I NFORMATI O N, ANALYSIS I NF O R MA T I O N A ND R E S E A R C H S E R V IC E S

AND ADVI C E FOR THE PARLI AMENT D E P A RT ME NT O F T HE P A R L I A ME NT A R Y L I B R AR Y

Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade

Inquiry into Australia’s Maritime Strategy

A Foundation Paper on Australia's Maritime Strategy

Alex Tewes; Laura Rayner; Kelly Kavanaugh

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This paper will be made available to other Senators and Members making a similar request to the Information and
Research Services. Advice on legislation or legal policy issues contained in this paper is provided for use in
parliamentary debate and for related parliamentary purposes. This paper is not professional legal opinion.

This paper has been designed to meet the requirements of a particular parliamentarian or parliamentarians and should
not be attributed to the Information and Research Services of the Department of the Parliamentary Library.
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Introduction ...........................................................................................................................1
Section I - Historical Summary of Australian Strategic Policy. ............................................2
Introduction – enduring themes ........................................................................................2
From the founding of the colonies to Federation ..............................................................2
From Federation to the Singapore Strategy ......................................................................3
The Singapore Strategy.....................................................................................................5
World War Two ................................................................................................................6
Post World War Two ........................................................................................................6
The era of forward defence (mid 1950s to mid 1970s) .....................................................7
Self reliance ......................................................................................................................8
The Development of an Australian Maritime Strategy..........................................................9
Defence of Australia and the emerging Maritime Strategy...............................................9
The Dibb Report – Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities ......................................9
The Defence of Australia 1987 – Self-Reliance Within an Alliance Framework ...........10
Australia’s Maritime Strategy 1987 – 1994 ....................................................................11
Defending Australia - Defence White Paper 1994..........................................................12
Defence 2000 – A Maritime Strategy at last? .................................................................13
Maritime Strategy a decade after the end of the Cold War..................................................14
The Nature of the Question.............................................................................................15
The Modern Context for Maritime Strategy ...................................................................16
Asymmetric Warfare and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) ............................17
A “small s” maritime strategy .........................................................................................19
The “Big S” Maritime Strategy.......................................................................................26
Expeditionary Strategies: The US and UK .....................................................................29
Current and Future Issues for Australia’s Maritime Strategy ..............................................31
The Role of Sea Power in a Maritime Strategy...............................................................32
The Role of Land Forces in A Maritime Strategy...........................................................34
The Role of Aerospace Power in a Maritime Strategy....................................................35
Information Capability....................................................................................................37
The Role of Defence Industry in a Maritime Strategy ....................................................39
The Move to a Mature Maritime Strategy.......................................................................39
Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................40
Issues for Consideration..................................................................................................40
Appendix 1 - Australian/NZ Strategy : A regional contrast –a view from the West Island 42
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Introduction – Similarities and differences .....................................................................42
New Zealand's defence posture.......................................................................................42
Depth versus breadth.......................................................................................................43
Maritime Strategy ...........................................................................................................44
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................45
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Introduction
If our nature is characterised by our myths and legends, then Australia is not a maritime
nation. As a people we are happy to lie at the beach and toss pebbles at the waves, or turn our
back upon it and fix our gaze on the dusty enormity of our island continent. Our myths and
legends, of both peace and war, celebrate the land and our impression upon it. We know all
about the wartime heroism of the “Rats of Tobruk” but few know of the “Scrap Iron Flotilla1”
that fiercely contested Hitler’s reach upon the Mediterranean Sea. We celebrate Gallipoli but
ignore submarine AE-2. We remember Kokoda but forget about the Leyte Gulf. This may be
partly because we never had a “Grand Fleet” that sailed off to do battle with its enemy
equivalent. In land and sea we provided components that plugged and merged into other
forces and fleets. One side effect of this approach is that we supported the strategies of others
rather than give power to our own.

The term “strategy” is derived from the ancient Greek word “strategia” meaning
“generalship”. Originally reserved for the direction of military forces, the term came to be
used more broadly through the idea of “total war” as demonstrated through WW1 and WW2.
As the term implies, in such wars the total efforts of the state, through conscription and
national mobilisation, were devoted to the defeat, not only of the adversary’s armed forces,
but of their nation as a whole. This idea of national security being limited to the concept of
military security flourished during the Cold War as the prospect of strategic nuclear war
influenced all interactions between states. Much of what has been written on maritime
strategies emerged from this era of Total War. Conflict for the unimpeded use of the world’s
oceans between the UK and Germany, and later the US and the USSR was a constant feature
of the strategic environment.

The end of the Cold War in 1991 brought about a major strategic shift to the world’s
maritime frontiers. The US Navy became the undisputed superpower and thus secured the
world’s oceans for the allies that sailed in its shadow. These changes enabled the ideas of
national security to become broader and more complex than just military security. Questions
of transnational crime, of the unregulated movement of people across borders, and of
environmental threats became recognised as valid security concerns for the nations of the
world. And as the concept of security broadened, so did too the need for security strategies
that included these broader concerns. Consequently, maritime strategy needs to consider
those non-military aspects of national power that govern and influence those broader security
concerns at sea and on the lands which the seas influence.

This document aims to put before the members of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Defence and Trade the ideas upon which maritime strategy is discussed and decided.
Readers should note that this document gives no answers but aims solely to provide the
foundations upon which meaningful questions may be asked. In Section I, the document
provides a historical summary of strategic developments in Australia up to the development
of the concept of Self Reliance. Section II covers the development of Australia’s maritime
strategy from the Dibb Report until the Defence 2000 White Paper. Section III looks at the
current situation, and focuses on the issues affecting the future development of Australia’s
Maritime Strategy. The paper includes an appendix which reviews New Zealand’s approach
to its own maritime strategy.

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Section I - Historical Summary of Australian Strategic Policy.

‘The ultimate source of strategy lies in the values of the people of a nation.’

Admiral Henry E. Eccles USN2

Introduction – enduring themes

The development of Australia's maritime strategy possibly has had more to do with its
relationships with its larger allies than as a direct response its strategic circumstances, that is,
to a greater or lesser extent, Australia has traditionally responded to its strategic
circumstances through its relationships with great and powerful friends. To a large measure
this has been an understandable and practical response. Australia's size, its isolation, sparse
population and limited financial resources have made security difficult to even contemplate
achieving alone, 'however, although reducing the feeling of vulnerability, this reliance on
allies has tended to inhibit the development of strategic independence'.3

The themes running through the history of Australia’s security policy and defence strategies
have been identified as including: ‘the evolving nature of relationships with major power
allies, the development of greater confidence in Australia’s capacity to provide for its own
security in its local region, the types of defence contingencies that have driven defence
planning, the development of Australia’s economic capacity’ which enabled it to sustain a
defence development program ‘impressive by regional standards’, and ‘the evolution of close
consultative and cooperative defence relations with most of Australia’s neighbours in
Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.’4

Australia’s relationship with its maritime environment can also be explained in terms of its
strategic culture. It has been argued that despite being ‘an island continent dependent on sea
communications and trade’, Australia is not culturally a maritime nation, rather ‘Australians
are a costal people with a continental outlook, an island-nation with an inward focus.’5 In the
twentieth century at least, this led to a division in Australian military thinking between
continentalism and navalism (ie land defence proponents struggling for supremacy over those
who argued for the greater importance of maritime defence).6

Australia’s strategic culture has also been described as idiosyncratic with seemingly
conflicting elements of ‘predilection to alliances’ juxtaposed with ‘an almost equally strong
disposition towards self-reliance’. Other enduring elements of Australia’s strategic culture
include: ‘a highly possessive approach’ to islands in the immediate neighbourhood; ‘an acute
sense of vulnerability’ in relation to the sparse population in the north and west of the
continent, manifesting as an ‘persistent anxiety about invasion’; ‘an endemic ambivalence
towards Indonesia’.7

From the founding of the colonies to Federation

It could be argued that the history of maritime strategy as it affected Australia from the
founding of the colony to the fall of Singapore, and perhaps beyond, could be summed up in
three words – ‘The Royal Navy’. While it is quite true that until the fall of Singapore
Australian maritime strategy was dictated by British and Imperial strategy and Australia's
security was dependant on the Royal Navy, there are some milestones in the slow
development of an independent Australian maritime strategy that should be acknowledged.

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It can be argued that the founding of the new colony was an expression of Great Britain's
maritime strategy, especially as a means of denying expansion to imperial rivals, such as the
French. The British Empire's control of the sea was no less important to the colonists. The
colony was not viable without outside assistance in its early years, and the survival of the
settlements depended on the safe arrival of supplies by sea.

In second half of the 19th century the self governing colonies developed an increasing
concern for the safety of their settlements. Australia's dependence on safe sea routes for trade
increased with the discovery of gold and the opening up of more country for primary
production for export. However, Australia's ability to influence events affecting its maritime
security (ie the security of its trade and passenger vessels) remained minimal in the littoral
and non-existent in blue water terms, despite colonial attempts to acquire warships and naval
forces, and despite the Queensland naval force’s expedition to acquire a colony, Papua, on
behalf of, but without reference to, the British authorities. Essentially, the maritime strategy
of the Australian self-governing colonies was to depend on the Royal Navy for protection
from a succession of possible threats from France, Germany, Russia and the United States.
This dependence came at a price in the second half of the nineteenth century when through a
series of arrangements the colonies began to subsidise the Royal Navy’s presence and
protection.

The Jervois Report of 1877 assessed that the greatest danger to Australia would be ‘small
scale naval raids’ launched from the French port of Saigon or from Russian or American
Pacific bases attacking the major Australian ports and capturing merchant trade and gold
shipments.8 During the 1870s and 1880s 'the notion of the interdependence of the empire and
the need to protect the empire's lines of communication became accepted as the basis of
imperial defence.'9 However, the colonies had a broader view of imperial security than their
focus on protection from raiders would suggest. During the late 1880s the Australian colonial
troops assisted Britain in maintaining imperial discipline in the Sudan, the Boer War and
Boxer Rebellion. Support for reliance on Britain was not universal, however, with
‘republican antecedents of the Labor Party’ arguing for ‘a more self-reliant and independent
defence posture’.10

From Federation to the Singapore Strategy

At Federation Australia's maritime defence was still subject to the 1887 Agreements
(whereby the colonies paid a subsidy towards the cost of naval defence) and dependent on the
Royal Navy, and prior to 1909 the focus of the Commonwealth's new naval forces was local
defence, eg port fortifications, with 'little consideration of "blue-water" strategy.'11 The
primary threat to Australia was still considered to be 'small scale raids by enemy cruisers,
rather than large scale invasion'.12 The naval defence of Australia was three tiered: the Royal
Navy provided an imperial squadron as the first line of defence; the second tier comprised an
auxiliary squadron of third-class vessels which had been subsidised by the colonies and were
not supposed to be used outside Australian waters; the third tier comprised the colonial fleets
used mainly for harbour protection.13 The Colonial Defence Committee considered that 'the
maintenance of British supremacy at sea is the first condition of the security of Australian
territory and trade in war..' and 'the Barton government initially lacked any firm or considered
policy on naval defence'.14

However, even if the new Commonwealth had the financial means to establish a proper navy
and develop a blue water strategy, its ability to do so would have been limited as Australian
warships were prohibited from operating outside territorial waters without being under the

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control and orders of the Royal Navy. Despite Federation, 'the Commonwealth was still not a
sovereign state and thus under international law (and in the eyes of foreign powers) her
warships were not recognised as distinctly 'Australian'.15 This situation eased after Australia
adopted the British Naval Discipline Act, but Australian warships were still restricted to the
Australia Station 'unless under the orders of a British admiral'.16

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902

In 1902 Britain made an alliance with Japan which was renewed in 1905 and 1911. Britain
wanted to contain Russian ambitions in the Far East to protect its own interests in China and
Korea. The alliance received initial popular support in Australia as being beneficial to
Australia’s security and commercial interests as it decreased the likelihood that an
expansionist Japan would threaten British or Australian interests in the Asia-Pacific.
However, Australians were very wary of Japan, and by 1905 with the rise of Japan, its defeat
of the Russian fleet, and the growth of its military capability, it was Britain's new ally in the
Pacific which was generally seen in Australia as a greater threat to the Commonwealth than
Germany, which was increasingly seen by Britain as posing the greatest threat to it. In 1908
the US, also wary of Japan’s intentions, sent its fleet on a warmly welcomed goodwill visit to
Australia to gauge Australian sentiment and military strength in advance of the possibility
that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance might see Australia and the US on opposite sides in a US-
Japanese conflict.

Imperial Defence – 'One fleet one Empire'

Under the Naval Agreement of 1903 which was strongly criticised during debates in the
Australian Parliament, the Commonwealth still had neither ownership nor control of naval
forces, despite paying an increased subsidy, albeit less than half the actual cost of the
service,17 In addition, ships on the Australia Station could be removed from Australian waters
without the approval of the Commonwealth.

Captain W.R. Creswell, appointed to the new position of Director of Naval Forces in March
1904 was a proponent of an independent Australian naval force. Creswell disagreed with the
London based Committee of Imperial Defence's theory 'that as an attack on Australia by
raiders would be met by a preponderating (sic) force sent in pursuit', there was no 'strategic
justification' for an expanded Australian navy. Creswell saw benefit in having suitable forces
on the spot. This was especially important given Australia's lack of internal communications,
as 'the sea provided the only means of communication with Western Australia and Tasmania,
and Queensland depended totally on sea transport for contact with its northern districts'.
Creswell was concerned that interstate and overseas trade valued at over 170 million pounds
had been left out of consideration in Australian defence plans and he feared that the imperial
squadron would be removed in war, 'leaving local commerce unprotected and forced to seek
refuge'18.

In 1909 during a special imperial naval conference the British Admiralty, under Admiral
Fisher suggested the creation of dominion fleet units (the fleet unit concept) based on
squadrons which would serve the Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa stations
and combine to form a Pacific Fleet. Britain could then leave the naval defence of the Pacific
almost entirely to the dominions.19 Unfortunately the Admiralty did not keep its
commitments and by 1913 the agreement had been breached. Britain had changed its
priorities and was now focussing on home waters. In the meantime, in 1911, the Permanent
Naval Forces of the Commonwealth had become the Royal Australian Navy

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In 1915 the Australian War Staff's position paper noted that in 1914 the Admiralty had
rejected the 1909 plan for a Pacific squadron. The paper expressed concern that, as the
current war was almost purely an Atlantic affair, Pacific problems would continue to be
secondary to the British authorities and Australia could not safely leave it to Britain to
establish the protective fleet necessary for Australia's defence, or even to contribute to the
bulk of it. Britain might never provide the necessary assets or might change its mind as had
happened in 1909 and 1914 and withdraw its ships 'at an awkward moment'. 20

World War One

At the outbreak of war, the Royal Australian Navy (the RAN comprised one battle cruiser,
three six inch gun cruisers, three destroyers, two submarines, and some survey, harbour and
repair ships) was put under the control of the British Admiralty under which arrangement
RAN ships saw action in Australian waters and abroad. The RAN was able to use its assets to
remove German control of New Guinea, but Australian troopships on their way to the Middle
East/Europe were protected not only by RAN and RN ships, but also by the Japanese Navy
under the Anglo Japanese Alliance of 1902.

