MANU/TN/1196/2025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

W.P. No. 8215 of 2025 and W.M.P. No. 9206 of 2025
Decided On: 17.03.2025
Tamilselvi Vs. The Commissioner, Sholinghur Municipality, Ranipet and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
M. Sundar and K. Govindarajan Thilakavadi, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: B. Arvind Srevatsa assisted by A. Irfan Sherif
For Respondents/Defendant: T.K. Saravanan, Additional Government Pleader
ORDER
M. Sundar, J.
1 . When the captioned matter was listed in the Admission Board (first listing) on
10.03.2025, this Court made the following proceedings/order:

2. It is submitted by Mr. B. Arvind Srevatsa that title has been decided by R1 in

and by order dated 19.02.2025 bearing reference Na.Ka.No.2876/2024/F1
(hereinafter 'impugned order' for the sake of convenience and clarity) in
summary proceedings under proviso to Section 128(1)(b) of The Tamil Nadu
Urban Local Bodies Act, 1998 (Act 9 of 1999).
3. Issue notice to respondents.
4 . Mr. T.K. Saravanan, learned Additional Government Pleader, accepts notice
18-07-2025 (Page 1 of 10) www.manupatra.com
School of Law, CHRIST (Deemed to be University)
 for both the respondents and submits that the impugned order was assailed in
another writ petition being W.P. No.7229 of 2025 and that writ petition came to
be dismissed by this Court on 05.03.2025. Saying so, learned State counsel
sought for a short accommodation to produce a copy of the aforesaid order.
5. Request acceded to.
6. List this matter one week hence.
7. In the interregnum, let status quo as of today shall be maintained.
8 . List under the cause list caption 'NOTICE REGARDING ADMISSION' in the
Admission Board i.e. Motion List, on 17.03.2025 (Monday).
(M.S., J.) (K.G.T., J.)
10.03.2025'
2. The aforementioned proceedings/order shall now be read as integral part and parcel
of instant order. This means that the short forms, short references and abbreviations
used in our earlier proceedings/order dated 10.03.2025 shall continue to be used in the
instant order too.
3 . In the second listing (today), adverting to the aforementioned proceedings/order
dated 10.03.2025, Mr.T.K. Saravanan, learned Additional Government Pleader, placed
before us, an order dated 05.03.2025 made by this Bench in W.P. No.7229 of 2025 and
the writ miscellaneous petition thereat in N.Malliga's case (N.Malliga v. Sholingur
Municipality) and a reproduction of this order is as follows:

18-07-2025 (Page 2 of 10) www.manupatra.com

School of Law, CHRIST (Deemed to be University)
 Captioned writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner assailing a notice
dated 19.02.2025 in Na.Ka.No.2876/2024/F1 seeking a direction to forbear the
respondent from taking any action against the writ petitioner pursuant to the
above notice.
2. The contention of the writ petitioner is that she had purchased a portion of
land in S.No.645/2A by virtue of a sale deed dated 08.06.2005 from one M.J.
Sundararaj and she is in possession and enjoyment of the said land till date.
While so, on 19.02.2025, the respondent issued a notice under Section 128(1)
(b) of 'The Tamil Nadu Urban Local Bodies Act, 1998 (Act 9 of 1999)'
(hereinafter 'TNULB Act' for the sake of convenience and clarity) to one Mr.
Nagaraj, neighbour of the writ petitioner alleging encroachment in the said
land. Further contention of the writ petitioner is that the petitioner is having a
legal right over the said property and therefore, the said notice issued by the
respondent is liable to be set aside.
3. Issue notice to the respondent.
4. Mr.T.K. Saravanan, learned Additional Government Pleader accepts notice for
the respondent.
5. The impugned notice was not issued to the writ petitioner and the same was
issued only to one Mr. Nagaraj. On this short and solitary ground itself, we are
not inclined to entertain this writ petition.
Resultantly, this writ petition fails and accordingly dismissed as devoid of
merits. Consequently, the connected writ miscellaneous petition is closed.
There shall be no order as to costs.
(M.S.,J.)(K.G.T.,J.)
05.03.2025'
4. A careful perusal of the aforementioned order dated 05.03.2025 in N. Malliga's case
brings to light that the writ petition was dismissed on the short and solitary point that
the writ petitioner was not noticee qua impugned notice. This has been set out very
clearly in paragraph no.5 of N.Malliga's case.
5. In this view of the matter, Mr. B. Arvind Srevatsa, learned counsel for writ petitioner
and learned State counsel, submitted that N.Malliga's case really does not have any
impact qua captioned WP. We, therefore, revert to the case on hand.
6 . Notwithstanding very many averments, contentions and grounds in writ affidavit,
learned counsel for writ petitioner predicated his campaign against the impugned order
on the sole contention that R1 has usurped Civil Court jurisdiction and decided title in
summary proceedings which is impermissible.
7 . Learned State counsel submitted to the contrary by pitching his argument on the
point that the revenue record classification of the land that is subject matter of
impugned order i.e., land comprised in S.No.645/2A in 35, Sholinghur Village,
Sholinghur Taluk, Ranipet District (hereinafter 'said land' for the sake of convenience
and clarity) is 'road'. A scanned reproduction of copy of the relevant portion of 'A'
register and Adangal account, as placed before us, by learned State counsel is as
follows:

