con- The semi-structured interviews were recorded in writing
straints of access to Yemeni institutions, it is very diffi- and the transcript were analyzed by the researcher in
cult to interview more junior Yemeni stakeholders line with established academic best practices. The
independently from their superiors. In practice, the obtained data was then triangulated with data from
interviews with Yemeni institutions therefore often were other sources, e.g., from the literature review.
“mini-group interviews”. Wherever possible, efforts were
made to ensure that information is attributed to the cor-
rect person in the records. While the researcher made
attempts to include a diverse set of stakeholders, given
the focus on Yemeni security institutions, there were
few female interview partners, as they are almost com-
pletely absent from leadership positions in Yemen.
Another significant limitation for meetings with key
stakeholders is that interviews with stakeholders based
in Houthi-held territories – which include the capital of
Sana’a and the important ports of Hodeidah and Salef
– were not possible due to security and freedom of
movement restrictions. The researcher however inter-
viewed UN staff based in Houthi-held territories both in
person in Aden and remotely.

Primary data collection instrument

(semi-structured interviews)
Given the absence of other data sources, the research
relies primarily on data collected through semi-struc-
tured interviews with key stakeholders both in Yemen
and abroad. Guiding questions were developed in prep-
aration for the field research phase and were adapted
for the specific interviews, e.g., meetings with higher-
level stakeholders (government minister) had a differ-
ent set of questions compared with those with
representatives from agencies etc. The interview part-
ners were informed that their participation in the study
and in the interview is voluntarily and that the informa-
tion obtained will only be used anonymously. The
researcher adheres strictly to the rules of confidential-
ity and anonymity. The data obtained from the inter-
views was summarized in writing after the end of the
field research phase, given the sensitive nature of the
research as well as the local conditions, it was not pos-
sible to audio/video record the interviews.

Geographic focus of the field research

The field research focused on the temporary capital of
Aden which is where most Government of Yemen
counterparts are located and also the location where a
number of relevant UN agencies have based the
“Southern” part of its operations. Remote interviews
were also conducted with key informants based out-
side of Aden.

27
 Assessment of the response to illicit weapons trafficking
in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea

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