The interwar years

Despite having secured a seat at the Peace Conference Australia was still bound to Imperial
naval strategy and, as part of the British Empire's quota to decrease its navy, the RAN had to
scuttle HMAS Australia. In this period Australia abandoned any pretence of a blue water
strategy and returned to local naval defence,21 remaining in a dependent relationship with the
Royal Navy for the inter-war period. Two reports commissioned in this period identified
Japan as the main potential threat to Australia’s security. Both saw the need for a large
British naval presence in the region and one, by General Chauvel, recognised that in the event
of an attack on Australia, Australia would have to rely on its own resources ‘for an
appreciable and anxious period.’ 22 However, in 1925 the Committee for Imperial Defence,
looking ten years ahead, dismissed any ‘aggressive action an the part of Japan’ as ‘not a
contingency to seriously to be considered.’23 Naval defence planning was difficult in pre war
years because of this uncertainty. The revoking of Britain’s ten year no-threat assessment in
1932 prompted a reassessment in Australia and recognition, by some at least, of the
possibility that Australia would have to rely solely on its own resources for its defence.24

The Singapore Strategy

The Singapore Strategy which dominated Australian defence planning in the inter-war years
had two components: the construction of a major secure naval base at Singapore and the
speedy dispatch (within six weeks, extended to 90 days by 1939)of a large Royal Navy fleet
to deter and defend British and dominion territories and interests in the Asia Pacific from
hostile forces. The strategy was a reaffirmation of the imperial defence doctrine that had
dominated the previous century – a blue-water strategy which asserted that if the Royal Navy
dominated the seas, the outlying areas of the empire would be secure against a major
invasion, with local forces dealing with local defence. 25 However, even in the same year as
the 1923 Imperial Conference, the Australian Government was being warned by General
Chauvel, the Inspector-General of Australian Military Forces, against having 'a blind faith in
the powers of the British Navy'.26 In succeeding reports Chauvel continued to warn that a
threat to Britain in Europe would delay the arrival of the promised fleet in Singapore.
However, the RAN’s arguments for a blue-water imperial defence strategy won out over the
Australian Army’s pursuit of continental defence.27

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The 1924 British announcement that it would not proceed with the Singapore strategy
(supposedly as a matter of principle not for questions of economy) prompted the Australian
Government to 'institute a long-term naval expansion program in Australia's own interests,
including the building of two cruisers to Washington Treaty limits'.28 However, Australia
continued to request and receive assurances from Britain that a fleet would be forthcoming.
Although Britain warned that it was impossible to predict what might happen, at the 1937
Imperial Conference it was still assuring Australia that the basis of its strategy was to
establish as early as possible after the outbreak of hostilities with Japan, a fleet with enough
strength to defend against, or deter, any threat to British interests in the Far East. Australia,
lacking an independent military intelligence capability, 'had little choice but to accept British
assurances'.29

However, at the same time, the British Chiefs of Staff were advising their government that
they could not foresee a time when their defences would be strong enough to defend their
territory, trade and vital interests against simultaneous threats from Germany, Italy and
Japan.30 And although Singapore was regarded as 'central to Australian and British defence
planning in the Asia-Pacific in the inter-war years’, cuts in British defence spending in the
1920s and 1930s meant that it was not until the mid 1930s that ‘serious attention was devoted
to the task of completing the base.’31

The Singapore strategy ‘at one level…rested on an element of bluff' that a naval base, as both
a symbol and a tangible indication of British determination to protect its interests, would
deter Japanese aggression. The bluff could not survive the dramatically changed strategic
circumstances of a world war, ie war against more than one aggressor and in more than one
theatre. 32

World War Two

As with WWI, the Second AIF's expeditionary role was made possible by 'the maritime
supremacy of the alliances in which Australia operated.' (ie transport of troops and equipment
and sustainment of operations) It was when this maritime supremacy was under threat, as in
1941-42, that 'Australia was most in peril.'33

The RAN's primary WWII tasks were the protection of shipping and support of land
operations, ie: supply of the besieged fortress of Tobruk and support of Australian troops in
South West Pacific Area. 'A navy created and trained in the form of the RAN was always
more about what it enabled others to do than what it appeared to achieve in its own right.'34
By late 1940 the strategic challenge for Australia was to establish exactly what British Far
East Strategy would be and how it would relate and depend on American strategy, and where
Australia's naval effort fitted in with British plans.35

Post World War Two

WWII had demonstrated the importance of sea power; the Australian 1947 five year defence
plan included provision of two light fleet carriers reflecting the Australian Navy's desire to
possess an independent regional capability and the capability to make substantial
contributions to allied operations. However, as the US and UK were so pre-eminent, ‘any
Australian attempts at ‘independence’ at sea seemed unnecessary,’ and given the limited
funds available ‘the question of relevance was an acute one’.36

The 1946 Chiefs of Staff's appreciation of Australia's strategic position argued that Australia's
defence would continue to be based on empire cooperation because 'the size of the country

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demanded more for its defence, armed forces and an industrial potential quiet beyond [its]
present capacity'.37 Thus Australia's focus remained 'the possible contribution to the global
strategies of our major allies.' The naval author Commodore Hector Donohue has remarked
that it was less than two years later that, with the recognition that the British Empire was
beginning to break up, the 'first flicker of a new theme appeared in the Chiefs' 1947
appreciation which saw the necessity for Australia to 'make greater efforts for self-
sufficiency'.38

Australia was very apprehensive that Japan would again pose a threat to its security. Despite
this Australia had again committed itself, under the empire defence regime, to supporting
Britain in the Middle East with ground forces should war break out with the Soviet Union,
with Australian naval forces remaining in the ANZAM area39 and the air force being
deployed to Malaya. It has been argued that, given the events of 1942, Australia and New
Zealand 'were less sanguine about leaving the defence [of their countries] to chance, and
sought security guarantees from the United States.'40 At a meeting between the British and
American chiefs of staff in Washington in October 1950, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff made a
secret undertaking that the US would counter seaborne threats to either Australia or New
Zealand, allowing them to plan Middle East deployments. It was fortunate for Australian
maritime strategy that during this period the greatest threat to the security of the US was
considered to be a Soviet submarine offensive in the Far East. Therefore the US recognised
the value of 'some form of cooperation with British and Commonwealth forces for the
contingent defence of the ANZAM and CINCPAC areas'.41

Indeed, the threat of the expansion of communism, with the communist victory in China and
the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 along with communist insurgency in Malaya and the
conflict in Indo China, replaced the threat of Japan in Australian strategic perceptions and
ANZUS proved flexible enough to accommodate the change. It has been argued that
Australia’s support for the US position on Korea earned the gratitude of the Truman
administration leading to the eventual tripartite alliance with the US and New Zealand.42 The
ANZUS alliance was a continuation of the tradition of collective defence practiced by
necessity by both Australia and New Zealand, and, while this policy arguably limited external
policy choices, it was relatively inexpensive and enabled government to direct resources to
economic development.43

In 1951 Australia, New Zealand and the United States also negotiated an agreement–the
Radford-Collins Agreement–to provide for the protection and control of shipping in wartime
in the ANZAM area, and regular peacetime surveillance, ie tracking potentially hostile
vessels and submarines in the areas.

The era of forward defence (mid 1950s to mid 1970s)

It has been argued that in considering the development of ‘the naval dimension of national
strategy’ in this period ‘we are to some extent talking about things that did not happen’. Apart
from its role in the defence of military shipping en route to operational areas in Southeast
Asia, and despite an era of ‘moderately high military activity…the RAN was in general
denied the opportunity to discharge any of its major functions’ as identified in a Defence
Committee minute in 1962. These were to provide an effective and sustained naval
contribution to allied forces maintaining command of the seas in our areas of strategic
interest; to contribute to and defend military shipping en route to areas of operations in
Southeast Asia; to protect within the Australia station shipping carrying essential imports and
exports; and to cooperate with sister services in the defence of Australia.44

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The US focus on the threat of expanding communism in the Asia Pacific facilitated the
development of Australia’s policy of forward defence. Forward defence had actually been the
basis of Australian defence policy since Federation, but in this instance, it referred to
Australia’s attempts to ensure that the gap between itself and the ‘southward flow of
communism’ did not narrow. To this end Australia contributed to the British Commonwealth
Strategic Reserve (Far East) (FESR) and became involved in the US-initiated Southeast Asia
Treaty Organisation (SEATO). For Australia, this was an insurance policy which, like the
later Vietnam War, was seen as the means of keeping the US interested and engaged in the
region. Underlying all this was the Australian government’s growing fear of China and
suspicions of its intentions which were seen as menacing and expansionist, despite the fact
that by 1964 China had become Australia’s fifth largest trading market.45

The British announcement in 1967 that it would withdraw half of its forces from Malaysia
and Singapore by 1971, with the rest being withdrawn by 1976, and President Nixon’s Guam
Doctrine of 1969 which required US allies to provide the main forces for their own defence,
caused Australia to reassess its forward defence policy. Without major allies actively engaged
in the region, forward defence became impractical for a defence force the size of Australia’s,
and Australia had been put on notice that a degree of self reliance was going to be necessary
in conflicts other than with the Soviet Union.

Self reliance
In 1968, following the Britain’s east of Suez announcement, the Australian Minister of
Defence argued for greater independence in defence planning. In the next few years the
Liberal Country Party government moved away from the overtly hostile view of Communist
China and the Soviet Union. The Gorton and McMahon governments began to examine
alternatives to forward defence and the Gorton government made statements ‘to the effect
that Australia faced no immediate or obvious threat’.46

In 1971 the Strategic Basis for Australian Defence paper broke free of tradition in stating ‘a
uniquely Australian strategic perspective, eschewing traditional notions of dependence on
allies and down playing Australia’s global security role.’ The 1971 paper recognised the Asia
Pacific region as of vital importance to Australia’s security. It identified the sea air gap
between Australia and Indonesia as being the most likely route of any military threat to
Australia and proposed greater emphasis on continental defence without ruling out overseas
deployments in support of regional security47

In the early 1970s the recognition that Australia could no longer rely on the military
assistance of allies forced a rethink of the threats Australia was likely to face. In a conceptual
turnaround Australia’s geography and isolation, long seen as a liability and the reasons for
the need for great and powerful friends, was now recognised as an asset, as it made Australia
a difficult target to attack. Only the two superpowers had the capability to invade Australia.
Regional nations would need to develop such capabilities over many years, giving Australia
time to expand its defences.48

The focus of Australian strategy from 1972 was the defence of Australia which ‘emphasised
the importance of the capabilities of strike and interdiction based on naval and air forces
rather than land forces.’49 The 1972 Australian Defence Review ‘proposed that the concept of
self-reliance become a ‘central feature in the future development of Australia’s defence
policy’’.50 Self-reliance did not, however, mean that Australia no longer valued its major ally

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as 'the move towards self-reliance [was] accompanied by Canberra's desire to strengthen
alliance ties with the US'51.

The Development of an Australian Maritime Strategy

Defence of Australia and the emerging Maritime Strategy
This new era in Australian defence policy, largely driven by the United States’ Guam
Doctrine and the British withdrawal from Suez was formalised in the 1976 Defence White
Paper, Australian Defence. The shift in defence policy that this represented was significant, as
for the first time in history Australia attempted to develop a uniquely Australian military
strategy that was not dependant on allies. This represented a difficult period in Australia’s
military history as previously Australia’s military strategy, doctrine, training, equipment,
command structure, and importantly culture was structured around, or dictated by our
powerful allies.52 However, with hindsight it can be seen that the 1976 White Paper was an
immature statement of Defence policy that did not adequately address the significant shift
from forward defence to defence of Australian and from coalition operations to joint
operations. The White Paper did not detail how a strategy of defence of Australia might be
achieved, it lacked force structure implications and strategic guidance, resulting in a
protracted debate between Defence planners over how to achieve a defence of Australia
policy. The lack of guidance in a period that was also marked by strategic uncertainty over
the expansion of the Soviet Union’s power within the region, resulted in a strategy of
Defence of Australia and self-reliance not being realised.53

The Dibb Report – Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities

By 1985 the protracted debate over military strategy had reached an impasse.54 As a result
the then Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley, commissioned Paul Dibb, a former member of
the Department of Defence to examine the rationale of defence forward planning and to
advise on capabilities appropriate for Australia’s defence requirements.55

The Dibb report was a detailed analysis of Australia’s

Defence strategy, it reiterated that defence of Australia was ‘Our most important
Defence’s priority task and proposed a strategy of denial, concern is to ensure
which was to be achieved through a layered defence within that an enemy would
our area of direct military interest (see figure 1).56 The direct
have substantial
area of military interest extended between 1000 and 1500
nautical miles from our and it is within this area, Dibb difficulty in crossing
argued, that Australia must be able to project independent the sea and air gap.’
and comprehensive military power in order to ensure the Dibb 1986
defence of Australia from a military attack.57 Dibb argued
that there was no apparent threat to Australia, large scale invasion was unlikely and therefore
forces should be structured around credible low level conflict scenarios such as incursions,
harassment and raids in northern Australia. The strategy of Denial was to be achieved
through a layered approach that focused on defending the Sea-Air Gap to Australia’s North,
presenting the enemy with a series of interlocking barriers to an attack on Australia. The
layers are as follows:

• the first layer included comprehensive intelligence and surveillance, giving priority to
real time surveillance out to 1500 nautical miles using over the horizon radar and long
range maritime patrol aircraft to track and detect hostile intruders in the Sea-Air Gap,
whist maintaining comprehensive intelligence about military developments in the region58

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• the second layer is comprised of capable air and naval forces, including air strike
capabilities to counter threat forces attempting to cross the Sea-Air Gap once detected
• the third layer focused on defensive capabilities closer to the shoreline to prevent the
enemy operations in Australia's focal areas or shipping lanes including mine counter
measures, air defence assets, and surface ships
• while the final layer of defence was mobile ground forces to combat a threat force if it
was successful at crossing the Sea-Air Gap, denying him access to vital assets and
population centres.

Dibb’s strategy was largely continental with force structure determined solely on the
capability to defend the Sea-Air Gap. A strategy of denial gave little emphasis to promoting
regional security, alliances and force projection in order to assist in shaping the regional and
global security environment, specifically Dibb placed less emphasis on ANZUS and the
Radford-Collins agreement than previous policies.59 Critics of the Dibb Report argued that it
was too defensive and was isolationist, specifically the report raised some concerns
internationally about Australia’s commitment to the region and its alliances.60

Direct Area
of Military Interest

Figure 1: Australia’s Regional Security Interests and Australia’s Direct Area of Military Interest

The Defence of Australia 1987 – Self-Reliance Within an Alliance Framework

The 1987 White Paper, the Defence of Australia, largely reflected the line of thought
identified in the 1976 White Paper, however it was significant as it marked the first clear
articulation of Australia’s military strategy. The Dibb report formed the basis of the White
Paper. However it overcame some of the criticism of the Dibb report by increasing the
emphasis on developing closer security ties within the region and by reiterating the
importance of alliances.61

The White Paper focused on defence of Australia, emphasising the need to defend our
northern maritime approaches through a strategy of defence in depth. This strategy was a
revamped version of Dibb’s strategy of denial with a greater emphasis on offensive strike.

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Defence in depth gave priority to operations within Australia’s direct area of military interest,
emphasising the need for:

• a comprehensive surveillance and intelligence network to target and track threats at a

distance from our shore

• capable maritime forces (air and naval) to mount air and maritime operations, including
offensive strike and interdiction missions in the Sea-Air Gap

• a comprehensive range of defensive capabilities, including air defence, mine

countermeasures and protection of coastal trade

• land forces to protect vital civil and military infrastructure and to provide a mobile
offensive capability against low level incursions from an adversary whom had crossed the
Sea-Air Gap.

Similar to the Dibb report land forces were largely confined to the Australian continent.

The 1987 White Paper shaped to a large extend the current Australian Defence Force (ADF)
force structure as it commenced the move of the Army to the North, the establishment of bare
aircraft bases and a squadron of F/A-18 aircraft in northern Australia, as well as the
establishment of a second RAN fleet base, to be located in Western Australia. Despite the
increased focus on regional security ties, compared to Dibb, force structure priorities were
still based solely on capabilities that contributed to a strategy of defence in depth.

Australia’s Maritime Strategy 1987 – 1994

The defence of Australia focus was quick to be tested after the release of the 1987 White
Paper, as changing regional and global dynamics saw Australia’s military commitments
focused far outside our area of direct military interest, emphasising that Australia’s national
interests were not confined by our geography. 62 The apparent disconnect between Australia’s
declared military strategy versus the operational reality raised questions about the
appropriateness of our force structure priorities. However in 1989 the then Foreign Affairs
and Trade Minister, Gareth Evans, stated that while the ADF was designed for a defensive
role, its capabilities ‘provide a foundation for our capacity to contribute to a positive security
environment through the exercise of what might be described as military diplomacy.’63 He
proposed that in light of fundamental changes that were taking place in the wake of the end of
the Cold War there was a need for a strategy of ‘constructive commitment’ towards the South
Pacific and that Australia would be prepared to use its military forces in the South Pacific in
‘pursuit of security interests not directly affecting the defence of Australia.’64

The end of the Cold War in 1991 led to a considerable change in the global strategic
environment. The Department of Defence however, argued that the strategic changes were of
‘little direct relevance to the formulation of Australia’s defence policy and force structure
development’65 and therefore Australia’s military strategy remained focused on sea-denial
operations in northern Australia. Leading up to the release of the 1994 White Paper it was
evident that Defence had finally recognised that the end of the Cold War had a significant
impact globally and that Australia’s military strategy needed to account for the changes in the
regional security environment that had resulted.

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Defending Australia - Defence White Paper 1994
At the tabling of the 1994 White Paper, the Minister of Defence, Robert Ray, stated that the
end of the Cold War had ‘fundamentally changed the global security environment’, that no
part of the globe was unaffected and that strategic circumstances have changed in the region
and worldwide.66 The end of the Cold War ended the threat of global war but also ended the
stability which it imposed on the Asia Pacific region. The increased economic growth within
the region was predicted to continue and with it the expansion of military capabilities. This
expansion of military capabilities within the region created a potentially destabilising effect
which resulted in Australia’s strategic environment being more demanding that before.67

Despite the significance of events in the global and regional security environment between
1987 and 1994, this change was not reflected in the White Paper as it continued to focus on
defence of Australia and operations in the Sea-Air Gap through a strategy of depth in defence
which was similar to the 1987 strategy of defence in depth. The 1994 White Paper gave
increasing priority to regional engagement but placed less emphasis on ties with the US
compared to previous White Papers. Despite the slight shift in emphasis to regional
engagement, defence of Australia still was given primacy and force structure determinants
were solely based on defence of Australia roles.

Australia’s Strategic Policy 1997

In 1996 the new Liberal National Coalition Government were faced with growing tensions
between the need for self-reliance and regional engagement. The release of the Australia’s
Strategic Policy (ASP97) in 1997 saw Australia’s strategic interests broadened from previous
policies to encompass the Asia-Pacific region 68 and it also saw a return in emphasis on the
US alliance.

Defence of Australia was renamed Defeating Attacks on Australia and remained the ADF’s
priority task, however ASP97 argued that ‘we need to recognise that regional conflicts–which
may well relate directly to our security, or at least have a knock-on effect–are more likely
than direct attacks on Australia.’69 ASP97 recognised the importance of regional security on a
defence of Australia policy, gave more emphasis to Australian operations within the region
and to contributing to peace operations. ASP97 concluded that because of Australia’s unique
geography, a maritime rather than a continental strategy is best suited to our geo-strategic
situation. However the declared maritime strategy did not represent a significant shift in focus
from previous White Papers as force structure was still centred on defeating aggressors in our
maritime approaches though capable intelligence, surveillance, command and control, air
superiority, maritime interdiction and strike. However, ASP97 did recognise that greater
consideration needs to be given to the capabilities needed to defend our regional interests and
that it cannot be assumed that forces developed for defence of Australia would be adequate
for defending Australia’s regional interests.