18-07-2025 (Page 3 of 10) www.manupatra.com

School of Law, CHRIST (Deemed to be University)
8 . In support of his contention that deciding title in summary proceedings is
impermissible, learned counsel for writ petitioner pressed into service Thummala
Krishna Rao case law [Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao and
another reported in MANU/SC/0519/1982 : 1982:INSC:37 : (1982) 2 SCC 134 decided
on 16.03.1982], Padmavati Devi case law [State of Rajasthan v. Padmavati Devi and
others reported in MANU/SC/1014/1995 : 1995 Supp (2) SCC 290 decided on
06.04.1995] and Kavasji case law [Kaikhosrou (Chick) Kavasji Framji v. Union of India
and another reported in MANU/SC/0383/2019 : 2019:INSC:378 : (2019) 20 SCC 705
decided on 15.03.2019].
18-07-2025 (Page 4 of 10) www.manupatra.com
School of Law, CHRIST (Deemed to be University)
9 . Learned counsel submitted that Thummala Krishna Rao principle has been adverted
to and applied in Padmavati Devi case and Padmavati Devi principle, has, in turn, been
applied and adverted to in Kavasji case.
10. This Court carefully considered the rival submissions and this Court comes to the
conclusion that the captioned WP deserves to be dismissed. The discussion and
dispositive reasoning is as follows:
(i). Before we embark upon the legal drill of considering the case laws pressed
into service by learned counsel for writ petitioner, we deem it appropriate to
write that as regards how case laws have to be relied on and how a citation
should be adverted to, we respectfully follow the declaration of law made by a
Hon'ble Constitution Bench in Padma Sundara Rao case [Padma Sundara Rao v.
State of Tamil Nadu reported in MANU/SC/0182/2002 : 2002:INSC:136 :
(2002) 3 SCC 533], wherein, the factual matrix is, a notification issued under
Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was assailed in Madras High Court
and the Madras High Court, relying on N.Narasimhaiah case reported in
MANU/SC/1139/1996 : 1996:INSC:82 : (1996) 3 SCC 88, held that the same
was validly issued. The matter was carried to Hon'ble Supreme Court on the
question of law as to whether, after quashing of a notification under Section 6,
a fresh period of one year is available to the State Government to issue another
notification under Section 6. It is, in this context, i.e., while deciding this legal
question, the Constitution Bench declared the law with terse eloquence as
regards how Courts should place reliance on case laws / precedents. The most
relevant paragraph is paragraph 9 and the same reads as follows:
''9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as
to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision
on which reliance is placed. There is always peril in treating the words
of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative
enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are
made in the setting of the facts of a particular case, said Lord Morris in
Herrington v. British Railways Board [MANU/UKHL/0014/1972 : (1972)
2 WLR 537 : 1972 AC 877 (HL) [Sub nom British Railways Board v.
Herrington, MANU/UKHL/0014/1972 : (1972) 1 All ER 749 (HL)]].
Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a
world of difference between conclusions in two cases.'
(underlining made by us for ease of reference)
(ii). As regards Thummala Krishna Rao case, learned counsel drew our attention
to paragraph 9 and submitted that facts which raise a bona fide dispute of title
between Government and the occupant must be adjudicated by a Civil Court.
We carefully and respectfully perused the factual matrix in Thummala Krishna
Rao case. In Thummala Krishna Rao case, three parcels of lands situate in
Habsiguda, Hyderabad East Taluk, Andhra Pradesh, constituted the subject
matter and all these three parcels of lands originally belonged to one Nawab
Zainuddin. After his demise, they devolved on Nawab Habibuddin. Thereafter,
in 1932 and 1937, all these three parcels of land were acquired by the
Government of Nizam of Hyderabad under the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act
(Act akin to Land Acquisition Act, 1894) for the benefit of Osmania University
which was then administered by a Department of the Government of
Hyderabad. Thereafter, on 13.02.1956, Osmania University filed a civil suit in
18-07-2025 (Page 5 of 10) www.manupatra.com
School of Law, CHRIST (Deemed to be University)
 O.S. No.1 of 1956 against Nawab Habibuddin in the City Civil Court, Hyderabad,
claiming that the three parcels of lands were acquired by the Government for
the benefit of University and praying for eviction from those lands. This suit
was dismissed by the Trial Court in 1959 inter alia on the ground that one of
the parcels was not acquired by the Government and the two other parcels
were, no doubt, acquired but University failed to prove its possession thereof
within twelve years before the filing of the suit. The Trial Court also returned a
finding that with regard to other two parcels, Nawab Habibuddin had
encroached upon the same in 1942 which in any event was more than twelve
years before the filing of the suit. Osmania University carried the matter to High
Court on appeal, High Court confirmed the findings of the Trial Court and to be
noted, State Government was not impleaded as a party to these proceedings.
When things stood thus, Osmania University wrote a letter (on 08.05.1964) to
the Government of Andhra Pradesh requesting it to take steps for summary
eviction of persons who were allegedly in unauthorised occupation of all three
parcels of land and the jurisdictional Tahsildar, acting under Section 7 of Land
Encroachment Act, 1905, called upon Nawab Habibuddin to vacate the lands
followed by an order of eviction. Nawab Habibuddin carried it on appeal to the
Collector (unsuccessfully) and a further appeal against decision of the Collector
was also unsuccessful (appeal dismissed by Revenue Board in 1968) and the