ASP97 represented a shift towards a maritime strategy. However defence of the Sea-Air Gap
is only one element of classic maritime strategy, the strategy of sea denial, which seeks to
deny an adversary freedom to operate within the Sea-Air Gap, but not assuring freedom of
action for your own forces.70 ASP97 could be best described as continental strategy, however
it is primarily navalist in orientation, albeit with a significant air component.71

Michael Evans, Head of the Land Warfare Studies Centre, has made the observation that
ASP97 ‘upholds the narrow primacy of defending the Sea-Air Gap between Australia and the

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northern archipelagos rather than the sea-land-air gap that reflects the reality of littoral
battlespace.’72 Evans also emphasises that a credible maritime strategy needs to take account
of the requirement for land forces to secure forward operating bases for sea and air assets,
emphasising the need for force projection capabilities and amphibious operations.73

Defence 2000 – A Maritime Strategy at last?

In June 2000 the Government released Defence Review 2000: Our Future Defence Force – A
Public Discussion Paper, which sought input from the public on national security issues to
inform the White Paper. The discussion paper came at a time when Australia was at a level of
operation commitment not experienced since the Vietnam War and the paper sought to gain
public support for an increase in defence funding as Defence faced the prospect of block
obsolescence.74

The Prime Minister, John Howard, presented Defence 2000 as ‘the most comprehensive
reappraisal of Australian defence capability for decades.’75 The significance of the White
Paper, however, is possibly more along the lines of–as described by Dibb–an ‘evolutionary
rather that a revolutionary’ change.76 It was evolutionary in that it further matured the
concept of defence of Australia and marked a shift towards the development of a maritime
strategy, however it was not a significant change from previous defence policies.

Defence 2000 continued along the same lines as ASP97 emphasising that ‘the key to
defending Australia is to control the air and sea approaches to our continent, so as to deny
them to hostile ships and aircraft, and provide maximum freedom of action for our forces’
and concluding that this requires a fundamentally maritime strategy.77 Defence 2000
however, was the first White Paper to recognise that controlling our sea and air approaches
was a joint operation and that maritime forces included all three services. Compared to
previous policies, the White Paper clearly recognised the role of maritime forces in maritime
security of the wider region, the protection of Australian ports from sea mines, support of
civil law enforcement and coastal surveillance operations. However Australia’s maritime
strategy was then narrowly described as a strategy of sea denial across the Sea-Air Gap and
hence only represents a small tenet of a true maritime strategy.

The shift to a more considered joint maritime strategy was evident as the White Paper
highlighted that land forces had a ‘vital and central’ role in a maritime strategy.78 Despite this
welcomed statement, the White Paper then described role of land forces primarily in the same
vain as Dibb: defending vital assets and conducting offensive operations against threat forces
that land on Australian territory. It can be argued, however, that while Defence has
considerably matured in its ability to conduct joint operations, the declaratory policy of
defence of Australia lacks detailed consideration of joint operations, which is essential for
medium powers to be truly effective and for the development of a mature maritime strategy.
The White Paper highlights the requirement for maritime forces to achieve sea control stating
that ‘the ability to operate freely in our surrounding oceans, and deny them to others is
critical to the defence of Australia, and to our capacity to contribute effectively to the security
of our immediate neighbourhood.’ However the ADF’s ability to achieve sea control in the
Sea-Air Gap–which implies denying freedom of action to the enemy while maintaining your
own freedom of action–except in confined areas for short periods of time, is questionable
given the current and planned force structure. In particular the limited air defence
capabilities of our surface ships until the air warfare capable ships come into service would
mean that the ADF is reliant on land based aircraft for air defence which characteristically
lack permanence and to some extent reach even with air-to-air refuelling.

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The White Paper emphasised that the ADF may be deployed
on operations within the region and beyond and importantly We are only at the
that operations in the region will be considered in force beginning of
structure development, however defence of Australia still fundamental
has primacy. The White Paper details a need for a high level changes that will be
of preparedness to respond to short notice crises in the required in the early
region giving priority for the Army to sustain a brigade
deployed on operations for extended periods whilst
twenty-first century’
maintaining a battalion group available for deployment to move towards a
elsewhere. East Timor highlighted the importance of air and truly joint maritime
sea lift which was reflected in the White Paper. However, concept of strategy.
importantly, the White Paper only plans to upgrade and Evans, M, Towards and
replace the current amphibious lift capabilities,79 not to Australian Way of
increase the capability of these platforms, highlighting that
there is no priority to structure the ADF for expeditionary
Warfare, Quadrant, July
operations in any level of conflict that may involve an – August, 2002, p. 14.
opposed landing. This means that, primarily, they will be
used for sea transport rather than force projection.

Maritime Strategy a decade after the end of the Cold War

In 1815, the world changed in ways similar to the end of the Cold War in 1991. Napoleon was
defeated and France rendered prostrate before British power. The end of the Napoleonic Wars
shattered the basis for Britain’s military strategy and made obsolete the roles, tasks and intimate
knowledge that generations of naval officers had developed in response to Napoleonic
expansionism. As a result, the British maritime strategy of confining French freedom of action
by close blockade of the French ports became obsolete. This strategic discontinuity was so total
that it took the British almost a century to come to terms with the new circumstances80.

We are currently in the aftermath of a change of similar scope to that of 1815. However, the
evidence suggests that many commentators have failed to grasp what the new environment
means, and thus cling to anachronistic ideas about the utility and power of conventional thinking
about sea power and maritime strategy.

Western military thinking on expeditionary warfare and power projection has undergone
significant changes since the end of the Cold War. This has been precipitated by the new
strategic realities and by the changes in military doctrine, organisation and equipment that
together come under the title of the Revolution in Military Affairs81. The result has been a
growing difference between the US approach, and that of other Western middle powers. This
dichotomy is evident in the different strands of Western thinking regarding expeditionary
warfare and power projection.

Since the end of the Cold War, the US has assumed the ability to exert its power globally and
unhindered by any real competition. It does not have to fight for the strategic space to reach
across the world’s oceans. It just assumes that capacity and focuses instead in the application of
national power from the sea to influence events ashore in the littoral regions of the world across
the operational spectrum of peace, crisis, and war82.

This assumed capability means that the US is therefore able to use the sea to wield power over
land. This is reflected in its 1994 Maritime Doctrine White Paper “Forward … From the Sea”83.
This paper outlines a concept for the use of maritime expeditionary forces to project the power

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and influence of the US to foreign waters and shores in both peace and war. The document notes
that the country’s economic, political and military interests are truly global in nature and scope.
This will be discussed in more detail further in this document. To promote and protect those
interests the US requires military forces able to operate globally across the full spectrum of
conflict, from peacetime, through crisis intervention, through to regional wars and beyond. The
US approach in this regard will be explored in a later section of this document.

The assumption of command of the seas that is inherent in the current US maritime strategy also
applies to other Western middle powers84 if operating in concert with the US, (but not if using
maritime capacity to achieve their own strategic ends). The distinguished naval author Rear
Admiral J. R. Hill makes the point that as medium powers existing in the shadows of greater
powers (such as the US) the chief distinguishing characteristic of their middle power status is
autonomy85. In other words, medium powers such as Australia are defined as such by their
capacity to create and keep under national control enough means of power to initiate and sustain
coercive actions (upon both sea and land) whose outcome will be the preservation of their vital
interests. Consequently, their maritime strategy must bring together the elements of such power
in such a way to maintain their ability to use the sea to achieve their national interests. It should
be noted that the term “means of power” refers to the full spectrum of national power, though
military power is their ultimate guarantor.

The Nature of the Question

A fundamental question in any discussion of maritime strategy is whether the topic is
considered as a subset of a broader national military strategy (shown below as a “small s”
maritime strategy), or whether the discussion is one of the bias within a national security
strategy (a “big S” maritime strategy). In the former case, the question is one strictly of the
application of military power across a narrow range of security sectors. In the latter case, the
term encompasses a national approach to its security that is either continentalist or maritime-
focussed and considers responsibilities, not only for military forces, across a wide spectrum
of security sectors. It is likely that the Committee will receive submissions framed from
either of the two approaches
D efin ition ?

a m aritim e s trateg y TH E M A R ITIM E S TR A TE G Y

D ip lom atic C on s tab u lary W arfig h tin g G lob al/R eg ion al R eac h

P ow er P rojec tion A sh ore

D eterren c e S overeig n ty C om m an d of th e S ea
S ea C on trol/S L O C

C oercion N atu ral R es ou rc es S ea C on trol B road S ec u rity

S ed u ction G ood O rd er at S ea S ea D en ial E n viron m en tal

S ea L in es of C om m u n ic ation E con om ic
(S L O C )

P ow er P rojec tion A s h ore P olitic al

S oc ietal

M ilitary

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Figure 2: The Nature of the Question
The Modern Context for Maritime Strategy

As noted above, the end of the Cold War gave to the US and its allies an almost
unprecedented87 ability to use the oceans without serious challenge. Consequently, the focus
of maritime strategies moved away from overcoming such challenges towards the manner in
which this new freedom could be exercised to apply power to areas of interest on the world’s
coastlines and inland. These areas are known as the littoral.

The Littoral in Modern Warfare (Projecting power ashore in a complex environment).

The littoral is defined as the areas to seaward of the coast which is susceptible to influence or
support from the land and the areas inland from the coast which are susceptible to influence
from the sea88. At the turn of the 21st Century, the littoral accommodates over three quarters
of the world’s population, hosts over 80% of the world’s capital cities and nearly all of the
marketplaces for international trade. With the end of the Cold War, the littoral’s aggregation
of trade and people make it the most likely arena for important conflicts. Such conflict is
likely to challenge not just regional military security, but all other sectors. That is, such
conflict will have implications for political, environmental, societal, and economic security.

For the US, the expected “chaos in the littorals89” is seen as

requiring the ability to project military power ashore against For a medium power,
all forms of obstacles, ranging from devastated infrastructure maritime strategy in the
to disaster relief and the full spectrum of armed threats. This littoral is not just about
may mean non-state actors such as terrorists, inimical the military
regional power, or a newly emerged rival super-power.

For medium powers, the challenges presented by the littoral are made more complex by the
lower level of resources that can be applied to the issue. Australia is a good example as our
littoral concerns include enforcement of sanctions in the Persian Gulf, protection of fisheries in
the Southern Ocean, criminal activity across the Torres Strait and enforcement of migration
legislation across the northern edges of our continent.

National Power
National security is no longer merely military security. Similarly, national power is not
merely military power but the sum total of a nation’s efforts to achieve its goals. It is both
directed (such as through its government domestic policies, foreign relations, and military
capabilities) and emergent (such as its international reputation, image, attractiveness and
success in economic, sporting, scientific and artistic
domains). Government policy may directly affect some
As national power is
elements of national power but affect others only harnessed through a broad
indirectly. For example, a nation’s foreign and security national security policy to
policies may address the challenges of the unregulated achieve the vital national
flow of people across borders, whilst a culture of self interests, so must all
reliance and environmental consciousness may address elements of the nation’s
challenges across the economic and environmental
sectors of national security. National power is
maritime power be harnessed
translated into national security when it addresses through a broad maritime
strategy to achieve its vital
national interests in the seas
and its environs.
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successfully the challenges facing the country across the various security sectors.

The corollary of the above is that military power (and military strategy) should have a role to
play across all security sectors. This is not a new idea for this committee. In its own words:

Government [must] develop and maintain a national security policy. This policy
should, amongst other things, guide the Defence Forces on their role in an
integrated national concept for promoting and achieving international prosperity,
peace, and security90.

As national power is harnessed through a broad national security policy to achieve the vital
national interests, so must all elements of the nation’s maritime power be harnessed through a
broad maritime strategy to achieve its vital national interests in the seas and its environs.
Asymmetric Warfare and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)

In military and national security terms, Asymmetric Warfare can be defined as:
Acting, organizing and thinking differently from opponents to maximize
relative strengths, exploit opponents' weaknesses or gain greater freedom of
action 91

Naval history abounds with examples of asymmetric strategies, such as:

• During WW2 the Germans attempted to use submarine warfare to counterbalance the British
advantage in capital ships;

• If the Cold War spilled over into military conflict, the Soviet Navy intended to use massive
salvoes of missiles and decoys to overcome the defences of US carrier battle groups; and

• Today, illegal fishing vessels in the Southern Ocean use their numbers to frustrate the efforts
of national patrol vessels.

Our small population, our western culture and predilection for high-technology solutions limit
Australia’s strategic options. Asymmetric responses to our strategies may include anti-access
strategies92, dispersed approaches that stress our numerically inferior forces, and protracted
tensions that consume scarce resources in ongoing operations.

A key concept that has pervaded Western military debate over the past decade is that of a
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). At its heart, the concept articulates a belief that
innovations in information sciences and related computing advances have created a
discontinuous shift in the level of knowledge and precision that can be applied to the battlespace.
Changes created by the RMA extend to military doctrine, organisation and equipment. Whilst
evolution in military hardware such as Global Hawk is the most visible example of these
changes, evolution in doctrine and organisation may have the more reaching of impacts.

In the maritime sphere the impact of the RMA is already apparent in terms of broad area
surveillance and similar tasks. Over the next decades the cumulative effect of stresses associated
with the RMA are expected to reduce the flexibility of maritime forces by making them easier to
find and hit. Other changes only now being presaged relate to the application of the same
technologies that make uninhabited air vehicles (UAV) like the Global Hawk possible, in
maritime applications. This could result in a significant reduction in the number of people

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engaged in maritime activities in both peace and war and bring significant benefits to an
environment that is both stressful and intensely dangerous.

Maritime Strategy after 9/11

The terrorist attacks upon the US on 11 September 2001 have been claimed by various
commentators93 as a trigger for a reassessment of the nation’s security strategies. The argument
for this is that it highlighted the capacity of non-state actors to inflict damages on a nation-state
which previously could only be inflicted by another nation-state. So, if a non-state actor can
inflict such damage, then they need to be considered alongside nation-states in considerations of
national security and strategy.

It must be said that terrorists have long held the potential for catastrophic strikes, but until the
end of the Cold War such actions would likely have been perceived through the ideological
prism of East-West conflict. In the past decade, the global security agenda has been
extraordinarily fluid, and thus open to influence by non-state actors using terrorism as a political
tool. Many writers94 warned of the dangers that non-state actors posed, but they were largely
dismissed in favour of the more traditional preoccupations with regional states and their capacity
for traditional warfare. In other words, nothing changed for national security and maritime
strategy in 2001. The changes took place in 1991 but we failed to give them due regard.

"Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose." (The more things change, the more they stay the same).
Whilst significant, the changes in the strategic environment that were brought sharply into focus
by the events of 9/11 did not invalidate the continuing requirements for a comprehensive
maritime strategy that addresses both the new security concerns and the old defence concerns.
The sections below outline the two conceptual approaches to a maritime strategy in terms of
concepts, roles and responsibilities.

A “small s” maritime strategy

In this version, maritime strategy is a subset of a broader military strategy aimed at meeting
the requirements of a government’s security policy. The current policy was outlined as a
listing of strategic interests in the Defence 2000 White Paper. In order of priority, these
enduring strategic interests are95:

• ensure the Defence of Australia and its direct approaches

• foster the security of our immediate neighbourhood

• support strategic stability in the wider Asia-Pacific region, and

• support Global Security.

These strategic interests are to be achieved through an Australian Military Strategy. The aim
of this strategy is to shape the strategic environment, conduct military support operations, and
provide combat ready forces to accomplish five major strategic tasks. These tasks are96:

• defeat of attacks on Australia (DAA)

• defence of Regional Interests (DRI)

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• defence of Global Interests (DGI)

• protection of National Interests (PNI), and

• shaping the Strategic Environment (SSE).

It is worth making two points about the above. First, the maritime component of DAA is one
of the denial of the Sea-Air Gap to our north to any potential aggressor wishing to launch
attacks upon our soil. This is a very limited aim and will be discussed further below when
addressing the difference between sea control and sea denial.

Second, the order of these strategic tasks also reflects their importance as a basis for
acquiring new equipment, or force-structure development. Until recently, only DAA was a
valid force-structure determinant. Since the attacks on 9/11 this has been relaxed somewhat
but it is still the case that most acquisitions are justified on their contribution to the DAA
task. The danger with this approach is that, because military capabilities in the region are low,
there is little pressure to develop capabilities that can operate successfully in high-threat
environments. This constrains government options in terms of what capabilities it can
contribute go coalitions operating in high-threat environments such as the Persian Gulf.

A “small s” maritime strategy contributes to the achievement of the strategic tasks outlined
above in three major ways. These are through military diplomacy, through constabulary tasks
in the enforcement of national sovereignty, and through combat operations. These three roles
are addressed in more detail below.

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Diplomatic
A Man-o-War makes the best ambassador

Oliver Cromwell

Maritime forces are visible, mobile, and potent symbols of the nation-state97 and as such are
useful instruments of foreign policy. This role can be as part of the shaping of the strategic
environment through their sheer presence and port visits, or as more direct enforcers of
national power in the defence of regional or global interests.

Deterrence
In its simplest form, deterrence means discouraging the enemy from taking military action by
posing for him a prospect of cost and risk outweighing his prospective gain98. Deterrence is
an exercise of national power which, like coercion or seduction, uses elements of national
power, more likely the military, to
prevent an adversary from
undertaking a course of action that “Another military blinding glimpse of the
the nation regards as undesirable, obvious is the utility of sea power in the
by threatening to inflict East Timor operation. The persuasive,
unacceptable costs upon the intimidatory or deterrent nature of major
adversary in the event that the warships was not to me as the combined
action is taken99. Deterrence joint force commander an incidental, nice
strategies may be divided into two
sets. The first relies on denial; to have ‘add on’ but an important
conventional land, sea and air indicator of national and international
forces deter by their effect on the resolve and most reassuring to all of us
aggressor’s estimate of the who relied on sea lifelines”
probability of gaining their Major General Peter Cosgrove AC MC
objective. The second relies on the
potential for punishment and the
associated costs to the aggressor100.

The effectiveness of deterrence can rely either on denial capabilities, typically conventional
land, naval and air forces, which deter by their effect on the aggressors estimate of the
probability of gaining his objective; or on “punishment” capabilities which deter by acting on
the aggressor’s estimate of possible costs101. During the Cold War, the effect of both tactical
and strategic nuclear weapons relied on this latter aspect of deterrence. In an Australian
context, the speed, range and payload of the F-111 fulfilled this same role within the region.

The deterrent aspect of maritime strategy is based on three related ideas. These are reach,
presence, and power. In other words, the ability to carry out and sustain operations in the area
of interest which may be a significant distance away from Australia to reassure allies or deter
adversaries, the recognised capacity to inflict damage on an opponent, and finally the ability
to graduate the response as circumstances evolve. In other words, maritime strategy sets the
parameters within which maritime forces can deter an adversary by demonstrating sufficient
power to deny him his objective, or by sustaining operations from where punishment can be
inflicted upon him. Of course, this capacity is dependent on the specific capabilities of the
maritime forces available.

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Deterrence is central to maritime strategy because of the capacity of maritime forces to
influence events on land, both upon one’s homeland, but also on the homeland of a potential
aggressor. Furthermore, the level of deterrence, particularly through punishment, can be
adjusted with exquisite precision. The noted American author Norman Friedman notes that
maritime forces can project force to influence events on land in four main ways:

• Control of offshore shipping through embargo. As have been imposed upon Iraq for the past
decade. Australian maritime forces have been continuing participants in those operations.

• Punishment through discrete strikes upon particular targets ashore. For example the air
attacks on Tripoli in 1986 and against a terrorist camp in Afghanistan in 1998.

• Sustained air attacks in support of other operations, such as was the case in the Persian Gulf
in 1991.

• Actual or threatened landing of ground forces. This can be in the form of raids as are
conducted by the Commando Regiment, or in amphibious operations as was the case in
Normandy and the Pacific in WW2, and as was threatened during the 1991 Gulf War. In
Australia’s case this includes our experiences in New Guinea in 1942.

An appropriate balance of capability and strategy enables the use of maritime forces in the
deterrent role to either dissuade a potential aggressor (eg Iraq) or to modify their behaviour
through the graduated and flexible application of force to their homelands. However, such
maritime strategy can only succeed if the maritime forces giving it effect enjoy appropriate
reach, power, and presence.

Unfortunately, there is no way of determining a priori if inaction on the part of the adversary
is due to our successful efforts at deterrence (with all its attendant costs in terms of equipment
and manpower) or is due to an absence of hostile intent on the part of our putative adversary.
This uncertainty helps to explain why critics argue that deterrence institutionalises worst-case
thinking about the adversary’s intentions and ignores all other constraints upon their decision
making, which may be so compelling that they render deterrence superfluous102.

Coercion
Coercion can be defined as the open application of power where one party secures another’s
compliance by a threat of sanctions103. Maybe the clearest example of the role of coercion as
part of a maritime strategy involved the American naval squadron under the command of
Commodore Perry, who On July 8, 1853, anchored his four ships, including the powerful
steam frigates MISSISSIPPI and SUSQUEHANNA, in lower Tokyo (then Edo) Bay. The
Japanese ordered him to go to Nagasaki, the only port open to foreigners, but Perry firmly
declined. He presented his papers to the Japanese emperor, requesting protection for
shipwrecked American seamen, the right to buy coal, and the opening of one or more ports to
trade. The expedition then retired to the China coast. He returned in February 1854 with a
larger fleet at which time a treaty was concluded that acceded to American requests, opening
the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate to U.S. trade104.

It should be noted that to be effective as a strategic tool, coercion has to be believable. This
requires not just actual or perceived military capability, but also the belief that the
government will use its power if compliance with its wishes is not forthcoming. Therefore,
coercion is not only a military strategic, but a national strategic issue.

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Seduction
Seduction can be seen as the flip-side of coercion. In this case one party secures the
compliance of another because of the expected benefits that the second party expects to
receive. This can be preferential access to technology, security guarantees or other strategic
benefits. Examples of such power relationships may include alliances between partners of
different strategic standing, such as ANZUS or the US-Japan alliance105. In this latter case,
the security guarantees contained in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security ensure
Japan’s compliance with the US desire to curb nuclear proliferation in the Asia Pacific
region.

Constabulary
The extension of sovereign rights associated with the Law of the Sea Convention106 have
greatly complicated the responsibilities of governments. In Australia’s case, the declaration
of a 200 nautical miles (nm) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in 1994 brought with it the
responsibility to watch over and manage an area of 8,148,250 sq. km. This area is larger than
the sum total of the land area of Australia. Keeping in mind the number of vessels patrolling
that huge area, it is the same as if there were only some fifty police cars in the whole of
Australia.

Sovereignty
In its simplest definition, sovereignty means self-government. It is a claim by the state to
supreme authority both within its territory and over its citizens107. However, the concept itself
is not uncontested due to the leaching away of classical sovereignty from the nation state
upwards into supra-national bodies, and downwards into regional or provincial jurisdictions.
Similarly, questions remain as to whether sovereignty is an inherent right, or concept that
exists only when exercised. Under this latter reading it behoves a nation state to maintain
forces capable of exercising its sovereignty to the full extent of its claimed borders.

Under the Law of the Sea Convention, Australia has claimed a territorial sea over which it
claims full sovereignty out to 12 nautical miles from its coasts108. Beyond that, Australia
claims a Contiguous Zone out to 24 nautical miles over which it enforces customs, fiscal,
immigration and sanitary laws109. One of the requirements of a maritime strategy with respect
to sovereignty would then be the ability to exercise such sovereignty throughout the nations
territorial sea and contiguous zone.

Natural Resources
The Law of the Sea Convention also gave effect to a system of EEZ under which nation
states have sovereign rights over natural resources out to 200 nm from its coasts (but not
sovereignty). Australia claimed such rights in 1994 under the Maritime Legislation
Amendment Act 1994. The convention also allows states to claim sovereign rights over
seabed resources where the continental shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles.

The actual definition of this extended continental shelf is a geological problem, and
information to support it must be submitted to the UN Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf by 2004. In Australia’s case there are a number of areas that extend
significant distances beyond the limits of the EEZ and this will extend further the

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requirements of our maritime patrol capabilities to enforce Australian jurisdiction over the
resources found in such areas.

Good Order at Sea

As stated above, Australian sovereignty extends out to 12 nm from the coastline whilst laws
governing customs, immigration, fiscal, and sanitary matters extend out to 24 nm. However,
Australian jurisdiction also extends to vessels of Australian nationality or registry (known as
Flag State jurisdiction) wherever they may be. Furthermore, some offences such as piracy are
subject to universal jurisdiction when they occur on the high seas.

If we accept that sovereignty only exists when enforced, then also sovereign rights exist only
when enforced. The legal regime delineated by the Law of the Sea Convention therefore
creates certain expectations that states which take advantage of the provisions contained in
the convention will also ensure that its provisions are adhered to.

Warfighting
Despite the central place that warfighting has had in the development of maritime affairs ,
there was until the nineteenth century a dearth of writing on the subject. This was of course
due to several factors, not the least that such things were not necessary as they were all
perfectly obvious. During the battle of Camperdown in 1797 one of Admiral Duncan’s
commanders was so bewildered by the stream of signals made to him by his admiral that he
swore soundly, threw the signals book to the deck in disgust and simply ordered his
Quartermaster to steer into the middle of the enemy’s fleet. This was exactly what was
needed, and required no strategic or doctrinal guidance. It just required a professional officer
with a good measure of commonsense to see what needed to be done110.

This belief in the “school of experience” as the best source on maritime strategic affairs
changed in 1890 with the publication of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan’s book “The
Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783”. The book became immensely popular and
remains in print to this day. Both Mahan and later writers such as Sir Julian Corbett111 wrote
in time when various nations could and did contest for supremacy on the world’s oceans.
Consequently, both writers placed emphasis on the requirement to wrest either command or
control of the sea from adversaries. Where these two writers differed was that Mahan
advocated naval supremacy as an enabling end in itself, whereas Corbett saw maritime
strategy as merely one component of an overall national strategy aimed at the pursuit of
national political goals. Despite the differing viewpoints, their ideas are not mutually
exclusive, and are detailed further below.

Command of the Sea

This has been defined as the possession of such a degree of superiority that one’s own
operations are unchallenged by an adversary, while the latter is incapable of using the sea to
any degree112. This is an unqualified concept, achievable only through the destruction or
neutralisation of the adversary’s fleet. The end of the Cold War brought the US to this
position without having to face what Mahan called the “decisive battle”. This unchallenged
supremacy on the world’s oceans have allowed the US and its allies to concentrate its focus
on the projection of power ashore.

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Sea Control
Julian Corbett understood that it was not command of the oceans that mattered, but the ability
to use them. Consequently, he distilled the idea of command of the sea to a much more
limited concept, that of sea control which entails the ability to use an area of ocean for one’s
purposes. This control is often limited in both time and space. This task is sometimes
achievable by the maritime forces of a medium power. The duration and extent of such sea
control is a function of the resources available to enforce it, and the requirements of the task
to be performed.

It should be noted that sea control is an active role, requiring the elements of presence, reach
and power which characterise maritime forces. Furthermore, sea control is not merely an idea
exercised in wartime. Current examples of sea control include the RAN’s operations in the
Persian Gulf, and Operation RELEX. In this latter example, maritime patrol aircraft, surface
combatants and minor war vessels combined to exercise sea control over an area of ocean to
the north of Australia to deal with the unregulated movement of people towards Australia.

Sea Denial
This can be defined simply as the ability to prevent an adversary from making use of a
particular area of the world’s oceans. It can take many forms ranging from blockade to the
submarine and air operations by the Argentine military in the 1982 Falklands War.

In Australia’s case, recent Defence White Papers have pursued a strategy of denial of the Sea-
Air Gap to our north as the primary focus of our defence effort. Such denial strategies can be
pursued through the combination of effective surveillance and strike capabilities, ie to find
and destroy any putative adversary before it reaches our shores. As can be seen in Operation
RELEX, ongoing sea control operations are demanding of both people and platforms113. Sea
denial in the littoral environment can be pursued over wide areas on an ongoing basis with
much lower resource implications.

Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC)

It was Julian Corbett who pointed out that maritime conflict was about control of
communications114. The protection of the “Sea Lines of Communications” (SLOC) is, in fact,
a misnomer as there are no physical highways or lines to protect; what matter are the ships
that use various routes. In the protection of our national interests, the protection of SLOC
takes on a particular importance for two main reasons. First that the majority of our sea-borne
traffic passes through numerous straits and other chokepoints as they move to and from our
trading partners in Asia. Second, that shipping in the Indian and Pacific Oceans can be
identified from some distance away as being bound only for Australia or New Zealand. The
protection of such SLOC is not only a wartime role. Piracy and the danger of terrorist action
post 9/11 have increased the security requirements for vessels whose cargo is seen as
environmentally sensitive, attractive, or strategically-significant. Maritime strategy needs to
consider the role of maritime forces in the protection of SLOC in other than wartime tasking.

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Figure 3: Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) in Australia’s immediate maritime environment. (Source:
Australian Maritime Safety Authority)

Power Projection Ashore

With the end of the Cold War, it has become the orthodoxy that the purpose of maritime
power is to directly influence events on land, after all, that is where people live. The reach,
poise, and flexibility of maritime forces enable them to strike at the land from unexpected
and/or advantageous directions, making them, in the words of Liddell-Hart “the greatest
strategic asset that a maritime nation can possess”. However, in the 1970s serious doubts
emerged about the effectiveness of contested amphibious operations in high threat scenarios.
Such doubts were heightened by the casualty rates during the 1975 Mayaguez imbroglio115.

No significant amphibious operations have taken place since then116, but significant doctrinal
advances have taken place, such as the US Marine Corps “Operational Manoeuvre from the
Sea” concept which focuses on the ability to move directly from the ship to the objective on
land by taking advantage of high-speed capabilities such as the Advanced Amphibious
Assault Vehicle (AAAV) and the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor. Such capabilities allow the US to

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maintain the capacity to perform forcible entry operations in high threat environments.
Australia is not capable of performing such operations, and its much more modest doctrinal
approach is encapsulated in the Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment (MOLE)
Concept document117. Nevertheless, the capacity to influence events in land in areas such as
the South Pacific, as well as maintaining the capability to, for example, evacuate Australian
civilians from a conflict situation, are important parts of Australia’s maritime strategy.

The “Big S” Maritime Strategy

This reading eschews the narrow definition of security as strictly military security and thus
opens the door to an integrated security strategy able to bring together relevant elements of
national power across all aspects (or sectors) of security.

Several naval strategic concepts, such as power projection and sea control are similar under
both readings and will not be discussed further.

Broad Security
A shift occurred in Western strategic thinking at the end of the Cold War in 1991. From the
advent of total war, and during the decades when strategic nuclear war was a probability, all
aspects of security were subjugated to the idea of military security. With the threat of
strategic nuclear war extinguished118, national security was properly recognised as being
broader than just military security, and that it also encompasses economic, environmental,
societal, and political security119. Whether it is unregulated movement of peoples,
transnational crime, or unlawful exploitation of resources, threats to Australia’s national
interests are multi-dimensional. A comprehensive Maritime Strategy must consider the
implication for national security of the full gamut of security sectors.

Environmental Security
This security sector concerns the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere as the
essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend. The environmental
security aspect of a Maritime Strategy has relevance not only for security policy but also for
oceans policy and related topics.

Ecological security threats can damage the physical base of the nation state and its
institutions120. Whilst some threats are global and thus beyond the scope of any sole nation’s
strategy, others are caused by, for example, transborder pollution. In Australia’s case such
pollution may arise, e.g. from poorly controlled mining activity in PNG121 or clearance-
burning for agriculture in Indonesia and Malaysia.

Economic Security
Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance, and markets necessary to sustain
acceptable levels of welfare and state power. In the main, economic threats are part of the
normal discourse of nations and do not often stray into the realm of national security. Such
leakage can occur however through the relationship between economic capability on the one
hand, and military capability, power and socio-political stability on the other122.

The links between maritime strategy and economic security are based on the importance of
seaborne trade, and of the exploitation of the ocean spaces (and of the seabed). Basic policy

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work in understanding the overlapping nature of many maritime control regimes would be a
useful tool in enhancing this aspect of maritime security123.

A more immediate threat to economic security arises from the growth of transnational crime,
including people and drug smuggling. Such threats have the dual effect of draining
economically significant amounts from the national economy, but also create expensive
social and health related concerns in the target population.

In Australia’s case, the absence of land borders with any other country124 makes such security
threats a valid focus for a national maritime strategy. Such threats bring together law
enforcement and military capabilities in ways which are uncomfortable for the culture of both
areas and which create difficulties in terms of surveillance and intelligence cooperation and
coordination.

Political Security
Political threats to security are aimed at the organisational stability of the state. Their purpose
may range from pressuring the government on a particular policy, through overthrowing the
government, or fomenting secessionism125. Terrorism is one aspect of political security that
has taken on a new importance after the attacks on New York and Washington on 11
September 2001. The possibility of terrorists using the ocean spaces to pursue their political
or ideological agenda through, for example, acts of ecological destruction could have
significant impacts on national security as a whole.

In Australia’s case, examples of such acts could include the deliberate introduction of
diseases into the country, or the breakup of an oil tanker upon sensitive areas of the Great
Barrier Reef. Either of those two events would have significant impacts on our national
interests.

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Figure 4: Extent of the Australian Ship Reporting Area, and Search and Rescue responsibilities
(Source: Aust Maritime Safety Authority)

Societal
Threats to national security at the social level amount to attacks on the national identity. At
the higher end of the threat spectrum, they are often part of a broader package of military and
political threats such as that faced by the Israelis from the Arabs126. In Australia’s immediate
region a lower level of threat exists, largely associated with nation-states suppressing, or at
least homogenising, sub-state social identities. Examples include the Javanese and others
transmigration into less heavily populated areas of Indonesia, tensions between the ethnic
Fijians and Indo-Fijians, and the conflict between Malaitans and the Guadalcanese in the
Solomon Islands127. While such threats are overwhelmingly internal to the respective nation
states, they do raise security concerns for Australia in its engagement with the region.

Military
The use of military force can wreak major undesired changes very swiftly and even threaten
the very existence of the nation state itself. Consequently they are granted the highest priority
in the national security considerations by the government of any nation state. The strategic
response to such threats has long been the skeleton of any maritime strategy. However, as the

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spectre of global annihilation through strategic nuclear war receded with the collapse of the
Soviet Union, it opened the door to a more comprehensive treatment of all sectors of security
and their treatment through integrated strategies, such as a national maritime strategy.