litigants in Thummala Krishna Rao case (respondents before the Supreme
Court) purchased the parcels of land from Nawab Habibuddin for valuable
consideration and on his demise, they were impleaded in the proceedings
before the Revenue Board. Thereafter, decision of Revenue Board also was
confirmed by the Government against which writ petitions and intra-court
appeals were preferred. It is, in this context, that High Court of Andhra Pradesh
held that summary remedy cannot be resorted to as regards complicated
questions of title and Hon'ble Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh by saying that title dispute between Government and
occupant must be adjudicated upon by ordinary Courts of law.
In Thummala Krishna Rao case, it is nobody's case that the lands that were
subject matter i.e., three parcels of lands were classified as public land i.e.,
road, as in the case on hand. There was a tussle for title and a Civil Court
decision was confirmed by the High Court and it is in this context, that
Thummala Krishna Rao case was rendered. Therefore, applying Padma Sundara
Rao principle (declaration of law as it is a Constitution Bench judgment), we
respectfully write that Thummala Krishna Rao case does not come to the aid of
the writ petitioner in the case on hand.
(iii). In Padmavati Devi case, facts make it clear that there were houses and
shops in the land in question and persons in occupation were paying rent to
State, jurisdictional Tahsildar called upon such persons to deposit rent and also
called upon the noticees to explain how they have been letting their premises
and selling pieces of land. Noticees responded to this notice stating that the
land is not a 'Sawai Chak' (Government land); they have been in possession of
the same for long and proceedings under Section 91 of the Rajasthan Land
Revenue Act, 1956 (hereinafter 'Rajasthan Act' for the sake of brevity) cannot
be initiated. Tahsildar rejected the objections making it clear that if the noticee
has got a right of any kind, she has to get her right settled in a Court of law.
Appeal against this order of Tahsildar was dismissed by the Collector. Further
appeal to the Revenue Appellate Authority resulted in setting aside of the orders
of the Tahsildar and Collector, Revenue Appellate Authority order was set aside
18-07-2025 (Page 6 of 10) www.manupatra.com
School of Law, CHRIST (Deemed to be University)
 by Board of Revenue and it was directed that noticee should be evicted from the
land forthwith under Section 91 of Rajasthan Act and it also directed that
construction made thereon be suitably dealt with. This order of the Board of
Revenue was assailed in the Rajasthan High Court by way of a writ petition, the
same was allowed and the matter was carried to Hon'ble Supreme Court and
Hon'ble Supreme Court, applying Thummala Krishna Rao principle, held that
summary remedy under the Rajasthan Act was not the kind of legal process
which is suited for an adjudication of complicated questions of title. This makes
it clear that the factual matrix in Padmavati Devi case is completely different
from the facts obtaining in the case on hand as this is not a case of lease by
State or alienation by lessee. In Padmavati Devi case, the Tahsildar himself had
called upon the noticee to approach Civil Court. Therefore, this Court has no
hesitation in respectfully applying Padma Sundara Rao case declaration of law
and as a sequitur, coming to the respectful conclusion that Padmavati Devi
principle also does not come to the aid of the writ petitioner.
(iv). The factual matrix in the case on hand is that, the subject matter is the
land comprised in Survey No. 645/2A, which, according to the revenue records,
admeasures 0.95.5 hectares equivalent to 2 acres and 35 cents classified as
'road'. One Chakravarthy Iyengar, in and by a sale deed dated 07.10.1970,
registered as document no.4027 of 1970 on the file of the jurisdictional Sub
Registrar, sold 84 cents with a recital regarding possession. This sale was in
favour of one Janakirama Naidu and after his demise, his son M.J. Sundar Raj
executed an unregistered possession deed dated 10.06.2004 in
favour of one Ashokan (husband of writ petitioner) and the local body passed a
resolution on 15.11.2002 accepting donation of a well for larger public use and
resolved that it is open to M.J. Sundar Raj to obtain patta for the remaining 35
cents of land. Neither M.J. Sundar Raj nor Ashokan obtained patta. To be noted,
said land is qua S.No.645/2A. It is clear that there is nothing regarding title of
the said land. Said land always stood classified as 'road'. Mere transfer of what
is described as 'possessory right' by a unregistered document is the stated
position of the writ petitioner. Furthermore, 'A' register clearly shows that after
M.J. Sundar Raj had patta only with regard to S.No.645/1 (Patta No. 893) to an
extent of 12.61 ares.
(v). To be noted, Section 2 of 'the Tamil Nadu Land Encroachment Act, 1905
(Tamil Nadu Act III of 1905)' (for brevity 'said 1905 Act') captioned 'Right of
property in public roads, etc., waters and lands' makes it clear that roads,
streets, lanes, paths, etc. have been declared to be a property of the
Government and sub-section (2) of Section 2 specifically declares that all public
roads and streets, vested in any local authority shall be deemed to be the
property of the Government. The entire Section 2 of the said Act reads as
follows:
'2. Right of property in public roads, etc. waters and lands --
(1) All public roads, streets, lanes and paths, the bridges, ditches,
dikes and fences, on or beside the same, the bed of the sea and of
harbours and creeks below high water mark, and of rivers, streams,
nalas, lakes and tanks, and all back waters, canals and water courses
and all standing and flowing water, and all lands, wherever situated,
save insofar as the same are the property --