Expeditionary Strategies: The US and UK

As stated above, the end of strategic competition upon the high seas has brought about a new
focus on the role of maritime forces in projecting power into the littoral areas of the world.
Both the US and the UK have outlined their approaches in this matter. Their primary guiding
documents are summarised below as examples for consideration.

The US Navy Doctrine “Forward … From the Sea”

This 1994 Doctrine is the second maritime strategic concept arising from the US in the
aftermath of the Cold War. Like it’s 1992 predecessor “From the Sea” this document
articulates the idea that the primary purpose of forward-deployed naval forces is to project
national power from the sea to influence events ashore in the littoral regions of the world.
This however is an evolution from the previous strategic concept in that it addresses
specifically the unique contributions of naval expeditionary forces in peacetime operations, in
responding to crises and in regional conflicts.

Peacetime Forward Presence Operations

Forward presence is intended to demonstrate the US commitment to its allies and partners, to
underwrite regional stability, gain familiarity with overseas operation environments, promote
combined training among the forces of friendly nations and provides the US with timely
initial response capabilities. Furthermore, as the threat of ballistic missiles becomes more
widely spread, maritime forces equipped with theatre ballistic missile defence capabilities can
play an important role in conventional deterrence by extending credible defences to friendly
and allied countries.

Crisis Response
The timely initial response capabilities provided by the forward presence of maritime forces
assists in deterring aggressors. Building on such normally deployed forces the US can mass,
if the situation requires, multiple aircraft carrier battle groups, amphibious ready groups with
embarked Marine Expeditionary Units and project expeditionary forces ashore using the
afloat Maritime Prepositioning Force128.

Regional Conflict
As a situation moves beyond immediate crisis towards
regional conflict, this strategic concept sees forward- Sealift is a crucial
deployed maritime forces as the transition force whilst capability for joint
land-based forces are brought forward into theatre (either operations in the
from continental USA or from another regional command). littoral
Such maritime forces would also be called upon to protect
vital sealift capabilities and points of entry into the theatre
or conflict. It is worth noting that “Forward … From the Sea” identifies sealift capabilities as
the key to force sustainment for joint operations, and highlights the US commitment to it as a
strong national capability. The same requirement for sea-borne sustainment would apply to

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middle powers. In Australia’s case is worth noting the crucial role played by HMAS JERVIS
BAY during the INTERFET operations in East Timor.

The UK’s 1998 Strategic Review – Rebirth of Middle-Power Expeditionary Warfare

The 1998 UK Strategic Defence Review (SDR) represents a fundamental rethink of the UK’s
defence requirements in the post-Cold War period. In short, it accepts that in the new century,
middle powers such as the UK must be prepared to “go to the crisis, rather than wait for the
crisis to come to us”129. The SDR is also a useful reminder that it is possible for western
voters to accept the need for defence spending without solely invoking a threat to the nation’s
sovereignty and homeland. In the UK’s case spending in new capabilities includes two new
aircraft carriers as well as transport aircraft and other capabilities intended to move people
and equipment quickly to troublespots beyond the immediate region.

The missions and tasks delineated in this new framework of expeditionary warfare are as
follow:

• Peacetime Security. The 1998 Strategic Defence Review noted that support against terrorism
of all kinds would remain of the highest priority for the foreseeable future130. This was
tragically reinforced by the events of 9/11. This role also includes elements similar to
Australia’s roles of Defence Support to the Civil Community (DACC).

• Security of the Overseas Territories. Whilst the SDR recognises there is no significant
military threat to the UK overseas territories, it highlights the ongoing threats to the security
of those territories across all security sectors and the defence forces role in their amelioration.

• Defence Diplomacy. This new mission covers arms control, non-proliferation and related
security building measures, an outreach programme in Eastern Europe, and wider military
assistance and training for overseas countries.

• Support to Wider British Interests. This includes support to security arrangements such as the
Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA).

• Peace Support and Humanitarian Operations. The SDR highlights that the UK will continue
to play its full part in such international efforts. At one end of the spectrum, this might
involve logistic or medical support to a disaster relief operation. At the other, it might involve
major combat operations as were prepared to undertake when NATO's Intervention Force
(IFOR) first deployed to Bosnia.

• Regional Conflict outside the NATO area.

• Regional Conflict inside the NATO area

• Strategic Attack on NATO. The SDR emphasises that no threat on this scale is in prospect. It
does however caution that it would be unwise to conclude that one could never reappear but
the conventional forces needed to threaten such an attack would take many years to create.
This mission therefore provides the UK with longer term insurance through a credible nuclear
deterrent and the retention of the essential military capabilities on which the UK could
rebuild larger forces over a long period, if circumstances were radically to worsen.

Overall, the SDR represents a well-articulated response to the strategic changes the UK faced in
the aftermath of the Cold War. It proposes an approach to security that marries expeditionary

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warfare capabilities with acknowledged responsibility across a number of security sectors.
Fundamentally, it represents an emphatic choice by the UK government to pursue a global
security role through the maintenance of capable expeditionary maritime forces.

Anti-Access Warfare: The response to Expeditionary Maritime Strategies

Anti-access warfare is the asymmetrical response to expeditionary strategies. Its basis is that
the only way to disrupt the massive capacity for expeditionary warfare wielded by the US and
its Western allies is by attacking the ports and air-bases that such forces require to depart its
territory and to enter the area of conflict. The US Chief of Naval Operations put the challenge
in these terms:

Over the past ten years, it has become evident that proliferating weapon and
information technologies will enable our foes to attack the ports and
airfields needed for the forward deployment of our land-based forces.

I anticipate that the next century will see those foes striving to target
concentrations of troops and materiel ashore and attack our forces at sea and
in the air. This is more than a sea-denial threat or a Navy problem. It is an
area-denial threat whose defeat or negation will become the single most
crucial element in projecting and sustaining U.S. military power where it is
needed131.

The same concerns apply to Australia’s maritime strategy. Our limited maritime capabilities
are concentrated in, and dependent on, a very small number of ports and airfields.
Interference with such infrastructure, whether through mining, sabotage, or the use of
WMDs, makes for an easy and cheap counter to Australia’s maritime capabilities.

Current and Future Issues for Australia’s Maritime Strategy

‘The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is moving towards developing a maritime concept of
strategy that integrates manoeuvre operations in a littoral environment, amphibious
capability and the integration of sea control with a broader appreciation of naval and air
[and land] power in maritime strategy.’ 132

While the above is true the situation is more complex. The operating environment is
becoming more uncertain with a combination of state and non-state actors, an increase in
asymmetric and non-conventional threats and the proliferation of highly capable missiles and
other capabilities within our region. The Revolution in Military Affairs and the rapid
developments in Command Control Computers Communications Intelligence and
Surveillance (C4IS) capabilities has changed the conduct of conflict at all levels, and can
result in greatly improved situational awareness resulting in the more effective employment
of combat forces. Australia’s desire to exploit these new technological developments is
evident in the White Paper, Defence 2000, as technological developments in C4IS enable a
small force to be used to maximum effect.

The last decade has seen a shift in defence operations from platform centric warfare to
network centric or network-enabled warfare as well as an increasing emphasis on effects
based operations133. Further in June 2002 the Minister for Defence, Robert Hill, highlighted
the need for the ADF to be capability based rather than threat based, in order to be equipped

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to meet the unexpected.134 The changed operating environment increases the importance of
an integrated, highly interoperable and flexible joint force supported by superior intelligence
and an integrated command support systems in a maritime strategy. Further, as the line
between civil and military national security agencies blur, the ADF’s maritime forces will
increasingly need to become interoperable with other government agencies responsible for
national security in the maritime environment.

The changing operating environment affects the way in which the sea, land, air and
information components of a maritime strategy are, and will be employed in the future.
The Role of Sea Power in a Maritime Strategy
Over the past twenty years the changing strategic situation and the move towards a maritime
strategy has forced the RAN to re-evaluate its operational concepts and doctrine.135 Blue
water navies are less relevant and the focus of sea power has moved to operations in the
littoral, where increasingly there is not only the blurring of the air, land and maritime
environments but also the relationship between civil security and national defence, as
demonstrated by Operation RELEX, the ADF’s interception operations of unauthorised boat
arrivals to Australia’s north. This blurring has increased the importance for Australia to
develop a national maritime strategy to gain synergistic effects in both the traditional and
non-traditional military and civil security domains.

The littoral is defined by the RAN as ‘those areas on land that are subject to influence by
units operating at or from the sea, and those areas at sea subject to influence by forces
operating on or from the land’.136 The RAN has increased its focus on joint operations in the
littoral and the RAN’s future warfare concepts envisage ‘maritime forces providing
protection and sustainment of embarked land forces while enroute and while the land forces
remain in the littoral.137 Surface combatants are envisaged to play a dominant role in
achieving area air battlespace dominance and the RAN’s amphibious ships will be reliant on
helicopters and watercraft to move land forces ashore.138 Technological developments in
munition capabilities in particular extended range munitions and ballistic missiles have
increased the focus on littoral operations as navy’s are now capable of land attack and thus
are able to influence events on the land from the sea.139 The ADF has looked into land attack
capabilities for a number of years for the submarines and now as part of the maritime air
warfare capability ship project, a number of concepts are being covered including land attack
however, the shape of this new capability is a number of years away from maturity (see
figure 5 for information on the RAN’s current, enhanced and future fleet).

While, the post Cold War period has seen an overwhelming focus on littoral operations, the
key tenets of sea power still remain relevant. ‘Control of the sea will require capabilities in
submarine, surface and air warfare, as well as in mine warfare. Power projection requires the
ability to put forces ashore, and to provide fire support and strike. All these missions require
sophisticated C3I [Command Control Communications and Intelligence]support from ashore
and afloat if their potential is to be maximised.’140

Hence sea control and sea denial will remain crucial for keeping the sea lines of
communication open, for expeditionary operations, projection of power ashore, land strike
and support to operations on land. The importance of a limited amphibious capability to
project maritime forces was demonstrated by the ADF’s deployment to East Timor in 1999.

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THE THREE FLEETS

FORCE ELEMENT ENHANCED FUTURE FLEET

FLEET IN BEING 2005
GROUPS FLEET 2015 2025
• 3 Upgraded FFG • 2 Air Warfare
• 3 or 4 Air Warfare
• 3 FFG Destroyers (+1 or 2
Destroyers
• 1 Anzac FFH (ASMD Building)
Surface Combatants • A mix of New Surface
Upgrade) • 4 Upgraded FFG •
Combatants and
• 5 Anzac FFH 8 Upgraded Anzac
upgraded Anzac FFH
• 4 Upgraded Collins Class FFH
• A mix of Next
• 6 Upgraded Collins Generation Submarines
Submarines • 2 Collins Class
Class and upgraded Collins
Class
• 1 Landing Ship Heavy
• 3 Large
(LSH) • 3 Large Amphibious
Amphibious
• 2 Landing Platform Platforms
Amphibious Lift Platforms
Amphibious (LPA) • ADF Watercraft
• ADF Watercraft
• 6 Landing Craft Heavy Replacements
Replacements
(LCH)
• 1 Auxilliary Oiler
• 2 Fleet • 2 Fleet Replenishment
Afloat Support • 1 Fleet Replenishment
Replenishment Ships Ships
Ship
• 6 Huon Class Coastal
Minehunters • 6 Huon Class • Next Generation
• 2 Auxilliary Coastal Minehunters Minehunting Platforms
Mine Warfare
Minesweepers • 2 Clearance Diving • 2 Clearance Diving
• 2 Clearance Diving Teams teams
Teams
• 16 Seahawks • Common type
• 16 Seahawks
• 11 Seasprites Warfare/Utility
Aviation • 11 Seasprites
• Utility Helicopters • Helicopter
• 7 Seakings
Possibly UAVs • UAVs
• 2 Leeuwin Class • 2 Hydrographic • 2 Replacement
• 4 Paluma Class Ships Hydrographic Platforms
Hydrographic
• LADS (Laser Airborne • Next Generation • Future Airborne
Depth Sounder) LADs type capability System
• 13 Fremantle Class
• Replacement Patrol • Next Generation
Patrol Boats • 2 Replacement Patrol
Boats Patrol Platforms
Boats

Figure 5: The Royal Australian Navy’s Three Fleet Navy142

The proliferation of capable Anti Ship Missiles within the region will lead to our surface
combatant force becoming more vulnerable as they posses a limited air warfare capability
and therefore in a conflict scenario are dependant on land based air cover which restricts the
range of potential operations that can be conducted. The limited air warfare capability of our
surface combatants is particularly problematic with the apparent shift to conducting
expeditionary operation in the region. Specifically it won’t be until at least 2013, when the air
warfare capable ships are delivered, that the Navy’s strategy of having the surface combatants

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playing a dominant role in achieving area air battlespace dominance could be achieved.
Therefore operations at the higher end of the scale of conflict may be limited until such a
time that the ADF can provide better air warfare capabilities.

The previous points have largely focused on operations at the higher end of the conflict
spectrum however, with the focus still on defence of Australia there will be an increasing role
for sea power in non-conventional military tasks including constabulary, diplomatic and
humanitarian assistance operations. The ADF will continue to support Coastwatch and the
ADF’s role in civil surveillance may increase as threats to our maritime resources,
immigration and customs operations are becoming increasingly sophisticated. In addition to
the traditional military and civil threats, emerging asymmetric threats and increasing
transnational crime is likely to drain ADF resources in the future. Seapower is essential in
our current and future operating environment, the ADF is likely to be employed on a greater
range of tasks from homeland defence to regional and coalition operations and therefore the
ADF’s capabilities and doctrine needs to be inherently flexible to cope with these new tasks
while still maintaining a capability for traditional military tasks.

The Role of Land Forces in A Maritime Strategy

Australia’s continentalist strategy post Dibb resulted in the Army experiencing ‘a level of
strategic ambiguity between its specified strategic role in defence of Australia and its
historical employment in offshore peace enforcement and humanitarian operations.’143

Operations in East Timor highlighted the need for the ADF to be structured for short notice
contingencies within our region and the importance of air and sealift capabilities. The White
Paper recognised this change and called for a force that is balanced ‘between the demands of
operations on Australian territory and the demands of deployments offshore’, however the
White Paper did not adequately address the ambiguity as force structure determinants were
still stated to be focused on defence of Australia. In an attempt to balance the demands
between defence of Australia and operations in the region, the White Paper reinforces the
importance of an amphibious lift capability by committing to retaining and eventually
replacing the Amphibious Support Ships, HMAS Manoora and HMAS Kanimbla, and also
HMAS Tobruk. This combined with the additional squadron of troop lift helicopters to
operate from the Amphibious Support Ships provides Defence a limited amphibious
capability.

In order to better define the Army’s role in a maritime strategy two key documents have been
released post the White Paper, the Fundamentals of Land Warfare, the Army’s strategic
doctrine, and the concept document Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment. Both
documents emphasise the importance of the littoral environment–that area where the
operational domains of sea, land and air merge–in a maritime strategy and highlight that ‘by
their nature, littoral areas require the effective conduct of joint operations’ (see figure 7).144
Further they highlight that the maritime approaches to our territory are littoral in nature and
therefore the capability to conduct joint operations in the littoral is essential to an effective
maritime strategy. The concept document, Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral
Environment (MOLE), is a classified document. However some comments on the document
have been made in the public domain.145 The army defines littoral manoeuvre ‘as integrated
sea-land-air operations involving forced entry from the sea and air undertaken in the littoral
region.’146 The MOLE concept emphasises the importance of concentrating overwhelming
effects at a particular place and time, and emphasises the need for the ADF to be capable of
conducting operations in the inner-arc to seize, deny or protect forward operating bases.147

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LITTORAL
MANOEUVRE:
The army defines
littoral manoeuvre
‘as integrated sea-
land-air operations
involving forced
entry from the sea
and air undertaken
in the littoral
region.’145

Figure 7: Operations in the littoral environment148

The ability to conduct manoeuvre operations in the littoral to project force, to seize and hold
points of entry, to deny or protect forward operating bases, emphasises the current trend in
US and UK, but significantly extends the White Papers pretence of a ‘limited amphibious
capability’. ‘Forced entry from the sea and air’ implies a conflict scenario. However the
ADF’s limited force projection, sea control and surface air warfare capability, combined with
the lack of endurance associated with air power, raises questions about how the ADF might
be able to effect this operation with the current and planned capital investments.149

MOLE is a significant shift from the White Paper in both policy and force structure
implications, however it is a move towards a more considered maritime strategy and it could
be argued is more congruent with likely future operations. MOLE is perhaps a confirmation
that Australia’s declared defence policy, despite being a move forward, is still lagging behind
current defence thinking and current defence operations. For a MOLE type concept to be truly
effective it needs to be developed as a joint concept and needs to gain force structure priorities
as the current White Paper does not express a planned capability to conduct manoeuvre
operations in the littoral environment in any threat based scenario.

The Role of Aerospace Power in a Maritime Strategy

‘Air Combat is the most important single capability for the defence of Australia.’150

Since Dibb the role of the aerospace power has remained largely unchanged. Aerospace
power is not confined to the Air Force but incorporates air arms of both the Navy and the
Army and in a complete maritime strategy includes civil assets as well as the civil and
military infrastructure from which aerospace power can be projected. Aerospace power is
defined as ‘the ability to project military force in the third dimension, by or from a platform
above the surface of the earth.’151

The White Paper describes air combat as the most important capability because control of the
air over our territory and maritime approaches is critical to a maritime strategy. However in
addition to air combat the ADF needs to be capable of supporting a regional coalition and

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providing air-defence and support to deployed forces in our immediate region. The
Fundamentals of Aerospace Power 2002–the Air Force’s strategic doctrine–highlights the
fact that given Australia’s geographic isolation, the ability of aerospace power to strike at ‘the
enemy’s ability to project military power over substantial distance, provides a fundamental
component of national security.’152

The role of the aerospace power has not changed substantially since the end of the Gulf War
and in a maritime strategy effective aerospace power includes the ability to:

• conduct both maritime and land strike

• gain air superiority

• conduct aerial mining

• conduct air to air refuelling

• provide airlift

• conduct offensive air support operations in both the land and maritime environment, such
as close air support and undersea warfare

• conduct information operations (missions include surveillance, reconnaissance and

intelligence)

• provide early warning and control.

In a maritime strategy the importance of deterrence that lies essentially within our F-111 fleet
should not be overlooked. In addition to the above roles of aerospace power, aerospace power
also has a role in non-conventional warfare including civil surveillance, search and rescue
operations, logistics support to natural disasters or humanitarian operations and aeromedical
evacuations.

An important development in aerospace power is precision guided munitions and stealth

technologies, both of which the ADF considers important, as demonstrated by signing up as a
level three partner in the JSF project. Precision guided and stand-off weapons allow the ADF
to strike at specific targets to gain a desired effect. These weapons are generally employed for
strategic missions such as land strike and maritime strike on high value targets. Stealth
technology provides protection against air defence systems.

The Navy and Army currently have a strong emphasis on littoral operations, however as
littoral operations by their nature require a joint concept of strategy it is important that the
role of aerospace power is not overlooked. Littoral operations are not mentioned in the
Fundamentals of Aerospace Power nor was the role of aerospace power mentioned in the
RAN’s definition of littoral operations in the RAN’s strategic guidance document Australia’s
Navy for the 21st Centaury. Australia’s Navy for the 21st Centaury does mention aerospace
power in the context of littoral operations however it is largely confined to airlift capabilities
therefore restricting its application. Aerospace power has a significant role when conducting
joint operations in the littoral. In particular Aerospace power can be used to:

• gain air superiority

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• conduct maritime and land strike

• provide effective surveillance and reconnaissance

• provide an airlift capability.

Aerospace power is generally revolutionary in nature. Specifically the development of

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV) will
have a significant impact on a joint maritime strategy in the short to medium term.

At the strategic level aerospace power can be used to achieve synergistic effects through the
use of ‘aerospace power’s superior reach, responsiveness and precision to exploit the
uncertainty of asymmetric response, and to strike directly at vital points, achieving strategic
surprise and shock and confound the enemy’s situational awareness.’153 When combined
with sea and land power the synergistic effects of aerospace power will be further exploited
to achieve maximum effect in a maritime strategy.

Information Capability
The revolution of military affairs has significantly affected the conduct of operations with
defence forces exploiting the information environment to achieve disproportionate effects
across the entire spectrum of war. Information capability can been broken into intelligence,
surveillance and command and control.
Intelligence – Intelligence is an essential component of Australia’s maritime strategy.
Intelligence can provide commanders with increased situational awareness and enabling him
to achieve decision superiority across the spectrum of conflict. Intelligence is essential in
both war and peacetime situations and is becoming increasingly important as Australia’s
strategic environment is becoming increasingly complex.

In spite of the fact that Australia has very capable intelligence agencies both within and
outside of Defence, the coordination between these agencies is not exploited to achieve
optimal effect. This lack of coordination will increasingly becomes problematic as military
and civil security operations merge and as threats to Australia’s national security are
increasingly non-state based and asymmetrical. Effective intelligence is essential to all
counties, however it is particularly important to Australia given the small size of military and
the vastness of the land in which they are tasked to defend. Effective intelligence means that
commanders can make the most efficient and effective response at the right time.
A mature national maritime strategy that covers both conventional and non-conventional
threats would required increased collaboration and information sharing not only between
Australia’s national security intelligence agencies:

• Australian Secret Intelligence Service

• Australian Security Intelligence Organisation

• Defence Intelligence Organisation

• Defence Signals Directorate

• Defence Imagery and Geo-spatial Organisation

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• Office of National Assessments,

but also between other Australian agencies that have an intelligence function, some of these
agencies include:

• the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

• Australian Customs Service, including Coastwatch

• the Australian Federal Police, as well as state police agencies

• Australian Fisheries Management Authority.

Surveillance – surveillance is defined a ‘the systematic observation of aerospace, surface or

sub-surface area, places, persons or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other
means.’154 Surveillance is fundamental to Australia’s maritime strategy as it provides the
‘capability to detect air and sea activity in and beyond Australia’s sovereign air and sea space
and to integrate that information with other agencies.’ Importantly surveillance information
needs to be processed in a timely fashion by intelligence staff in order for the intelligence
staff to provide decision makers with timely information about a potential adversary’s
capabilities and intentions.155

Australia’s maritime strategy places a large emphasis on surveillance provided by the

Jindalee Over-the Horizon Radar Network (JORN) and the trial of high frequency surface
wave radar which provides the potential for 24-hour surveillance of our northern approaches,
combined with the surveillance capability embedded with the Orion maritime patrol aircraft
and the Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft (when they enter service). These
capabilities create a detailed surveillance network to provide extensive coverage of
Australia’s maritime approaches. Importantly Australia’s surveillance effort is primarily
focused on northern Australia, Australia has a limited focus on, or capability to, conduct
surveillance operation to Australia’s south as has been highlighted by the increased incidence
of illegal fishing in the Southern Ocean.

Command and Control - Headquarters Australian Theatre is the primary operational

command for the ADF and holds the responsibility of commanding joint operations at the
theatre level. In addition to Headquarters Australian Theatre, the ADF currently has a single
deployable joint task force headquarters. A second deployable joint task force headquarters is
being developed under project JP 8001–the second deployable joint task force headquarters
project–which will comprise an afloat capability aboard HMAS KANIMBLA. Two
deployable joint task force headquarters allows the ADF to command two concurrent
operations simultaneously, providing increased flexibility.

Despite moves for more flexible command arrangements the Army is still structured to carry
out conventional warfare operating in Brigade sized formations. Similarly the ADF is
primarily structured and commanded along single service lines. The move to a joint maritime
strategy and as the likelihood for large-scale conventional operations decreases and smaller
joint non-conventional operations increases, the ADF will need to move to a more flexible
command structure.

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The Role of Defence Industry in a Maritime Strategy
Since the early seventies defence planning has focused on ‘self-reliance’, the effectiveness of a
self-reliant posture in times of both peace and conflict is closely linked to the capability of our
defence industries to meet strategic needs. Since the end of the Cold War there has been a
significant decrease in defence industries worldwide, primarily due to the decreased demand for
military equipment in an era of relative peace and wide scale consequent rationalisation.

The Department of Defence has recognised that there is over capacity in Australia’s defence
industrial base and encouraged defence industry to rationalise in order to sustain an effective
defence industrial base. In order to assist defence industry rationalise Defence has developed a
strategic alliance approach to defence industry and Defence has identified four key defence
industry sectors that have strategic significance to Australia, namely naval shipbuilding and
repair, electronic systems, aerospace and land, and weapon systems. Of primary importance to a
maritime strategy is the naval shipbuilding and repair sector plan that seeks to establish a single
prime contractor for naval shipbuilding and repair, as Defence has proposed that there is only
enough work to sustain a single shipbuilding prime in Australia. This plan is yet to be approved
by Cabinet and a number of concerns have already been raised in regards to competitiveness and
the capability to foster new technologies under a sole source arrangement.156

Not directly linked to the Australian shipbuilding industry is the issue of Australian flagged ships
and Australia’s merchant marine, both of which have reduced significantly over a number of
years and now only represent a very small capability. For example the ADF chartered nineteen
ships for their deployment to East Timor, all of which were foreign flagged. Availability and
capacity are obvious factors in the selection of chartering ships, however the limits involved do
emphasise the question of how important is it for a maritime nation that is so dependant on its
sea trade to maintain a credible Australian flagged fleet and merchant marine? Closely linked to
this is strategic civil infrastructure such as ports and airports. In the case of port access there is no
strategic plan for ADF port access as the ADF is largely reliant on the Defence Act 1903 to gain
access to port facilities that are now largely privatised. A clear policy for defence industries,
Australian flagged ships, our maritime marine and our strategic civil infrastructure, needs to be
developed as part of a broader maritime strategy.

The Move to a Mature Maritime Strategy

Defence 2000 was the first step towards developing a maritime strategy. There is however a
significant way to go before Australia has a mature and integrated maritime strategy.
Importantly the ADF needs to develop joint operational concepts and have a clearer
understanding of the potential operations that the ADF may be tasked to support both in the
region and abroad. As the civil and military security domains increasingly overlap and with
an increased emphasis on homeland defence, it is increasingly important for a national
security strategy to be developed, incorporating all aspects of national power at sea not just
military. A more mature maritime strategy would see an integrated approach to national
surveillance and intelligence, a greater understanding of the role of industry and civil
infrastructure, as well as greater coordination between all agencies responsible for Australia’s
security.
Defence 2000 highlights the importance of defending the Sea-Air Gap and regional
engagement. However post September 11 have these priorities changed? Is it still appropriate
for the ADF to be primarily structured around defending the Sea-Air Gap? At the Defence
and Industry Conference in June 2002, the Minister for Defence, Robert Hill, emphasised that

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the emerging trends identified in the White Paper, such as increasing non-military threats to
Australia, are likely to continue and, post 9/11, they have proved to be more substantial than
originally thought.157 Recent ADF operations have included border protection operations
against people smugglers, fisheries patrols in the Southern Ocean, peacekeeping in East
Timor, the continuing deployment to Bougainville, Australia’s contribution to the War on
Terror and most recently support to the Bali bombings. These illustrate the range of
operations that the ADF must be prepared to conduct and, increasingly, these operations are
both military and non-military in nature and will be carried out alongside civilian
organisations.

Australia is faced with an increase in non-military and non-state based threats, a region that
lacks stability and the rapid advancement of information technology, intelligence,
surveillance and precision weapons capabilities. More than ever the ADF needs to be flexible
to adapt to the widest range of operations in joint and coalition forces, as well as along side
civilian organisations. The ADF needs to be capable to lead multinational peacekeeping
operations in our region, similar to INTERFET, and have the capability to be interoperable
with our allies. A maritime strategy encompassing all aspects of national power at sea should
be inherently flexible to adapt to current and emerging threats. It has been argued that ‘in the
peculiar conditions of the post-September 11 world, Australia needs, more than ever before, a
multi-faceted security outlook–one that is simultaneously globally attuned, regionally focused
and alliance-orientated158.

Defence has recognised the changed environment and the disconnect between Australia’s
declared policy and operational reality. The strategic review due to be presented to Cabinet in
October 2002 will reassess Australia’s security environment and priorities compared to the
White paper and post September 11. This review will bring changes. However, the extent to
which these changes will recommend a more considered national maritime strategy only time
will tell.

Conclusion
Issues for Consideration

• The extent to which Defence against attacks on Australia should remain as the highest
priority for the development of maritime strategy, and consequently the ADF’s force
structure.

• Whether Sea Denial is an appropriate strategic posture to protect our national interests in the
maritime environment.

• The extent to which current and planned capability development priorities reflect
operational requirements under a maritime strategy.

• Whether the ADF is adequately trained and structured to meet likely operational
requirements in a maritime strategy.

• The extent to which the ADF needs to be capable of leading multinational operations within
our region and interoperable with our allies.

• The extent to which the increased overlap between civil and military security domains calls
for the development of a detailed national security strategy, incorporating all aspects of
national power at sea.

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• The extent to which lower-order security challenges such as piracy or the unlawful
movement of people into Australia, should be considered as driving factors for Australia’s
maritime strategy, and consequently the ADF’s force structure priorities.

• The extent to which a more integrated approached to national surveillance and intelligence
is required and the extent to which greater coordination between all agencies responsible for
Australia’s security is necessary.

• The implications of our Southern Ocean and Antarctic EEZ claims for the development of
maritime strategy, and consequently the ADF’s force structure.

• The implications of a broadly focused maritime strategy for inter-departmental or inter-

governmental control and reporting arrangements

• The role of defence industries, Australian flagged ships, our maritime marine and strategic
civil infrastructure as in a maritime strategy.

• The impact of the commercialisation of maritime infrastructure such as ports, on Australia’s

national security and defence requirements.

As stated in the introduction, Australia is not culturally a maritime nation. The feel for the
rhythm and use of the oceans is not part of the myths and legends that define us as a nation.
From the founding of the colonies we were lulled into a false sense of security by being born
of the most powerful maritime nation of its day. The Royal Navy secured our backs as we set
out to conquer the wide, brown land.

Australia’s contribution to the two world wars that blighted the 20th Century was
overwhelmingly focussed on the land campaigns. Our ships may have played important local
roles, but maritime strategy was set and implemented by the Royal Navy, and later the US
Navy. Our contribution to those conflicts was tactical or operational, but never strategic.

The decades since the end of WWII have seen a maturation process take place. Both in law
and in practice we have moved to recognise and enforce the privileges and responsibilities
that come from being an island continent which is utterly dependent on seaborne trade.
Nevertheless there remains a tension between our claims, and the resources, military,
economic, and cultural that we devote to enforce those claims.

The end of the Cold War and the rise of non-state actors have made our security context
much more complex and even more demanding. An effective and coherent Maritime Strategy
will assist in the management of these complex challenges by properly integrating Defence
initiatives into a broadly focused national security strategy.

Appendix 1 - Australian/NZ Strategy : A regional contrast –a view from the West

Island
Introduction – Similarities and differences

There are obvious similarities between Australia and New Zealand politically and
historically. They have also been economic and military allies under the Closer Economic
Relations and Closer Defence Relations agreements. Both Australia and New Zealand depend
on secure sea lines of communication for the bulk of their trade. More than 70 per cent of
Australia's exports and imports go by sea in terms of value and well over 95 per cent by bulk.

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For New Zealand it is 95% by volume and 90% by value159. Geo-strategically, however, the
similarity between the two has sometimes been overstated, and the strategic divergence
between the two nations has increased since the election of a Labour-Alliance coalition
government in New Zealand in 1999 when the new Prime Minister, Helen Clark, ‘made it
clear that she did not regard New Zealand and Australia as a ‘single strategic entity’’.160 This
is not surprising, as despite being neighbours in the south Asia/Pacific region, they face
different security environments.161 Australia is ‘on the door step of Asia, and dramatically
influenced by what goes on there’, while, in contrast, New Zealand is and sees itself as more
a South Pacific nation.162

The self imposed exile of New Zealand from ANZUS also inevitably led to a growing
divergence in strategic outlook. ANZUS remains Australia's most important alliance, while
New Zealand has learned to live without it. Authors such as Robert Patman have argued that
‘Australia has tended to view its security in terms of a calculation of specific threats’ whereas
‘New Zealand believed its regional priority was in the South Pacific and tends to see security
in a more comprehensive fashion centred on collective security and the United Nations’.163 It
should also be said that New Zealand can afford to do this because it is in the happy position
of having a huge land mass to its west providing protection through what amounts to an
extensive sea-air-land-Sea-Air Gap.

A New Zealand MP, Derek Quigley, points to identity as an important aspect of difference
between Australia and New Zealand’s defence strategies. He sees Australia as having
established its identity a long time ago, while New Zealand’s evolving defence policy is part
of a search for national identity and an attempt to develop a more independent international
stance, with the recent changes in defence policy being part of an evolutionary process which
can be traced back to the 1985 anti-nuclear ship visits policy of the Lange government. The
Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Hugh White, explains the differences
between Australia’s defence policy and those of other nations, including those of New
Zealand as resulting from Australia’s distinctive strategic culture. This culture currently
features a ‘renewed tolerance of the idea of forward defence… and more support for regular
operational deployments of the ADF to theatres near and far’.164
New Zealand's defence posture

In a series of reviews165 since 1999, the New Zealand Government has flagged a number of
major changes to its view of its defence needs and how these should be met. New Zealand's
defence posture is predicated on a pre 11 September 2001 threat assessment that New
Zealand is not directly threatened by any other country and is not likely to be involved in a
widespread armed conflict within a five year period. The 2001 Strategic Assessment,
considered that New Zealand is likely to face low-level security challenges, for example,
competition for marine resources in the EEZ, the Southern Ocean and Antarctic waters. New
Zealand is also likely to be asked to assist with problems arising from 'weak governments in
the region', and its strategic environment will be disturbed by challenges to or shifts in the
balance of power in the region.166 The New Zealand Government’s defence policy outlined in
the Defence Policy Framework's statement of New Zealand's security interests, included a set
of roles and tasks for the NZDF which are linked to the broad strategic outcomes identified in
the New Zealand parliamentary committee report, Defence Beyond 2000. Briefly these roles
are: to defend New Zealand; to meet alliance commitments to Australia; to help maintain
South Pacific security; to play an appropriate role in assisting in Asia/Pacific security167; and
to contribute to global security and peacekeeping 168.