18-07-2025 (Page 7 of 10) www.manupatra.com

School of Law, CHRIST (Deemed to be University)
 (a) of any zamindar, poligar, mittadar, shrotriemdar or inamdar
or any person claiming through or holding under any of them,
or
(b) of any person paying shit, kattubadi, jodi, poruppu or quit
rent to any of the aforesaid persons, or
(c) of any person holding under ryotwari tenure including that
of a janmi in the Gudalur taluk of the Nilgiris District and in the
transferred territory or in any way subject to the payment of
land revenue direct to Government, or
(d) of any other registered holder of land in proprietary right
or
(e) of any other person holding land under grant from the
Government otherwise than by way of licence, and, as to lands,
save also insofar as they are temple site or owned as house-
site or back yard, are and are hereby declared to be the
property of Government except as may be otherwise provided
by any law for the time being in force, subject always to all
rights of way and other public rights and to the natural and
easement rights of other land owners, and to all customary
rights legally subsisting.
(2) All public roads and streets vested in any local authority shall, for
the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be the property of the
Government.'
It is is nobody's case, not even that of the writ petitioner, that the said property
falls under any of the exceptions vide clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (1) of
Section 2.
(vi). As regards Kavasji case, the property that was subject matter of the case,
comprised a main bungalow, a cottage, outhouses, garages and an open plot of
land (garden) admeasuring around 1.52 acres or thereabouts. This property
was owned by two persons, viz., Burjorji Goostadji and Cooverbai Homi Karani.
Thereafter, this duo sold the property to one Sorabji, who, in turn, leased out
the property to the Government for a period of five years. Further lease was
granted and in 1939, Sorabjee applied to the Cantonment Board, Poona,
seeking permission to undertake certain building work in the suit property and
after exchange of some letters, permission was granted and on Sorabjee's
demise, his son Kavasji inherited the property. At this juncture, the
jurisdictional Collector, in and by an order dated 08.06.1943, requisitioned the
property under the Defence of India Rules, 1939, and requisitioned handing
over of the same to military authorities. Thereafter, on 23.03.1946, there was a
de- requisition but on 05.08.1948, the Collector, once again, requisitioned the
suit property but in this order, it was clearly mentioned that Kavasji is the
owner of the suit property. Kavasji filed a writ petition in Bombay High Court
seeking restoration and repossession of suit property. Bombay High Court
allowed the writ petition and directed restoration to Kavasji but the Government
of India did not vacate the suit property. Thereafter, there were further
proceedings holding that the suit property was held under old grant which
stood resumed. Kavasji assailed this, the matter was carried to Hon'ble
18-07-2025 (Page 8 of 10) www.manupatra.com
School of Law, CHRIST (Deemed to be University)
 Supreme Court after orders of Bombay High Court and in this context, Hon'ble
Supreme Court referred to Padmavati Devi principle (paragraph 48 of Kavasji)
and ultimately held that whenever questions of ownership of rights of the
parties will have to be gone into by the Court concerned, it shall be decided
strictly on pleadings. Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly held that the appellant
(Kavasji) had raised a bona fide dispute of question of ownership of the suit
property and the respondent/State did not have jurisdiction to invoke powers
under the Public Premises Act by resorting to summary procedure. The factual
matrix in the case on hand is completely different as would be evident from the
narrative of factual matrix in Kavasji case and therefore, Kavasji case also does