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Australian academic Stewart Woodman has been quoted as saying that the New Zealand
strategy might not be very different from that set out in the Australian white paper, as both
recognise the threat of direct attack as unlikely and questions whether ‘New Zealand [is] at
the end of the slide Australia is starting on’. Woodman makes the point that ‘much larger
countries than Australia are actually going down this [more selective defence] path’.169 Hugh
White goes further, by suggesting that Australia is an anachronism among industrialised
nations, in that it still requires its defences force to be structured primarily to fight major
conventional wars, whereas New Zealand has radically changed the balance of its forces
since the end of the Cold War.170

The strategic differences between Australia and New Zealand are also illustrated by the
relative importance of each to the other in the declaratory policies of each. The Australian
white paper states that the strategic interests of the two nations are closely aligned, and that
each would come to the aid of the other in time of trouble, but Australia does not look
specifically to its relationship with New Zealand for its security. Defence 2000: our future
defence force describes New Zealand merely as a ‘very valued defence partner for
Australia’.171 New Zealand, on the other hand, sees ‘a strong strategic relationship with
Australia in support of common interests for a secure and peaceful region’172 as an important
strategic outcome, second only to the protection of New Zealand’s people and sovereignty.
Some of this difference in emphasis can be put down to the difference in size of the two
countries. Australia has more capacity than New Zealand ‘to influence regional decision-
makers through power or the potential to project power’.173 However, it is also a function of
the different overall focus of the two strategies. The ADF is tasked to overcome hostile forces
as far from its shores as possible. New Zealand has little or no capacity to do the same, and
makes no acknowledgment that such actions would be contemplated.
Depth versus breadth

Unlike Australia's focus on self-reliance which requires the maintenance and development of
a balanced force, the Government Defence Statement could envisage no easily foreseeable
circumstances in which New Zealand would deploy forces on its own. Instead, the
Government saw value in contributing to international coalitions, most likely peacekeeping
operations, with capabilities developed by concentrating resources in high priority areas (well
equipped combat trained land forces)174 which make the maximum contribution to its defence
objectives. Reconfiguring the defence force, ie, reducing the range of capabilities, is aimed at
making the NZDF sustainable and affordable over the long term.175

In focussing on depth rather than breadth, the 8 May 2001 Statement announced the
scrapping of the New Zealand Air Force's combat fighter force, the decision to sell the navy's
sealift ship and replace that capability with contingency leasing of commercial ships, and the
possible purchase of a smaller patrol vessel instead of a third Anzac class frigate to replace
the aging Leander class frigate, HMNZS Canterbury. The New Zealand Army will receive
the bulk of defence expenditure for new communications equipment and new armoured
personnel carriers to enable the New Zealand Defence Force to continue to contribute to
international peacekeeping operations. These decisions have been seen as a significant shift
away from New Zealand’s traditional approach of ‘wanting a little bit of most things’, and it
is also ‘a significant shift away from Australia’s position’.176
Maritime Strategy

The New Zealand Navy's Strategic Plan 2001-2006 states that New Zealand's 'maritime
strategy is fundamentally about control of the sea – to varying degrees.' However, without a

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current or foreseeable direct threat being identified, New Zealand's maritime strategy is
actually less to do with control of the sea against military threats and more to do with threats
against its economy and sovereignty in the maritime environment (fisheries, customs and
marine safety (including environmental protection).177 New Zealand’s responsibilities under
various international maritime conventions and its intention to claim, by 2006, continental
shelf rights which will extend its maritime boundaries far beyond the EEZ178 can only
increase the resource and sovereignty protection focus of its maritime strategy.

The May 2001 Government Defence Statement recognised sealift, maritime patrol and
hydrographic survey as three areas of importance in New Zealand’s maritime strategy. The
government decided to meet requirements for sealift by charter arrangements, as had been
used for deployments to Bosnia and East Timor, making New Zealand dependent on the
availability of commercial shipping to deploy and sustain its forces overseas. In contrast, the
Australian defence white paper states that, given the lessons of the INTERFET deployment,
Australia will give a high priority to the ADF’s capacity to deploy and sustain forces on
operations and intends to replace its recently expanded amphibious lift capability when the
current ships retire. 179

New Zealand has focused on civilian requirements for maritime patrol in the areas of
fisheries, resource management, conservation, pollution, immigration, customs, maritime
safety, and search and rescue, as well as the need for a military maritime patrol capability. In
keeping with the 'whole of government' approach in reviewing both military and civilian
needs, the New Zealand Government decided to establish a new Maritime Co-ordination
Centre to be co-located with the Joint Force Operational Headquarters at Trentham to
integrate the work of all agencies to ensure that there is a comprehensive national strategy for
managing maritime risks.

To meet the requirements for maritime patrol, the Maritime Forces Review identified the
need for a mix of five small inshore patrol vessels for most of the inshore patrol tasks, and at
least three capable offshore patrol vessels (OPV), plus a multi role vessel (MRV), for the
offshore tasks. The Review considered that some of the P3-K Orions could perform both the
long distance civilian patrol tasks with commercial equipment as well as providing the
RNZAF with an effective contingency capability against surface military targets.180 The
Review found that while ‘it would be prudent for the RNZAF to retain some military capacity
for detecting a military surface target….[t]here was no compelling evidence that an anti-
submarine capability is required for national security.’181 'More distant military requirements
were seen as being adequately catered for by the two New Zealand ANZAC frigates and the
support ship, HMNZS Endeavour.' The third frigate, Canterbury, will be retired by 2005
possibly to be replaced by a multi role ice-strengthened vessel with helicopter and limited
troop and vehicle transport capabilities suitable for peacekeeping, disaster relief in the
Pacific, evacuating nationals, protecting New Zealand’s exclusive economic zone,
undertaking search and rescue, and maintaining a “presence”.182

Taking into account the reduction of the frigate force by 33%, and the consequent loss of
‘critical mass to guarantee a ship on station, and the loss caused by the removal of 800 hours
of fighter-frigate training and the synergies this produced’, New Zealand academic David
Dickens estimates that ‘cumulatively the navy has lost about 40% of its combat
capacity’,183and this does not include the erosion of New Zealand’s sea power over the past
30 years or so.184 Dickens also argues that New Zealand’s decision to disband its air combat
forces, not to acquire a third frigate or to upgrade its Orions will decrease its contribution to

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the Five Power Defence Arrangements’ Integrated Air Defence System by 55% initially,
rising to 75% as the Orions become inoperable.185
Conclusion

In contrast to New Zealand's stance, Australia’s Defence 2000 states that Australia needs ‘a
fundamentally maritime strategy’, as ‘the key to defending Australia is to control the air and
sea approaches to our continent, so as to deny them to hostile ships and aircraft, and provide
maximum freedom of action for our forces’.186 The RAN's Maritime doctrine emphasises that
it is 'control of the sea [rather than sea denial] which more closely bears upon [Australia's]
national situation', as Australia's location in a sea dependent region where the significant
maritime and air capability of a large number of nations makes the strategic context far from
certain. New Zealand has made assumptions that it is probably not necessary to worry about
sea control or denial against military threats in its region in the immediate future, and has
structured its force to that effect. Australia considers that 'it would be extremely unwise to
make the assumption that the preconditions for sea control will exist whatever the strategic
situation' and so the RAN considers that 'it will be necessary for Australia to maintain in the
immediate future a greater focus on fundamental issues such as sea control – including
control of the air'.187

The New Zealand Government considers it faces a dilemma described by a commentator as

being between 'the military imperative to maintain a balanced, conventional force and the
strategic imperative to allocate limited resources to priority national tasks.' 188 In opting for
the strategic imperative, New Zealand is developing a maritime strategy which has limited
military focus and a lot of dependence on allies.189 Australia however, remains committed to
the more ambitious course of maintaining a balanced defence force to meet a broad range of
contingencies, including in the maritime environment.

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1
This name was given to HMAS STUART, VOYAGER, VAMPIRE, VENDETTA and
WATERHEN by the Germans on the ships’ arrival to the Mediterranean. They were so named
because they were so old, slow and decrepit that they could only be used as scrap iron. The destroyers
saw significant action throughout the Mediterranean campaign. HMAS WATERHEN was eventually
sunk, whilst the other four returned to Australian waters and did battle against the Japanese.
2
Evans, M ‘Strategic culture and the Australian way of warfare: perspectives’ in Stevens, D and
Reeve, J (eds). Southern trident: strategy, history and the rise of Australian naval power. Crows Nest
NSW, Allen and Unwin, 2001. p.95.
3
Donohue, H From empire defence to the long haul: post-war defence policy and its impact on naval
force structure planning, 1945-1955. Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs, No.1. Canberra,
Department of Defence, 1996. p.2.
4
Babbage, R ‘Australia’s defence strategies’ in Ball, D and Downes, C (eds). Security and defence:
Pacific and global perspectives. Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1990. p.208.
5
Evans, M ‘Strategic culture and the Australian way of warfare: perspectives’ in Stevens, David and
Reeve, John (eds). Southern trident: strategy, history and the rise of Australian naval power. Crows
Nest NSW, Allen and Unwin, 2001. p.93.
6
Evans, M ‘Strategic culture and the Australian way of warfare: perspectives’ in Stevens, David and
Reeve, John (eds). Southern trident: strategy, history and the rise of Australian naval power. Crows
Nest NSW, Allen and Unwin, 2001. p.93
7
White, H ‘Australian defence policy and the possibility of war’ Australian journal of international
affairs, Vol.56 No.2, 2002, p.257.
8
Dupont, A Australia’s threat perceptions: a search for security. Canberra papers on strategy and
defence No.82. Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, 1991. p.2-3.
9
Grey, J A military history of Australia. Revised edition. Cambridge, CUP, 1999. p.44.
10
Dupont, A Australia’s threat perceptions: a search for security. Canberra papers on strategy and
defence No.82. Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, 1991. P.4.
11
Cowman, I ‘The vision splendid’: Australian maritime strategy, 1911-23. In Stevens, D (ed). In
search of maritime strategy: the maritime element in Australian defence planning since 1901.
Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.119. Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,
ANU, 1997 p.43.
12
Mortimer, J ‘Foundation of the Australian Navy 1901-1914’, in Defence Force Journal no.61,
December 1986, p.22.
13
Grey, J ‘A military history of Australia’. Revised edition. Cambridge, CUP, 1999. p.69.
14
Mortimer, J loc.cit.
15
Lambert, N A. Australia's naval inheritance: imperial maritime strategy and the Australia Station
1880-1909. Papers in maritime affairs, no.6. Canberra, Department of Defence, Maritime Studies
Program, December 1998. p.10.
16
Ibid.
17
The Australian government agreed to pay two hundred thousand pounds per year towards the cost
of the Australia Squadron which was less than half the whole cost. Lambert, Nicholas A. Australia's
naval inheritance: imperial maritime strategy and the Australia Station 1880-1909. Papers in
maritime affairs, no.6. Canberra, Department of Defence, Maritime Studies Program, December 1998.
P.14

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18
Stevens, D ‘1091-1913: the genesis of the Royal Australian Navy’, in Stevens, D (ed) The Royal
Australian Navy. Sth Melbourne, OUP, 2001. pp. 15-16.
19
Cowman, I ‘The vision splendid": Australian maritime strategy, 1911-23.’ In Stevens, D (ed). In
search of maritime strategy: the maritime element in Australian defence planning since 1901.
Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.119. Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,
ANU, 1997 p.43-44.
20
Ibid. p.45.
21
Ibid. p.65.
22
Dupont, A Australia’s threat perceptions: a search for security. Canberra, Strategic and Defence
Studies Centre, ANU, 1991. p.23.
23
Ibid. pp.22-24.
24
Ibid. pp.24-26.
25
Dennis, P et.al. The Oxford companion to Australian military history. Sth Melbourne, OUP, 1999
pp.549-550.
26
Brown, G The 1942 Singapore disaster: assessing recent claims. Background Paper No1, 1993
Department of the Parliamentary Library.
27
Evans, M op.cit. p.93
28
Gill, G The Royal Australian Navy: 1939-1942. Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1957. pp.19-
20.
29
Dupont, A Op.cit p.31.
30
Brown, G The 1942 Singapore disaster: assessing recent claims. Background Paper No1, 1993
Department of the Parliamentary Library.
31
Dupont, A op.cit. p.29.
32
Dennis, P. et.al. The Oxford companion to Australian military history. Sth Melbourne, OUP, 1999
p.550
33
Australian Maritime Doctrine, p.34
34
Goldrick, J ‘1941-1945: World War II: the war against Japan’, in Stevens, D (ed). The Royal
Australian Navy. Vol.III of the Australian centenary history of defence. Melb., OUP, 2001. p.153
35
Goldrick, J ‘1939-1941: World War II: the war against Germany and Italy’, in Stevens, David (ed).
The Royal Australian Navy. Vol.III of the Australian centenary history of defence. Melb., OUP, 2001.
p. 114-115
36
Beazley, K ‘The development of Australian maritime strategy’ [Speech given to a naval
symposium], 26 November 1987.
37
Donohue, H ‘The oceans and Australia's defence’ in Wilson, D and Sherwood, D Oceans
governance and maritime strategy. St Leonards, NSW, Allen and Unwin, 2000. p.49.
38
Ibid.
39
ANZAM – Australia New Zealand and Malaya (Arrangement) was firstly a peacetime planning
organisation which also allocated to Australia the wartime responsibility for the defence of Australia
and its territories, together with the direction and control of operations other than those intended for
home defence, in an area approximating the ANZAM region. Grey, Jeffrey. 'The Royal Australian
Navy in the era of forward defence, 1955-1975' in Stevens, David (ed). In search of maritime
strategy: the maritime element in Australian defence planning since 1901. Canberra Papers on
Strategy and Defence No.119. Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, 1997. P.103.

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40
Grey, J ‘The Royal Australian Navy in the era of forward defence, 1955-1975’ in Stevens, D (ed).
In search of maritime strategy: the maritime element in Australian defence planning since 1901.
Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.119. Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,
ANU, 1997.p.105.
41
Young, T D ‘Australian, New Zealand, and United States Security Relations 1951-1986’ Boulder,
Colorado, Westview Press, 1992. pp.60-61.
42
Dupont, A op.cit. pp.43-44
43
Young, T D Ibid. p.191
44
Grey, J Ibid. p.100-101
45
Dupont, A op.cit. pp.57-62.
46
Dupont, A op.cit. p.67.
47
Dupont, Alan. Australia’s threat perceptions: a search for security. Canberra, Strategic and
Defence Studies Centre, ANU, 1991. P.67-68
48
Babbage, R ‘Australia’s defence strategies’ in Ball, Desmond and Downes, Cathy (eds). Security
and defence: Pacific and global perspectives. Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1990. pp.211-212.
49
Evans, M ‘From Deakin to Dibb: the Army in the making of Australian strategy in the 20th century’.
Land Warfare Studies Centre Working Paper No.113, Canberra, LWSC, June 2001 p. 26.
50
Evans, Ibid. p.27
51
Young, T D op.cit. p.103, note 19.
52
Woodman, S ‘Defending the Moat: Maritime Strategy and Self-Reliance’, in Stevens, S. (ed), In
Search of a Maritime Strategy: The maritime element in Australian defence planning since 1901,
Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 119, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian
National University, Canberra, 1997, pp. 121-122.
53
Dupont, Alan, Australia’s threat perceptions: a search for security, Canberra papers on strategy and
defence, no. 82, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1999.
54
Andrews, E ‘The Department of Defence’, The Australian Centenary History of Defence, Volume V,
Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2001, p. 249.
55
Dibb, P, ‘Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities’ Parliamentary Paper No. 163/1986,
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986.
56
Dibb identified the area of direct military interest as an area that stretches more than 4000nm from
the Cocos Islands in the west to New Zealand in the east, and more than 3000nm from the
archipelagic chain and Papua New Guinea in the north to the Southern Ocean in the south. This areas
accounts for more than 10% of the earths surface. See Dibb, P, Review of Australia’s Defence
Capabilities, Parliamentary Paper No. 163/1986, Australian Government Publishing Service,
Canberra, 1986, p 50-51.
57
Woodman, S ‘Strategies and concepts’. In Malik, J Australia’s Security in the 21st Century, Allen &
Unwin, 1999, p. 36
58
Cheeseman, G ‘From Forward Defence to Self-Reliance: Changes and Continuities in Australian
Defence Policy 1965-90’, Australian Journal of Political Science,
59
The Radford Collins Agreement was signed in 1951 and is an agreement with the US and NZ that
details each countries responsibility for the naval control of allied shipping in both wartime and
peacetime.
60
Woodman, S op.cit. p. 37.

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61
O’Connor, M ‘The Struggle for Maturity: The 1987 Defence White Paper one year later’, Quadrant,
May, 1988, pp.16-18.
62
In 1987 the coup in Fiji led to the deployment of the ADF to assist with a possible evacuation of
Australian nationals, in 1988 the ADF was on standby as the political situation in Vanuatu had
deteriorated and post 1988 the ADF was sent further afield to Namibia, Somalia, and the Persian Gulf.
63
Cheeseman, Graeme, The Search for Self Reliance: Australia Since Vietnam. Longman Cheshire:
Melbourne, 1993.
64
Cheeseman, Graeme, The Search for Self Reliance: Australia Since Vietnam. Longman Cheshire:
Melbourne, 1993.
65
Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Hansard, 1 December 1989,
p112.
66
Ministerial Statement by Robert Ray, ‘Defence White Paper’, Senate Hansard, 30 November 1994,
p. 3566.
67
Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, Australian Government Publishing Service,
Canberra, 1994.
68
The Asia Pacific region is defined in ASP97 as: East Asia, Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, the
United States, and, perhaps in increasingly in the future, South Asia. Australia’s Strategic Policy,
Department of Defence, 1997, p. 9.
69
Australia’s Strategic Policy, Department of Defence, 1997, p. 36.
70
O’Connor, M ‘The 2000 White Paper - A Personal View’, Australian Defence Force Journal, 147
March/April, 2001, pp. 37 -38.
71
Evans, M ‘Developing Australia’s Maritime Concept of Strategy: Lessons from the Ambon Disaster
of 1942’. Land Warfare Studies Centre, Study Paper No. 303, 2000, p. 73.
72
Evans, M Ibid. pp. 25-28.
73
Evans, Michael, Developing Australia’s Concept of Strategy: Lessons from the Ambon Disaster of
1942. Land Warfare Studies Centre, Study Paper No. 303, 200, p 72-74.
74
For information on block obsolescence see: Woolner, D ‘Pressures on Defence Policy: The Defence
Budget Crisis’, Parliamentary Library Research Paper 20, 2000.
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/1999-2000/2000rp20.htm
75
Ministerial Statement by John Howard, ‘Defence 2000 - Our Future Defence Force, House
Hansard, 6 December 2000, p. 23456.
76
Dibb, P. ‘Australia’s Best Defence White Paper?’ Australian Defence Force Journal, 147, March
/April, 2001, p. 30.
77
Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, Department of Defence, 2000, p. 47.
78
Ibid., p. 47.
79
The Department of Defence (as outlined in the Defence Capability Plan, 2000) plans to upgrade and
replace the capability inherent in its amphibious operations capability, namely Defence aims to
replace the RAN’s Landing Platform Amphibious (LPA) ships; HMAS Manoora and HMAS
Kanimbla, the RAN’s Landing Ship Heavy; HMAS Tobruk, the RAN’s Landing Craft Heavy and
provide the army with a watercraft system that can be used in conjunction with HMAS Manoora and
HMAS Kanimbla (replacement for the Landing Craft Mechanised LCM8).
80
Friedman, N. “Seapower as Strategy: Navies and National Interests”, Naval Institute Press, 2001. P.
14

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81
The literature on the concept of the Revolution in Military Affairs is extensive. A useful summary
can be found at http://www.comw.org/rma/index.html
82
Adm J.L. Johnson, “Forward … From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept”;
http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/fromsea/ffseanoc.html. March 1997
83
“Forward … From the Sea” http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/fromsea/forward.txt.
84
In the context of maritime strategy, the British author Admiral J.R. Hill categorises states as either
superpowers, medium powers, and small powers, according to the extent to which they can protect
their vital interest from within their own resources. Superpowers are strategic monoliths capable of
protecting all their vital interests from their own resources, small powers in contrast are characterised
by their relative weakness, and are unable to guarantee their vital interests without recourse to some
external agency, such as the United Nations, or the European Union. Middle powers are what lies in
between these two extremes of self-sufficiency and insufficiency. Middle powers are sufficient only
in parts and need to think hard about their vital interests and how to secure them. Hill, J.R. pp 17-21.
85
Hill, J.R. “Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers”; Croom Helm, Sydney, 1986; p.27
86
Hill pp 30-36
The only precedents are Rome at the height of its empire, and Great Britain through most of the 19th
87

Century.
88
Australian Maritime Doctrine, p154.
“United States Marine Corps Warfighting Concepts for the 21st Century”; Concepts Division,
89

Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia, 1996. Page 1-4.
90
JCFADT “From Phantom to Force: Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army. Parlt of Aust; 4
Sep 2000 p.181.
91
Metz, S. ‘Military Review: Command and General Staff College’
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/JulAug01/met.asp
92
Simply stated, an anti-access strategy seeks to prevent friendly forces from being able to operate
within range of the enemy’s crucial targets or make those operations so difficult or painful as to force
the abandonment of operations or prevent the engagement from being considered. See Myers G.
“Getting to the Fight: Aerospace Power and Anti-Access Strategies”; Air & Space Power Chronicles,
March 2001 http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/myers01.html
93
Freedman, L. “Terrorism and Strategy”
http://www.stanford.edu/~zlevine/ps138sums/ps138%20freedman%20summary.doc
94
Arquilla, J. and Ronfeldt D. eds ‘Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and
Militancy’ RAND, 2001 http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1382/
95
Defence 2000 White Paper, Chapter 4, pp 29-32
96
Australian Maritime Doctrine, Commonwealth of Australia, 2000. P.34.
97
Military vessels are recognised in international law as sovereign territory of the flag state, just like
embassies.
98
Snyder, G. ‘Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security’. Princeton University
Press, Princeton New Jersey. 1961, p.3
Williams, P. ‘Nuclear Deterrence’ in “Contemporary Strategy I: Theories and Concepts 2nd Edition.
99

Booth, K. et al eds. Holmes and Meier, New York, 1987 p.115

100
Snyder, G. ibid p.15
101
op cit p.15
102
Williams ibid. p. 115

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103
Lukes, S. “Power: A Radical View”. The Macmillan Press, London, 1975. p. 17
104
“Matthew Calbraith Perry”, The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, 2001.
105
TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Article V.
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html
106
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (Montego Bay, 10 December
1982) http://sedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts/law.of.the.sea.1982.html
107
Buzan, B. “People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-Cold
War Era” Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991. P.67.
108
Given effect under the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973
109
Maritime Legislation Amendment Act 1994
110
Till, G. ‘Maritime Strategy in the Nuclear Age’, The Macmillan Press, New York, 1984. P.6
111
Sir Julian Corbett biographical details http://www.defence.gov.au/army/LWD1/pdfs/bios/Corbett.pdf
112
Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 38.
113
Allard, T. “Patrol Duty eroding Navy’s war readiness”; Sydney Morning Herald, 5 Aug 02.
114
Ibid., p.38.
115
on 12 May 1975, the U.S. merchant ship MAYAGUEZ was seized by the Khmer Rouge in the
Gulf of Siam about 60 miles from the Cambodian coastline and 8 miles from the Poulo Wai. The ship,
owned by Sea-Land Corporation, was en route to Sattahip, Thailand from Hong-Kong, carrying a
non-arms cargo for military bases in Thailand. A battalion-sized Marine landing team was airlifted
from Okinawa to U Tapao AB in Thailand, some 300 miles from Kho Tang. The destroyer Holt was
directed to seize the Mayaguez, while Marines, airlifted and supported by the Air Force, were to
rescue the crew, at least some of whom were believed to be held on Kho Tang. The attack faced
sustained resistance which led to eighteen Marines and airmen being killed or missing in the assault
and withdrawal. Twenty-three others were killed in a helicopter crash en route from Hakhon Phanom
to U Tapao, but the objectives of the operation were achieved. The Mayaguez and its crew were
rescued, though at high cost.
http://www.afa.org/magazine/valor/0991valor_print.html
116
During the 1991 Gulf War, large elements of the US Marine Corps acted as decoys by threatening
an amphibious landing on the Kuwaiti coast. This move tied down significant numbers of Iraqi forces.
However, no actual amphibious landing took place. “The US Military and the Persian Gulf War”
http://www.tim-thompson.com/desert-storm.html. 2 Oct 02.
117
Australian Army, Future Land Warfare Branch, Concept for Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral
Environment (Draft dated 16 December 1999), cited in Evans, Michael, Developing Australia’s
Maritime Concept of Strategy: Lessons from the Ambon Disaster of 1942. Land Warfare Studies
Centre, Study Paper No. 303, 2000
118
The threat of regional nuclear war has not, however, been extinguished as can be seen in the
ongoing tensions between Pakistan and India. Some commentators such as Prof Martin Van Creveld
argue that, in fact, the proliferation of nuclear weapons lowers the likelihood of interstate conflict.
119
Buzan, B. ‘People, States, and Fear: the National Security Problem in International Relations’,
Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1983 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983.
Military security –‘the … interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states …’
Political security –‘… the organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideology
that gives them legitimacy.’

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Economic security –‘… access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable
levels of welfare and state power.’
Societal security –‘… the sustainability … of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious
and national identity and custom.’
Environmental security –‘… the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere ...’
All quotes from Buzan, ‘People, States and Fear’, Second Edition,
120
Buzan, B. op.cit. p131
121
http://www.unescap.org/mced2000/pacific/background/pollution.htm
122
Buzan op. Cit. P126.
123
Haward, M ‘Outstanding Issues with Regimes for Oceans Governance. Oceans Governance and
Maritime Strategy’ Eds.. Wilson D, and Sherwood, D. Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 2000. Pp.121-128
124
The Australian Antarctic Territory has lands borders with the territories claimed by other nations.
However, all Antarctic claims for sovereignty have been in abeyance since the Antarctic Treaty came
into force in 1961.
125
Buzan, op cit, p.118.
126
Buzan, op cit, p.122
127
http://www.cs.org/internships/solomons.htm
128
“Forward … From the Sea” p 5 http://www.dtic.mil/jv2020/b014.pdf
Maritime Prepositioning Force: http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/tak-3013.htm
129
UK SDR, introduction, p1 http://www.mod.uk/issues/sdr/intro.htm
130
UK Strategic Defence Review – Missions http://www.mod.uk/issues/sdr/missions.htm
131
Jay Johnson [Adm., USN], “Anytime, Anywhere: A Navy for the 21st Century,” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, November 1997, p. 49.
132
Brooke, M, ‘The RAN Plots Course for Fleet Development to 2030’ Asian Defence Journal, 1 &
2/, 2002, p. 16
133
A process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or "effect" on the enemy, through the
synergistic, multiplicative, and cumulative application of the full range of military and non-military
capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
134
Speech, Senator Robert Hill, Keynote address: Defence and Industry Conference 2002, National
Convention Centre, Canberra, 24 June 2002.
135
Horner, D ‘Making the Australian Defence Force’, The Australian Centenary History of Defence,
Volume IV, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2001, p. 163.
136
Australia’s Navy for the 21st Centaury: 2001-2030, Royal Australian Navy, July 2001, p. 12.
137
Ibid., p.12.
138
Ibid., p.12.
139
Cox, T (Commodore, RAN) ‘Surface Warfare and Surface Combatants – An Australian View’, in
Wilson, D (ed) Maritime War in the 21st Century: The Medium and Small Navy Perspective, Papers in
Australian Maritime Affairs No. 8, Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre, Canberra, 2001, p. 1-9.
140
Ibid., p. 3.

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142
Figure sourced from Australia’s Navy for the 21st Centaury: 2001-2030, Royal Australian Navy,
July 2001.
143
Smith, S, ‘What the White Paper means for the Army’. Army in Profile, p. 1.
http://www.defence.gov.au/army/pubs/smith.htm
144
The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) 1, The Australian Army,
2002, p. 52.
145
Evans, M loc.cit
146
Australian Army, Future Land Warfare Branch, Concept for Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral
Environment (Draft dated 16 December 1999), cited in Evans, Michael, Developing Australia’s
Maritime Concept of Strategy: Lessons from the Ambon Disaster of 1942. Land Warfare Studies
Centre, Study Paper No. 303, 2000, p. 75.
147
Ibid., p. 76.
148
Figure sourced from Australia’s Navy for the 21st Centaury: 2001-2030, Royal Australian Navy,
July 2001.
149
For information on current and planned ADF capability refer to, The Australian Defence Force:
Capability Fact Book, 2000; the Defence Capability Plan: 2001 - 2010 (Public Version), 2001; and
the Defence Capability Plan: Supplement - 2002.
150
Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, Department of Defence, 2000, p. 84.
151
Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power, Royal Australian Air Force, Aerospace Centre,
Canberra, 2002, p. 3.
152
Ibid.,.p.121
153
Ibid., .p. 140.
154
Ibid., .p 193.
155
Ibid., .p 193
156
For more information see Thompson, Mark, Setting a Course for Australia’s Naval Shipbuilding
and Repair Industry, Australian Strategic Policy Institute Policy Report, Canberra, 2002.
http://www.aspi.org.au/ASPI_shipbuilding/index.html
157
Speech, Robert Hill, Keynote address: Defence and Industry Conference 2002, National
Convention Centre, Canberra, 24 June 2002.
158
Evans, Michael, ‘Towards and Australian Way of Warfare’, Quadrant, July-August, 2002, 15.
159
Royal New Zealand Navy. ‘What your navy does and why: why does New Zealand have a navy’.
http//www.navy.mil.nz/rnzn/does.cfm
160
Patman, R G. ‘Globalisation and trans-Tasman relations: integration or divergence?’ Australian
Journal of International Affairs, Vol.55, No.3, 2001 p.389.
161
‘Reflections on New Zealand’s Defence Policy Framework and Australia’s Green Paper’ CSS
strategic briefing papers, Vol.4,part 1 November 2000.
162
Quigley, D ‘New Zealand and Australia: where are we going in defence?’ in Brown, Bruce (ed).
New Zealand and Australia: where are we going? Wellington, New Zealand Institute of International
Affairs, 2001, p.52.
163
Patman, R G. op.cit. p.397.
164
White, H ‘Australian defence policy and the possibility of war’ Australian Journal of International
Affairs, Vol.56, No.2 2002, p.257.

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165
The documents outlining the Government’s thinking include: the New Zealand Ministry of
Defence’s Maritime forces review: key findings (January 2002); the New Zealand Government Defence
Statement (8 May 2001); the New Zealand Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet’s Maritime
Patrol Review (February 2001) and its 2001 Strategic Assessment; Defence Policy Framework (June 2000);
New Zealand's Foreign and Security Policy Challenges (June 2000) and the New Zealand Parliament’s
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee report, Defence Beyond 2000 (1999).
166
For the purpose of the paper, the Strategic Assessment 2001 defined the region to comprise the
countries of Asia from China south to Indonesia, with Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands.
South Asia, Russia, North America and Pacific Latin America all impinge on this region and were
included in specific contexts. New Zealand. Dept. of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. External
Assessments Bureau. Strategic Assessment 2001. 19 April 2001. P.1, note 1
167
During the debate on the future role of the NZAF’s Orions Prime Minister Clark’s commented that
the Government saw New Zealand’s primary area of interest as its EEZ, the South Pacific and the
deep southern oceans. As David Dickens argues, this is inconsistent with the Defence Policy
Framework’s goals in relation to New Zealand’s commitments to the Five Power Defence
Arrangements with Britain, Australia, Malaysia and Singapore. It is also in contrast to the
‘considerations of military strategy and deep regional engagement which underpin Australia’s white
paper’. Dickens, David. ‘The ANZAC connection: does the Australia-New Zealand strategic
relationship have a future?’ in Brown, Bruce (ed) New Zealand and Australia: where are we going?
Wellington, The New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 2001, pp.39-40.
168
These roles are: to defend New Zealand and to protect its people, land, territorial waters, EEZ,
natural resources and critical infrastructure; to meet our alliance commitments to Australia by
maintaining a close defence partnership in pursuit of common security interests; to assist in the
maintenance of security in the South Pacific and to provide assistance to our Pacific neighbours; to
play an appropriate role in the maintenance of security in the Asia-Pacific region, including meeting
our obligations as a member of the FPDA (the Five Power Defence Arrangements between Singapore,
the United Kingdom, Australia, Malaysia and New Zealand); and to contribute to global security and
peacekeeping through participation in the full range of UN and other appropriate multilateral peace
support and humanitarian relief operations.
169
Ware, M. 'Making peace, not war'. Time Pacific Magazine 21 May 2002, No.20.
170
White, H Ibid. p.254.
171
Australia. Defence 2000: our future defence force. Canberra, Defence Publishing Service, October
2000, p.42.
172
New Zealand. The government’s defence policy framework: New Zealand’s security interests. June
2000..
173
Quigley, D loc.cit.
174
Quigley, D op.cit p.53.
175
New Zealand. Government Defence Statement: a modern sustainable defence force matched to
New Zealand's needs: Executive Summary. 8 May 2001.
176
Rolfe, J and Grimes, A ‘Australia-New Zealand defence cooperation: some considerations’
Agenda, vol.9 no.1, 2002, p.47.
177
New Zealand, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Maritime Patrol Review. Wellington,
[the Department], February 2001, p.10
178
Royal New Zealand Navy. ‘What your navy does and why: why does New Zealand have a navy’.
http//www.navy.mil.nz/rnzn/does.cfm
179
Australia. Defence 2000: our future defence force. Canberra, [the Department of Defence], 2000,
pp.83-84.

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180
New Zealand, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Maritime Patrol Review. Wellington,
[the Department], February 2001, p1. This Review followed a Cabinet decision in August 2000 not to
proceed with the avionics upgrade of the RNZAF’s long range maritime patrol aircraft.
181
New Zealand, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Maritime Patrol Review. Wellington,
[the Department], February 2001, p1.
182
‘New Zealand’s Clark government creates a strategic vacuum in the Pacific’ Defense and foreign
affairs strategic policy. 4-5, 2001 p.10-11.
183
Dickens, D ‘The ANZAC connection: does the Australia-New Zealand strategic relationship have a
future?’ in Brown, Bruce (ed) New Zealand and Australia: where are we going? Wellington, The
New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 2001, p.41.
184
Some reflections on maritime strategy and an oceans policy for New Zealand: presentation to the
New Zealand Institute of International Affairs Christchurch Branch, 14-14 June 2002.
(http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css/docs/reports/NZIIACh’chJun02.html)
185
Dickens, D op.cit.p.49.
186
Australia. Defence 2000: our future defence force. Canberra, Defence Publishing Service, October
2000, p.47.
187
Australia. Royal Australian Navy, Australian Maritime doctrine, p.45.
188
Woodman, S 'When it comes to flying, the Kiwis decide size does matter'. The Canberra Times 17 May
2001.
189
Ware, M loc.cit.

Prepared at client request - not for attribution