not come to the aid of the writ petitioner.
(vii). Reverting to the impugned order, R1 has adverted to the aforereferred
1970 sale deed as well as resolution of the local body and has found that said
land having been classified as 'road', cannot be transferred by private parties, it
is of no avail and on that basis, 'final orders' were passed within the meaning
of proviso to Section 128(1)(b) of 'the Tamil Nadu Urban Local Bodies Act (Act
9 of 1999)' (hereinafter 'TNULB Act' for the sake of convenience and clarity).
Section 128 of the TNULB Act reads as follows:
'128. Power to remove encroachment from public place. -
(1) The Commissioner may, -
(a) remove without any notice any movable temporary structure,
enclosure, stall, booth, any article whatsoever hawked, exposed or
displayed for sale or any other thing whatsoever by way of encroaching
street or public place or the [land belonging to or vested with the
municipality] with the municipal limit;
(b) remove any immovable structure whether permanent or of
temporary nature encroaching the street or public place or the [land
belonging to municipality or vested with the municipality] within the
municipal limit, after issuing a show cause notice for such removal,
returnable within a period of seven days from the date of receipt
thereof:
Provided that the Commissioner shall consider any representation
received within the time limit, before passing final orders.
(2) Whoever makes any encroachment in any land or space (not being
private property) in any public street or any [land belonging to or
vested with the municipality] within the municipal limit, shall, on
conviction, be punished with imprisonment which shall not be less than
one year but which may extend to three years and with fine which may
extend to [fifty thousand rupees]:
Provided that the Court may, for any adequate or special reasons to be
mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a
term of less than one year.'
(viii). Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that it cannot be gainsaid
that R1 has decided title qua said land. R1 has merely adverted to the revenue
records and come to the conclusion that said land was always classified as
18-07-2025 (Page 9 of 10) www.manupatra.com
School of Law, CHRIST (Deemed to be University)
 'road' and continues to remain as 'road'. It is, in this context, that R1 has held
that purported conveyance or transfer of possessory right is of no avail. This, in
the considered view of this Court, cannot be construed as deciding title. In this
regard, this Court deems it appropriate to write that any private individual or
private entity can transfer any land in favour of another private individual or
private entity by executing a document. That, by itself, will not confer any title,
much less, any right in favour of vendee. It is deemed appropriate to reiterate
that it is the stated position of the writ petitioner that patta has not been
obtained either by writ petitioner, writ petitioner's spouse or M.J. Sundar Raj
and not even Chakravarthy Iyengar, for that matter. If an order akin to the
impugned order is interfered with in writ jurisdiction on the ground that it is
usurpation of rights of a Civil Court regarding deciding title, it may lead to a
situation where no public land occupied by encroachers can be dealt with under
summary procedure under the said 1905 Act, the TNULB Act and/or any other
similar Act which provides for summary procedure. The principle that parties
should be relegated to Civil Court will apply only when a bona fide disputation
of title arises.
1 1 . Ergo, the sum sequitur is, captioned main WP is dismissed. Consequently,
captioned writ miscellaneous petition thereat also perishes with the main WP, i.e.,
captioned writ miscellaneous petition is also dismissed. There shall be no order as to
costs.
© Manupatra Information Solutions Pvt. Ltd.

18-07-2025 (Page 10 of 10) www.manupatra.com

School of Law, CHRIST (Deemed to be University)